





DOCUMENTS ON  
GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY  
1918-1945

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<sup>1</sup> This list shows the composition of the Board of Editors at the time of the final editorial work on this volume (January 1957). Former editors, with their terms of service, were:

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DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY  
1918-1945

SERIES C (1933-1937)

THE THIRD REICH: FIRST PHASE

VOLUME I

January 30-October 14, 1933

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## PREFACE<sup>1</sup>

In June 1946 the British Foreign Office and the United States Department of State agreed to publish jointly documents from captured archives of the German Foreign Ministry and the Reich Chancellery. Although the captured archives go back to the year 1867, it was decided to limit the present publication to papers relating to the years after 1918, since the object of the publication was "to establish the record of German foreign policy preceding and during World War II." The editorial work was to be performed "on the basis of the highest scholarly objectivity." The editors were to have complete independence in the selection and editing of the documents. Publication was to begin and be concluded as soon as possible. Each Government was "free to publish separately any portion of the documents." In April 1947 the French Government, having requested the right to participate in the project, accepted the terms of this agreement.

It was originally intended to complete the entire publication for the period 1918-1945 in some twenty volumes. When, however, the preliminary work on the selections for the years from 1933 to 1945 was completed in 1954 it became apparent that an adequate selection of the documents for this period would require a publication on a scale approximately double the size which had been anticipated at the outset. After considering the length of time it would take to carry out a program on this enlarged scale the participating Governments have decided to limit the publication in English to the years 1933 to 1941—beginning January 30, 1933, when Hitler became Reich Chancellor and ending in December 1941 after the German declaration of war on the United States of America. The publication began with Series D, of which ten volumes (1937-1940) have already appeared. Three further volumes are planned for Series D, namely Volumes XI to XIII; Series C (1933-1937) will be completed in six volumes.

This, the first volume of Series C, begins January 30, 1933, with Hitler's assumption of power, and ends October 14, 1933, with the German withdrawal from the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference. The documents have been selected jointly by the

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<sup>1</sup> In each of the first four volumes published in series D there appears a "General Introduction" which describes some of the principles which have guided the editors in their work.

United States, British, and French editors, but the United States editors have had editorial responsibility for this volume. The editors have exercised complete freedom in both the selection and editing of the documents in the volume. Readers should bear in mind that these documents are presented as a source book for the study of history, and not as a finished interpretation of history. It has been the aim throughout to keep any interpretative comment out of the footnotes.

The documents are printed in chronological order. A topical arrangement of the analytical list at the beginning of the volume is designed to help those who wish to read on particular subjects. Each document printed in this publication bears a microfilm serial and frame number in the upper left-hand corner. The microfilm copy of the original German text can be located by reference to Appendix II, "List of German Files Used." As fast as is technically possible these microfilms are being made available to the public through the National Archives in Washington and the Public Record Office in London. The files of the German Foreign Ministry of the Weimar period, originally intended for coverage by Series A and B of this publication, are also being systematically microfilmed; a substantial number of these microfilms have already been deposited in the National Archives and Public Record Office.

The United States editors wish to express their appreciation to various officials of the Department of State for cooperation and assistance, and particularly to G. Bernard Noble, Chief of the Historical Division, as well as to members of the American Advisory Committee: Sidney B. Fay, Guy Stanton Ford, Carlton J. H. Hayes, Hajo Holborn, William L. Langer, Conyers Read, and Raymond J. Sontag. The translations were drafted by the Department of State's Division of Language Services, but the editors have final responsibility for the translations as well as full responsibility for the footnotes and other editorial matter. Valuable aid was given by Beverly A. Smith. The technical preparation of edited copy for the printer was done in the Division of Publishing Services of the Department of State under the direction of Bruce Buttles; the editors acknowledge gratefully his assistance and that of Elizabeth A. Vary, Collie E. Halbert, and other members of the staff of that Division.

# ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS <sup>1</sup>

## AUSTRIA

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933			
Feb. 18	<i>Minister Rieth to State Secretary Bülow</i> Supports a request by Professor Foppa for further financial support by the German Foreign Ministry of the Greater German party in Austria.	25	52
Mar. 13	<i>Circular of the Foreign Ministry</i> A comprehensive account of the Hirtenberg affair.	81	156
Mar. 15	<i>Memorandum by the Director of Department II</i> Records a conversation with the Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires, Wettstein, who on instructions of Minister President Gömbös, handed over a memorandum for Hitler setting forth reasons why he should support the Dollfuss Government.	89	169
Mar. 22	<i>Ministerialdirektor Köpke to Minister Rieth</i> Describes discussions over problem of premature raising of the Anschluss question and outlines views on the subject.	107	193
Mar. 23	<i>Memorandum by the Director of Department II</i> Records an inquiry from the Italian Ambassador regarding the speech of Hans Frank and his question whether Germany might not find it more expedient to support the Dollfuss Government. The Italian Ambassador describes a recent conversation with Hitler regarding the Dollfuss Cabinet.	112	206
Apr. 2	<i>Dr. Joseph Wirth to State Secretary Bülow</i> Submits a memorandum on the situation in Austria and offers to supply information on the basis of his familiarity with past German policies in Eastern and Southeastern Europe.	130	236
Apr. 20	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> A comprehensive report on the visit of Dollfuss to Rome; appraisal of Italian policy toward Austria and of the implications for German-Italian relations.	173	318
Apr. 25	<i>Memorandum by the Director in Charge of Economic Negotiations</i> A briefing paper recommending against conclusion of a preferential treaty with Austria.	187	346
Apr. 27	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records telling the Italian Ambassador that German support for Dollfuss could not be expected, but that he could state, on the basis of a recent talk with Hitler, that Anschluss was not an acute question for Germany.	191	351

<sup>1</sup> The documents in this volume have been arranged chronologically. For the convenience of readers who wish to trace topics through the volume, this analytical list of documents has been arranged alphabetically by countries or regions, with the addition of five subject headings: "Disarmament," "Financial Questions," "Four Power Pact," "General Questions," and "World Economic Conference."



## AUSTRIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 May 10	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Hitler and the Austrian Minister engage in a heated argument over German press attacks on Dollfuss on one hand, and anti-German agitation in Austria on the other hand; Neurath deplores the public spectacle of an Austro-German feud and urges that both Governments should restrain their press.	219	397
May 15	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records request by Austrian Minister that German Government have Bavarian Minister of Justice Frank recalled from Austria as soon as possible; otherwise the Austrian Government will have to expel him.	234	424
May 19	<i>Memorandum by the Director of Department II</i> It is Köpke's personal opinion that the Austrian complaint about Frank's speech in Graz is justified, notwithstanding the explanations given to the Austrian Minister; it should be considered in general, whether German officials ought not to stay out of the Austrian election campaigns.	249	460
May 20	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Department II</i> Observations on the alternatives open to Germany in face of the deterioration of relations with Austria.	256	474
May 27	<i>Note Verbale From the Austrian Government</i> The Austrian Government refuses to consent to the assignment of Habicht and Cohrs to the German Legation in Vienna.	267	496
May 29	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Dr. Joseph Wirth has made the suggestion that former Chancellor Brüning should talk to Dollfuss in order to explore the possibilities of Austro-German reconciliation, particularly since the Dollfuss Government was not likely to capitulate; Neurath has decided that a mediation by Wirth is out of the question.	270	498
June 9	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry</i> Hitler told Neurath that, if Habicht and Cohrs were expelled from Austria, the Austrian Press Attaché Wasserbäck would be expelled from Germany.	298	547
June 13	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Department II</i> Records a telephone conversation with the Minister in Austria, who reported the arrest by Austrian authorities of Habicht and Cohrs.	305	556
June 13	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Department II</i> Records instructions from Hitler to take countermeasures as soon as the arrest of Habicht had been established.	306	556
June 13	<i>The State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry to the State Secretary in the Reich Chancellery</i> Asks approval of Hitler for certain countermeasures proposed against Austrian action regarding Habicht and Cohrs.	307	557
June 14	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry</i> States what Dollfuss has been told, in London, about the counteraction taken against Press Attaché Wasserbäck in Berlin.	310	561

## AUSTRIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 June 15	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry</i> States that the arrest of the Austrian Press Attaché in Berlin has aggravated existing bad feelings against Germany; British politicians talk about a possible intervention by the Powers on grounds of violation of diplomatic immunity.	313	567
July 1	<i>Minister Rieth to State Secretary Bülow</i> Reports a discussion with Dollfuss of current possibilities for improving German-Austrian relations.	346	619
July 22	<i>An Official of Department II to the Bavarian State Chancellery</i> States that the Foreign Ministry agrees not to exercise a preliminary censorship over Habicht's broadcasts, provided they do not contain insults against Austrian statesmen; it is requested that appropriate instructions to the Bavarian radio be issued.	375	688
July 31	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a conversation with the Italian Ambassador who gave information about a British note to the Italian and French Governments which suggested a joint step by the three Powers in the Austro-German conflict. The Ambassador stated that Mussolini wanted to avoid such a step and suggested how it might be done.	383	704
Aug. 1	<i>State Secretary Bülow to Foreign Minister Neurath</i> Reports on a conversation with Habicht; discusses alternatives of Austrian policy open to Germany; suggests that the Foreign Minister talk about the matter with Hitler.	385	708
[Aug. 4]	<i>Foreign Minister Neurath to State Secretary Bülow</i> Summarizes Hitler's decisions regarding Austrian policy and suggests that the Italian Ambassador be informed	390	718
Aug. 5	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records informing the Italian Ambassador of Hitler's rejection of any mixing of third states in German-Austrian discussions, and of Hitler's other decisions relating to policy toward Austria.	391	719
Aug. 7	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a démarche by the French Ambassador criticizing German radio and leaflet propaganda against Austria as violation of article 80 of the Versailles Treaty and hinting at the possibility of applying article 11 of the League Covenant.	392	720
Aug. 7	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a conversation with the British Chargé d'Affaires who said that his Government was gratified over the statements on Austria which Bülow had made to Cerruti a few days earlier; the Chargé d'Affaires, however was vague whether his earlier instructions were still in force that he should make a démarche parallel to that of the French Ambassador.	393	723

## AUSTRIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933			
Aug. 9	<i>Foreign Minister Neurath to Reich Chancellor Hitler</i> Forwards texts of documents Nos. 392 and 393; alerts Hitler to the possibility of a new British action at the League of Nations or a new mediation effort by Mussolini.	398	732
Aug. 12	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Department II</i> Records a démarche of the Italian Ambassador, acting on instructions from Mussolini, regarding Habicht's most recent speech on the radio.	401	737
Aug. 14	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records a message given by telephone to the Italian Ambassador for Mussolini following a conversation with Hitler on the Italian démarche regarding the Habicht speech.	402	740
Aug. 17	<i>Minister Rieth to State Secretary Bülow</i> Draws attention to reports of the training and arming of an Austrian SA formation in Bavaria for the purpose of a possible invasion of Austria; states that these reports seem to be corroborated by documents seized from Austrian National Socialists and subsequently published in the Austrian press.	407	763
Aug. 21	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Summarizes information supplied by the Deputy Director of the Political Department of the Italian Foreign Ministry concerning the recent meeting in Riccione between Mussolini and Dollfuss.	408	766
Aug. 25	<i>State Secretary Bülow to Foreign Minister Neurath</i> Expresses concern over the "Austrian Legion" at Lechfeld near Augsburg and suggests that Neurath propose to Hitler that the camp be broken up and moved to northern Germany.	411	770
Sept. 5	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Department II</i> Records a conversation of Habicht with the State Secretary regarding the reports of an Austro-Italian military convention; the State Secretary opposed Habicht's suggestion of a German step in Rome in the matter.	416	780
Sept. 12	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records decision of Hitler to have the Austrians in the Lechfeld camp removed from the proximity of the Austrian border and quartered elsewhere.	427	798
Sept. 21	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports further intelligence regarding Mussolini's Italian policy; the attitude of the Vatican.	443	828
Sept. 26	<i>Memoranda of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> The record of telephone conversations relating to a possible meeting of Neurath and Dollfuss.	450	840
Sept. 28	<i>Memorandum by Baron Hahn</i> Records a conversation with Dollfuss, who commented on the attitude of the German press toward his policies and on the possibility of a meeting with Neurath and Goebbels.	465	869

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

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## AUSTRIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 Oct. 4	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Department II</i> Records a conversation with the Austrian Minister who expressed concern about intensified German propaganda against Austria and gave his own views about the probable development of Austria's domestic politics.	481	890
Oct. 13	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Department II</i> Records a conversation of a representative of Habicht with an emissary of Austrian Vice Chancellor Fey; also a conversation of the Austrian Ambassador in Rome, Rintelen, with the editor of the <i>Münchener Zeitung</i> ; both conversations on the possibilities of an understanding between the Austrian Government and the National Socialists.  (See also under "Four Power Pact" and "General Questions.")	497	919

## BELGIUM

1933 Feb. 25	<i>The Minister in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry</i> Belgian foreign policy continues to be firmly based on the Locarno Treaty. Conversations both with King Albert and the Socialist leader, Vandervelde, confirm this. Concern regarding German intentions continues to prevail.	39	83
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## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

1933 Feb. 22	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records statements by the Czechoslovak Minister regarding the recent convention signed by the Little Entente and Neurath's reply.	31	67
Mar. 22	<i>The Minister in Czechoslovakia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on a forthcoming visit of Sudeten German deputies to Germany for conversations with German officials and recommends the line which German officials might usefully take in talking to them.	110	203
June 9	<i>The Minister in Czechoslovakia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Assesses the question of whether Czechoslovakia might, in an extreme case, comply to Hungarian revisionist desires.	299	548
June 19	<i>The Minister in Czechoslovakia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Describes the deterioration in the situation of the Sudeten Germans as reflected in political trials, measures against the German University in Prague and new press and emergency laws; the recent trial of National Socialists at Pilsen indicates that any connection with Germany and the National Socialist movement may result in dangerous judicial proceedings.	326	583

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 June 23	<i>The Minister in Czechoslovakia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Apropos of the sentencing of two National Socialists holding German citizenship, points out that on the basis of the legal argument used by Czechoslovakia, any member of the German NSDAP who entered that country was running the risk of imprisonment.	334	594
July 15	<i>Minute by an Official of Department II</i> The Czechoslovak Minister stated that a recent German step in Prague in the matter of sentences imposed on German National Socialists in Czechoslovakia had made a strong impression and that Beneš and Krofta were prepared to give consideration to Germany's requests.	364	654
July 15	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Czechoslovakia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister which indicated an improvement in the prospects for better German-Czechoslovak relations.	366	655
Sept. 13	<i>The Minister in Czechoslovakia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a long conversation with Krofta apropos of recent Czechoslovak actions affecting Sudeten German National Socialists.	429	799
Oct. 5	<i>The Minister in Czechoslovakia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Sudeten German National Socialist and National parties have been banned and that Konrad Henlein, organizer of the Gymnastic Association is trying to set up a new organization of national Sudeten Germans.	483	892
Oct. 10	<i>The Minister in Czechoslovakia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the situation of the Sudeten Germans following the dissolution of the National Socialist and the German National parties.	488	904

## DISARMAMENT

1933	<i>Editors' Note</i> Highlights of the earlier phase of the Disarmament Conference.		18
Feb. 6	<i>State Secretary Bülow to Ambassador Prittwitz</i> Discusses the new German Government, the forthcoming election and Germany's rearmament plans, particularly with regard to the relationship between the Reichswehr and a new militia.	11	22
Feb. 8	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records the points agreed upon by Neurath and Blomberg regarding the line to be taken by Ambassador Nadolny at Geneva on the question of the extension of the arms truce.	17	37
Feb. 15	<i>Foreign Minister Neurath to Ambassador Nadolny</i> Stresses importance of always bearing in mind that, if the Disarmament Conference fails, it must appear to be due to French refusal to disarm rather than to German interest in rearmament.	20	42

## DISARMAMENT—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 Feb. 18	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Records a telephone message from Ambassador Nadolny at Geneva reporting that the French proposals regarding standardization of armies have brought the Disarmament Conference to a turning point; requests authorization to come with General Schönheinz to Berlin for consultations.	23	48
Feb. 19	<i>Memorandum by the Reichswehr Minister</i> Outlines the preliminary questions which need to be clarified before Germany can take a position on the principle of standardization of army systems.	26	56
Feb. 24	<i>The Head of the German Delegation at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to the question of a No-Force Declaration and recommends that the delegation be authorized to negotiate on a solution that would avoid a confirmation of our exceptional position but would leave the existing treaty situation unaffected.	36	78
Feb. 24	<i>The Foreign Minister to the German Delegation at Geneva</i> Instructions on the German position regarding the No-Force Declaration.	37	80
Feb. 25	<i>An Official of the German Delegation at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry</i> Requests instructions whether the formula for the No-Force Declaration proposed by Eden may be accepted.	38	82
Mar. 3	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Records a telephone conversation with Ambassador Hoesch reporting a statement by Simon that he and MacDonald would go to Geneva to help the Disarmament Conference to reach early decisions.	46	99
Mar. 6	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> Instructions to inform Simon that it was unlikely that a German Cabinet member could at present go to Geneva as the British had suggested; meanwhile Germany would like to know Britain's attitude on various questions, particularly on the proposal of an interim solution.	49	103
Mar. 7	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conversation with Sir John Simon regarding decision of Neurath not to go to Geneva.	56	121
Mar. 10	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Grandi. Grandi recounted a discussion with Simon on the interpretation to be given to the Anglo-French talks in Paris.	67	131
Mar. 10	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Mussolini regarding the Disarmament Conference, the Polish situation, and Italian relations with the Little Entente.	68	132

## DISARMAMENT—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 Mar. 11	<i>The Ambassador in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Cordell Hull. Prittwitz explained to Hull the German position on disarmament and was informed confidentially that Norman Davis was coming soon to Washington to discuss the disarmament question with the State Department.	72	139
Mar. 12	<i>The Head of the German Delegation at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on talks with MacDonald, Simon, and Aloisi regarding the problem of reconciling the German and French positions at the Disarmament Conference.	76	149
Mar. 13	<i>The Head of the German Delegation at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Aloisi regarding the latter's proposal, already submitted to MacDonald, that the crucial questions of the Disarmament Conference be submitted directly to the Governments of Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain. Also reports a conversation with the Americans, Gibson and Wilson, regarding the German position.	78	152
Mar. 13	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records the position of Neurath regarding Aloisi's proposals reported in document No. 78.	79	154
Mar. 15	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports explanations by Mussolini regarding his proposal for a four power pact, and the forthcoming talks with MacDonald and Simon.	87	166
Mar. 16	<i>The Head of the German Delegation at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports statements by Simon on the new British draft disarmament convention and on the more critical attitude in Britain and the United States toward Germany as the result of recent developments.	90	171
Mar. 17	<i>The Head of the German Delegation at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry</i> Requests confirmation of a directive for the Disarmament Conference which was given to Freiherr von Rheinbaben by Hitler on March 15.	94	175
Mar. 18	<i>The Head of the German Delegation at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits comments of the military expert of the German delegation regarding Rheinbaben's memorandum of March 15.	97	179
Mar. 20	<i>The Head of the German Delegation at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry</i> A statement of the proposed German position on the British draft convention of March 16.	103	186
Mar. 22	<i>The Foreign Minister to the German Delegation at Geneva</i> Rheinbaben's discussions in Berlin were not for the purpose of changing the instructions of the delegation; his memorandum is to be considered as nonexistent.	106	192

## DISARMAMENT—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 Apr. 29	<i>The Head of the German Delegation at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry</i> Request authorization to exert pressure on France by demanding that she establish a demilitarized zone on her territory along the Franco-German border corresponding to the demilitarized Rhineland zone.	200	365
May 2	<i>The Foreign Minister to the German Delegation at Geneva</i> Instructions on how to handle the question of the demilitarized zone.	202	368
May 5	<i>The Head of the German Delegation at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry</i> Certain delegations want to take up the section on effectives in the British draft convention to confront Germany with the decision on standardization of armies involving conversion of the Reichswehr to a short-time service army in spite of German opposition; it should be pointed out to Washington, London, and Rome that confronting Germany with a dictate in this question would create a serious situation.	209	378
May 12	<i>Minutes of the Conference of Ministers on May 12, 1933, 4:50 p. m.</i> Records the discussion in the Reich Cabinet of the situation at the Disarmament Conference; it was decided to call the Reichstag into session for May 17 for a declaration of the Government.	226	409
May 13	<i>The Reichswehr Minister to the Foreign Ministry</i> States his position regarding what should be said at Geneva regarding the organization of the future army and about the strength and training of paramilitary formations.	231	416
May 15	<i>Memorandum by the Reichswehr Minister</i> Consists of the text of Disarmament notes for the Government statement on May 17, 1933.	238	435
May 15	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> An account of the crisis at the Disarmament Conference, April 28–May 13.	239	437
May 16	<i>Memorandum by the Head of the German Delegation at Geneva</i> Sets forth the line which Germany should now follow if she is to avoid taking the blame for failure of the Disarmament Conference.	241	444
May 16	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Emphasizes importance attached by the British to Hitler's speech of May 17; appraises British attitude toward Germany and toward the four power pact; reports statements by Norman Davis on possibilities of a bold solution of the disarmament question.	242	445
May 16	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Reich Chancellor</i> Comments on the reply to be given to President Roosevelt's telegram to the Reich President.	243	447
[May 17]	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Suggestions for a reply to Roosevelt to be incorporated in the Chancellor's Reichstag speech of May 17.	246	451



## DISARMAMENT—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933	<i>Editors' Note</i> Hitler's address to the Reichstag on May 17.		451
May 19	<i>Circular of the State Secretary</i> The text of an internal instruction to the delegation at Geneva concerning the attitude to be taken toward the British plan in consequence of Hitler's speech of May 17, sent to Missions for their confidential information.	251	462
May 20	<i>The Head of the German Delegation at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry</i> Recommends acceptance of a suggestion by Eden to the effect that the main problems of the Disarmament Conference be approached through private discussions of the Foreign Ministers; after the Chancellor's speech and Nadolny's statements in the General Commission the situation is ripe for decisions in a small group.	255	472
May 21	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> A conversation with Paul-Boncour indicates that the present French Government will not dare to commit itself at Geneva to measures of disarmament; fearful of public opinion and disturbed by recent events in Germany it is demanding security through keeping the French Army at its present strength.	257	476
June 3	<i>The Head of the German Delegation at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry</i> The text of a memorandum by Nadolny on the principal questions of the Disarmament Conference which had been requested by the British for use in the forthcoming discussions at Paris between British, American, and French representatives.	283	516
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Acceptance by the General Commission of the British draft convention as the basis of the future convention.		546
June 9	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Summarizes information regarding Daladier's conversations with the British and Americans.	297	546
June 15	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry</i> In the course of several brief talks Daladier seemed disinclined to enter into discussions on disarmament or the interpretation of the Four Power Pact.	314	568
June 19	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on conversations with Henderson on the status of the disarmament question; Henderson was told that Germany wanted either an early conclusion of a convention or to have the fact established that nothing was to be achieved at the Conference.	322	578
July 13	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records statements by the French Ambassador regarding reports of German rearmament; Neurath's reply.	360	649
July 16	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conversations with Mussolini, Henderson, and Suvich regarding new French proposals for a disarmament convention.	367	657

## DISARMAMENT—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933			
July 19	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Department II</i> A record of the disarmament discussions during Henderson's visit to Berlin, together with a memorandum setting forth the German point of view.	370	662
July 22	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> In a conversation with Henderson Hitler rejected the French proposal for dividing the Convention into two sections of 4 years each, with the first section constituting a test of the functioning of supervision; furthermore, Hitler felt that Henderson's suggestion of a meeting between Daladier and himself was not feasible at present.	374	686
Aug. 8	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Mussolini told Hassell that after the failure of the Disarmament Conference the Four Power Pact was the logical forum for reaching an agreement, although not in the present atmosphere; first of all, he would use plain language with the French.	396	730
Sept. 4	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy</i> Instructions to state that Germany welcomes Italian efforts to bring about German-French agreement on disarmament and requests information on any developments in that respect.	413	776
Sept. 16	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports statements by Suvich regarding Italian discussions on disarmament with the French. Suvich read a memorandum containing Italian proposals.	431	806
Sept. 18	<i>State Secretary Bülow to Foreign Minister Neurath</i> Informs of three questions from Allen Dulles regarding Germany's position on disarmament conveyed by an intermediary and Bülow's reply.	433	808
Sept. 18	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in France</i> The reply to the questions by Allen Dulles summarized in document No. 433.	434	810
Sept. 19	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Records a conversation with Litvinov who expressed himself skeptically about the chances of success of the coming session of the Disarmament Conference.	437	814
Sept. 21	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records agreement with Blomberg that no German position with regard to Mussolini's disarmament plan should be communicated to Rome for the time being.	441	827
Sept. 21	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Mussolini was disturbed about the disarmament question in view of the Anglo-French conversations and wished to propose a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers at Stresa; Germany's views on this proposal were requested.	442	827
Sept. 23	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry</i> Neurath outlines the position which he intends to take in a conversation with Suvich regarding the Italian proposals.	445	834

## DISARMAMENT—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 Sept. 23	<i>State Secretary Bülow to Foreign Minister Neurath</i> Hitler has not yet taken a position on Mussolini's proposal of a Foreign Ministers' meeting at Stresa; Bülow feels that Germany ought to agree to the proposal, in view of the possibility that Britain and France might reject it.	446	835
Sept. 24	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry</i> Records an exchange of views with Simon and Eden regarding the division of the Disarmament Convention into two periods of 4 years each.	447	836
Sept. 26	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records a conversation with Aloisi and Suvich who urged German concessions on the disarmament question and stressed the dangers attendant upon failure to reach agreement.	454	844
Sept. 28	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records a discussion with Paul-Boncour of the disarmament question from which Neurath drew the conclusion that further discussions with Paul-Boncour would for the time being be useless.	466	871
Sept. 29	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Briefly records substance of a conversation with Aloisi and Suvich on September 28, with Simon and Eden on September 29.	469	874
Sept. 29	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Department II</i> Records a conversation with Colonel Haselmayr of the Wehrpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP who expressed his views on Reichswehr policy and on the prospects of the Disarmament Conference.	471	876
Oct. 2	<i>Minute by the Minister in Switzerland</i> Records a conversation with Massigli on September 29. Massigli stressed the concessions that France was prepared to make in the disarmament question.	472	877
Sept. 30	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a detailed discussion with Mussolini on the disarmament question. Mussolini reviewed the problem against the background of the Italian 10 points set forth in document No. 431 and suggested the possibility of a public statement by Hitler to reassure France.	474	879
Sept. 30	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records a conversation with Hitler who approved of the course adopted by Neurath at Geneva and stated that conclusion of a disarmament convention would be desirable even if it did not fulfill all German wishes.	475	882
Oct. 4	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports information from official circles that Simon has drawn up a revised version of the British draft convention, on the basis of the conferences at Geneva.	478	885

## DISARMAMENT—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933			
Oct. 4	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a conference with Hitler and Blomberg. It was decided that Germany must not risk negotiating on a new draft that was unacceptable; Hitler said Germany must declare that it would leave the Disarmament Conference and the League in the event that the others rejected disarmament and denied Germany equality of rights, or if an unacceptable draft was brought up for debate.	479	887
Oct. 4	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Switzerland</i> Instructions to Weizsäcker to go to Geneva and to explain to Simon and the Italians the German demands with respect to equipping the future army, without giving the impression that these are counter proposals in the nature of an ultimatum.	480	888
Oct. 6	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> The directives for the German disarmament delegation.	484	892
Oct. 10	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports an exchange of views with Simon regarding the German position on the disarmament question.	486	898
Oct. 11	<i>The Foreign Minister to the German Delegation at Geneva</i> Instructions to bear in mind that Germany intends to withdraw from the Disarmament Conference if the British position is irreconcilable, as it appears to be, with German equality.	489	906
Oct. 12	<i>The Head of the German Delegation at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports exchange of views on their respective positions with Henderson, Beneš, Simon, and Norman Davis.	493	912
Oct. 12	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records a visit of the Italian Ambassador with Hitler. New disarmament proposals from Mussolini.	494	914
Oct. 12	<i>The Head of the German Delegation at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry</i> Suggests that his departure from Geneva, which Hitler had ordered, might be postponed since it would prejudice American-Italian attempts at mediation.	495	915
Oct. 13	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Instructions to inform Mussolini that Germany will announce her withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference on October 14.	498	921
Oct. 13, 14	<i>Minutes of the Conferences of Ministers on October 13, 1933, 6:20 p. m. and on October 14, 1933, 12:00 Noon</i> Hitler presents his views on the policy required by developments at Geneva and proposes German withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League as well as a call for new elections and a plebiscite on the "peace policy of the German Government"; the Cabinet expresses agreement.	499	922

## DISARMAMENT—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 Oct. 14	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> In informing Mussolini, Hassell will emphasize that he was the only one to receive advance information on Germany's decision; it is suggested that Italian attempts at mediation be recognized in Hitler's Reichstag speech.	500	926
Oct. 14	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports informing Mussolini of the German decision. Mussolini strongly recommended that Hitler in his Reichstag speech should indicate the possibility of negotiations on the basis of the Four Power Pact; Hassell suggests that such a reference is absolutely necessary for further cooperation with Italy.  (See also under "Four Power Pact," "World Economic Conference," "France," and "General Questions.")	502	928

## FAR EAST

1933 Feb. 20	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Department IV</i> The Japanese Military Attaché expressed the hope that Germany would abstain from voting in the forthcoming vote in the League of Nations Assembly on the adoption of the draft report of the Committee of Nineteen on the Sino-Japanese dispute. German abstention would greatly improve feeling for Germany in Japan.	28	60
Mar. 6	<i>Memorandum by the Director of Department IV</i> Herr Heye, who had been recommended by Göring, presented a plan for establishing a bank in Manchuria with German state funds. Meyer inquired about Heye's past activities in Manchuria. Meyer offered Heye little encouragement.	50	104
Apr. 11	<i>Senior Counselor Michelsen to Minister Trautmann</i> General von Seeckt has informed the Foreign Minister that he is about to make a trip to China. It has been learned from the Chinese Legation that Seeckt will be offered a post as military adviser by the Chinese Government.	156	288
July 10	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of Department IV</i> Records a conversation with representatives of Rhein-Metall regarding the possibility of a Reich guarantee for an arms transaction with China.	357	643
Aug. 24	<i>Minister Trautmann to State Secretary Bülow</i> A personal letter, commenting on Chinese political developments and personalities, and on Chinese relations with Japan.	410	768
Aug. 26	<i>The Minister in China to the Foreign Ministry</i> Gives a comprehensive account of General von Seeckt's visit to China, and summarizes a memorandum on the reorganization of China's military forces which von Seeckt has submitted to Chiang Kai-shek.	412	773

## FAR EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 Sept. 18	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The Chinese Minister informed the State Secretary about communications between Chinese Finance Minister Soong and Herr Krupp von Bohlen relating to the delivery of an arsenal by the Krupp firm to the Chinese Government.	435	811
Sept. 18	<i>The Minister in China to the Foreign Ministry</i> Incorporates a report from Consul General Wagner describing activities of a Herr Klein regarding the establishment of an armaments industry in Canton. Klein had indicated that he would seek a Reich guarantee against loss. Wagner expressed concern about these activities and Trautmann also recommended caution.	436	812
Sept. 27	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a conversation with Krupp von Bohlen who wanted to know whether there were objections to the Chinese proposals such as those for the delivery of an arsenal to the Chinese Government. Bülow replied that Japanese annoyance could be disregarded, but things that might provoke Japan directly were to be avoided. Bülow advised caution in securing the necessary guarantees from China.	463	867

## FINANCIAL QUESTIONS

1933 Feb. 21	<i>Circular of the Foreign Ministry</i> Describes the negotiations leading to the renewal of the Standstill Agreement on Germany's foreign debt.	30	65
Mar. 29	<i>The State Secretary in the Reich Chancellery to the President of the Reichsbank</i> Requests the President of the Reichsbank to participate in all meetings of the Reich Government, especially those where financial and economic questions are considered.	124	230
May 5	<i>Circular of the Foreign Ministry</i> Gives details of the plan for a moratorium on transfers abroad to apply to debts dating from before July 15, 1931. The German debtor is to pay amounts due into a <i>Konversionskasse</i> which will hold the amounts on deposit for the foreign creditor. Certain exceptions would be made in cases where foreign creditors might be able to seize the assets abroad of the German debtors.	211	381
May 8	<i>The President of the Reichsbank to the Foreign Ministry</i> In a conference in Washington on financial and economic questions with Hull presiding, Schacht made known Germany's impending action on the transfer moratorium. The reaction was calm. He likewise informed President Roosevelt with the same result. Requests Berlin to proceed with appropriate action.	215	394
May 9	<i>The President of the Reichsbank to the Foreign Ministry</i> Asks that action regarding the transfer moratorium as requested in document No. 215 be stopped.	217	396

## FINANCIAL QUESTIONS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 May 11	<i>The President of the Reichsbank to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports further discussions with United States officials on the means of improving Germany's foreign trade position and of dealing with the exchange problem generally.	222	403
May 16	<i>Circular of the Foreign Ministry</i> Explains the reasons for the temporary postponement of the transfer moratorium.	244	448
June 6	<i>The President of the Reichsbank to the State Secretary in the Reich Chancellery</i> Forwards the formal letter from the Directorate of the Reichsbank to the Reich Chancellor describing Germany's foreign exchange position and recommending a law for a moratorium on transfer of payments abroad.	288	528
June 7	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records a protest by the French Ambassador against the plan of a German transfer moratorium as violating the Lausanne Agreements and the clearing agreement between France and Germany. Neurath described the step as inevitable in the circumstances.	289	531
June 7	<i>Circular of the Foreign Ministry</i> States that the Cabinet will probably approve the law on the transfer moratorium on the following day; instructions for guidance of conversations.	293	536
June 7	<i>The Directorate of the Reichsbank to the Foreign Minister</i> Forwards a letter from John Foster Dulles, representative of the American bondholders, to Dr. Schacht; attached is a memorandum summarizing the dollar bond situation generally.	294	538
June 8	<i>Extract From the Minutes of the Cabinet Session of June 8, 1933</i> Records the discussion regarding the law "relating to payment obligations abroad." At the conclusion the Chancellor stated that the bill was passed.	296	543
June 15	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The American Chargé d'Affaires presented an aide mémoire regarding alleged statements by Schacht indicating an intention to discriminate among creditor countries according to the German balance of payments with respect to the creditor. Bülow replied that Schacht's remarks should not be taken as evidence of an intention to discriminate.	316	570
July 6	<i>Circular of the Foreign Ministry</i> The deferment of the application of the transfer moratorium until July 1 has not resulted in a solution of the problem, although conferences have been held with representatives of the foreign creditors to mitigate so far as possible its effects on them. The Reichsbank has adhered to the principle of non-discrimination, despite the urging of the Swiss and Dutch and sympathy for their point of view.  (See also under "General Questions," and "United States.")	353	637

## FOUR POWER PACT

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 Mar. 14	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records a conversation with the Italian Ambassador who conveys the views of Mussolini on the current political situation and presents the draft of a four power pact.	83	160
Mar. 15	<i>Aide-Mémoire for the Italian Ambassador</i> The text of the German reply, approved by Hitler, to the Italian proposal for a four power pact.	84	163
Mar. 15	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy</i> Gives a tentative evaluation of the individual parts of the Italian pact proposal.	88	168
Mar. 17	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a discussion with the Italian Ambassador about the German comments on the Italian pact proposal; the Ambassador requested that the Germans formulate the desired amendments in such a manner that they could be incorporated in the Italian text.	95	177
Mar. 18	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a discussion with Suvich from which Hassell drew certain conclusions regarding the objectives which Italy was seeking by means of a four power pact.	98	181
Mar. 19	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Kánya, who had talked to Mussolini, confirmed Hassell's impression that the fear of an international conflict was stronger with Suvich than with Mussolini; Suvich was also nervous about Anschluss, while Mussolini felt that the main thing in Austria was the cooperation of Christian Socials, Heimwehr, and National Socialists against Marxism.	100	183
Mar. 19	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Mussolini arranged with Hassell that the latter should make the statement that he had received the Italian pact proposal only the previous day and that his Government felt it could accept it in its fundamental points.	101	184
Mar. 20	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports impressions received from talks with MacDonald, Simon, Mussolini, Aloisi, and Jouvenel regarding their attitude toward the pact proposals.	102	185
Mar. 22	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards the text of a British draft amending the original Italian draft pact.	105	191
Mar. 22	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records statements to the British Ambassador regarding the British revisions to the draft four power pact and the British plan for a disarmament convention.	108	196
Mar. 22	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> A comprehensive report on the visit of MacDonald and Simon to Rome. Discusses the Italian draft pact and its background. Summarizes the attitude of the Italian press.	109	196



## FOUR POWER PACT—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 Mar. 23	<i>Memorandum by the Director of Department II</i> Records a conversation with Italian Ambassador Cerruti regarding the English version of the draft four power pact.	111	204
Mar. 23	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports statements by Simon on the British position regarding the four power pact.	113	208
Mar. 24	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Detailed statement of German objections to the draft pact as amended by the British; instructs the Ambassador to take the matter up with the Italian Government, preferably with Mussolini in person.	115	211
Mar. 25	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the views of Foreign Minister Paul-Boncour on the four power pact.	117	218
Mar. 27	<i>The Ambassador in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports statements of the Italian Ambassador regarding State Department reaction to information about the four power pact and asks for instructions.	119	222
Mar. 27	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports giving Suvich detailed explanations of Germany's position on the four power pact in accordance with instructions contained in document No. 115; after referring to the worldwide offensive of public opinion against the German regime, Suvich said that hope for the success of the pact proposal was not great.	120	223
Mar. 27	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Transmits for information basic papers regarding the four power negotiations with instructions on what to tell the Soviet Government.	121	224
Mar. 28	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Mussolini based on the instructions contained in document No. 115.	122	227
Mar. 29	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Instructions to express to Mussolini German objections to announced intention of the Italian Government to publish the draft text of the four power pact.	123	229
Mar. 30	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Mussolini has agreed not to publish the draft pact at this time. Conveys information on the Bulgarian attitude toward the pact and on the resignation of the Polish Ambassador to Italy.	125	230
Mar. 30	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports giving Simon a revised draft for articles II and III of the draft pact. Simon stated that the British were not definitely committed to the Anglo-Italian text agreed upon in Rome.	126	231

## FOUR POWER PACT—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 Mar. 27	<i>Foreign Minister Neurath to Ambassador Hassell</i> Discusses German proposals for revision of articles II and III of the four power pact, the question of a trip by Hitler to Rome, relations with Hungary, Hitler's views on the Austrian question, and a trip to Vienna.	128	233
Apr. 3	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports admissions by Vansittart that the British and French were discussing in Paris the wording of the draft pact; Hoesch stressed the importance of letting Germany participate in these discussions or at least, of keeping her informed.	132	238
Apr. 4	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Gives revisions proposed by the British to the draft four power pact; reports Suvich's comments and his own reply.	133	239
Apr. 4	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Mussolini. Mussolini discusses a letter from MacDonald regarding modifications of the draft pact.	135	243
Apr. 4	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports informing Litvinov, according to instructions, about the four power negotiations; Litvinov's statements as to the Soviet attitude.	136	244
Apr. 5	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Instructions setting forth the German position on the latest British proposals regarding the draft pact.	138	248
Apr. 7	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports stating in detail to Simon Germany's objections to the new British draft; it appears that the British have no categorical objections to Germany's wishes but that they consider them impossible of realization in view of the existing opposition with respect to them.	146	268
Apr. 12	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits substance of French draft of the four power pact as communicated by Mussolini; Mussolini's comments on the draft.	151	280
Apr. 12	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Sets forth, for transmittal to Mussolini, the provisional German reaction to the French draft proposals.	153	284
Apr. 12	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> On the basis of further talks with Mussolini, reports that Mussolini will undoubtedly be willing to negotiate further on the basis of the French draft; recommends the tactics which Germany should adopt.	154	287
Apr. 15	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Aloisi apropos of the German objections to the French draft of the pact.	159	292

## FOUR POWER PACT—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933			
Apr. 19	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conversations of Papen and himself with Aloisi and Suvich. On the basis of a memorandum by Mussolini Aloisi had stated the Italian position and urged a quick decision. Hassell and Papen worked over the points chiefly at issue and Papen is bringing a text for discussion in Berlin.	164	300
Apr. 19	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a conversation with the French Ambassador regarding the French draft proposals for the four power pact; discussion also of the Disarmament Conference; statements by the Ambassador regarding his conversation with Hitler.	165	301
Apr. 20	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records the results of discussions with von Papen and Gaus regarding the formulation of a draft text for Hitler's approval. The draft text is attached.	170	313
Apr. 20	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Mussolini regarding the German position on the four power pact. Mussolini discussed the need for a general agreement on the principal issues of German-Italian relations and gave his views on the Austrian question.	171	316
Apr. 20	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in Italy</i> Records statements of an official of the Italian Foreign Ministry regarding the possibility of bringing a colonial agreement within the framework of the pact negotiations.	172	317
Apr. 22	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Instructions to continue discussions about a gentlemen's agreement on colonies.	176	325
Apr. 22	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a thorough discussion with Aloisi and the Political Director of the Italian Foreign Ministry about the French text of the four power pact as revised according to German wishes.	178	325
Apr. 24	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Suggests that Mussolini's offer to reach agreement with Germany, after conclusion of the pact, on basic policies in all important fields, including colonies, should be accepted by Germany.	181	334
Apr. 27	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records disputing the assertion of the French Ambassador that Germany was not interested in the conclusion of the four power pact; expressed willingness to examine further the possibility of a mutual assistance pact with France.	190	349
May 4]	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> The text of a new German draft of the four power pact drawn up in reply to a draft resulting from Anglo-French discussions with the Italian Foreign Ministry.	208	377

## FOUR POWER PACT—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933			
May 10	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> In discussing the new German draft Mussolini said that the possibility of revision through mention of article 19 of the covenant in the pact was not to be underestimated; Suvich was more skeptical than Mussolini with respect to the equality of rights under the pact.	220	399
May 13	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conversations with Suvich and the British Ambassador regarding the German proposals contained in document No. 208; Suvich's objections to German demand that stages be fixed with respect to equality of rights by means of an agreement prior to ratification of the pact.	230	414
May 20	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> In reply to questions by Göring from Rome, Neurath confirmed that the instructions given to Göring by Hitler remained unchanged and also agreed to limiting the pact to 5 years.	254	471
May 22	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records conversation with Göring who had just returned from Rome with an amended draft of the four power pact; Neurath's objections to the draft.	258	478
May 24	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Hitler stated at a conference with Papen, Blomberg, Göring, and Neurath that the Mussolini pact should be agreed to only after the Disarmament Conference had either broken up or produced a result totally inadequate for Germany; the conference decided to await the French and British reaction to the latest draft.	260	482
May 27	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> The Italian Ambassador, on instructions from Mussolini, pressed for the prompt initialing of the four power pact; Neurath raised several objections to the existing text and insisted on the restoration of the text of May 20.	265	493
May 28	<i>The Italian Ambassador in Germany to the Foreign Minister</i> Cerruti's report of his last conversation with Neurath on the four power pact has produced an exceedingly unfortunate impression in Rome; the German attitude at present is the sole obstacle to the initialing of the pact.	268	496
May 29	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> In the presence of Neurath, Blomberg, and Göring, Hitler demanded of Cerruti that Mussolini should give an authentic explanation of a passage objected to by Germany and express his willingness to define in detail the procedure for implementing the equality of rights immediately after the initialing of the pact.	269	497
May 29	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in France</i> Instructions to make inquiries at the French Foreign Ministry with reference to a report that France was bound by treaty to inform Yugoslavia and Rumania and to consult with Poland and Czechoslovakia before entering into any new political commitment.	271	499

## FOUR POWER PACT—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 May 29	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassies in Italy, France, and Great Britain</i> Instructions that clarification be obtained concerning a <i>Matin</i> report about a French guarantee protocol as supplement to the four power pact which is alleged to contain certain reservations with respect to France's treaties with her allies, territorial revision and matters coming before the League.	272	500
May 30	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry</i> Records a decision, following upon a message from Mussolini, to initial the latest version of the four power pact after the editing has been approved.	274	502
May 31	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> In reply to Köster's questions, the Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry stated that the <i>Matin</i> report on the alleged guarantee protocol was incorrect, however, the French Government intended to make known its own interpretation of the four power pact, which Léger explained as being in line with the Italian interpretation.	275	502
June 1	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Summarizes the message from Mussolini which Cerruti gave to Hitler in their conversation on May 30.	276	503
June 3	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a telephone conversation with Hassell regarding the confusion which had resulted from the fact that the French had been using a draft text different from that of the other three Powers.	282	513
June 6	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a discussion with the Italian Ambassador concerning a new text of article III which had been drafted in Rome and agreed to by the French. Bülow pointed out German objections to it.	285	524
June 6	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> In a talk with the British Ambassador on the new wording of article III of the pact, Bülow expressed himself even more negatively than in his previous conversation with Cerruti, as he had meanwhile been informed of Blomberg's opposition to the proposal.	286	526
June 6	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conversation with Suvich about the new wording of article III. Suvich agreed that the French were to blame for the difficulties, but urged German agreement to the new text anyway.	287	527
June 7	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Reports Hitler's decision to accept the Four Power Pact including the latest version of article III.	290	532
June 7	<i>Circular of the Foreign Minister</i> Instructions for information and guidance of conversations regarding the Four Power Pact.	291	532
[June 7]	<i>Agreement of Understanding and Co-Operation</i> The text of the Four Power Pact as initialed in Rome.	292	533

## FOUR POWER PACT—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933			
June 8	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on Mussolini's speech regarding the Pact and Mussolini's remarks after the speech about the reception of the Pact in Germany.	295	542
June 10	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Instructions to take up immediately with Mussolini the situation created by the French-Czechoslovak exchange of notes published the previous day; it is inadmissible that France should commit herself with respect to a third power to certain interpretations of the Four Power Pact.	300	549
June 10	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy</i> Records a conversation with Mussolini about the signing of the Pact, reaction to the Pact in Germany and France and the internal political situation in Germany.	301	551
June 11	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a discussion with the Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry regarding the possibilities for negotiation, particularly of frontier questions, on the basis of the Four Power Pact.	302	552
June 11	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Comments on Daladier's speech in the French Chamber of Deputies on the Four Power Pact.	303	553
June 12	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry</i> Neurath told Suvich that the situation created by the French notes to Poland and the Little Entente must be clarified prior to the signing of the Four Power Pact.	304	555
June 13	<i>The State Secretary to the German Delegation at London</i> Transmits a report from Hassell concerning a discussion with Mussolini on the exchange of notes between France and the Little Entente; Hassell proposes a text for a German note to the three other signatories of the Pact.	308	558
June 14	<i>The State Secretary to the German Delegation at London</i> The Italian suggestion that the situation be clarified by a press communiqué, a speech, or an instruction to Hassell does not seem very satisfactory.	311	561
June 15	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports statements by Paul-Boncour regarding the interpretation of the Four Power Pact.	315	569
June 16	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry</i> Asks Foreign Ministry to study suggestion by Suvich that Germany express her objections to the French notes in a note addressed to Mussolini rather than to the French.	317	572
June 16	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Cerruti read Bülow a telegram from Mussolini suggesting that Germany should content herself with the fact that the official German and Italian press commentaries on the Four Power Pact had been accepted without argument.	318	572

## FOUR POWER PACT—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933			
June 16	<i>Ambassador Köster to State Secretary Bülow</i> Comments on the reaction in France to the Four Power Pact; recommends that Germany explore the possibilities of using the Pact as a means of improving Franco-German relations and thus deprive the French of the opportunity to use it as a vehicle for closer Franco-Italian relations.	320	574
June 17	<i>The State Secretary to the German Delegation at London</i> Refers to document No. 317 and discusses the way of dealing with the French exchange of notes with the Little Entente.	321	577
June 19	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry</i> Suvich expressed agreement with the new draft of the German note which Neurath showed him but suggested that it be delivered in Rome with the request that Mussolini communicate its contents to London and Paris.	323	580
June 23	<i>Memorandum by the Director of Department II</i> Records decisions of Neurath on the further handling of the Four Power Pact.	332	592
June 26	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Transmits the text of a note to be delivered to Mussolini regarding the French exchange of notes with the Little Entente countries; instructions regarding the further handling of the matter.	337	605
June 30	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records conversation with the Italian Ambassador on Mussolini's views regarding the signing of the Four Power Pact and a subsequent meeting of the four Chiefs of Government.	340	610
June 30	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports carrying out instructions of document No. 337; Mussolini's comments.	343	613
July 11	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports discussion with Suvich regarding the steps taken by the Italian Government to clear the way for signing of the Pact. Recommends that Suvich's suggestions about the signing be accepted.	358	645
July 17	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the signing of the Four Power Pact and suggests further steps which might be taken by Germany "to smash the threatening circle of isolation".  (See also under "Disarmament" and "Great Britain".)	368	660

## FRANCE

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 Jan. 30	<i>M. René P. Duchemin to Dr. Hermann Bücher</i> Forwards a copy of minutes of conversations on January 29 and 30 between German, French, Belgian, and Luxembourg industrialists at which the Polish Corridor and other international questions were discussed. Requests the views of the new German Government on statements made in the course of those conversations.	2	2
Feb. 6	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records a discussion on February 4 with the French Ambassador regarding the Disarmament Conference and a possible mutual assistance pact between France and Germany.	9	20
Feb. 9	<i>Foreign Minister Neurath to Vice Chancellor Papen</i> Comments on document No. 2 and the conversations between German, French, Belgian, and Luxembourg industrialists on international questions. Notes that statements by German participants are at variance with the official position; M. Duchemin should be informed that the Reich Government regarded the conversation as of a private and unofficial nature.	18	38
Feb. 10	<i>State Secretary Bülow to Ambassador Köster</i> Forwards a copy of document No. 18. Considers that the time is not ripe to launch a discussion of revision of the eastern frontier.	19	41
Feb. 18	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> The French Ambassador cited reasons why French public opinion was disturbed over events in Germany. Bülow replied that a campaign of distrust and hostility toward Germany was being generated in France on the initiative of the French Government. François-Poncet suggested a public statement by the Chancellor on German-French relations and asked for an opportunity for a discussion with the Chancellor.	24	49
Mar. 10	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits published reports that armed Nazi units had occupied barracks at Kehl and raised the swastika near the bridge across the Rhine. Requests instructions.	69	134
Mar. 11	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Events in Germany have made the French very uneasy. Reports of impending German-Italian rapprochement have had a further unsettling effect. Incidents such as that at Kehl should be avoided, in view of the increasing tendency in France to regard deterrence by force as the only remedy.	70	135
Mar. 16	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Press Department</i> Comte de Brinon indicated Daladier's willingness to have direct discussions with Neurath or Papen in case a preliminary agreement could be reached at the Disarmament Conference.	92	173
Apr. 5	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the views of a leading member of the Radical party with regard to French attitudes on the four power pact and recent anti-Jewish activities in Germany.	139	250



## FRANCE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 Apr. 18	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Department II</i> Records information received regarding a conversation shortly before Easter between the Reich Chancellor, the Reichswehr Minister, and the French Ambassador, which had taken place on the latter's initiative. Hitler described German policy regarding the western and eastern frontiers; Poncet asked about the possibility of resuming direct conversations between French and German military authorities.	163	298
Sept. 11	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> François-Poncet spoke with concern about deterioration of Franco-German relations. François-Poncet again pointed out the dangers of propaganda to Franco-German relations.	423	790
Sept. 15	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Record of a conversation of Hitler with the French Ambassador in the presence of Neurath. Statements by François-Poncet on the deterioration of German-French relations and the replies of Hitler and Neurath.  (See also under "Poland and Danzig," "Four Power Pact," and "Disarmament.")	430	803

## GENERAL QUESTIONS

1933 Jan. 30	<i>Circular of the State Secretary</i> Any apprehension abroad as to Germany's future foreign policy should be met by referring to men like Neurath, Blomberg, and Schwerin von Krosigk who represent a guarantee for the continuity of German policies, and by stating that Germany's attitude toward other countries does not depend on the tenets of the Government that happens to be in office.	1	1
Jan. 31	<i>Minutes of the Conference of Ministers, Held at the Reich Chancellery, on January 31, 1933, at 4 p. m.</i> Topics discussed: the Reich Chancellor's negotiations with the Center party, the question of new elections, and the problems arising from the continued existence of the Prussian Cabinet headed by Otto Braun.	3	5
Feb. 1	<i>Extract From the Minutes of the Conference of Ministers, Held at the Reich Chancellery, on February 1, 1933, at 11:30 a. m.</i> Discussion of the elections and of possible changes in the election laws.	7	15
Feb. 2	<i>Extract From the Minutes of the Conference of Ministers, Held at the Reich Chancellery, on February 2, 1933, at 6:00 p. m.</i> Records the discussion of a proposal by the Minister of Interior that one million reichsmarks be made available to the Reich Government for use in the election campaign.	8	17

## GENERAL QUESTIONS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 Feb. 8	<i>Extract From the Minutes of the Conference of Ministers, Held at the Reich Chancellery, on February 8, 1933, at 4:10 p. m.</i> Contains statements by Hitler on German rearmament made in the course of a discussion on a proposal for building a reservoir.	16	35
Feb. 15	<i>The State Secretary in the President's Office to the State Secretary in the Reich Chancellery</i> Transmits a copy of a letter sent to Hindenburg by former Reich Chancellor Wirth, protesting against derogatory statements made in a recent manifesto of the Reich Government regarding previous post-war German Governments.	21	44
Feb. 28	<i>Minutes of the Conference of Ministers on February 28, 1933, at 11 a. m.</i> Records the discussion regarding the Reichstag fire and a draft of a decree for the protection of the people and state.	42	88
Mar. 2	<i>Extract From the Minutes of the Conference of Ministers, Held at the Reich Chancellery, on March 2, 1933, at Noon</i> Göring reported to the Cabinet on Communist sabotage plans and on the investigation of the Reichstag fire; the Cabinet discussed matters relating to the press abroad, the Social Democratic party, and to the distribution of coal and butter in distressed areas prior to the election.	44	93
Mar. 7	<i>Minutes of the Conference of Ministers on March 7, 1933, at 4:15 p. m.</i> Records a discussion of the political situation and statements of the Foreign Minister regarding complaints of the French and United States Ambassadors and difficulties with foreign correspondents.	54	113
Mar. 24	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in France</i> Asks Köster to report on his earlier relations with General Bredow and particularly on the journey to France which the latter was about to take recently when he was arrested at the border.	114	210
Apr. 1	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Austria</i> States that a memorandum on Germany's foreign policy situation in March 1933, enclosed for the Minister's own information, is not to be put into the files but must be hidden away and destroyed before the end of the year.	129	235
Apr. 5	<i>Chancellor Hitler to President Hindenburg</i> Explains and defends his policy regarding the Jews.	141	253
Apr. 7	<i>Extract From the Minutes of the Conference of Ministers, Held at the Reich Chancellery, on April 7, 1933, at 4:15 p. m.</i> A comprehensive statement by the Foreign Minister on Germany's foreign policy situation; a report of the President of the Reichsbank on the foreign exchange situation.	142	256

## GENERAL QUESTIONS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 May 24	<i>Minutes of the Conference of Heads of Departments, Wednesday, May 24, 1933, at 5:00 p. m.</i> In an interdepartmental conference dealing with the organization of propaganda abroad, Hitler stated that the Foreign Ministry's Press Department would henceforth limit itself to its traditional activity, while active propaganda abroad would be the task of the Propaganda Ministry and its press office that was to be set up.	261	483
May 26	<i>Extracts From the Minutes of the Conference of Ministers on May 26, 1933, 4:15 p. m.</i> Schacht reported on his trip to America and on American views on the World Economic Conference, the transfer question, and disarmament. Relations with Austria were discussed; it was decided to force the collapse of the Dollfuss Cabinet by introducing a 1000 mark fee for German tourists going to Austria.	262	486
July 12	<i>Minutes of a Conference of Heads of Departments, Under the Chairmanship of the Reich Chancellor, on July 12, 1933, 5:00 p. m.</i> Records a discussion of the question of the ownership of mines in eastern Upper Silesia, the status of the disarmament question, and propaganda regarding the disarmament question.	359	647
July 27	<i>State Secretary Bülow to Foreign Minister Neurath</i> Reports on current business and problems of the Foreign Ministry; question of a visit by Ritter to Rome and Paris to discuss Danubian matters; Aschmann's project of a five power pact; incidents involving the Saar and Austria.	376	689
July 29	<i>Foreign Minister Neurath to State Secretary Bülow</i> Replies to No. 376; agrees on all points and emphasizes particularly that the time is unsuitable for a German diplomatic initiative.	381	701
July 31	<i>Foreign Minister Neurath to State Secretary Bülow</i> Discusses certain pending personnel questions in the diplomatic service; a conversation with Hitler apropos of Papen's activities; Hitler is not modifying his line toward Austria.	384	707
Sept. 12	<i>Minutes of the Conference of Ministers on September 12, 1933, at 4:30 p. m.</i> Records a statement by Neurath on the German position regarding problems likely to come up at the forthcoming session of the League; also a discussion of Germany's relation with the International Labor Organization and of the Leuschner case.	426	795
Sept. 26	<i>Minutes of a Conference of Heads of Departments, Held at the Reich Chancellery, on Tuesday, September 26, 1933, at 4:15 p. m.</i> Record of a discussion of an anticipated Dutch proposal at the League of Nations regarding German refugees and of the expulsion of German journalists from the USSR.	456	848

## GENERAL QUESTIONS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 Oct. 11	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Department II</i> Summarizes a discussion with representatives of other interested Ministries of a "Study concerning a reinforced border patrol service" along Germany's western borders. The Foreign Ministry raised various objections.	490	907

## GREAT BRITAIN

1933 Feb. 6	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Britain has taken over from France the role of political leader in Europe. Her leadership is being demonstrated in such fields as the Far Eastern conflict, the disarmament question, the debt problem, and preparations for the World Economic Conference. Such a development is not unfavorable for Germany, which must cultivate relations with Britain and protect them from unnecessary damage.	13	26
Mar. 15	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports an exchange of views with Stanley Baldwin on general aspects of current Anglo-German relations; increasingly favorable public attitude toward a meeting between MacDonald and Mussolini.	86	165
Apr. 12	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports statements by MacDonald concerning developments within Germany and the reaction of the British public; difficulties which had developed in connection with the four power pact; importance of international financial questions at the World Economic Conference.	152	282
Apr. 14	<i>Memorandum by the Director of Department III</i> Records action taken regarding a protest on the House of Commons debate on German questions.	158	290
Apr. 27	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports speaking to Simon about the House of Commons debate on German questions on the previous day and the disturbing effect of such debates in Anglo-German relations.	193	354
May 11	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records that Hitler received the British Ambassador who inquired about the purpose of Rosenberg's trip to London and spoke of the regrettable change of feeling in England toward Germany. Hitler explained the reasons for action against the Jews and expressed regret that there was so little understanding in England for events in Germany, especially for his aims of destroying communism. The Ambassador mentioned evidence of German military strength and read a recent telegram from Sir John Simon.	223	404
May 15	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Assesses Rosenberg's trip to England. The trip has not led to any improvement in the atmosphere. Discusses the nature and sources of opposition to Germany in Britain, and summarizes a conversation with Grandi on German policy toward Britain.	237	432

## GREAT BRITAIN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 July 29	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Great Britain</i> States that the British Chargé d'Affaires expressed surprise at statements by the German Air Minister and other officials regarding Germany's air armament. The State Secretary replied that there was no occasion for such representations and that the alleged statements had been tendentiously distorted by the British.	380	696
Aug. 16	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Submits a comprehensive analysis of the state of Anglo-German relations concluding with some suggestions as to how they might be improved.  (See also under "Disarmament.")	406	751

## HUNGARY

1933 Feb. 8	<i>The Reich Chancellery to the Foreign Ministry</i> Conveys the text of a memorandum, left by the Hungarian Minister with Hitler on February 7, containing a message from Minister President Gömbös.	15	34
Apr. 22	<i>Minister President Gömbös to Reich Chancellor Hitler</i> Requests that Germany agree to take more Hungarian exports and that experts be sent to work out details.	179	327
Apr. 28	<i>Reich Chancellor Hitler to Minister President Gömbös</i> Replies to document No. 179.	195	358
May 9	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Yugoslav Minister has proposed to Kánya a defensive alliance of Italy, Yugoslavia, and Hungary against the danger of the Anschluss which threatened all three countries equally; Kánya replied that he definitely knew that the Anschluss was not an imminent question for the leaders of Germany and that he therefore would not submit the proposal to the Hungarian Cabinet.	218	396
May 17	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Minister of Food and Agriculture</i> States that Hungary is denouncing the existing clearing agreement with Germany because of dilatory German treatment of its requests. This situation is undesirable from the foreign policy point of view and must be settled by concessions with respect to German imports of vegetables, fruits, and horses from Hungary.	247	455
May 27	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Turkey and to the Legations in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Greece</i> Explains the possibility that peaceful revision of the peace treaties may some day be the subject of international negotiations. Directs each mission to submit an opinion regarding the extent to which the given country might make concessions to Hungarian or Bulgarian revisionist wishes.	266	495

## HUNGARY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933			
June 2	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Gömbös has transmitted to the Reich Chancellor a request for a personal meeting to discuss political, economic, and military questions, and is now waiting for the Chancellor's decision as to time and place.	280	512
June 19	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Department II</i> Records statements by the Hungarian Minister on what was said at the conversation of Gömbös with Hitler on June 17.	324	580
June 22	<i>Memorandum by the Director of Department II</i> Records statements by Hitler regarding what has been said on the subject of a Hapsburg restoration during his talks with Gömbös.	330	589
June 30	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on recent developments in the relations between Italy and Hungary.	344	615
July 14	<i>Memorandum by the Director of Department II</i> The Hungarian Minister on official instructions urged Germany to support Hungary's effort, initiated by Gömbös on his recent visit to Vienna, to prevent Austria from slipping away to the French group.	363	653
July 28	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on conversations with Kánya and Gömbös concerning their talks with Mussolini, particularly as regards policy toward the Little Entente, Austria, and Germany.	377	691
July 28	<i>Ambassador Hassell to Ministerialdirektor Köpke</i> Discusses press coverage of the visit of Gömbös and Kánya in Rome; replies to document No. 99 regarding Italian policy toward Yugoslavia.	378	693
July 30	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports statements by Aloisi regarding the results of the Gömbös visit in Rome and the German proposals on the disarmament question.	382	702
Aug. 11	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Hungary</i> Directs that the leader of the German community in Hungary be told that the German Government will continue to support the cultural aspirations of the German minority in Hungary, but not by exerting pressure on the Government.	400	737
Sept. 18	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Conveys information concerning discussions of Kánya with French leaders regarding Beneš' aim of achieving a political truce.	432	808
Sept. 20	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records the first visit of Hungarian Minister Masirevich with Hitler. Discussion of policy relating to persons of German extraction in Hungary.	440	825

## HUNGARY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 Sept. 27	<i>Counselor Benzler to Ministerialdirektor Ritter</i> Conveys information on the highly confidential character of the discussions regarding preferential economic arrangements with Hungary and regarding alleged statements by Hitler to Gömbös in favor of preferential agreements.	464	868

## ITALY

1933 Feb. 6	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Conveys statements of Mussolini on the new Government in Germany, and on a speech by Beneš.	12	25
Feb. 7	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Discusses the position to be taken with regard to proposals made by Mussolini in December 1932 for German-Italian economic cooperation in the Danube Basin. Favors continuation of consultations on such cooperation, but indicates possible difficulties, especially with regard to Austria.	14	29
Feb. 20	<i>Ministerialdirektor Köpke to Ambassador Hassell</i> Supplements in a personal letter the formal instructions of February 7 regarding cooperation with Italy in the Danube Basin. Reviews previous policy with respect to Italy, indicates possible areas of conflict, and concludes that Germany would derive slight benefit from a policy coordinated with that of Italy in Southeast Europe.	27	57
Feb. 23	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Restates his views favoring increased economic cooperation with Italy in Southeast Europe.	35	74
Feb. 25	<i>Ambassador Hassell to Admiral Seebohm</i> Replying to a letter from the League for Germanism Abroad, explains the difficulties of taking up South Tirol questions with Italian authorities.	40	85
Mar. 6	<i>Ambassador Hassell to Ministerialdirektor Köpke</i> Restates his views in favor of increased economic cooperation with Italy in the Danube Basin. Encloses a memorandum concerning recent negotiations between representatives of German and Italian industrialists in Venice.	51	106
Mar. 8	<i>Ambassador Hassell to Foreign Minister Neurath</i> Calls attention to his previous reporting favoring cooperation between Germany and Italy in all areas where this is possible. Discusses the question of a visit by the Reich Chancellor to Italy.	64	128
July 15	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Mussolini expressed his satisfaction at Germany's conclusion of the Concordat. Mussolini stated that he intended to try to come to a quick agreement with the Soviet Union, which he considered would also be in the German interest.	365	655

## ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933			
Aug. 3	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Mussolini often reverted to the question of German-Italian economic cooperation in the Danube Basin. Hassell outlines a 5-point program on which Germany and Italy might agree.	388	71
Aug. 8	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a discussion with Mussolini on economic questions, particularly respecting the Danube Basin. Hassell outlined his 5-point program to which Mussolini assented.	397	73
Sept. 24	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Hassell outlines his views on the major goals of German foreign policy and recommends the lines to be followed in order to realize these goals.	448	83f
Oct. 6	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Observes some deterioration in German-Italian relations and discusses factors which may have brought this about, especially the Austrian question. Repeats and again advocates his 5-point program for cooperation in the Danube Basin. Argues that the governing factor in the relationship between Germany and Italy is their community of interests.  (See also under "Disarmament," "Four Power Pact," and "Austria.")	485	89f

## LITHUANIA AND MEMEL

1933			
Mar. 2	<i>Memorandum by the Director of Department IV</i> Briefs the Foreign Minister for the forthcoming conversation with the Lithuanian Foreign Minister and discusses the points to be emphasized.	45	97
Mar. 4	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records discussing with Lithuanian Foreign Minister Zaunius on March 3 the whole complex of German-Lithuanian problems.	47	100
Mar. 3	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Records a conversation between MM. Zaunius and Šaulys and Herren Meyer and Zechlin; it was agreed that discussions for a settlement of political and economic questions between Germany and Lithuania should be undertaken. Attitudes of the two countries toward the Soviet Union and Poland, the question of the Corridor and the possibility of military cooperation were discussed.	48	101
May 31	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Lithuania</i> Explains that the Chancellor received the Lithuanian Minister. The Minister's request for an explanation of Germany's intentions, such as had been given to Poland, was refused.	281	513



## LITHUANIA AND MEMEL—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 July 6	<i>Minister Zechlin to Ministerialdirektor Meyer</i> Reviews German-Lithuanian relations. Suggests a more accommodating attitude toward Lithuania, especially of economic concessions; Germany might agree to accept imports of hogs to relieve the Lithuanian surplus.	354	638
July 21	<i>Ministerialdirektor Meyer to Foreign Minister Neurath</i> Records that authorization of 9 million reichsmarks for use in settlement with Lithuania has been secured. It is the view of Hitler that in face of urgent considerations of foreign and national policy, economic and financial objections must give way. Hitler had been unable to see T. V. Soong.	373	685
Aug. 16	<i>Ministerialdirektor Meyer to Foreign Minister Neurath</i> Describes preliminary negotiations for a German-Lithuanian settlement. Encloses text of exchange of letters with Zaunius in which assurances were given that work permits for Germans in Memel would not be denied and that direct discussions would occur between the Governor of Memel and the President of the Directorate to eliminate difficulties arising from the Memel Statute.  (See also under "France.")	405	748

## PALESTINE

1933 July 18	<i>The Minister of Economics to Hanotaiah, Ltd., Tel-Aviv</i> Sets forth the measures which the Minister of Economics is willing to support in order to facilitate transfer of assets by German Jews intending to migrate to Palestine.	369	661
Aug. 10	<i>The Ministry of Economics to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards copy of a letter to the Director of the Anglo-Palestine bank putting the agreement with Hanotaiah, Ltd. regarding emigration to Palestine on a more general basis.	399	732

## POLAND AND DANZIG

1933 Feb. 17	<i>Memorandum by the Director of Department IV</i> Records statement by the Polish Minister that Polish-German relations had reached such a state that the two nations were on the eve of war. The interview proceeded in an atmosphere of recrimination regarding Polish-German relations in numerous fields.	22	46
Feb. 22	<i>The Minister in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports discussions with the French Ambassador in Warsaw on the Corridor problem. The Ambassador felt the Corridor was not tenable in the long run and considered various possibilities for a new settlement of the question.	34	73

## POLAND AND DANZIG—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933			
Mar. 7	<i>The Consul General at Danzig to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the reinforcement of the Polish force at the Westerplatte and the request of the League of Nations Commissioner for withdrawal of troops in excess of the number authorized by the existing agreement.	52	111
Mar. 7	<i>The State Secretary in the Reich Chancellery to the Foreign Minister</i> States that the Reich Chancellor has issued instructions to prevent repetition of a recent incident in which uniformed National Socialists had made their way into the Polish Consulate General at Berlin.	53	112
Mar. 8	<i>The Consul General at Danzig to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Polish Government requested that the action of Danzig in the harbor police question be considered an <i>action directe</i> .	57	122
Mar. 8	<i>The Consul General at Danzig to the Foreign Ministry</i> States that the internal political situation at Danzig must be clarified in the near future; suggests that the President of the Senate be urged to support new elections.	58	123
Mar. 8	<i>The German Representative With the League of Nations to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports discussing the Westerplatte case with the Secretary General of the League. A Council session will be held on the Danzig incidents at an early date.	59	124
Mar. 8	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports discussing the Westerplatte incident at the Foreign Office, stressing the seriousness of the Polish action.	60	124
Mar. 8	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports discussing the Danzig incidents with Suvich emphasizing the gravity of the situation.	61	125
Mar. 8	<i>The Minister in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the Polish reaction to the Reichstag elections.	63	126
Mar. 9	<i>The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports discussing the Danzig situation with Paul-Boncour and calling attention to possible dangers. Paul-Boncour considered that Poland might well be alarmed over the safety of the Westerplatte munitions depot.	65	129
Mar. 10	<i>The Deputy Director of Department IV to the Consulate General at Danzig</i> Directs that the Danzig authorities be advised that alarming reports to the effect that Poland was about to march into Danzig should not be circulated at this time by official agencies.	66	130
Mar. 11	<i>The German Representative With the League of Nations to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on progress of discussion of the Westerplatte question at Geneva.	71	138
Mar. 11	<i>The Minister in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the views of the chief diplomatic representatives in Warsaw regarding the Polish action at the Westerplatte.	74	146

## POLAND AND DANZIG—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933			
Mar. 12	<i>The Minister in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Discounts reports about movements of Polish troops in the Corridor.	77	151
Mar. 14	<i>The Director of Department IV to the Foreign Ministry</i> Outlines procedure which is to be followed at Geneva to settle the Westerplatte incident and forwards draft text of German statement to be made in that connection for which approval is requested.	82	158
Mar. 16	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records a statement by Hitler that he had instructed the NSDAP leadership in Danzig to maintain greatest reserve.	85	164
Mar. 16	<i>The Director of Department IV to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Polish delegation stated that withdrawal of additional Polish troops from Westerplatte would be accomplished by 10 p. m.	91	172
Mar. 17	<i>The Reich Minister of Finance to the Senate of Danzig</i> States that a subsidy of 4,200,000 reichsmarks in quarterly payments will be made available to Danzig for the fiscal year 1933. A list is given of certain expenses to be covered from the subsidy funds.	96	178
Mar. 24	<i>State Secretary Bülow to State Secretary Meissner</i> Discusses the internal political situation in Danzig on the basis of a conversation with Danzig Senate President Ziehm, who refused new elections for the present. The result of discussions between Ziehm and representatives of the Danzig NSDAP should be awaited.	116	217
Mar. 31	<i>Memorandum by the Director of Department IV</i> Notes a deterioration in the internal political situation in Danzig. Discussions between Ziehm and NSDAP representatives have failed. Suggests a discussion between Ziehm and the Danzig NSDAP leaders under the chairmanship of the Reich Chancellor.	127	232
Apr. 3	<i>Memorandum by the Director of Department IV</i> Summarizes the instructions given to Consul General Thermann regarding a reorganization of the Danzig Government.	131	237
Apr. 12	<i>The Reich Minister of Food and Agriculture to the Reich Chancellor</i> Transmits a memorandum calling attention to the danger that the Poles might enter Danzig in case of election campaign disorders such as those being directed by the Danzig NSDAP against the Danzig Nationalists.	155	287
Apr. 19	<i>The Minister in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a discussion with Beck on the subject of alleged anti-German excesses in Poland, and encloses a memorandum of the conversation.	167	306
Apr. 20	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of Department IV</i> Records a conversation with the Polish Minister who repeated his request for an interview with the Reich Chancellor.	168	311

## POLAND AND DANZIG—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 Apr. 21	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Reich Minister of Interior</i> Notes that recently issued German laws on officials and lawyers contravene the Polish-German agreement on Upper Silesia of May 15, 1922, by which the Reich was obligated to accord protection to all inhabitants of German Upper Silesia without discrimination. Attention has already been called by the Chairman of the Mixed Commission for Upper Silesia to discrimination against Jews in Upper Silesia. A pending law on excessive foreign attendance at German schools and universities presents similar problems which should be discussed with the Foreign Ministry.	175	323
Apr. 22	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports intelligence via former Chancellor Wirth regarding Polish intention to take preventive military action at the German eastern border.	177	325
Apr. 23	<i>The Minister in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Submits a comprehensive analysis of the question of a Polish preventive war. Attached is a memorandum summarizing the intelligence regarding Polish preparations for war.	180	328
Apr. 25	<i>The Minister in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Further considers the evidence regarding the possibility of a preventive war by Poland.	183	342
Apr. 25	<i>The Minister in Czechoslovakia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Gives evaluation of the likelihood of preventive war.	184	343
Apr. 26	<i>Minister Moltke to State Secretary Bülow</i> Examines the implications of current actions by Poland directed against Germany, particularly the possibility of a League of Nations action regarding the treatment of Polish Jews in Germany.	192	351
Apr. 29	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports discussion with Litvinov on the Soviet attitude toward the increasing tension in German-Polish relations.	199	364
May 2	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records a conversation of Hitler with the Polish Minister, and subsequent discussion of Neurath with the Minister regarding the communiqué to be issued.	201	365
May 3	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Regards a visit by Goebbels to Danzig to make a speech to be out of the question.	205	374
May 3	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records expression of thanks of the Polish Minister for the Chancellor's statement of the previous day.	206	375
May 6	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records that the Polish Minister denied the truth of a statement attributed to Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss that the Polish Government intended to occupy Danzig in case the NSDAP should take over the government there. Urges that it would be well for the Polish Government to get used to the idea of the Nazis taking over Danzig.	213	390

## POLAND AND DANZIG—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 May 8	<i>The Consul General at Danzig to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Senate President Ziehm considers the participation of Reich Ministers in the Danzig election campaign as objectionable, but that he would take no position on the matter.	216	394
May 10	<i>The Military Attaché in Poland to the Reichswehr Ministry and to the Foreign Ministry</i> Gives an account of his reception by Pilsudski on May 8; describes the personality of Pilsudski.	221	401
May 20	<i>The Minister in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports statements by Beck on the improvement of German-Polish relations and on the situation in Danzig.	253	470
May 30	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Reich Minister of Finance</i> Approves requests made by Dr. Rauschning for immediate financial assistance for Danzig.	273	501
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Conversation between the Polish Minister and Hitler.		650
Aug. 2	<i>President of the Reichsbank Schacht to State Secretary Lammers</i> As the Danzig requests for subsidies are so extensive, asks that the matter be presented to the Chancellor.	387	714
Sept. 6	<i>Minute by the State Secretary</i> Recommends that consideration be given to the question of whether the Danzig-Polish quarrel should be allowed to revive, and when. The Danzig Senate should be warned against too extensive concessions to Poland.	417	782
Sept. 25	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records a conversation with Beck who expressed the hope that Polish-German problems could be settled by direct negotiations. Neurath welcomed such an attitude.	449	840
Sept. 26	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records a conversation with the Polish Foreign Minister in which he recurred to the desirability of direct German-Polish negotiations and indicated certain subjects which might be usefully discussed.	451	842
Sept. 29	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a discussion with the Minister of Finance regarding the situation in eastern (Polish) Upper Silesia and negotiations for sale of I. G. Kattowitz-Laura properties there.	473	878
Oct. 11	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of Department IV</i> Refers to a letter from President Schäfer of the Bank of Danzig to the President of the Reichsbank and notes that the readiness of the Danzig Government to negotiate and come to agreements with Poland represents a departure from German eastern policy. Suggests that the matter be discussed with Rauschning and discouraged.	491	909

## POLAND AND DANZIG—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 Oct. 11	<i>Ministerialdirektor Meyer to Foreign Minister Neurath</i> Reports discussion with Rauschning of reports of plans to adjust the Danzig currency to the Polish zloty. Rauschning replied that there were no such plans, but that a fixed relationship between the gulden and the zloty was necessary for Danzig-Polish trade and that there had been discussion of advances of foreign exchange to the Bank of Poland by the Bank of Danzig. Rauschning intends to discuss these matters with the Chancellor and Foreign Minister in Berlin during the next week.  (See also under "General Questions" and "France.")	492	910

## RUMANIA

1933 Jan. 31	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Rumania</i> Explains that the Rumanian Minister has asked that Germany express its sympathy with the plan for an economic union of the southeast European countries based on custom preferences as outlined recently in an interview given by the Rumanian Foreign Minister. Instructs the Legation to leave the Rumanian Government in no doubt as to Germany's rejection of all economic systems that would result in German goods being pushed out of the markets in the Danube area.	5	12
Feb. 22	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records statements by the Rumanian Minister regarding the recent agreement of the Little Entente.	32	69
Mar. 27	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Department II</i> Records a private communication from Titulescu to Hitler and suggests the sort of reply which might be given to it.	118	219
Apr. 26	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports statement of Tatarescu, leader of the Rumanian National Socialists, that Foreign Minister Titulescu confirmed the receipt of an invitation from Hitler for a personal talk. Titulescu would accept but could not yet set a date.	189	349
May 27	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records a conversation of Hitler with the Rumanian Minister, who listed Rumanian complaints regarding trade relations with Germany; Hitler's sharp rejoinder.	264	492
June 21	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records a conversation with Titulescu who said that the Italian project of a reunion of Austria and Hungary would mean war, but that Rumania had no objections to an Anschluss; nor would he oppose Germany's revisionist aspirations as long as Germany did not actively support Hungarian revisionism.	328	585
June 21	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports impressions of Gömbös, conveyed by Kánya, of his trip to Berlin; Gömbös' views on the future development of German-Hungarian relations.	329	586

## RUMANIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 Aug. 8	<i>Minute by Ministerialdirektor Ritter</i> Records a conversation with Brandsch, a German deputy in the Rumanian Parliament who had come on instructions from the Rumanian Minister President primarily to clarify whether Germany would be willing to restore friendly relations with Rumania; Ritter said that the answer could only be a clear "no" as long as Rumania took no initiative in changing her previous political attitude toward Germany.	395	728
Sept. 5	<i>Minute by an Official of the Economic Department</i> Summarizes the terms of a large transaction concluded by the I. G. Farben concern to exchange I. G. Farben products for Rumanian agricultural produce.	414	777
Sept. 5	<i>Minute by an Official of the Economic Department</i> Confidential information on funds supplied by I. G. Farben for political purposes in Rumania in connection with the transaction recently concluded.	415	779
Sept. 28	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Rumania</i> Explains that the Reich Chancellor received Tatarescu, leader of the Rumanian National Socialist party, on September 15 and the former Rumanian Minister, Goga, on September 19; Tatarescu also called on other Government and party officials requesting financial assistance in establishing a newspaper printing plant.	468	873
Oct. 11	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Rumania</i> Encloses a memorandum on conversations of Tatarescu in Berlin regarding German financial support for newspapers of the Rumanian National Socialist party, and asks for the views of the Legation.	496	916

## SAAR

1933 Mar. 13	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Department II</i> Advises against initiating negotiations with France regarding the Saar. Propaganda in connection with the plebiscite should be started only a short time before the date set for the plebiscite.	80	155
Apr. 20	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Department II</i> Notes that the efforts of Röchling to work out arrangements for the meeting of Saar leaders with Hitler have been unsuccessful; recommends that the Foreign Ministry take the initiative and simply invite the parties to a meeting.	169	312
May 2	<i>Minute by an Official of Department II</i> Records that Herr Kossmann of the Saar Governing Commission conveyed a warning for State Secretary Bülow from Mr. Knox, Chairman of the Commission, against disorders caused by National Socialists in the Saar. Knox had said he would have to resort to the sharpest measures against such incidents.	203	369

## SAAR-- Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 May 4	<i>Minute by an Official of Department II</i> Records that Herr Röchling had an interview with Hitler on May 3 in which he suggested that the present parties in the Saar be allowed to continue their existence until the plebiscite as they could help Germany and National Socialism more in that way. Hitler agreed.	207	375
May 15	<i>Minute by an Official of Department II</i> Records that Herr Kossmann of the Saar Governing Commission was received by Hitler on May 12, and gave the latter a survey of the situation in the Saar. Hitler agreed with Kossmann's view that all Germans must stand together.	227	412
May 15	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Department II</i> Records that the representatives of the Saar who were to be received by the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister in the afternoon called on Voigt in the morning for a preliminary conference. Plans for the afternoon program were discussed. Formation of a united German front in the Saar was to be stressed.	235	425
May 15	<i>Minutes on the Reception of the Parliamentary Delegation From the Saar Territory by the Reich Chancellor in the Reich Chancellery on May 15, 1933</i> The Chancellor assailed the attitude of the Marxist parties on national questions. For the plebiscite campaign in the Saar a bloc should be formed of the NSDAP and the Christian trade unions, but it was not desirable that the other parties dissolve. The single political object in the Saar Territory should be to return to Germany.	236	430
May 16	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Department II</i> Records that most of the Saar representatives who had been received by Hitler the previous day met with Voigt for further discussion. It was agreed to appoint an executive committee to consist of Bürekel, Kiefer, and Röchling. Disorder was to be avoided so that no pretext would be given the Governing Commission for use of force.	240	440
May 17	<i>Hermann Röchling to Geheimrat Voigt</i> Forwards a memorandum on the meeting of the Saar representatives with Hitler on May 15.	248	456
Sept. 26	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records that the Chairman of the Saar Governing Commission referred to recent difficulties in the Saar Territory arising from party agitation, and requested that influence be exercised from Berlin on Nazi leaders in the Saar to assist in preserving order.	452	842
Oct. 4	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records statement of Papen that, with the approval of the Reich Chancellor, he intended to take in hand the preparations for the plebiscite in the Saar and the reincorporation of that territory. He asked to be regularly informed on developments.	482	891



## SWITZERLAND

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 Apr. 11	<i>The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Submits a report on the various groups in Switzerland sympathizing with National Socialist ideas.	150	277
July 20	<i>The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Replying to a circular instruction and questionnaire on anti-German propaganda, emphasizes the importance to Germany of Swiss neutrality. Improved German propaganda methods in Switzerland and a hands-off policy with respect to political "fronts" in Switzerland are recommended.	372	679
Sept. 11	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Press Department</i> Discusses the banning of the <i>Neue Zürcher Zeitung</i> and other Swiss newspapers.	424	792
Sept. 26	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records a conversation of Neurath and Goebbels with the Swiss Federal President at Geneva. There was discussion of border incidents and prohibition of Swiss newspapers. Neurath stated in reply to Motta that the idea of German annexation of German parts of Switzerland was absurd.	453	843

## TURKEY

1933 July 13	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports statements by the Turkish Foreign Minister on the Hugenberg memorandum and on the Eastern security pacts.	361	650
Aug. 7	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a long conversation with the Turkish Foreign Minister on broader aspects of Turkish foreign policy, particularly as regards Turkish relations with the USSR, the Little Entente, Bulgaria, and Greece.	394	725

## UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

1933 Jan. 31	<i>Ambassador Dirksen to State Secretary Bülow</i> Reports on conversation with Krestinsky concerning political developments in Germany. Requests permission to come to Berlin to report and confer.	6	14
Feb. 6	<i>State Secretary Bülow to Ambassador Dirksen</i> Explains why it is undesirable for Dirksen to come to Berlin at this time; gives reasons why continuity in German policy toward the USSR may be expected.	10	21
Feb. 20	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Discusses the Franco-Soviet nonaggression pact and possibilities of a rapprochement between France and the Soviet Union. Urges prompt ratification of protocol for extension of the Berlin Treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union.	29	62

## UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933			
Feb. 22	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Suggests that the Ambassador inaugurate discussions with the Soviet Government which would serve to clarify the Soviet attitude toward Germany and on European policy generally.	33	71
Feb. 28	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Krestinsky who stated that the Soviet Union intended no reorientation of its policy, but wondered whether Germany did not wish to seek an alliance with France. Reports had been received that Papen had proposed to Herriot a military alliance directed against the Soviet Union.	41	87
Mar. 1	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records a discussion with Litvinov on current problems affecting the relationship and feelings between Germany and the Soviet Union.	43	91
Mar. 8	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records a protest of the Soviet Ambassador against passages referring to the Soviet Union in Hitler's speech of March 2.	55	119
Mar. 11	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports continuation of talks with Litvinov and Krestinsky on German-Soviet relations and of the respective relations of the two countries with France.	73	140
Mar. 20	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports protesting to Krestinsky against Soviet press attacks. Krestinsky referred to Soviet uneasiness about the attitude of Germany toward the Soviet Union.	104	189
Apr. 4	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports complaints by Litvinov against incidents involving Soviet organizations and citizens in Germany; interprets Litvinov's statements as indication of serious deterioration in German-Soviet relations and asks to come to Berlin to report.	134	241
Apr. 4	<i>Ambassador Dirksen to State Secretary Bülow</i> Comments on the bad state of German-Soviet relations and suggests what can be done to bring about an improvement.	137	246
Apr. 5	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Directs that a statement be made that Germany is ready to ratify the protocol extending the Berlin Treaty. Also that Litvinov be told that the recent incidents would be investigated, but that Soviet business organizations must drop Communist connections in Germany.	140	252
Apr. 8	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conversation with Litvinov regarding recent incidents affecting Soviet nationals and interests in Germany. Litvinov agreed to the proposal for early announcement of ratification of the protocol extending the Berlin Treaty.	147	271

## UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 Apr. 14	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports unfavorable effects of reports of renewed harassment of Soviet nationals in Germany.	157	289
Apr. 19	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador and M. Weizer, chiefly regarding the difficulties affecting German-Soviet economic relations; Khinchuk asked about reports of a customs union with the Baltic States and the ratification of the Berlin Treaty.	166	304
Apr. 25	<i>Memorandum by the Director of Department IV</i> Records a protest of the Soviet Ambassador against the appointment of a State Commissioner to manage Derop.	186	344
Apr. 28	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records a conversation of Hitler with the Soviet Ambassador. The Ambassador read a prepared statement; Hitler's response.	194	355
Apr. 28	<i>Ambassador Dirksen to Ministerialdirektor Meyer</i> Discusses steps which might be taken to eliminate so far as possible the "malaise" which had arisen in German-Soviet relations.	197	362
Apr. 29	<i>The Director of Department IV to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Gives details of the decision of the Chancellor regarding the reorganization of Derop.	198	364
May 2	<i>Ambassador Dirksen to Ministerialdirektor Meyer</i> Suggests lines along which the press might deal with German-Soviet relations in general on the occasion of the ratification of the protocol of the Berlin Treaty.	204	372
May 5	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the exchange of instruments of ratification of the protocol for extension of the Berlin Treaty and gives a summary of the preliminary history of the protocol, an estimate of the political effect of ratification, and a further review of German-Soviet relations concluding that the Soviet connection remains a valuable one.	212	385
May 14	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conversations with Krestinsky and Voroshilov on the state of German-Soviet relations; reviews evidence indicating that agreement on extension of the Berlin Treaty has not brought general improvement in Soviet attitude toward Germany, although Voroshilov had made friendly statements on the occasion at an Embassy dinner for General von Bockelberg.	232	418
May 16	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union</i> Records a conversation with Litvinov in which Dirksen again expressed his misgivings regarding the Soviet attitude toward Germany. Following a series of charges by each against the conduct of the other side Litvinov concluded by saying that the Soviet Government still considered it possible to have as friendly relations with a National Socialist Germany as with	245	449

## UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933			
May 19	<i>The Reichswehr Ministry to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits two reports from the Military Attaché in Moscow dealing with the question of cooperative experimentation in chemical warfare.	252	464
June 5	<i>Ambassador Dirksen to Foreign Minister Neurath</i> Forwards a memorandum of a conversation with Krestinsky in which Dirksen had spoken of uncertainty with regard to the Soviet attitude toward Germany and had asked for a clarification. Krestinsky said that because of recent incidents the Soviet Union was likewise uncertain as to Germany's policy and now wished, without prejudice to its relations with Germany, to pursue a positive policy with respect to other countries also, for example, France.	284	518
June 28	<i>The Military Attaché in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports further deterioration in the relations with the Red Army.	339	609
June 30	<i>Memorandum by the Director of Department IV</i> Suggests that astonishment be expressed to the Soviet Ambassador that Germany was not informed of the negotiations for a nonaggression pact between the Soviet Union and neighboring states.	342	611
July 28	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Poland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the Soviet Minister who thought that Poland was the beneficiary of the deterioration of relations between Germany and the Soviet Union, and who expressed apprehension about German intentions.	379	695
Aug. 4	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conversation with Molotov on the general state of German-Soviet relations. Molotov denied that a change in principle had taken place in the Soviet Government's attitude toward Germany. Suggests that Molotov's statements might provide the occasion to obtain a clarification of German-Soviet relations.	389	716
Aug. 14	<i>Foreign Minister Neurath to State Secretary Bülow</i> Sends a memorandum containing statements by Papen answering to Soviet charges that he had disclosed to French authorities details about German-Soviet military relations.	403	741
Aug. 14	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Discusses the state of German-Soviet relations and suggests that an attempt be made to clarify these relations through a series of conversations resulting possibly in a more or less loose but written agreement.	404	744
Aug. 24	<i>Memorandum by the Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union</i> Describes the farewell visit of General Lutz in connection with conclusion of German-Soviet military co-operation.	409	767
Sept. 8	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a conversation with the Italian Chargé d'Affaires regarding the Italo-Soviet Treaty.	420	787

## UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 Sept. 8	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a conversation with the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires and the head of the Soviet Trade Mission on the effect of German trade policy on commercial relations with the USSR.	421	787
Sept. 13	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a request by the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires that two representatives of the Soviet press be admitted to the Reichstag fire trial at Leipzig.	428	798
Sept. 19	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits memoranda of conversations with Litvinov and Stern showing increasing Soviet irritation over various incidents affecting Soviet-German relations.	438	816
Sept. 19	<i>The Military Attaché in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry and the Reichswehr Ministry</i> Proposes that efforts be undertaken for a revival of military cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union. Believes that the Soviet side would be willing but that no very strong gesture for a rapprochement can be expected in the near future. A letter to Voroshilov might be an opening move.	439	819
Sept. 22	<i>Memorandum by the Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union</i> Records a discussion with Helphand of the Soviet Foreign Commissariat regarding Soviet relations with France and Germany.	444	831
Sept. 26	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records discussion with the Soviet Ambassador regarding the incident resulting from the exclusion of Soviet journalists from attendance at the Reichstag fire trial at Leipzig. Bülow promised to take the matter up with the Reich Chancellor.	455	845
Sept. 26	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> A further record of that part of the Ministerial Conference (document No. 456) dealing with the expulsion of German journalists from the USSR.	457	851
Sept. 26	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Litvinov on the journalists conflict. The Soviet Government attaches great importance to good relations with Germany, but feels that this attitude finds no answering sentiment in Germany.	458	853
Sept. 26	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Litvinov formally denied that the Soviet Government had communicated to the French details of former German-Soviet military cooperation and gave assurances that this would not be done in the future.	459	855

## UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 Sept. 26	<i>The Military Attaché in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Describes the farewell dinner for German military specialists in the Soviet Union. The speeches and discussion seemed to show that Soviet officers regretted the termination of military cooperation. Prospects for renewing cooperation are discussed.	460	856
Sept. 27	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records giving the Soviet Ambassador the position of Hitler on the incident involving the journalists and the subsequent discussion with the Ambassador on the subject.	461	862
Sept. 30	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry</i> Records a conversation on September 27 with the head of the Soviet Trade Mission in Berlin regarding German-Soviet economic questions and particularly countermeasures which the Soviet Government might take if no concessions were made on the German side.	462	864
Sept. 28	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that minor modifications were being permitted in the order for expulsion of German correspondents from the Soviet Union, but considers that the Soviet Union will insist on admission of Soviet correspondents to the Leipzig trial as a condition for settling the dispute.	467	872
Sept. 29	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Department IV</i> Records a communication from Colonel von Stülpnagel of the Reichswehr Ministry concerning the generally friendly way in which the liquidation of the military stations in the USSR had been concluded; also evidence of increased cordiality of Soviet military officials toward Germans.	470	875
Sept. 30	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the departure of the German journalists from the Soviet Union and explains the Soviet insistence on full equality of rights for the Soviet press.	476	883
Oct. 2	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports statements from a confidential informant concerning the deterioration of German-Soviet relations and the possibilities of bringing about an improvement.	477	884
Oct. 10	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation on October 7 with Stern, who took a very serious view of the state of German-Soviet relations and considered that German-Soviet conversations at the moment offered no promise of success.  (See also under "World Economic Conference" and "General Questions.")	487	901

## UNITED STATES

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 Mar. 11	<i>Ambassador Prittwitz to Foreign Minister Neurath</i> Informs the Foreign Minister that, as his views are founded on the idea of a free form of government and on the ideals of a republican Germany, he must now out of self respect give up his present post.	75	147
Mar. 16	<i>The Ambassador in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports an interview with Bullitt followed by a call on the President who discussed the general European situation and particularly the prospects of the Disarmament Conference.	93	173
May 6	<i>The President of the Reichsbank to the Foreign Ministry</i> Describes initial conversations with Hull and Roosevelt. Roosevelt justified American devaluation of the dollar and in private conversation with Schacht discussed the Jewish question. He advocated tariff reduction and an increase in German-American trade. Disarmament problems were also discussed.	214	390
May 15	<i>The President of the Reichsbank to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that his farewell visit with President Roosevelt was friendly. He told Roosevelt that in the disarmament question Germany could no longer be treated as a second-class nation. In an interview in New York with leading Jews Schacht warned them that pressure from outside Germany would only make matters worse. Schacht listed the general impressions gained during his visit in the United States.	233	423
May 23	<i>The Ambassador in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Roosevelt gave his views on pending questions relating to disarmament and international finance and expressed particular interest in whether the four power pact contained any mention of territorial questions.  (See also under "Disarmament," "Financial Questions," "World Economic Conference," and "General Questions.")	259	479

## VATICAN

1933 Apr. 7	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Department II</i> Records a conversation with von Papen, who confirmed his intention, on the occasion of his pending visit to Rome, of suggesting to the Vatican the conclusion of a concordat with the Reich.	145	266
Apr. 18	<i>The Ambassador to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports briefly on the visits of von Papen and Göring to the Holy See.	162	298
June 7	<i>Unsigned Note</i> Records a meeting on April 26 of Chancellor Hitler with Bishop Benning and Prelate Steinmann, at which freedom of the Catholic Church, schools, and associations, and dismissal of Catholic officials because of past political activity were discussed.	188	347

## ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS

LIX

## VATICAN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 Apr. 28	<i>Reich Chancellor Hitler to Cardinal Bertram</i> Defends the record of the National Socialists against charges of violent treatment of their opponents since their advent to power. Contends that the National Socialists were subjected to much worse treatment previously. The Government does not desire conflicts with the churches.	196	358
May 12	<i>Ambassador Bergen to Foreign Minister Neurath</i> Conveys information concerning continuation of talks regarding the concordat with the Cardinal Secretary of State by Prelate Kaas upon authorization of von Papen.	228	413
May 19	<i>Foreign Minister Neurath to Ambassador Bergen</i> States that Menshausen is bringing to Rome the current draft of the concordat. The matter is to be handled by Kaas and Papen, but Kaas is to keep Bergen informed.	250	461
May 26	<i>Vice Chancellor Papen to Ambassador Bergen</i> Discusses the future role of the Catholic Church in the political life of Germany, particularly as this relates to the proposed article 31 of the concordat.	263	491
June 1	<i>The Ambassador to the Holy See to Vice Chancellor Papen</i> Urges that the demand for taking the clergy out of politics be absolutely insisted upon even at risk of failure of the negotiations.	278	507
June 16	<i>Vice Chancellor Papen to Counselor Menshausen</i> Requests that a telegram be sent to Ambassador Bergen stating that Hitler has authorized him to come to Rome to complete negotiations for a concordat.	319	573
June 23	<i>Vice Chancellor Papen to Counselor Menshausen</i> Contains the text of a telegram to be sent to Bergen with Hitler's instructions regarding modifications in the draft Concordat and arrangements to be made for concluding the negotiations.	333	593
June 30	<i>The Ambassador to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports conversation of Papen with Cardinal Pacelli on the conclusion of the Concordat.	341	610
July 2	<i>Vice Chancellor Papen to Chancellor Hitler</i> Comments on certain passages in the text of the Concordat and the reasons for the language adopted.	347	622
	<i>Draft Concordat</i> The text of the draft Concordat examined by Hitler, Neurath, and Frick at meetings on July 4 and 5.	348	625
July 3	<i>The Embassy to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits Papen's urgent recommendation that article 31 of the draft Concordat be accepted and the Concordat be quickly concluded in order to avoid a conflict between Church and State.	349	633
July 3	<i>The Embassy to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits a further message from Papen: The dissolution of the Center party is regarded here as certain to follow conclusion of the Concordat and is approved.	350	634



## VATICAN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933			
July 3	<i>Ambassador Bergen to Foreign Minister Neurath</i> Describes the last negotiations leading up to agreement on the text of the Concordat on the previous evening.	351	634
July 4	<i>The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits report by Papen of conversation with Mussolini, who stressed the value of concluding the Concordat.	352	636
July 8	<i>The Ambassador to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports initialing of the Concordat.	356	642
July 14	<i>Extract From the Minutes of the Conference of Ministers on July 14, 1933</i> Discussion of the Concordat and the decision to proceed with conclusion of the Concordat.	362	651
July 20	<i>Concordat Between the Holy See and the German Reich</i> Text of the Concordat as signed by Cardinal Pacelli and Vice Chancellor von Papen, together with the final protocol and annex.	371	669
Sept. 6	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires of the Embassy to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards a note of the Cardinal Secretary of State requesting certain clarifications in the provisions of the Concordat as a preliminary to ratification.	418	782
Sept. 7	<i>Memorandum by the Chargé d'Affaires of the Embassy to the Holy See</i> Records that the Cardinal Secretary of State had presented a memorandum on clarification of points in the text of the Concordat and had said that if the German Government would issue a declaration in the language of the memorandum he could obtain the Pope's consent to immediate ratification of the Concordat.	419	786
Sept. 8	<i>Memorandum by the Chargé d'Affaires of the Embassy to the Holy See</i> Records the formula agreed upon for a statement by the German Government in connection with the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Concordat.	422	789
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Signature of the Concordat and exchange of instruments of ratification.		790
Sept. 12	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires of the Embassy to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that on the occasion of ratification of the Concordat the Cardinal Secretary of State handed Klee a memorandum concerning its implementation, which he refused to accept as it contained a section on dismissal of Catholic officials and discrimination against Catholics of Jewish descent. The memorandum was then withdrawn and another without this section substituted. Later a separate memorandum on these subjects was transmitted.	425	793

## VATICAN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 Oct. 14	<i>The Ambassador to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports information from the Cardinal Secretary of State that a note had been drafted protesting against the increasing number of violations of the Concordat and oppression of the Catholics, and that the Pope intended to come out in an address against the acts he objected to in Germany. Bergen warned Cardinal Pacelli against carrying out such steps.	501	927

## WORLD ECONOMIC CONFERENCE

1933 Jan. 31	<i>Circular of the Foreign Ministry</i> Describes the results of the second meeting of the Preparatory Committee of Experts for the World Economic Conference. It is believed that the antitheses in the views of the individual governments which appeared in the meetings of the experts will persist in the meetings of the full Conference. Missions should avoid any derogatory appraisal of the report of the experts.	4	8
Mar. 8	<i>The Ambassador in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Describes his first conversation with Secretary of State Hull. Prittwitz conveyed the German wish to get in touch with the Americans about the preparation of the World Economic Conference. Hull said that international cooperation for the solution of the world economic problem was the most urgent task.	62	125
Apr. 7	<i>The Ambassador in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Under Secretary of State Phillips who discussed the proposed visit of MacDonald; conveys an invitation for the Chancellor or other member of the Cabinet or a special envoy to come to Washington for discussions preliminary to the World Economic Conference.	143	263
[Apr. 7]	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Outlines, for the Foreign Minister's use in conversation with Norman Davis, the German position with regard to arrangements for the World Economic Conference and lists the subjects considered most important for Germany. At the top of the list is final settlement of the short-term external debts, followed by adjustment of long-term debts to changed commodity prices.	144	264
Apr. 10	<i>Minute by Ministerialdirektor Ritter</i> Describes his conversations with Norman Davis and Allen Dulles regarding preliminaries to the World Economic Conference. Its date of meeting, composition of delegations and the matter of a preliminary conference were discussed. Ritter also presented the German point of view on certain substantive questions, such as foreign debts and tariffs, likely to come up for discussion at the Conference.	148	273

## WORLD ECONOMIC CONFERENCE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 Apr. 10	<i>State Secretary Bülow to Foreign Minister Neurath</i> Discusses the matter of German representation at conversations in Washington preliminary to the World Economic Conference. Appointment of Schacht might place Ambassador Luther in a difficult position. Advised against Nadolny's proposed trip to Rome.	149	276
Apr. 15	<i>The President of the Reichsbank to the Reich Chancellor</i> Requests a decision by Hitler on the line to be followed regarding the World Economic Conference.	160	293
Apr. 16	<i>The Reich Minister of Economics to the Reich Chancellor</i> Suggests that the German attitude with respect to the World Economic Conference requires early and thorough discussion by the Cabinet. Doubts that an early convocation of the Conference is desirable. Advocates retaining complete control of the German market for agricultural products and argues that the way to revive purchasing power is not by eliminating customs barriers but by reviving the health of the individual national economies. Suggests a special import levy the proceeds of which would be used to promote German exports.	161	293
Apr. 21	<i>The Ambassador in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the President upon presenting credentials; requests instructions for forthcoming talk with Roosevelt regarding the World Economic Conference.	174	322
Apr. 24	<i>Minutes of the Meeting of the Economic Policy Committee of the Reich Government, Held at the Reich Chancellery, on Monday, April 24, 1933, From 6:00 to 9:30 p. m.</i> Discussion, presided over by Hitler, of the German position to be taken at the World Economic Conference and of the related problems of German economic policy.	182	334
Apr. 25	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the United States</i> Directs that President Roosevelt be informed that President of the Reichsbank Schacht will be despatched to Washington in response to the American invitation for discussions preliminary to the World Economic Conference.	185	344
May 5	<i>Extract From the Minutes of the Cabinet Session of May 5, 1933</i> Discussion of the reply to be made to the American proposal of a tariff truce in the period preceding the opening of the World Economic Conference. It was opposed by the Minister of Economics, but the Foreign Minister thought the answer could not be a flat "no". The views of the Foreign Minister were adopted in principle.	210	380
May 12	<i>Extract From the Minutes of the Cabinet Session of May 12, 1933, 11:45 a. m.</i> Further discussion of the American proposal for a tariff truce in the period preceding the opening of the World Economic Conference. The Minister of Economics expressed opposition, but it was decided to agree to the proposal, adding a general reservation.	224	406

## WORLD ECONOMIC CONFERENCE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 May 12	<i>Minute by Ministerialdirektor Ritter</i> Contains the text of the reply to the American proposal for a tariff truce in the period preceding the opening of the World Economic Conference as formulated after the Cabinet session and communicated to Ambassador Hoesch in London.	225	408
May 13	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records that the Italian Ambassador brought up the memorandum which he had received from Reich Minister Hugenberg advancing the idea of a bloc of European states which might collect a 5 percent special customs levy at the frontiers of the bloc, the proceeds to be used for debt reduction. The Ambassador had told Hugenberg that Italy could not go along with such a plan.	229	413
June 1	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Reich Minister of Economics</i> States that Hitler has designated the Foreign Minister to be head of the German delegation to the World Economic Conference. In the material respect the Ministry of Economics will hold first place.	277	506
June 14	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry</i> Summarizes the opening of the Conference.	309	560
June 14	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Submits the text of the speech which Hugenberg intended to deliver before the Economic Commission of the World Economic Conference, but which was released to the press instead.	312	562
June 19	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Krestinsky, after a serious conversation about the Hugenberg memorandum, asked for a statement from the Reich Government in the matter.	325	581
June 20	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Replies to Dirksen's request for information about the Hugenberg memorandum. The Soviet interpretation of the memorandum is incomprehensible. Germany's policy toward the Soviet Union has not been changed in any way.	327	584
June 22	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador who presented a note protesting against the Hugenberg memorandum.	331	590
June 23	<i>Extract From the Minutes of the Conference of Ministers, Held at the Reich Chancellery, Following the Cabinet Session on June 23, 1933, 4:15 p. m.</i> Discussion of the problems which had come up at the World Economic Conference.	335	598
June 24	<i>The Reich Minister of Economics to the Foreign Minister</i> In reply to Neurath's request for a statement concerning Soviet complaints about his memorandum, Hugenberg contends that there is no cause for Soviet objections to his statements and no reason for him to give any explanation.	336	603

## WORLD ECONOMIC CONFERENCE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1933 June 27	<i>Extract From the Minutes of the Conference of Ministers and Cabinet Session on June 27, 1933, 5:30 p. m.</i> Discussion of the political situation apropos of Hugenberg's decision to resign.	338	607
July 7	<i>A Member of the German Delegation to the World Economic Conference to the Foreign Ministry</i> States that criticism expressed by State Secretary Posse at the World Economic Conference with respect to establishment of new industries in the world had been distorted by Soviet propaganda and had met with objections on the part of the Turkish delegation; suggests that the Turkish Ambassador in Berlin be informed as to what Posse actually meant.	355	640
Aug. 1	<i>Burgomaster Krogmann to Foreign Minister Neurath</i> Forwards a copy of the report to Hitler summarizing the results of the World Economic Conference.  (See also under "Great Britain," and "Financial Questions.")	386	712

## YUGOSLAVIA

1933 Mar. 16	<i>Ministerialdirektor Köpke to Ambassador Hassell</i> Discusses the question of German mediation in Yugoslav-Italian relations; concludes that such a role would not be understood in Rome or Paris.	99	182
June 1	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that in a long conversation, King Alexander expressed opposition to any revision of the peace treaties outside the League of Nations, but displayed understanding for Germany's dissatisfaction with her eastern borders; he was also in favor of a closer Austro-German relationship and expressed sympathy for some features of the National Socialist regime; he also stated his concern that a closer German-Italian relationship might induce Italy to adopt a more aggressive attitude toward Yugoslavia.	279	508
June 30	<i>The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the Yugoslav attitude regarding revision of the territorial clauses of the peace treaties.	345	617

*Circular of the State Secretary*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, January 30, 1933.

e. o. Ref. D. 49.

For Chief of Mission personally.

After it became evident that, as a result of the opposition of almost all parties, the political pressure upon the Schleicher Cabinet had immeasurably increased, while on the other hand with the revival of the so-called Harzburg front<sup>2</sup> a new basis was at hand, the President did not feel that he was in a position to entrust Chancellor von Schleicher with the powers to dissolve the Reichstag and accepted the subsequent resignation of the whole Cabinet.

With respect to the forming today of the Hitler Cabinet I expect you, in view of the foreign comments so far, to exert a calming influence. As guidance for your conversations I point out that

(1) in its composition as available to date, the new Cabinet conforms to the earlier expressed wish of the President to enlist, on the basis of the Constitution, the cooperation of the largest German party; and furthermore that the effective participation of the German National party and the Stahlhelm has been achieved. Still pending negotiations with the Center party and the Bavarian People's party about participation or abstaining from opposition might even result in a working majority in the Reichstag;

(2) any apprehensions regarding future German foreign policy should preferably be met by reference to the Foreign Minister, who has been a member of the last two Cabinets and who has again been called because of the confidence of the President to conduct foreign policy. Continuity of policies is likewise guaranteed by such persons as Reich Minister of Finance Count Schwerin [von] Krosigk with respect to the continuation of financial and currency policies and General von Blomberg, who is known abroad as a member of the Disarmament delegation;

(3) as for German domestic politics, Germany had studiously avoided, and would continue to avoid, making her attitude toward other countries dependent upon the tenets of whatever Government

<sup>1</sup> Sent to all Diplomatic Missions as well as to the Consulates General at Danzig and Geneva.

<sup>2</sup> A political alliance of extreme right-wing groups, such as the National Socialists, the German National party, and the Stahlhelm; it was formally brought into being at a rally of these organizations held in Bad Harzburg in Brunswick in October 1931.

happened to be in office at the time. In this respect German necessities and conditions are the sole determining facts of the future government policies of the German Government.

BÜLOW

No. 2

4624/E203066-70

*M. René P. Duchemin to Dr. Hermann Bücher*<sup>1</sup>

Établissements Kuhlmann

PARIS, January 30, 1933.  
11, rue de la Baume—VIIIe.

MY DEAR DOCTOR: With reference to our conversations on January 29 and 30, I take pleasure in forwarding to you the enclosed résumé of these conversations, with respect to which we have reached agreement.

In view of the fact that a new German Government has been formed, my French colleagues and I would appreciate it if you would let us know whether this new Government is in agreement with the content of the statements which you have made to us.

It would indeed be of great importance for us to have your reply before we ourselves forward the résumé of these conversations to the new Foreign Minister of our country.<sup>2</sup>

Accept, etc.

R. P. DUCHEMIN

[Enclosure]

PROTOCOL OF THE CONVERSATIONS ON JANUARY 29 AND 30, 1933<sup>3</sup>

*Present:*

On the German side:	Geheimrat Bosch, Geheimrat Bücher,
On the French side:	MM. Duchemin, W. d'Ormesson, Parmentier
On the Belgian and Luxembourg side:	MM. Barbanson, Guth, Al. Meyer

<sup>1</sup> The document and its enclosure are in French. Duchemin was a French industrialist and president of Établissements Kuhlmann. Bücher was a German industrialist, president of Allgemeine Elektrizitäts Gesellschaft.

Marginal note: "Original presented to the Foreign Minister by Herr von Papen. Three copies made; copy No. 3 given to Ambassador Köster for information. Völckers, Feb. 7."

Marginal note in Neurath's handwriting: "Strictly confidential."

<sup>2</sup> On Jan. 31, Joseph Paul-Boncour, who had been Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs since Dec. 22, 1932, became Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet of Daladier.

<sup>3</sup> Bülow in a memorandum of Feb. 7 describes these as "the Luxembourg conversations" (4624/E203071-72). Documents on earlier phases of these discussions among French, German, Belgian, and Luxembourg industrialists, beginning in 1931, are filmed on serial K 516.

### I. *The Polish Corridor*

Having examined the various solutions proposed with regard to the Polish Corridor, the German members state that they believe that Germany would be able to cooperate without mental reservations in the establishment of a firm peace in Europe, and in full collaboration with France and Poland in the political and economic fields, subject only to the following territorial stipulations: \*

1. Reestablishment of land communication between the German Reich and East Prussia through abolition of the Corridor.

Although the German members are not in a position to define precisely the new boundary to be established, they believe that Germany would accept a frontier passing at a certain distance to the south of the Berlin-Danzig railway line, so that the territorial cession to be agreed to by Poland would comprise the entire territory northward of that boundary extending to the sea.

2. Rectifications of the frontiers in Upper Silesia, in such a manner as to facilitate operation of the various industrial enterprises, without substantial diminution of either Poland's territory or the composition of her industries.

3. Return to Germany of the territory of Danzig now under control of the League of Nations.

The German members propose as compensation for Poland:

a. That in order to provide Poland with an outlet to the sea, entirely under its sovereignty, a solution be sought involving the Memel Territory, which would have the support of the German Government; <sup>4</sup>

b. That Poland be given guarantees designed to assure the free flow of goods to or from the ports of Danzig or Gdynia, <sup>5</sup> which would henceforth be under German sovereignty; free zones in these ports should to this end be set aside for Poland:

c. That Germany, in return for the port of Gdynia, also grant to Poland an indemnity to enable her to construct a new port and assure the construction of a railroad line connecting with it;

d. That all problems arising out of the cession of the Corridor be examined in a spirit conducive to solutions involving the minimum inconvenience for those concerned;

e. That Germany enter into commercial agreements with Poland calculated to restore the Polish economy, particularly by assuring her of her natural markets;

f. That Germany, in accord with France, guarantee to Poland not only her new frontier with Germany, but her other frontiers as well.

4. The German members furthermore declare that it is Germany's desire to pursue a policy of friendship toward Poland and that such policy of friendship is not possible unless the question of the Corridor is settled in accordance with their demands.

\* See paragraph V, the Question of the Mandates. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>4</sup> Marginal note in Bülow's handwriting: "Dangerous."

<sup>5</sup> Marginal note in Bülow's handwriting: "Also [one word illegible] Stettin."



5. They hold that the question of the Corridor far transcends a territorial question involving a few square kilometers more or less to be ceded by Poland to Germany, since the solution of the Corridor is one of the essential conditions for the establishment of a European community, of which Poland would protect the eastern frontier.

## II. *Armament and Security*

In regard to the problem of armament and security, settlement of the preceding issue would lead to a political arrangement in Europe whereby:

1. Germany, Belgium, France, and Poland <sup>6</sup> would mutually guarantee their security;

2. The signatory powers, within the framework of this security pact, would determine by joint agreement, and regulate by means of a continuing collaboration of their General Staffs, their armament requirements and the composition of their military forces, the respective sizes of these forces having previously been established by a permanent accord;

3. A common policy would also be drafted and applied in the matter of disarmament;

4. The countries which have acceded to the Locarno Treaties <sup>7</sup> would be eligible to join the new pact if they agree to accept the obligations thereof.

## III. *Reparations*

The participants in this meeting hold that since the conclusion of the Lausanne pacts <sup>8</sup> the reparations problem no longer constitutes an obstacle to a Franco-German rapprochement.

The Belgian and the French participants point out, however, that ratification of the Lausanne agreements is still subject to a settlement of the international debt problem.

## IV. *Economic Cooperation*

The economic cooperation already undertaken between France and Germany, which is inherent in the nature of the situation, would be greatly facilitated by conclusion of a political accord; it could be developed as a regional arrangement, encompassing Belgium and Poland and possibly other European nations.

Such an accord would unquestionably be much more efficacious than any universal plan in accomplishing the dismantling of tariff barriers and resumption of international trade.

## V. *The Question of the Mandates*

The question of the mandates was raised. The German members stated that it was strictly a *French* concern, indicating however that

<sup>6</sup> Marginal note in Bülow's handwriting: Czech[oslovakia].

<sup>7</sup> Signed Oct. 16, 1925; League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. LIV, p. 289.

<sup>8</sup> The Lausanne Agreement of July 9, 1932, between Germany and her principal creditor countries, provided for the abolition of reparations. It was accompanied by a so-called "Gentlemen's Agreement" that the Lausanne Agreement would not be ratified until a satisfactory agreement was reached between those nations and their own creditors. The texts are printed as British White Paper, Cmd. 4126 (1932) and 4129 (1932).

the voluntary transfer of a mandate to Germany under a general accord would be of considerable psychological importance with regard to German public opinion.

## No. 3

8598/791609-14

*Minutes of the Conference of Ministers, Held at the Reich  
Chancellery, on January 31, 1933, at 4 p. m.<sup>1</sup>*

Rk. 938;  
939;  
940.

*Present :*

Reich Chancellor	Hitler
Vice Chancellor and Reich Commissar of Prussia	von Papen
Foreign Minister	Freiherr von Neurath
Reich Minister of Interior	Dr. Frick
Reich Minister of Finance	Count Schwerin von Krosigk
Reich Minister of Economics, Food and Agriculture	Dr. Hugenberg
Reich Minister of Labor	Seldte
Reich Minister of Justice <sup>2</sup>	
Reichswehr Minister	von Blomberg
Reich Minister without Portfolio and Reich Commissar for Air	Göring
Reich Commissar for Employ- ment	Dr. Gereke
State Secretary in the Reich Chancellery	Dr. Lammers
State Secretary in the Reich President's Office	Dr. Meissner
Reich Press Chief :	Ministerialdirektor Funk
Recording Official :	Ministerialrat W i e n - stein

(1) Draft of a decree amending the Decree of July 20, 1932, relating to the restoration of public safety and order in the territory of the State of Prussia.

<sup>1</sup> The Minutes of the Conference of Ministers held on Jan. 30 (3598/791603-08) are printed in *Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal* (Nuremberg, 1947), vol. xxv, document No. 351-PS, pp. 369-376. An English translation is in *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946), vol. III, pp. 272-275.

<sup>2</sup> There is no name listed against this entry.

The Chancellor read the content of the attached draft<sup>\*</sup> of a decree amending the Decree of July 20, 1932, relating to the restoration of public safety and order in the territory of the State of Prussia.

The Cabinet approved the draft in the attached version.

## (2) Political Situation

The Reich Chancellor reported about his conversation on the morning of January 31 with representatives of the Center party, Prelate Dr. Kaas and Dr. Perlitius. The representatives had told him that they did not wish to join the Government at this time. They did not consider abstention from opposition to the Cabinet by the Center party impossible.

He, the Reich Chancellor, had immediately asked them whether they would consent to an extended adjournment of the Reichstag, perhaps for a year. He had received the answer that the Center party could not at once consent to the adjournment for a whole year, but at the most to an adjournment for 2 months at a time. Anyway, it was not out of the question that in this way an adjournment for a whole year would be possible. But such an attitude of the Center party would depend on the answers to a series of questions which Prelate Kaas wanted to send him, the Reich Chancellor, today in writing. As Prelate Kaas further said, the Center party would consider a coalition only if this would include Prussia. The Center party representatives had not been able to deny in the conversation that a very great portion of the German people stood behind the present Government.

He wanted to sum up the result of the conversation with the representatives of the Center party to the effect that an adjournment for a year could not be obtained with certainty. Perhaps he could talk once more about the course of the conversation and the further development of the political situation with Reich Minister Dr. Hugenberg personally.

The Reich Minister of Economics, Food and Agriculture stated he would be very glad to have that talk.

The Reich Chancellor further stated that he thought it possible in case of a new election to have 51 percent of the Reichstag backing the present Government. He had talked on the morning of January 31 with a number of Gauleiters of the NSDAP, who had also confirmed that. In his opinion further negotiations with the Center party were useless so that a new election would be unavoidable.

The Vice Chancellor and Reich Commissar of Prussia stated that it would be best to decide even now that the coming election of the Reichstag was to be the last one and a return to the parliamentary system was to be avoided forever.

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<sup>\*</sup> Not printed (3598/791615).

The Reich Chancellor declared that he wished to make the following binding promises:

- (a) The outcome of the new election of the Reichstag is to have no influence on the composition of the present Government;
- (b) The forthcoming election of the Reichstag is to be the last election. Any return to the parliamentary system is to be absolutely avoided.

The Reich Minister of Finance pointed out that by the votes in the committees of the Reichstag gradually some impossible situations were arising for the Reich Government. The Government parties must immediately declare that in view of the political situation they demanded the adjournment of the committees. If adjournment could not be obtained, the representatives of the Government parties must dissolve the committees of the Reichstag and in this way prevent them from passing resolutions.

No objections were made to this motion of the Reich Minister of Finance.

The Reich Chancellor then read a letter meanwhile received from Prelate Kaas, containing the questions to the Reich Government promised by him. The Reich Chancellor declared that it was not possible to go into the details at this time. To deal with the individual questions satisfactorily, if one really wanted to do so, would mean several weeks' work. In his opinion a detailed substantive reply could not be given.

The Reich Minister of Economics, Food and Agriculture pointed out that it was urgently necessary to depose the so-called sovereign Braun Government<sup>4</sup> in Prussia as soon as possible. Otherwise the civil servants in Prussia would get into an intolerable situation.

The Chancellor assented in principle to this point of view. He then turned to the future work of the Reich Government and stated that an extension of the protection against distraint was urgently needed in the interest of the German farmer. In his view, distraint proceedings against farming property must be suspended with respect to all claims that had arisen prior to the appointment of the present Cabinet.

It was decided to discuss this question in detail in a meeting of the economic committee of the Government to be held on February 1, at 12 o'clock noon.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> The German Supreme Court on Oct. 25, 1932, had ruled that the Presidential Decree of July 20, 1932, appointing a Reich Commissar of Prussia and removing Prussian Minister President Otto Braun and his Cabinet from office was constitutional, but that the Decree could not deprive the Prussian Cabinet of the power to represent Prussia in her relations with the Reich, the Prussian Diet and other German states.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed (9048/E633920-23).

A Ministers' Conference<sup>6</sup> for the discussion of the political situation was set for 11:30 a. m. on February 1 following the visit of the Reich Chancellor and Vice Chancellor with the Reich President.

State Secretary Meissner pointed out that it was possible to dissolve the Prussian Diet by a decree based on art. 48 of the Reich Constitution. Such a decree will have to be based on the decision of the Supreme Court for Constitutional Questions [*Staatsgerichtshofs*] that unity in the leadership of the State, the Reich and Prussia was required.

The Vice Chancellor and Reich Commissar of Prussia stated that in his opinion it would be best if the President would appoint himself State President of Prussia.

State Secretary Meissner expressed certain objections to this proposal and said it would be best to obtain a voluntary dissolution of the Prussian Diet. If such a voluntary dissolution could not be attained, a dissolution on the basis of art. 48 of the Reich Constitution could then be considered. In any case it would be necessary that the so-called sovereign Braun Government should soon disappear.

The Cabinet approved these statements.

Recorded:  
WIENSTEIN, February 3

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\* Document No. 7.

## No. 4

9245/E651522-29

### *Circular of the Foreign Ministry<sup>1</sup>*

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, January 31, 1933.  
e. o. W 790.

With reference to our circular instruction No. W 161 of January 12, 1933.<sup>2</sup>

The Preparatory Committee of Experts for the World Economic Conference held its second meeting in Geneva between January 9 and 19.<sup>3</sup> As appears from the above-mentioned instruction, the Committee confined itself in November to a discussion of the economic and financial questions that would presumably be treated by the World Economic Conference and recorded the result of the discussion in a summary statement.<sup>4</sup> At the second meeting the attempt was made

<sup>1</sup> The circular was addressed to all Missions (except that at the Vatican), to the Consulates General, and to the Consulate at Geneva.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (9245/E651311-18).

<sup>3</sup> The first meeting had been held Oct. 31-Nov. 9, 1932.

<sup>4</sup> For the report of the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee of Experts upon the work of the Committee, Oct. 31-Nov. 9, 1932, see League of Nations document C. 764.M.361.1932. II.

to establish a suitable basis for the work of the conference by drawing up and explaining in detail a formal agenda. The Committee thereby formally completed the task assigned to it by the Organizing Committee of the League of Nations Council. The draft, a copy of which is enclosed,<sup>5</sup> comprises in addition to the introduction and a general program for the conference a formal agenda consisting of six parts, to which a comprehensive explanation is added. An objective study of the explanation shows, however, that the Committee has not got beyond a statement of the various possibilities in the individual fields. The antithesis in the views of the individual governments have remained the very same, although frequently in a concealed form, as they were found to be previously in the course of the November meeting. To be sure, the German representatives strongly urged that the work of the World Economic Conference be prepared materially as far as possible, especially in the field of economic questions, by drawing up concrete drafts of government agreements. The execution of this plan, however, foundered on the opposition of the other delegations, especially the English representatives. The English Government, obviously in view of the still completely unsettled question of the war debts, wishes to keep a free hand on all sides until the conference meets. In view of this situation the experts had to confine themselves in many cases in the explanations of the agenda to setting down the conflicting views side by side, without its being possible for all of them or even a majority of the experts to decide on any definite solution for the individual problems. The Committee was not blind to the realization that the conclusion of comprehensive agreements, radically affecting the entire economic and financial policy of each individual country, at a government conference to which more than 60 nations are to send representatives will in practice encounter almost insuperable difficulties. It has therefore declared (p. 7, last paragraph) that the success of the conference depends to a large extent on the vigor with which the governments conduct the necessary preliminary negotiations. The prospects for the success of the conference would, it is said, be considerably heightened if the possibilities of mutual concessions were clarified in preliminary negotiations during the coming months.

The Reich Government, which has repeatedly made known by statements from authoritative quarters the decisive importance which it attaches to a successful outcome of the World Economic Conference, will decide on the basis of the experts' report how far such pre-

<sup>5</sup> League of Nations, Monetary and Economic Conference, *Draft Annotated Agenda submitted by the Preparatory Commission of Experts* (Official No.: C.48.M.18.1933.II. [Conf. M. E. I.]).

liminary negotiations with individual governments can be inaugurated with a prospect of success. I am reserving further information on this for communication at the proper time to the Missions in the countries which come into consideration in this connection. For confidential information I wish to state that both the French and the Italians have already expressed the desire for an understanding with Germany about a common procedure.

At the meeting of the Organizing Committee of the League of Nations Council on January 25, at which the opening date of the conference was to be set, England and the United States voiced opposition to any such stipulation at the present time. The English Foreign Minister admitted that the English Government could not yet commit itself, in view of the status of the debt question. The American representative stated that the decision of the incoming Democratic administration could not be anticipated at the time. Although on the German side it was said that it was necessary to fix the date for the beginning of the conference soon, the Organizing Committee of the Council was forced, after these statements by the Anglo-Saxon representatives, to agree finally on a compromise proposal according to which the Committee is to meet again within a period of 3 months and then set a date for the beginning of the conference. The Organizing Committee unanimously proposed as president of the conference the English Prime Minister, MacDonald; the Council, too, adopted this proposal unanimously. The decisions concerning the list of participants at the conference which were taken by the Council on the basis of the proposals of the Organizing Committee may be seen from annex 2.<sup>6</sup> I wish to remark on this point that the participation of the International Chamber of Commerce in the work of the conference, even though it is only loose, is due to its advocacy by the German member of the Organizing Committee.

The foregoing statements, just as the annexed critical appraisal of the report,<sup>7</sup> are intended only for the information of the Mission officials themselves. In conversations about the prospects of the conference I request that it be emphasized, especially to the press, that the Reich Government fully approves of the statements in the introduction of the report, where the responsibility of all governments for a successful outcome of the conference is strongly emphasized. In that connection I request that it be especially emphasized that in the unanimous opinion of all the experts only joint action in all fields can lead to a restoration of healthy conditions. In the discussions

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<sup>6</sup> League of Nations document C.68.1933.II.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed (9245/E651537-47).

of the Committee the attempt has repeatedly been made to give some measures a certain priority over others. For example, the French and the English have tried in the field of economic policy to designate the elimination of obstacles to trade (quotas, foreign exchange restrictions, etc.) as especially urgent, and, on the other hand, to push into the background the question of customs duties, which in the German view is just as important. The German representatives have opposed these efforts and it has been possible in all important fields to put over the idea that only a simultaneous reversal of the crisis policy followed thus far in finance and economy will open a way out of the crisis. That does not mean, however, that from the German point of view all the problems up for discussion are equally important. Even if the negotiations now taking place in Berlin lead to a one-year extension of the Standstill Agreement,<sup>8</sup> the settlement of the short-term debt constitutes the most important and urgent problem for Germany. I request that this be emphasized in all conversations.

In relation to the public any derogatory appraisal of the experts' report must be avoided, if only for psychological reasons. Public opinion, the skepticism of which is justified after the meager results of previous international conferences, must not, in any case through official German statements, be confirmed in the view that no economic or financial improvement can be expected from the conference. It must be made clear, however, that the readiness of the individual governments to make decisions and take responsibility will be decisive for the outcome of the conference. Only if they can decide under the pressure of public opinion, even though it should be at some sacrifice, to renounce the policy of mutual isolation [*Abkapslung*] hitherto followed, will it be possible to bring about the increased freedom of movement of goods and capital which the experts term indispensable.

In so far as any noteworthy statements about the probable attitude of the individual governments to the various problems of the conference come to light there in conversations with leading political or economic personalities or in the press of the area in which you are accredited, I request that this be regularly reported.

By order:  
RITTER

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<sup>8</sup> See document No. 30.



## No. 5

9588/E675706-16

*The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Rumania*BERLIN, January 31, 1933.  
zu II Balk. 231 R.<sup>1</sup>

With reference to report No. 257 of January 28.<sup>2</sup>

In a conversation that the Rumanian Minister had with the State Secretary on January 30, he referred of his own accord to the interview that Minister Titulescu recently gave to the Hungarian paper *Az Est*.<sup>3</sup>

Herr Comnen stated that he had corresponded with Bucharest concerning this interview and even talked on the telephone personally with Titulescu. The proposal for a union of the southeastern European agrarian countries on a preferential basis was meant in all seriousness. In contrast to the Tardieu plan, it was not associated with political intentions. Titulescu had employed the figure of a three-story building. The southeastern European agrarian countries were to occupy the ground floor; on the next floor were to be quartered the countries like Germany and Italy which were directly interested in the southeast and which, on the basis of their relations, deserved special consideration; and on the top floor the other countries: England, France, America.

With reference to these statements, the Minister asked whether we were not prepared in some form or other to demonstrate publicly our sympathy for such plans. The State Secretary rejected this idea, on the grounds that we were completely taken up with the preparation of the World Economic Conference and within this framework first had to study and work out the financial problems which, in turn, could alone provide the basis for an economic structure. The preliminary condition for possible later consideration by us of such ideas was al-

<sup>1</sup> II Balk. 231 R: Not printed (2980/581378-79). This is a memorandum by Bülow of his conversation with Rumanian Minister Petrescu-Comnen on Jan. 30.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (6070/E449322-27). This is a report by Schulenburg on a visit to Rumania by the Yugoslav King and Queen.

<sup>3</sup> In this interview Titulescu had stated, according to a summary sent to several German Missions, "that an economic collaboration by way of an entente between Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania was possible. This entente would be based on preferential duties, but would respect the rights of all nations and show consideration for the special interests of individual central European countries. As far as the Tardieu plan was concerned, although its formula of last year had proved abortive, it should not be regarded as finished. It was only postponed; the future, however, belonged to this plan." (9588/E675711)

The Tardieu plan, proposed at a conference of the four European Great Powers held at London in April 1932, suggested close economic cooperation among the five Danubian States on the basis of reciprocal customs preferences and a quota system.

ways, to be sure, that they should not involve a reversion to the Tardieu plan, which had fortunately been buried at Stresa.<sup>4</sup>

So far as can be inferred from the Titulescu interview and the explanations of the Rumanian Minister, the Rumanian Foreign Minister in his conception of an economic reorganization within the Danubian area seems to pursue ideas that were propagated by Hantos, the Hungarian economic theorist, with great zeal and in various ways during the negotiations on the Tardieu plan.

The basic thought here, too, seems to be to obtain German and Italian approval of a union of the Danubian countries on a preferential basis by recognizing the special interest of these two Powers in markets for their goods in the Danubian area, not, to be sure, by including them in the preferential system planned, but through granting them a preferential position with respect to the other less interested powers. Under such a system Czechoslovakian industrial exports would be given preference over German exports in these countries. As a result this system also becomes unacceptable to us for the same reasons that led us to reject the Tardieu plan.

Although your view seems to me correct—that it is not so much a seriously intended economic plan which is involved in Titulescu's statements, but rather a purely tactical maneuver intended to reassure Hungary with respect to the results of the visit of the Yugoslav King and at the same time to make a friendly gesture in the direction of France—I would nevertheless ask you when opportunity offers to leave no doubt as to the fact that we would, as in the past, have to reject all economic systems in the Danubian area which would have the effect of pushing our goods out of the markets of the Danubian area. Our geographical situation and, above all, the fact that we are the biggest customer of the Danubian countries, justifies to the fullest extent our claim to at least most-favored treatment in the markets of the Danubian countries. This attitude of ours should really meet with a particularly ready understanding in Rumania, whose most important customer we shall always remain. We are astonished, therefore, that the Rumanian Foreign Minister in his interview has reverted to ideas which have long since proved to be at variance with the actual economic realities.<sup>5</sup>

By order :  
KÖPKE

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<sup>4</sup> At a conference in Stresa, Sept. 5-20, 1932, representatives of 15 European states had adopted a draft convention aimed at improving the economic situation of the southeastern countries by means of a system of preferential tariffs based on bilateral treaties and a common fund for raising the price level of grain. See League of Nations, Commission of Enquiry for European Union: *Report by the Stresa Conference for the Economic Restoration of Central and Eastern Europe* (Stresa, 1932).

<sup>5</sup> A copy of this instruction was sent to the Legation in Budapest with further instructions that the Hungarian Government should not be left in "any doubt as to our opposition to combinations such as are visualized by Titulescu."

## No. 6

4620/E200263-66

*Ambassador Dirksen to State Secretary Bülow*

URGENT

Moscow, January 31, 1933.

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

DEAR BÜLOW: Thank you very much for the telegraphic information which you gave me in telegram No. 13 of January 30<sup>1</sup> concerning the domestic political situation brought about by the Cabinet change and concerning the attitude on foreign policy of the Papen-Hitler Government. You can imagine that the retirement of Schleicher, in whom they had much confidence here respecting his attitude toward Russia, and the summoning of the Hitler-Papen Cabinet has caused great uneasiness here. The concern as regards Herr von Papen has not disappeared here by any means and the National Socialist party is considered to be strongly anti-Soviet—perhaps not entirely unjustly, if one recalls the announcement of a publication about the Red Army in the *Völkischer Beobachter* in which Russia is called Germany's greatest enemy.

I already had an opportunity Saturday evening, when the resignation of the Schleicher Cabinet was announced, to exert a pacifying influence on a number of important people such as Litvinov, Krestinsky, and Radek during a party at the Japanese Embassy. After the formation of the new Cabinet became known yesterday afternoon I was able to continue this conversation with Krestinsky today on the basis of your telegram.

As I have already reported to you by telegram,<sup>2</sup> I had the impression that Krestinsky's lively misgivings were lessened by these communications. In particular a pacifying influence was exerted by the fact that several persons in whom they have confidence here—such as Herr von Neurath, Herr von Krosigk, and General von Blomberg—remained members of the new Cabinet, too, or became such.

Perhaps an even greater cause for Krestinsky's concern than the Hitler-Papen combination was the fact of Herr Hugenberg's entry into the Cabinet. He said this man was a doctrinaire and it was to be feared that he would follow other courses, also in the area of German-Soviet economic policy.

During the conversation I pointed out on my own initiative that in my opinion the attitude of the German Communist party would be important for the future state of German-Soviet relations regarding foreign policy. If the party did not exercise restraint and if as a result of its provocations there were clashes with the National Socialists

<sup>1</sup> Bülow's circular telegram of that date, document No. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram No. 13 of Jan. 31 (1908/429485).

the danger existed that the enmity of the National Socialists toward Communists would also be transferred in the area of foreign policy to enmity toward the Soviets.

Considering the difficulties which will arise for the continuation of our Russian policy owing to the changes which have now occurred, if only on the basis of the attitude here, I would consider it exceedingly desirable if I could come to Berlin for a few days as soon as possible<sup>3</sup> in order to report and confer. One reason for this is that it is known here that I have no personal connections with the National Socialist party. It would therefore increase the effectiveness of my words and be important for my authority if I could speak on the basis of my own conference with those who are the leading persons at present. I should be very grateful to you if you or the Foreign Minister could have me come to Berlin. Could you telegraph me possibly as soon as Thursday, February 2, so that I could leave here on Saturday the fourth and be in Berlin on Monday the sixth? The state treasury would not be put to any expense. Dienstmann could take over for me; he has been working here for the past week.<sup>4</sup>

Yours, etc.

DIRKSEN

<sup>3</sup> Marginal note in Bülow's handwriting: "Not too soon!"

<sup>4</sup> Marginal note in Bülow's handwriting:

"I suggest answering as follows: 'For the Ambassador personally. With reference to your letter to Bülow of January 31st. Am in agreement in principle with your coming here for oral report; however, the time has not yet come—the trip could cause uneasiness here at the present time. Neurath.' B[ülow], Feb. 2."

This marginal note is followed by Neurath's initials. A message to this effect was sent as telegram No. 14 of Feb. 2 (4620/E200267).

## No. 7

3598/791617-19

*Extract From the Minutes of the Conference of Ministers, Held at the Reich Chancellery, on February 1, 1933, at 11:30 a. m.*<sup>1</sup>

Rk. 872.

### (1) *Political Situation*

The Reich Chancellor stated that a united front extending from the trade unions to the Communist party of Germany appeared to be forming against the present Government. The Reich President had declared himself willing to dissolve the Reichstag. He, the Reich Chancellor, was thinking of the slogan "Attack Against Marxism" as the election slogan of the Government.

<sup>1</sup> The complete minutes of this meeting including a list of those present are filmed on 3598/791616-21. The minutes were recorded by Ministerialrat Wienstein of the Reich Chancellery.

Reich Minister Göring pointed out that acts of terrorism on the part of the Communists were becoming increasingly frequent. The police had partly fallen down on the job, especially in the west. Unfortunately, the existing statutes were inadequate, especially for taking action against the press. It was therefore necessary to put the so-called "drawer decree" (*Schubkastenverordnung*) into effect as soon as possible. He had some doubt whether it would be possible to work with the present staff of the Prussian Ministry of Interior.

The Reich Minister of Interior<sup>2</sup> stated that it would be best to hold the election of the Reichstag on March 5. On February 2 he would submit the so-called "drawer decree" to the Cabinet for its decision.<sup>3</sup> It was perhaps advisable for the election to change the election law in a few points. Perhaps the electoral quota of required votes [*Wahlkoeffizient*]<sup>4</sup> for one seat could be increased from 60,000 to 80,000 so that the number of deputies would be reduced or at any rate not increased, which might occur through the increase in the number of persons qualified to vote.

The Chancellor objected to the increase of the electoral quota of required votes, because the German National party might suffer by it. A situation might arise where in some election districts the German Nationals would remain below the increased figures for distributing the votes and then, because they lacked the basic seats, be at a disadvantage with respect to the total number of their seats.

The Reich Minister of Economics, Food and Agriculture<sup>5</sup> agreed with the Chancellor.

It was therefore decided to refrain from increasing the electoral quota of required votes from 60,000 to 80,000 votes.

The Reich Minister of Labor<sup>6</sup> proposed to make the forming of new parties more difficult in such a way that parties not represented in the last Reichstag were to be allowed to participate in the new election only if they could enlist a minimum of 60,000 signatures in one constituency.

The Reich Cabinet adopted this proposal.

State Secretary Dr. Meissner stated that he wanted to draft the decree for dissolution in such a way as to convey the idea that the President had dissolved the Reichstag in order that through the election the German people could express their attitude toward the Government of the national coalition.

<sup>2</sup> Wilhelm Frick.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. document No. 8.

<sup>4</sup> Under the German system of proportional representation each party needed at least 60,000 votes in one constituency to be able to claim, on the basis of this "basic seat" (*Grundmandat*) a share in the distribution of seats in proportion to the votes cast.

<sup>5</sup> Alfred Hugenberg.

<sup>6</sup> Franz Seldte.

The Reich Minister of Labor suggested adding an introductory sentence at the beginning, stating that it had proved impossible to form a parliamentary majority in the Reichstag.

The Cabinet approved this suggestion.

The Reich Minister of Interior pointed out that an agreement had been concluded between the National Socialists and the German Nationals to the effect that the radio and similar facilities of the Reich would be available on an equal footing to both parties for the impending election of the Reichstag.

The Reich Minister of Economics, Food and Agriculture confirmed the accuracy of this statement.

### No. 8

3598/791631-33

*Extract From the Minutes of the Conference of Ministers, Held at the Reich Chancellery, on February 2, 1933, at 6:00 p. m.*<sup>1</sup>

Rk. 1034;  
1035.

#### 3) *Decree for the protection of the German nation*

The Minister of Interior presented the annexed draft of a decree for the protection of the German people.<sup>2</sup>

The Reich Chancellor raised the basic question whether it was psychologically advisable, by putting such a decree into effect, to reduce the Communist menace to total insignificance in the election campaign. He pointed out, moreover, that it would probably be better not to put into effect for the time being the second part, "Protection Against Danger to Vital Enterprises." Perhaps it would be sufficient to put into effect only sections I, II, and IV, and the penal provisions that apply to these sections.

The Vice Chancellor and Commissar of Prussia stated that it was urgently necessary to introduce a fine for political insults in paragraph 9 of the draft.

It was decided to reformulate the draft in a joint conference between the Reich Ministry of Interior and the Reich Ministry of Justice, taking into consideration the wishes expressed, discuss it again in the Reich Cabinet the next day, and then adopt it.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The complete minutes of this meeting including a list of those present are filmed on 3598/791628-35. The minutes were recorded by Ministerialrat Wienstein of the Reich Chancellery.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (3598/791636-58).

<sup>3</sup> The decree as adopted was published in the *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1933, I, p. 35, under date of Feb. 4.

4) *Outside the agenda: election propaganda*

The Reich Minister of Interior pointed out that the Reich Government hardly had any funds available for the impending election campaign. In the Reich Ministry of Interior a total of 15,000 reichsmarks each from the fund for the protection of the Republic and the fund for information came into consideration for the election campaign. In addition, the funds of the Reich Central Office for Domestic Information [*Reichszentrale für Heimatdienst*]<sup>4</sup> would naturally have to be employed for the election campaign. In all, however, only quite small sums were available. The Brüning Government had operated on a grand scale in the election campaign and had spent 500,000 reichsmarks for so-called objective information, but actually for the election campaign. In his opinion 1 million reichsmarks should be placed at the disposal of the Reich Government for the election campaign.

The Reich Minister of Finance<sup>5</sup> pointed out that the Braun Government had always been criticized for using official funds for the election campaign. The present Reich Government, which was publicizing the idea of integrity in public life, should not expose itself to the same criticism that had been raised against the Braun Government.

The Reich Chancellor agreed with the statements of the Reich Minister of Finance and also emphasized that he did not favor the proposal of the Minister of Interior. A certain amount of propaganda by the Reich Government was, to be sure, necessary and possible in so far as the Reich Government's appeal to the German people and the projected general balance sheet of the Government would have to be circulated by posters and similar means.

The Foreign Minister and the Reich Minister of Economics, Food and Agriculture spoke in the same sense as the Chancellor.

The Reich Cabinet adopted a decision to that effect.

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<sup>4</sup> The functions of this Office which was established in 1921 were defined at the time as "objective information about questions of foreign and economic policy and social and cultural questions, not in the spirit of individual parties, but from the point of view of the state as a whole."

<sup>5</sup> Count von Schwerin-Krosigk.

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[EDITORS' NOTE. The opening of this volume coincides with a new phase of the Disarmament Conference which, a year before, had begun its sessions at Geneva with representatives of fifty-nine countries present. In connection with the discussions on disarmament during the preceding year the following highlights may be noted:

1. On July 22, 1932, the German representative had announced that Germany would not continue to participate in the Conference unless the general principle of equality of rights was recognized as applicable

to Germany; and when the Bureau of the Conference had resumed meetings on September 23, 1932, Germany was not represented.

2. Meanwhile, in a speech on July 26, 1932, Reichswehr Minister Schleicher developed the idea that, as a corollary to recognition of equality of rights, Germany would press for a reorganization of the Reichswehr by introducing shorter terms of service for members of the Reichswehr itself, thereby increasing the total number of trained effectives; at the same time it was proposed to supplement the Reichswehr by a newly organized militia. The German position on these matters was then officially communicated to the French Ambassador in Berlin in a memorandum of August 29, 1932, in which the plan for the proposed militia was defined as "the short-term training of a special compulsory militia for the purpose of maintaining internal order as well as for the protection of the frontiers and coastal regions."

3. The French Government, in its turn, defined its position in a memorandum of November 14, 1932, submitted to the General Conference. A special organization of the European states was proposed by the French, and this organization was to be charged with functions not only of a military, but also of a political, character. As for the military aspects of the French proposals, the characteristic feature was that all members of the European organization should have a standardized type of "national short-service army with limited effectives." Actually the main points of the French memorandum had already been stated by Herriot in a speech before the French Chamber of Deputies on October 28, 1932, and in subsequent references the French proposals were often called simply "the Herriot plan."

4. Direct discussions between representatives of France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States resulted, on December 11, 1932, in a Five Power Declaration the text of which is printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1932*, volume I, pages 527-528, and reads as follows:

"(1) The Governments of the United Kingdom, France and Italy have declared that one of the principles that should guide the Conference on Disarmament should be the grant to Germany, and to the other Powers disarmed by Treaty, of equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations, and that this principle should find itself embodied in the Convention containing the conclusions of the Disarmament Conference.

"This declaration implies that the respective limitations of the armaments of all States should be included in the proposed Disarmament Convention. It is clearly understood that the methods of application of such equality of rights will be discussed by the Conference.

"(2) On the basis of this declaration, Germany has signified its willingness to resume its place at the Disarmament Conference.

"(3) The Governments of the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy are ready to join in a solemn reaffirmation to be made by all



European States that they will not in any circumstances attempt to resolve any present or future differences between the signatories by resort to force. This shall be done without prejudice to fuller discussions on the question of security.

"(4) The five Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy declare that they are resolved to co-operate in the Conference with the other States there represented in seeking without delay to work out a Convention which shall effect a substantial reduction and a limitation of armaments with provision for future revision with a view to further reduction."

5. The new phase of the Disarmament Conference, with a German representative again present, opened with a meeting of the Bureau of the Conference on January 23, 1933, followed by the convening of the General Commission on February 2. The General Commission had begun its work with a general discussion of the French memorandum of November 14, 1932.]

## No. 9

3154/668461-62

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, February 6, 1933.

RM 154.

During his visit on February 4 the French Ambassador got around to speaking of the work of the Disarmament Conference and German-French relations in general. He said that the development in Geneva was not very promising, but on the other hand it was absolutely necessary to arrive at the conclusion of a convention. In order to achieve this result he considered the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between France and Germany to be exceedingly desirable. Within the framework of such a pact, preferably providing for the obligation of mutual assistance in case of an attack by a third power, the German wishes in regard to re-equipment of our present armed forces could also be fulfilled in that the individual troop units to be provided by the two contracting parties in case the obligation to render assistance should arise could be stipulated in detail. At the same time the homogeneous character of the defense system could be arranged in this manner.

In response to the question of the Ambassador as to my position on this idea, I said I could imagine that such a pact could be useful if it were concluded exclusively between Germany and France. To my knowledge, however, France had already concluded similar treaties with other countries, such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. Thus, for example, should Germany come into conflict with one of

these countries, France would be free to choose to which side she wanted to give her support. This discretionary position of France made the value of concluding such an assistance pact appear questionable to me. The Ambassador then suggested that one might at least let the idea be discussed in Geneva between Paul-Boncour and Herr Nadolny. I answered that I naturally had no objections to a discussion; perhaps in the process it would also become clear how Paul-Boncour or the French Government visualized the details of the implementation of the pact.<sup>1</sup>

V. N[EURATH]

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. document No. 165.

## No. 10

4620/E200268-69

*State Secretary Bülow to Ambassador Dirksen*

BERLIN, February 6, 1933.

DEAR DIRKSEN: Thank you very much for your letter of January 21 [31].<sup>1</sup> I already realized from your telephone call<sup>2</sup> that there is unrest in Moscow. I believe that they overestimate there the importance in terms of foreign policy of the change of government. When they have the responsibility the National Socialists are naturally different people and pursue a different policy than they proclaimed before. It was always like this, and it is the same with all parties. The persons of Neurath and also of Blomberg guarantee the continuity of the previous political relations. Nor need the persecution of Communists in Germany affect our relations.

As we have already telegraphed you,<sup>3</sup> we have misgivings about complying at this time with your suggestion that you come to Berlin for a few days to report. In the first place, your visit could arouse the impression that something is going on in our Russian policy; in particular, however, for reasons of personnel policy we want to keep our Ambassadors in motion as little as possible. We could no longer call off a visit by Köster that had been in preparation for a long time, but we hope it will remain entirely unnoticed. Your trip to Berlin would be conspicuous without a doubt. However, we shall keep the matter in mind and take advantage of a suitable moment to summon you.

Litvinov unfortunately passed through here without calling on anyone at all. Neurath would have been willing to receive him and

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<sup>1</sup> Document No. 6.

<sup>2</sup> No record has been found of this call.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram No. 14 of Feb. 2; see document No. 6, footnote 4.

give him pacifying assurances. Perhaps this can be done on his return trip.<sup>4</sup>

The situation here is much less tense than people abroad seem to suppose. The coming weeks will be devoted to the election campaign. During this period I do not expect any sort of change in foreign policy, and in economic policy only to the extent that this seems unavoidable to the present Government owing to the elections. What these weeks will bring us in this regard cannot be predicted today as yet.

At any rate, please do not let yourself be made uneasy or irritated in any way by any rumors which may circulate, even if they come from Berlin. Things are boiled in water here like everywhere else [*Es wird hier wie anders wo immer noch mit Wasser gekocht*].<sup>5</sup>

Yours, etc.

Bülow

<sup>4</sup> Litvinov was in Geneva for sessions of the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference.

<sup>5</sup> On Feb. 15 Neurath initialed the following instruction (6609 E496952) to the Embassy in Moscow, but it was marked *cessat* at Meyer's suggestion (6609/E496953) and not sent. Cipher letter e. o. IV Ru. 644 of Feb. 22 (document No. 33), was sent instead.

"I took the opportunity today to talk over Russian policy in detail with the Chancellor. The Chancellor is convinced about the importance of the Russian problem and about the necessity to maintain our previous political, economic-political, and military-political line; he will not allow any sort of changes to occur in German policy toward Russia.

"In bringing this to your knowledge, I leave it to your discretion, as occasion offers and in a way which seems suitable, to give knowledge of it orally to the responsible Russian authorities."

## No. 11

4620/E200847-50

*State Secretary Bülow to Ambassador Prittwitz*

BERLIN, February 6, 1933.

DEAR PRITTWITZ: My best thanks for your letter of the 17th of last month.<sup>1</sup> Since it arrived, much has changed here with us. I myself in my letter of the 19th<sup>2</sup> have proved to be a bad prophet, but in this I share the fate of the vast majority of even well-informed persons. We are just now facing an election campaign which will,

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (4620/E200845-46).

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (4620/E200841-44). In this letter Bülow had set down his appraisal of the political situation within Germany and had described the situation respecting the National Socialists in the following terms:

"The National Socialists are not getting along well at all; the party structure has been badly shaken and the financial situation is rather hopeless. Some people are even concerned lest a collapse of the party might possibly come too quickly, so quickly that it will not be possible to absorb the voters and many of them will be delivered up to the Communists."

to be sure, give us a period of rest in the field of purely foreign policy, but which is still unpredictable in its economic aspects, precisely in view of the elections, and may easily lead to unpleasant experiments because of election propaganda. It is difficult to foresee the outcome of the elections. The present Government parties would need an increase of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  million votes for an absolute majority. Most people believe that they will not get this increase. It is difficult to prophesy, however, since the increase in the number of Government votes must come primarily from the participation of habitual non-voters in the decision. If the Government does not obtain an absolute majority, there is still the possibility of broadening the Government's base, as is in fact indicated in the letter from Hitler to Kaas.<sup>3</sup> Besides there is naturally, at least theoretically, also the other possibility of ignoring certain provisions of the Constitution, a development which is difficult for me to conceive of today, however.

Now in reply to the questions in your letter, at the risk of repeating what has already been said earlier: Our rearmament plans can be broadly defined to mean that we wish to continue with the 7 infantry divisions and 3 cavalry divisions of the present Reichswehr if the other countries are prepared to take an appreciable step in the direction of general disarmament. We wish to equip these divisions with material similar to that of the troops of other countries. This means some (a few) batteries of heavy artillery, some few air wings, and possibly a few tanks, should the two latter categories of weapons not be prohibited. We are not thinking of the creation of an army headquarters artillery, a special air arm, etc., which are the core of the offensive power of other countries. In principle, we wish in general only a strengthening of our defensive power and are not only prepared to renounce all offensive weapons ourselves, but are striving at the Disarmament Conference precisely for the elimination of the weapons of offense. This is especially true of heavy artillery, against which we would be powerless for lack of other than field fortifications. Besides the Reichswehr we wish to organize a militia, which is not, however, to be organized like the Swiss militia, but rather in the manner of the American territorials. This is a matter, therefore, of formations with a very brief training period (possibly 3 months; in the opinion of the French, it is possible to speak of soldiers only after they have had a training period of 6 months) and very slight military value.

This militia is to be used for the purpose of being called up locally in case of disorders, threats to the frontier, and similar occasions, and

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<sup>3</sup> Cf. document No. 3.

its main purpose is naturally one of domestic policy: the abolition of all para-military organizations. Finally the desire of the German to be called to the defense of his Fatherland cannot be suppressed, and this so-called Schleicher militia<sup>4</sup> is the most harmless form in which this urge to military service can be satisfied. The so-called Herriot militia<sup>4</sup> is something quite different. It is nothing else than the standardization of the European continental army [*armies*] on the basis of general compulsory military service, and the shortening of the service to some 9 months. This is the logical development of the French "disarmament," which since the end of the war has merely consisted in shortening, time and again, the period of service—at present 1 year. Whether and to what extent we can take kindly to these ideas, practically speaking, depends on the explanations that the Geneva negotiations must bring. In principle, we are prepared, however, to consider this idea more closely, if we get the impression that it can be put into reality. In this respect, the specialists are, to be sure, still very skeptical. Compulsory military service is only of minor significance for us in this entire connection, because, if only for financial reasons, we are unable to consider introducing conscription, that is, of inducting the persons liable to military service. To be sure, we attach great importance to compulsory military service in so far as its introduction could lead to a reduction of our military budget or to a reduction in the cost of the Wehrmacht. As a practical matter it would take something of the form that in the future the Reichswehr will be separated from the Schleicher militia, since part of the soldiers in the militia would enlist for a longer period of service. The militia soldiers would be mostly volunteers, however, and only a certain percentage, similar to the guard units in prewar days, would be conscripts drawn by lot. The fact, however, that one can in theory induct every one liable to military service would make it possible to make out with a very much smaller base pay. You were quite right when you wrote that compulsory military service was not for the time being contained in our proposals. It was taken over by us, or our press, from the Herriot plan and has essentially the above-mentioned secondary but financially important significance.

Next time, when I am better able to judge the situation, I shall write more.

Always yours,

Bülow

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<sup>4</sup> See Editors' Note, p. 18.

## No. 12

2784/540132-33

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 18 of February 6

ROME, February 6, 1933—9:30 p. m.

Received February 7—12:15 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 17 of February 3.<sup>1</sup>

I thanked Mussolini today as instructed for his congratulations on the occasion of Baron Neurath's birthday. The Chief of the Government thereupon expressed once more his great liking for the, as he put it, extremely youthful 60-year old. Thereupon I conveyed to him the greetings of the Reich Chancellor, as instructed by telephone.<sup>2</sup> Mussolini replied that he was very grateful for these greetings and cordially reciprocated them. He was extraordinarily pleased that the coalition had been established at last. The conduct of the participants who brought about this union, both Hitler and Papen, was deserving of high praise; the latter had shown himself a man of worth and perfect gentleman [*uomo di valore e gentleman perfetto*]; especial admiration must again be felt for the Reich President, who was the principal pillar of the Government. Once the newly formed coalition was solidified by the elections in March, as he certainly expected, Germany and Italy, he was convinced, would be able to conduct a closely coordinated policy [*politica molto vicina*]. For their interests were closely related in regard to many major issues, for instance, the policy toward disarmament, at the Economic Conference, and questions concerning southeastern Europe. Turning to the disarmament policy, I mentioned Baron Aloisi's effective speech,<sup>3</sup> which remark he warmly seconded adding that the French plan was dead in his opinion. I referred to Beneš' efforts to pick up any remnants left so as to salvage as much as possible of it. Mussolini thought it unlikely that

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (2784/540128).

<sup>2</sup> No record of these instructions sent by telephone has been found. In a letter to Neurath of Feb. 7, which gave further details on his conversation with Mussolini, Hassell indicated, however, that he himself had suggested the idea that Hitler should send greetings to Mussolini; and he had then been instructed by telephone to convey Hitler's greetings to the Duce (8038/E578175-80).

<sup>3</sup> Baron Aloisi, who was head of the Italian delegation to the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference, had spoken on Feb. 2 regarding the French plan. On the French plan, see Editors' Note, p. 18. Baron Aloisi criticized the French plan on the grounds that "changing the label" on national armies to put them under the authority of an international organization did not represent an effective reduction of armaments; and he warned that the French definition of "continental countries" implied "the conception of a United Kingdom holding aloof from the European system proposed by the French plan". For the text of this speech by Aloisi, see League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (Geneva, 1933): *Records of the Conference*, Series B, *Minutes of the General Commission*, vol. II, pp. 217-220.

he would succeed; as a matter of fact, Beneš was a very industrious individual but he lacked any creative spark. I read Mussolini the language of Beneš' speech (instruction II Ts. 73, of February 1<sup>4</sup>) and the article in *Lidové Noviny* (instruction P 353 of January 25<sup>5</sup>), which seemed to arouse a great interest in him; he thought that they denoted an advance for the revisionist idea and the marked fear thereof, which was particularly well founded in the case of Czechoslovakia, since that state was perhaps the weakest politically of the successor states. Czechoslovakia's relationship to Poland was not one of affection but it had shown improvement recently; in that respect Beneš had scored a certain success.

HASSELL

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<sup>4</sup> Not printed (9147/E643329-31).

<sup>5</sup> Not printed (8953/E627835-37).

### No. 13

7289/E534274-78

#### *The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry*

A 305

LONDON, February 6, 1933.

Received February 9.

III E 285.

One of the most significant characteristics of world developments in the past year seems to me to be the fact that the role of political leader in Europe has passed over more and more from France to England. A comparison between the French hegemony under Laval in the autumn of 1931, with England in a state of almost total financial impotence and greatly impaired political activity, and the present situation, which shows England to be active and France to be in an increasingly defensive position, provides clear proof of the change-over that has taken place.

In England the prerequisite for the possibility of such a change-over was created by the policy of financial rehabilitation which was purposefully and, considering the circumstances, quite successfully carried out by the national Government; as far as France is concerned, on the other hand, the reason for her losing her position of hegemony is not, as the French rightists wish to have one believe, to be found in the success of the leftists in the elections to the Chamber this year and the political instability allegedly resulting from this, for the preceding legislative period from 1928 to 1932 was precisely the time of a particularly large consumption of French Cabinets, and the Tardieu, Laval, Tardieu Governments were anything but stable.

The real reason for the shift in leadership in Europe lies rather in the schism which has long been latent, and was increasingly difficult

to hide, between the position or moral leadership usurped by France and the egoistical objectives pursued by France under the cover of this position.

Only through the skill and authority of Briand was it possible, by preserving relative elasticity of French policy, to relieve or conceal its inner divergence. His successors on the Left are frustrated in this task, since Tardieu with his so-called disarmament plan and his Danube project of last spring<sup>1</sup> had already brought about an isolation of France that was patched up again temporarily only by Lausanne and the *pacte de confiance*.<sup>2</sup>

In England they are very well aware of the reshuffling described above, and one of my first impressions here was that England is resolved to take over and perform the role of leader falling to her. This role of leader does not bring unmixed pleasure to England, since in some points it involves the deferment of purely British interests. This expresses itself at the moment in the following areas:

### 1. The Far East conflict:

In view of French vacillation between a policy of out-and-out favoring of Japan, cautious reserve, and protection of League of Nations interests according to the political coloring of the governmental majority at any given time, in view of the reckless one-sided advocacy of the League of Nations rules by medium and small countries, as well as in view of America's reserved attitude, England was forced to take over the leadership in dealing with the question of Manchuria. She is aware that in so doing she is hazarding important interests having to do with her relations with Japan. The English line of march runs along the narrow path between snubbing or even chastising Japan and openly violating the League of Nations pact.

### 2. Disarmament question:

England continued irrevocably the initiative begun in the autumn for the solution of the disarmament question by her recently submitted program of negotiation, and she did not hesitate to announce in Eden's speech<sup>3</sup> her predominantly negative position with respect to the French security project. Public opinion approves of this announcement in the main, and I have the impression, which also resulted from my recent conversation with Sir John Simon, that the English Government, recognizing the role of leadership forced upon England in this field, too, and conscious of the support of the majority of English public opinion, has resolved to push forward energetically with the disarmament problem.<sup>4</sup>

### 3. Debt problem:

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 5, footnote 3.

<sup>2</sup> The reference is apparently to the Anglo-French declaration of July 13, 1932, to which a number of other states subsequently adhered. The text is in British Cmd. 4131 (1932).

<sup>3</sup> Eden's speech at the Disarmament Conference on Feb. 3.

<sup>4</sup> Hoesch had discussed the disarmament problem with Sir John Simon on Jan. 31, as reported in telegram No. 14 of that day (3154/668449). See also *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, edited by E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, second series (London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1950), vol. iv, document No. 232.



Here, too, France is fighting a rear-guard action through abandoning her thesis of the sanctity of treaties, and England has therewith moved into the leader's role. Through the conversation with the English Ambassador brought about by Roosevelt, contact has been made with the future American regime.<sup>5</sup> Chamberlain's latest speeches,<sup>6</sup> perhaps not entirely fortunate, in which he termed this debt settlement also in the interest of America and refused a barter transaction, have of late worsened the atmosphere in America in relation to England, to be sure. However, they hope here that from the report of the Ambassador, who arrived in London today, there will develop a way for the further pursuit of the debt question and a concrete outlook on the Anglo-American negotiations scheduled for March. In all circumstances the guiding principle for England remains the maintenance of Lausanne, which is to be made possible by the results of the Anglo-American negotiations.

#### 4. The World Economic Conference:

Through designation of MacDonald as president of the Conference and the choice of London as the meeting place England has already obtained outwardly the role of leader in this matter, too. Setting the time of the Conference is in her hands and the attempt will be made to gain a decisive influence on the Conference objectively, as well.<sup>7</sup>

The extent of the reshuffling of the leadership relationships in Europe as described is particularly clear if one recalls the times in which France with Briand, Loucheur, Jouvenel, etc., ruled the League of Nations politically, economically, and spiritually, whereas England merely more or less concurred; the times in which the Pact outlawing war lent uncontested prestige to Briand; the times, finally, in which Briand with his European project which was quite undesirable for England, appeared to be the hardly contested political and moral leader of Europe.

The development I have described seems to me to be not unfavorable for us. In pursuit of the policy dictated to us by our own aims, it must be our task, so far as England is concerned, to continue to promote relations with England and protect them from unnecessary damage, as well as by constant contact with the English Government to see to it that our interests are not adversely affected by future steps taken by England.

VON HOESCH

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<sup>5</sup> A number of documents on discussions between Great Britain and the United States on intergovernmental debts in January 1933 are in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1950), vol. I, pp. 826-835.

The British Ambassador in the United States, Sir Roland Lindsay, visited President-elect Roosevelt on Jan. 29, and then returned to London for consultation.

<sup>6</sup> On Chamberlain's speeches of Jan. 24 and Feb. 1 on intergovernmental debts, see *Survey of International Affairs, 1932* (London, 1933), pp. 133-135.

<sup>7</sup> Preparations were going on at the time for the holding of the Monetary and Economic Conference, which met at London, June 12-July 27, 1933.

## No. 14

8036/E577941-49

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy*

BERLIN, February 7, 1933.

W 424 II.

With reference to your report No. I 60 of January 11,<sup>1</sup> and our telegram No. 13 of January 24.<sup>2</sup>

I am in full accord with continuing the consultations on German-Italian cooperation in the economic sphere. You may also assure Signor Mussolini of the equally strong desire of the German Government to see this cooperation enter the stage of practical realization.

It ought to be realized on our side, however, that the reasons for the failure of the efforts to date lie not merely in psychological distrust and difficulties of a technical order; the underlying reasons are conflicting interests and difficulties of a substantive nature. Were we oblivious to these, it is most likely that the new economic talks, which you have initiated, would soon reach an impasse again. New disappointments and new irritation then might provoke a sharp reaction in the attitude of the Chief of the Italian Government, which I would like to avoid.

Germany's attitude in her economic policy toward the countries of the Danube Basin is consistent with her general political attitude. As you know, we do not have in mind entering any political associations or establishing political relations of any *special* kind with the countries of the Danube Basin.<sup>3</sup> There can therefore be no idea of any political

<sup>1</sup> In a report of Dec. 9, 1932 (I 1659: 8036/E577907-09), Hassell had described proposals by Mussolini for German-Italian economic cooperation in the Danube Basin, according to which the two countries would agree as to which branches of their respective industries would be given precedence throughout the area. In his reply of Jan. 5, 1933 (W 8708: 7680/E547644-49), Neurath had pointed out various difficulties of carrying out such a division of interest. On the other hand, he wished to avoid a negative reply, and consequently suggested that the proposals be submitted for study to the German-Italian Economic Committee which had been set up, upon Italian initiative, the previous summer. It was to this that Hassell had replied with report No. I 60 of Jan. 11 (6062/E448352-55). While agreeing that the difficulties of carrying through Mussolini's proposals were real, Hassell doubted that the German-Italian Economic Committee could deal very usefully with the problem. It was primarily important, he felt, to convince the Italians that they enjoyed with Germany a relationship of especial trust in questions of commercial policy. The Italians, he pointed out, were troubled by the intimate German-French relations in the economic sphere. Hassell argued that, instead of getting involved in negotiations of detailed questions, the German and Italian Governments should seek to reach an agreement to inform and consult each other about their contemplated economic policies in the Danubian area. He asked for instructions whether he could continue the discussions with Mussolini along these lines.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 13 (5642/E410776) Bülow directed Hassell to await further instructions before proceeding with a discussion of Danube Basin questions.

<sup>3</sup> Marginal note in Hassell's handwriting: "Not even with Austria?"

"expansion toward the Southeast" [*"Drang nach Südosten"*]. You are requested to make this quite clear to Signor Mussolini.<sup>4</sup> The general objective pursued by us in that region is merely to work for a gradual loosening-up and, if possible, the eventual complete breakup of the Little Entente. I suppose that the German and Italian political conceptions are quite generally in agreement in this aim. This absence of any interest [*désintéressement*] in the pursuit of definite political aims of our own in the Danube Basin area has been manifested in the past by our not making difficulties at any time for Italy in the development of her political relations with Hungary or any other states. Neither shall we do so in the future; we would, quite on the contrary, even be very glad if Italy's further efforts in this direction, e. g., with respect to Rumania, should be successful. We therefore feel no misgivings over Italy's plans for achieving predominance in the Danube Basin. This, too, could be made explicitly clear to Signor Mussolini.

A divergence between Germany's and Italy's policies exists, however, on one issue, namely Austria. While it is proposed in the report of January 11 "to declare in the face of Italy's policy which, as we all know, looks at *Austria* and Hungary from a special viewpoint, that we are prepared to establish a relationship of trust [*Vertrauensverhältnis*] with Italy in the sphere of commercial policy, in any case within the Danube Basin," we must remain fully aware of the limits set to cooperation between Germany and Italy in regard to Austria. With respect to that country there exists a definite divergence of interests and aims in matters dealing with commercial policy. This is not a divergence that came into being merely as a result of the customs union plan,<sup>5</sup> or the Brocchi Agreements,<sup>6</sup> or the Stresa negotiations,<sup>7</sup> but it is a fact and did not come about as a result of these negotiations. By stressing this divergence here, I by no means intend to suggest that you give emphasis to it in your further talks. On the contrary, I believe that this divergence ought not to be mentioned if it can be avoided as long as the Lausanne Agreement<sup>8</sup> in connection with the debt negotiations with the United States is not assured in the full legal sense, and as long as the current phase of the disarmament negotiations is not concluded. But it must always be borne in mind that the subject of Austria must always remain excluded from such talks related to the sphere of commercial policy, which might have the result of anticipating the subsequent development of *our special* relations with Austria.

<sup>4</sup> Marginal note in Hassell's handwriting: "Was done repeatedly."

<sup>5</sup> The plan, announced in March 1931, for an Austro-German customs union.

<sup>6</sup> The reference is to agreements reached between Austria, Hungary, and Italy in 1931 and 1932 which had the effect of establishing a system of preferential tariffs between the three countries.

<sup>7</sup> See document No. 5, footnote 4.

<sup>8</sup> See document No. 2, footnote 8.

There are no material reasons for not discussing economic cooperation throughout the rest of the Danube Basin. As regards procedure, I believe that Rome underestimates the potentialities offered by cooperation between the *private* principals involved. Precisely the example of the French shows that cooperation of the private principals affords very far-reaching possibilities. Inasmuch as the report of January 11, 1933,<sup>9</sup> refers to the close German-French cooperation and to the substance of instruction No. W 9066 of December 28, 1932,<sup>10</sup> I should like to deal in detail with the scope and the origin of the German-French private cooperation. Between the German and French economies there exist in fact personal and business relations of a very singular order, such as never existed between two other countries either before or since the War. A situation has developed where nowadays the producers in nearly all major sectors of German industry are personally acquainted with their French competitors, and in most cases even know them very well through their connection over many years; as a result, the German and French producers, instead of entering into a competitive struggle, frequently come to an understanding and work together. It is in general not sufficiently known that there exist to a considerable extent German-French agreements on prices and other sales terms, on production and restriction of production, on sales in Germany and France as well as in third countries, on the exchange of technical information, on financial collaboration in third countries, and so forth. This applies to a very large number of industries, beginning with mother-of-pearl buttons and enameled cooking utensils through to the big industries, such as chemicals and electrical power. The major impulse to this close personal acquaintance and collaboration was furnished by the reparation deliveries, and as far as this is concerned, Italy has no opportunity to catch up. The reparation deliveries first of all furnished the occasion and demonstrated the necessity of personal contact and cooperation. The French industrialists became acquainted on this occasion with the versatility in the business field, the careful work and reliability as well as the large-scale conceptions and, in many areas, the technical superiority of the German industrialists. The French industrialists were not long in discovering the advantages they could derive from an understanding and collaboration with their German competitors. The agreements, for instance, regarding collaboration on large public construction projects in third countries, mentioned in instruction No. W 9066 of December 28, 1932, are the outgrowth of personal business connections which were established while carrying on large public construction jobs in France. These agreements in particular are due exclusively to private initiative. This private

<sup>9</sup> See footnote 1.

<sup>10</sup> Not printed (8951/EG27797-804).

collaboration worked out rather well in connection with the application of the French import quota system and helped to avert the worst damage which the French quota system might have inflicted on German industry and economic relations in general between Germany and France. I would suggest that you call Signor Mussolini's attention quite frankly to this example, stressing also that this is perhaps not a result that was brought about intentionally by either the French or the German Government, but a development which shaped itself spontaneously and naturally by private initiative. The beginning of such a development in the relationship between Germany and Italy is to be found only in a few instances, e. g., some sectors of the chemical industry. Precisely the German-French example shows that the close collaboration desired by the two Governments should first of all be sought by the way of private initiative.

On the other hand, it should be remembered that the attempts which have been made by German and Italian *official* representatives to establish closer collaboration have so far been relatively unproductive. There is no point in going into the question as to which side bears the greater share of responsibility for this. I merely wish to recall that the official German representatives at the numerous meetings at Geneva or at international conferences have very often been successful in establishing with the official representatives of France, Belgium, England and other countries, personal relations which sometimes even developed a character of deep mutual trust, but that this could never be accomplished with respect to the official Italian representatives. To cite an example, it has not been possible to establish a personal relationship of mutual trust with Signor de Michelis, for many years the Italian official representative in Geneva for economic questions. Quite the reverse, one could almost be sure that if a given proposal was made to Signor de Michelis in personal conversation, he would favor its opposite in public session. At Lausanne, during the negotiations on the economic questions concerning the Danube Basin, the attempt was made to work together with Signor Anzilotti<sup>11</sup> in the same way as with M. Coulondre of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Signor Anzilotti, however, showed a timidity and rigidity, which precluded any collaboration whatsoever. He frequently canceled prearranged conferences and evaded discussions with empty excuses. Signor Suvich was also relatively inaccessible while he acted as Italian representative at Geneva, to be sure dealing mainly with financial matters. I would also recall to you the experiences, familiar to you, which I had with Signor Aloisi during the negotiations at Geneva about the question of equality of status.

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<sup>11</sup> Eugenio Anzilotti, commercial and economic expert; official of the Ministry of Corporations.

I am citing these instances, involving particular individuals, merely in order to show that our experiences lead us to believe that official German-Italian collaboration would be even less promising than Rome expects collaboration between private individuals to be. I would finally also remind you that we sent Ministerialdirektor Posse to Rome several times without ever accomplishing anything.

A joint German-Italian plan of operation with regard to commercial policy in the Danube Basin suggests nothing meaningful to us. I have already enumerated several arguments adverse to it in instruction No. W 8708 of January 5, 1933.<sup>12</sup> Any attempt to realize the objective of economic collaboration in the Danube Basin through official action in the field of commercial policy encounters at once two obstacles: first, the limitations arising from the operation of the most-favored-nation system, and second, that the objects of such a joint plan of operation, i. e., for instance, Yugoslavia and Rumania, must effectively cooperate, which can hardly be expected.

I would like nevertheless to recommend that the effort to accomplish German-Italian economic collaboration within the framework of the German-Italian Economic Committee should not be treated as of trifling importance, but on the contrary that all our common endeavors at this time should center on it. But neither would I wish to arouse any extravagant expectations of speedy tangible results. The German-French collaboration, of which I spoke, is in fact the outcome of a gradual development over a period of 10 years. In the case of Italy, too, it would therefore be well to adjust our expectations to a slow development. As matters stand now, I still expect greater things from private initiative than I would from official initiative.

There are three phases in the task to be put to the German-Italian Economic Committee:

1. Collaboration of German and Italian industries in Italy proper, in the course of which German industrial experience is to be utilized in the common interest.

2. Collaboration in the Danube Basin. Such collaboration would be most fruitful if, after liquidation of the economic crisis, the governments or other public bodies in the Danube Basin were again to undertake large-scale public construction projects, such as railway construction, port construction, electric power plants, and the like.

3. A consultation concerning the problems of the World Economic Conference.<sup>13</sup>

I would have no objection if, along with the foregoing, consultations were to be held from time to time between official representatives on the subject of the commercial policy to be pursued in the Danube Basin. If occasion offers, I should be willing, from time to time, to

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<sup>12</sup> See footnote 1.

<sup>13</sup> See document No. 13 and footnote 7.

send to Rome the German official in charge of commercial policy, as was done repeatedly with Herr Posse in the past. Only, one must not do this with any positive anticipation of immediate major results. I do not believe that much more will be accomplished than a mutual exchange of information concerning commercial-policy objectives in the immediate future. I would be glad to have you bring to our attention any special opportunities which may arise for such official consultations. It will in most cases probably be advisable to arrange this sort of official consultation in such a way as not to attract outside attention.<sup>14</sup>

NEURATH

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<sup>14</sup> Hassell's reply is document No. 35.

### No. 15

9564/E673148-50

#### *The Reich Chancellery to the Foreign Ministry*

Rk. 995 II

BERLIN, February 8, 1933.

II Ung. 78.

On February 7 the Chancellor received the Royal Hungarian Minister, as the latter, on instruction of the Royal Hungarian Minister President, had requested at the Foreign Ministry. M. de Kánya left a memorandum, a copy of which is respectfully transmitted herewith for information, concerning the verbal message conveyed on this occasion from Minister President Gömbös to the Chancellor.

By order:  
THOMSEN

[Enclosure]

#### *Message of Royal Hungarian Minister President De Gömbös to Chancellor Adolf Hitler<sup>1</sup>*

BERLIN, February 6, 1933.

zu Rk. 995 II.

The Minister President expresses his most sincere congratulations to the Reich Chancellor. Recalling the exchange of views carried on 10 years ago through Herr Scheubner-Richter,<sup>2</sup> he asks the Reich Chancellor to maintain official contacts also with him. It is his conviction that the two countries ought to cooperate in questions of foreign policy, especially in that of disarmament.

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<sup>1</sup> The original text of this message bears Hitler's initial (9614/E678533-34).

<sup>2</sup> Presumably Max Erwin von Scheubner-Richter, one of Hitler's early followers who was killed in the Munich Putsch of Nov. 9, 1923.

He regrets keenly that the economic relations between Germany and Hungary are rather loose and that Germany is not open to Hungarian agriculture as a market to the extent that would be desirable in view of the community of destiny between the two countries. He requests the earliest possible dispatch of the commission for the study of German-Hungarian economic relations which was promised by the former Reich Chancellor.<sup>3</sup> He would be very happy if in the near future a lively trade developed between the two states.

He expresses the hope that the Reich Chancellor will use his influence to bring about closer cooperation between the German and the Hungarian minorities in the successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

Finally, he requests the Reich Chancellor always to bring up with complete frankness any differences of opinion that may arise between the two countries and settle them with a sincerity consonant with the nationalist [*völkischen*] attitude on both sides.

<sup>3</sup> In a letter of Dec. 6, 1932, Gömbös had asked Reich Chancellor Schleicher to bring his influence to bear in favor of an improvement in German-Hungarian economic relations. In his reply, Schleicher stated that he would pay "special attention" to the cultivation of German-Hungarian relations and that he realized that "economic questions were of great importance" in this connection (9564/E-673137-43). This letter did not mention a German-Hungarian economic commission. Such an idea was, however, discussed in a conference of the responsible Foreign Ministry officials with the German Minister in Hungary. The results were summarized in a minute of Dec. 1, 1932, by Heeren and Ritter (9564/E673-116-22).

## No. 16

3598/791669-72

*Extract From the Minutes of the Conference of Ministers, Held at the Reich Chancellery, on February 8, 1933, at 4:10 p. m.*<sup>1</sup>

Rk. 1123.

2. *Building of a Reservoir on the Malapane river near Turawa in Upper Silesia.*

The Reich Minister of Transport<sup>2</sup> read the contents of memorandum Rk. 933 of February 3<sup>3</sup> and proposed appropriating a first installment of 2.5 million reichsmarks in the budget of the Ministry of Transport for 1933 for the construction of a reservoir on the Malapane near Turawa.

The Reich Minister of Finance replied that it would be very difficult for the Reich Cabinet at this time to arrive at an opinion

<sup>1</sup> The complete minutes of this meeting including a list of those present are filmed on 3598/791667-78. The minutes were recorded by Ministerialrat Vogels of the Reich Chancellery.

<sup>2</sup> Freiherr von Eltz-Rübenach.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (3598/791689-91).



whether approval of the funds requested would be justified from the point of view of the total budget.

For one thing, the Cabinet had first of all to get a general idea of the 1933 budget. He was ready to present shortly a summary of the budget of the Reich for 1933. So far it had not been possible to submit the budget of the Reich, because no reliable estimate of the tax receipts for the fiscal year 1933 was available, and furthermore the shape of the 1933 budget for the Reich was decisively influenced by the cost of unemployment relief. He therefore had to be particularly careful to get as close as possible to the new fiscal year before drawing up the new budget, in order to be able to make as reliable an estimate of the cost of unemployment relief as was possible. Only after the total budget was known would the Cabinet be properly equipped to decide whether or not it could grant the expenditure item requested by the Minister of Transport.

The Reich Chancellor stated that in judging the request by the Minister of Transport, another decisive consideration had to be taken into account. Germany was now negotiating with foreign countries about her military equality of rights. The recognition of theoretical equality of rights was a necessary consequence of the very near future. But Germany could not content herself with that. The theoretical recognition must be followed by practical equality of rights, i. e., by German rearmament. The world, especially France, was entirely prepared for German rearmament and regarded it as a matter of course. The next 5 years in Germany had to be devoted to rendering the German people again capable of bearing arms [*Wiederwehrhaftmachung*]. Every publicly sponsored measure to create employment had to be considered from the point of view of whether it was necessary with respect to rendering the German people again capable of bearing arms for military service. This had to be the dominant thought, always and everywhere.

The Reich Minister of Labor<sup>4</sup> supported these statements of the Reich Chancellor, but said that besides the purely military tasks there was other economically valuable work, too, which ought not to be neglected.

The Reich Minister of Transport pointed out that the development of German waterways was a military necessity, too. In case of an emergency the entire German traffic system had to be in order, which included the operation of the waterways.

The Reich Commissar for Air<sup>5</sup> felt he had to emphasize on the other hand that the improvement of the German highway system was even more important.

<sup>4</sup> Franz Seldte.

<sup>5</sup> Hermann Göring.

The Reichswehr Minister <sup>6</sup> expressed the point of view that in the first place the immediate needs of the army had to be considered. The German Army was disarmed to such an extent that it was necessary above all to provide the material foundation for armaments.

Only after the emergency armament had been completed would it be possible to tackle larger tasks.

The Reich Chancellor again stressed that for the next 4-5 years the main principle must be: everything for the armed forces. Germany's position in the world was decisively conditioned upon the position of the German armed forces. The position of the German economy in the world was also dependent on that.<sup>7</sup>

The Reich Cabinet decided to have the total budget for 1933 submitted first, then to examine what could be done especially for the armed forces, and finally to see what funds were left for the development of the waterways, especially for the building of a reservoir in Upper Silesia, now under discussion.

<sup>6</sup> W. E. F. von Blomberg.

<sup>7</sup> A few days earlier, on Feb. 3, Hitler (according to notes made by Lieutenant General Liebmann) had made the following statements on this subject at a dinner given by General von Hammerstein-Equord, Chief of the Army Command, which was attended by leading officers of the Reichswehr:

"... Rebuilding of the armed forces is the most important prerequisite for attaining the goal: Reconquest of political power. Universal military service has to come back. First the leadership of the state must see to it, however, that those liable for service are not poisoned, even before they enter, by pacifism, Marxism, Bolshevism or that they do not succumb to that poison after having served.

"How is political power to be used after it has been won? Not yet possible to tell. Perhaps conquest of new export possibilities, perhaps—and indeed preferably—conquest of new living space in the east and ruthless Germanization of the latter. It is certain that the present economic conditions can be changed only through political power and struggle. All that can be done now—land-settlement—stop gaps.

"Armed forces remain the most important and most socialistic institution of the state. They are to remain non-political and above parties. The domestic struggle is not their business, but that of Nazi organizations. Different from Italy, no amalgamation of army and SA is intended. The most dangerous period is that of the rebuilding of the armed forces. Then we shall see, whether Fr[ance] has *statesmen*; if so, she will not leave us time but will fall upon us (presumably with eastern satellites)."

From Thilo Vogelsang, "Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reichswehr 1930-1933," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, II/4(1954), p. 435.

## No. 17

8698/E608132-33

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, February 8, 1933.

II F Abr. 491.

At the Cabinet meeting today<sup>1</sup> the Foreign Minister was told by the Reichswehr Minister that on the 28th of this month the arms

<sup>1</sup> There is no reference to the raising of this issue in the available record of this meeting; see document No. 16.

truce<sup>2</sup> will expire. The military members of the delegation at Geneva have apparently asked that instructions be issued in time to Herr Nadolny to form a front against the extension of the arms truce and under all circumstances to oppose this extension using the familiar reason that pressure must be used to bring about the early conclusion of the Convention.

The Foreign Minister thereupon on a piece of paper informed the Reichswehr Minister of his attitude as follows:

"1. Agreed, that Nadolny be instructed to get in touch with the leaders of other delegations in order to create as broad a front as possible for the rejection of the extension of the arms truce.

2. Precedence to be left, if possible, to other Powers.

3. If, however, no other power should be prepared to refuse, we must not be the only ones to do so, since our intention to rearm would thereby be manifested too soon. In this event, however, consent to a brief extension only."

The Reichswehr Minister has declared himself in agreement with the view of the Foreign Minister.

Please draw up an instruction<sup>3</sup> to Ambassador Nadolny in accordance with the ideas of the Foreign Minister.

BÜLOW

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<sup>2</sup> A resolution adopted by the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference on July 23, 1932, had recommended that the Governments "renew for a period of four months from November 1, 1932, the truce provided for by the resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of September 29, 1931." See League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (Geneva, 1932): *Conference Documents*, vol. I, p. 271.

<sup>3</sup> The instruction drawn up in accordance with this directive is not printed (8698/E608134).

## No. 18

9214/E647952-57

*Foreign Minister Neurath to Vice Chancellor Papen*

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, February 9, 1933.

DEAR HERR VON PAPEN: With reference to M. Duchemin's letter and the protocol of January 30 on the German-French conversations<sup>1</sup> I have several comments to make:

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<sup>1</sup> Document No. 2. Bülow had written a memorandum to Neurath on Feb. 7 on the subject of these conversations in which he stated that although he had outlined to Herren Bücher and Bosch Germany's aims in the East, they had put forward much too limited claims and that much more extensive territorial demands would have to be made both in the Corridor and in Upper Silesia. He also objected to a territorial guarantee applying to Poland's eastern boundary, and to the proposal for a disarmament agreement between Germany, Belgium, France, and Poland. He therefore opposed indicating to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs German approval of the protocol without reservations (4624/E203071-72).

1. I would still question whether it is expedient at the present moment, when the discussions about revision of the eastern frontier have reached proportions which are undesirable for us, to put this matter on the agenda of a German-French conversation. In any case, the negotiations were steered on a wrong course in that the Corridor question continued to be treated as a transportation problem, while in our view it is a territorial and ethnic issue. As our starting point we must always take the injustice of Versailles, so as to come back to the Wilson points. On the basis of the Wilson points it was understood that the definitely Polish areas (Poznan and Gniezno) would be awarded to Poland. Instead, at Versailles, Poland was given in addition all the areas with mixed populations. The new state was for that reason put under an obligation to protect minorities, but this, as we know, has been ineffectual. In any redetermination of the frontier, the territories of mixed nationality would have to be partitioned in some such manner as to leave *not more* Germans in Poland than there are Poles in Germany, because only thereby could we get enough territory to make an exchange of populations practical. The possibility of an exchange of populations is an essential safeguard that would ensure a practical solution of the minority question, or take off its edge.

2. The territorial demands put forward by Herr Bücher and Herr Bosch as a matter of fact fall far short of the minimum we might consider acceptable. A line running parallel to the Berlin-Danzig railroad line would leave to the Poles, e. g., the Netzegau district with a population that has still a large admixture of Germans, and the Vistula river lowlands, which are also predominantly German. In the Corridor we could discuss only a line that runs to the south and parallel to the Schneidemühl-Bydgoszcz railroad line, but this by no means exhausts our boundary demands. The westward extension of this line, following the ethnic boundary, would run between Poznan and the present German frontier, to connect again with the old Silesian border to the southward. Important military considerations play a part in the determination of this portion of the boundary line. To give the French any information on this point now would seem unwise to me. Whenever the subject is raised, we should therefore, as I pointed out above, talk only about reverting to the Wilson points and a territorial partition in conformity with the proportion of the German and Polish populations as it existed at the end of the war.

3. Also in regard to Upper Silesia the demands advanced by Herr Bücher and Herr Bosch are far short of our actual demands. It may well be that it will be impossible for us to insist on the return of all of Upper Silesia. But in no circumstance could I concur with the statement that our future demands would not substantially diminish

Polish territory and Polish industry in Upper Silesia. The current Upper Silesian regime with its liberalized traffic regulations, etc., as you know, runs out in 1937. With the present boundary line our industry in German Upper Silesia would then have only a meager chance of survival. Its preservation will require very substantial boundary rectifications and the return of a large portion of the now Polish industrial establishments. This would represent our *minimum* program for Upper Silesia. Heretofore we have always demanded the return of all of Upper Silesia.

4. What Germany is offering in return for a boundary rectification could probably be stated more effectively than was done by Herr Bücher and Herr Bosch. But I cannot endorse the offer made regarding Memel. It would be known in Kaunas within a very short time and would drive Lithuania, in the effort to make the deal herself, into the arms of Poland.

5. Regarding the last item, (f), I must further say right now that a German-French guarantee of Poland's eastern frontier can *never* be considered. If such a guarantee could be given at all, it would have to rest on a much broader, practically a European basis. This seems to have been rightly understood by the French negotiators, to judge by the concluding words of paragraph 5.

6. Neither can I say that I agree with the statements bearing on disarmament and security. A disarmament agreement between Germany, Belgium, France, and Poland strikes me as neither desirable nor practicable. In any official negotiations the French Government would undoubtedly at once demand inclusion of Czechoslovakia and we would therefore as a matter of expediency have to request ourselves the participation of the Locarno Powers, including Italy.

7. As regards the other points I have nothing of importance to note. From the foregoing remarks it is readily apparent how inexpedient conversations would be at this time between people, who are after all influential, about revision of the eastern frontier. The campaign to explain to the rest of the world the meaning and justice of our revisionary demands has not yet advanced far enough to assure us of broad enough support. Large circles abroad still see the solution in a modification of the arrangements regulating traffic through the Corridor and generally view the issue entirely in terms of traffic arrangements. In Poland the conditions requisite for the initiation of any successful negotiations for revision have not yet come about. If, owing to some untoward circumstances, we had to negotiate about the Eastern problem right now, we would be bound to come off poorly. But we must always bear in mind that the revision of the eastern frontier is an indivisible problem and that there will be only one more partition of Poland. There would be no point in seeking a solution of the Corridor question by itself. Demands for which we can-

not gain satisfaction on that occasion will never be fulfilled later on. For there can be no doubt that the revision of the German-Polish boundary will end with some Eastern Locarno or some similar binding commitment.

Inasmuch as the statements by Herr Bücher and Herr Bosch are at considerable variance with the official position, it seems imperative to me that the said gentlemen inform M. Duchemin explicitly that the conversation was of a private and unofficial nature, on which the Reich Government must decline to take any position. Do you want to inform the German participants of this yourself or should I have Herr Bücher come to see me and tell him myself?

I should of course be glad to discuss the above ideas in greater detail orally.<sup>2</sup>

Accept, etc.

FREIHERR V. NEURATH

<sup>2</sup> No reply to this letter has been found. In a communication to Neurath on Feb. 25, Bülow forwarded a draft memorandum which he suggested might be sent to Bücher, Bosch, and Lammers (4624/E203088-91). On Mar. 1, he forwarded a revised draft memorandum on these points (4624/E203093-95).

In a minute of Mar. 9 Bülow recorded: "Vice Chancellor von Papen informed me on Mar. 8 that he had heard from Herr Bücher that M. Duchemin had let it be known that the French Government had approved the protocol of Jan. 30, 1933 (Bücher, Bosch, and Co.) and therewith "recognized" our Corridor demands (in the inadequate version of this protocol). The Foreign Minister is informed." (2945/575824)

## No. 19

9214/E647950-51

*State Secretary Bülow to Ambassador Köster*

BERLIN, February 10, 1933.

DEAR KÖSTER: When you were in Berlin, we gave you a copy of M. Duchemin's protocol of January 30 on the conversations with Herr Bücher and Herr Bosch.<sup>1</sup> I am sending you enclosed the Foreign Minister's comments in his letter to Vice Chancellor von Papen, of February 9.<sup>2</sup> All essential points are covered by it.

For my own part I would just like to add that, as I already informed you orally, we must not broach the revision of the eastern frontier at this time because the question is not yet ripe for discussion and consequently we must not give any information about our aims and plans to anyone. Our remarks, if a reply is unavoidable, must be confined to saying that the wrong of Versailles must be righted again and that our aim is a return to the Wilson Points. The territory in dispute must be partitioned anew in such manner as to reestablish the land connection with East Prussia and so as to leave not more Germans in Poland than there are Poles in Germany,

<sup>1</sup> See enclosure to document No. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 18.

always taking the population of 1919 as a basis. The one million Germans whom the Poles have already pushed out must be included in the compilation at any future settlement because there must be the possibility of settling these people along with those who must be taken back in return for Poles.

But the time, as I have said, is still far from ripe for such negotiations. The Reich Chancellor, as I know, also shares this opinion. The public abroad, as the Minister has also written to the Vice Chancellor, is now aware only of the Corridor problem, and this it views as a question concerning traffic arrangements. The enlightenment campaign on the demographic factor has already been started, but it will be a long time yet before these ideas take hold. More particularly, however, there is in Poland as yet no sufficient readiness for negotiations. It is only in the course of economic developments after the depression is over that it will have to be made clear to the Poles that without our cooperation and without a settlement of the frontier question they can never achieve economic prosperity. In this connection I would recall that at present, as I told you before, we would not even be able to take any steps leading to an economic rapprochement because we are in no position to absorb the Polish products which Poland can only or mainly market in our country. That, as a matter of fact, is possible only in times of economic prosperity and such a time must therefore be awaited. This is necessary also for the reason that with the financial system in disorder, a precarious currency, and until military rearmament is accomplished, we could not risk the political repercussions of such difficult negotiations.

Therefore please be very cautious in your conversations with all Frenchmen and other foreigners.<sup>3</sup>

Yours, etc.

BÜLOW

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<sup>3</sup> Köster's reply of Feb. 21 is not printed (4624/E203082-85).

## No. 20

7668/E547474-77

*Foreign Minister Neurath to Ambassador Nadolny*

BERLIN, February 15, 1933.

DEAR NADOLNY: Pursuant to a telegram which is being sent you today,<sup>1</sup> I should like to state below in somewhat greater detail the considerations which are summarized in a few brief sentences in the telegram.

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<sup>1</sup> Telegram No. 72, sent Feb. 15, 2:20 p. m., not printed (3154/668507).

The development that the new phase of the Disarmament Conference seems to be taking fills me with great anxiety. I should like, therefore, although I have nothing really new to tell you after our many discussions, to call your attention to a general consideration which will be of decisive importance for our conduct in the next few weeks.

If I understand the Geneva situation correctly, the danger seems to be coming ever closer that the Conference will end with a mere interim solution, somewhat of the kind that was advocated by Norman Davis as early as December of last year.<sup>2</sup> We shall in certain circumstances have to expect that, for lack of another way out, most of the Powers, particularly America and England, will finally have to resign themselves to such a result. For us such an interim solution, as you yourself so aptly put it at the Bureau meeting of the 10th,<sup>3</sup> would be completely unacceptable. On the other hand, however, it would be an extremely serious situation for us, too, if the Disarmament Conference were to fail because of the fact that *we*, in contrast to the majority of the Powers, had to reject the interim solution. The interim solution would surely be staged by the other side in such a way that it would promise everything possible for the future, including our equality of rights, and that it would therefore appear, in the eyes of the world public at least, as a certain progress, while it would, in fact, maneuver us out of our strong position. Germany could then easily be represented as the country that had prevented such progress in the interest of her own rearmament.

We must, therefore, always bear in mind the one thing—that if a failure of the Conference really proves inevitable, the lack of an intention to disarm on the part of France must appear as the cause. In other words, we must make every effort to throw into relief the question of the reduction of weapons of offense and of troops, and to bring about a decision on the fate of the Conference in this sphere. If this does not succeed, there would still remain the other way of making, in time, the realization of our equality, such as we demand it, the decisive point. The world will ultimately stand predominantly on our side if we force the French, before the idea of the interim solution as such is brought up for discussion, to admit that they do not want to realize in a practical way equality of rights even if *thereby* comes to a break. This would, in any case, be far more favorable for us than if the discussions developed without such a clarification toward the interim solution, and if we then by rejecting it had to make the break complete.

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<sup>2</sup>The American position, to which reference is made here, was set forth in a memorandum, "Project of Preliminary Convention" of Nov. 28, 1932. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1932*, vol. 1, pp. 508-511.

<sup>3</sup>Nadolny reported on this meeting of the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference in telegram No. 127 of Feb. 10 (7641/E545818-21).



I am convinced that you share my opinion and that your reflections take the same direction. I should also not care to interfere in your individual tactical considerations. I was only anxious in the present situation to express my opinion once more concerning the basic policy to be pursued by us.<sup>4</sup>

Yours, etc.

NEURATH

<sup>4</sup> Marginal note: "Taken care of by Ambassador Nadolny personally in a discussion in Berlin. F[röhwein], Feb. 22."

## No. 21

3443/E594144-47

*The State Secretary in the President's Office to the State Secretary  
in the Reich Chancellery*

BERLIN, February 15, 1933.

Received February 16.

Rk. 1281.

On special instructions of the President, I have the honor of sending you enclosed a letter of former Reich Chancellor Dr. Wirth with the request that it be submitted to the Reich Chancellor for his information.<sup>1</sup>

MEISSNER

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, February 10, 1933.

MY DEAR HERR PRESIDENT: The manifesto of the Reich Government of February 1, 1933,<sup>2</sup> condemns all the political work done since the end of the war.

In my capacity as former Reich Chancellor and Minister, I feel compelled to object formally to these assertions by the Reich Government which are unhistorical and in contradiction to the truth.

To mention only one aspect of the work which was accomplished, but remained naturally hidden to the public, I may respectfully point out the fact that the two Governments which I headed at the time were continually trying to do anything that was at all possible for Germany's capacity to defend herself, in spite of the harshness of the disarmament provisions imposed upon the German people. It was precisely in the years 1920-23 that a series of measures were introduced

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "The fact that the gentlemen of the Center did not succeed in destroying the last remnant of German military capability is not owing to them but to the generals of the Reichswehr. A[dolf] H[itler]."

<sup>2</sup> For the text, see *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik* (Berlin, 1939), vol. I, p. 5-9.

and carried out which resulted from the initiative of the responsible men joined together in the Reich Governments of that time and which partly became effective immediately and partly by their very nature could be brought to completion in the future only. Without going into details, I should like to mention, my dear Herr President, merely the watchwords "Upper Silesian uprising,"<sup>3</sup> and refer to the measures taken on Russian soil,<sup>4</sup> the nature of which I may assume is known.

I may be permitted in this connection to refer to the special efforts, resulting from my initiative, for assuring the technical development of German arms. The operations made possible thereby are still being continued, as General von Schleicher told me 2 years ago, in accordance with the arrangement of June 10, 1921. A letter by the late Ambassador Wiedfeldt, the former director of the Krupp Works, which refers to these matters is always available for your information.

These measures were carried out in the closest cooperation with the leading military figures at the time, Reichswehr Minister Gessler<sup>5</sup> and General von Seeckt. Both men, I am sure, will give testimony at any time about the patriotic work accomplished at that time. Only a short while ago, General Seeckt had confirmed to Count Westarp,<sup>6</sup> as the latter told me on the occasion of a correspondence about a book, the accuracy of my statements to the same effect about the work accomplished in the years 1920-23.

I may also add that in the last few years, too, much was done for German interests in various fields which must remain hidden from the public eye.

Yet it is precisely this situation which makes it impossible for members of former Reich Cabinets, faced with the derogatory judgments of the manifesto of the new Reich Government, to appeal to the judgment of the German public, before whom our work is being discredited.

We consider this judgment of the manifesto a grave injustice which I, at any rate, cannot accept without submitting these statements to you, my dear Herr President, with the firm belief in your sense of justice and with the request that you be kind enough to appreciate them at their true value.

Herr Krupp von Bohlen-Halbach, General von Seeckt and Reichswehr Minister Gessler are being informed orally of the contents of this letter.

Yours, etc.

JOSEPH WIRTH

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<sup>3</sup> Following the plebiscite held in Upper Silesia in March 1921, Polish volunteer forces led by Wojciech Korfanty occupied the area claimed by Poland which in turn led to the armed intervention of German volunteer units.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. document No. 197, footnote 6.

<sup>5</sup> Otto Gessler, Reichswehr Minister, 1920-1928.

<sup>6</sup> Count Kuno Westarp, a leader of the German National People's party.

## No. 22

6601/E495037-40

*Memorandum by the Director of Department IV*

BERLIN, February 17, 1933.

c. o. IV Po. 1224.

The Polish Minister called on me today and brought up first the question of the Military Attaché.<sup>1</sup> I repeated the decision already transmitted to him by Minister Hey, that nothing could now be changed in the dispatch of General Schindler.<sup>2</sup>

The Polish Minister then came to speak of German-Polish relations by way of the new appointment of the Consul General at Königsberg, the former one having died of the grippe. He remarked that there might be no reason to occupy this post, since after all we were on the eve of a war between Germany and Poland. He went into a long exposition on the anti-Polish propaganda that was being carried on in Germany, and finally, after referring to alleged anti-Polish statements by the Reich Chancellor of earlier date, he cited the latest interview with Colonel Etherton.<sup>3</sup> He stated that his Polish colleague in London had told him that Colonel Etherton had published only a very small portion of what the Reich Chancellor had really said.

I protested most sharply against these statements and stated that the interview had not been given at all in the manner publicized by Colonel Etherton. He was familiar with the official correction of the WTB and I must refuse to discuss with him any sort of false reports by his Polish colleague. Moreover, I must call his attention to the fact that the semiofficial organ of the Polish Government, the *Gazeta Polska*, had on the occasion of the Reich Chancellor's interview, despite knowledge of the correction by WTB, spoken about the Reich Chancellor in a way that must be most emphatically rejected. Herr von Moltke had been instructed to take the necessary steps in Warsaw in this regard.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The Polish Minister on Feb. 2 had expressed the preference of the Polish Government for an officer of lower rank than General Schindler as Military Attaché at Warsaw for reasons of protocol (9182/E645780 81).

<sup>2</sup> The Minister in Poland on Feb. 22 reported that the Polish Government had withdrawn any objections to the appointment of General Schindler (9182/E645782).

<sup>3</sup> Col. P. T. Etherton had had an interview with Hitler on Feb. 6, and an account of the interview appeared in the London *Sunday Express* of Feb. 12. This account was described in Germany as inaccurate and an official version was published there on Feb. 14, a translation of which is printed in *The Speeches of Adolf Hitler*, edited by Norman H. Baynes (London, 1942), vol. II, pp. 1005-1007.

<sup>4</sup> These instructions to Moltke have not been found. In telegram No. 7 of Feb. 17 Moltke reported:

"In accordance with instructions I protested against the article of the *Gazeta Polska* regarding the Reich Chancellor's interview which appeared in the *Sunday Express*, with special reference to the fact that publication ensued with the knowledge of the WTB correction." (9982/E697403)

M. Wysocki then pulled a copy of the *Stahlhelm* from his pocket and stated that the press was now using language against Poland which rendered relations less and less tenable and in his opinion must necessarily lead to war. Herr Seldte was a member of the Reich Government and the statements by the *Stahlhelm* possessed symptomatic importance.<sup>5</sup> He stressed that the Polish people were of one mind that they would rather let themselves be killed than retreat one foot from the present borders. The German press was trying to bring about a war. This did not correspond with what Minister von Neurath had told him recently, that the German Government did not aspire to a revision of the borders at the present time.<sup>6</sup>

I replied to the Minister, starting from the statements of the Reich Foreign Minister, that there could not be any talk at all of war; the German Government, which had after all also acceded to the Kellogg Pact,<sup>7</sup> strove for peace and wanted to live in friendship with all countries. Moreover, the *Stahlhelm* was not a semi-official organ. Quite aside from that, however, he knew after all that there was no German Government and no party in Germany, from the Communists up to the National Socialists, which recognized as justified the borders forced on us by the dictatorial Treaty of Versailles.

M. Wysocki remarked that these statements could not really be true unconditionally for the Social Democrats and a number of other leftist circles. I contradicted this idea. Moreover, I stated that the German Government would be glad if there should be a relaxation of tension in German-Polish relations. Since he spoke of psychological considerations, I did have to point out that in Poland both official and non-official circles and the Polish newspapers sinned gravely in this respect. I referred in this respect at considerable length to the discrimination against the German minority in Poland, mentioned the complaints about the schools, agrarian reform, etc., stressed how the Polish state violated the rights of Danzig and took no account of any decision by the League of Nations Council, pointed to the statements in the Polish press hostile to the minority, etc., etc. He should not be surprised that the German population did not let all this happen to it with equanimity. A prerequisite for any real relaxation of tension was that the Polish Government and all its organs stood on the basis of law in the ceded areas and that in the Danzig question the decisions of the League of Nations Council were respected and faithfully carried out. M. Wysocki replied that he was not well enough informed about Danzig; however, Germany misused the minority complaints for political ends. I replied that that was a new version that had re-

<sup>5</sup> Seldte was Minister of Labor and head of the *Stahlhelm* organization.

<sup>6</sup> The Neurath statement referred to has not been found.

<sup>7</sup> Treaty for the Renunciation of War; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1928, vol. I, pp. 153-157.

cently been produced by Poland, but it did not have the slightest justification. The German Government would be happy if the treatment and situation of the minorities could relieve it of the necessity of steps before the League of Nations. M. Wysocki thereupon came to speak of the situation of the Poles in Germany and said they were being boycotted in an incomprehensible way. I contradicted him and asked him to tell me of any possible cases.

M. Wysocki emphasized repeatedly in the course of the conversation that he was not carrying on this conversation as Minister and not in any official or semi-official capacity, but privately; his official *démarche* had been completed with the discussion of the Military Attaché matter.

MEYER

No. 23

3154/668528-29

*Unsigned Memorandum*

BERLIN, February 18, 1933.

TELEPHONE MESSAGE FROM AMBASSADOR NADOLNY,  
AT GENEVA, AT 5 P. M.

Please submit at once to the Foreign Minister.

The situation here is as follows:

On the basis of yesterday's speech by Pierre Cot<sup>1</sup> and the preceding negotiations, the impression exists here that the conference has reached an important turning point. France has now explained her plan for standardization<sup>2</sup> of the army systems of the European continental countries to the extent that a framework seems to be offered for the extensive reorganization and numerical expansion of our Wehrmacht. The statements of Pierre Cot make it appear possible that the framework proposed for standardization will be so developed and transformed through negotiations that it will permit the measures deemed necessary by us. Characteristic of this is the remark by Pierre Cot that in establishing the term of service, the special conditions obtaining in each country will have to be taken into account and a rather long transition period permitted. Conversations with other delegations have indicated that, as the situation is generally viewed here, our reply will be of critical importance for the fate of the conference.

<sup>1</sup> In telegram No. 147 of Feb. 18, Nadolny had reported in detail on a speech made on Feb. 17 in the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference by French Air Minister Pierre Cot who elaborated on the French scheme of standardized armies with short-term service (7641/E545856-59). For a published record of this meeting, see League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (Geneva, 1933): *Records of the Conference*, ser. B, *Minutes of the General Commission*, vol. II, pp. 278-288.

<sup>2</sup> See Editors' Note, p. 18.

Actually French fear of the Reichswehr offers us a good chance of asserting our essential military interests.

Our reply cannot be restricted to a mere attitude of waiting, since the French demand that we take a position on the principle before the negotiations on questions of detail, and they have the support of the majority in this. Our friends, such as the Italians, Hungarians, and Dutch, have already expressed themselves positively with respect to the principle. Our stand would naturally have to be hedged in with necessary reservations and therefore should not yet be by any means in the nature of a definitive acceptance. If the proposed course is to be adopted at all, however, a positive element would have to emerge. According to inquiries made by Schönheinz,<sup>3</sup> this requires renewed study by the Berlin military authorities. The far-reaching political importance likewise makes thorough study necessary. In view of this, the delegation has arrived at the conviction that a personal talk by the leader of the delegation and General Schönheinz with the home office is necessary.

Pierre Cot has gone to Paris, Eden to London, both to discuss the situation. I spoke with the Italians, English, French, and Russians this morning and at the same time stated my intention of going to Berlin to report. This was generally regarded as natural and consistent with the importance of the situation. At my request, Henderson postponed until Wednesday the session of the General Commission scheduled for Monday. This has not been concealed from the press, which will already have reported on my trip and that of the other leaders of the delegations. It would therefore attract considerable attention here if my trip did not take place. I would appreciate it if, with the foregoing in mind, reconsideration were given there to the question of my and Herr Schönheinz's trip.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Chief military expert of the German delegation.

<sup>4</sup> Nadolny and Schönheinz did go to Berlin and a conference was held there on Feb. 20 with Neurath, Bülow, and Lieutenant Colonel Obstfelder of the Reichswehr Ministry (3154/671283-90).

## No. 24

2406/510631-36

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, February 18, 1933.

The French Ambassador called on me today in order to sign an exchange of notes regarding the new regulation of foreign exchange.<sup>1</sup> He began with complaints that owing to our latest measures com-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (9964/E696665-68).

mercial traffic would be very much restricted,<sup>2</sup> so that hardly any foreign exchange would be left to regulate. I interrupted his complaints and said that other more serious matters gave me much more concern. The campaign that had been launched in France over the alleged secret treaty with Italy and Hungary, in spite of our denials, was outrageous.<sup>3</sup> Two things had particularly annoyed us in this campaign, first that they had alarmed public opinion with false reports that must be recognized as such, evidently merely in order to put through the French Army budget,<sup>4</sup> and then that they insinuated that possible treaties concluded by Germany disturbed the peace whereas all other countries were entirely free to enter into alliances and also made ample use of this right. Here again a double standard was being used, a point on which German public opinion was justifiably particularly sensitive. Furthermore, according to reports published today which would evidently be confirmed, the French together with the English had handed the Austrians a note that was quite outrageous in tone in the matter of the Hirtenberg arms transports.<sup>5</sup> This was an offensive reversion to the methods and atmosphere of the first postwar years. Such conduct on the part of France poisoned the atmosphere and one could not blame our public opinion when it inclined more and more to the standpoint that every attempt at an understanding with France was after all in vain.

The Ambassador gave the impression that in his heart he thought me right, but he objected that it was not only in France that the change in government in Germany had greatly alarmed public opinion; also it was feared that the German Government would ally itself with the very restless Hungarian Government as well as with Italy, and the latter was making it known quite openly that it expected and desired the collapse of Yugoslavia. The whole trouble, as far as France was concerned, emanated from southeast Europe, and the

<sup>2</sup> In a note verbale of Feb. 11, 1933, the German Ambassador in Paris notified the French Foreign Ministry that the German Government would terminate certain parts of the Franco-German trade agreement of Aug. 17, 1927, concerning tariff reductions, as of Mar. 1, 1933 (7787/H557153-59).

<sup>3</sup> The Ambassador in France had reported in telegram No. 110 of Feb. 14 that the Paris correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, Sieburg, had informed him of an interview with Premier Daladier, in which the latter had said that he had evidence of the existence of an alliance between Germany, Italy, and Hungary, and that he regarded this as likely to produce a serious situation in which peace might be endangered (5737/H028627-29).

Neurath by telegram No. 64 of Feb. 15 directed the Ambassador to inform Daladier that there was not a word of truth in the story of a German-Italian-Hungarian alliance (5737/H028630). Bülow supplemented this in telegram No. 66 of Feb. 17 by informing the Ambassador that it had been established, after consulting Hitler, that there were no agreements between the National Socialist and fascist parties which might have given rise to the rumors of an alliance (5737/H028631).

<sup>4</sup> The Minister in Switzerland had reported by telephone on Feb. 13 that, according to his informants, the uneasiness observable in France was "an artificial creation" designed to lend support to the military budget (2406/510627).

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 81.

Hirtenberg affair formed the nucleus of the excitement. If the note to Austria was really very sharp, the reason for this was that they were pursuing an insincere policy in Vienna; moreover, the note was certainly not so sharp in tone as the telegram which Reich Minister Göring had addressed to Sweden<sup>6</sup> and which had been very much noticed in France precisely because of the tone. Furthermore, French public opinion was becoming very much alarmed by the very sharp daily statements of the papers that represented the views of the Government and by the foreign programs of the future that were revealed here. He referred particularly to the *Börsenzeitung*, the *Stahlhelm* and the *Völkischer Beobachter*, though for a week the latter had written in an unusually moderate and reasonable way, whereas the *Stahlhelm* had revealed exceedingly far-reaching foreign policy objectives. He was forced as Ambassador to report these voices of the press to Paris, since otherwise he would be reproached for ignoring them in his reporting. However, he had not neglected to point out that it was difficult for any opposition press at first to adapt and restrain itself correspondingly after a change in government.

I replied to the Ambassador on the various points that he had advanced, but said that the particulars did not seem to me to be so important as the entire picture, which I once more summarized to the effect that a campaign of distrust and hostility was being generated not only with the sufferance but on the initiative of French Government authorities, as shown by the alliance affair, and this not only made any understanding illusory, but must necessarily lead to quite unnecessary complications even with slight provocation. The alarm about the objectives and intentions of the new Government was all the less justified since the Government statement<sup>7</sup> had not only announced the foreign policy objectives very clearly and in an exceedingly objective formulation, but also this same government statement set up a domestic 4-year program. This 4-year program within the realm of the possible conforms with the old Franco-English desire for a truce of God [*Gottesfrieden*], a desire that we could realize today just as little as 1 or 2 years ago. If, however, the Reich Government set up a domestic program of such significance and permanence, there was thus provided, so far as was politically possible, the guarantee that it did not intend any sort of foreign policy measures during this time which, by their very nature, would be bound to endanger the execution of the domestic reconstruction program.

The Ambassador then turned of his own accord to the situation in Geneva and complained about the unfriendly response which the

<sup>6</sup> See the *Times* (London), Feb. 10, 1933, p. 11.

<sup>7</sup> The Government's statement of Feb. 1, 1933; text in *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik*, vol. 1, pp. 5-9.



cooperative statements of Pierre Cot had had in the German press.<sup>8</sup> I told the Ambassador that I myself had a great deal to complain about in Pierre Cot's speech. It did not contain a word to the effect that the standardized armies which France suggested should correspond to the size of the population and the needs of the country. Thereby the impression naturally arose that France wanted to disarm us once more without herself reducing her armaments. I repeated the arguments which Nadolny had used in Geneva and told the Ambassador, who complained about the lack of clarity in our rearmament objectives, that we would be in a position to formulate our rearmament objectives only when we finally learned from France how far she wished to go in her own disarmament. So far we had not received even a qualified answer in response to our inquiries on the subject. The entire Geneva situation suffered from this lack of clarity about the sincere intentions of France to disarm.

The Ambassador then stated at some length that he himself was constantly trying to improve the German-French atmosphere. For this purpose he had proposed to Foreign Minister von Neurath that he persuade the Reich Chancellor to make a public statement in regard to German-French relations. If this were not possible or not opportune at the moment, a good deal might be done toward relaxing tension if he were given the possibility of a discussion with the Reich Chancellor<sup>9</sup> so that he could report reassuringly to the French Government concerning his views and intentions.

BÜLOW

<sup>8</sup> See document No. 23 and footnote 1.

<sup>9</sup> Marginal note in Neurath's handwriting: "Not before the elections."

## No. 25

4938/E269443-49

*Minister Rieth to State Secretary Bülow*<sup>1</sup>

VIENNA, February 18, 1933.

DEAR HERR VON BÜLOW: The chairman of the Greater German party, Professor Foppa, has recently returned from Berlin, where he had talks with Herr Hugenberg, the leaders of the Stahlhelm, and other personalities of the political Right. This was Herr Foppa's second visit to Berlin in recent months with a view to establishing closer contact between his party and groups of a similar political orientation in Germany. A close collaboration of this kind existed at one time with the German People's party, but has more or less lapsed since the death of Herr Stresemann<sup>2</sup> and the resignation of Herr

<sup>1</sup> This copy of the letter which is from the files of the Vienna Embassy is not signed.

<sup>2</sup> Gustav Stresemann, German Foreign Minister, 1923-1929.

Curtius,<sup>3</sup> and probably also as a result of the process of contraction which has affected the People's party.

Herr Foppa also paid a call on Herr von Grüнау.<sup>4</sup> He expressed on that occasion the wish for a single grant by the Foreign Ministry of financial assistance to the party, of the kind repeatedly received in the past either upon the instigation of Herr Stresemann or Herr Curtius, or directly through the Foreign Ministry.

Herr von Grüнау said that a statement by the Legation in the matter would seem advisable to him. Moreover, I myself have had for some time the intention of approaching you with a similar request. Presumably you are sufficiently acquainted in a general way with the position of the Greater German party and its role in the domestic politics of this country, as well as also with the role which this party plays with regard to Germany's policy in Austria, so that I need not go into details on these matters. Representing German interests in the Parliament and in the country at large constitutes today almost the only justification for the existence of the party which has no clearly defined domestic political program apart from representing the interests of a few occupational groups, e. g., the civil servants. But this is precisely what makes the party valuable to us, because it will advance our point of view regardless of the current issues of domestic policy at any given moment, and also because of the fact that it occupies a position in the Austrian Parliament which, if it is not completely decisive, comes very close to that by reason of the distribution of seats in this Parliament. Thus, to cite only one example, the great weakness of the Dollfuss Government is mainly due to the noncooperation of the Greater German party, partly on account of the question of the Lausanne loan.<sup>5</sup> Herr Dollfuss, with a majority of about one to three votes, has as a matter of fact been able to remain in power until now only through his exceedingly skillful juggling between the antipodes of the Heimwehr and the Social Democrats, and he would not have accomplished even that if the Greater German party had seriously wanted to overthrow him.

In a possibly near future this situation may, in my opinion, make itself felt in our favor in an even more important way. The latest developments in the Hirttenberg affair, which I have outlined in report A. 141,<sup>6</sup> to be dispatched today, have not only sharpened the

<sup>3</sup> Julius Curtius, German Foreign Minister, November 1929–October 1931.

<sup>4</sup> Director of Department I in the German Foreign Ministry.

<sup>5</sup> A guaranteed loan to Austria to the amount of 300 million schillings was negotiated at the Lausanne Reparations Conference in the summer of 1932. On July 15, 1932, Austria had signed a protocol which, in addition to other commitments, reaffirmed the provision in the Geneva Protocol of Oct. 4, 1922, that "Austria undertakes, in accordance with the terms of article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain, not to alienate its independence."

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 81 and footnote 9.

antagonism between Right and Left in a degree nearly intolerable for the Government, but the opposing tendencies in Austria's foreign policy of a French and of an Italo-Hungarian orientation have on this occasion come into collision in a way which might make a showdown inevitable in a perhaps not too distant future. In this game, the value of the trump card, which we hold in the absolutely reliable Greater German party, will still increase, and this not only with respect to political developments here, but also as regards the foreign policy developments. It is possible, as I suggested in the aforementioned report, that the question might soon be considered whether a course even more distinctly to the Left than up to now, and with an orientation toward France is to be entered upon, or rather a course more sharply to the Right, with a short-lived predominantly Italo-Hungarian orientation in the beginning. The latter course would be assured by the accession of the Greater German party and of necessity shift more toward Germany or, inasmuch as this seems possible or desirable, take on a German-Italian orientation. A Leftist regime in Austria, on the other hand, would inevitably detach the country from us on account of the political system prevailing in Berlin.

But even without such a clarification of the general political situation here, which will come sooner or later in my opinion, the, so to speak, invisible pressure as such, which the Greater German party is exerting not only on the Government itself but also on the various Government parties by keeping aloof from the Government, is from our point of view exceedingly important. This, to be sure, is true to an even higher degree of the National Socialist movement, even though it is faced with the handicap, at least to some extent, that all the other parties which feel threatened by it might join forces in some kind of defensive struggle. But with the National Socialists not represented in the Parliament and with new elections not likely to be held in the near future, we must now, as in the past, regard the Greater German party as a factor of great importance to us with respect to practical political decisions.

The way in which the aforementioned invisible pressure by the Greater German party operates is already apparent, to mention only this, from the unceasing efforts which Herr Dollfuss and leading Christian Socials are making to draw closer to us again following the estrangement caused by Lausanne, and is also evident from certain rather interesting recent moves of the Heimwehr leadership (which used to be completely under Italo-Hungarian and in a lesser degree Legitimist influence) to establish good relations with us. The last mentioned fact is especially significant because a bourgeois government unsupported by the Greater German party can maintain itself, and then only precariously, solely with the aid of the Heimwehr

votes, while on the other hand, the Heimwehr, on which the Social Democrats have the effect of a red rag would need the Greater German party to form a strong bourgeois front.

If the Greater German party rejoined the Government and thereby helped set up such a bourgeois front against the Social Democrats, their present financial difficulties would cease or be greatly diminished. These difficulties essentially result from their being in the opposition, a position which they took up chiefly in the interest of German policy, first when Schober<sup>7</sup> was dropped and then after Lausanne. Any financial assistance extended to them now could therefore be looked upon, for the time being, merely as a single grant to tide them over what, it is hoped, will be a short period, that is until conditions enable them to join a bourgeois government, which is what they themselves want.

For all these reasons I would give my warmest support to the request presented by Herr Foppa to Herr von Grünewald, and I would be greatly indebted to you if you would be good enough to accede to his request for a single grant of financial assistance by giving him, say, 30,000 reichsmarks or an amount as close as possible to it. Only a portion of this total would have to be provided during this fiscal year, so long as the remainder is paid as soon as possible after April 1.

Since Herr Foppa is in most urgent need of assistance at this time, I would also be especially obliged to you if you would inform me of your decision soon. I would of course leave the choice among the various methods by which any such payment would be made to your or Herr Grünewald's judgment. I believe that last time the Foreign Ministry simply increased the political fund of the Legation by a corresponding amount.<sup>8</sup>

Yours, etc.

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<sup>7</sup> Johann Schober, leader of a parliamentary group which included also the Greater German party, had resigned as Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister when the Cabinet of Karl Buresch was reshuffled in January 1932.

<sup>8</sup> Rieth also wrote to Ministerialdirektor von Grünewald on Feb. 18 along these same lines (4938/E269440-42). On May 28, Grünewald replied that financial assistance of the kind suggested was "out of the question at present." Grünewald then added that "in case there should be a change in Austria's domestic political situation, I request that you bring up the matter again so that it may be reexamined here." (4938/E269456)

Later on, however, Grünewald informed Rieth in a letter dated Sept. 26 that in the matter of the Greater German party, which the Minister had brought up for discussion recently, Bülow's consent "to the solution agreed upon by us" had been obtained. "I am asking you, therefore, to lay out the amount of 10,000 reichsmarks for the purpose in question and to draw for this amount upon the Foreign Ministry funds in the customary way under symbol I 5 IV. I shall expect further reports from you with respect to making available an equal amount at a later date." (4938/E269457)

On Mar. 28, 1934, Grünewald authorized Rieth to make another payment to the amount of 10,000 reichsmarks to the Greater German party (4938/E269467). There is also in the files the following handwritten note: "Today I received from the German Legation 11141.35 s[chillings]. Vienna, June 21, 1934, H[ermann] Foppa, Chairman of the Greater German People's party." (4938/E269451)

## No. 26

3154/671270-71

*Memorandum by the Reichswehr Minister<sup>1</sup>*

BERLIN, February 19, 1933.

## DIRECTIVES FOR THE DELEGATION

Subject: Standardization of Army Systems.

Germany is ready to participate in the discussion of the standardization of the army systems.<sup>2</sup> It does not make sense, however, to take a position as early as this with respect to the principle, but to tie it up with numerous reservations, and furthermore to make the final attitude dependent on the decision regarding other questions. Germany cannot, therefore, take a position on the principle of standardization until the following preliminary questions are clarified:

1. How shall general disarmament be carried out? Here it must be made clear:

a) The ratio of the number of those to be inducted annually to the size of the population. (In this connection the principle of the relativity of armaments is later to be stressed);

b) The decision regarding the abolition of heavy weapons of offense and of military aviation, as well as regarding the ban on aerial bombardment;

c) The final status of the armaments of the individual countries;

d) The defining of the stages of disarmament;

e) The regulation of the national security of the disarmed countries until the time of the definitive equalization of armaments.

2. On what points shall there be in the case of the small countries a deviation from the principles of standardization to be established for the big Powers? In this connection the stronger bond between the states of the Little Entente<sup>3</sup> and the greater significance of the small states resulting from it must be pointed out.

3. Will there be included in the standardization,

a) the military forces from overseas stationed in the mother country or near it,

b) not only the continental, but all European states?

Germany must reserve the right to raise further preliminary questions.

<sup>1</sup> This memorandum (3154/671272) was transmitted to Neurath by Bülow who noted: "My suggestions for amending and supplementing it are inserted in parentheses."

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 23.

<sup>3</sup> On Feb. 16, 1933, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia had signed a "Pact of Organization of the Little Entente" designed to strengthen the alliance by the establishment of common organs such as the Permanent Council and the Economic Council of the Little Entente. For the text of this statute, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cxxxix, p. 233.

It is also to be especially pointed out that in the case of the transitional provisions, not only the needs of external security but also those of internal security must be considered.

(We have to assume that standardization cannot be limited to the term of service, but must apply also to army strength and armaments. Such a revolutionary innovation can only be considered if the whole result of disarmament and its effects can be foreseen.)

(The attempt must therefore be made so to amend the Cot resolution<sup>4</sup> that it no longer represents the recognition of a principle, but an instruction to the Commission to try to develop a just and practical disarmament solution out of the French disarmament proposal.)

Everything is to be done to prevent a vote (now) (on the principle). Should it nevertheless come to a vote, you are to refrain from voting.<sup>5</sup>

VON BLOMBERG

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<sup>4</sup> See document No. 23.

<sup>5</sup> Marginal note: "Approved. N[eurath], Feb. 20."

## No. 27

6001/E442001-07

*Ministerialdirektor Köpke to Ambassador Hassell*

BERLIN, February 20, 1933.

II It. 223.

DEAR HASSELL: The aftereffects of grippe are still keeping me confined to my room. Therefore I was unfortunately not able to send you a few lines with the last courier, as I had intended, in reply to your interesting and important letter of January 25.<sup>1</sup> On the question discussed there concerning closer political cooperation with Italy in the Danube Basin you have in the meantime received instruction W 424 II of February 7,<sup>2</sup> which was drafted in consultation with Department II and signed by the Minister himself. The economic side of the question is treated there in detail; the political side, however, in keeping with the real subject of the instruction, is only touched on. As a supplement to the instruction I should therefore like to communicate to you in addition some ideas which have been factors in determining the policy we have hitherto followed with Italy.

As you know, we have hitherto shaped our political relations with Italy according to this principle: the closest collaboration wherever there are common interests but no binding commitment of German policy to the Italian. The decisive factor in this basic rejection of a

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed (8038/E578169-74).

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 14.

policy of alliance was particularly the fact of our extremely exposed position with respect to France; Italy could not protect us against the pressure of French power politics even if she wished.

As merely one example from the not-too-distant past, I should like to call to mind Mussolini's great speech before the Italian Senate in November 1923,<sup>3</sup> in which the Duce impressively set forth the position of the Italian Government on the reparations question and declared quite positively and openly that Italy had never agreed to a military occupation of the Ruhr territory. Nevertheless it was not possible for the Italian Government to stop the Ruhr action. Without doubt Italy's position has become stronger since then. But do you believe yourself that, with all her willingness to help, Italy would today be in a position to impose her will on France in any question that concerns us? Our chief concern remains the problem of the eastern frontier. Do you think Italy is strong enough—even now—to take the pressure off our western front, if necessary, in the event of a conflagration in the east? Not to mention the fact that in case of a military conflict our southeastern frontier would undoubtedly also become involved!

But then there is also another objection. The Italians have always been political realists. In view of the situation created in Europe by the peace treaties they must now, if possible, calculate even more soberly than ever before. It seems to me that cooperation with Italy gives promise of success only if we are able to offer the Italians compensation for their political or military support. What could that consist in? The political ambitions of Italy have always been directed toward the extension of Italian influence in the Mediterranean and especially on the North African Coast—spheres of interest where we unfortunately have nothing to seek and nothing to give, whereas France does!

Moreover, the Balkan peninsula, where Rome has to a certain extent taken over the inheritance and therewith the role of Vienna, has since the war become an Italian sphere of interest. In the Danube region our political interests undoubtedly do not run parallel with the Italian. Unreserved collaboration with Italy in the Danube region would only be conceivable either in the framework of a comprehensive alliance—which for the present is unthinkable to me—that would bring us such benefits in other, vital areas as might make our sacrifices in the southeast seem bearable, or—after a political settlement is brought about in the Austrian question and in the closely related question of the structure of the Danube region. You yourself, however, have pointed out very clearly how great the conflicts of interest are which particularly here separate us from Italy. The three catch-

<sup>3</sup> The reference is to Mussolini's speech in the Italian Senate on Nov. 16, 1923. Text in *Scritti e discorsi di Benito Mussolini* (Milan, 1934), vol. III, pp. 253-273.

words, Brenner frontier, South Tirol, and Anschluss, say enough on that point. Unforgotten are the experiences at the beginning of 1926, when the Italians, without any reason, suspected that "after Locarno" we would "hurl ourselves against the Brenner frontier." You recall the astonishing spontaneous outburst of the Duce in his speech in the Chamber on February 6, 1926,<sup>4</sup> in which Mussolini spoke of a "German campaign against Italy," which at the same time he called "contemptible and laughable"; Italy would never "lower the flag she had planted on the Brenner". And in connection therewith the entire Italian press made an unbridled attack on the Anschluss. It is not necessary for me here to go into Italy's corresponding unqualified rejection of the Curtius customs union project.<sup>5</sup> Italy's concern about her Brenner frontier will determine her position on the Anschluss question also in the future, at least for the foreseeable future, and where we are seeking an open road for our economic expansion to the southeast, Italy is thinking of erecting a barrier designed to cut us off from this area. To be sure, we too as well as Italy have an interest in the loosening of the Little Entente and consequently of the French system of alliances. But while we have been trying, not without hope of success, to bring about this loosening by playing, with respect to the individual Balkan States, the economic trump cards which our geographic position and the capacity of our market give us, the Italian policy with its aims at political power has so far led to a heightening of the political tensions and thereby to the consolidation of the Little Entente which just now has been agreed upon at Geneva.<sup>6</sup> An alliance between Germany, Italy, and Hungary, such as the French have just now pictured as already existing, obviously in order to force such an association, would, I am convinced, be a combination whose inferiority in power politics would inevitably be detrimental above all to Germany in view of the present situation in which the armament settlement has not yet been reached even in theory, let alone in practice, and in which any new economic upheaval may bring with it an incalculable aggravation of our domestic situation.

In these depressing circumstances it is hard for me to see what benefit we would derive from an active policy in the southeast coordinated with that of Italy. I fear on the contrary that a settlement of our differences of opinion with Italy is not yet possible and that an agreement on political collaboration would therefore be a vessel without content, soon broken into fragments for which we would have to pay.

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<sup>4</sup> Text in *Scritti e discorsi di Benito Mussolini*, vol. v, pp. 261-269.

<sup>5</sup> The plan, announced in March 1931, for an Austro-German customs union.

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 26, footnote 3.



On the other hand, we naturally have every interest in using all possible means to dispel the Italian suspicion concerning alleged German plans for hegemony in the southeast. In reality we have never had such plans for political hegemony, and since we also do not intend to become active in that direction in the future, it should really be possible to dispel the Italian distrust.

In this connection perhaps sometime you might consider whether the Italian Government could be informed in all frankness—with the authoritative approval of the Chancellor, to be sure, and only through you by confidential diplomatic channels—that in the framework outlined above, i. e., taking into account our view of the Austrian question, we do not intend to create any kind of obstacles for the plans of Italian policy in the area of the Danube region. Such a declaration, intended only for the Italian Government, would in my opinion be of considerably more practical interest to it than any sort of alliance with us, which would not have a realizable content.

Since I assume that after the elections you will in any case be summoned to Berlin for further political discussion, all these things can be discussed more fully than the framework of a friendly correspondence between us permits. You will certainly agree with me that particularly the internal political development in Germany will contribute greatly toward deepening our friendly relations with Italy in such a way that in the future there will no longer be any room for distrust such as was often promoted in the past by all kinds of minor and perfectly trivial dissensions and intrigues. It is to be hoped that the possibilities of economic cooperation set forth in the instruction mentioned at the beginning will also have a reassuring effect in this direction.<sup>7</sup>

With many heartfelt greetings to you and your family, I am

Yours, etc.

Körke

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<sup>7</sup> Hassell's reply is document No. 51.

## No. 28

6024/H044758-59

### *Memorandum by an Official of Department IV*

BERLIN, February 20, 1933.  
e. o. IV Ja. 157.

After telephoning, the Japanese Military Attaché here, Lieutenant Colonel Banzai, just paid me a visit in order to discuss the situation with me.

He said that he wanted to request that Germany, if at all possible, abstain from voting during the balloting in the League of Nations

Assembly.<sup>1</sup> B. stressed that Japan was now at a decisive turning point in her entire policy which could also be important for Germany. Heretofore Japan had, to be sure, tried to support Germany in individual questions, but had not been able to do so nearly as much as she would have liked, since she had been seriously hindered by regard for France. The trend in Japan that was pro-German and had always demanded that one stand by Germany in her fight against the Versailles Treaty had so far been confronted by a very strong trend that was oriented toward France. Now the way was becoming free for cooperation with Germany. From now on Japan did not need to take any more account of France and could fight against Versailles together with Germany. If Germany should abstain during the voting in the League of Nations Assembly this would greatly improve the feeling for Germany in Japan. The difficulties of such a decision for Germany, which also had good relations with China and had tried to remain neutral toward both countries, were known to him, Banzai. However, he did want to say that the favor asked would deserve thorough consideration in Germany's own interest in view of future developments, and that even China herself was by no means entirely in agreement with the Lytton report,<sup>2</sup> which was at the basis of the forthcoming decision of the League of Nations Assembly.

My question as to whether Japan would leave the League of Nations was answered energetically in the affirmative by Mr. Banzai. He stated further that he thought the entire Japanese Embassy here was of the same opinion, and that he was certain from a telephone conversation with Geneva yesterday that the Japanese delegation there was likewise of the same opinion. The Japanese Chargé d'Affaires, Counselor of Embassy Fujii, knew of his visit to me. He, Banzai, had undertaken to make these communications to me himself, since as an officer and on the basis of our acquaintance of many years' standing he could speak of these things more easily with me.

Without expressing any sort of opinion on his statements themselves, I thanked Mr. Banzai for his frank communication and told him that I would pass it on.<sup>3</sup>

CZEBULINSKI

<sup>1</sup> In the forthcoming vote on the adoption of the draft report of the Committee of Nineteen on the Sino-Japanese dispute.

<sup>2</sup> For the Lytton report, see League of Nations, *Appeal by the Chinese Government, Report of the Commission of Enquiry* (Geneva, October 1, 1932).

<sup>3</sup> Marginal notes on first page of this memorandum:

"I should like to suggest not giving any answer and not reverting to the conversation. M[eyer], Feb. 21."

"Has been submitted to the Reich Minister. V[ülckers], Feb. 21."

At the session of the League Assembly on Feb. 24, Germany voted for adoption of the report of the Committee of Nineteen.

## No. 29

6609/E496900-05

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

A 334

Moscow, February 20, 1933.

Received February 23.

IV Ru. 758.

## POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: The foreign relations of the Soviet Union with France and Germany. Effect of political relations of Germany-France-Soviet Union on negotiations. French initiative in the direction of friendlier relations with Russia. Favorable reception in Moscow. Feeling of insecurity with respect to German policy. Instability of German-Russian relations. Need for ratification of the Protocol to the Berlin Treaty.

The reciprocal effect of German-French and German-Soviet relations, which had already so often influenced the course of Franco-Soviet negotiations for a nonaggression pact (see report No. A 3270 of November 28, 1932<sup>2</sup>), has apparently also had a decisive effect on the coming into force of the treaty which has been concluded: ratification of the Pact and the exchange of instruments of ratification are taking place at a moment of increased tension in German-French relations and growing instability in German-Soviet relations.<sup>3</sup>

If throughout the course of Franco-Soviet negotiations for a nonaggression pact it was the French side which took the initiative in promoting the conversations—in the summer of 1931 because of the German-Austrian negotiations concerning a customs union; in the summer of 1932 because of the German-French dispute at the Disarmament Conference—so this last positive development in Franco-Soviet relations is also, in my opinion, attributable principally to France. Litvinov's Geneva proposal with regard to the definition of the aggressor<sup>4</sup> was based, to be sure, on the Herriot plan,<sup>5</sup> but only on the first section of this plan. Litvinov intended by his proposal—in so far as we are able to judge from here—less a support

<sup>1</sup> Marginal notes on the first page of this report (E496900) indicate that the report was submitted to the Foreign Minister and to the Reich Chancellery.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (9469/E867925-31). A quotation of a portion of the report appears on p. 63.

<sup>3</sup> Ratifications were exchanged on Feb. 15, 1933, of the treaties of nonaggression and conciliation between France and the Soviet Union, concluded on Nov. 29, 1932. For texts, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLVII, p. 411.

<sup>4</sup> Litvinov had made his proposal concerning the definition of the aggressor at the Feb. 6, 1933, session of the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference. The text is in League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (Geneva, 1933): *Records of the Conference*, ser. B, *Minutes of the General Commission*, vol. II, pp. 234-239.

<sup>5</sup> This refers to the memorandum submitted by the French delegation on Nov. 14, 1932. See Editors' Note, p. 18.

of the French thesis than to climb up, so to speak, on the shoulders of Herriot, in order to be able to attack the Japanese more effectively from there. The Geneva negotiations, as well as the formal act of ratification only acquire political importance for Franco-Soviet relations through the decidedly pro-Soviet attitude of a portion of the French press and particularly of Herriot.

What the prerequisites are on the French side for a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, I am unable to judge. With regard to the motives that govern the Soviet Union in the shaping of her relations with France, the statements made in my report No. A 3270 of November 28, 1932, still apply:

"The general instability of the political situation, the general debility, the world-wide economic crisis make it improbable, particularly in the next few years, that one of the Great European Powers will be confronted with the fateful question of an "either/or." But the preparation for such a development, the gradual slipping into the other camp is, indeed, conceivable even now. Poland alone offers the Soviet Union too little inducement for this. But concessions on the part of France in the political and economic field—that would be quite a different sort of temptation. Even to temptations from this direction the Soviet Government would yield only if it were no longer sure of Germany. Collaboration with Germany is the most logical and the most coveted combination for the Soviet Union."

The Soviet Government perceives in a settlement with France a welcome and necessary improvement in its diplomatic and military situation. It will do everything to encourage such a rapprochement, if only in order to loosen such Franco-Japanese ties as are supposed to exist. But the true test for the Soviet Union of the strength of the French desire for reconciliation will only be the readiness of the French economy to grant credits. These points of view are expressed also in the semi-official *Izvestia* article, concerning which I am reporting separately.<sup>6</sup>

The French declarations of friendship are taken much more seriously here than previously, without complete faith being put in them, however. It is not considered improbable that Franco-Russian friendship is for France less an end in itself than a means for strengthening the international position of France. Once this purpose is achieved, the Soviet Union would again be dropped. Despite all the accommodation shown by the *Izvestia* article, which even makes a bow to the satellites of France, in general there still prevails here mistrust and an attitude of watchful waiting. It is unmistakable, however, that in the past few weeks the trend has been toward a growing inclination for

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<sup>6</sup> This report has not been found.

France. Even during the signing of the pacts with Poland<sup>7</sup> and France, *Izvestia* made the statement that the policy of friendship for Germany was not prejudiced thereby. Only in January, in his speech to the ZIK,<sup>8</sup> Molotov found friendly words for Germany, while the mention of France and Poland was confined only to an allusion to the nonaggression pacts concluded. The change that has taken place in recent weeks is apparent.

The further attitude of the Soviet Union regarding France will be decisively influenced by the judgment of the future attitude of Germany. An attitude of watchful waiting is being taken toward the new German Cabinet here. Basically it is hoped that the strength of their mutual interests will make possible the continuance of the present friendly policy. But the foundations of their mutual relations are felt to be unstable, both in a juridical and in a political respect: in a juridical respect, because the Berlin Treaty and the Conciliation Convention are not in force because they were not ratified;<sup>9</sup> in a political respect because there have for some time been no statements of political intention on the part of the Reich Government with respect to its Russian policy, while toward France very positive statements had been made by Germany in the past year. They are still haunted here by the story of the military alliance offered to France. The statements made by influential Germans privately to Soviet politicians regarding the unaltered course of Germany's Russian policy have, it is true, assuaged the strongest fears. But they could not take the place of the positive effect of a public statement by the German Government. There is also disappointment here over the fact that even the substitutes for such official Government statements, such as friendly telegrams on special occasions or interviews of a positive nature on the part of Germany, have been omitted. They bring up by way of comparison the telegraphic protestations of friendship from Kemal, Ismet,<sup>10</sup> and Rüşti,<sup>11</sup> on the 15th anniversary of the founding of the Soviet Union, or the equally warm declarations of affection of Premier Herriot after the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact.

<sup>7</sup> The reference is to the Pact of Non-Aggression between Poland and the Soviet Union, signed on July 25, 1932. For the text, see *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. cxxxvi, p. 41.

<sup>8</sup> The initials stand for the Central Executive Committee. Extracts from Molotov's report to the Central Executive Committee on Jan. 23, 1933, are in *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, selected and edited by Jane Degras (London, 1953), vol. III, pp. 1-5.

<sup>9</sup> The reference is to the delay in ratification of an agreement of June 24, 1931, for the extension of the Berlin Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality signed on Apr. 24, 1926, and of a Conciliation Convention between Germany and the USSR, signed at Moscow, Jan. 25, 1929. See *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. LIII, p. 387, and vol. xc, p. 219.

<sup>10</sup> Ismet İnönü.

<sup>11</sup> Tewfik Rüşti Aras.

How thoroughly they are occupied with these thoughts is shown by a remark of Litvinov's to me: In the opinion of the jurists of the Foreign Commissariat, ratification of the protocol on extension of the Berlin Treaty was possible by means of emergency order [*Notverordnung*] without violation of the provisions of the Constitution.

The restoration of the juridical and political basis of German-Russian relations through ratification of the protocol on extension of the Berlin Treaty is the most urgent requirement for the continuance of Germany's present Russian policy. Ratification might also—whether it be through parliamentary channels or not—provide a natural opportunity for a government statement on German-Soviet relations. Such an action becomes all the more urgent in view of the latest development in Franco-Russian relations. Even though the value of such a German attitude would have been greater without the parallel with France, the advantage to Germany even now will be considerable.

DIRKSEN

### No. 30

9508/E670062-66

#### *Circular of the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, February 21, 1933.  
e. o. W 1260.

With reference to circular instruction W 1473 of March 11, 1932.<sup>2</sup>

The negotiations concerning the Standstill questions led on February 17, 1933, to the conclusion of a new agreement, the German Credit Agreement of 1933.<sup>3</sup> This takes the place of the German Credit Agreement of 1932, which expires on February 28, 1933.<sup>4</sup> The enclosed printed copy of the official communiqué<sup>5</sup> gives more detailed information concerning the most important provisions of the new Agreement, particularly in so far as they deviate from the present arrangements. With regard to the new Agreement, the text of which will go to our officials abroad, the following should, moreover, be mentioned:

That the negotiations were brought to a satisfactory conclusion in a relatively short time—barely 3 weeks—is attributable primarily to

<sup>1</sup> This circular was directed to all Missions and Career Consulates except the Embassy to the Vatican.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (K515/K145274-99).

<sup>3</sup> Text printed in *The German Credit Agreement of 1933* (Druckerei der Reichsbank, Berlin, 1933). English text filmed on 7188/E528016-79.

<sup>4</sup> An agreement of January 1932 regarding private international debts of Germany had included provisions for a 10 percent reduction of these debts.

<sup>5</sup> WTB release No. 339 of Feb. 18 (9508/E670067-68).

the circumstance that this year's Standstill conference was very carefully prepared as a result of two preliminary conferences between the German Debtors' Committee and the foreign creditors' committee, which had taken place in London during last December and January. In London we had already succeeded in parrying the originally extensive demands of the creditors for repayment of large capital amounts. In so far as on certain points there has been a change for the worse, as compared with the former arrangements, this is completely offset by improvements in other fields. This is true, for example, of the reduction of 5 percent of outstanding credit lines. The reduction in the total volume that this entails and the consequent loss of foreign exchange to the entire German economy is considerably less than the savings in foreign exchange resulting to the Reichsbank from the lowering of the interest rates. It is to be expected that through the reduction of interest the Reichsbank will save about 20-25 million reichsmarks in foreign exchange annually. In the matter of the lowering of the interest rates, it is also significant that the lower rates must become effective on April 1, 1933, at the latest. An assurance is thereby created that the reduction of interest rates will not be postponed for months by tedious negotiations, as it was in the past year.

Also of importance is the fact that the creditor no longer has the right to terminate the credit if the rediscount credit granted to the Reichsbank, which at present is still 86 million dollars, should not be extended by the banks of issue which are granting the credit and the Bank for International Settlements. Not only is the Reichsbank thereby assured of considerable freedom of action in the negotiations with the creditors, but a factor of insecurity for the existence of the Standstill is also eliminated.

According to the calculations made by the Reichsbank and the German Debtors' Committee, theoretically there may be involved in a conversion of Standstill monies into the registered obligations created by the new Agreement at most some 900 million reichsmarks, of which approximately 180 million would be Standstill funds of industry. It is the conviction of all groups involved, however, that this theoretical maximum limit will in practice not be anywhere near reached.

In the final discussion of the Agreement, in which the representatives of the German banking world and German industry took part, it was acknowledged on all sides that the results of the negotiations represented a considerable improvement over the present arrangements. Please, however, point out in all conversations that the German Government and German economic circles concerned must attach decisive importance to a definitive solution of the Standstill problem,

since without such a permanent solution, a recovery of the German economic and credit system does not seem possible.

The committee of the foreign Standstill creditors issued a report on the occasion of the extension of the Standstill Agreement for one year, in which the carrying out of the present Standstill Agreement is critically discussed in connection with the measures taken by the German Government and the attitude of the German economic circles concerned. With regard to the substance of the report, I refer to the attached excerpt,<sup>6</sup> which I commend to your special attention for the orientation of your language. The Committee of Creditors, which comprises the representatives of the creditors in the 11 countries participating in the Standstill, pays high tribute therein both to the measures of the Reich Government and to the collaboration between Government, Reichsbank, banks, and industry, and the understanding attitude of the broad mass of the German people. Of importance and especially adapted for use in conversations is the statement contained in the concluding remark of the report to the effect that the German problem has become more and more identified with world problems, and that the growth of German prosperity, which is indispensable to a recovery of the world economy, and adequate employment of the people of Germany, are not possible without an increase in German foreign trade. These remarks acquire increased importance in view of the World Economic Conference, which must also take up the question of the short-term debts and the restoration of greater freedom in the movement of capital, goods and services, in accordance with the draft of an agenda drawn up by the experts. Please, therefore, make use of the report of the Committee of Creditors accordingly in all your statements and conversations on the World Economic Conference.

By order :  
WIEHL

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<sup>6</sup> WTB release No. 343 of Feb. 18 (9508/E670069-70).

## No. 31

3086/618247-49

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, February 22, 1933.  
RM 232.

Yesterday the Czechoslovak Minister called on me in order, as he told me, to discuss German-Czech relations in connection with the recent tightening of the Little Entente.<sup>1</sup> M. Mastný began by saying that basically the convention signed in Geneva by Czechoslovakia,

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 26, footnote 3.



Yugoslavia, and Rumania did not signify any change in the relations which already existed between the three states mentioned. Since repeated attempts had recently been made, however, to represent Rumania's position within the Little Entente as uncertain and since it had been shown that individually the small states had been shoved aside in Geneva and also elsewhere by the Great Powers when important questions of interest to the Little Entente were dealt with, the governments of these three states had considered it necessary to demonstrate their solidarity also toward the outside world and to establish formally the basis for joint action. They believed that the peace of Europe and conditions in the Balkans would also be served thereby. He would openly admit that Italy's attitude toward Yugoslavia and Hungary had been the special occasion for this step by the Little Entente. This alliance was not directed against Germany. Czechoslovakia in particular attached the greatest importance to having good relations with Germany, and M. Beneš had instructed him to give expression to this fact here.

I replied to M. Mastný that I could not see how the conclusion of this convention at the present time and in the form in which it occurred served the peace of Europe. The preludes to the convention, beginning with the exaggeration of the Hirtenberg affair<sup>2</sup> and the rumors launched from Paris about a German-Italian-Hungarian alliance, had at any rate not been exactly such as to set Europe at rest. The conclusion of the alliance was also in crass contradiction to the attitude of Czechoslovakia toward the German-Austrian customs union plans of last year and the language which had been used at that time in Prague and in the Czechoslovak press against these plans. When the Minister stated that economic reasons had also been a chief factor in the conclusion of this alliance, these reasons had been present to a still greater degree in the German-Austrian customs union plans. To me it was also conceivable that this alliance was apt to strengthen the restless elements in Yugoslavia and thereby increase rather than lessen the danger of warlike complications in the Balkans. The Minister denied this and said that on the contrary they were hoping in Prague that they might be able to exert a calming influence on the Yugoslavs.

From the statements of the Minister it was quite plain that the rejection which M. Beneš had met in Geneva at the conference of the five Powers in December<sup>3</sup> of last year was what induced this ambitious gentleman to urge the conclusion of the present convention, in which he played the chief role and in which he intends to play a special part.

V. N[EURATH]

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 81.

<sup>3</sup> See Editors' Note, p. 18.

## No. 32

2980/581369-71

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, February 22, 1933.

The Rumanian Minister called on me today in order to give me explanations about the new agreement of the Little Entente.<sup>1</sup> He had the authorization of his Government to do so and had also consulted his Czech and Yugoslav colleagues in advance about his visit to the Ministry.

The Minister proceeded on the assumption that the new agreement had been unfavorably received and misunderstood by our press, obviously under Italian and Hungarian influence. The reason for the action of the Little Entente, he could definitely assure me, was not to be found in the events of the last few weeks but in the neglect on the part of the Great Powers which the Little Entente had experienced for years and which it had fought and protested against in vain. He needed only to recall the conferences at The Hague, Lausanne and Geneva (German equality of rights). He wished to tell me in strict confidence that for the present action two factors had been of decisive importance. First, Rumanian disappointment over the Polish attitude in the question of the Non-Aggression Pact with Russia<sup>2</sup> and the anxiety lest states of the Little Entente follow the Polish example. As early as 1924, for example, Rumania had had to protest against a Czech-Russian rapprochement. For this reason there had been newly incorporated into the agreement of the Little Entente the obligation, morally recognized even before, not to conclude any political treaties without the consent of the other members. The other motivating factor had been the internal political situation in Yugoslavia, with respect to which it could not be denied that outside influences were at work. In these troubled times one wished to assure the Yugoslav public that it could in all circumstances rely on the allied countries.

The assertion that the Little Entente had agreed to conclude trade agreements or commercial arrangements only jointly was quite wrong. He read to me the pertinent passage, which says that economic agreements shall require the consent of the other members if they cause considerable political repercussions.

For the rest, nothing essentially new had occurred, as I could convince myself from the communiqués on previous meetings of the Little Entente. The Little Entente had intentionally confirmed its solidarity

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 26, footnote 3.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 29, footnote 7.

somewhat demonstratively, without, however, departing from the previous line of development, or going significantly beyond the earlier state of the present obligations. The periodical meetings of the "Council of the Little Entente," which had always consisted of the Foreign Ministers of the three countries, would be continued in accordance with the practice thus far. The establishment of a permanent secretariat at the seat of the Council's chairman at any given time had no practical significance. This was merely a sinecure for young diplomats. He concluded with the assurance that the purpose of the action of the Little Entente was to assert itself with respect to the Great Powers in order not to be confronted any more with the accomplished fact of a joint decision of the leading powers, as had happened so often. The new agreement, moreover, would be published in the very next few days.<sup>3</sup>

I thanked the Minister for his explanations, but otherwise took a reserved attitude and said that before taking any position I would have to wait for the promised publication. As for the attitude of our press, it was naturally influenced by the attitude of the Italian, Hungarian and Bulgarian press, because we had less interest in the political relations in the Southeast, but were well aware that the above-mentioned countries followed it very attentively.

The Minister then emphasized also that the new agreement was not a demonstration of independence directed against France, referring in that connection to critical statements in *Le Temps* of February 17. He admitted quite frankly that the action of the Little Entente was intended to be a demonstration against the revision of the boundaries, which was all the more necessary since it was being stated quite openly in Hungary that 1933 was the year of boundary revisions. In conclusion he spoke at length about the economic and political harmony of Germany and Rumania, which should not and could not be disturbed by any agreements of the Little Entente. He also indicated that Rumania would disinterest herself completely in our revisionist wishes if we on our part could declare ourselves disinterested in the state of affairs in the Southeast.<sup>4</sup>

BÜLOW

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<sup>3</sup> It was published on Feb. 25 in Prague, Belgrade, and Bucharest.

<sup>4</sup> Information on the Rumanian Minister's statements to Bülow and on the parallel step taken by the Czechoslovak Minister (document No. 31) was given in a Foreign Ministry instruction of Feb. 28 sent to the Missions in Austria, Bulgaria, France, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Rumania, Soviet Union, Switzerland, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, and to the German delegation at Geneva (9608/E677821-27).

## No. 33

6609/E496954-57

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union*

## Cipher Letter

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, February 22, 1933.

SECRET

e. o. IV Ru. 644.

In the past few weeks the relations of Soviet Russia to Germany and France have to a greater extent become the subject of discussion in political circles and the press. The attitude of the Russian and French authorities especially has often furnished occasion for extensive comment. I should like in this connection to refer, for example, to the following facts. M. Litvinov at various times made statements before the Disarmament Conference at Geneva which met with an unusually friendly reception in the French press. If one links these speeches with the statements of leading French politicians, the thought suggests itself that Litvinov's statements are conditioned not only by the subject of the Disarmament Conference, but that they reflect more far-reaching political intentions. Also to be mentioned in this connection are the various statements of Herriot in speeches, newspapers, and periodicals. Further to be considered is the apparently imminent exchange of Military Attachés and the decidedly cordial reception which Russian military men recently met with in Paris when they were purchasing armaments material.

Evidently the last change in government in Germany has strengthened the uncertainty shown by the Soviet Government from the time of the Papen Cabinet regarding the further development of German-Russian relations. Actually there is no reason for this. It is a question whether or not the wishes repeatedly expressed to us at certain intervals since the fall of the Brüning Cabinet, to receive from the Reich Government assurances of an official or semi-official nature that there was no change in our policy toward the USSR, are to be considered only as tactical steps. Perhaps, for lack of such a declaration, we should be held responsible for a cooling in German-Russian relations, or the making of such a declaration should even be utilized for the purpose of strengthening our position with respect to France. I have, however, already informed the Russian Ambassador recently that there would be no change in our political line with respect to Russia. Also, in a general discussion with me of the Russian problem, the Chancellor very definitely took the stand that a sharp distinction had to be drawn between the internal treatment of communism and international relations with the USSR,

and that he would allow no change to take place in the political, economic, and military policy with respect to Soviet Russia. Proof of this is given also by the aid that we are granting the Russians financially in the economic negotiations.

In addition to the uncertainty of the USSR concerning the developments in Germany, a number of factors also appear which are not of course related to our internal political development. The threatening situation in the Far East, the economic tension in Russia, and the fact that the Russians perhaps regard the economic possibilities in Germany as more or less exhausted are certainly factors which might cause the Russian Government to take a cooler view of German-Russian relations and to cause it to incline to a certain extent toward France. Of especial importance in this connection is the fact that France is obviously trying of her own accord to cater to such trends in many different ways. As the last reports from Herr von Hassell show,<sup>1</sup> the Italian Government is also of the opinion, moreover, that Russo-French rapprochement is to be taken entirely seriously.

I consider it proper not to let things drift along, but to discuss with the USSR frankly and plainly the present situation with respect to our policy. Naturally this must not be done in such a way as to give the impression that we were anxiously pursuing the Russians. There must also, therefore, be no question, for example, of having the Reich Government now issue a spontaneous public statement on German-Russian policy, since I made the above-mentioned statement to the Russian Ambassador. On the other hand, I consider it appropriate for you as soon as possible to enter into a discussion of the general situation in regard to European policy with the proper authorities there and thus clarify the Russian attitude.

The result of your conversations, the form of which I leave to your discretion, will be of great importance for our judgment of the present situation.<sup>2</sup>

V. NEURATH

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<sup>1</sup> Hassell had referred to Russo-French rapprochement in reports Nos. I 17 of Jan. 5 (6615/E498684-86); I 62 of Jan. 11 (6615/E498687); and I 395 of Feb. 25 (5737/028639-41).

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 41.

## No. 34

6176/E463397-99

*The Minister in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

A 77

WARSAW, February 22, 1933.

Received February 23.

IV Po. 1307.

## POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: The French Ambassador regarding the Corridor problem.

The French Ambassador here, M. Laroche, has repeatedly broached the Corridor question to me of late. When I condense his various statements the following picture results:

M. Laroche, who worked on various subcommittees during the Versailles peace negotiations, claims to be particularly well satisfied that he had nothing to do with fixing the eastern border of Germany; for he had foreseen that only new friction and lasting enmity between Germany and Poland would result from the system of the Corridor. In former times the scattered location of various areas belonging to a country was nothing unusual, but such a situation was not really compatible with the modern concept of state territory. It was clear to anyone who took a map in his hands that the Corridor was not tenable in the long run. It was also in the interest of Poland to reach a rapprochement with Germany, and he understood that that was not possible without eliminating the Corridor. He had also spoken about this repeatedly at the Quai d'Orsay, but at the same time he had also always had to stress the tremendous difficulties that stood in the way of a solution. In particular it should be pointed out that in the Corridor precisely those areas were involved with which the partitions of Poland had begun previously, and therefore in his opinion there existed here in Poland, quite aside from all others, the fear bordering on psychosis that if any negotiations were undertaken concerning the Corridor this could mean the beginning of further partitions of Poland.

What seemed necessary to him in settling the Corridor question was the following:

1. Poland must be awarded a compensation of some sort (what this compensation should consist of M. Laroche did not say).

2. Poland must retain Gdynia.

3. The strip of land to be ceded to Germany must be as narrow as possible, so as not to make it too difficult for the Poles to accept the solution. He knew that this limitation was not considered acceptable in Germany at the present time, but then the whole question was not yet ripe for a solution, and especially not in Poland. The atmos-

phere for negotiations could hardly be any worse than at the moment; for this reason it was more sensible to wait, although one must remember on the other hand that, thanks to their upbringing, the youth here would be still more nationalistic than the present generation.

To my question whether he had already spoken about this question with Polish politicians here he replied that he was careful not to bring up this subject. He also did not consider that to be the task of the French Ambassador. Furthermore, all Poles who for their part had broached this subject to him had always expressed the view in agreement with the present official watchword hammered into the whole population by intensive propaganda, that territorial negotiations were out of the question. Whether that was really the true opinion of all reasonable people here he believed one could doubt.

VON MOLTKE

### No. 35

8070/E579314-21

#### *The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

I 368

ROME, February 23, 1933.

Received February 28.

W 1486.

#### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: German-Italian cooperation in the Southeast.

With reference to your instruction of February 7—No. W 424 II.<sup>1</sup>

The discussion begun by Signor Mussolini on "German-Italian cooperation in the economic field" (the proposal refers only to the Danube region) will be continued by me at the next opportunity along the lines indicated to me.

Since I consider the question to be fundamentally of great importance, I should like first, however, to state my views once more on the main points of the instruction.

The instruction states that Germany's economic attitude toward the countries in the Danube region coincides fairly well with her general political attitude. Thereby the economic policy is quite justifiably placed in the framework of general policy; on that point I should like to note the following, as a supplement to page 2, paragraph 3, of my report No. I 60, of January 11:<sup>2</sup>

Nothing is further from my mind than to view German-Italian relations with exaggerated, sanguine hopes, and under the present

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 14.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 14, footnote 1. In the paragraph referred to here Hessel had recommended that Germany show greater readiness to come to agreement with Italy regarding economic policy in the Danube Basin.

power relations to strive for a rigid German-Italian alliance front. I consider statements made in this vein (cf. report No. I 256, of February 8<sup>3</sup>) not only misleading but highly dangerous. On the other hand I should like to emphasize two things: 1) I consider correct Mussolini's tactic of first isolating France still further and bringing her down from her godlike position and her claims to hegemony before any practical steps toward understanding are contemplated—even if, as seems to be the case at the moment, it produces a counteroffensive which, in view of France's great power, again retards the development desired. 2) I believe that, precisely because the time is not yet ripe for a solid and open common front in the great political question of revision (mainly on account of our weakness), every opportunity should be used for bringing about a systematic cooperation with Italy in fields where that is already possible today. These fields include, besides certain questions of high policy (revision, reparations, and disarmament), particularly economic policy, under which a special place should be given to the future development of economic questions in the Danube region, where our political and economic interests touch each other closely. The purpose of such cooperation is twofold, namely, first of all, to provide a sort of foundation for a more far-reaching policy with Italy, which, it is hoped, will be possible later, but secondly to promote the above-mentioned goal of softening up [Reifmachens] France.

In my opinion we cannot, therefore, as might be concluded from individual statements in the instruction, treat France and Italy without any distinction and, depending on the apparent or even real chances of the moment, pursue economic cooperation in the Danube region sometimes with one, sometimes with the other; on the contrary, we should keep the goal of cooperation with Italy constantly in mind. It appears, however, particularly from instruction No. II Oe. W. D. B. 7, of February 13,<sup>4</sup> which was received at the same time, that in Lausanne, for example, it was quite definitely decided without consulting Italy or Hungary, to try to establish a common front with France and in accordance with the French proposal to take a positive attitude toward the idea of presenting "a joint German-French draft."<sup>5</sup> After these occurrences and those in Stresa the ineradicable impression arose in Italy and Hungary that in this matter Germany really intended to align herself with France. Whether Hungary and Italy for their part, too, had reason to say *mea culpa*, is another question. Now that the attempt made through the Ritter-Coulondre discussions to establish a united German-French front in

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (8954/E627841-42).

<sup>4</sup> Not printed (5642/E410748-56), a circular to the Missions in Budapest, Bucharest, Belgrade, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, Bern, Rome, and London. It refers, apropos of statements made by the new Hungarian Foreign Minister, Kánya, to the persistence of rumors since the time of the Lausanne Conference in June 1932 that the German Government might go along with a modified form of the Tardieu plan for a preferential customs arrangement to rehabilitate the Danubian countries. Since it was known that some of these rumors derived from reports concerning talks between Ritter and Coulondre at the time of the Lausanne Conference, a memorandum by Ritter summarizing the substance of the talks was enclosed with the circular instruction.

<sup>5</sup> The efforts of Ritter and Coulondre to agree upon a draft for "a collective agreement on the valorization of the price of Danubian grain" were described in Ritter's memorandum.



the treatment of the economic questions in the Danube region has not led to any practical result, as appears from the instruction of February 13, greater attention should be given to the idea of closer cooperation with Italy in this sector, which is of equal importance to the two countries. In this connection attention should be called in particular to the circumstance that the political aim of dissolution of the Little Entente, set forth for us, Italy and Hungary in the instruction of February 7, can be achieved not with France but only in opposition to France, among other things by first creating in the economic field a German-Italian cooperation supporting Austria and Hungary, which will make it increasingly clear to the Little Entente that it must make a settlement with these four countries.

As for the undeniable conflict between Germany and Italy in the form of the Austrian question, I do not by any means deny its existence. In fact, this conflict is precisely a starting point for my arguments. I hope my recommendation "to confront Italian policy (which, as is well known, is specially aimed at Austria and Hungary) with our express willingness to establish a special relationship of close commercial ties with Italy, at least in the Danube Basin", has not been taken to mean that I would advise acquiescence in these Italian plans. The meaning is rather that we should try by close collaboration with Italy and Hungary to render these plans innocuous to us, i. e., prevent Italy from trying to erect a barrier against Anschluss and against our economic activity in the Southeast. For we must realize clearly that in all our policy in the Southeast, especially as regards the shaping of the political and economic future of Austria, we shall always encounter Italy, and that for us it can only be a question of whether we shall succeed in gradually making this partner understand our aims or whether we shall see her land finally in the camp of our enemies. Whether it is advisable to tell Mussolini, in accordance with the instruction, that with us there cannot be any question of a drive to the Southeast [*Drang nach Südosten*] and that we have no distrust of Italian plans, seems to me doubtful. Mussolini knows as well as we do that we have strong economic interests in the Southeast (without necessarily thinking precisely of the slogan, "*Drang nach Südosten*"), which some day may very well conflict with the aims of Italian policy in this area. He also knows that we cannot lose sight of the future course of Austria's political destinies. Therefore I do not believe that such assurances can make any great impression, but rather that only the cooperation which has actually been started can gradually dispel the distrust and coordinate our policy and the Italian.

In agreement with the instruction I consider it advisable to leave unexpressed as much as possible the conflict inherent in the Austrian question. In that connection care must naturally be taken so that the later development of our special relations with Austria is not forestalled. This limit must be kept in mind; but it does not constitute, I assume—likewise in agreement with the instruction—an insuperable barrier to fruitful agreements concerning economic policy.

The instruction then states with reference to the method that the possibilities inherent in a cooperation of interested private parties are underestimated in Rome. To that, I should like to remark that in Italy Mussolini is not only a political dictator but maintains the strongest state control of economic life. In Finance Minister Jung,

who came from the banking business, he has a sort of economic dictator at his side. In my opinion Italian private industry can be won over to German-Italian cooperation and be permanently directed to it only by the Italian Government. The very failure of the efforts made thus far shows the necessity of this, for hitherto precisely this "cue from above" has been lacking. Hence the anxiety of Italian (official and private) representatives in this field—an anxiety, moreover, which has been considerably aggravated by the sensitivity caused by various occurrences, for example those indicated above.

For the rest, the French example shows as a matter of fact how it is possible to cooperate economically with success, but in a country such as present-day Italy in particular the impulse and direction must come from above and derive from a broad, political viewpoint recognized and grasped in both countries. This situation explains why people such as the two "dictators" mentioned "belittle" the conversations of private individuals. In this skepticism they were naturally confirmed also by the fact that the beginning of the discussions, announced since October, concerning which I was to inform Mussolini at the time, has been repeatedly postponed.

As far as their content is concerned, I should like to recommend for consideration whether the impulse which the reparation deliveries gave in relationship to France cannot to a certain extent be replaced by another viewpoint in relationship to Italy. One of the most important problems for Italy is the question of obtaining supplies in the event of war, Italy being almost entirely dependent on imports from abroad for procuring the most important raw materials and ensuring supplies for the army. Italy gets most of her coal from Great Britain, most of her iron and steel from France. These as well as many other supplies would no doubt be cut off in case of war.<sup>6</sup> An attempt should therefore be made to make Italy understand that even in peacetime she should import these commodities from countries that can deliver also in wartime, in order to make the industry of the countries concerned productive and to build up during peacetime the apparatus for supplying Italy on a large scale. In return for concessions in this field Germany could probably also make certain concessions.<sup>7</sup>

Considering his whole attitude and in the face of the extremely sharp antagonism to France, I believe that his suspicion might be strongly aroused by an allusion to the fruitful Franco-German cooperation.

The instruction then takes up the official cooperation and deplors its failure thus far. The latter is certainly due in part to the peculiarity of a personality such as De Michelis, but also to the above-indicated lack thus far of the "cue from above."

So when it is stated that nothing concrete can be envisaged under a joint German-Italian plan for commercial-political operations in the Danube Basin, I may perhaps be permitted to refer to the conversations of Messrs. Coulondre and Ritter (instruction II Oe. W. D. B. 7, of February 13<sup>8</sup>). I have in mind something quite similar, but in the German-Italian political context. Such discussions between re-

<sup>6</sup> Marginal note in Neurath's handwriting: "This has always happened previously."

<sup>7</sup> Marginal note in Neurath's handwriting: "?".

<sup>8</sup> See footnote 4.

sponsible representatives, I believe, can as a matter of fact lead to more "than a mutual exchange of information for orientation as to commercial policy objectives in the immediate future".

I should like to request that you give these thoughts renewed consideration and send me further instructions.<sup>9</sup> In the meantime the beginning of the German-Italian economic discussions has fortunately been set for the day after tomorrow.<sup>10</sup> In accordance with the instructions received (telegram No. 24 of February 23<sup>11</sup>) I shall send Herr Schmid-Krutina.<sup>12</sup> I myself conferred immediately today with both the Finance Minister, Signor Jung, and the Under State Secretary, Signor Suvich, in the sense of instruction No. W 424 II, of February 7, and explained the German points of view in detail to both men.

HASSELL

<sup>9</sup> Cf. document No. 64.

<sup>10</sup> This refers to a meeting held at Venice on Feb. 27 of representatives of German and Italian industry. A confidential protocol dated Feb. 28, which had been signed by the Italian and German participants, as well as minutes of the discussions were sent to the Foreign Ministry on Mar. 7 by Herr Kasl of the German delegation (8070/E579322 33). Kasl stated that he and Herr von Raumer, also of the German delegation, had an appointment with Neurath in order to inform him of the talks.

<sup>11</sup> Not printed (5642/E410732).

<sup>12</sup> Schmid-Krutina was sent as an observer for the Embassy in Rome. For Schmid-Krutina's report of the proceedings, see the enclosure to document No. 51.

## No. 36

8965/E628547-49

### *The Head of the German Delegation at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

GENEVA, German Delegation, February 24, 1933.

No. 176 of February 23

Received February 24—2:10 a. m.

V 2508.

With reference to our telegram No. 171 to Herr Gaus.<sup>1</sup>

The course of the negotiations on the No-Force Pact<sup>2</sup> threatens to cause serious difficulties for our general conference policy.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (7641/E545878-81). This is a report sent on Feb. 23 by Göppert, legal expert of the delegation, on the attempts to draft a formula for a "Declaration of Non-Resort to Force". See footnote 2.

<sup>2</sup> By way of implementing point 3 of the Five Power Declaration of Dec. 11, 1932 (see Editors' Note, p. 18), proposals relating to a "No Force Declaration" had been referred to the Political Commission of the Disarmament Conference. On Feb. 15 Eden presented to this body a "Draft Declaration to be signed by the Governments of Europe simultaneously with the Disarmament Convention," and a further draft was presented by Bourquin, the Belgian delegate. For texts, see League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (Geneva, 1932): *Records of the Conference*, Series D, vol. v, *Minutes of the Political Commission*, pp. 11-15.

The question of the No-Force Declaration had then been referred to a drafting committee. The German concern over developments in the drafting committee

In the question of army standardization we remained today, as was to be predicted and as I announced in Berlin, entirely isolated with our counterproposal against the French resolution.<sup>3</sup>

The explanation for our attitude in this question will after all be found by impartial observers in the fact that we wish thereby to press again for real work on disarmament. However, if we now also isolate ourselves in the No-Force Pact and the latter fails because of our attitude, the impression could arise that we are not interested in a positive result of the Conference, so that the responsibility would perhaps fall on us. That existing treaties for preserving the peace must be maintained in their entirety, as the French and Belgians (group missing), is also the opinion of the English and the Italians, and will probably likewise be considered a matter of course by the other delegations. True, one may expect that unprejudiced persons will understand if we do not want to accept any formulae which expressly perpetuate the clauses of the Locarno Pact that affect us unilaterally. However, we will no longer be able to count on understanding if we also reject a formula that does not contain any confirmation of these clauses but only leaves the existing treaties unchanged. If we do not accede to such [a formula] but insist on a material change in the Locarno provisions the impression could arise that we wish to open up the whole

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Footnote (2)—Continued

was expressed in a memorandum of Feb. 24 from the German Embassy in London to the British Foreign Office, following a conversation which Ambassador Hoesch had had with Vansittart that morning (telegram No. 32 of Feb. 24 from London: 3154/668573). The text of the memorandum (*British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. iv, document No. 282) is as follows:

"A difficulty has arisen in the Committee of the Disarmament Conference dealing with the No-Force Declaration.

"In the Five-Power Agreement of December last, the idea of a No-Force Declaration was accepted on the basis of the British proposal which simply banned force as a means of pursuing political aims. A text was proposed accordingly by the British delegation at Geneva.

"Several delegations, however, criticised the British formula as too simple and made counter-proposals with all kinds of juridical complications. Besides, the same difficulties became visible which had, through many months, been in the way of the conclusion of the Kellogg Pact. At that time, the Government of M. Poincaré wanted to make certain exceptions for ruling out war, with regard to the special stipulations concerning the Rhineland. The American Government, however, refused to accept exceptions of that kind.

"It is now proposed to add to the No-Force Declaration a reference to the former agreements about the preservation of peace and with special regard to the Pact of Locarno. The German Government cannot accept such a proposal. My Government does, of course, not want in any way to put into question the Treaty of Locarno, but they do not think it necessary to give now a new confirmation of this treaty to which Germany is bound by its signature.

"The German Government wishes to see the original idea of a simple declaration against force to be maintained and not to be complicated by restrictive ideas. It would, however, appear to be possible to base the No-Force Declaration on the Kellogg Pact and to refer to this Pact in the Declaration.

"The German Government would be very grateful to the British Government if the British delegation could be instructed to maintain the idea of a simple declaration against force and to oppose all efforts to complicate this question."

<sup>3</sup> See documents Nos. 23 and 26.

question of the Rhineland zone now and, moreover, to use this campaign as the point of departure for attacking the Locarno Pact—which contains guarantees—by England and Italy which are important for us.

Unless considerations that in your opinion are decisive make a different attitude appear advisable, I should therefore like to recommend that the delegation be authorized to negotiate on a solution that would avoid a confirmation of our exceptional position but would leave the existing treaty situation unaffected.<sup>4</sup>

NADOLNY

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<sup>4</sup> See document No. 37.

No. 37

8965/E628551-55

*The Foreign Minister to the German Delegation at Geneva*

Telegram

Action today

BERLIN, February 24, 1933—8:35 p. m.

IMMEDIATE

zu V 2508.<sup>1</sup>

No. 92

With reference to your telegram No. 176.

It had not been the intention here of our own accord to use the debate on the No-Force Pact in order to make any material changes in the Locarno provisions. On the other hand, however, we have no reason, and must refuse, to confirm expressly once more any point of the earlier treaties, which represent the placing of a unilateral liability on Germany.

Regarded objectively, the question around which the debates of the drafting committee there have so far turned is this: The French through the Locarno Pact have waived the possibility of taking military action against Germany in case of German violations of the demilitarization of the Rhineland except in a particular and clearly defined exceptional case. This exception is that France is to have the right of self-defense if Germany should flagrantly violate the demilitarization provisions, in so far as such a violation represents an unprovoked act of aggression and immediate action is necessary owing to the concentration of armed forces in the Rhineland zone. If these prerequisites for the exceptional case exist, i. e., in practice if Germany should complete a strategic concentration in the Rhineland directed against France or Belgium, then France would surely in any case, quite independently of Locarno and the demilitarization provisions, claim for herself the right of self-defense and take military

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<sup>1</sup> V 2508: Document No. 36.

action against Germany. To this extent, therefore, in a purely objective sense our confirmation of these Locarno provisions could be considered as practically of no importance.

This objective aspect of the matter is not decisive in the present case, however. The French for their part evidently believe that they can derive, nevertheless, a special right for themselves from the provisions in question, or at least they see in them something that they could utilize in case of a German-French conflagration in order to saddle Germany with the blame for breaking the peace. Perhaps all that they are now interested in is establishing on this occasion in general and in a roundabout way that the material provisions of articles 42 and 43 of Versailles<sup>2</sup> remain in force. It is politically impossible for us to cooperate in efforts of that kind. We have all the less reason to do so since it was after all not we that demanded the No-Force Pact. At English suggestion we have stated that we are unreservedly in favor of the Pact, and we cannot permit the other side to make explicit reservations in its own favor, or take the opportunity to obtain from us another explicit recognition of the demilitarization provisions.

This position does not mean, as already stated, that we should strive of our own accord on this occasion for a material change in the Locarno provisions. Thus to this extent the authorization requested in your telegram, to negotiate on a solution that avoids a confirmation of our exceptional position but would leave untouched the existing treaty situation is entirely compatible with the intentions here. The question is only whether and how such a solution is possible in view of the course of the discussions in the drafting committee up to now. At any rate the proposals made so far by the Belgians and French do not meet this prerequisite. I for my part would have no objection to a formula referring in a general way to the renunciation of war in the Kellogg Pact<sup>3</sup> and stating in this connection that the European powers confirm the obligation assumed in this Pact by renouncing any use of force in disputes between states. Special attention should be paid to ensuring that after agreement on such a formula the French are not able at once to make public an interpretation to the effect that Germany had once more expressly acknowledged the demilitarization of the Rhineland or any sort of special rights of France in regard to her self-defense.

I discussed the matter yesterday evening with the English Ambassador<sup>4</sup> here and suggested to him very emphatically, in the sense of the above statements, that his Government should instruct Mr.

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<sup>2</sup> Relating to the demilitarized zone in the Rhineland.

<sup>3</sup> Treaty for the Renunciation of War, signed at Paris, Aug. 27, 1928; for the text, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1928*, vol. I, p. 153.

<sup>4</sup> No record of this conversation has been found.

Eden to support a general formulation of the Pact corresponding to the agreement of December 11, 1932.<sup>5</sup> I also instructed Herr von Hoesch by telephone this morning in the same sense.<sup>6</sup>

(Foreign Minister) <sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup> See Editors' Note, p. 18.

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 36, footnote 2.

<sup>7</sup> Marginal note: "The Foreign Minister's initial is on the carbon copy which has already gone to the Coding Bureau. K[ordt], Feb. 24."

## No. 38

8965/E628558-59

### *An Official of the German Delegation at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry*

#### Telegram

PRIORITY

GENEVA, February 25, 1933.

Del. No. 184 of February 25

Received February 25—4:30 p. m.

V 2584.

With reference to your telegram No. 92.<sup>1</sup>

In today's conference of the participating delegations on the No-Force Pact, in which Eden represented England together with Malkin and Cadogan, Eden, after we had rejected Basdevant's proposal and the French and Belgians had rejected the wording we proposed in accordance with telegram No. 92, proposed the following formula:

"The Governments . . .

"Anxious to further the cause of disarmament by increasing the spirit of mutual confidence between the nations of Europe by means of a declaration expressly forbidding the resort to force in the circumstances in which the Pact of Paris forbids resort to war:

"Hereby solemnly reaffirm the commitment that they will not in any event resort, as between themselves, to force as an instrument of national policy."<sup>2</sup>

The French and Belgians approved of this formula. The Italian representative, Marquis Soragna, is likewise in agreement. We reserved our position. It was arranged that all five delegations are to give a definitive statement on this formula by Monday<sup>3</sup> morning. The Drafting Committee is to meet on Tuesday. In a private conversation Eden and Soragna urgently advised acceptance, since in their opinion the formula takes account of the German points of view which they also recognize as justified. Eden remarked that in case

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 37.

<sup>2</sup> Since this formula was the same as the text of the Declaration as finally adopted on Mar. 2 the translation of these passages which are in French in the original follows the official English text, published in League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (Geneva, 1933): *Records of the Conference*, ser. D, vol. v: *Minutes of the Political Commission*, p. 23.

<sup>3</sup> Feb. 27.

of German acceptance France would of course not be permitted to proclaim any sort of victory of her point of view, and he will speak with the French delegate to that effect. If the occasion should arise the German delegation would naturally also have to speak to the same effect with the French and Belgians.

It is our unanimous impression that the formula represents the ultimate limit of concessions that can be obtained from the other side. Please send instructions<sup>4</sup> by Monday morning whether we accept the formula.

GÖPPERT

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<sup>4</sup> In telegram No. 98 of Feb. 27, Neurath gave his approval to the Eden formula (8965/E628561).

## No. 39

8468/E595911-14

*The Minister in Belgium to the Foreign Ministry*

A 67

BRUSSELS, February 25, 1933.

Received February 27.

II F Abr. 785.

Subject: Belgian foreign policy; the Locarno Treaty.

As I already reported in my telegram No. 12 of February 24,<sup>1</sup> the German statement in the subcommittee of the Geneva Disarmament Conference dealing with the drafting of a pact against the application of force<sup>2</sup> has become the object of lively discussion in the press. Since the original reports (Havas, Belga) left something to be desired as far as clarity was concerned, the nationalist papers have utilized the opportunity to cast suspicion on the German policy. In particular the *Indépendance Belge* went so far as to express, with obviously malicious intentions, the suspicion that Germany wanted to denounce the Locarno Treaty.<sup>3</sup>

As I have always stressed, every Belgian Government regards Locarno as the pivot of Belgium's position in Europe.

In this connection I must mention a conversation that I had with King Albert I at the court concert on February 24. Whereas His Majesty had always greeted me in a friendly way on earlier occasions, to be sure, but had avoided discussing "policy" with me in any way, yesterday he walked across the whole reception hall to me and drew me into a lengthy conversation mainly to the effect that Belgian foreign policy was firmly based on the Locarno Statute and that Belgium saw her security in this; he did not understand why this Statute in its

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed (3154/668574).

<sup>2</sup> See documents Nos. 36, 37, and 38.

<sup>3</sup> Signed Oct. 16, 1925, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. LIV, p. 289.



significance and its effects was often held in such low esteem in Belgium and particularly in a portion of the Belgian press. He expressed himself literally thus: "You have to worry yourself blue in the face about the local press."

I found this opinion of the highest authority confirmed on the same day in a conversation with the socialist leader Vandervelde. M. Vandervelde said that he had gained the impression from conversations with the leading members of the Government that the Government was holding to Locarno in all circumstances and had the sincere desire to avoid difficulties with the German neighbor. In this connection he had noted that an interpellation brought by the government parties for next week regarding the status of national defense would not be debated, and this was at the express wish of National Defense Minister Devèze. The Government did not want to push still further the excitement that existed in many Belgian circles, and also wanted to avoid everything that might provoke Germany unnecessarily.

Actually for next week a big speech was expected of Devèze, which would certainly have led to unpleasant statements, whether from the Government side or from the interpellators. I cannot, of course, say whether in this respect the misgivings I recently expressed both to the Minister President and to Minister Hymans and other Cabinet Members regarding the defense psychosis and its effect on German public opinion made any impression.

On the other hand I maintain my telegraphic recommendation for a clarification of the Geneva discussion. I do this all the more since the Flemish-Catholic newspaper *Standaard*, which is in general friendly toward us, strikes the same note in the enclosed article.\*

An article No. 110 which appeared in today's *Kölnische Zeitung*, "A New Attempt at Throttling," is much too wordy and unmethodical to make any sort of impression here.

If I survey the development of the past weeks particularly since the accession of the Hitler Cabinet, it does not seem to me that there has been a change as compared with earlier conditions. The tension which has undeniably gripped all of Europe in recent months traces back to the earlier period. Certainly the change in government in Germany has not contributed to calming the feeling in Belgium. Concern and distrust regarding the German intentions continue to reign; all voices from Germany that demand an energetic representation of German interests are noted with concern. The anti-German press utilizes this to paint a picture of the danger of war in the immediate future and to preach a close alignment with the French neighbor. Unfortunately, so far the *Standaard* has been the only

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\* Not reprinted (8468/E595915-16).

newspaper to reject these rumors of war, referring to the dangerous nature of such talk. It is only too well-known that wide Belgian political and industrial circles express a lively fear of war and regard the international situation as thoroughly dark and inscrutable. Such a mood is, of course, dangerous, and there is every reason not to intensify it unnecessarily; everything that might serve to relax the atmosphere will serve the German interest. But I must stress once more that it would be wrong to deduce from the general situation at the moment any change in the principles of foreign policy here.

COUNT LERCHENFELD

## No. 40

8038/E578086-89

*Ambassador Hassell to Admiral Seebohm*<sup>1</sup>

ROME, February 25, 1933.

DEAR HERR SEEBOHM: In reponse to the official letter<sup>2</sup> which you addressed to me in the name of the League for Germanism Abroad [*Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland*] I should like to reply today very confidentially to you personally, since I do not consider it advisable for these statements about the very ticklish program to get into the ordinary files. I therefore wish to ask you to utilize the contents only for your information and possibly to note for the files of the Association that the letter was taken care of by a private communication. If you wish to inform Herr Gessler<sup>3</sup> of it at some time I naturally have no objection.

As you perhaps know, I had the opportunity in Copenhagen to discuss the question of the German minority with the Danish authorities rather freely and unrestrictedly. In Yugoslavia that was not possible in the same manner.<sup>4</sup> I did succeed, however, in winning a personal

<sup>1</sup> Admiral (ret.) Seebohm was acting president of the League for Germanism Abroad, which was an organization to promote unity of Germans in the Reich and abroad, principally by propaganda in cultural fields. It was particularly active in the support of German schools in areas of mixed nationality.

<sup>2</sup> The letter dated Jan. 9, 1933, transmitted a report of Jan. 4 concerning the replacement of 11 German teachers of religious education in South Tirol by Italian priests (8038/E578082, 8052/E578800-01), and went on to say: "For practical purposes the royal decree of last September has thereby been already largely put into effect. This means naturally that the German language in South Tirol will soon lose even its last places of refuge—in religious instruction and in church services. We therefore must urgently request you to use all your influence in order that the worst may be prevented and these measures may be canceled. Otherwise we must give up South Tirol as entirely lost."

<sup>3</sup> Presumably the reference is to Otto Karl Gessler, who had been Reich Minister of Defense, 1920-1928.

<sup>4</sup> Hassell had served as Minister in Denmark 1926-1930, and Minister in Yugoslavia 1930-1932.

relationship of confidence with the King, on the basis of which I could take up the matter and could do something for the German national group with practical results. Here in Italy the matter is quite different. My predecessors in office were never able to discuss the question with Mussolini because Italy, so to speak, contests our title to do so [*aktive Legitimation*] and rejects every intervention in this question which the Italians consider a purely internal Italian affair. One could in theory adopt a militant attitude and not pay any attention to this negative stand. That is naturally quite impossible, however, since as we know our policy toward Italy is not limited to this question but is of such a kind that we are very greatly dependent in the great questions of world policy on Italian support. Thus in all matters lying outside grand policy, e. g., in economic policy and precisely in the question of South Tirol, we are always confronted with the conflict whether we should and may endanger the grand political line by energetically prosecuting our claims. That does not mean that we disinterest ourselves in the question of South Tirol, but it does mean that we are forced to exercise the greatest caution. It is therefore more easily said than done when the League for Germanism Abroad asks in its letter of January 9 that I "use all my influence in order that the worst may be prevented and the measures may be canceled". You may be sure that I for my part am doing everything in my power, but on the other hand one cannot have any illusions in this regard. Whether I will succeed in the course of time in speaking with Mussolini about these matters is a question that I must still leave open today.

As concerns the matter itself, its gravity cannot be disputed. Nevertheless I do not believe the formulation used in the letter: "Otherwise we must give up South Tirol as entirely lost" to be correct. It is unjustified and actually dangerous, I believe, to take such a position in this question, in which a long struggle with, in all probability, very different phases will have to be fought. Nor, as I became convinced from numerous conversations, is it in any way in accordance with the views of the South Tirolese, who will not give up their struggle even though at present things do indeed look bad in the question of religious instruction. You may be sure, however, that the fight will be continued by all parties concerned. At the moment the center of gravity is not so much in the Italian state as in the Vatican, or rather the Archbishop of Trento. There, above all, influence must be exerted. I do not need to say that I am in closest contact with my colleague here at the Holy See.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> The German Ambassador to the Holy See was Diego von Bergen. The file copy of this letter is unsigned.

## No. 41

6609/E496961-62

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

Moscow, February 28, 1933—1:18 a. m.

SECRET

Received February 28—6:10 a. m.

No. 22 of February 27

zu IV Ru. 644.<sup>1</sup>

For the Foreign Minister personally.

Today I began the conversations with M. Krestinsky, as directed in instruction IV Ru. 644.<sup>1</sup>

To my detailed statements, M. Krestinsky said that he would soon reply at length and would today confine himself to the following statements:

1. The Soviet Union would not undertake any reorientation of its policy.

2. The Soviet Government for its part wondered whether Germany did not wish to turn her back on the Soviet Union diplomatically and seek an alliance with France. The Foreign Commissariat had been informed by an influential Frenchman that von Papen, when he was Reich Chancellor, had proposed to Herriot a military alliance directed against Russia.<sup>2</sup>

I replied that we had categorically denied such reports time and again and asked M. Krestinsky the names of the Frenchmen in question.

Krestinsky thought he recalled that Herriot himself had given information to this effect to Dovgalevsky. Further confirmation of this was to be found in Herriot's article in the *Petit Provençal*.

3. The statements heretofore given out by Germany regarding the continuance of the present German policy on Russia had always been made only in private. The public at home and abroad was not informed about the intentions of our Russian policy.

I replied that there had been no occasion for public statements. On the other hand, despite the fact that the nonaggression pacts had brought a new element into its policy, the Soviet Government had not taken an official position concerning its relations with Germany.

Then I called the attention of Krestinsky to the attitude of the Soviet press, which was emerging from its initial reserve and, like *Pravda*, for example, was publishing vehement articles against the National Socialist movement. I warned him that this might easily lead to an aggravation of the situation. Krestinsky termed these articles reverberations of the attacks of the National Socialist press.

Finally I asked Krestinsky to announce me to Molotov, the President of the Council of People's Commissars, for a conference.<sup>3</sup>

DIRKSEN

<sup>1</sup> IV Ru. 644: Document No. 33.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 43 and footnote 2.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. document No. 73.

## No. 42

3598/791917-22

*Minutes of the Conference of Ministers on February 28, 1933,  
at 11 a. m.*

Rk. 1828;  
1829.

*Present:*

Reich Chancellor	Hitler
Vice Chancellor and Reich Commissar of Prussia	von Papen
Foreign Minister	Freiherr von Neurath
Reich Minister of Interior	Dr. Frick
Reich Minister of Finance	Count Schwerin von Krosigk
Reich Minister of Economics, Food and Agriculture	Dr. Hugenberg
Reich Minister of Labor	Seldte
Reich Minister of Justice <sup>1</sup>	
For the Reichswehr Minister	Colonel von Reichenau
Reich Minister of Posts and Transport	Freiherr von Eltz-Rübenach
Reich Minister without Portfolio and Reich Commissar for Air	Göring
Reich Commissar for Employ- ment	Dr. Gereke
Reich Commissar <sup>2</sup>	Dr. Popitz
State Secretary in the Reich Chancellery	Dr. Lammers
State Secretary in the Office of the Reich President	Dr. Meissner
Reich Press Chief:	Ministerialdirektor Funk
Recording Official:	Ministerialrat Wienstein
Agenda: The political situation.	

The Reich Chancellor stated that a ruthless reckoning with the Communist party was now urgently needed.<sup>3</sup> The right psychological moment for that reckoning had arrived. It was useless to wait any longer.

The German Communist party was resolved to resort to extremes. The struggle against it must not be made dependent on legal considerations. Since the arson in the Reichstag building he no longer doubted that the Government would capture 51 percent of the votes in the election.

<sup>1</sup> The name of Reich Minister of Justice Gürtner is not entered in this list.

<sup>2</sup> Johannes Popitz was Reich Commissar for the Prussian Ministry of Finance.

<sup>3</sup> The previous evening the Reichstag building had been set afire.

He had to submit several proposals to the Reich Cabinet:

(1) The Government should express its thanks to the personnel of the Reichstag building and the personnel of the police and fire brigade who participated in fighting the fire.

(2) The Reichstag building had to be restored immediately.

(3) The outrage against the Reichstag building must not change the date of the election and the convening of the Reichstag.

(4) He proposed that the Town Palace in Potsdam should be the place for the meeting of the Reichstag.

(5) The issuance of a decree for the protection of society against the Communist danger was urgently needed. Also needed was the special protection of all cultural monuments of the German people.

He estimated the damage to the Reichstag building at 3 to 4 million reichsmarks. The repairs would in his opinion take 2 years.

Reich Minister Göring stated that it was impossible for a single arsonist to have started the conflagration. The setting of the fire was carefully prepared for at least an hour in advance. The police had behaved in an exemplary manner. According to a statement of the Dutch Communist<sup>4</sup> arrested he had also been in touch with the German Social Democratic party. To be sure, the man arrested had indeed asserted that he was the only one involved in the outrage. But no credibility should be attached to this statement. He, Reich Minister Göring, assumed that there were at least 6 or 7 involved in the outrage.

The arsonist together with the Communist Reichstag Deputy, Torgler, was observed some time before the fire by unexceptionable witnesses. Both had been walking about in the Reichstag building.

The question arose why the Communists had instigated this outrage. He, Minister Göring, did not believe that the attempt had been decided on because of the closing of Liebknecht House.<sup>5</sup> He was more inclined to believe that the outrage upon the Reichstag building had been decided on and carried out because of the seizure of voluminous secret material of the Communist party by the Prussian police. From the material seized it appeared that the Communists wanted to form terror groups, intended to put fire to public buildings, wanted to put poison into public kitchens, sacrificing if necessary even some of their own followers; and that they also wanted to kidnap as hostages the wives and children of Ministers and other high-ranking personages.

The Communist party headquarters was, in his opinion, being conducted by Münzenberg. The Communists Remmele and Schneller, who could not be found by the police, had been arrested by SS men. Unfortunately, the loss of three SA men, who had been shot dead during the night had to be deplored.

He, Reich Minister Göring, had taken the following measures:

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<sup>4</sup> Marinus van der Lubbe.

<sup>5</sup> The Karl Liebknecht House in Berlin, central headquarters of the German Communist party, had been closed by the police on Feb. 24.

He had ordered the temporary closing of museums and palaces. Furthermore he had provided for a better surveillance of the government quarter. Besides the Communist press, he had also prohibited the Social Democratic press in the whole territory of the Reich. He had ordered the closing of all premises of the German Communist party and the arrest of all Communist deputies and party officials who could be reached. For the regular police [*Schutzpolizei*] and the criminal police the highest state of readiness had been ordered. Today 2,000 SA and SS men would march through the city in support of the police.

The Reich Minister of Interior stated that he had originally intended, in view of the arson in the Reichstag building, to change the decree of February 4 for the protection of the German people.<sup>6</sup> But now he had decided to work out, proceeding from a decree of July 20 of last year, the draft of a decree for the protection of the people and the state.

The Reich Minister of Interior thereupon read the draft<sup>7</sup> of the decree for the protection of the people and the state.

The Vice Chancellor and Reich Commissar of Prussia voiced some objections against the text of paragraph 2 of the draft, according to which the Reich Minister of Interior may temporarily exercise the powers of the supreme state authority in a state if the measures necessary for the restoration of public security and order are not being taken. He declared that such a wording would arouse the resistance of the South German states in particular. It would be better to come to an amicable arrangement with the states about the measures to be taken.

The Reich Chancellor pointed out that the government of a state might conceivably, despite representations from the Reich Government, not do what is necessary. Paragraph 2 was providing for such a case.

Reich Commissar Dr. Popitz suggested to insert "in so far as" after "Reich Government."

The Reich Minister of Interior declared that he would be glad to accept this suggestion.

The Reich Minister of Justice stated that the special offenses of conspiracy, use of poisons as means of terrorism, and preparation of murder had also to be inserted into the draft.

The final text is to be submitted to a Minister's Conference on the same day, at 4:15 p. m., and will be briefly discussed once more.<sup>8</sup>

Recorded:  
WIENSTEIN, March 2

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 8.

<sup>7</sup> Not found.

<sup>8</sup> The minutes of this conference are filmed on 3598/791923 25. The decree for the protection of the people and state was published immediately. For the text, see *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik*, vol. I, pp. 13-15.

## No. 43

2860/562415-18

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, March 1, 1933.  
RM 266.

This morning Litvinov, the Soviet People's Commissar, called on me accompanied by Ambassador Khinchuk.<sup>1</sup>

Litvinov seemed to me, in contrast to his usual behavior, rather agitated. He spoke at once of the events of the last few days in Berlin and the measures taken against the Communists. M. Litvinov stated that the procedure against the German Communists had created considerable alarm in the Russian press and in Moscow.

I told M. Litvinov that I was surprised that he was disturbed about what the German Government was doing against the German Communists, whose activities had, indeed, been demonstrated to him by the Reichstag fire. Heretofore he had always assured me that German-Russian relations had in no way been influenced by the attitude of the German Government toward German communism. It seemed to me from his statements that a change had taken place in that respect recently. I had to explain to him, however, that no German Government would let itself be deterred from taking the necessary measures for the preservation of security and order in the country against terroristic excesses of Communists.

M. Litvinov then said that the uneasiness in Moscow had begun to be felt as early as the summer of last year, in consequence of the statements of the then Chancellor von Papen to M. Herriot regarding a German-French alliance, the purpose of which was to be the attack on communism in Germany and to the East.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Litvinov was en route from Geneva to Moscow.

<sup>2</sup> In the course of a conversation with Herriot at Lausanne on June 29, 1932, Papen, according to his memorandum of the conversation (3375/731352-54), stated "that the German Government was extraordinarily serious in its striving to remove the barriers which lay between France and Germany. As proof of this I wanted to tell him how far we were determined to go in connection with this thing. We were ready for a customs union with France which would bring both countries great advantages, and in the field of security we could give no greater proof of our sincerity, in my opinion, than that we were thinking of an entente between the French and the German Armies. This entente must have no aggressive tendency at all directed against anyone, but would simply make possible an exchange of views and information between the General Staffs, and would bring a feeling of security about the present situation. The prerequisite for such an entente was naturally the restoration of equality which I had repeatedly demanded. Herriot hereupon replied that the project of a customs union interested him very much. He would submit it to the Council of Ministers and tell whether we could pursue the matter further."

In a subsequent conversation on July 7 Herriot informed von Papen that "after mature consideration he had reached the firm decision that the Conference must confine itself to its actual task, the solution of the reparations question" (unsigned memorandum of July 7, 1932: 3375/731525-26). See also *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. III, especially document No. 175. Further documents relating to this subject are filmed on serials 9963 and 4620.



I replied to M. Litvinov that this alleged offer of Herr von Papen's was, as he might recall, repudiated by us even at that time in Lausanne as inaccurate. I had no desire always to say the same thing. This story did not acquire veracity from the fact that M. Herriot utilized it when he was courting the favor of Russia. M. Herriot had a rather lively imagination, as I gathered from his various statements recently. I mentioned only the alleged German-Italian-Hungarian alliance, which he had invented. It was the same with this offer by Herr von Papen.

M. Khinchuk then mentioned the measures which had allegedly been taken yesterday against Soviet institutions in Berlin and against members of the Russian trade delegation, which he had already brought up for discussion here yesterday.<sup>3</sup>

I replied that from the measures of the police which had been reported to me, I could see no cause for complaint by him. It was only natural that after the events of the evening of the day before yesterday,<sup>4</sup> in which a foreign Communist had been arrested as a culprit, the police should regard foreign members of the Communist party with especial suspicion. Moreover, German nationals, too, had been asked by the police for identification papers, and in any case no special action had been undertaken against Russian members of the trade delegation.

I then also commented to M. Litvinov regarding his statements at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva<sup>5</sup> after he had described them as entirely within the framework of his previous policy and I called his attention to the joyous echo they had received in Paris. He stated that he still adhered to our line at the Disarmament Conference, but he admitted that he was not always in agreement with Herr Nadolny on the question of tactics. He expressed himself very skeptically on the outcome of the Disarmament Conference and stated that it was now only a question of finding some sort of conclusion "to save the face."<sup>6</sup>

In answer to M. Litvinov's complaint regarding an altered attitude in German policy toward Russia, I then referred to the cooperation we had shown just recently in acting on Russia's wishes for a bridging of the economic difficulties of the next few months.<sup>7</sup> I called the at-

<sup>3</sup> On the previous day the Soviet Embassy had protested against police action in halting and arresting certain persons attempting to enter or leave the Soviet hotel in the Geisbergstrasse (Tippelskirch memorandum of Feb. 28: 6025/11045-406-08).

<sup>4</sup> The reference is to the Reichstag fire.

<sup>5</sup> See especially League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (Geneva, 1933): *Records of the Conference*, ser. B, *Minutes of the General Commission*, vol. II, pp. 234-239.

<sup>6</sup> The quoted passage is in English in the original.

<sup>7</sup> By an agreement of Jan. 17, 1933, the German Government had made available to the Soviets for the year 1933 blocked accounts of foreigners to the sum of 60 million reichsmarks (final protocol of Jan. 17: 6608/E496594-601). To this credit, by an agreement of Feb. 25, was added a further 140 million reichsmarks from the Dresdener bank and the Deutsche bank to the State bank of the

tention of M. Litvinov to the fact that it could be inferred even from this accommodation, which was by no means a slight one for us, that no change in policy was intended. I could tell him again, moreover, as I had already told M. Khinchuk, that this was not the case, and I hoped that the Russian Government, too, did not find itself obliged to change its attitude as a result of the measures that we had to take against the German Communists. M. Litvinov confirmed this, but it was evident from the way he expressed himself that he was uneasy about the steps taken by the German Government against German communism.

M. Litvinov expressed himself very cautiously about the attitude of Russia toward France. At any rate, it might appear from his attitude that he is thinking of developing relations with France further.

M. Litvinov then also asked if we had news concerning the attitude of Poland toward the new Little Entente. I told him that so far we knew nothing about it and asked him, for my part, whether the Russians had any leads. M. Litvinov replied in the negative.

Finally the conversation turned to ratification of the Berlin Treaty<sup>\*</sup> and to a public statement on Germany's Russian policy. I told M. Litvinov that both would probably occupy the Reichstag, which was convening soon.

V. N[EURATH]

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<sup>\*</sup> See document No. 29, footnote 9.

## No. 44

3598/791954-60

*Extract From the Minutes of the Conference of Ministers, Held at the Reich Chancellery, on March 2, 1933, at Noon*<sup>1</sup>

Rk. 1822;  
1823.

(1) *Matter of internal policy (outside the agenda).*

Reich Minister Göring stated with regard to the measures directed against the Communists that last night important material on the Communist plans had been found. The time for setting off the operation had first been fixed for the evening and the night of Election Day, but had then been postponed to the middle of March. A Pharos map of Berlin had been found in duplicate, on which all important electrical control stations, subways, transformer stations were indicated.

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<sup>1</sup> The complete minutes of this meeting including a list of those present are filmed on 3598/791953-70. The minutes were recorded by Ministerialrat Fessler.

One copy had been in the hands of headquarters; the other had been cut up and distributed to the individual groups. The map was being photographed. In consequence of this the power lines were being guarded with especial care.

From the material the close connection that existed with Moscow was also evident. The German Communists had been given a time limit within which to do something. Otherwise they would be deprived of their subsidies. The directive concerning the operation and the photograph of the map would be sent to the Ministers personally. He did not consider it feasible to publish it because it might provoke acts of sabotage.

The police would have to turn over the examining of the culprit to the Reich Supreme Court [*Reichsgericht*] at once. The examining judge was the *Landgerichtsdirektor*, Dr. Braune, who had formerly conducted the examinations of members of the NSDAP. He had always proceeded most severely against the party.

Even if it had to be assumed that he would work objectively, he was hardly a suitable person to handle this important matter. It is possible that he might confine the examination merely to the one that committed the outrage although, in the opinion of the experts concerned, at least 6 to 7 persons must have been involved. He might possibly also release Deputy Torgler prematurely from prison. Inept handling might have intolerable results. Whether another more suitable person might not be entrusted with the investigation of the arson in the Reichstag, which had to be regarded not as such, but as high treason, must be considered.

The funds at his disposal for fighting criminal elements amounted to only 30,000 reichsmarks and would not be replenished until April 1. This amount was not nearly enough to take care of the very considerable outlays for rewards to informers and similar expenditures.

Also to be considered was whether something could not be done about the foreign press, which in part reported that he himself had set fire to the Reichstag, and was also making similar statements about the Reich Chancellor too. In addition Stampfer<sup>2</sup> had stated that he did not mean to say that the Reichstag had been set afire by Göring the Reich Minister but by Göring the National Socialist.

The Reich Chancellor likewise considered the agitation of the world press against the German Government very dangerous. All grounds for the clamor would have been removed if the culprit had been hanged right away.

He wondered whether the former Prussian Government, particularly Minister President Braun and Minister [of Interior] Severing, could not be called to account for having taken 2 million reichsmarks

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<sup>2</sup> Friedrich Stampfer, editor-in-chief of the Social Democratic paper *Vorwärts*.

from the fund for fighting criminal elements. Possibly a civil action might be considered.

He, too, considered it objectionable for *Landgerichtsdirektor* Braune to conduct the examination, not because he assumed that he would not take an objective attitude, but because the previous examinations had been conducted inconceivably badly. In the trial of the officers before the Reich Supreme Court [*Reichsgericht*] he had played a sorry role, so that foreign journalists had made fun of it.<sup>3</sup> He had designated as the principal witness for the prosecution a person who had several times been in an insane asylum and had previously received a prison sentence for serious offenses. The Reich Prosecutor had finally dispensed with the witness. When the point was raised, the examining judge had himself stated that the witness was pathological. The latter had sung the German national anthem when Zeppelin flew over the prison and given a cheer for the Reich President. A judge of greater mental stature must be entrusted with the preliminary examination.

The Foreign Minister stated that it was difficult to do anything effective against the propaganda abroad. As far as journalists residing in Germany were concerned, he had no objection to expelling them. But these journalists could not be held responsible for editorials in their newspapers. All that could be done was to issue a warning. The German Missions had protested everywhere where it was necessary. But it was not always possible for them to take effective measures against the press.

He wondered whether the measures against the German Social Democratic party could not be softened or abolished. They were one of the chief reasons for the strong agitation in the Leftist press abroad against the Reich Government.

Reich Minister Göring replied that the German Social Democratic party was making very strong efforts to enter into a united front with the Communists. The German Social Democratic party enjoyed a great reputation abroad because it was compared there to the Social Democratic parties of the other countries. There was no objective basis for doing so, however.

If the German Social Democratic party were severely dealt with, it was to be expected, according to the information in his possession, that it would lose very many of its followers, to the advantage of the NSDAP. And this would be so in particular if the trade unions no longer played so important a role with the Government, and if it turned out that they had no more funds.

<sup>3</sup>In September 1930, three lieutenants of the Reichswehr garrison of Ulm who had engaged in National Socialist activities were tried by the Reich Supreme Court in Leipzig on the charge of high treason. The Foreign Ministry file on this trial has been filmed. (L121/L022585-653)

The ban on a trade union newspaper had meanwhile been lifted. The ban on the newspapers of the German Social Democratic party should not be lifted before the election. After that they could be allowed a little breathing space. In their incendiary agitation, to be sure, they were not to be surpassed by the Communists; but they were more cowardly than the latter.

In reply to the question of the Reich Minister of Posts as to whether the foreign press in Germany could not be banned, the Reich Minister of Interior said that this was being done. But it was necessary to delete the names of the newspapers from the lists of postal subscribers, because new subscriptions could then no longer be ordered as was now possible. The publishing houses would then be directly affected, while in the case of a ban by the police, only delivery to the subscribers would be prevented.

(2) *Relief measures for the class of people without means (outside the agenda).*

The Reich Minister of Interior considered it necessary, even before the election, to take measures in favor of the people without means, particularly the unemployed, which would result in relieving their situation. He was thinking primarily of the free delivery of coal on ration cards in the amount of some five zentners<sup>4</sup> for each household. That would be an expenditure for the individual household of from 8 to 10 reichsmarks. The coal stocks would be reduced. After the elections it would be necessary to achieve substantial savings in relief for the unemployed. Then the expenditures could be balanced again.

The Reich Chancellor considered such action desirable and effective. In the discussion that followed, it appeared, however, that at least 20 to 30 million reichsmarks would have to be spent for this.

The Reich Minister of Finance proposed that, instead of the delivery of coal, certain agricultural products should be distributed at reduced prices or free, either to the unemployed in general or limited to certain distress areas. It would be a question primarily of butter and grain. They had to be consumed in additional quantities.

The State Secretary in the Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture<sup>5</sup> explained the statements by saying that out of the butter subsidy, 2,000 tons were available that could be given away free or against payment of charges. But the quantity was too small for a general distribution. Certain distressed areas came into consideration, such as Berlin, Upper Silesia, Thuringia, Ruhr and Rhineland, the Free State of Saxony, Königsberg, which together would comprise a fourth of the German population. Relief with bread grains could also be considered, particularly in the Bavarian Forest, the Thuringian

<sup>4</sup> One zentner is 50 kilograms.

<sup>5</sup> Von Rohr.

Forest, in the Allgäu, in the Erzgebirge. The distribution would best be by the authorities, not by other organizations. The quantities of butter owned by the Government would, however, be too small even for the distressed areas. It would be possible, to be sure, to continue the butter subsidy and thus make greater quantities available. For this purpose some 4 million would be needed, 2 million of which would be available from savings. Altogether an operation of this kind would cost 5-6 million.

The Cabinet agreed to this proposal.

## No. 45

3015/596282-85

### *Memorandum by the Director of Department IV*

BERLIN, March 2, 1933.

#### MEMORANDUM FOR A CONVERSATION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER WITH LITHUANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ZAUNIS

In October 1932, the Lithuanians expressed the desire to resume the negotiations on the general settlement between Germany and Lithuania, which had been interrupted by the Böttcher conflict.<sup>1</sup> To our program of negotiations of November 19, 1932,<sup>2</sup> the Lithuanians replied with a promemoria of December 23 of last year,<sup>3</sup> in which they stated that "before concrete discussion is begun of the issues raised, a basic exchange of opinion should take place in the form of a general clarification."

The conversation with M. Zaunius is to inaugurate German-Lithuanian negotiations officially. It will be confined to questions of a general political and economic nature.

## I

### *Political questions.*

1. In the opinion of Germany, Germany and Lithuania have great interests in common. In this connection one might refer to German-Lithuanian-Russian relations and the common attitude toward Poland. It would be welcomed very much by Germany if these common interests could be reasserted more strongly than has often been the case recently.

<sup>1</sup> This conflict in Memel had begun in February 1932 when Böttcher, the head of the locally-elected Directorate had been dismissed by the Lithuanian Governor of Memel, who also appointed a new Directorate. When the case was appealed to the Permanent Court of International Justice the Court ruled that the dismissal of Böttcher had been justified, but that dissolution of the Memel Diet had not been.

<sup>2</sup> Outlined in Meyer's memorandum of his conversation with the Lithuanian Minister on that date (6684/H096844-45).

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (6684/H096894-95).

2. The negative element. If these common interests have asserted themselves relatively little of late in the policy of the two countries, the reason for it is primarily the Memel question, which has often in recent years clouded German-Lithuanian relations. Without going into the past or without wishing to discuss the question of who is to blame, it is necessary for the future to see to it that the Memel issue no longer encumbers German-Lithuanian relations. German policy desires that the autonomy of the Memel Territory be loyally observed and that no coercive Lithuanianization, on any territory whatever, be practiced. It should be entirely possible for the Lithuanian Government to agree to this basis. Then, too, the uneasiness that is widespread here over the fate of the Memel population will disappear. Naturally it is not intended in any way to meddle in the internal affairs of Lithuania. German-Lithuanian relations require, however, that Lithuania should not challenge the legitimate political right of Germany, in the event of friction in the Memel Territory, to strive for its elimination.

3. If the political points of friction are eliminated in this way, the mutuality of German-Lithuanian interests will be able freely to assert itself. Then, too, collaboration in the matter of military policy, which has already taken place on so encouraging a scale between the German and the Lithuanian Armies, will particularly undergo a further development.<sup>4</sup> The possibility will then surely arise for extensive detailing of officers and for conversations on questions of material.

4. *Joint relations with respect to Russia.*

Both countries are linked by good relations with Russia. It is certain that the new Reich Government will also continue to pursue without change this policy with respect to Russia. In this respect my conversations with M. Litvinov have also been very valuable.<sup>5</sup>

5. *The common attitude toward Poland* proceeds, for one thing, from the territorial questions in the east. Germany is fully interested in the injustice that was done Lithuania by the forcible seizure of Vilna. Germany will, as she has done before, support Lithuania's stand in this respect (as much as possible).

6. Should M. Zaunius come to speak of the *question of the Corridor* and the plans that have been formulated in this connection for an exchange of the Corridor for the Memel Territory,<sup>6</sup> the reply could be

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<sup>4</sup> Earlier documents on German-Lithuanian military relations are filmed on serials 4530 and 9974.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 43.

<sup>6</sup> In a letter to Köpke from Paris, Jan. 18, 1933, Köster mentioned "the persistent rumors that Marshal Pilsudski has declared himself ready to negotiate with Germany about the Corridor and the Eastern frontier if Poland would obtain Lithuania in exchange and that the Vatican was ready to mediate." (9975/-E6973631-66)

made to him that this idea which had been launched by the Poles, is not under actual consideration by any government and in any case is not the goal of German policy.

7. Should M. Zaunius, contrary to expectations, broach the question of the German-Lithuanian frontier guarantee, the reply could be made to him that German policy on principle does not re-confirm the stipulations of the dictate of Versailles. But even if this were possible, such open political agreements would not be suited to facilitate the policy of both countries in the concert of Europe.

## II

Zaunius will probably present Lithuanian wishes in the field of commercial policy.

A discussion of details should be avoided so far as possible. On the other hand, we could declare our readiness to try as far as possible to comply with Lithuania's wishes. In this connection it is contemplated, after the elections<sup>7</sup> to send Consul General Schlesinger to Kaunas for a few days, around the 20th, to acquaint himself first of all locally with the present economic situation in Lithuania and to inform us as to the possibilities of German-Lithuanian trade.

MEYER

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<sup>7</sup> Elections to the Reichstag were to be held on Mar. 5.

## No. 46

3154/668617-18

### *Unsigned Memorandum*

BERLIN, March 3, 1933.

Ambassador von Hoesch just called Ministerialdirektor Dieckhoff from London and informed him as follows:

Sir John Simon had asked him to call on him this afternoon and had divulged the following to him:

He would receive the French, American and Italian Ambassadors after him and hand them the following statement, which will be published this evening in London:

"His Majesty's Government has had before them a full account from Mr. Eden, the Parliamentary Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who has represented the United Kingdom at Geneva in recent weeks, of the present position at the Disarmament Conference. Deeply impressed with the necessity of giving all possible assistance to enable the Conference to reach early decisions, the Cabinet has requested the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as the head of the United Kingdom delegation to go out to Geneva as soon as can conveniently be arranged, and they intend to



do so. Meanwhile Mr. Eden will return to Geneva to resume the leadership of the United Kingdom delegation, pending their arrival.”<sup>1</sup>

Herr von Hoesch asked three questions in this connection:

1. Time. To this Sir John Simon replied that they hoped to be able to meet in Geneva in about 5-6 days, but that naturally they realized that it would be especially difficult for the German Government, which stood on the eve of an election, to come to Geneva so soon, and that they therefore counted on Monday, March 13, as the latest possible date. Sir John Simon did not explicitly mention who was expected from the German side, but he did mention the name of the Foreign Minister and said the time had come where the “heads”<sup>2</sup> rather than the leaders of the delegations should meet.

2. Herr von Hoesch asked whether it was intended to convene a new five Power conference. Sir John replied:

Strictly speaking this was not intended, since the British Government was not thinking of committing any power in advance in any way whatsoever; the wish of the British Government was only to contribute as a friend of everyone to removing the present difficulties. Naturally it was not impossible that the five interested main Powers would meet with one another in the course of the conferences in Geneva.

3. Herr von Hoesch asked what special difficulties the British Government had in mind at this time. Sir John Simon replied: There were no particular difficulties, but they had in general the impression which Mr. Eden had communicated, namely, that quite generally the situation had become somewhat stalemated and they did not want to leave anything untried in order to push matters forward.

In the course of the conversation Herr von Hoesch asked the question whether today's newspaper report that M. Daladier was coming to London on March 15 was accurate. Sir John Simon had replied that he had not heard anything about this; in any case M. Daladier was coming to Geneva and if only for that reason such a trip to London would thereby become pointless.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The paragraph in quotation marks is in English in the original.

<sup>2</sup> In English in the original.

<sup>3</sup> Dieckhoff recorded on Mar. 4 that the British Ambassador gave him the same statement by the British Government which Hoesch had received (3154/668625-27).

## No. 47

3015/596281

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, March 4, 1933.

RM 283.

In the conversation that I had yesterday with the Lithuanian Foreign Minister, M. Zaunius, the whole complex of questions of German-Lithuanian relations was discussed. I stressed the fact that

the autonomy of the Memel Territory must be faithfully observed by Lithuania. On this condition, German-Lithuanian relations, which had the same interests both in the direction of Poland and Soviet Russia, could easily be restored to their former good condition. M. Zaunius agreed to this. He then asked whether our policy in regard to Russia would undergo any change. I replied in the negative, whereupon M. Zaunius said that Lithuania's relations with Russia, in contrast to recent years, had become closer rather than looser. In the course of the conversation M. Zaunius spoke of the rumors of an alleged indemnification of Poland at the expense of Lithuania in the event of the return of the Corridor to Germany.<sup>1</sup> I replied that these reports, as he well knew, had been launched by France, but had not been gone into or taken seriously anywhere.

With regard to the requests concerning commercial policy, M. Zaunius did not go into the matter further with me. I referred him in this respect to the conversation with Director Meyer.<sup>2</sup>

On the whole I had the impression that M. Zaunius was trying to forget the Memel incidents of recent years and to bring Lithuanian policy closer to Germany again.

V. N[EURATH]

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 45, footnote 6.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 48.

## No. 48

8684/H096988-90

### *Unsigned Memorandum*

BERLIN, March 3, 1933.

IV Rd. 786.

#### CONVERSATION BETWEEN MM. ZAUNIUS, ŠAULYS, MEYER, AND ZECHLIN

After M. Zaunius had said by way of introduction that this morning's conversation with Herr von Neurath<sup>1</sup> and Herr von Bülow had only dealt with the atmosphere, pending questions were discussed. First it was agreed that there should be preliminary informational discussion of economic questions by Consul General Schlesinger as soon as possible in Kaunas. Legal questions are to be discussed by Geheimrat Kraske and the Lithuanian Legation in Berlin, to which a specialist is to be added. Political questions, particularly the Memel questions, are for the present to be reserved for discussion by M. Zaunius and Herr Zechlin in Kaunas.

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 47.

In the discussion of German-Lithuanian questions, Herr Meyer rejected the idea of the Corridor-Lithuania exchange,<sup>2</sup> but emphasized the mutuality of German-Lithuanian interests in regard to Poland, and particularly to Vilna. The significance of the Memel question for German-Lithuanian relations was likewise pointed out.

M. Zaunius then asked how Germany conceived of military collaboration, and Herr Meyer replied to the effect that as close a contact as possible should exist between the two armies (detailings, material, etc.) and the general staffs. M. Zaunius approved this and stressed only the fact that the Lithuanian Army had to maintain contact with other armies also.

German-Russian and particularly German-Polish relations were then discussed in detail. The Lithuanian gentlemen repeatedly expressed their strong interest in the question of Vilna. They also regarded the settlement of the German-French antagonism from the point of view that pressure would have to be put on Poland as nearly as possible simultaneously, in regard to the Corridor and Vilna. As for the Corridor, we particularly stressed the fact that, militarily and economically, it was superfluous for Poland. M. Zaunius said, with regard to both these points of view, that they were new to him, and he thought that in this case a German-Polish settlement ought to be much easier. He seemed to have certain fears concerning the possibility of transporting French arms via Riga to Vilna, in the event of serious developments. We did not consider this very likely. He stated, moreover, that Polish influence in Riga was very great.

The conversation finally turned to general questions (disarmament and the World Economic Conference) and it was agreed that the Lithuanian Government should be kept informed concerning German policy in this respect through the German Legation in Kaunas.

In conclusion Herr Meyer once more recapitulated the agreement given at the beginning concerning German-Lithuanian negotiations, and again emphasized the importance of the Memel question. Herr Meyer also referred to the abuses in local border traffic, which had to be eliminated.<sup>3</sup> Early negotiations on this score were necessary. M. Zaunius took this quietly and said he had already expected that this point would be put on the agenda.

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<sup>2</sup> See document No. 45, footnote 6.

<sup>3</sup> This seems to refer to German complaints during 1932 that Lithuanian border officials were obstructing the local border traffic contrary to the German-Lithuanian Commercial Agreement of 1923 (9973/EG97344-45).

## No. 49

7360/E538271-74

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Great Britain*<sup>1</sup>

## Telegram

No. 31

BERLIN, March 6, 1933—6:45 p. m.

II F Abr. 881 I.

Saturday afternoon the English Ambassador here called on Ministerialdirektor Dieckhoff in order to submit here, too, the statement of his Government regarding the disarmament question.<sup>2</sup> He asked on that occasion whether it was already decided who would represent Germany in Geneva. Since MacDonald and Simon were going to Geneva in person, and would do everything to ensure success, it was very important that Germany, too, be represented by a Cabinet member, and that I personally should come to Geneva. Dieckhoff limited himself in his reply to saying that at the moment he could not say how the Reich Government regarded the English proposal. In his personal opinion it would not be easy for any of the Cabinet members to leave Berlin in the near future in view of the important domestic problems.

Please call on Sir John Simon and tell him the following:

We fully shared the concern of the English Government at the entirely unsatisfactory status of the negotiations of the Disarmament Conference. An energetic attack on the disarmament problem was quite in accord with our demands. Considering the tasks confronting the Reich Cabinet since yesterday's elections, however, it was not clear whether I or another Cabinet member could be spared here in the near future.

Aside from this, the Reich Government could not at the present stage of the Conference negotiations form any picture of how the English Government visualizes the discussions and the possible result of a conference of ministers. The most important disarmament questions, at least those of particular interest to Germany, had still so far not been discussed at all at the Conference. So far it was entirely uncertain how a real disarmament was to be realized in the sphere of personnel and material. The question of doing away with heavy offensive weapons, especially mobile heavy artillery and tanks, the question of submarines, of military air forces and of bombing attacks were entirely unsettled. Likewise the question of reducing army strength inclusive of colonial forces in the mother country or its vicinity was still entirely open.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was sent for information to the German delegation at Geneva and to the Embassies in France, the United States, and the Soviet Union; it was also sent to the Embassy in Italy with the instruction to discuss the matter along the same lines with the Italian Government. For the reply from Rome to this instruction see document No. 64.

<sup>2</sup> See document No 46, footnote 3.

In Geneva they were evidently already playing in various quarters with the idea of an interim solution of the sort proposed by Norman Davis in December.<sup>3</sup> In no circumstances did such an interim solution come into question for us, for obvious reasons of which you have been repeatedly informed, since this would not bring the long overdue realization of Germany's equality of rights and would entirely disregard Germany's pressing need for security.

In these circumstances the Reich Government was interested, before further discussing the question of a conference of ministers, in hearing from the English Government what its attitude was on the questions in the two preceding paragraphs.

For your personal information and if necessary as a guide to your conversation I wish to remark also that, considering all the elements of the situation, we could not agree to an extension of the arms truce unless it should be a matter of a very short extension of about one month.<sup>4</sup>

N[EURATH] <sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 20 and footnote 2.

<sup>4</sup> Marginal note: "Minute. The Reichswehr Ministry agrees to the above version. Köpke, Mar. 6."

<sup>5</sup> Neurath had discussed the position to be taken in this telegram with Blomberg and Lieutenant Colonel von Obstfelder on Mar. 4, and it was agreed to clear the matter with Hitler before dispatching the telegram (memorandum by Bülow of Mar. 4: 7360/E536258-60).

A marginal note by Neurath on another copy of the document (3154/668637-39) recorded that Hitler agreed to the telegram. "He emphasized that the decision, whether and when a Cabinet Minister ought to go to Geneva, must be left completely open. To be absolutely rejected was the idea that he himself go there."

## No. 50

6693/H098861-63

### *Memorandum by the Director of Department IV*

BERLIN, March 6, 1933.

Today I received Herr Ferdinand H. Heye, who had been recommended to the Foreign Minister by Reich Minister Göring.<sup>1</sup>

Herr Heye stated that his plan was to establish a bank in Manchuria with state funds in order to develop Manchuria and Inner Mongolia largely with German capital and German industrial products. According to his experience and discussions the Japanese were willing to participate with one-third; Mongolian princes of his acquaintance would underwrite the second third. Moreover, the Japanese should be persuaded to undertake an action against Vladivostok and to proceed via Siberia to Lake Baikal in order to deal Bolshevism a death blow. He had for a long time pursued the plan of having the German Government establish a bank in Mongolia on a large scale with a capital of about 8 million Mexican dollars, and this must now be carried out by the national government.

<sup>1</sup> In a letter of Mar. 4 (6693/H098860).

I asked Herr Heye first whether he had been a member of the firm of Eisenträger, Heye & Co. in Harbin. Herr Heye answered in the affirmative and explained that he had founded the firm in Harbin from here at the time at the desire of Herr Eisenträger. Herr Eisenträger had told him that one could do an excellent business there with trading in arms and opium, which was also permitted. After some time he had gone there himself and found that trade in "white goods" (narcotics) was prohibited and that it was a fraudulent business. He had thereupon immediately dissolved the firm and Herr Eisenträger still owed him more than 100,000 marks today (see annexed memorandum of Consul Gipperich<sup>2</sup>).

I said regarding Herr Heye's projects that, as was known, Germany had a great interest in the economic and industrial development of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Formerly an attempt had also been made by the German side to raise the necessary capital in order to establish a bank in that region; heretofore, however, it had always been impossible to raise enough capital; I must warn against making financial experiments there with insufficient funds.

I then asked him about the settlement plans dealt with in his letter to Reich Minister Göring,<sup>3</sup> in particular whether he contemplated settling Chinese or colonists of German origin, and explained that the region there and the local method of working made it impossible to settle German colonists. Herr Heye agreed and said he had only thought that after the establishment of industries with German capital and German machines a number of German specialists (engineers, foremen, etc.) would settle in the cities concerned. Herr Heye also said that his material was all in the hands of the Mongolian princes in Peking with whom he was acquainted. He considered my suggestion of possibly having the material brought here by courier from Peking unworkable, since, as he said, the Mongolian princes were much too mistrustful to hand anything over. Herr Hitler and Herr Göring had already been approached in the matter and were very sympathetic to it.

I said that in these days it would hardly be possible to obtain any considerable funds for establishing a bank in Manchuria and that even the Hamburg and Bremen export firms were not in a position to make money available. Herr Heye replied that an institution formed on the basis of private capital was out of the question for him; he would not make himself available for this. He would consider only establishment of a bank operated or controlled by the state. I replied that after all the German Government could not open a bank in Manchuria.

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<sup>2</sup> Not printed (6693/H098868).

<sup>3</sup> Heye had forwarded, with his request for an interview with the Foreign Minister, copies of correspondence he had addressed to Göring concerning his projects (6693/H098859; H098849-58).

If any bank at all were to be established only the form of a private bank could be considered, in which the state might somehow participate indirectly.

In order to bring the conversation to a close I asked Herr Heye to formulate his ideas and proposals in writing and submit them.

Herr Heye then said that he wanted to go to East Asia as a kind of plenipotentiary and carry on the negotiations there; he now lived in Lugano and would have his wife come here. I advised him against this and asked again that he have his memorandum sent to me; it would be studied here. It would be most practical for him to return to Lugano. He would then receive a further communication.<sup>4</sup>

MEYER

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<sup>4</sup>No communication of this description has been found. A telegram was sent to the Consul at Harbin on Mar. 6 inquiring about Heye (6693/H098864). A telegram of Mar. 9 and a report of Mar. 10 from Harbin contained unfavorable information regarding Heye's activities there, including statements that he had been engaged in narcotics smuggling (6693/H098870; H098873-85). Heye did go to Manchuria and Japan in the late summer of 1933, however. Further documents on this subject are to be published in vols. II and III of this series.

## No. 51

6001/E442908-16

*Ambassador Hassell to Ministerialdirektor Köpke*

ROME, March 6, 1933.<sup>1</sup>

DEAR KÖPKE: Thank you very much for your detailed reply, in spite of the aftereffects of the grippe, to my remarks on the South-eastern question.<sup>2</sup> Your statements interested me greatly. Some of your arguments have in the meantime been dealt with in my report No. I 368 of February 23.<sup>3</sup> Both the instruction of February 7<sup>4</sup> and your letter seem to me to proceed from the idea that I am advancing by storm, so to speak ("in the honeymoon of the new Ambassador") toward an alliance or at least a firm front with Italy. I have read my reports and letters once more and do not really believe that I have given cause for such an assumption. Moreover, it is a question of a suggestion by Mussolini, not by me, and one meant entirely seriously—as is evident from conversations with Suvich, Jung, and Ciancarelli (Ritter's opposite number here).

As for fundamental principles I should like to bring out the following points once more:

1. Precisely because I consider a policy of alliance with Italy impossible of realization and dangerous today, I am in favor of utiliz-

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<sup>1</sup> In Hassell's letter to Neurath of Mar. 8 (document No. 64) the letter printed here is referred to as of Mar. 8. This, together with the reference below to report No. I 472 of Mar. 8, suggests that there may have been a typist's error in the dating of this letter and that it should be of Mar. 8 rather than Mar. 6.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 27.

<sup>3</sup> Document No. 35.

<sup>4</sup> Document No. 14.

ing all possibilities of cooperation,<sup>5</sup> and very particularly those of economic policy in the Southeast, where we have the great common interest in the dissolution of the Little Entente. I have described in the report how I visualize the cooperation.

2. Precisely because I recognize certain conflicts in German and Italian interests in the Danube Basin and the resultant Italian intention to erect a barrier, I am of the opinion that we should make common cause with Italy there in economic policy in so far as this is at all possible, so as to prevent this barrier from being erected (through our getting into the act).<sup>6</sup>

3. If one considers a basic understanding with France worth working for, the proper method in this regard consists, in my opinion, not in premature, fitful attempts at reaching agreement (usually by inappropriate methods), but precisely in systematic isolation of France in order to render her ripe for an agreement.<sup>7</sup> For this reason I have opposed the attempts, which I regard as unsuitable, for joint activity with France in the Danube area.<sup>8</sup>

4. Precisely when we in our weakness must avoid firm commitments and premature combinations (cf. the position I took with Mussolini against premature opening up of the revision question—telegram No. 13 of January 27, 1933<sup>9</sup>), we should be careful not to lapse from this sort of thinking into a continual zigzag course that arouses distrust on the part of the powers with which we have the strongest community of interests, to say nothing of countries less kindly disposed toward us. Our policy in the Southeast is rich in such examples.<sup>10</sup>

As for the question what sort of political estimate we should form of Italy, I believe that we should not have too low an opinion<sup>11</sup> either of the past conduct of Italy, i. e., of Mussolini, in the great political questions of interest to us (particularly the question of revision and disarmament), or of the future possibilities. I shall go into the whole problem very soon in writing and I hope also orally. In any case, at the present time it is really possible only in Italy, of all countries in the world, that the leading newspapers, obviously acting on government instructions, write in an emphatic way of friendship and cooperation with Germany,<sup>12</sup> as just now occurred after the elections. You will perhaps object: "Yes, in writing!" But in my opinion the writing itself under the present conditions is a political asset.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Marginal note in Köpke's handwriting: "Exactly our opinion and always has been!"

<sup>6</sup> Marginal note in Köpke's handwriting: "Correct! But it is not so simple and it is unfortunately doubtful whether it will come to a barrier (cf. the outcome of the meeting in Venice)."

On the meeting in Venice see the enclosure to this document; also document No. 35, footnote 10.

<sup>7</sup> Marginal note in Köpke's handwriting: "The egg of Columbus! (If only it could be done that methodically and simply!)."

<sup>8</sup> Marginal note in Köpke's handwriting: "Which attempts?"

<sup>9</sup> Not printed (5737/H028607-09).

<sup>10</sup> Marginal note in Köpke's handwriting: "Except for the Customs Union I know of none!"

<sup>11</sup> Marginal note in Köpke's handwriting: "We don't have anyway."

<sup>12</sup> Marginal note in Köpke's handwriting: "Correct! And we evaluate it accordingly."

<sup>13</sup> Marginal note in Köpke's handwriting: "Certainly!"



In regard to the current practical side of the question, the meeting in Venice confirmed the fact that such conferences of industrialists are certainly useful for the individual export branches but are not suitable for establishing lines of economic policy.<sup>14</sup> I am enclosing an exceedingly illuminating memorandum by Herr Schmid-Krutina, whom I had asked to tell Signor Jung his Venetian impressions; *this is only for the use of the Ministry and not for the economic authorities and interested parties*, whom I do not wish to confuse in their practical individual economic tasks. Practically it is not very important whether the Italians were actually reserved in the question of co-operation in the Southeast for the reason that they had the impression they claimed, or because they were instructed to that effect by Jung. At any rate it is a fact that Jung (and Mussolini) do not believe that they can make any basic progress in the matter through conferences of industrialists.

How very important it is that a general directive be effective for all individual areas and individual negotiations is shown by the course taken by the discussions about tourist traffic to Italy on the one hand and the German coal deliveries to Italy on the other, which caused very bad blood here, as I have already reported by wire.<sup>15</sup>

I shall call on M[ussolini] in the near future and shall pursue the conversation only in general terms in the sense of the instructions issued me, since I assume I shall receive a supplementary statement shortly in response to my report.<sup>16</sup> For the rest, I hope indeed for a consultation in Berlin soon, also as regards the question of the statement suggested by you in the next to the last paragraph.

## II

A conversation which Smend had yesterday in the Foreign Ministry regarding Italo-French relations and the mission of M. de Jouvenel induces me to revert once more to this point and request you to take cognizance of the report on this subject (No. I 472 of March 8<sup>17</sup>).

<sup>14</sup> Marginal note in Köpke's handwriting: "But that was mainly the fault of the Italians." Hassell had also summarized his estimate of the results of the Venice talks in report No. I 456 of Mar. 6 (8070/E579334).

<sup>15</sup> In telegram No. 28 of Mar. 4 (2784/540149).

Marginal note in Köpke's handwriting: "But that has been straightened out again in the meantime."

Ritter informed Hassell of the settlement reached on these questions by telegram No. 33 of Mar. 7 (5642/E410728-29).

<sup>16</sup> Cf. document No. 64, footnote 2.

<sup>17</sup> This report (7819/E567031-34) took a conversation of Mussolini with French Ambassador de Jouvenel as the point of departure for an examination of Italo-French relations. Hassell concluded with the observation that Germany must guard against "the danger of an Italo-French agreement without us and at our expense". German foreign policy should therefore seek "the restoration of a confidential relationship with Italy" by taking advantage of every opportunity for practical political and economic cooperation. "We must not forget," he said, "that Mussolini is a realist par excellence and expects practical cooperation from the New Germany; his attitude toward the Italo-French problem will largely depend on the prospects and the successes of this cooperation with Germany."

Indeed, I consider it particularly important (cf. point 3 above) that we proceed *pari passu* with Italy in the question of a future understanding with France, i. e., jointly try to make France ripe for this and keep one another informed about our steps and impressions in this regard. One must not forget that in spite of all the clamor the idea of an Italo-French understanding is constantly kept alive here and can quickly become reality if France pays enough, though the latter is not to be expected at the moment.

In conclusion one more question. The Czechoslovak Minister here, Chvalkovsky, whom you know, always speaks of you in very lofty tones and yesterday asked me again to give you his best regards. He does not neglect any opportunity of assuring me that he openly and energetically advocates a more pro-German orientation of Czechoslovak policy<sup>18</sup> and that he is convinced that the time will soon be ripe for such a reversal.<sup>19</sup> I should be very grateful to you if you would inform me what you and people in Berlin in general think of the personality and orientation of M. Chvalkovsky.<sup>20</sup>

Yours, etc.

HASELL

[Enclosure]

ROME, March 3, 1933.

#### MEMORANDUM

I called on Finance Minister Jung today in order, as I told him, to tell him, by instruction of the Ambassador, my impressions as "observer" at the conference of industrialists in Venice. I told him that the German delegates had been particularly pleased at the cordial reception in Venice. The negotiations had been very friendly and there had also been some results, so that the hopes of a more intensive economic cooperation of the two nations in the future seemed entirely justified.

But in the discussion of the question of economic cooperation in the Danube Basin there were unfortunately few results. After the German proposal of cooperation in Russia had found a very favorable response from the Italian side, the Germans had really been very much surprised at the reception of the proposal for similar cooperation in the Danube Basin, made on the basis of a suggestion by the Duce. The Italians had said with respect to the proposal that they were very much in favor of a general economic cooperation with Germany, but

<sup>18</sup> Marginal note in Köpke's handwriting: "That is entirely correct."

<sup>19</sup> Marginal note in Köpke's handwriting: "Chvalkovsky hopes for this but I have never believed in it. Ch[valkovsky] means well himself but has little influence in Prague."

<sup>20</sup> No reply to this question has been found.

they implied at the same time that South America, Africa, and East Asia were after all much more important areas. Accordingly, the Germans got the impression that the Italian delegation had not yet received a "sign from above".

Jung interrupted me by saying that the "sign from above" had been issued; he himself had spoken with and instructed the Italian delegation before its departure.

I responded that at any rate the German delegation had received a different impression. It had spoken out decidedly for the Italian proposal for cooperation on other continents, but had proposed that a beginning should be made with economic cooperation in the Danube Basin. It could not be said as yet, to be sure, how the details of such cooperation could be worked out, but the German side did reject a proposal already made by the Duce at an earlier stage,<sup>21</sup> for dividing up the Danube market according to categories of goods, since no export prohibitions can be applied to certain categories of goods and this type of prohibition would also only benefit third countries.

Signor Jung interrupted me by saying that of course it would not work that way. He himself was also not thinking of a division, but only of an agreement according to categories of goods.

I replied that at any rate the Germans had not understood the Italian suggestion made at the conference in this way; rather, they had for their part proposed an agreement of the separate branches of industry in order in this way to reach understandings relative to prices, sales conditions, markets, financial cooperation, etc. The question had not, however, been examined in any detail as yet by the German side, as they explained; rather, in order to examine the question it was proposed that a large, mixed German-Italian commission be set up which would address itself to the economic relations with the countries in the Danube Basin. This German proposal had found no response, however; it was agreed to let the matter remain in the hands of the present industrial commission.

Signor Jung responded that the decision to this effect was already known to him.

I said that the impression had arisen, at any rate, that a German offer had been more or less rejected by the Italians in a polite way, whereas it had after all in reality been a question of a proposal of the head of the Italian Government.

Signor Jung now stated that Signori Olivetti and Guarneri <sup>22</sup> had already reported to him about the talks. He wanted to tell me very

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<sup>21</sup> See document No. 14, footnote 1.

<sup>22</sup> They had represented Italian industry at the Venice talks.

frankly their impressions, too. They had returned with the impression that it was the Germans who had acted only on a "sign from above," but had themselves not been interested in the question.

I replied that in my opinion this was not correct. I had not by any means gained this impression during lengthy conversations with the German delegation.

Signor Jung stated that the Italian delegation had in any case had the feeling during the conference, as he wanted to tell me frankly, that at the present stage the question was not suited to a discussion between the representatives of the industries of the two countries; still less, however, both in his opinion and in that of the Italian industrialists, was it suited to a discussion in a large mixed commission, since, as experience had shown, that sort of commission was the grave of all proposals. Thus if one wished to come to any sort of results the Ambassador would have to continue to negotiate the matter with the Duce. Of course, investigations by the industrial groups of both countries on the possibilities of economic cooperation running parallel to these discussions could do no harm; on the contrary, it was very well for the representatives of the industries of the two countries, which, like the industries of all countries, as experience has shown, offer some resistance to new ideas, to occupy themselves even now with the idea of economic cooperation.

SCHMID-KRUTINA

## No. 52

6208/E469335

*The Consul General at Danzig to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 8

DANZIG, March 7, 1933—12:40 p. m.

Received March 7—1:30 p. m.

IV Po. 1615.

With reference to my telegram No. 7.<sup>1</sup>

League of Nations Commissioner Rosting yesterday directed a question to Poland as to whether reports about the reinforcement of the Westerplatte garrison <sup>2</sup> were true; if so, he requested immediate with-

<sup>1</sup> Of Mar. 6, not printed (6208/E469323).

<sup>2</sup> By the Poland-Danzig Agreement of 1921 and the interpretation of it by the Council of the League of Nations of Dec. 9, 1925, the Polish Government was entitled to keep at Westerplatte peninsula in Danzig harbor a force of 88 men for protection of Polish munitions stores in transit there. On Mar. 6 these forces had been increased to 200 men.

drawal, since this had been without his approval, which was necessary. Since Poland had so far not replied Danzig was filing a complaint asking that it be determined that an *action directe*<sup>3</sup> had taken place. Rosting set the period for answering his inquiry at 48 hours, for answering the Danzig complaint, 24 hours. Rosting intends, after conferring with the Secretariat General of the League of Nations,<sup>4</sup> to convene an unofficial Council meeting for Friday<sup>5</sup> in order to request a decision on the *action directe*; he will probably go to Geneva on Thursday; likewise the President of the Senate on Wednesday evening, who would be available in Berlin Thursday morning.

THERMANN

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<sup>3</sup> In a resolution of the Council of the League of Nations of Mar. 13, 1925, an *action directe* was defined as an action "which might endanger or prove a serious obstacle to the maintenance of public security in Danzig or which might jeopardize good relations between Danzig and Poland." See League of Nations, *Official Journal*, April 1925, p. 564.

In telegram No. 6 of Mar. 6 (6208/E469322), Thermann reported an alleged approach by the Polish representative in Danzig to Rosting regarding his attitude toward an increase of the Polish garrison on the Westerplatte.

<sup>4</sup> Rosting's communication of Mar. 7 to the Secretary General (9951/E696197-200), is in League of Nations, *Official Journal*, April 1933 pt. II, p. 634 (C. 184. 1933. I).

<sup>5</sup> i. e., Mar. 10.

## No. 53

2945/575818

*The State Secretary in the Reich Chancellery to the Foreign Minister*

Rk. 1948

BERLIN, March 7, 1933.

RM 300.

DEAR HERR FOREIGN MINISTER: In response to letter RM 277 of March 3, 1933,<sup>1</sup> I have the honor to inform you that the Reich Chancellor in his capacity as leader of the NSDAP has by party order had the necessary instructions issued so that incidents such as occurred at the Polish Consulate General in Berlin will not be repeated in the future. I have informed the Reich Minister of Labor in his capacity as first Bundesführer of the Stahlhelm of the incident and the decision of the Reich Chancellor, with the suggestion that he issue a similar order for the members of the Stahlhelm, as well.<sup>2</sup>

Yours, etc.

LAMMERS

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<sup>1</sup> This letter enclosed a memorandum describing an incident on Mar. 1 in which several uniformed National Socialists had made their way into the Polish Consulate General at Berlin in connection with a visa application (9189/E646425-27).

<sup>2</sup> An expression of regret for the incident was sent by the Foreign Ministry to the Polish Legation on Mar. 11 (2945/575819-20).

## No. 54

3598/791989-2001

*Minutes of the Conference of Ministers on March 7, 1933,  
at 4:15 p.m.*Rk. 2241;  
2242;  
2243.*Present:*

Reich Chancellor  
 Vice Chancellor and Reich  
 Commissar of Prussia  
 Foreign Minister  
 Reich Minister of Interior  
 Reich Minister of Finance  
 Reich Minister of Economics,  
 Food and Agriculture  
 Reich Minister of Labor  
 For the Reich Minister of  
 Justice  
 Reichswehr Minister  
 Reich Minister of Posts and  
 Transport  
 Reich Minister without Port-  
 folio and Reich Commissar  
 for Air  
 Reich Commissar for Employ-  
 ment  
 Reich Commissar  
  
 State Secretary in the Reich  
 Chancellery  
 State Secretary in the Office of  
 the Reich President  
 Reich Press Chief:  
 Recording Official:

Hitler  
  
 von Papen  
 Freiherr von Neurath  
 Dr. Frick  
 Count Schwerin von Krosigk  
  
 Dr. Hugenberg  
 Seldte  
 State Secretary, Dr. Schlegel-  
 berger  
 von Blomberg  
  
 Freiherr von Eltz-Rübenach  
  
 Göring  
  
 Dr. Gereke  
 Former Reich Minister Dr.  
 Popitz  
  
 Dr. Lammers  
  
 Dr. Meissner  
 Ministerialdirektor Funk  
 Ministerialrat Wienstein  
 Also Oberregierungsräte Dr.  
 Willuhn and Killy

*Agenda of the Conference:*

- 1) Political situation.
- 2) Statements of the Foreign Minister.

1) *Political Situation*

The Reich Chancellor opened the meeting and stated that the newly-elected Reichstag had best convene in the period from the 3rd to the

8th of April. The formal opening session was to take place in the Potsdam Garrison Church. Where further sessions would take place was yet to be considered. The services for the deputies on the day of the opening would take place in the Evangelical Nicolai Church and in the Catholic Municipal Parish Church in Potsdam.

On the opening day the Reich President would lay a wreath on the grave of Frederick the Great.

There would now have to be a large-scale campaign of propaganda and information [*Aufklärung*] in order that no political lethargy should set in. This operation of informing the people must be conducted from a central office to be newly established. It should be borne in mind that the overwhelming electoral victory of the National Socialists was achieved in part with the help of persons who would ordinarily not vote and who, if not given adequate political information, would soon return to the ranks of the non-voters. The assertion that many Communists had switched to the National Socialist side was not true. The situation was, on the contrary, that former Social Democratic voters had voted National Socialist and former Communist voters had voted Social Democratic. As far as the voters of the Center and of the Bavarian People's party were concerned, they could not be won over by the national parties until the Curia dropped both parties.

A bold attack on the problem of the relation of the Reich to the Länder was necessary. He considered especially disloyal the attacks of Minister President Dr. Held<sup>1</sup> on him, the Reich Chancellor, after he had been to see him only a short time ago. The frequent elections to approximately 50 different bodies in the German Reich were very awkward. It was necessary to establish the present and future composition of the Reichstag as the ratio for the composition of all the Diets.

He regarded the events of March 5 as a revolution.<sup>2</sup> In the end Marxism would no longer exist in Germany.

What was necessary was an enabling law with a two-thirds majority. He, the Reich Chancellor, was firmly convinced that the Reichstag would pass such a law. The deputies of the German Communist party would not appear at the opening of the Reichstag because they were in jail.

With respect to the financial and economic sphere the following was to be noted. A change in the management of the Reichsbank was absolutely necessary. The Reichsbank should have a flexible man at the head. Especially important was the question of the compulsory admixture of butter to margarine. It should be remembered

<sup>1</sup> Of Bavaria.

<sup>2</sup> The elections to the Reichstag.

that the number of margarine consumers was extremely large. In this connection he had to express his astonishment that State Secretary von Rohr<sup>3</sup> had not complied with his, the Reich Chancellor's, request by telephone to hear experts on this question. State Secretary von Rohr had justified his refusal on the grounds that he did not in principle receive party politicians. If necessary he, the Chancellor, would have to tell the Reich President that if State Secretary von Rohr behaved in this way, he could no longer get together with him.

The Minister of Interior reported on the events in Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck, and Hessen.<sup>4</sup> He stated that measures by the Reich had to be taken because otherwise the greatest danger to order and security would have existed in these Länder. The present rulers in these Länder struck no responsive chord in the people; the discipline of the police seemed endangered if the Reich did not intervene.

Also in Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, and Saxony, new ordering of governmental conditions was urgently needed.

The Reich Minister of Economics, Food and Agriculture first went briefly into the matter of State Secretary von Rohr and stated that the latter had objected to receiving the four gentlemen recommended by the Chancellor since the Reich Ministry of Food had refused in principle to talk to representatives of professional or other organizations about the margarine question.

He, the Reich Minister of Economics, Food and Agriculture, had told State Secretary von Rohr he wanted to talk to the four gentlemen himself.

The Vice Chancellor and Reich Commissar of Prussia expressed to the Reich Chancellor and the National Socialist organization the thanks of the Reich Cabinet for their admirable performance in the election.

He stressed the fact that the relation of the Reich to the Länder had to be put on a different basis. It was necessary, however, to avoid reducing the Länder to a level of uniformity.

With regard to the internal political situation, the Vice Chancellor stated that yesterday (March 6) Prelate Kaas had been to see him. He had stated that he had come without previously consulting his party and was now prepared to let bygones be bygones. He had, moreover, offered the cooperation of the Center party.

With respect to foreign policy he was, perhaps in contrast to the Foreign Minister, of the opinion that pending problems had to be tackled in the near future with the utmost energy.

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<sup>3</sup> Of the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture.

<sup>4</sup> On Mar. 7, Reich Commissars appointed by the Reich Minister of Interior had taken over the police powers in these states.



The Reich Minister of Labor expressed to the Reich Chancellor, in behalf of the *Kampffront* Black-White-Red,<sup>5</sup> his thanks for the Chancellor's services in the election.

Reich Minister Göring stated that the Communist deputies would not take part in the sessions of the Reichstag because they were in jail. Strong accusations were also to be made against a number of Marxist deputies. Forty persons of the Iron Front<sup>6</sup> had carried out the united action with the German Communist party.

He was firmly convinced that the two-thirds majority in the Reichstag would be obtained for an enabling law. Deputies who left the session in order to make it impossible for the necessary two-thirds majority to be present would have to forfeit their free travel passes and allowances for the duration of the legislative period. He wished to make a change in the rules to this effect. The duty of the Deputy to exercise his mandate, in his opinion, also entailed that he must not absent himself from sessions without being excused.

Grass, the chairman of the parliamentary group of the Prussian Center party, had been to see him even before the election. Grass had made the offer that no further personnel changes be made before the election; then the Center party would be ready to cooperate. According to the statements made by Grass, the collaboration of the German Nationals could then be dispensed with. It was best to tell the Center party that all its civil servants would be removed from office if the Center party did not agree to the enabling law. For the rest, the tactics to be employed toward the Center party would have to consist in courteously ignoring it.

Vice President Esser<sup>7</sup> too, had asked to see him, Reich Minister Göring. The conversation had, however, not yet taken place.

The Reich Minister of Interior then spoke of the display of flags on the Day of National Mourning (March 12). He proposed that the official display of flags be retained, and that the suggestion be made that the government buildings display also the black-white-red flag.

The Reich Minister of Finance stated that the Finance offices in the states had asked for a general ruling on the display of flags. He proposed an order to the effect that the black-white-red flag must be shown beside the black-red-gold one.

The Cabinet declared itself in agreement with this.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>5</sup> This was the name of the electoral bloc formed by the German Nationalist party and the Stahlhelm.

<sup>6</sup> A propaganda organization formed by the Social Democrats and the Reichsbanner Black-Red-Gold.

<sup>7</sup> Thomas Esser, Center party member of the Reichstag.

<sup>8</sup> Marginal note: "Note. This decision has meanwhile been superseded. W[iens]ein." This note apparently refers to the presidential decree of Mar. 12 stipulating that henceforth the black-white-red and the swastika flag were to be displayed together.

The Reich Minister of Posts and Transport stated that recently many Catholics had been to see him who did not belong to the Center. They had stressed the fact that they were in general friendly to the NSDAP, but that they had hesitations because of point 24 of the program.<sup>9</sup> Perhaps a satisfactory interpretation of this point could be given by the party leaders.

The Reich Chancellor stated that the authentic interpretation of all questions pertaining to the Church was a matter for the Bishops. The Church would accept the National Socialist party at such a time when it would be forced by circumstances to accept the party.

Moreover, conditions at the German Embassy to the Vatican were very difficult. The spiritual adviser, Prelate Steinmann, who had been officiating there for some years, was frequently intriguing against the Ambassador.<sup>10</sup> Here, too, a change would be necessary. A man like Abbot Schachleitner should, in his opinion, be in Steinmann's place.

The Foreign Minister pointed out that the position of a spiritual adviser at the German Embassy to the Vatican did not exist before the war, and to his recollection, had been created after the war under Chancellor Wirth. There was no need for this position.

The Reich Minister of Interior spoke about the Reichstag fire and the punishment of the culprits, and stated that it was urgently necessary to hang van der Lubbe at once, and that, moreover, in the Königsplatz. To be sure, the law that applied to arson provided for only a prison sentence, but it must be possible to impose the penalty of death by hanging with retroactive effect for such a heinous crime. The principle of *nulla poena sine lege* should not be applied without restriction. Professor Dr. Nagler (Breslau), Professor Dr. von Weber (Jena), and Professor Dr. Öttler (Würzburg) had rendered opinions to this effect.<sup>11</sup>

The Reich Minister of Interior then reported on the substance of the opinion as enclosed.<sup>12</sup>

The Chancellor stressed the fact that, in his opinion also, it was urgently necessary to hang van der Lubbe. The German public absolutely expected this. He could not recognize the doctrine of "the law must be observed," if the entire national life had to perish as a result.

<sup>9</sup> Point 24 of the National Socialist program of 1920 read as follows: "We demand liberty for all religious denominations in the State, so far as they are not a danger to it and do not militate against the morality and moral sense of the German race."

"The party, as such, stands for positive Christianity, but does not bind itself in the matter of creed to any particular confession. It combats the Jewish-materialist spirit *within* and *without* us, and is convinced that our nation can achieve permanent health from within only on the principle: the common interest before self-interest."

<sup>10</sup> Diego von Bergen.

<sup>11</sup> Not printed (1739/402202-22).

<sup>12</sup> Not printed (1739/402195-201).

Reich Minister Göring stated that the Reichstag fire had been previously announced at four different places. Whether the person arrested at the Belgian border had any connection with the deed was still uncertain. Meanwhile it appears that van der Lubbe had already been hailed to Court three times in Holland.

He had seized the Karl-Liebknecht house. Here a special commission for the struggle against the German Communist party was to be installed.

The attempt planned on the life of the Chancellor in Königsberg was serious. It had been carefully prepared. Three persons had also been arrested. It was necessary to await the results of the investigation.

The Reich Chancellor stated that, as far as his person was concerned, he had no fears of attempts at assassination. The consequences of a successful attempt would, however, be terrible for the public. In that event probably 100,000 Communists would be killed.

State Secretary Dr. Schlegelberger stated that he agreed entirely with the view of the Reich Chancellor that the law had to be adjusted to the circumstances.

A preliminary investigation of van der Lubbe had been opened today (March 7) on grounds of high treason and arson.

He had to refer very emphatically to the doctrine of *nulla poena sine lege*. Only in Russia, China, and some small Cantons of Switzerland did this doctrine not apply. He would again study carefully the opinion mentioned by the Reich Minister of Interior. The Reich Ministry of Justice would then, for its part, prepare an opinion and send both opinions to the Reich Ministers for their information.

State Secretary Dr. Meissner stated that the statements of the Chancellor were entirely correct politically. The public was right in demanding a severe punishment for van der Lubbe.

The Reich President might, however, twice suffer severe qualms of conscience, namely, if he were to sign an order prescribing the death penalty, etc., and then, if he were later to decide on a petition for pardon of the condemned man. He asked that the Reich Chancellor, the Reich Minister of Interior, and the Reich Minister of Justice submit the matter to the President before there was a final decision of the Cabinet.

Reich Commissar Dr. Popitz stated that he was afraid that the Reich Supreme Court [*Reichsgericht*] would not recognize the validity of a retroactive order prescribing the death penalty.

The Chancellor stated that he would get in touch with the President of the Reich Supreme Court about this.

It was expected that the Chancellor would first speak alone with the President concerning the matter.

2) *Statements of the Foreign Minister*

The Foreign Minister stated that the French and American Ambassadors had made complaints concerning excesses committed by SA people.<sup>13</sup>

The Chancellor asked whether the names of the alleged SA men had been learned. It was his firm conviction that SA people were not involved, but probably Communists who had donned SA uniforms.

The Foreign Minister stated that the names of the alleged SA men had not been learned. It would probably be best if he laid the matter before the police.

The Foreign Minister then spoke about the attitude of foreign journalists toward the present Reich Government. He stated that Loutre, the correspondent of *Petit Parisien*, wished to apologize for an article. Especially aggressive had been the attitude of Madame Keith, correspondent of *Izvestia*. Nevertheless the foreign correspondents who had thus far reported maliciously on domestic conditions in Germany and had remained in Germany had promised in future in their reporting to steer clear of all malicious tendencies. In view of this fact, it was, in his opinion, desirable for the present to refrain from expulsion and to give these correspondents a trial period of 2 months. He would also have an announcement made to this effect.

The Cabinet declared itself in agreement with this.

For the minutes:

WIENSTEIN, March 11

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<sup>13</sup> A list of such complaints by Diplomatic Missions in Berlin, including the Embassies of France and the United States, has been filmed (9770/E686728-35). In the files are two memoranda recording the fact that the First Secretary of the United States Embassy, Kliefoth, brought several cases of that kind to the attention of the Foreign Ministry (M4/M000061-69). Cf. also *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933*, vol. II, p. 321.

## No. 55

2860/562422-24

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, March 8, 1933.

RM 302.

Yesterday the Soviet Ambassador, Khinchuk, called on me for the purpose of lodging a protest, on instruction of his Government, against several passages in Reich Chancellor Hitler's speech on March 2.<sup>1</sup> He also read to me the paper attached hereto.

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<sup>1</sup> Portions of the text are printed in the *New York Times* of Mar. 3, p. 5, and also in Baynes, *The Speeches of Adolf Hitler*, vol. I, pp. 254-261.

I replied to the Ambassador that I could see no grounds for a protest by the Russian Government in the speech which I had before me in the text issued by the Wolff Bureau. I had repeatedly told him as well as M. Litvinov that any interference by the Soviet Government in German domestic affairs, especially our actions against the German Communists, would in every instance be rejected by us. In the Reich Chancellor's speech, all expressions were aimed exclusively at the German Communists. In these circumstances I could only urgently advise the Russian Government to refrain from publicizing the *démarche* he had undertaken with me. Such publication would only tend to provoke a protest on our part, and that would certainly not help improve German-Russian relations.

The Ambassador assured me that nothing would get into the press from his side about the *démarche*, which was very embarrassing to him personally, and that he would report to Moscow in this sense.<sup>2</sup>

I also mentioned on this occasion that the Reich Chancellor had told me that he was going to receive M. Khinchuk soon.

V. N[EURATH]

[Annex]

What brings me to you, Herr Foreign Minister, is the speech Reich Chancellor Hitler made at the Berlin Sportpalast on March 2, which contained extremely violent attacks on my country.

The Reich Chancellor deemed it appropriate to characterize the economic, social, and political system and the condition of the USSR in a contemptuous and offensive manner that cannot be reconciled with the relations existing between the USSR and the German Reich.

On the instruction of my Government I enter a protest against the attacks of the German Reich Chancellor directed against the internal affairs and conditions of my country.

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<sup>2</sup> *Izvestia* of Mar. 9 carried a Tass report dated Berlin, Mar. 8 stating that the Ambassador had, on orders from his Government, lodged a strong protest against Hitler's speech.

A note of Mar. 14 by Völckers stated that the *Izvestia* article was actually based on a communiqué issued at Moscow before the Ambassador made his *démarche* and therefore did not indicate any deception on the part of the Ambassador (6025/H045420).

## No. 56

7360/E536287-89

*The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry*  
Telegram

No. 44 of March 7

LONDON, March 7, 1933—11:25 p. m.

Received March 8—3:30 a. m.

II F Abr. 916.

With reference to your unnumbered telegram of March 6 (II F Abr. 881) <sup>1</sup> and today's telephone conversation of the Foreign Minister with me.<sup>2</sup>

This afternoon I had a 1-hour conversation with Simon. I told Simon that the Reich Minister will not come to Geneva now, immediately after the election, owing to his commitments in Berlin, and will not be able to make dispositions with respect to his time before March 24; also that at the present stage of the Conference negotiations the Reich Government is unable to form any picture of the course and outcome of any discussions among the Ministers. I made the statements given in the telegraphic instruction and asked to be informed of the opinion and position of the British Government on the points touched upon. Finally, I pointed to the talk making the rounds regarding the possibility of an interim solution, and stated that such an interim solution would in no case be acceptable to us.

Simon was very much taken aback by the information that no authoritative German official was to be expected to go to Geneva. He said that MacDonald and he had decided on the trip in order to contribute to the progress of the Disarmament Conference in the same impartial and unselfish spirit which had guided the British Government in its recent intervention in the disarmament question. What the British Cabinet, as a friend of all participating Governments, had been interested in was to seek, in cooperation with other responsible statesmen, a solution in the present critical stage of the Conference. He was well aware that the question of material, for example, had not by any means been exhaustively treated, but precisely the fact of the unsatisfactory progress of the negotiations of the Commission had aroused the wish on the part of the British Government to establish broad lines for a solution in a comprehensive way. If representatives of the German Government stayed away, the result would be an Anglo-French meeting, since Daladier's arrival at the end of this week was surely to be expected. This would in no way correspond to British wishes and would give the meeting of Ministers in Geneva a false character. He therefore regretted very much the absence of a member of

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 49. The telegram was dispatched from Berlin as No. 31.

<sup>2</sup> No record of this conversation has been found.

the German Government and would immediately inform MacDonald of my important communications. According to the arrangements made, MacDonald and he were to leave here Thursday morning, spend the night in the British Embassy in Paris—this might possibly lead to a meeting with Daladier and Boncour—and then proceed to Geneva. He wanted to stress once more that no Anglo-French arrangement of any sort was contemplated, but that the purpose of the trip to Geneva had been precisely that of seeking a solution with a thorough absence of prejudice on all sides, with MacDonald's great influence particularly on the French Government becoming effective.

We then spoke for a long time about the situation and the prospects of the Conference. In this connection Simon stressed repeatedly that the English were striving to avoid, in all circumstances, having the Conference result perhaps in a general rearmament and finally even danger for the peace. I thereupon made clear to him by way of emphatic statements the German desire for security, by pointing out how absurd it was to discuss France's wishes for security and hardly to consider the needs of defenseless Germany for security, and I intimated clearly that if the Disarmament Conference should fail, the German wishes for security would take on an acute form. I refuted Simon's concern about conflicts with a reference to Germany's willing acceptance of the No-Force Declaration.<sup>3</sup>

In the course of the conversation Simon seemed to be somewhat more reconciled to our refusal; however, he asked me to convey to the Foreign Minister, along with his regards, his lively regret at our absence. Furthermore, he denied that England was at present considering an interim solution, saying that the British Government continued as in the past to desire and strive for as comprehensive a solution as possible.

HOESCH

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<sup>3</sup> See document No. 38 and footnote 4.

## No. 57

6208/E469346

*The Consul General at Danzig to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 9

DANZIG, March 8, 1933—12:56 p. m.

Received March 8—1:35 p. m.

IV Po. 1626.

With reference to my telegram No. 8.<sup>1</sup>

Yesterday the Polish Government applied to the High Commis-

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<sup>1</sup> Document No. 52.

sioner for determination that an *action directe* by Danzig had occurred in the harbor police question.<sup>2</sup> This petition is likewise to be decided in an extraordinary Council session.

THERMANN

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<sup>2</sup> This refers to a counterclaim made by Poland on Mar. 7 that action of the Danzig Senate on Feb. 15 in reviving the controversy over control of the Danzig Harbor Police (which had been dormant since 1927), by placing the Danzig police units constituting the Danzig Harbor Police under the control of the Police President of Danzig instead of under that of the Danzig Harbor Board as formerly, also constituted an *action directe*. This revival of the Harbor Police controversy was reported in Danzig Consulate General reports I G 220 of Feb. 22 (9067/E636268-71) and I G 312 of Mar. 8 (6208/E469377-82, E469389-404).

## No. 58

9062/E634784

*The Consul General at Danzig to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 10

DANZIG, March 8, 1933—2:22 p. m.

Received March 8—3:45 p. m.

IV Po. 1628.

The recently greatly intensified foreign political pressure on Danzig makes it seem absolutely necessary in the very near future to clarify the internal political situation and create a majority government fully capable of action. The Volkstag elected in the fall of 1930 clearly no longer represents today's distribution of forces. The National Socialists resolutely demand new elections and the formation of a government after the German pattern. The President of the Senate and the German National People's party here are for the time being still decidedly against new elections, as a result of which there is an ominous splintering of national forces.

I should like to suggest that on the occasion of tomorrow's visit<sup>1</sup> you exert influence on the President of the Senate in the sense of a more cooperative attitude toward new elections. It is urgently desired that Ziehm stay at least until questions of foreign policy are dealt with.

THERMANN

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<sup>1</sup> Danzig Senate President Ziehm was to arrive in Berlin on Thursday, Mar. 9, en route to Geneva; see document No. 52.



## No. 59

6208/E469354

*The German Representative With the League of Nations to the  
Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT  
Del. 221GENEVA, March 8, 1933.  
Received March 8—8:10 p. m.  
IV Po. 1631.

With reference to your telegrams No. 129<sup>1</sup> and No. 130.<sup>2</sup>

As instructed, I have discussed the Polish procedure at Westerplatte with the Secretary General, who recognizes the gravity of the situation and said that he was very precisely informed by Rosting. There is to be a Council session on the Danzig suit for determination of an *action directe*<sup>3</sup> and the Polish suit regarding the harbor police<sup>4</sup> on Saturday at the earliest or Monday at the latest.<sup>5</sup>

KELLER

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<sup>1</sup> On Mar. 8 circular instructions had been given to the Embassies at London and Rome by telephone, the Embassy at Paris by telegram No. 92, and the German delegation at Geneva by telegram No. 129 (zu IV Po. 1615: 6208/E469336-38), which reviewed the course of events in the Westerplatte incident and directed that the matter be taken up with the Foreign Ministers or their representatives in those capitals and the Secretary General of the League of Nations. The seriousness of the situation was to be stressed and also the danger of complications whose consequences could not be foreseen.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (6208/E469347); it repeated to Geneva the text of Danzig telegram No. 9 of Mar. 8 (document No. 57).

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 52.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 57.

<sup>5</sup> I. e., Mar. 11 and 13, respectively.

## No. 60

6208/E469357

*The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 45 of March 8

LONDON, March 8, 1933—7:44 p. m.  
Received March 8—10:40 p. m.  
IV Po. 1633.

With reference to the telephoned communication by Count Adelman regarding the Polish troop reinforcements at the Westerplatte.<sup>1</sup>

Since Simon and Vansittart were occupied all this afternoon by preliminary work for the impending visit of the English Ministers in Geneva,<sup>2</sup> I undertook the démarche on the Polish troop reinforcements

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 59, footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup> MacDonald and Simon left on Mar. 9.

on the Westerplatte with Sargent, leaving behind a memorandum. I stressed thereby with great seriousness the open treaty violation by the Poles and pointed to the great danger that could result from the treaty infraction.

Sargent, who knows the problem, promised to inform Simon of my démarche as soon as possible.

HOESCH

## No. 61

6208/E469356

### *The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

#### Telegram

No. 31

ROME (Quirinal), March 8, 1933—9:30 p. m.

Received March 8—11:45 p. m.

IV Po. 1632.

With reference to today's telephone conversation IV Po. 1615.<sup>1</sup>

I have just carried out the instructions with State Secretary Suvich. He stated that he had received reports from the Consul General at Danzig, but had learned a great deal that was new, especially concerning the attitude of the High Commissioner, from my information. I described to him the great gravity of the situation and the incalculable effects, whereupon he said he would immediately issue corresponding instructions.

HASELL

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 59, footnote 1.

## No. 62

9245/E651618

### *The Ambassador in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

#### Telegram

No. 86 of March 8

WASHINGTON, March 8, 1933—6:29 p. m.

Received March 9—3:30 a. m.

W 1680.

With reference to my telegram No. 71<sup>1</sup> and your telegram No. 58.<sup>2</sup>

In my first conversation with Secretary of State Hull today I had the opportunity, in accordance with instructions, to convey to him

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<sup>1</sup> In telegram No. 71 of Mar. 1 Prittwitz noted that in statements made in November and December of the previous year, to which little attention had been paid at the time, Cordell Hull had linked the solution of the debt problem with new policies regarding currency and trade, and had called for a 10-percent reduction of tariffs by all countries (9245/E651608-09).

<sup>2</sup> Telegram No. 58 of Mar. 4, not printed (9245/E651614).

our wish to get in touch with the Americans about the preparation of the World Economic Conference.<sup>3</sup> Hull received this information with great satisfaction and agreed with me most emphatically when I pointed out the necessity of a careful preparation of the World Economic Conference. Referring to his statements mentioned in telegram No. 71,<sup>4</sup> Hull said in the further course of the conversation that international cooperation for the solution of the world economic problem seemed to him to be the most urgent task and at the same time the only way to eliminate the political difficulties, too, which existed at present in the world. Although this first conversation did not offer any opportunity at all to discuss the subject exhaustively, it is interesting to find that the Secretary of State is already perfectly aware that any substantial reduction of protective agricultural tariffs is out of the question for the European countries. He told me that the French Ambassador, too, had expressed himself to that effect.

PRITZWITZ

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<sup>3</sup> These instructions had been conveyed in telegram No. 51 of Feb. 28 (9245/-B651590-91).

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 1.

## No. 63

8481/E596780-83

### *The Minister in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

A 105

WARSAW, March 8, 1933.  
Ref. D. 184.

### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: The reception of the Reichstag elections in Poland.

The outcome of the Reichstag elections and the sweeping success of the National Socialist party expressed therein has been received in Poland with noteworthy calm. This might cause astonishment at first, for what has now occurred was formerly represented here deliberately and very zealously as a frightening specter for European peace. To be sure, they are still greatly concerned today because of the growth of the national movement, from which they fear an energetic treatment of problems relating to foreign policy. However, on the other hand, opinions are often expressed here that—for different reasons—agree in the final conclusion that precisely this national course could have repercussions that would signify for Poland directly or indirectly a reduction of pressure.

In the first place it can be said that the electoral success as such was not particularly surprising here; for the Polish press has already been prophesying for a year and a day that the National Socialist seizure

of power was inevitable. It even often declared this development necessary in the interest of clear responsibility in order at the same time—for reasons of propaganda—to be able to shudder about it. If the former Reich Governments were suspected here of threatening with the national movement only in order to obtain concessions in this manner, many circles hope that this situation, which was felt to be exceedingly uncomfortable, would now be eliminated through greater clarity of the national objectives and that one would know in the future where one stood.

From this, however, they continue to hope for a not inconsiderable diminution of the sympathies of the Western democracies for Germany. They believe they can count on a strengthening of the German national consciousness to mobilize the same forces which once combined to suppress the “imperialistic” prewar Germany, and that this will result in favorable prospects for putting up a defense against German revisionist desires. It is assumed that the anti-Semitic tendencies could have the same effect.

Special hopes are placed on the domestic political situation in Germany. It is believed that the Reich Government will now be occupied for a considerable length of time with internal problems, so that its power of action in foreign policy will be paralyzed. Moreover, the fight against the Communists is welcomed, for one reason because in this way the Communist danger is also lessened for Poland, but most particularly because it is assumed with certainty that this fight might affect German-Russian relations in an unfavorable way.

Everything indicates that they are resolved here to exploit actively the prospects resulting from the possibility of a loosening of German-Russian relations. Litvinov's speech in Geneva <sup>1</sup> and the attempt at Franco-Russian rapprochement undertaken by Herriot have already been observed here with the greatest attention. Now, since the Soviet press has been expressing itself with unrestrained asperity concerning developments in Germany, they feel a fresh breeze. With noteworthy purposefulness the Polish correspondents in Moscow of the semi-official *Gazeta Polska* pass on to Poland all Soviet Russian statements that indicate that Russia is turning away from the path taken at Rapallo. These expectations were expressed most clearly in an article by the Government Conservative Deputy Mackiewicz, the well-known enfant terrible of Polish foreign policy, who has frequently with astonishing unconcern given expression to what others still consider it correct to leave unspoken. With unconcealed satisfaction Mackiewicz equates the Reichstag fire in its foreign policy effect for Poland with the shots at Serajevo. Then and now the cooperation between Germany and Russia, so fateful for Poland, was conclusively destroyed.

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 29, footnote 4.

Cooperation between Germany and Russia had always meant impotence and partition for Poland. With this is said what everyone here longs for in his secret heart: that a German-Russian alienation would remove from Poland the nightmare of border revision.

MOLTKE

No. 64

8038/E578187-89

*Ambassador Hassell to Foreign Minister Neurath*

ROME, March 8, 1933.

DEAR NEURATH: In the last weeks, so eventful in the sphere of domestic policy, I have not been keeping you informed in detail about the question of German-Italian cooperation in economic policy in the Southeast. As a result of the elections I suppose that stability has come not only in our domestic but also in our foreign policy, and I should therefore like to ask you to take cognizance of my report No. I 368 of February 23<sup>1</sup> and perhaps also to ask Köpke to let you see my letter to him of today's date<sup>2</sup> with its rather interesting annex. In my opinion the following is now important with respect to Italy: not to dream, and particularly not to speak, of an alliance or a common front, but quietly to go about establishing a practical meshing of interests in all areas where this is possible. It belongs to the same policy that in the question of a future understanding with France we proceed *pari passu* with Italy, i. e., we try *jointly* to make France ripe for this. I believe that report No. I 472 regarding Jouvenel's mission, sent today,<sup>3</sup> will interest you in this respect.

Here and elsewhere, too, there is recurrent talk of a visit by the Reich Chancellor and you yourself in Rome in the near future;<sup>4</sup> I have already written you of this in earlier letters<sup>5</sup> and would be very glad to hear your opinion of it. Such a visit seems to me very desirable, but the above-indicated consideration as to the inadvisability of advertising too obviously a German-Italian front must also be taken into account, i. e., the moment must be well chosen and moreover the visit must be discussed with Mussolini sufficiently in advance and carefully prepared.<sup>6</sup> In the Foreign Ministry here they spoke yesterday

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 35.

<sup>2</sup> Apparently a reference to document No. 51. Referring to the matter in a retrospective memorandum of 1935 (8038/E578139-63) Hassell noted that, except for the instructions of Feb. 7, 1933 (document No. 14), his reports to Berlin on German-Italian relations in the Southeast found no echo for the next 8 months, although he repeatedly referred to the theme in reports, telegrams, and private letters.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 51, footnote 17.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. document No. 79.

<sup>5</sup> Not found.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. document No. 83.

of the end of April or beginning of May as supposedly contemplated in Berlin. I should now like to request that the time from April 18 to 23 be eliminated, since I have already obligated myself in Rovigno and San Remo for these days and would not like to break the engagement the first time.

Yesterday afternoon I received telegram No. 31 on the disarmament question.<sup>7</sup> I immediately spoke with Aloisi, who wanted to report to Mussolini yesterday evening or this morning and then give me more particulars about the Italian position. Incidentally, he had already spoken to me about the matter 3 days ago, on the basis of a telegram from Cerruti, according to which you had said you could not come to Geneva now; he wanted to know what I knew about this. However, at that time I had to confess that I was not informed.

H[ASSELL]

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<sup>7</sup> I. e., telegram No. 31 of Mar. 6 to the Embassy in London (document No. 49). The copy to Rome is filmed on 7360/E536294-96.

## No. 65

6208/E469365-66

### *The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry*

#### Telegram

URGENT

PARIS, March 9, 1933.

No. 155 of March 9

Received March 10—12:05 a. m.

IV Po. 1658.

With reference to your telegram No. 92 of March 8.<sup>1</sup>

Today I informed M. Paul-Boncour, as instructed, about the events and called his attention to the dangers that could arise for the maintenance of orderly conditions in the Danzig area through Poland's procedure in contravention of treaties.

He took cognizance of this, but replied that if he might speak frankly he could not wonder at Poland's fears for her munitions depot. The degree of excitement of large circles in Germany could best be seen from the incidents at Hüningen bridge,<sup>2</sup> that had understandably occasioned great agitation in France.

I answered M. Paul-Boncour that it was a question of two entirely different things. The case I described to him had to do with an inci-

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 59, footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup> On Feb. 19 members of German paramilitary formations had advanced to the actual frontier at the middle of a bridge across the Rhine at Hüningen on the Franco-German border, and had sung the song, "Siegreich woll'n wir Frankreich schlagen." The French Ambassador had protested the incident with Neurath on Feb. 28 (RM memorandum 265 of Mar. 1: 5697/H016831).

dent on the territory of the Free City of Danzig, where the Polish Government had violated its treaty obligation and furthermore had ignored the authority of the League of Nations Commissioner. The prerequisite for arousing feeling and for markedly unsettling the Danzig population had been created by Poland's attitude. This fact was also the reason why the German Government considered it correct to direct the special attention of the French Government to the occurrence.

Paul-Boncour then still wanted to broach with me the question of the legal justification [*Aktivlegitimation*] of the German Government for the step I had undertaken, but then refrained from going more thoroughly into the subject because of my remark that this legal justification came simply from the effort of my Government together with the French Government to see that orderly conditions were maintained in the Danzig area.

KÖSTER

No. 66

6601/E495043

*The Deputy Director of Department IV to the Consulate  
General at Danzig*

Telegram

URGENT

No. 13

MARCH 10, 1933—2:10 p. m.  
e. o. IV Po. 1690.

Yesterday evening and this morning rumors have been circulating to the effect that Poland is on the point of marching into Danzig. According to trustworthy information these rumors are to be traced to a communication by the Police Presidium there to the 'T. U.<sup>1</sup> representative. Please persuade the Danzig authorities in a way that appears suitable that such alarming reports must not be launched by official agencies. It is not in the interest of either Danzig or the German Reich for such alarming reports to be circulated at the wrong time. In case a serious situation should arise there is danger that really well-founded reports would be depreciated and not be believed. It is desired that similar influence also be exerted on the T. U. representative.

HEY

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<sup>1</sup> Abbreviation for the news service Telegraphen-Union.

## No. 67

7360/E536332-33

*The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

No. 48 of March 10

LONDON, March 10, 1933—4:46 p. m.

Received March 10—7:40 p. m.

II F Abr. 973.

With reference to my telegram No. 46.<sup>1</sup>

Grandi told me that the day before yesterday, before the departure of the English Ministers for Geneva, that he had a detailed discussion with Simon which took a course similar to my conversation with Simon the previous day.<sup>2</sup>

The Ambassador pointed out to Simon that the Anglo-French discussion in Paris could be misinterpreted in Italy and could accordingly produce astonishment, as had the ominous *pacte de confiance*<sup>3</sup> last summer. Simon thereupon stressed, as he had to me, that the English visit in Paris resulted only from the geographical situation of the French capital and by no means from any English desire for special arrangements with France. Precisely in order to avoid false interpretations it would have been desirable for a member of the Italian Government to have met with the English Ministers in Geneva. If now the trip of the English Ministers to Geneva regrettably and falsely had the outer appearance of a meeting between English and French Ministers, the fault lay only with those governments that had not been able to make up their minds to send cabinet members to Geneva.

To this Grandi remarked that since it was of course out of the question for Mussolini to go to Geneva, there was really no other Cabinet member in Italy who had responsibility for matters relating to foreign policy. For the rest I gained the impression from Grandi's statements—as he always takes care to stress Anglo-Italian friendship and to cultivate it wherever possible—that this time, too, he carried on his conversation with Simon in the most cordial and friendly manner.

Grandi then referred me also to yesterday's editorial in the *Times*, excerpts of which I wired yesterday in telegram No. 46, to which Grandi, too, attributes a semi-official character, and the content of which accurately expresses the sense of the statements made by Simon to Grandi and me. When I asked the significance of the remark in the article in question about a possible English meeting with Mussolini

<sup>1</sup> This telegram of Mar. 9 had quoted extensively from an article in the *London Times*, which emphasized that no arrangement or pact of any kind was discussed by the British Ministers with the French (3154/668677-78).

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 56.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 13, footnote 2.



in Turin or Milan, Grandi stated very decisively that not a word on that subject had been spoken by him and Simon. Nor had he encountered such a suggestion anywhere else; the remark in question in the *Times* article was the first reference of this kind.

Hoesch

## No. 68

7360/E536356-59

### *The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 34 of March 10

ROME, March 10, 1933—6:10 p. m.

Received March 10—10:35 p. m.

II F Abr. 985.

Mussolini received me this morning, after the meeting of the [fascist] Grand Council had closed at half past twelve at night with the resolution known to you. I mentioned with thanks the congratulations brought to the Reich Chancellor by Cerruti,<sup>1</sup> whereby he expressed satisfaction at the German election results, particularly the destruction of the Main River line so much valued by France, and he said the Government would now be in a position to bring about order at home. Then we came to speak of the Disarmament Conference, particularly the trip of the English Ministers. In order to obtain a clear picture of Mussolini's attitude I made cautious reference to Suvich's statements reported day before yesterday by telegram (No. 32<sup>2</sup>), since it was hinted to me yesterday from another quarter in the Foreign Ministry that we should not be too intransigent. However, Mussolini expressed himself quite irreproachably to the effect that after France's conduct yesterday the Disarmament Conference was to be considered finished; the Foreign Minister did very well not to go to Geneva. France had even rejected individual arrangements respecting prohibitions of arms or reductions of arms.<sup>3</sup> It appears accordingly that yesterday's events in Geneva and the evening meet-

<sup>1</sup> Not found.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (7360/E536313-15). This telegram reported statements by Suvich to the effect that there was no reason to object to partial results being achieved with regard to reduction of certain types of arms, since this did not constitute an interim solution of the kind Germany had opposed. Europe was in such a state of irritation that it might be advisable "to achieve, through such partial results, a short breathing spell to let matters calm down".

<sup>3</sup> At the discussion on land war material in the General Commission on Mar. 9 the French delegate, Massigli, had insisted that quantitative and qualitative reductions of material could only be considered in connection "with a general organisation of European security" and "with the unification of the types of European armies on the basis of a short-term service army with limited effectives." For the proceedings of this meeting, see League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (Geneva, 1933): *Records of the Conference*, ser. B, *Minutes of the General Commission*, vol. II, pp. 343-352.

ing of the Grand Council eliminated, at any rate with Mussolini and at least for the moment, any possibly existing inclination to compromise. Mussolini stated further that the English evidently had as usual only vague intentions of arbitrating, but no positive program; Grandi, too, had expressed the same thought, though a report from him was still outstanding. I pointed to the danger of an Anglo-French agreement in Paris, whereupon he stated that one had to reckon in any case at the present time with an Anglo-French entente. The overwhelming tendency in England was in favor of an alignment with France and, if anything, the French armed forces were considered a possible protection for England. In the same sense, an Italo-French understanding was urgently desired. England, not France, had been the leading and politically active force in the Hirtenberg affair.<sup>4</sup> It was the English not the French Ambassador who had made representations to him; De Jouvenel had done so only in a very mild way to Suvich. To be sure, Italy had directed attacks on France instead of England for tactical reasons. But even the Anglo-French agreement could not change anything in the obviously negative outcome of the Disarmament Conference. If Germany, in consequence of this, took action in a cautious way nothing would happen; neither England nor France would make an occasion for a conflict out of it. To be sure, there was a strong tendency in French military circles to exploit the present situation, but it would hardly prevail. In view of this opinion, surprisingly firm to judge from other impressions, I asked once more whether Italy was resolved in the sense of the Grand Council's decision to reject any interim solution that did not do justice to the basic Italian position. He answered in the affirmative.

In the course of the conversation Mussolini came to speak in more detail about De Jouvenel's mission. The latter was reasonable and sober, but had nothing positive to offer. He, Mussolini, had told De Jouvenel that one should not start from the individual Franco-Italian differences; these could easily be solved at a general settlement, whereas their solution without a general settlement was without value. France and Italy had to agree on the broad lines of policy, and that in the sense of bringing about an understanding of the four Great European Powers on all important questions, to be supplemented by separate agreements between them. Here he had mentioned first disarmament and second the question of revision, and (group garbled) De Jouvenel the impossibility of the Corridor, the creation of which had been a grave mistake, a mistake which Poland compounded by establishing Gdynia—at which point I interjected: “and by the systematic de-Germanization of the Corridor area”.

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<sup>4</sup> See document No. 81.

Germany, he had told De Jouvenel, would in no case put up with the Corridor. Poland and France had to be aware of this. De Jouvenel had admitted that the establishment of the Corridor had been a mistake, but it was a very difficult thing to undo. At this point I went into the Westerplatte conflict,<sup>5</sup> described the gravity of the situation to Mussolini and asked him to support Danzig's undoubtedly legal position. He promised to do so. Just as in the Corridor question, he continued, he had described to De Jouvenel the necessity of revision in favor of Hungary. De Jouvenel had said that this question was more difficult, if possible, since three countries were involved. At any rate, Mussolini, as he said, left De Jouvenel in no doubt that recognition of the necessity for revision was the indispensable prerequisite both for peace and for the desired quadripartite understanding.

As regards the Little Entente, Mussolini said that nothing essentially new attracted notice. Questioned by the Italian Minister in Belgrade on the score of military measures at the borders, Yugoslavia had given satisfactory explanations. Rumania already seemed (group garbled) to regret her policy; Ghika<sup>6</sup> was constantly calling with assurances of friendship and good will. It seemed that they did not dare to bring the treaty before the Rumanian Parliament, but wanted to ratify it by royal decree. I asked about a possible renewal of the Rumanian-Italian Treaty,<sup>7</sup> whereupon Mussolini replied that this chapter was very difficult and a decision was dependent, among other things, particularly on the further development of Hungarian-Rumanian relations.

HASSELL

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 52 and footnote 2.

<sup>6</sup> Rumanian Ambassador in Italy.

<sup>7</sup> Presumably the Italo-Rumanian Commercial Treaty, signed Feb. 25, 1930.

## No. 69

9997/E698059-60

*The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 157

PARIS, March 10, 1933.

Received March 10—midnight.

II F 758.

The Agence Havas on March 9 had the following report from Strasbourg on the occupation of a barracks at Kehl by National Socialists:

"This afternoon a detachment of about 500 Nazis in brown shirts with arms and equipment occupied the barracks located on the bank of the Rhine, near the railway station and bridge at Kehl. The Hitlerite flag was raised. No incident resulted."

In today's *Journal* there is the following account of the incident, which differs particularly in regard to the question of the arming of the National Socialists:

"Recently all the former barracks located in the demilitarized zone 50 kilometers in depth extending along the frontiers of France and Belgium, have been occupied by Hitlerite troops. Today it was the one at Kehl, close by Strasbourg, which they have occupied since 3 o'clock this afternoon (the 169th Hitler unit from Lahr, Grand Duchy of Baden). The occupiers were 400 in number, of whom 1 in 10 was armed. Upon their arrival at the barracks, only a few meters from the bridge over the Rhine, they hoisted on the roof 4 huge banners bearing the swastika.

"According to reports which have reached us all the members of the Führer's party living in the district of Kehl were summoned and seem to have responded to individual mobilization calls. The Hitlerites intend to occupy immediately all the public buildings, notably the sub-prefecture and the post office. No incidents have been noticed up to now. Necessary protective measures for the railway station and the Rhine bridges have been taken, however, by the French authorities."

I would be grateful if I could receive instructions regarding the subject matter concerned.<sup>1</sup>

KÖSTER

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<sup>1</sup> Explanations were sent to the Embassy in Paris by the Foreign Ministry in telegram No. 101 of Mar. 11 (9997/E698062). On Mar. 14 French Ambassador François-Poncet called on Foreign Minister Neurath and protested that the events at Kehl were in violation of article 43 of the Versailles Treaty. The text of a German communiqué on the conversation, signed by Neurath and transmitted to the Press Department of the Foreign Ministry, is filmed on 9997/-E698070. No further memorandum of the conversation has been found.

## No. 70

5881/E430429-32

*The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 162 of March 11

PARIS, March 11, 1933.

Received March 11—11:00 p.m.

II Fr. 776.

For the State Secretary personally.

With reference to my telegram No. 159 of March 10.<sup>1</sup>

In yesterday's conversations the five Power conference seems to have been brought up for discussion by the English but to have been categorically rejected by the French.<sup>2</sup> Nor was it possible to obtain

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed (7360/E536827).

<sup>2</sup> This refers to the meeting which MacDonald and Simon had with Daladier and Paul-Boncour in Paris on Mar. 10. The record of the meeting is printed in *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. IV, document No. 290.

agreement of both Governments for cooperation on a broader basis. The English have therefore actually gone to Geneva without a program. Meanwhile the French have placed the Kehl incidents<sup>3</sup> in the foreground as proof of the danger threatening the peace and seem to have impressed the English with this.

Daladier and Paul-Boncour are supposedly irritated about the negative attitude of the English toward setting a common line in the disarmament question. The fact that Daladier turned away the reporters who rushed up to him after he left the conference hall with the words that they should leave him in peace and ask Paul-Boncour probably confirms the truth of the report about French disillusionment over the English attitude.

In general it can be said that the state of mind in political circles here is rather irritated, while at the same time there is indecision about the French position which is now to be taken. As a help toward the comprehension of the present state of mind I should like to describe briefly the historical development of the feeling in French political circles since the taking over of the government by Reich Chancellor Hitler. As already reported, this take-over occasioned great surprise. In spite of the tremendous growth of the National Socialist movement they felt sure that the Reich President would not entrust Herr Hitler with the formation of the new cabinet. The sharp internal measures before the elections, directed not only against the Communists, transformed surprise into strong concern, since they regarded this as a restriction of civil liberty, which is considered, particularly by the French, to be the most elementary right of the citizen.

Generally perceptible nervousness really set in, however, only when reports reached here from which the French concluded that the new Government intended to pursue a more active foreign policy. Especially the report on the Italian-Hungarian-German alliance. My categorical denial transmitted to the Government here in accordance with instructions doubtless had a pacifying effect.<sup>4</sup> The favorable impression was entirely erased, however, by the report a short time later "from authoritative German quarters in Geneva" concerning a prospective meeting of the Reich Chancellor with Mussolini, especially since this report was not denied by us in the same categorical way. Added to this were incidents along the German-French border, such as the demonstration at the Hünigen bridge,<sup>5</sup> and especially

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<sup>3</sup> See document No. 69.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 24 and footnote 3.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 65 and footnote 2.

the Kehl incident. This latter especially had occasioned quite unusual excitement and irritation.

The fever curve would doubtless not have risen so high if France were led by a government that had a firm grip on the reins. The present government, however, as reported earlier, is very weak, and in addition is greatly encumbered by the unfavorable economic situation, by the financial crisis, and by the not very favorable feeling in the country owing to the present parliamentary conditions in France; furthermore there are the failures in the international area, such as the unfriendly reaction in America to the refusal of debt payment<sup>6</sup> and the failure of the constructive French plan. The unusual accumulation of unfavorable factors can easily lead to precipitate decisions dangerous to the further tranquil development of Franco-German relations if incidents similar to that at Kehl are repeated on the German side. In this connection it should above all, in my opinion, be considered whether such incidents could not lead to compliance by the English with French desires in disarmament matters, since according to my information here England is very distrustful of all measures in Germany having to do with arming, with incorporation of SA and Stahlhelm units in police formations, etc.

Without wanting to dramatize matters I consider it my duty to point to the change in our disfavor clearly visible everywhere in recent weeks, even in circles advocating a reconciliation between France and Germany; in this connection, I cannot cover up the fact that the thought of a prompt deterrence by force of the allegedly threatening danger is gaining favor.

I therefore consider it urgently advisable, in the first place, to take all precautions in order to avoid without exception in the future occurrences in the border area such as the Kehl incident. Furthermore it would probably be very advisable to suppress or deny all reports that are spread—possibly by interested third parties—in order to prove that closer contact or political ties with Italy are imminent. The conviction that a German-Italian bloc is being formed against France could create a situation here that would subject German-French relations to a strain such as we have not experienced since the occupation of the Ruhr.

KÖSTER

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<sup>6</sup> The French Chamber of Deputies on Dec. 14, 1932, had voted against the proposal of the Herriot Government to pay \$19,000,000 on Dec. 15 to the United States on the French debt.

## No. 71

6208/E469429-31

*The German Representative With the League of Nations  
to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

Del. No. 242 of March 11

GENEVA, March 11, 1933.

Received March 12—12:10 a. m.

IV Po. 1731.

Status of the Westerplatte question.<sup>1</sup>

1. The decision whether Simon or Eden will be the rapporteur will not be made until tomorrow morning.

2. Rosting reported to Drummond this morning in detail, at which time he complained emphatically, especially about being passed over, and he obtained the promise that Drummond will support him completely. According to Rosting's statement, Drummond wants to get the report to state that (a) an *action directe* [and] (b) disrespect for the High Commissioner are determined to have occurred; (c) discussion of the question itself is refused as long as the new guard detachment is not withdrawn.

According to Rosting, the English position corresponds approximately with Drummond's standpoint; the French would hardly support Poland, since they have termed the Polish action a clumsy exacerbation of existing antagonisms. Rosting has said at various times that he would do everything to preserve the respect for the High Commissioner which was endangered by the Polish hostility toward his person. He could therefore in no circumstances permit any efforts at joining or treating on a quid pro quo basis the Westerplatte question and that of the harbor police;<sup>2</sup> anyway, there were no grounds for comparison.

Aloisi told me that he already had a general orientation from Rome and was prepared to support us as far as possible. Upon my indicating to him in his capacity as President of the Council that I would energetically oppose any Polish attempt to discuss German domestic political conditions<sup>3</sup> he took note of it, but without showing understanding.

Rosting will call on me tomorrow for a detailed discussion. There will also be a discussion with Carr<sup>4</sup> tomorrow.

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 59.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 57.

<sup>3</sup> In Geneva telegram No. 240 of Mar. 11, Keller had reported that the Poles would apparently attempt to justify their action at Westerplatte on the ground that the internal political changes in Germany were having repercussions endangering the security of Danzig. He submitted for clearance the statement which he proposed to make rejecting the Polish arguments (6208/E469422-23).

<sup>4</sup> E. H. Carr, a Foreign Office representative on the British delegation at Geneva.

To judge from observations thus far, the general situation does not seem to be unfavorable. However, the results of previous Polish activity will only be discernible tomorrow.

3. Ziehm's sharp statement to press representatives today, which has already doubtless been reproduced today in the evening papers there, was made without prior consultation with me and without my knowledge. I made it clear to Ziehm that considering the present not unfavorable prospects of the debate in the Council the mention of danger of war in this form is exceedingly objectionable and that it most probably would be interpreted as originating from an official German source.

KELLER

## No. 72

7360/E536386-87

### *The Ambassador in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

#### Telegram

No. 95 of March 11

WASHINGTON, March 11, 1933—7:15 p. m.

Received March 12—3:45 a. m.

II F Abr. 991.

With reference to your telegram No. 74.<sup>1</sup>

In view of the impending Norman Davis-Hull conversations<sup>2</sup> I called on the latter today and explained to him, and also to Under Secretary of State Phillips immediately thereafter, the German position in detail and with emphasis. In doing so, I explained in particular the reasons why we rejected an interim solution such as was discussed last fall. The Secretary of State, who had not yet had time to study the details of the question, was not unreceptive to my arguments and said that he hoped for a successful conclusion of the Disarmament Conference if only in the interest of the progress of the impending World Economic Conference, although the former had obviously entered a critical stage. He was without prejudice with respect to any of the participants in the Disarmament Conference and was therefore willing to explore every suggestion, no matter where it came from. He asked me for the best method of coming to a result. I replied, pointing to the British initiative,<sup>3</sup> that a meeting of leading members of governments in order to obtain positive and definitive results seemed entirely appropriate to me, but of course only on condition that some agreement had been reached in advance on the general outlines of a final solution, and that the trip to Geneva was made with

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (7360/E536311).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933*, vol. I, p. 40.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 46.



the intention of reaching a definitive understanding. A conference without results that would remain nothing more than a stage in the series of heretofore unproductive discussions of the disarmament question seemed to me to involve renewed dangers and to lead only to further disappointments, particularly in Germany.

As Hull told me in strict confidence, Norman Davis will arrive here at the beginning of next week for a thorough discussion of the disarmament question with the State Department. In case we can make particular suggestions here for the further handling of the Disarmament Conference, the State Department is willing at all times to receive them. As I have heard, it is intended to send Norman Davis to Geneva at the end of next week.<sup>4</sup>

Hull expressed considerable concern about the political situation in Europe and the possibility of its repercussions on the disarmament question. I tried to set his mind at rest and pointed out that it was precisely the failure to solve the disarmament question that was one of the main causes of European unrest. In reply to further questions by the Secretary of State I stressed that the disarmament policy in Germany was not a matter of party politics, as was evident in the fact that all German Cabinets had kept the same line in this question. For the rest, I supposed that owing to his personal discussions with the Reich Foreign Minister<sup>5</sup> Norman Davis was well informed about the German wishes in the disarmament question.

PRITTWITZ

<sup>4</sup> Davis departed on Mar. 22 but went to London and Paris first. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933*, vol. I, pp. 67-68.

<sup>5</sup> This presumably refers to conversations between Davis and Neurath in Geneva on Nov. 22, 1932. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1932*, vol. I, pp. 473-475.

## No. 73

6609/E496963-74

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

A 507

Moscow, March 11, 1933.

Received March 16.

IV Ru. 1087.

### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Talks on German-Russian relations.

- I. Presentation of the German position
- II. M. Litvinov's reply
- III. Summation
- IV. Continuation of the talks

<sup>1</sup> The original of this document is illegible in a number of places. In most of these places the readings could be determined from a carbon copy filmed as 6615/E498765-76.

With reference to instruction IV Ru. 644, of February 2 [22], 1933.<sup>2</sup>

The talks directed by the above-cited instruction for the purpose of clarifying the political relations between Germany and the Soviet Union were undertaken by me in lengthy conversations with M. Litvinov and M. Krestinsky; I also took the opportunity to form an impression of the prevailing climate of opinion through talks with other Soviet personages and in turn to explain our attitude toward the Soviet Union.

The conversations ran approximately as follows:

I pointed out that the German Government and the German public have always possessed full understanding for the pact policy [*Paktpolitik*] of the Soviet Union, even if the open rapprochement with France and Poland had caused a strain in our relations. But while we were convinced in the past that the Soviet Government would cultivate its relations with Germany with undiminished vigor despite the conclusion of these pacts, doubts had arisen in our minds during the past weeks. It looked as though the Soviet Union wanted to reorient its foreign policy in the direction of a closer rapprochement with France.

In examining the evolution of French-Soviet relations, our basic assumption, of course, was that the initiative for the Franco-Russian rapprochement had largely come from the French side; as a matter of fact, M. Herriot, in particular, was for a variety of reasons making himself the champion of this new friendship. To any close observer of Soviet policy it was nevertheless apparent that the initiative came in a large measure also from the Soviet side. Litvinov's actions at the Disarmament Conference at Geneva, his warm approval of the Herriot plan were to be sure not exclusively motivated by the tactical consideration that the indirect course through Herriot would enable him to attack Japan more effectively. This objective could have been attained by Litvinov as easily if he had based the definition of the aggressor not on the Herriot plan but on the earlier disarmament proposals which he had offered himself.

Similarly, the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact with France<sup>3</sup> was accompanied by a greater show of cordiality toward Paris than appeared to be called for by the occasion: The leading editorial of *Izvestia* on February 18, dealing with the coming into force of the Pact, explicitly included the Soviet-Polish relationship within the scope of its considerations. M. Litvinov himself, in the interview which he gave the French newspaper correspondent, Luciani, in Moscow after ratification of the Pact, had similarly without any external reason, characterized the relationship between Russia and

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<sup>2</sup> Document No. 33.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 29 and footnote 3.

Poland as fully in accord with the Franco-Soviet treaty. The Soviet Government had thus twice made a bow in the direction of France by discussing France's system of alliances in friendly terms. A rapprochement seemed to be developing also in the military-political field.

The German Government was aware that the Soviet Government had given anxious thought in recent years to the development of their mutual relations, and that it had manifested a sense of insecurity. However, M. Litvinov, or M. Khinchuk, had repeatedly received assurances from leading German personages that our side was not thinking of making a change in our policy toward the Soviet Union. We had moreover denied the false reports spread either from the French or some other quarter, especially the reports of supposed German-French negotiations for a treaty of alliance. Furthermore, we had declared that the nonratification [sic] of the protocol extending the Berlin Treaty<sup>4</sup> would be effected as soon as the parliamentary situation permitted.

I pointed to these circumstances with a view to invalidating from the outset any argument that the Soviet Union was justified in tracing any reorientation of its policy to a supposed modification in the line of Germany's policy. It was furthermore the intention of the present Cabinet to leave the political, economic-political, and military-political relations with the Soviet Union unchanged; Reich Chancellor Hitler had made an express statement to this effect to Minister von Neurath.<sup>5</sup> I would therefore be grateful to M. Litvinov if he would make clear his position on what I had said and would explain to me the attitude of Soviet policy toward Germany.

## II

In a lengthy discourse M. Litvinov replied:

In the first place, as far as his moves at the Disarmament Conference were concerned, it was usually overlooked that he rejected precisely what France had made her chief demands: standardization of the army, mutual assistance, and maintenance of the air force. The French attributed only minor significance to the Herriot plan, which was merely an extension of the Kellogg Pact. Again, he had supported that plan only on the dual condition that an objective impartial body be established and that there be a clarification of the concept of aggressor.<sup>6</sup> It could not be said, therefore, that he had identified himself with the French disarmament proposals to the fullest extent. It was Herriot, or rather the French press, by whom such a positive interpretation had been given to his statements. If the French cared

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 29 and footnote 9.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. document No. 10, footnote 5.

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 29, footnote 4.

to make propaganda for the Soviet Union, there was no reason for the Soviet Government to refuse it.

The anxieties of the Soviet Government in regard to the continuance of Germany's policy toward Russia, however, were very grave and well-founded. Herr von Papen has always been an outspoken foe of Bolshevism and the Soviet Government. At Lausanne he had in consequence made proposals to Herriot, which were at the expense of the Soviet Union; this was clearly evident from Herriot's latest article in the *Petit Provençal*. The Soviet Government had brought the German denials, which by the way had never been published in the press, to the attention of its French sources; but these sources had maintained their allegations.

I replied that I could no more than refer to Herr von Neurath's remark that such false assertions did not become any less false by frequent repetition.

The advent of the National Socialists in the Reich Cabinet, M. Litvinov continued, must be viewed by the Soviet Government with the greatest circumspection. The National Socialist party had from the beginning blazoned on its banner the fight on communism, without making any distinction between communism at home and the relations with the Soviet Union. It was further known that leading National Socialists, e. g., the Reich Chancellor's adviser on foreign affairs, Herr Rosenberg, had close relations with Ukrainian emigrés, who were agitating for the detachment of the Ukraine from the Soviet Union.

I interposed at this point that nothing whatever was known to me about such relations.

M. Litvinov then stated further that the apprehensions of the Soviet Government had proved well-founded. Whereas in the first weeks in office, the Reich Chancellor and the other National Socialist leaders had talked about fighting communism only in general terms, Hitler had in his radio address<sup>7</sup> dealt with the conditions in the Soviet Union itself and subjected them to vehement criticism. That meant that official personages had taken a position opposed to the Soviet Government itself. Furthermore, the police had taken very drastic action against the Soviet institutions in Berlin and against individual Soviet citizens and press representatives; they had arrested German citizens working at the Soviet Embassy and the trade mission. While the German police authorities had the formal right to proceed as they did, it was nevertheless an act of great unfriendliness toward the Soviet Union.

I vigorously countered M. Litvinov's statements: The Reich Chancellor in his radio address had expounded his views on the Bolshevik

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<sup>7</sup> The reference is to Hitler's speech in the Sportpalast in Berlin on Mar. 2. See document No. 55 and footnote 1.

ideology in general and had occasionally referred to the Soviet Union for specific examples, very much as M. Kalinin had shortly before referred to conditions in Germany. The drastic action of the German police authorities against Soviet citizens and German Communists in the employ of Soviet institutions had a ready explanation in the events of the past weeks and the uncovering of Communist acts of terrorism as well as other treasonable plans.

M. Litvinov brought his statements to the following conclusion: The Soviet Government had no desire to change its foreign policy and especially its relations to Germany. But it considered a German-French alliance as contrary to its interests and would seek to prevent it. But while the Soviet Government had sought to prevent a German-French alliance in the past by bringing influence to bear on the German side, it would now endeavor to attain the same objective through closer relations with France.

This astonishing remark of the People's Commissar roused in me the suspicion that prevention of a German-French alliance is to serve as a smokescreen for a corresponding rapprochement between the Soviet Union and France; I therefore asked M. Litvinov whether the Soviet Government was trying to prevent a German-French alliance by itself concluding an alliance with France.

M. Litvinov replied emphatically that the Soviet Government would never enter into any alliance with France and in any way confirm the Treaty of Versailles; it would merely seek to develop its relations with France.

I further asked M. Litvinov whether in that case prevention of a German-French alliance was a chief goal of Soviet policy.

M. Litvinov replied in the affirmative. He then repeated the urgent desire of the Soviet Government for ratification of the protocol extending the Berlin Treaty. In doing this he adopted M. Krestinsky's argument that in France the President had ratified the Treaty without consulting the Parliament, while in our case ratification was still impossible to obtain.

I referred M. Litvinov to the statement which the Foreign Minister had made to him at their last conversation,<sup>8</sup> namely, that the Treaty would be submitted to the Reichstag which was to reconvene soon.

So much for the content of my talk with M. Litvinov.<sup>9</sup>

### III

The remarks of People's Commissar Litvinov, which provide a confirmation of the attitude of the public here toward Germany, as repeatedly reported by me in the past weeks (cf. report No. A 334 of

<sup>8</sup> See document No. 43.

<sup>9</sup> A more extended account of his interview with Litvinov was recorded in a memorandum by Dirksen of Mar. 7 (1908/429509-18).

February 20,<sup>10</sup> and report No. A 438 of March 6, 1933<sup>11</sup>), can be summed up in the following three points:

1. The Soviet Government does not wish to reorient its policy or to permit a cooling of its relations with Germany.

2. The Soviet Government is concerned over the attitude and the development of German policy; it is afraid that this policy might turn away from the Soviet Government and possibly toward France.

3. The Soviet Government, prompted by these considerations, would like to develop its relations with France in a positive direction. As regards the tempo of this development, I may repeat the observations made in my report No. A 438 of March 6: "The development of Soviet-French relations will be correlated with that of German-Soviet relations; the greater the cooling toward Germany, the greater the disposition to cordiality toward France."

I may recall that the relationship Germany-France-Soviet Union, which equally underlies the above-cited remarks of the People's Commissar, has always played a major part in M. Litvinov's political conceptions. Even in the initial stages of the negotiations for the Franco-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact he was preoccupied with the idea of a coalition of the three Powers (cf. report No. A 1210 of July 31, 1931,<sup>12</sup> and my letter to State Secretary von Bülow of August 1, 1931<sup>13</sup>).

The attitude of the Soviet Union toward the German-French relationship, which is—as with other political questions as well—based on mistrust and an often poorly functioning intelligence service and the interpretation of obscure hints, cannot be changed in the near future by conversations and explanations, no matter how detailed; France's counter-pressure has become too strong for that; leading Soviet representatives, I am reliably informed, are constantly being reminded by the French side what an insult to the Soviet Union the radio address of the Reich Chancellor must really be.

A stabilization of German-Russian relations can be effected only by ratification of the protocol extending the Berlin Treaty; the further maintenance of these relations will have to be achieved by a steady attitude on our part and by making a clearcut distinction between our fight on communism at home and our relations with the Soviet Union.

#### IV

I shall put off for the present my proposed talk with Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Molotov.<sup>14</sup> For one thing, the complex of questions has been talked over so thoroughly in past conversations in Berlin and here that any talk with M. Molotov would

<sup>10</sup> Document No. 29.

<sup>11</sup> Not printed (6609/E496944-48).

<sup>12</sup> Not printed (K290/K101487-90).

<sup>13</sup> Not printed (4620/E199332-37).

<sup>14</sup> See document No. 41.

only be repetitious; on the other hand, it seems to me that a talk of such importance is not promising of success in the present unclarified atmosphere. It will moreover be necessary to make a decision on how the so-called list of German desiderata is to be handled in the future. If the employment of every resource to obtain satisfaction of our demands is deemed desirable on our side, it would be best if this question also is taken up with M. Molotov himself. I therefore believe that the right time for a talk with M. Molotov will be after these preliminary questions have been clarified and the protocol extending the Berlin Treaty is ratified.

V. DIRKSEN

### No. 74

6208/E469438-40

#### *The Minister in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

A 106

WARSAW, March 11, 1933.

Received March 13.

IV Po. 1781.

#### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Views of the representatives here of the chief powers on the Council regarding Poland's reinforcement of the garrison of the Westerplatte.

In the last few days I have had opportunity to speak with the representatives here of the chief powers on the Council about the question of the Westerplatte, and I have been at pains to correct the erroneous views held in some quarters, in view of the reports that may be transmitted.

This new power coup is considered by everyone to be "typical Beck," although this time—probably unlike the *Wicher* incident<sup>1</sup>—Marshal Pilsudski also seems to have given his consent beforehand. The purpose of the move is believed to be chiefly the regulation of the police question. The Polish contention that the Westerplatte is endangered has apparently not met with much credence thus far. Since the occurrences at Kehl,<sup>2</sup> however, the view has also been held here recently that the Poles were probably not altogether wrong if they anticipated certain surprises. When it is also frequently stated that Beck obviously intended by his action to give a reply to the German elections, it may be true that this idea also played a part. I am rather inclined to believe, however, that the desire to give the advocates of the revisionist idea in Europe a warning sign was in the forefront as an

<sup>1</sup> On June 14, 1932, the Polish destroyer *Wicher* had made a courtesy visit upon a British flotilla in the harbor of Danzig against the protests of the Danzig Senate.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 69.

intended secondary effect. Finally, Colonel Beck may also have been influenced by the memory of the setback suffered last summer on the occasion of the visit of the German warship<sup>3</sup> and this may have given rise to the wish to repair that damage.

Among the diplomats here I have scarcely found one who has not more or less sharply criticized or condemned the Polish mode of action. On the other hand, it has also been pointed out repeatedly in these conversations that it is hard to understand why the Danzig Senate considered it necessary just at this time to give notice of the termination of the arrangement regarding the harbor police.<sup>4</sup> These reproaches, which I have countered, using the reports of the Consulate General at Danzig, were expressed with particular sharpness by the English Ambassador, whose judgment appears to be particularly important in view of England's role as rapporteur on this matter but who for the most part unfortunately shows a strong bias in German-Polish or Danzig-Polish affairs.

As for the question whether the Polish action is assuming a provocative nature, with the aim of causing incidents or creating faits accomplis, the view which prevails without exception in diplomatic circles here is that there are no such intentions. The reason generally given for this view is that Poland has no interest in creating situations that are bound to bring up the question of Germany's eastern frontiers. Besides, even with the present status of Germany's armament, there is a feeling in authoritative circles here of being weaker, and consequently they do not want to bring about any serious conflicts. I believe that this view can in general be accepted. To be sure, it must also be said that anyone who plays with fire cannot, at least, escape the blame for a *dolus eventualis*.

MOLTKE

<sup>3</sup> Apparently a reference to the visit of the German cruiser *Schlesien* to Danzig on June 23, 1932, following the *Wicher* incident. See footnote 1.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 57.

## No. 75

8593/E603504-05

*Ambassador Prittwitz to Foreign Minister Neurath*

WASHINGTON, March 11, 1933.

DEAR HERR FOREIGN MINISTER: I should like to reply to your friendly telegram of March 7<sup>1</sup> that I of course understand thoroughly that

<sup>1</sup> Prittwitz in telegram No. 79 of Mar. 6 to the Foreign Minister had said:

"In view of the decision with regard to domestic policy in Germany, I consider it my duty to request you to place my position here at the disposal of the Reich President." (8593/E603500)

The Foreign Minister had replied in telegram No. 66 of Mar. 7:

"Thank you for your communication. I must reserve the selection of the time for the report to the Reich President." (8593/E603503)



you would like to report on the personnel question here to the Reich President at a moment which appears suitable to you. On the other hand you will understand that I am interested in a clarification in principle in the near future.

For more than 5 years I have represented the German cause in the United States to the best of my ability and conscience. True to my position as a career official I have never during this time placed special interests of any sort whatsoever in the foreground and have simply tried to serve my fatherland. However, during my activity here, which has frequently forced me to speak in public, too, I have never made a secret of my general political orientation, which is rooted in the soil of a free form of government for the state and the basic principles of republican Germany. My modest cooperation in the political reconstruction of recent years has thus always been performed in a spirit which according to the view of leading members of the present Reich Government is to be condemned. Both for reasons of personal respect and for those connected with objective tasks I can therefore no longer function here successfully.

A man who has been in the foreign service for 25 years does not write such lines with a light heart, particularly not when fate dictates that they must be addressed to a chief with whom, to be sure, I have had differences of opinion, but have never had a different conception of our objectives of foreign policy.<sup>2</sup> But our connections over the years will also make it understandable and explainable to you that I cannot act differently without betraying myself.

I hardly need to say that I am naturally willing to retain the technical direction of this post as long as that is in the interest of the work and may appear useful for winding up certain matters. I should be particularly grateful if in my separation from the service account could be taken of the school obligations of my daughter and the financial difficulties connected with the post here.

I wish to thank you sincerely for all personal good will and I wish with all my heart that you will succeed in protecting the foreign policy fortunes of our fatherland from harm.<sup>3</sup>

Yours, etc.

F. W. v. PRITZWITZ

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<sup>2</sup> A question mark has been written in the margin at this point.

<sup>3</sup> No reply has been found.

## No. 76

7360/E536343-47

*The Head of the German Delegation at Geneva to the  
Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

PRIORITY

IMMEDIATE

Del. No. 241 of March 11

GENEVA, March 12, 1933.

Received March 12—1:05 a. m.

II F Abr. 984.

This morning I sent word to MacDonald and Simon that I was at their disposal any time. I was thereupon invited for a discussion this evening in the Hotel Beau Rivage. There had been previous discussions of MacDonald and Simon with Henderson, Beneš, Bourquin, and Aloisi.<sup>1</sup> The last-mentioned asked me to see him before my visit with the English Ministers and told me concerning his conversation with the latter that they had asked him whether there was any possibility of an interim solution on the basis of the results achieved thus far and whether the close German-Italian collaboration recently was based on an agreement. He, Aloisi, had said on the question of an interim solution that it would hardly be possible to obtain Germany's consent thereto, since the question of equality of rights would then remain open. On the question of German-Italian collaboration he had stated that no agreement existed; the explanation of their joint action was that there were no essential differences of opinion on general policy between Germany and Italy, that because of the internal political development of Germany there were psychological sympathies between the two, and that on the question of disarmament we agreed in substance on all points.<sup>2</sup>

MacDonald and Simon, who received me in the presence of Eden and Cadogan, said they had come in order to help the Conference along as far as they could and asked me for my opinion on the reasons why it had come to a standstill. I replied that in my opinion the attitude of France was solely responsible for this. In all fields of actual disarmament, as for example recently in an especially glaring manner in the question of material, France had laid down stipulations and conditions which were completely unrealizable, so that her action was practically tantamount to sabotaging disarmament. We could only conclude from it that in reality she did not wish to disarm. If the English Ministers wished to break the Conference deadlock, they would therefore have to bring influence to bear on France in order

<sup>1</sup> For a record of these discussions, see *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. iv, documents Nos. 292-294.

<sup>2</sup> For this conversation between Aloisi and the British Ministers, cf. *ibid.*, document No. 293.

to dissuade her from her intransigent attitude of hostility to disarmament. MacDonald and Simon then tried to get a statement from me as to whether the French wishes for further security could not after all be met. Pointing out that I could not speak on instruction from my government but only for my own person, I replied that France was so extensively protected by treaty guarantees of security through the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Locarno and Kellogg Pacts, and recently also the readiness to conclude the treaty renouncing the use of force,<sup>3</sup> that it was incomprehensible how she could demand still more far-reaching guarantees. European mutual assistance, which had already proved impracticable on account of the negative attitude of numerous European countries, was by no means necessary for the defense of France. The idea of a standardization of army organization, that is, putting it concretely, transforming the Reichswehr into a conscript army, was also not justified from the standpoint of security. At Versailles a professional army had been forced upon us for the purpose of preventing offensive warfare. The French could therefore not now take the position—objectively not justified either—that the German Reichswehr constitutes an army intended for the offensive. Eden pointed out in reply that we ourselves had always said the defense system imposed on us was unsuitable and had striven to abolish it. To this I said I would like to state frankly that our domestic political situation, resulting from the postwar condition and the subversive attitude of numerous elements, does not permit the abolition of the Reichswehr, which is an essential factor of internal security. MacDonald and Simon seemed to have understanding for this. They then pointed out that as a result of the establishment of the new regime in Germany some countries had now become uneasy. They had no desire to interfere in German affairs, but did want to say that the conclusion of a disarmament convention was made more difficult by such uneasiness. For that reason it should also be considered whether one should not decide on an interim solution or adjournment of the Conference as a way out, since otherwise complete failure was to be feared. I replied that in view of the situation at the Conference, especially the attitude of France, we would have to consider an adjournment or an interim solution as a failure of the Conference. We did not want that; on the contrary, we were quite interested in a positive outcome. In my opinion, however, that could be achieved only through strong pressure on France to make her give up her opposition to disarmament. The change of regime in Germany was motivated purely by domestic politics and had no significance for foreign policy, especially the Disarmament Conference. The uneasiness abroad was completely unwar-

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<sup>3</sup> See document No. 38 and footnote 2.

ranted. The conversation was broken off, since we were all invited together this evening to a private home. MacDonald said before the conclusion of the conversation that he regretted that no member of the Reich Government was present in Geneva, but he hoped that in a few days someone, perhaps the Foreign Minister at least, would nevertheless come to Geneva, although he fully understood the difficulties involved in leaving Berlin at this time.

It should furthermore be mentioned that in the conversation the question of German rearmament was not touched on by the English, although I repeatedly called attention to the necessity of equality of security and equality of military forces.

The press was told concerning the conversation merely that the progress and present situation of the Conference had been discussed, together with the reasons for the impasse which the Conference had now reached. No further discussion had been arranged, which did not mean, however, that such a discussion might not take place.

After the above-mentioned dinner in the private home, which only Englishmen, Americans, Aloisi and I attended, MacDonald told me that he would now have further discussions with other representatives and then ask me to see him again. Aloisi said MacDonald had told him that my frank comments had appealed to him very much but had made it appear to him that the difficulty to be overcome was very great. Aloisi has been invited again for tomorrow afternoon. He was considering a proposal that the Conference discuss further technical details and secondary questions while the fundamental questions are in the meantime settled between the cabinets concerned.<sup>4</sup>

NADOLNY

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<sup>4</sup> For a British account of Nadolny's conversation with the British Ministers, see *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. iv, document No. 295.

## No. 77

6200/E466995

### *The Minister in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 10 of March 12

WARSAW, March 12, 1933—2:05 p. m.

Received March 12—3:40 p. m.

IV Po. 1735.

Regarding the reports about alleged troop movements in the Corridor, officially denied by Poland in the meantime, the Consulate at Toruń reports that no troop movements were observed in the last few days. Minor troop movements toward the north were only noticed at

the end of February, but they could be in connection with the reported winter maneuvers.<sup>1</sup>

MOLTKE

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<sup>1</sup> Telegram No. 12 of Mar. 13 from the Consul General at Danzig (6200/E467009) stated that reports about Polish troop assemblages in the Corridor were highly exaggerated, although there had been some reinforcement of the garrison of Gdynia.

No. 78

7360/E536371-74

*The Head of the German Delegation at Geneva to the  
Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

PRIORITY

Del. No. 244 of March 12

GENEVA, March 13, 1933.

Received March 13—1:30 a. m.

II F Abr. 988.

Aloisi called on me toward evening today in order to report on the discussion which he had had shortly before with MacDonald.<sup>1</sup> He said he had presented to MacDonald his idea, already reported by me yesterday,<sup>2</sup> that the crucial questions be taken out of the Conference until after Easter and submitted for decision directly to the four Cabinets mainly concerned (Germany, France, Italy, England); in the meantime the Conference could concern itself with secondary questions. In about 6 weeks, i. e., soon after Easter, a decision on the main questions would have to be reached between the Cabinets. Aloisi told me that MacDonald had asked him to get in touch with me about this suggestion of his. I asked Aloisi whether Mussolini was informed of his proposal, to which he replied that this was the case. When I asked him how he envisaged bringing about an agreement among the Cabinets, Aloisi told me, stressing the strictest confidential treatment, that Reich Chancellor Hitler would probably soon visit Mussolini and the two men would quickly reach an agreement. England would presumably support it and the three Powers could then jointly compel France to give up her intransigence. He advised me to transmit his proposal to Berlin or go there myself and discuss it. He himself intended for his part to get in touch with Rome. I said that the advantage of the proposal was not evident to me at first glance, since it would limit our freedom of action with respect to the Conference, but that I would consider it. He then arranged to meet me at noon tomorrow for the purpose of further discussion. After Aloisi's visit Gibson and

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. iv, document No. 297.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 76.

Wilson called on me<sup>3</sup> in order, as they said, to find out informally my view of the progress of the Conference, MacDonald's visit having suggested this to them. I said that in my opinion the Conference should be continued as energetically as possible. The two Americans stated that this was also their view; some progress could after all be achieved in time, as indicated by the agreement reached recently<sup>4</sup> in the committee on effectives on the concepts of military and premilitary training. They believed, however, that the procedure of discussing and voting on all problems in the General Commission was not suitable for bringing about an agreement. Instead, the controversial questions should first be settled in smaller committees, if necessary also from delegation to delegation. I agreed, but said that the main obstacle to the progress of the work was French sabotage and in that connection made effective use of France's latest proposal for the questionnaire on material.<sup>5</sup> The most important means of furthering the Conference was, therefore, to bring influence to bear on France in order to make her give up her opposition to a settlement of the disarmament question proper and armament reduction in general. This did not preclude further discussion of the French wishes; however, their fulfillment could not be made a prerequisite for disarmament and the French plan thereby a hindrance to the real disarmament work. The Americans showed understanding for this and wanted to think about it. They then asked me why we had not agreed to standardization of the armies. Since we had been dissatisfied with the system imposed on us at Versailles, the French proposal was after all the best means for us to bring about a change. I explained to the Americans that abolition of the Reichswehr was impossible on account of the present internal situation in Germany, which they seemed to understand. In reply to the question whether the French could not somehow be accommodated on this point, I said that in my personal opinion formal concessions as, e. g., with respect to shortening the length of service—which, however, did not alter the matter itself in any way—could perhaps be considered. Aloisi's proposal to take the main questions out of the Conference and refer them to the cabinets for discus-

<sup>3</sup> For Gibson's account of this conversation see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933*, vol. I, pp. 34-37.

<sup>4</sup> At meetings of the Special Committee on Effectives on Mar. 7 and 8, the report of its Technical Committee concerning the police forces which were to be taken into account in calculating effectives was discussed. The German and Hungarian delegations objected to the criteria established by the Technical Committee with respect to military and premilitary training of police forces, but eventually accepted the report, after having been assured that each concrete case would be examined on its merits. See League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (Geneva, 1932): *Conference Documents*, vol. II, pp. 583-584.

<sup>5</sup> For the text of this "Questionnaire on Land Material drawn up by the Drafting Committee" on Mar. 15, including the reservations of individual delegations, see *ibid.*, pp. 670-673 (Official No.: Conf. D./C.G. 51).

sion, which, by the way, he has already announced to the press, seems to me also upon further consideration to be far from advantageous to us. In the first place I doubt whether in the event of a German-Italian agreement, which would undoubtedly be easy to achieve, England would forthwith join a German-Italian front against France. Moreover, as the Conference progresses, the French must in my opinion lose more and more ground if we operate in the right way, since their disinclination to disarm will become increasingly clear. The possibility of constantly urging disarmament before the forum of the Conference therefore gives us an important trump which we ought not give up. And I can hardly envisage a settlement of the crucial disarmament questions between the four chief European Powers without joint oral negotiations. Finally, I doubt whether France would accept the proposal anyway. In order not to hinder the hitherto satisfactory cooperation with Aloisi, who probably conceived the proposal himself, I did not lay much stress on my objections to him. If they should be shared by you, I suggest bringing influence to bear on Mussolini through Hassell. In any case I should appreciate it if you would inform me of your view.<sup>6</sup>

NADOLNY

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<sup>6</sup>This telegram from Nadolny was sent to Rome in telegram No. 44 of Mar. 13 (7360/E536364-65) with a comment by Neurath to the effect that Aloisi's proposal could scarcely be harmonized with Mussolini's attitude as reported in document No. 68. Neurath further stated that the proposal was not acceptable in that form and instructed Hassell to find out from Mussolini what instructions he had sent to Aloisi. See document No. 87.

## No. 79

7360/E536379-80

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, March 13, 1933.

With reference to telegram No. 244<sup>1</sup> from Nadolny, the Foreign Minister has made the following decision on Aloisi's proposal:

Nothing has as yet been arranged with respect to the Chancellor's visit with Mussolini; in particular, it is still entirely uncertain whether the Chancellor has in mind a state visit or a meeting staged more as a party affair. Nor has any invitation been received as yet. Ambassador Cerruti is at present in Rome and will presumably bring back proposals.

Aloisi's idea that England could be induced to join a German-Italian front in the disarmament question and France thereby compelled to change her attitude is utopian.

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<sup>1</sup> Document No. 78.

On the question brought up by Herr Nadolny of how we stand on Aloisi's technical proposal, it should be stated that we do not consider the possibilities of the Conference as exhausted yet and would regard it as a mistake to break off or restrict the practical work of the Conference prematurely. We would have no objection, however, to a further, simultaneous discussion of the main questions of the Conference in parallel diplomatic negotiations.

I suggest that Geneva, Rome and possibly Paris and London, too, be informed to this effect.<sup>2</sup>

BÜLOW

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<sup>2</sup> An instruction to this effect was sent to Geneva in telegram No. 153 of Mar. 13 (7360/E536381-82).

## No. 80

7892/E571596

### *Memorandum by an Official of Department II*<sup>1</sup>

MARCH 13, 1933.

II SG 506.

### SAAR QUESTION

The Saar question has rested since the German-French negotiations were broken off in July 1930. At present no new negotiations can be considered, not only because there is no inclination for them on the French side, but in particular because other more urgent questions of foreign policy are in the foreground; combining these with the Saar question could easily endanger a solution of the latter that would be unobjectionable from the standpoint of national policy. Furthermore, France would interpret a German initiative for new negotiations to mean that Germany wanted to avoid the plebiscite, and would hold back if only for this reason, or at least increase her demands. Therefore we must calmly await either the plebiscite in January 1935 or the time when France for her part seizes the initiative under the pressure of the approaching plebiscite. The necessary measures have been taken for guarding against French propaganda, which is working more underground than in the open. If it is not to fizzle out prematurely, the actual plebiscite propaganda can of course be started only a short time before the plebiscite. It will be of great importance that the united German front in the Saar is not hampered by quarrels of party politics, and that the great national goal remains dominant. It would also be desirable to start soon the financial preparations for buying back the Saar mines.

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<sup>1</sup> According to the register this memorandum, which is unsigned, was by Senior Counselor Voigt. An unsigned marginal note reads: "Draft of survey of the present foreign policy situation that had been intended by the Foreign Minister for the Reich Cabinet. The plan has been abandoned."



## No. 81

6057/E446891-99

*Circular of the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>BERLIN, March 13, 1933.<sup>2</sup>zu II It. 190;<sup>3</sup>214;<sup>4</sup>216;<sup>5</sup>263.<sup>6</sup>

Drafting Officer : Senior Counselor v. Heeren.

Subject: The matter of the Hirtenberg arms shipments.

With reference to our instruction of February 9—II It. 138.<sup>7</sup>

The disclosures by the Austrian Social Democratic party concerning the importation of arms to Austria from Italy were exaggerated by the Little Entente and France with an eagerness which contrasted grotesquely with the military significance of the arms shipment (50,000 rifles, [200<sup>8</sup>] automatic rifles) and can only be explained by the necessity of exploiting this incident to the utmost in order to make it appear that the reorganization of the Little Entente which was then imminent was defensive in nature.

The course of the affair was rich in surprising turns and afforded many an interesting glimpse into the internal conditions in Austria and the working methods of the Cabinets concerned.

According to the very detailed reports received here the story is in summary as follows:

When the Austrian Social Democratic party decided to reveal in its press and in Parliament the arms shipments to Hirtenberg, the decisive reason for it was not so much its theoretical pacifism or its desire to cause difficulties for the Dollfuss Government as knowledge of the fact that some of the arms were destined for the Austrian Heimwehr, hence for their bitterest opponents in domestic politics.

<sup>1</sup> This circular was sent to the Embassies in France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, the Legations in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Poland, Bulgaria, Greece and Switzerland, and to the German delegation at Geneva; copies for information went to the Embassy in Italy and to the Legations in Austria and Hungary.

<sup>2</sup> Actually the instruction was sent to the individual Missions on various dates between Mar. 14–Mar. 21.

<sup>3</sup> II It. 190: Not printed (6057/E446875–76). This is a report by Rieth, dated Feb. 7, on conversations with Austrian officials regarding the Hirtenberg affair.

<sup>4</sup> II It. 214: See footnote 9.

<sup>5</sup> II It. 216: Not printed (6057/E446827). This is report A. V. No. 20 Feb. 20 from the Legation in Prague enclosing newspaper cuttings on a debate in the Czechoslovak Parliament on the Hirtenberg affair.

<sup>6</sup> II It. 263: Not printed (6057/E446850–54). This is Hassell's report No. I 392 of Feb. 25 which assessed the Hirtenberg affair as seen from Rome.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed (6057/E446780–84).

<sup>8</sup> The copy printed was damaged along the edges and part of this passage has become illegible; the figure in brackets has been supplied from another copy of this document (3086/616449–54).

In the face of the interventions of the Ministers of the Little Entente, which set in immediately and were supported by France and England, the Austrian Government at first assumed an attitude which was as irresolute as it was unclear. This went so far that the account of the matter given to the individual Ministers differed in essential points, a contradiction which could not but become evident immediately and cause a great deal of annoyance.

Dissatisfied with the explanations obtained in Vienna, which denied—probably due to confidence of getting Italian support—that there was any violation of the peace dictates [*Diktate*] and which characterized the matter as a purely private transaction in which other states were far more interested than Austria, the Little Entente now urged in Paris and London that the matter be taken up by the League of Nations Council for the purpose of starting proceedings of investigation against Austria.

Such a development could not appear desirable either in Paris or in London. In Paris they had no interest whatever in poisoning further the already strained relations with Italy through a dispute in the League of Nations Council, and in London there was a strong desire to avoid anything that might create new difficulty for the Disarmament Conference. Paris and London therefore promised the Little Entente to take steps in Rome and Budapest and particularly to take strong action in Vienna.

The steps, which in Rome took the form of a "friendly exchange of views" and in Budapest the form of an official *démarche*, did not, however, produce any further clarification of the matter. Rome denied any official participation in the shipment of the arms, and Budapest any knowledge of the matter whatever.

This failure in Rome and Budapest now made strong action in Vienna appear especially urgent to France and England, since otherwise there was no longer much prospect of disposing of the matter without having the Little Entente bring up the question in Geneva. At the suggestion of Beneš it was then decided to send the Austrian Government a note demanding an early reply, the detailed drafting of this note being undertaken by England. Irritated by the previous evasive replies of the Austrian Government and convinced that the Austrian Government would treat the text of the note confidentially in order not to undermine its own position, the Foreign Office probably believed that the best way for it to handle the matter was to give the note its unprecedentedly sharp form. Only this can account for the fact that the customary measure of courtesy generally observed in intercourse between sovereign states was disregarded to such an extent that the requested explanations were demanded of the Austrian Government *under oath*.

After this note was delivered by the English and French Ministers on February 11, the Dollfuss Government actually intended at first to treat the text of the note confidentially. It was decided, however, to inform the Italian Minister of the text with the reproachful observation that the Austrian Government had relied on Italy's being able to prevent such an action by the Great Powers against Austria in a matter which after all mainly concerned Italy.

Italy realized more quickly than Austria that the impression which publication of the note was bound to make was apt to turn a diplomatic defeat into a diplomatic success and without previous consulta-

tion with the Austrian Government had the note published by the *Giornale d'Italia*.<sup>9</sup>

The repercussion of this publication in the German, and above all in the Austrian, press now forced the Austrian Government to stiffen its attitude and announce its intention flatly to reject the Anglo-French demands in so far as they were of a humiliating nature. Public opinion in neutral countries, even in England itself, also repudiated the tone of the note. Consequently, Italy's statement issued in London to the effect that she was prepared to take back the arms was sufficient to make the English Foreign Minister declare the incident closed and not insist on any reply to the note by the Austrian Government. France had to join in this action by England whether she liked it or not.

It is understandable that the Little Entente was not very pleased with this outcome of the incident. Nevertheless, it finally dropped the idea of pursuing the matter further in the League of Nations Council. In that connection a very plain hint given to it by England through an article in the *Times* may have been decisive. This outcome could no longer be altered in any way even when the fact became known that Director General Seefehlner of the Austrian Federal Railways had tried, without the knowledge of the Austrian Government, to make preparations for transferring the arms stored in Hirtenberg to Hungary, even after the Austrian Government had promised to return these arms to Italy.

There is no doubt that the impression made by the whole affair has done serious injury to French prestige in Austria. The ill-will toward France was further increased by the fact that the French Minister did not hesitate to use the possibility of sabotaging the Lausanne loan, which is still open to the French Government, as a means of exerting pressure.

[In addition, however, all circles in Vienna that have not irrevocably thrown in their lot with Italy for better or worse will have come to realize what dangers are incurred in lending support to Italian endeavors which in no wise serve the interests of all the Germans and are only likely to jeopardize the preservation of Austrian neutrality in the event of an Italian-Yugoslav conflict.]<sup>10</sup>

By order:  
KÖPKE

<sup>9</sup> The note had been published in the *Giornale d'Italia* on Feb. 18. That day Rieth had sent a German translation of the French note as an enclosure to his report A 141 (II It. 214) which described the Austrian reaction to the French and English notes. (6057/E446816-26)

<sup>10</sup> The paragraph enclosed within brackets was deleted before the instruction was sent.

## No. 82

6208/E469462-63

*The Director of Department IV to the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

No. 248

MARCH 14, 1933—3:15 [a. m. ?]

Do not reproduce; for Ministerialdirektor Gaus only.

<sup>1</sup> Ministerialdirektor Meyer had gone to Geneva on Mar. 12, on the eve of the session of the League Council. His impending arrival was announced in Foreign Ministry telegram No. 128 of Mar. 10 to Geneva (6208/469371)

Send immediately with a carbon copy to the morning conference by 9:15 a. m.

The Westerplatte situation is as follows: The report provides:

1. Question by Beck concerning security of Westerplatte.
2. Answer by Ziehm in the affirmative.
3. Statement by Beck:
  - a. Withdrawal of troops by Tuesday evening;<sup>2</sup>
  - b. Recognition of legal bases for Westerplatte;
  - c. Recognition that the measure does not constitute a precedent.
4. Statement by Simon:
  - a. Assessment of Beck's statements;
  - b. Description of the legal course to be followed if necessary;
  - c. Formal reference to the inadmissibility of any arbitrary action;
  - d. Recognition of Rosting's attitude.
5. Statement by Ziehm. Satisfaction at settlement.
6. Proposed statement by Keller as follows: [see annex]. (Consent to 6 requested by 10:00 a. m.)<sup>3</sup>

MEYER

[Annex]

The very grave and important matter which the Council is dealing with today and which is regarded with the greatest concern and agitation by the whole world, and particularly the German people, urgently demanded a speedy and thorough solution. The question was clear and unequivocal. I have taken cognizance of the statements of the Polish representative to the effect that the guard at the Westerplatte will today be returned to its normal strength. I can now state that this important incident is herewith concluded along the lines of the proposals of the Free City of Danzig. I have thereby taken cognizance with particular interest of the statement of the Polish representative that the Polish measure in Danzig does not represent a precedent.

I welcome most warmly the statements of the rapporteur regarding the person of the High Commissioner of the League of Nations in Danzig, M. Rosting, and agree entirely with the high appreciation of his conduct; this appreciation contributes not only to consolidating the authority of the High Commissioner, but also to strengthening the guarantees of the Free City of Danzig.

<sup>2</sup> i. e., Mar. 16.

<sup>3</sup> No reply to this telegram has been found. The course of the discussion was reported in the delegation's telegram No. 253 of Mar. 14 (6208/E469464-67), and the official minutes are printed in League of Nations, *Official Journal*, April 1933 (pt. II), pp. 626-630. In the second part of the session of Mar. 14, the Polish petition concerning the Danzig harbor police (see document No. 57) was taken up and it was agreed that the previous arrangement should be reestablished for the time being. See also document No. 91.

## No. 83

3170/675726-29;  
3170/675734-35*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, March 14, 1933.

RM 337.

This morning the Italian Ambassador, who had just returned from Rome, came to see me. He told me that Mussolini had instructed him to convey to me his views on the present political situation:

It was not without anxiety that Mussolini viewed the growing deterioration in the political situation in Europe. According to the reports he had received, the ammunition and ordnance factories in France were working at high pressure. Tremendous quantities of ammunition particularly were being stored. The French General Staff was of the opinion that France would have to wage a preventive war as soon as possible, both against Italy and against Germany, as long as France and her allies still had military supremacy. The Italian armaments were not yet completed. Germany could not be prevented from rearming. France therefore had to utilize the present favorable moment in order to render both powers harmless for years to come. This view was naturally supported by the armaments industry and allied concerns. The same view prevailed in the military circles of Poland. On the other hand, among the French population there was a great desire for peace, which should not be overlooked in an appraisal of the situation. On the whole, the desire for peace prevailing in the whole of Europe was, in the opinion of Mussolini, at present still the stronger factor, so that he believed unless there were strong provocations on the one side or the other, warlike complications were hardly to be feared. In addition, it was realized that a war spelled financial ruin even for the victor and that Europe's economy would definitely be finished as a result. The Little Entente was an uncertain factor. But there was no inclination for war there either in view of its serious consequences. In the opinion of Mussolini, acute elements of danger existed only at the German-Polish border. But these could be eliminated by dealing with matters calmly and by rigid control over the irresponsible elements. Mussolini had authorized the Ambassador to state that he fully recognized and would support the claims of Germany to have East Prussia connected again with the Reich through elimination of the dividing corridor. He thought, however, that the moment had not yet arrived for pursuing an active policy of revision, since Germany was at present not even a match for the Polish Army.

The situation at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva was completely hopeless in Mussolini's opinion. There was no headway to be

made through the course adopted there. MacDonald had realized this, too, and had had the request made that he, for his part, seek ways and means to obviate the dangers that a complete collapse of the Disarmament Conference would undoubtedly entail. MacDonald also strongly urged him to meet with him in the next few days in order that they might confer jointly on the question of finding a way out. He had thus far avoided such a discussion, but he could no longer do so without creating the suspicion that he wished to sabotage the Disarmament Conference. In order to meet MacDonald's wish, Mussolini had drafted a plan which, in his opinion, would be calculated, if the four principal Powers, namely Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany, could agree on it, to bring about a considerable détente in Europe and ultimately also satisfy the desire existing in all quarters for a peaceful development. Mussolini had instructed him to submit this plan<sup>1</sup> to the Reich Chancellor and me with the request for as speedy as possible an expression as to whether the German Government was inclined to come in on this basis. He had wished to inform us of it first, since only if Germany were prepared to accept this agreement would he approach Great Britain and France. He observed that this draft was naturally susceptible of revision and he looked forward to receiving our wishes in this respect. He asked only for an immediate reply in order that he might then, in the event of a meeting with MacDonald, first discuss this plan with him and win him over to it. As he viewed the matter, some 3 weeks were required for the necessary diplomatic preparations. If they succeeded in winning France also, as he hoped to do with the aid of England, then the ceremony of signing this agreement, possibly in a meeting of the leading statesmen, could take place at Turin. A prior visit from the Reich Chancellor to him,<sup>2</sup> much as he would, of course, like to see it, would probably create great excitement in France as well as in England and could therefore at present probably be only a detriment. Once the agreement was concluded, all these disturbing elements would vanish and Mussolini would be very glad to welcome the Chancellor in Rome or elsewhere.

In regard to Austria Mussolini had said: Italian policy was aimed at strengthening Austria as much as possible and making her independent of any attempt on the part of France or the Little Entente to exert influence on her. Mussolini was of the opinion that this could

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<sup>1</sup> See enclosure. The negotiations which now followed upon the presentation of Mussolini's plan for a four power pact were handled by the Foreign Minister's office until the end of April 1933, and the documents were placed in this file and appear to be complete. From late April 1933, the matter was taken over by Referat II Italien and filed in a series of seven secret files. These were badly damaged by fire while being moved by the Germans during the war, and so the documentation for the last phase of the negotiations is not complete, although significant gaps have not been noted.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. documents Nos. 64 and 79.

best be done at present by keeping the Dollfuss Government at the helm with the aid of the Heimwehr. A fall of the Dollfuss Government would probably bring a Socialist or Clerical-Socialist [*schwarzrote*] government into power. The National Socialist party in Austria was not yet strong enough to be able to take over the government. He would therefore consider it expedient if it would for the present, together with the Heimwehr, support the present Government. As far as Anschluss was concerned, it was well known that Italy could never permit this and therefore had to oppose all efforts in this direction. He was of the opinion, moreover, that this question was not acute at present.

v. N[EURATH]

[Enclosure]

ROCCA DELLE CAMINATE, March 4, 1933/XI.

# POLITICAL PACT OF UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE FOUR WESTERN POWERS<sup>3</sup>

## I

The four Western Powers—Italy, France, Germany and Great Britain—undertake to carry out between themselves an effective policy of cooperation with a view to the maintenance of the peace, in the spirit of the Kellogg Pact and the “No-Force Pact”,<sup>4</sup> and they undertake to act in the sphere of European relations in such a way that this peace policy, if necessary, is adopted by the others.

## II

The four Powers reaffirm, in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the principle of a revision of the peace treaties given the existence of conditions which might lead to a conflict between the states. They declare, however, that this principle of revision can be applied only within the framework of the League of Nations and in [the spirit of] mutual understanding and solidarity of reciprocal interests.

## III

Italy, France and Great Britain declare that, in case the Disarmament Conference should lead to partial results only, the equality of

<sup>3</sup> The original of this enclosure is in Italian. A German translation, made by the Italians, is also in the files (3170/675736-37). The Italian original of the document printed here is identical with the text published in Francesco Salata, *Il Patto Mussolini* (Milan, 1933), pp. 175-176, except for the date line, which, however, is given in the narrative part of this publication, on page 23.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 36, footnote 2 and document No. 37.

rights conceded to Germany must have an effective application [*portata efectiva*], and Germany undertakes to implement this equality of rights by stages which shall be the result of successive agreements to be concluded among the four Powers through normal diplomatic channels.

The four Powers undertake to conclude similar agreements with regard to "equality" for Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria.

## IV

The four Powers undertake to adopt, in as much as this is possible, a common line of conduct in all political and nonpolitical, European and extra-European questions, as well as with regard to the sphere of colonies.

## V

This agreement of understanding and cooperation will, if necessary, be submitted for approval to the Parliaments; its duration shall be for 10 years and it shall tacitly be regarded as renewed for the same period of time, unless it is denounced by one of the parties 1 year before it expires.

## VI

The present pact shall be registered at the Secretariat of the League of Nations.

## No. 84

3170/675743-44

*Aide-Mémoire for the Italian Ambassador*<sup>1</sup>

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, March 15, 1933.

The Italian draft for a pact<sup>2</sup> is an inspired [*geniale*] conception which might afford a solution for the difficulties of the present political situation. The German Government would therefore, if need be, be quite ready to enter into negotiations about the draft. First it is anxious, however, to submit to the Royal Italian Government confidentially the following comments on some points of the draft.

Article II of the draft contains in the first sentence a clear-cut acceptance of the idea of the revision of the peace treaties. In the second sentence the League of Nations is charged with the realization of this

<sup>1</sup> Marginal notes: "Draft of the pact and our reply have been approved by the Chancellor. N[eurath], Mar. 15." "Original of the aide-mémoire was today handed to the Italian Ambassador by the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister gave the necessary explanations with respect to this. V[ölkners], Mar. 15."

<sup>2</sup> Enclosure to document No. 83.



idea. Since the provisions of the League of Nations Covenant which apply to this problem are, practically, entirely inadequate, it will be necessary to give the draft a more definite wording on this point, perhaps by saying that the contracting powers shall seek realization of the revision through mutual agreement and avail themselves in this connection of the cooperation of the organs of the League of Nations.

The German Government welcomes with especial satisfaction the idea expressed in the first sentence of article III, that in view of the unsatisfactory result to be expected of the Disarmament Conference, Germany's equality of status must be given immediately practical expression. As for the carrying out of this idea, the German Government does not wish to insist on making use at once of her equal status to an extent that in itself would seem justified on account of the insufficient disarmament of countries like France. The limitation of her rights, which Germany would be prepared to accept, would, however, have to be related to the period during which the first Disarmament Convention remains in force and which is to last about 5 years. If the present version of the second sentence of article III were retained, Germany would be entirely dependent on the arbitrary judgment of the French Government with regard to the measures to be taken by her in the field of rearmament, even after the signing of the political pact.

Subject to a satisfactory settlement of the points above indicated, the German Government could declare herself forthwith in agreement with the other provisions of the draft.

## No. 85

3015/598272

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

MARCH 16, [1933].

The Reich Chancellor stated yesterday in the Cabinet meeting that he had instructed the NSDAP Gau leadership in Danzig to maintain the greatest reserve and also not to press in the question of government reorganization.<sup>1</sup>

VON NEURATH

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<sup>1</sup> No record of such a statement has been found in the minutes of the Cabinet meeting of Mar. 15. Parts 1-4 of the minutes of that meeting are printed in *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. XXXI, document No. 2962-PS, pp. 402-409. Parts 5-7 have been filmed as 3598/792045-48.

## No. 86

5740/H030503-05

*The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

No. 52 of March 15

LONDON, March 15, 1933—4:12 p. m.

Received March 15—7:00 p. m.

III E 561.

Yesterday reports reached me according to which the English Government, in its dilemma as to whether it should permit Germany a free hand and thereby allow France to become still more frantic, perhaps to a dangerous degree, or go along with France to a certain extent but thereby permit excitement in Germany, is about to incline toward the latter alternative, in the conviction that it is most important of all that any independent and precipitate decisions by France should be avoided.

Therefore I called this morning on Baldwin, the deputy head of the Government, with whom the French Ambassador also had conversations in the last few days, and I discussed the situation with him.

I then stated that the recent developments in Germany were of a revolutionary character and had to be evaluated accordingly. The French complaints about enrollment of the storm troops and the Stahlhelm in the police and about the appearance of storm troops in the demilitarized zone were not valid. The police reinforcement was temporary and had become necessary for the purpose of maintaining the authority of the Government. The appearance of the storm troops in the Rhine zone had nothing to do with concentrations of armed forces, but only represented an action of mainly local groups of government supporters who were already at hand for the purpose of accelerating the establishment of the new order in city and country. It would be absurd to think of any sort of danger to the peace along the western border of Germany, since there was no acute cause of conflict with France. Moreover, the recent announcement of the Reich Government in the domestic sphere showed that the Government was resolved to maintain discipline.<sup>1</sup> German foreign policy had undergone no changes. What had been spoken and written in the last few days here concerning the possible danger of war was as incorrect as it was damaging and it lacked any basis in fact. As far as the German domestic situation was concerned, people abroad must realize that the seizure of power by the new Government, carried out in part in a revolutionary manner, was complete, and that the world now had to reckon with this new Germany.

<sup>1</sup> Apparently a reference to President Hindenburg's Emergency Decree of Feb. 28, 1933.

Baldwin replied that he did not want to leave me in doubt that England was concerned. His further statements can be summarized to the effect that English policy would let itself be guided in its course and its measures by the firm and unshakable conviction which he himself had often proclaimed in public statements, namely that a new war would inevitably bring with it the destruction of Europe, as the World War had already brought about disorganization of a sort that it had so far been impossible to master. For the rest, I received the impression that Baldwin had understanding for my statements. He said that England, too, was entirely willing to continue to work closely even with a Germany under the new order, in connection with which the idea of maintaining the peace must always play the leading role.

I should still like to add that the idea of a meeting of MacDonald with Mussolini is being aired more and more here and continues to be warmly advocated.<sup>2</sup> According to the reports brought me yesterday, the idea has supposedly already taken on rather firm outlines, and the main considerations are now said to be only those in regard to initiative and arrangements. Today's editorial in the *Times* warmly advocates a meeting, stating that Mussolini, because of his close connections with the new German regime, would be especially well able if necessary to exercise a moderating influence on Germany.

Hoesch

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<sup>2</sup> See document No. 101 and footnote 2.

## No. 87

3154/668755-57

### *The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

#### Telegram

URGENT

No. 37 of March 15

ROME, March 15, 1933—4:15 p. m.

Received March 15—7:00 p. m.

RM 353.

In accordance with telegraphic instruction No. 44 of March 13<sup>1</sup> and today's telephone conversation between Baron Neurath and Nadolny,<sup>2</sup> I conferred with Mussolini this morning on the present changed situation.

The latter interpreted Aloisi's proposal, especially (group garbled) idea, precisely in the sense of my telegram No. 36 of yesterday.<sup>3</sup> The greatly intensified pressure in the French General Staff recently

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 78, footnote 6.

<sup>2</sup> No record of this conversation has been found.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (7360/E536414-15).

(group garbled) preventive war, in conjunction with the systematic Jewish, Masonic and Bolshevist world propaganda against the new regime in Germany and Fascism, made necessary a tactic which on the one hand would secure the basic German-Italian demands and on the other hand prevent an acute conflict and in particular allow Germany time for undisturbed consolidation of the regime and gradual strengthening of the armed forces. In this way Germany would be in a position, as he had recently stated,<sup>4</sup> to take the consequences of failure of the Disarmament Conference without danger. For that purpose he had made the proposal presented to Neurath yesterday by Cerruti,<sup>5</sup> on the one hand to give France the allegedly needed security against force or deprive her of this pretext, and on the other hand to have the two basic principles of revision and equality of armament officially recognized and established by the four leading Powers. During the 5- or 10-year period of tranquility thereby assured Germany would gradually be able to arm on the basis of equality of rights, without France's having any pretext for taking action against it. At the same time the possibility of revision would be officially recognized for the first time and would also be kept open during the aforementioned period through the League of Nations. The system of the peace treaties was thereby practically finished, especially since Hungary, Austria and Bulgaria would naturally also be included. Except for the German Government, no one had any knowledge of this plan; England knew only that some such proposal by Italy was to be expected. He would inform Kánya,<sup>6</sup> who is to arrive here tomorrow. Moreover, MacDonald had inquired through Graham whether he and Simon might come here—a proposal which he had gladly agreed to at once. The two Englishmen would arrive here on Saturday and remain several days. For him, Mussolini, it was of the greatest importance to have Germany's prior concurrence in principle. Naturally he did not intend to present the proposal to the Englishmen as a German-Italian agreement, but he did want to be in a position to let them understand that the present regime in Germany would undoubtedly support the proposal. In reply to my remark that France's approval could hardly be expected, he said that he, too, was skeptical in this regard. France would then be definitively isolated, however, and Germany and Italy would have full freedom of action. I replied that particularly after what he had told me the last time about the solidarity of Anglo-French relations, England's approval seemed doubtful to me, because the English would be convinced that France would not go along. He replied that he was not so sure about that if the situation and especially the

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<sup>4</sup> See document No. 68.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 83.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. document No. 100.

German position were made sufficiently clear to the English in Rome. I then called attention to the danger of watering down the proposal; in its present form it did in fact contain very important advances, but if in the discussions with the English here only half of it should be left, the result might be very serious. Mussolini said that for him the proposal naturally was of value only if the two basic principles of possibility of revision and effective German equality of rights in the armament question were preserved.

Mussolini also said that adjournment of the Conference could no longer be considered, but in the event of acceptance of the (group garbled) by the four Powers the Disarmament Conference would naturally lose much of its importance. MacDonald would probably make a speech today in which he would try to set forth the practical results achieved thus far, but French opposition thereto was to be expected.

HASSELL

## No. 88

3170/675747-48

*The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy*

Telegram

No. 54

MARCH 15, 1933—9:15 p. m.  
e. o. RM 347.

For the Ambassador personally.

For your personal information I give below our tentative evaluation of the Italian pact proposal:<sup>1</sup>

1. In the pact the four Western Powers constitute themselves the leaders of European policy. This is given particularly clear expression in the second sentence of section I, since here the other European Powers are not granted equal rights as far as accession to the pact is concerned, but rather provision is made that the four Powers shall, if necessary, force the other powers to pursue a policy of peace. This is a sharp attack against the French system of alliances, especially against Poland and the recently consolidated Little Entente. It is more than doubtful whether France will accept this.

2. Section II of the draft deals with the question of revision. Essentially, it contains a clear-cut acceptance of revision of the peace treaties, but with respect to the application of this principle, it refers unfortunately to the League of Nations. Since the provisions of the League of Nations Covenant with regard to the revision of the treaty are, as we know, entirely inadequate, this part of section II would have to be amended.

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<sup>1</sup> See enclosure to document No. 83.

3. Section III clearly states in its first sentence that the recognition of Germany's equality of rights must take practical expression at once. On the other hand, the second sentence of this section would divide the realization of German equality into various stages, the extent of which would be determined by successive agreements between the four Western Powers. This is unacceptable to Germany in this form, if such a settlement is to be entered into at all. In place of the second sentence, it would at least have to be stated that Germany is committing herself only for the period of the first Disarmament Convention (5 years), to settle the extent to which her equality of rights will be exercised in practice by a special treaty between the four Powers. But this treaty would then have to be negotiated at once, so that it could be signed even before ratification of the political pact.

4. Section IV confirms the leading role in Europe assigned to the four Western Powers and at the same time touches in general form on the colonial question. No German objections to this would need to be raised.

5. Section V provides for a period of 10 years during which the pact will remain in force. This might be acceptable to Germany if the limitation on complete German equality mentioned under point 3 above could be limited to 5 years.

BÜLOW

## No. 89

6077/E450615-17

### *Memorandum by the Director of Department II*

BERLIN, March 15, 1933.

II Oe. 288.

The Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires visited me today to make the following statements on instructions of his Government: As is known, Foreign Minister de Kánya recently sent a private letter to Herr von Papen requesting him to use his influence in such a way that the German Government would support the Dollfuss Cabinet so far as possible. Otherwise a Black-Red<sup>1</sup> coalition would come into power in Vienna which would be injurious and dangerous in the same way to both German and Hungarian interests. Baron Wettstein said that he had been instructed by Minister President Gömbös to pursue this matter further and, repeating in this connection the previously mentioned statements in the letter of his Foreign Minister, to submit to the

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<sup>1</sup> Clerical-Socialist.

Reich Chancellor the same request for support of the Dollfuss Cabinet in Vienna. M. de Wettstein handed over the attached memorandum which was to be the basis of his démarche. In the situation it did not appear to be possible to dispose of the matter directly with the Reich Chancellor with the required speed. Therefore he had chosen the Foreign Ministry channel, and requested that the memorandum be sent on immediately to Reich Chancellor Hitler.<sup>2</sup>

Without taking any position on the request itself, I confined myself to assuring M. de Wettstein that it would be referred immediately to my superiors.<sup>3</sup>

KÖPKE

[Enclosure]

The Royal Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires has been instructed to transmit to the Reich Chancellor the following message from the Royal Hungarian Minister President:

M. de Gömbös considers the political situation in Austria as particularly dangerous, since the National Socialist party there is carrying on a common struggle with the Social Democrats against Federal Chancellor Dollfuss. The fall of the Rightist Government, however, would lead to the formation of a Black-Red coalition. The Royal Hungarian Minister President has reliable information that the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet has called on all Social Democratic parties to unite with the Communist party against governments with fascist or National Socialist tendencies.

In order to oppose as much as possible the outcome of the present internal political struggle in Austria mentioned above, which is highly undesirable to Hungary, the Royal Hungarian Minister President is addressing to the Reich Chancellor the personal request that he should instruct the leadership of the Austrian National Socialist party not to cooperate, at present, with the Social Democrats so as to bring about the overthrow of Federal Chancellor Dollfuss, but rather to support the latter and in this way to assure the existence of a Rightist Government in Austria also in the future and to prevent a political development in an opposite direction.

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<sup>2</sup> Marginal note: "The Foreign Minister has given a copy of the attached memorandum to the Reich Chancellor."

<sup>3</sup> Wettstein inquired about this matter again on Mar. 29 and, according to Köpke's memorandum of the conversation, was given the same reply "which the Reich Chancellor gave with respect to the similar inquiry by the Italian Ambassador" (3086/616462); cf. document No. 112.

## No. 90

8618/E604335-36

*The Head of the German Delegation at Geneva to the  
Foreign Ministry*

PRIORITY

No. 259 of March 15

GENEVA, German Del., March 16, 1933.

Received March 16—1:15 a. m.

II F Abr. 1041.

Simon informed me this evening about the English plan for a disarmament convention<sup>1</sup> which is to be distributed tomorrow afternoon after MacDonald's speech.<sup>2</sup> The convention is to run for 5 years and provide the following: Limitation of artillery calibers to 105 mm.; authorization of small tanks; in the matter of aviation, prohibition of bombardment from the air and no abolition of military aviation because, as Simon said, there was no way in the judgment of the English experts of preventing the use of civilian aircraft for military purposes. In the matter of effectives, reduction of strength in accordance with the Hoover plan.<sup>3</sup> As to security, apart from the No-Force Declaration, consultation as provided under the Kellogg Pact, under the supposition that the United States would concur. The principle of equality of rights is to be given effect by a first substantial reduction in armaments and gradual further equalization of armaments. He did not say that there would be no rearmament of Germany. He characterized the question of standardizing army organizations as being particularly difficult, referring to my recent remarks about the importance of the Reichswehr in domestic politics.<sup>4</sup> In this connection he began to talk very confidentially, making a point of stressing that he had no intention of interfering in German internal affairs. Feeling toward Germany in England as well as America had been increasingly favorable until recently. This had unfortunately changed in the past several weeks as a result of internal events in Germany. We must bear this in mind and do our utmost to achieve a contractual agreement. In reply I pointed out to him that Germany was now going through a revolution and that as the recent decrees of the Reich Chancellor and Minister Göring showed, everything was being done to

<sup>1</sup> For the text, see League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (Geneva, 1932): *Conference Documents*, vol. II, pp. 476-493 (Official No.: Conf. D. 157 (1)).

<sup>2</sup> For the text, see League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (Geneva, 1933): *Records of the Conference*, ser. B, *Minutes of the General Commission*, vol. II, pp. 352-357. It is also printed in *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. IV, appendix IV.

<sup>3</sup> This refers to President Hoover's proposal presented at the Disarmament Conference by the United States delegation on June 22, 1932, the main feature of which was the reduction of arms in the world by one-third. For the text, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1932*, vol. I, pp. 211-215.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 76.



return developments to an orderly course. For that matter, present conditions were for the most part the result of the fact that the German people had for 14 years been kept in the shackles of the Versailles Treaty, and I hoped that in the discussion of various points of the English proposal, this circumstance would be taken into account, especially on the English side. Simon thanked me for these frank remarks, which, he said, he fully appreciated.

In conclusion he told me with regard to the planned visit to Rome that they wanted to talk with Mussolini not only about the Disarmament Conference, but also about the political situation in general. He thought that this would lead to a further exchange of views among the four Cabinets in London, Rome, Berlin, and Paris.

NADOLNY

## No. 91

6208/E469498

*The Director of Department IV to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 262

GENEVA, German Delegation, March 16, 1933.

Received March 16—3:25 p. m.

IV Po. 1872.

With reference to my telegram No. 258 of March 15.<sup>1</sup>

This morning at 9 o'clock the Polish delegation informed Rosting that the troops would be withdrawn in the course of today. The statement was rejected as inadequate; a statement of the exact hour was demanded and a final time limit of 11:00 a. m. was set. In case there should not be a satisfactory statement by that time an extraordinary Council session would be convened. At 11:00 a. m. Beck made a formal statement to the High Commissioner that the evacuation of Westerplatte by Polish troops would be accomplished by 10 p. m. In consideration of this, the question of calling a night meeting of the Council (this afternoon presentation of the MacDonald disarmament project) has been left open for the time being.<sup>2</sup>

MEYER

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<sup>1</sup> This telegram reported efforts to secure a Polish statement setting a definite time for the departure from Westerplatte of the Polish troops in excess of the permitted number (6208/E469506-07).

<sup>2</sup> In Geneva delegation telegram No. 265 of Mar. 16 it was reported that the transport vessel for the Polish troops had departed from Westerplatte at 10:45 p. m. Mar. 16 without incident (6208/E469511).

## No. 92

2406/510647

*Memorandum by an Official of the Press Department*

SECRET

BERLIN, March 16, 1933.

RM 356.

According to a communication from the Comte de Brinon French Premier Daladier expressed the wish to him by telephone yesterday evening that they might now at the Disarmament Conference arrive for the time being at a materially limited *preliminary* agreement accepting points on which a basic agreement had been reached. In this case he would be willing to follow the suggestion made by Herr von Neurath in July,<sup>1</sup> to meet for direct and discreet discussions either with the Reich Foreign Minister or with Herr von Papen. Since in any case he intended to go to the Riviera or the Swiss lakes around Easter,<sup>2</sup> it would not be difficult to find an opportunity for such a discussion.

Comte de Brinon remarked that he had not informed M. François-Poncet of this conversation, and he asked that nothing be told the latter regarding his communication.

Submitted herewith to the Deputy Director.<sup>3</sup>

BRAUN V. STUMM

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<sup>1</sup> No record of this has been found in the Foreign Ministry files.

<sup>2</sup> i. e., Apr. 16.

<sup>3</sup> A marginal note by Völckers on the following day returning the memorandum reads: "The Foreign Minister asks that Comte de Brinon be told, in case he reverts to the matter, that the Foreign Minister is in principle ready for such conversations, but that at the moment he cannot anticipate developments and must set the date later on."

## No. 93

7360/E536439-42

*The Ambassador in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, March 16, 1933—10:44 p. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Received March 17—8:45 a. m.

No. 108 of March 16

II F Abr. 1070.

For the Foreign Minister.

This morning Mr. Bullitt called on me to discuss with me the situation in regard to the disarmament question. He stated that the President was very much concerned about the general situation in Europe, particularly owing to the evidently insuperable differences in opinion at the Disarmament Conference. He would ask me to call

on him in the near future to ask me more about our opinion of the situation. I used this opportunity, of course, to inform Mr. Bullitt, who spoke appreciatively about his stay in Berlin,<sup>1</sup> about our opinion of the situation and to warn him against believing all the sensational reports from Europe.

A few hours after this conversation I received a request to call on the President and I had a half hour's conversation with him. The President received me in a friendly way and expressed to me his fear that the Disarmament Conference might be broken off. This must be prevented in any circumstances in the interest of the suffering world. The pulse of the world economy was growing constantly weaker and it had to be put on the path to convalescence by a concentric attack by all the countries. For this it was important that: 1. the time of the World Economic Conference be advanced. It did not appear wise to him to wait till July; rather, he hoped that the conference could convene on May 1. The English did not seem to want to agree to this advance as yet, but the French seemed to be for it. I stated that I assumed the Reich Government could only welcome it if the work of the conference were taken up as soon as possible.

2. Thus, continued the President, the Disarmament Conference had to be kept alive under all circumstances. So far the Italian proposal seemed to him to be the best, i. e., to continue the Conference as in the past and arrange a meeting of the authoritative government members for April.

In the conversation the President also came to speak of the alleged endangering of the European political atmosphere, alluding to a number of press reports of recent date. In response I stressed energetically the peaceful character of German foreign policy and in particular pointed to the Reich Chancellor's statements on the Disarmament Conference. My statements calmed the President visibly. When I asked about the concrete proposals of the American Government on the solution of the disarmament question the President developed the ideas that are known to us from the Hoover proposals,<sup>2</sup> particularly stressing the necessity of doing away with offensive weapons. At the same time he stressed that he had full understanding for the German standpoint, although he likewise understood the French [desire] for security. However, one could not give France any further guarantee; no one was willing to do this. The elimination of offensive weapons was the best guarantee for all countries. I had an opportunity to go into the separate German demands and found full understanding with

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<sup>1</sup> Bullitt had been in Berlin on Jan. 28, where he had had interviews with Neurath, Bülow, and Ritter. Memoranda of these interviews are filmed on 3087/621739-44.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 90, footnote 3.

the President regarding both the army and the navy. The President seemed not to be acquainted in detail as yet with the British proposals just published in Geneva, although he also received the English and the French Ambassadors today.

My impression of the conversation in summary is that President Roosevelt endorses the disarmament policy of the Hoover administration with the difference that he, in accordance with his temperament, is desirous of pressing for haste in this area, too. At the close of the conversation the President expressed the wish that it be made possible for him to speak personally with one of the German leaders having a decisive voice in international questions, such as the German Foreign Minister. He asked me expressly to submit this idea to my Government, in the hope that it could be carried out. I pointed to the difficulties that exist for a Cabinet member in leaving Europe at the present time, but stressed that the Foreign Minister would certainly be very glad to have a talk with the President if this should be possible. I should like to suggest that the President's idea, which corresponds in a certain sense with the suggestions that Bullitt made in Berlin, be given thorough consideration.<sup>3</sup> It would be exceedingly useful to our interests, particularly considering the wave of feeling in our disfavor that is noticeable at present in American public opinion, if such a visit—which could after all be regarded as returning Stimson's visit<sup>4</sup>—could materialize.

PRITTWITZ

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<sup>3</sup> See documents Nos. 143 and 149.

<sup>4</sup> Apparently a reference to Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson's visit to Europe in April 1932, in the course of which he had had discussions with Chancellor Brüning and other German officials. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1932*, vol. I, pp. 104-114.

## No. 94

7360/E536464-66

### *The Head of the German Delegation at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

Del. No. 267 of March 17

GENEVA, March 17, 1933.

Received March 17—1:45 p. m.

II F Abr. 1091.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

Freiherr von Rheinbaben has put down in writing as follows the directive for the Disarmament Conference which the Chancellor gave

him on March 15 on the occasion of his report in the presence of the Foreign Minister and the Reichswehr Minister.<sup>1</sup>

1. No sabotage. Work for a positive conclusion is to be preferred to rearmament without a treaty. Further utilization of the League of Nations as a tribune for the German point of view.

2. No objection to elastic tactics respecting the French plan for standardization of European armies. Possibility of German agreement in principle, taking into consideration the following arguments:

a) Internal need in Germany for a special type of army.

b) Reduction of the period of service from 12 years to a substantially shorter period is in effect a concession in the direction of French desires.

c) The fact that North African troops serving long periods are stationed on French soil, and also the fact that it is intended to use substantial contingents of such troops on European soil in the event of French mobilization, operates in the direction of recognizing the maintenance of a special body of German troops serving long periods combined with a militia serving a short period.

3. With respect to the qualitative reduction of war material, the German right to complete equality of weapons with the heavily armed countries must be recognized in principle without qualification. Consistent with this right there is the possibility that Germany may declare that, for a short transitional period, she will voluntarily make a limited use of this right with respect to numbers, calibers, and weight.

4. As between armament for land and sea, a relative priority of financial expenditure is to be given to land armament in the immediate future.

5. Limitation and control of the German military budget is to be avoided.

6. Agreement to the thesis that the immediate German aim is the quick creation of a military power equal to any eventuality in the east and in the Baltic.

In agreement with Freiherr von Rheinbaben I would be grateful if this memorandum were studied by you and confirmed, possibly in agreement with the Reichswehr Minister. With respect to point 5 I call attention to the fact that we have always fought against limitations on expenditures and against controls over the execution of the limitation, but that we have declared our agreement with the publication of expenditure for armaments carried out according to standardized rules. This has also been accepted in principle by all other countries. I should like to believe that the directive of the Chancellor is compatible with maintenance of this position.

NADOLNY

<sup>1</sup> A memorandum of Mar. 15 by Kreutzwald of Department II recorded the main points of Hitler's directive as he had received them that day from Rheinbaben (7360/E536423). Kreutzwald's memorandum differs in detail from Rheinbaben's own version as recorded in this telegram. Cf. Werner Freiherr von Rheinbaben, *Viermal Deutschland: Aus dem Erleben eines Seemanns, Diplomaten, Politikers 1895-1954* (Berlin, 1954), pp. 272-276.

## No. 95

3170/675750-51

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, March 17, 1933.

The Italian Ambassador called on me this afternoon in order to discuss thoroughly once more the Italian proposal for a pact. The only new information which he brought was that Mussolini agreed and proposed for consideration that the pact be limited to 7 years, that is, until December 31, 1940. His other statements coincided with what he had already reported to the Reich Chancellor.<sup>1</sup>

The Ambassador proceeded from the assumption that article I of the pact was the important thing. In view of the failure of the League of Nations, the four Powers were to combine to shape European policy. Article II had to be read in the light of article I and in this sense our objections were not quite comprehensible, for Mussolini's idea was to carry out revision through an agreement of the four Powers and merely have it confirmed by the League of Nations. Since the principle of revision was inherent in the League of Nations Covenant, the reference to the League of Nations cannot be avoided in carrying out the revision. The Ambassador also took issue with our objections to article III, for it was not a case of our negotiating with France alone, but rather of the present and future disarmament conferences being replaced or possibly prepared by agreement of the four Powers. In these circumstances, if the pact became effective and restored confidence in Europe, we would not have to fear a French veto of our rearmament wishes. The Ambassador admitted the validity of my argument that we would have to apply the full pressure of our rearmament threat at the next disarmament conference, but did not believe that there would be a disarmament conference of the present type, but that there would only exist agreements of the four Powers, which would then impose suitable disarmament on the other powers.

I explained to the Ambassador the meaning and import of our aide-mémoire,<sup>2</sup> but I did not have the impression that he understood me on all points. On the question as to whether we would prefer a 5- or 7-year pact to a 10-year one, I told him that the period in itself seemed to us of secondary significance. The Ambassador remarked here that the Reich Chancellor had told him the same thing.

The Ambassador asked at the close of our conversation that I should try to formulate the amendments desired by us in such a manner that they could be incorporated in the Italian text. I promised to do so

<sup>1</sup> Record of Cerruti's conversation with Hitler has not been found. Cf. document No. 98.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 84.

with the reservation that I could submit any possible drafts to the Foreign Minister on Monday at the earliest. The Ambassador remarked, moreover, that he was still without instructions with regard to the reception given our aide-mémoire of March 15.

BÜLOW

## No. 96

6203/E468394-96

### *The Reich Minister of Finance to the Senate of Danzig*<sup>1</sup>

D 8400-2 I

BERLIN, March 17, 1933.

IV Po. 2015.

Subject: Assistance for Danzig.

In view of the financial situation of the Free City of Danzig I am willing to make available for Danzig for the fiscal year 1933, too, a subsidy of 4,200,000 reichsmarks out of Reich funds in quarterly payments. In order to avoid unnecessary movements of money I shall order that the sums be transferred as in the past via the Bank for German Industrial Bonds [*Bank für deutsche Industrie-Obligationen*] to the Bank of Danzig.

I have also applied to the German State Railways and the Reich Postal Minister with the request that they take over the full pension payments for the former railroad and postal officials for fiscal year 1933 as well. I reserve the right to make further communications on this subject.

I request in advance that there be utilized from the subsidy:

1. for the Technical College:	
a. for the Agricultural Institute in general	10, 000 RM
b. for the Agricultural Institute-industrial organization	5, 000
c. for the Geographical Institute	5, 000
d. for the Library	6, 000
e. for special teaching materials	20, 000
f. at the disposal of the Rector	10, 000
g. expansion of the library area—second installment	20, 000
	<hr/>
Total	76, 000 RM
2. for restoration of the Marienkirche or the Artushof	50, 000 RM
3. for the City Theater	40, 000 RM

<sup>1</sup> The letter was to be transmitted through the courier service of the Foreign Ministry. A copy was sent to the Foreign Ministry for information (received Mar. 22) and a further copy was furnished for the Consulate General at Danzig.

4. for the Rural Settlement Agency [Ländliche Siedlungswerk], to be given to the Agricultural Bank [Landwirtschaftliche Bank], formerly Provincial Bank [Landschaftliche Bank]	50,000 RM
5. for maintaining shipping to the Danzig resorts and to Hela, to be given to the Vistula Company [Weichsel A. G.]	40,000 RM
6. for erection of a winter school, to be given to the Agricultural Bank, formerly Provincial Bank	20,000 RM
7. for support of economically endangered concerns or promotion of other institutions in the German interest in agreement with the Consul General	110,000 RM
8. for other cultural purposes that are to be encouraged in agreement with the Consul General at Danzig	10,000 RM
Total	396,000 RM

I request that the excess funds which may accrue accordingly to the Free City of Danzig and any amounts which may be made available by the Reich Postal Minister and the German State Railways will not under any circumstances be used for further outlays, but only for amortizing debts.

The sums I have promised will be made available on the condition that the budget for fiscal year 1933 is legally established by March 31, 1933, at the latest.<sup>2</sup>

COUNT SCHWERIN VON KROSIGK

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<sup>2</sup> By a letter of Apr. 5 from the Minister of Finance to the Senate of Danzig it was indicated that a further nonrecurrent subsidy of 5 million RM was being supplied to Danzig to cover deficits caused by heavy expenditures, due to unemployment, in fiscal year 1932 (6203/E468402).

## No. 97

7360/E536467-69

*The Head of the German Delegation at Geneva to the  
Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

Del. No. 270 of March 18

GENEVA, March 18, 1933.

Received March 18—11:00 a. m.

II F Abr. 1092.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to my telegram No. 267.<sup>1</sup>

General Schönheinz expresses himself as follows concerning the Rheinbaben memorandum on the directives of the Reich Chancellor of March 15:<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Document No. 94.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 94 and footnote 1.



The directives contained in the memorandum contradict in the following points the instructions given to me by the Reichswehr Minister:

Regarding 2. Consent to the French plan of standardization of the defense systems has been rejected in *any* form—even merely in principle.

No position has been taken on the strict demand for extension to England, which was also made by the Reich Chancellor and the Foreign Minister.

The demand for a *separate* German long-term service element along with a short-service militia is not entirely understandable according to the plan for the reorganization of the army.

Regarding 3. Concessions in regard to numbers come into question according to the present directives only in cases in which the other states also limit their numbers. The present version can lead to misunderstandings.

Concessions in regard to caliber and weight are impossible according to the present instruction, since even in the cases in which no material of this kind is to be put into service for the time being, production processes should and must get under way.

Regarding 4. The utilization of funds is a domestic German affair, which will probably not be expressed in the budgets for internal reasons. No conclusions of any sort can be drawn from this for the Conference.

Regarding 5. According to the oral statements, the Reich Chancellor has sharply *rejected* any budgetary limitation. The expression "to be avoided" can be misunderstood.

Regarding 6. It is a question of a purely domestic German matter, the utilization of which within the framework of the Conference could lead to the most far-reaching consequences and could most seriously endanger the operations.

The question of the demilitarized zone is to be handled separately.

For the above-mentioned reasons I am compelled to point out that without the express permission of the [Reichswehr] Minister I cannot depart from my present instructions.

I shall therefore inform the Reich Minister of my position and request that he participate in the final confirmation of the directives. Schönheinz.

I should be grateful if you would take this statement into account when Rheinbaben's memorandum is studied and if the matter were clarified.<sup>3</sup>

NADOLNY

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<sup>3</sup> See document No. 106.

## No. 98

3170/675752-53

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

No. 41 of March 18

ROME, March 18, 1933—10:25 p. m.

Received March 19—2:30 a. m.

RM 365.

With reference to your telegram No. 54 of March 15.<sup>1</sup>

I spoke with Suvich today regarding the German comments on the pact proposal (telegram No. 53<sup>2</sup>). Suvich said that Cerruti had meanwhile given the Reich Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs further enlightenment on the two critical points,<sup>3</sup> which had at least tempered Germany's objections. The wording of section 2 did not actually refer directly to League of Nations procedure; rather, mutual agreement of the four Powers was the decisive factor. With regard to equality of rights, it could be stated that the pact leaves entirely open the content and duration of the necessary agreements which would be concluded.

Today Suvich delivered to the English and French Ambassadors the draft of the pact. It must remain a secret that Germany had received a draft of the pact in advance. There is no discrepancy between MacDonald's proposals<sup>4</sup> and the draft of the pact, in so far as the former referred only to disarmament while point 3 of the draft of the pact expressly states, "in case the Disarmament Conference closes with only partial results".

It was again clearly evident from Suvich's statements, as has also been confirmed to me indirectly, that Italian policy as expressed in the pact proposal, consists of two elements, first: anxiety over the extraordinary tension of the moment. The atmosphere of conflict had to be dispelled somehow, since naturally Italy, and Germany too, could not wish for a conflict. Even though it may not be a question of war, occupation or similar coercive measures were conceivable.

Second: On the other hand, the strong trump card that Italy was dealt by the victory of the Hitler movement is to be preserved intact; that is, the position of the German régime consequently is to be strengthened, in respect to foreign policy also. Likewise, therefore, in accordance with the basic principles of Italian foreign policy, the demands for German revision and for an effective equality of rights should be adhered to and piloted to safety through today's tension.

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 88.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (3170/675745-46).

<sup>3</sup> No records of these conversations have been found.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 90 and footnote 1.

Suvich handed me a German translation of the draft pact, which had been prepared in the Ministry, as well as the authentic Italian text. The German translation is faulty and in point 3 particularly the word *successivamente* is translated by *subsequently* [*nachträglich*]. I shall hand Suvich the correct translation today, however.

HASSELL

No. 99

6064/E448637-40

*Ministerialdirektor Köpke to Ambassador Hassell*

BERLIN, March 16, 1933.

Sent March 18.

[zu] II Balk. 390 Js.;<sup>1</sup>

II Balk. 470 Js.<sup>2</sup>

DEAR HASSELL: In an audience that Dufour recently had with King Alexander, the King spoke once more, and again in great detail as he did at your farewell audience,<sup>3</sup> of his past efforts to reach a political settlement with Italy. He stated that his negotiations with Mussolini in the spring of 1932, after having lasted almost a year, were about to be concluded when the Italian Government suddenly changed its attitude and the negotiations were broken off on the grounds that the situation in Yugoslavia no longer appeared sufficiently stable for the conclusion of such political agreements. The King places the blame for this stiffening of Italian policy on the influence of Balbo and Aloisi, which had become increasingly strong precisely at that time—an influence which the King considers very baneful. At the interview, the King described Balbo, as well as Aloisi, as being actually adventurer types. The King regretted that as a result of these developments he had been forced very much against his will last fall to renew the offensive and defensive alliance with France. Even today, however, he was not yet abandoning hope of reaching an agreement with Italy after all and thus obtaining a free hand for a pacification at home and for economic reconstruction.

These statements of the King obviously aim at convincing us that, despite all the complications that have meanwhile set in, he is today still prepared to resume the contact with Italy which was broken off in the spring of 1932. The King would evidently be glad if we could use our good offices in Rome to repair the broken ties between him and Mussolini.

<sup>1</sup> II Balk. 390 Js.: Not printed (6064/E448623-31). This is the report of the German Minister in Yugoslavia on his conversation of Feb. 12 with King Alexander, which is summed up briefly in this document.

<sup>2</sup> II Balk. 470 Js.: Not printed (6064/E448635). This is a report from Belgrade sent Feb. 25 stating that in the spring of 1932 King Alexander had been reluctant to renew his alliance with France.

<sup>3</sup> Hassell's report on this audience has not been found.

We certainly have the greatest interest in a relaxation of tension in Italian-Yugoslav relations. There is no doubt that the continuation of this tension contributes substantially to the disturbed internal situation of Yugoslavia and thereby seriously increases the possibilities of a disintegration of this country. A collapse of Yugoslavia, that is, a secession of Croatia and Slovenia, must, however, be especially undesirable for us precisely in the very near future, for it is to be expected that as a result of the rapid developments in our country, the situation in Austria will also be strongly influenced in the one direction or the other. Nothing could give legitimism in Austria a stronger impetus than the political rapprochement of an independent Croatia and Slovenia with Austria and Hungary.

Nevertheless it would, in our opinion, be unwise to take over the role of mediator offered us by the King. Such an initiative on our side would not be understood at all in Rome, especially at present, and in Paris also would arouse only mistrust without offering any prospect of success. For as long as Italy believes in an early collapse of Yugoslavia, she will interpret the readiness of the King to come to an understanding only as a proof of his weakness. This, however, would certainly not increase the willingness of Italy to come to an understanding, but, on the contrary, necessarily lead to a stiffening of her attitude.

I can, unfortunately, perceive in this state of affairs no possibility of our taking any useful initiative aimed at a relaxation of tension in Italian-Yugoslav relations, which is in itself desirable for us too. I would be greatly interested, however, if there should be an opportunity to have your opinion, too, on this matter.<sup>4</sup> At present you naturally have more important questions to deal with, but I wanted to avail myself of the courier—unfortunately so infrequent—just to write you something on this subject.

With best regards,

Yours, etc.

KÖPKE

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<sup>4</sup> See document No. 378.

## No. 100

3170/675762-63

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 42 of March 19

ROME (Quir.), March 19, 1933—5:50 p. m.

Received March 19—9:10 p. m.

I had a conversation today with Kánya, whom Mussolini has informed about the Italian pact plan, but only in a general way. Mussolini expected no difficulties from Germany, hoped for English con-

sent, but expected opposition from the French. Kánya, too, from a recent conversation with Paul-Boncour had received an impression of the strongest intransigence: no disarmament without security according to the French plan. Kánya confirmed my impression of Italy's fear of a conflict, which was stronger with Suvich than with Mussolini. Mussolini had expressed lively satisfaction over Hitler's victory and hoped for good cooperation. Suvich was nervous about the greater danger of Anschluss, which Kánya had tried to persuade him was not imminent at present, while Mussolini was much calmer in this respect, too, and had emphasized that the main thing was the crushing of Marxism in Austria, too, through the cooperation of the Christian Socials, the Heimwehr, and the National Socialists. Then the task would be a practical but unobtrusive and close cooperation of Italy, Germany, Austria, and Hungary in the Danube area. Kánya characterized the reform of the Little Entente<sup>1</sup> as a slight change in substance yet as a dangerous provocation. The Rumanian Minister had assured him that Rumania had merely consented in order to achieve a conformity of policy of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania with respect to the Soviets.

The Pope had expressed to Kánya the strong anxiety that Germany might now entertain plans of attacking France, but Kánya emphatically reassured him on this score.

HASSELL

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 26, footnote 3.

## No. 101

3170/675764

### *The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

#### Telegram

No. 43 of March 19      ROME (Quir.), March 19, 1933—5:50 p. m.  
                                  Received March 19—9:10 p. m.  
                                  RM 373.

With reference to my telegram No. 41 of March 18.<sup>1</sup>

Mussolini summoned me at 2 p. m. today immediately after the English Minister's lunch with the King<sup>2</sup> and, making use of the pretense that I had only received the proposal for a pact yesterday, asked me to make the statement to him that I had yesterday transmitted the proposal to my Government and had been informed that the German Government accepted it in its fundamental points. He expected it to have a good effect on the English who, without having discussed

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<sup>1</sup> Document No. 98.

<sup>2</sup> Prime Minister MacDonald and Foreign Secretary Simon had arrived in Rome on Mar. 18.

details, seemed in general to be favorably disposed. In view of the last sentence of the German aide-mémoire<sup>3</sup> I stated that I agreed, but with the modification that after a rapid scrutiny the German Government thought that it could accept it [the pact proposal] in its fundamental points.

HASSELL

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<sup>3</sup> Document No. 84.

## No. 102

3170/675766-67

### *The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

#### Telegram

No. 44 of March 19

ROME, March 20, 1933—4:45 a. m.

Received March 20—9:00 a. m.

RM 375.

With reference to my telegram No. 43.<sup>1</sup>

The Anglo-Italian conversations were concluded this afternoon.<sup>2</sup> There is only the press reception tomorrow, and then the English will leave for Paris for a stay of several hours to confer with the French Ministers. I can assume familiarity with the colorless communiqué issued today.<sup>3</sup>

This evening after dinner at the British Embassy I spoke separately with MacDonald, Simon, Graham, Mussolini, and Aloisi, as well as with Jouvenel. On the whole, my impression is that the English did not receive the idea unfavorably but that they expressed reservations particularly in view of the attitude of France. The English and Italians explain the colorless nature of the communiqué by saying that the impression had to be avoided that any agreement had already been reached without France. The misgivings of the English refer in the main to the meaning of the emphasis on the possibility of revision, particularly whether it is now to be expected that the revision question, e. g., with regard to the Corridor, will be taken up at once. Furthermore, the English wish to eliminate the colonial question, and Mussolini seemed to me to be inclined to do this if the rest of the proposal could thus be made acceptable to the English.

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<sup>1</sup> Document No. 101.

<sup>2</sup> For the record of these conversations see *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, edited by E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, Second Series, vol. v, 1933 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), document No. 44, enclosures 4 and 5.

<sup>3</sup> Published on Mar. 19, this communiqué stated that "after a full and exhaustive exchange of ideas on the general situation, the Ministers examined in their conversations a project for an understanding on the larger political questions put forward by the head of the Italian Government with the object of securing the collaboration of the four Western Powers in an effort to promote, in the spirit of the Kellogg Pact and the 'No-Force' Declaration, a long period of peace for Europe and the world." See the *Times* (London), Mar. 20, 1933, p. 12, col. 1.

On the whole, the Italians did not seem to me to be exactly enthusiastic about the outcome, but neither were they dissatisfied. Mussolini stressed to me that the mention of cooperation between the four Powers is important in the communiqué, as this principle was thereby established as fundamental. He had at once absolutely rejected an attempt of the English to consider including small powers; small powers could be brought in separately in individual cases if their interests were affected. Mussolini will send me a memorandum on the outcome of the discussions tomorrow.<sup>4</sup> Both Englishmen expressed criticism to me, MacDonald even in a sharp or I might say an offended tone, of recent public manifestations of German policy, mentioning Göring's speech in particular. The strong feeling in England in favor of equal rights for Germany had received a serious blow. MacDonald said he would certainly be attacked Thursday in the House of Commons because of too great weakness toward Germany. I described to these gentlemen the origin and nature of the German national movement and the present frame of mind, but did not meet with much understanding on the part of MacDonald. Subsequently I spoke with both Mussolini and Aloisi about this attitude and suggested that they explain the German situation to the English. Aloisi said he had already done this, while Mussolini expressed himself sharply about the English lack of understanding for continental conditions. In the opinion of the Italians Jouvenel is not without understanding for the proposal; he also expressed himself to me in a similar sense. He congratulated Mussolini in a very loud tone of voice on the wording of the communiqué, whereupon the latter made no reply.

HASSELL

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<sup>4</sup> Not found, but see document No. 105.

## No. 103

8618/E604370-74

*The Head of the German Delegation at Geneva to the  
Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

URGENT

No. 273 of March 20

GENEVA, German Delegation, March 20, 1933.

Received March 20—2:43 p. m.

IIF Abr. 1107.

With reference to my report No. 2795 of March 19.<sup>1</sup>

There follows the comprehensive position of the delegation on the English draft convention<sup>2</sup> in so far as it affects German interests.

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<sup>1</sup> Not found.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 90 and footnote 1.

The draft represents an attempt to find a middle way for the most important conflicts of interests that have come up during the Conference, particularly between Germany and France, while utilizing the results of the negotiations thus far and without English sacrifices. The leading idea thereby is evidently to insert a transitional period of 5 years between the present state of German armaments and a status of full equality. In addition there is probably a secondary intention of bringing the Disarmament Conference to a close if it is impossible to reach an agreement, with the question of responsibility clarified to the greatest possible extent. [Specifically<sup>3</sup>] the following should be stated:

### I. *Disarmament.*

In the land sector the draft provides for a not too considerable but nevertheless perceptible reduction in armaments. Its effectiveness, however, is impaired by the temporary retention of guns from 105 to 155 mm.; moreover, it should be better safeguarded and strengthened by provisions that would prevent circumvention such as immobilization of the available land guns over 155 mm. in fortresses. Furthermore, the numerical proportion with respect to personnel is unsatisfactory for equalization of armaments, particularly if one considers France's African troops and high figures for our eastern neighbor.

In the naval sector the draft does not provide for any reduction of armaments, but essentially a stabilization until the entry into force of the decisions of the naval conference contemplated for 1935. Still, the inclusion of Italy and France in the London Naval Convention<sup>4</sup> would represent some progress.

In the air sector the draft presents an appearance of being very radical. In reality, however, the proposed stipulations relative to aerial bombardment are inadequate and the heavy reduction in airplanes is easily circumvented; furthermore, the prospect of total abolition of military aviation after 5 years is minimal. For the duration of the convention the regimentation of civil aviation would be effectively carried out as an alleged armament [sic] measure.

### II. *Equality of rights.*

Since the Convention and the later disarmament conventions are meant to replace part V of the Versailles Treaty and with the exception of the provisions on martial law the period of validity for all of them is set at 5 years (for the naval portions until the end of 1936), the draft corresponds as far as form and duration of the obligation are concerned to our thesis of equality of rights; in this matter, we for our part presuppose the interpretation that, after expiration of the period of validity, if no new convention is achieved Germany like all the others will enter into a condition unregulated by treaty. However, the draft contains severe violations of equality of rights.

<sup>3</sup> The text reads here *Im Ernstfalle* which is obviously a typographical error; it should read *Im Einzelfalle*.

<sup>4</sup> This apparently refers to the London Naval Treaty of Apr. 22, 1930, under which limitations on cruisers, destroyers, and submarines were laid down only for the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, but not for France and Italy. For text, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1930*, vol. I, p. 107.



Above all, the air provisions are unacceptable to us. In conversation, however, the members of the English delegation have hinted that with the draft the last word has not yet been spoken on equality of rights as far as the English are concerned. There is, moreover, a severe violation of equality of rights in the case of submarines. It should also be objected that according to the draft we could not start building a new pocket battleship before the end of 1936. Practically accomplished, however, is at least qualitative equality of rights in regard to small cruisers and the smaller vessels (exempt-ships? <sup>5</sup>). It should be taken into account in the naval sector that at the end of 1936 we would have entire freedom of action in case no new convention is achieved at the Naval Conference in 1935,<sup>6</sup> and this considerably strengthens our position with respect to naval negotiations in 1935. In the case of land material equality of rights in regard to tanks has evidently been achieved; in the case of artillery, however, only to an insufficient degree, since other Powers may use up their mobile guns between 105 and 155 mm., i. e., in practice may retain them for a long time still, whereas these would be permitted us only up to 105 mm.

As regards amounts of land material permitted, there would be no limitation for us just as for the other states, which would be a considerable advance over Versailles. Equality of rights has been achieved in regard to the personnel of the land army, aside from the inadequate numerical proportion. Particularly significant is the fact that the draft, by establishing the figure 200,000, departs from the previous English thesis regarding the non-rearmament of Germany; the real significance of the figure, however, will be completely discernible only after a decision has been made on how the police and paramilitary formations [*Wehrverbände*] are to be calculated. Standardization of the army system in accordance with the French proposals, though basically compatible with equality of rights, involves the familiar and still open question of the Reichswehr.

### III. *Security.*

The proposed amplification of the Kellogg Pact would be acceptable to us, as is the statement renouncing the use of force that has already been decided upon. It should be acknowledged that the draft does not fulfill the more far-reaching French wishes for security which run counter to our interests. It is regrettable, however, that the possibility of regional mutual assistance pacts is expressly mentioned.

### IV. *Result.*

Without considerable improvement the draft is not acceptable to us, but on the whole is to be welcomed and represents a useful basis for discussion. Since the French, too, will at best probably declare the draft acceptable only with important changes in their favor, the prospects of success are for the time being problematical. However, the possibility is not excluded that reluctance to appear responsible for the failure of the Conference could after all impel the French to make concessions. In this situation we have naturally to press our demands for improvements in the draft so vigorously that the convention, if there should be one, will do justice to our interests. On the other hand

<sup>5</sup> In English in the original.

<sup>6</sup> In conformity with article 23 of the London Naval Treaty of 1930.

our stand must be so positive that if the plan should fail the fault would lie on the French side and we would not lose the association with the English proposal. This will best be achieved by our accepting in principle the main idea of the English in regard to a 5-year period of transition; but at the same time we would claim the immediate right to the possession of all weapons permitted the other treaty partners as a necessary element of the first stage, and would leave it to the negotiations on the details to determine the manner in which the transitional character of the convention is to be taken into account. Aside from this most important point probably questions of standardization of army types and ratios of personnel will be of decisive importance. Therefore our tactics here must for the time being consist in upholding our interests without prematurely revealing our stand regarding the actual situation during the first stage, though preserving our claim to equal national security, and in keeping all ways open in so far as possible until the decision.

If I receive no other instructions I shall guide my policy along these lines during the general discussion of the English draft beginning on Thursday. It is to be concluded on Monday, March 27, with a closing speech by Simon. The English visualize the further procedure in the form of private negotiations from delegation to delegation, since they wish to avoid dividing up the draft convention among technical committees.

NADOLNY

## No. 104

6025/H045453-54

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

URGENT

No. 43 of March 20

Moscow, March 20, 1933—9:53 p. m.

Received March 21—1:10 a. m.

IV Ru. 1208.

Today's *Izvestia* reprints Keit [*Keith*<sup>2</sup>] telegram with news of the ban on *Izvestia* and *Pravda*, as well as the withholding of entry cards from Soviet journalists for the opening of the Reichstag tomorrow, and in the comments which follow they resort to violent attacks on the Government.

I at once lodged vigorous protests with Krestinsky against such improper attacks and pointed out that the ban on the Soviet papers was justified on the grounds of their venomous reporting and by no means warranted such language.

<sup>1</sup> Some minor corrections of passages in this telegram garbled in transmission have been made on the basis of the Moscow Embassy copy (1908/429565-68).

<sup>2</sup> Mme. Lilly Keith was Berlin correspondent of *Izvestia*.

Krestinsky attributed this tone of the press to the fact that the public here was especially disturbed over the discrimination implied in the exclusion of the Soviet press from the opening session.

In reply to my remark that a divine service marked the opening of the session, which the Soviet representatives would not attend anyway, Krestinsky stated that the Soviet Embassy had been told, in reply to representations it had made in the Foreign Ministry, that the representatives of the Soviet press had been barred from the opening session because of the tone they had used in recent weeks. He then handed me excerpts from the German press containing sharp attacks on conditions here and on leading personages.

Krestinsky then explained at length that the Soviet public was very uneasy and uncertain over the future attitude of the Reich Government on Russian policy. An end had to be put as soon as possible to these conditions that disturbed our relations. The promised reception of Khinchuk by the Chancellor had not yet taken place despite Khinchuk's presence in Berlin until March 17. It was also not known whether the Protocol on extension of the Berlin Treaty<sup>3</sup> would now be ratified. Nor had there been any letup in the attacks on the Soviet Union made in the Chancellor's radio address.<sup>4</sup> In the interest of mutual relations, the friendly continuance of which was a matter of great consequence to the Soviet Government, he hoped that the Chancellor's statement to the Reichstag would bring with it a positive attitude of the Reich Government on German-Soviet relations.<sup>5</sup>

I replied that it had not yet been possible to bring about Khinchuk's reception by the Chancellor because of the extraordinary demands on the Chancellor's time and the departure of Khinchuk, which had occurred in the meantime. The Reichstag would shortly take up ratification of the Berlin Treaty.

DIRKSEN

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 29 and footnote 9.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 55 and footnote 1.

<sup>5</sup> Marginal note: "Taken care of by telegram e. o. IV Ru. 1250. v. T[ippelskirch], Mar. 24." The telegram referred to, sent as No. 63 of Mar. 23, reads:

The Chancellor stated in the Government declaration [to the Reichstag on Mar. 23]:

"Toward the Soviet Union the Reich Government intends to cultivate friendly relations, advantageous to both parties. It is precisely the Government of the national revolution that finds itself in a position to pursue such a positive policy toward Soviet Russia. The fight on communism in Germany is our internal affair, in which we shall never tolerate interference from the outside. Political relations with other powers with which we are linked by important interests in common are not affected thereby." (6025/H045456)

The text of Hitler's speech of Mar. 23 is printed in *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik*, vol. I, pp. 34-47.

## No. 105

3170/675795-97

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

URGENT

No. 48 of March 22

ROME, March 22, 1933—4:00 p. m.

Received March 22—9:05 p. m.

RM 387.

With reference to the instructions by telephone from the State Secretary this morning.

The text of the English draft of the pact<sup>1</sup> reads as follows:

“Agreement of understanding and cooperation between the four Western Powers.

I. The four Western Powers—France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy—undertake to carry out between themselves an effective policy of cooperation in order to ensure the maintenance of peace in the spirit of the Kellogg Pact and of the “no-resort to force” pact envisaged by the declaration signed by the above Powers on December 11, 1932. They undertake, furthermore, to follow such course of action as to induce, if necessary, third parties, so far as Europe is concerned, to adopt the same policy of peace.

II. The four Powers confirm that while the provisions of the Covenant of League of Nations embody a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations as a means of achievement [sic] international peace and security, they also contemplate the possibility of the revisions of the treaties of peace when conditions arise that might lead to a conflict between nations. In order to regulate and define the application of this principle of revision, the four Powers declare that such application should take place through agreements based on the mutual recognition of the interests of all concerned and within the framework of the League of Nations.

III. The four Powers reiterate their resolve to cooperate in the Disarmament Conference with the other States there represented in seeking to work out a convention which shall effect a substantial reduction and a limitation of armaments with provision for future revision with a view to further reduction. But, should the Disarmament Conference lead to only partial results, France, Great Britain, and Italy declare that [the] principle of equality of right must have a practical value, and Germany agrees that such a principle of equality of rights shall only be put into practice by degrees under agreements to which each of the four Powers must be a party.

<sup>1</sup> In telegram No. 46 of Mar. 20 (3170/675773-76) Hassell informed the Foreign Ministry that Suvich had that day handed him the text of the British draft. Hassell reported further that “Italy was willing to accept this text if the other three Powers agreed to it. On the same condition and providing the Cabinet agreed the English Ministers had also accepted it. Since the French would now probably give their opinion of it, it was entirely appropriate for the German Government to comment on it as well.” The remainder of Hassell’s telegram was a summary of the points where the British draft differed from the Italian draft. Cf. *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. v, document No. 44, enclosure C [2].

IV. The application of such principle of equality of rights to Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria shall be governed by the same conditions as those expressed in the case of Germany in the preceding article and only under agreements to which each of the four Powers must be a party.

V. The four Powers pledge themselves to cooperate in the work of finding solutions for the economic difficulties which now face their respective nations and the world as a whole.

VI. The present agreement of understanding and cooperation will, if necessary, be submitted for the approval of the Parliaments of the Contracting Powers within 3 months of the date of its signature. Its duration shall be for 10 years. If no notice is given before the end of the 9th year by any of the Parties of an intention to treat it as terminated at the end of such 10 years, it shall be regarded as renewed for another period of 10 years.

VII. The present agreement shall be registered, in accordance with the Covenant of League of Nations, at the secretariat of the League of Nations."

HASSELL

## No. 106

7360/E536473

*The Foreign Minister to the German Delegation at Geneva*

Telegram

IMMEDIATE

No. 173

BERLIN, March 22, 1933—8:45 p. m.

[zu] II F Abr. 1091;<sup>1</sup>

1092<sup>2</sup> II.

For Ambassador Nadolny personally.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 267, 270 of March 17<sup>1</sup> and 18.<sup>2</sup>

Herr von Rheinbaben's discussions here were not for the purpose of changing the instructions of the delegation. They were of an informational nature and were designed to clarify the basis for any decisions possibly to be taken here in Berlin in the further course of developments. I therefore request that you consider the memorandum written there by von Rheinbaben about his conversation here as non-existent and do not file it.<sup>3</sup>

NEURATH

<sup>1</sup> II F Abr. 1091: Document No. 94.

<sup>2</sup> II F Abr. 1092: Document No. 97.

<sup>3</sup> Nadolny gave a preliminary statement of the German position on the British draft convention at the session of the General Commission on Mar. 27. This was one of a series of sessions devoted to the general discussion of the draft convention between Mar. 24 and Mar. 27. The General Commission then adjourned until Apr. 25 when, it was agreed, consideration of the draft convention, article by article, was to begin. See League of Nations, Conference for Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (Geneva, 1933): *Records of the Conference*, ser. B, *Minutes of the General Commission*, vol. II, pp. 361-403.

## No. 107

6077/E450583-88

*Ministerialdirektor Köpke to Minister Rieth*

IMMEDIATE

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, March 22, 1933.

Sent March 23.

e. o. II Oe. 302.

DEAR RIETH: A few days ago Messrs. Riedl<sup>1</sup> and Tilgner called on us in order to discuss in detail the consequences for a Reich policy with an all-German aim which, in their opinion, will result from the development of the internal situation in the Reich and in Austria.

The immediate occasion for their visit, they said, was their anxiety lest in the rush of events the Reich might act altogether too impulsively in dealing with the Austrian question. In that connection they were obviously thinking of two possibilities: first, that the Reich policy would prematurely introduce the question of Anschluss and thereby—as in 1918—expose it to the danger of a disastrous setback, or else that the Reich policy might—because of the necessity of political alignment with Italy—be induced to renounce the all-German aim altogether and let Austria slip away into groupings alien to the Reich.

I believe that these gentlemen left here with the impression that their anxiety is unwarranted. They will also without doubt find confirmation for this when they will have an opportunity soon to discuss the entire complex of questions personally with the Reich Chancellor.<sup>2</sup>

For the rest, the discussion with the two gentlemen showed that their views coincide in all essential points with our evaluation of the situation.

I should like to give you a brief outline below of how matters look to us and what we believe the implications of the new situation are for our policy.

Two facts, it seems to me, are of decisive importance for the further treatment of the Austrian question.

1. It is not conceivable that in the future any Austrian Government opposed to the National Socialist movement would be prepared for Anschluss. Any such government will rather, in order to defend its

<sup>1</sup> Richard Riedl, official of the Austrian Commerce Ministry until 1918; Austrian Minister in Germany, 1920–1925.

<sup>2</sup> On Apr. 10, Köpke sent copies of this letter and of Rieth's reply dated Mar. 31 (6077/E450603-10) to Minister Schoen in Budapest and Ambassador Köster in Paris. In the cover note, Köpke mentioned that Riedl had been received by Hitler in the meantime, but that nothing more was known about the results of this visit. "We know, however, that the Reich Chancellor takes the position that a lasting stabilization of Austria's internal situation, which undoubtedly would be in the general interest, is only to be expected if the Austrian National Socialist movement is given the place to which it is entitled according to its strength, and that the calling of new elections is the appropriate method for this." (6077/E450613-14)

existence, be forced to seek support from those elements inside and outside Austria which are hostile to Anschluss.

2. The mere possibility that the National Socialist movement in Austria may rise to a position of decisive influence in the government must cause all opponents of Anschluss extreme uneasiness, if for no other reason because of the resulting threat of *Gleichschaltung* of Austrian policy with Reich policy, and persuade them of the necessity of prompt and effective countermeasures.

In the immediate future we shall therefore have to expect increased activity by the opponents of Anschluss, and we must not underestimate the danger that some day France and Italy as well will be convinced that the last remaining way to escape Anschluss will be for them to agree, whether they like it or not, on a Legitimist solution of the problem. For I believe that Paris and Rome will not entertain any illusions about the fact that the struggle against the National Socialist movement in Austria will after all require other means than the financial and economic baits and threats customary hitherto.

The question is now what conclusions we are to draw from this situation for our policy.

That we must absolutely avoid broaching the Anschluss question prematurely is self-evident—not only on account of the danger of a setback, which would immediately arise if at a time when we ourselves are still politically powerless we should give the Great Powers opposed to Anschluss a pretext for joint intervention by an open treaty violation and thereby facilitate the establishment of a united front against us. More decisive still perhaps is the fact that we must as far as possible avoid an open conflict with Italy in this question.\*

The reserve accordingly imposed on our policy need not be difficult for us, since a development in Austria favorable to us will in any case, if it occurs at all, be under National Socialist leadership, hence under a leadership which would have the new and special characteristic that it would, even without any change in the constitutional and legal relationship, offer a full guarantee of effective *Gleichschaltung* of the policy on both sides.

All this makes it a question of crucial importance whether National Socialism in Austria will succeed in attaining the decisive influence in a bourgeois government—to which it is already entitled today according to the numerical strength of its followers in the land—or before Austrian policy under the pressure of domestic opponents of Anschluss and under the protection of Italy and France brings about decisions which could no longer be undone easily.

Riedl estimates the number of National Socialist seats after new elections at not less than 50, but believes that a considerably larger

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\* This passage was amended in handwriting and read originally: “. . . that in no way can we afford in the immediate future an open conflict . . .”

number is also possible provided the atmosphere continues to develop favorably until the election. In any case, therefore, only a Black-Red coalition *against* National Socialism would be conceivable. It is hardly to be expected, however, that such a coalition could maintain itself in the long run. As long as it lasted, however, it would have to be aligned with France and the Little Entente; for an Italian-Hungarian or Legitimist orientation cannot very well come into consideration for a government under Social Democratic leadership.

I will still consider alignment with France and the Little Entente as the lesser evil, however, since it will not be easy in this way to create irreparable facts.

We already have been urged by Hungary,<sup>4</sup> to support the "Black-Yellow [*schwarz-gelbe*]"<sup>5</sup> Government of Dollfuss" since otherwise there would be the threat of a Black-Red coalition. I believe that this reasoning is certainly in harmony with Italian-Hungarian interests but definitely not with the interests of an all-German policy.

It is of course another question whether the Dollfuss Government cannot be supported in such a way as to make possible its transformation into a Black-Brown [*schwarz-braune*]"<sup>6</sup> coalition; thereby a barrier will be set up at once against the increased activity to be expected from Rome and Paris. In my opinion this is only a question of tactics. It should be answered in the affirmative if the National Socialist movement in Austria is already strong enough to assure itself in the long run of the decisive influence in such a coalition.

It does not need special emphasis that the all-German idea would only suffer harm if our official policy in the future does not scrupulously avoid any appearance of influencing Austrian domestic policy. We must also always remain in a position where we can with a good conscience counter the Italian wishes (which perhaps are to be expected soon should the situation in Austria become critical) with our principle of nonintervention in Austrian internal affairs which we have always observed. All influence from the Reich must therefore be limited exclusively to the channels opened up by the ideological and organizational bonds between the National Socialist movements in the Reich and in Austria.

I have thought it useful, first of all, at least to discuss briefly in this way all these groups of interrelated questions in order to indicate to you the general direction in which we are marching.

I should be very grateful to you if you would keep us informed as fully as possible about further developments in Austria, taking into account the points of view outlined by me above.

Yours, etc.

KÖPKE.

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<sup>4</sup> See document No. 89.

<sup>5</sup> Black and yellow had been the Hapsburg colors.

<sup>6</sup> Clerical-National Socialist.



## No. 108

3170/675789

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

SECRET

BERLIN, March 22, 1933.

The English Ambassador<sup>1</sup> called on me today in order to ask what we thought of the Mussolini pact. I explained to him in broad outline our attitude of approval, without going into details, but told him that on the occasion of the visit of the English to Rome changes had apparently been made which appeared to us to be for the worse. The definitive text had not yet been received here.

In the conversation it developed that the English translation of the original Italian proposal differs substantially in meaning from our translation or that of the French. For example, it is already stated in article II that treaties are to be revised (only) if it should develop that their continued existence endangers the peace.

The Ambassador then asked me about our attitude toward the MacDonald plan.<sup>2</sup> I praised the initiative, especially the fact that figures were proposed, so that the public could form a graphic picture of disarmament, and also that the destruction of war material was demanded—in other words, tangible steps toward actual disarmament. On individual points we would have many objections to raise and questions to ask, as was inevitable with a plan of that kind.

BÜLOW

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<sup>1</sup> Sir Horace Rumbold.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 90 and footnote 1.

## No. 109

8840/E615094-103

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

I 565

ROME, March 22, 1933.

[Received March 25].

[II It. 348].

## POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: The visit of MacDonald and Simon in Rome.

Actual course [of the visit]. Antecedents of the visit. English motives. The Italian draft pact and its foundation. Evaluation of the pact from both positive and negative sides. Impression on the English side. Attitude of the Italian press.

With reference to my telegraphic reports.

MacDonald and Sir John Simon arrived in Genoa from Geneva on March 18, and on the same day flew to Rome in a plane piloted by Air Minister Balbo in person. In Ostia they were met by Mussolini, who took his guests to the capital by way of the large highway connecting the airport with Rome, which is considered one of the sights of Rome. The evening of their arrival the Duce gave a banquet at the Palazzo Venezia, which on this occasion was used for the first time for purposes of official entertainment, and members of the Government and the leading officials, the personnel of the English Embassy and representatives of Roman society, a total of about 110 persons, were invited. The very short toasts to the sovereigns and nations kept within conventional bounds. On March 19 the King received the English Ministers in an audience and subsequently gave a lunch for them at the Quirinal, in spite of the court mourning for the Duke of Abruzzi, who died shortly before, which had been decreed on the same day but not yet made public. In the evening there was a dinner at the English Embassy, followed by a reception to which the American, French, and German Ambassadors had received invitations. I attended as well as my two colleagues, and, as already reported elsewhere,<sup>1</sup> had an opportunity thereby to speak at length with both MacDonald and Sir John Simon and with Mussolini and Aloisi. On March 20 the English guests left Rome; during their short visit there, favored by the most beautiful weather, they had also seen a number of the sights of the city (among other things the Revolution exhibition). At MacDonald's departure Mussolini went to the train himself. Sir John Simon again chose to go to Genoa by air, and from there left for home via Paris together with the Prime Minister.

Regarding the antecedents of the visit, which is doubtless to be evaluated as a political event of far-reaching importance, all sorts of conjectures have been expressed, and it was asserted, in particular, that the trip of the English Ministers to Rome is to be attributed to the initiative of Mussolini. This version could also be supported by the wording of the official Italian communiqué, in which there is mention of a cordial invitation from the Chief of the Government to the English Ministers to come to Rome before returning home. In contrast to this it should be pointed out that, as Mussolini told me expressly,<sup>2</sup> the plan originated with MacDonald, who had the English Ambassador ask here whether he [Mussolini] would be agreeable to a meeting with him and Sir John Simon. The Englishmen probably at first were thinking of some place

**Actual  
Course**

**Antecedents  
of the Visit**

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 102.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. document No. 83.

in northern Italy, whereupon Mussolini invited them to Rome. The fact of an English initiative, the accuracy of which, moreover, is indicated by the feelers of the English press regarding a visit by English Ministers to Italy, which began as early as the beginning of March and were carefully ignored here, seems to me to be not unimportant for the **Motives** evaluation of the trip. The motives for MacDonald's decision to take up personal contact with Mussolini are appraised here about as follows: In the foreground there was the concern about the fate of the Disarmament Conference, the total failure of which has been expected more and more in England of late, considering the intransigent attitude of France and the German resolve not to be put off with dilatory "interim solutions". With this there arose for the English Government the danger, always considered particularly serious, of German rearmament with its repercussions on the situation in Europe, particularly on France, concern that new blocs would be formed and that there would be a further deterioration in the general economic crisis, made even worse by a possible failure of the World Economic Conference. Moreover, evidently a very strong factor in MacDonald's decision was the hope of gaining influence over German National Socialism through the leader of Fascism, in order to keep the movement from going too far or acting precipitately in its foreign policy demands. Thus the general concern about a serious turn of events in Europe which would disturb the English need for peace was the main motive for the trip. MacDonald's words before his departure, much quoted here, probably reflect rather accurately the main purpose of the Rome trip: "I am going to Rome to ask Mussolini whether he does not also believe that Europe is in serious danger, and whether he does not believe that we should cooperate in order to ward off this danger."

Here this concern met with the greatest understanding. In recent months there has been spreading here a nervousness that is becoming more and more evident even among leading people, based on the assumption that there actually exists an immediate danger for peace in Europe; this is happening under the impression of the political events of the past year, the rearmament and other preparations for war on the part of France and her satellites in southeast Europe, the newly proclaimed Little Entente,<sup>3</sup> the incendiary campaign characterized by the names of Wickham Steed and Hirtenberg,<sup>4</sup> the threatening failure of the Disarmament Conference, and perhaps also through some concern that the national movement in Germany will commit foreign-policy excesses. Nothing is more indicative of this state of mind than the

**The Italian Draft  
Pact and Its  
Foundations**

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 26 and footnote 3.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 81.

latest resolution of the fascist Grand Council<sup>5</sup> which, besides containing a short, pessimistic opinion on the past accomplishments of the Disarmament Conference and the usual glorification of Fascism meant mainly for propaganda purposes at home and abroad, represents a really passionate Italian avowal of peace and cooperation in the political and moral progress of Europe and, particularly by pointing explicitly to the "latest events", clearly reflects earnest concern about the danger of imminent European complications. Mussolini was not content, however, with this "appeal to world conscience", but has been preparing for a considerable time a constructive plan for the pacification of Europe based on his pet idea proclaimed in Turin,<sup>6</sup> namely, an alliance of the four great Western Powers, which, as we know today, took definite shape at the beginning of the month. It is difficult to say today whether it was originally intended to bring the draft to the negotiating stage so soon, or whether it was at first planned to present it only after a thorough preparation with respect to the time. The latter is supported by the Italian initiative at Geneva, advocating a postponement of the Disarmament Conference by about 6 weeks with the aim of having the decisive questions dealt with at that time by the four Cabinets mainly concerned (Germany, France, Italy, England). This was evidently meant not only to bring the Conference past the dead point (a factor for which MacDonald had evidently also understanding from his point of view), but it was also hoped that this postponement would provide time to prepare the ground in the capitals concerned for the Italian pact plan which had been kept strictly secret up to that time. This preparation seemed all the more necessary here since the terrain for a diplomatic action by Italy did not seem particularly smooth as far as England and France are concerned, to judge from the impressions gained at the latest disarmament negotiations in Geneva. It is known from my telegram No. 34 of March 10<sup>7</sup> how angrily Mussolini spoke about French stubbornness (Massigli's speech of March 9) and about England's attitude, and how pessimistically he evaluated the general situation at that time. At that time he was entirely dominated by the impending visit of the English to Paris, and in an emotion of anxiety, he anticipated that it would result in a definitive, firm Anglo-French front. In deciding a few days thereafter to bring the pact plan up for discussion nevertheless, probably the determining factor was the first intimation of the visit of MacDonald and Simon which was made at this time and the impression that the French and English had after all not

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<sup>5</sup> Of Mar. 9, 1933. See *Il Patto Mussolini*, pp. 21-22.

<sup>6</sup> On Oct. 23, 1932. For the text of this speech, see *Scritti e discorsi di Benito Mussolini*, VIII, pp. 123-128.

<sup>7</sup> Document No. 68.

parted in perfect harmony in Paris. Evidently he promised himself a great deal from his own power of persuasion and the impression made on the English guests by the Roman "milieu", which was not shown in all its charm for nothing.

This as regards the antecedents of the visit and the pact plan.

As concerns the latter, I have already expressed myself briefly in my telegraphic reports about its advantages and disadvantages for us as well as its prospects. The main thing to be stressed

**Evaluation of  
the Pact**

**Advantages  
of the draft  
for Germany**

remains the fact that for the first time the concrete proposal of closer cooperation between the four Western Powers for the purpose of a European détente has been brought up for negotiation. It is self-evident that the

basic Italian idea in this is to reduce, in their own (and the German) interest, the influence of the smaller countries following in the wake of France and to undertake the practical attempt to place the shaping of the economic and political situation in Europe in the hands of a directorate in which a balance of forces is brought about at least to some extent and to an increasing degree. Going beyond this, the draft contains recognition of the necessity for revision of the peace treaties by a new approach. Even though the realization of the desire for revision is placed within the framework of the League of Nations, nevertheless—at least in the Italian opinion—the main accent is on mutual agreement among the four main Powers. MacDonald asked me what the passage concerning revision was really supposed to mean: whether on the basis of it one would, for example, demand at once that the notorious Czechoslovak appendix be cut off or other Magyar areas be returned to Hungary or the Corridor be eliminated. I replied that the passage gave no support of any kind for this assumption. It was actually only a paraphrase of article 19, i. e., it confirmed a legal situation already in existence, and this confirmation had become necessary only because in spite of article 19 certain quarters had rejected any revision in principle and from the outset. If this argumentation of mine is correct, it of course also proves how limited is the advantage to us to be gained by this passage. Nevertheless—always assuming that the text, which has already been slightly impaired by the English, is not watered down still more—the fact of this formal recognition of revision combined with the establishment of a mode of procedure should not be underestimated.

The same is true of the question of equality of rights. Here the rights of Germany to a practical application of equality of rights, recognized in the draft, must likewise be termed a mark of progress, even if the application of the principle should still encounter considerable difficulties in practice. Mussolini told me that if it were possible to put through this passage the position of the other side,

if it should try in the projected negotiations to oppose a moderate use by Germany of the equality of rights achieved, would be very weak. In this field, too, the "moral" victory attained by the Italian proposal, the fact that the practical implementation of Germany's equality of rights is transferred to the four Great Powers, should perhaps be valued more highly for the present than the practical results to be achieved at once. As a further step on the way to our full sovereignty, at any rate, this renewed advance should not be underrated. It must also be put down as an asset that Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria are to receive the same satisfaction according to the draft.

On the other hand one must be clear about the fact that these favorable aspects of the pact are also balanced by considerable dangers and disadvantages which compel us to continue examining the proposals very carefully and to observe the greatest caution in our further procedure. I have already indicated in a telegram<sup>8</sup> the danger of the draft, already very meager in content, being watered down in the course of the negotiations. Not only the sense of the whole undertaking could be lost thereby, but it might even result in certain circumstances in a deterioration of our position.

As for the political effects of the pact, in case it should materialize, we must not lose sight of the point of view that a Franco-Italian rapprochement brought about by the pact might also work out to our disadvantage. The policy of the French Ambassador here goes in this direction; he immediately accepted the basis of the proposal, with the aim of thus bringing Italy close to France, leaving it to the negotiations to remove from the draft (all but completely) that which is poison for France. Naturally this tendency is opposed by strong currents of opinion in France which reject the pact unconditionally. However, in this case, France is threatened with an isolation which she cannot easily accept, whereas with the other method she can hope to separate us from Italy and assign to us the role of scapegoat and enemy of peace. Even yesterday the local press published a Hoover [sic]<sup>9</sup> communiqué of March 20 with a Paris dateline, evidently arranged by M. de Jouvenel, in which the basically friendly attitude of the French Government toward the Italian pact plan is announced and at the same time reference is made to the necessity for changes. Although Mussolini has assured me that he would by no means sacrifice the essence of the draft at French or English urging in order to save his plan, on the other hand it should not be forgotten that Italian foreign policy has exposed itself very much by the proposal and would accept a negative result only very unwillingly. It is all the more neces-

<sup>8</sup>Telegram No. 49 of Mar. 22 (9931/E694868).

<sup>9</sup>Agence Havas?

sary in my opinion that we continue without advertising to try in the "inner relationship" to strengthen the German-Italian community of interest in all possible fields and, for example, also to bring about economic cooperation which would obligate the Italian policy to seek an alignment with Germany for reasons of its own interest. Not the least of my thoughts is economic cooperation in the Danube area, which Mussolini has repeatedly termed particularly desirable even recently (just a few days ago to the Hungarian Foreign Minister Kánya).<sup>10</sup> Lack of action on our part with respect to this favorite idea of the Duce's could easily result in Italian policy turning away from this association based on interests and toward other alignments which could become quite uncomfortable for us some day far beyond the sphere of the Danube area. The strong antagonism in the Anschluss question which still exists today does not need to prevent this cooperation in the Danube area; on the contrary, I could imagine that a cooperation which is based on trust and is profitable could at some later date result in dissipating the Italian misgivings in the Anschluss question, with respect to which, moreover, the *natural* balance is weighted in *our* favor.

Certain objections to the pact of the Great Powers might perhaps also be raised by the smaller countries, whose support can on occasion be valuable to us, particularly within the League of Nations. This disadvantage would be balanced, however, by the fact that the French vassals in eastern and southeastern Europe will to a large degree be left out [*ausgeschaltet*] but Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria will be strengthened as factors. The fact that certain misgivings are already coming to life among the smaller countries under the impression of the pact proposal was proven to me yesterday by a somewhat irritated speech by the Turkish Ambassador here at a reception given for the newly appointed Ambassadors by the foreign press representatives.

Finally, in studying the draft—and I find the term "Western Powers" in the title in this sense a blemish—we must also not forget the repercussions on our relations with Russia, and we should remember the apprehensions aroused by the Locarno Pact which was interpreted as a German withdrawal from Rapallo and a one-sided orientation of German policy toward the West. These apprehensions, which will certainly appear in the present situation in an even more intensified form than before, should give us reason to take particular care in our relations with Russia at present and to keep the Government in Moscow informed about the progress of the negotiations at least in broad outline. Also in discussing German-Russian relations in public we ought to observe particular restraint and not strengthen still more the anger over an alleged change in German foreign policy toward Russia, which, at present, is increasingly in evidence.

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<sup>10</sup> See document No. 100.

The Italian press, which had received the draft as a masterpiece of Mussolini's policy, to be sure, but with some reserve about the matter itself, still retains today editorially its calm and waiting attitude. On the other hand, the reports of the foreign press, in so far as they express approval, are given a prominent place.

I have reported in detail on another occasion<sup>11</sup> on how the draft pact was received by the English side. At the moment I have nothing particular to add to this report. I hear from Italian circles which had an opportunity to observe MacDonald on his trip home that he gave an impression of being worried rather than of being cheerful. It is obvious to what a high degree the English attitude will be decisive for the content and fate of the proposal. MacDonald's total lack of understanding for the events and the new regime in Germany, which was acutely evident here and which I have already indicated by telegram,<sup>12</sup> thus gives all the more cause for concern.

The text of the communiqué given to the press concerning the course of the discussions as well as the text of a statement made by MacDonald to the press in Genoa are appended.<sup>13</sup>

HASSELL

<sup>11</sup> See document No. 102.

<sup>12</sup> Document No. 102.

<sup>13</sup> Not reprinted.

## No. 110

9127/E641934

### *The Minister in Czechoslovakia to the Foreign Ministry*

A. III. 1. b. 8.

PRAGUE, March 22, 1933.

Received March 23.

VI A 578.

Subject: Visit of Sudeten German Deputies to the Reich authorities.

As I hear from a third party, Dr. Medinger, former member of the Senate, Count Stolberg, member of the Senate, and Deputy Dr. Peters are going to Berlin at the end of this week, where they wish to call on officials of the Reich and particularly to pay a visit on the Vice Chancellor.

The subject of their representations will probably be the ban on payments<sup>1</sup> between Germany and Czechoslovakia and its harmful effect on Sudeten German trade and industry. The Czechs are not

<sup>1</sup> Following a general ban on the transfer of payments to Germany issued by the Czechoslovak National Bank on Mar. 8, the German Finance Ministry for its part issued on Mar. 17 a general ban on payments to Czechoslovakia. Negotiations to settle this conflict were begun in Prague early in April and resulted in a new German-Czechoslovak Foreign Exchange agreement, signed on Apr. 11. Documents on this conflict are filmed on serial 9618; the agreement of Apr. 11 with its annexes is filmed on 9618/E678879-92.



averse to such visits. They are counting on the pressure that the Sudeten Germans are exerting on the Reich. The Sudeten Germans have two Ministers in the Cabinet, and it is owing to their constant acquiescence in all measures of the Czechs against Germany that we have come to this pass. It should be the duty of the gentlemen to put pressure on *their* Government, which, after all, was the first to take steps toward making payments difficult. Instead they ask Germany to protect their interests.

I would consider it expedient if it were just made clear to the visiting gentlemen that we first of all have to take care of the interests of the Reich, but that we would be glad to welcome them as allies in a concentric attack on the Czech Government.<sup>2</sup>

DR. KOCH

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<sup>2</sup> Marginal note: "Herr v. Papen has been informed through a memorandum of [Department]W (cf. enclosure). To the files. R[oediger], Mar. 28."

Such a memorandum had been sent to Papen on Mar. 25 (9618/E678863-64).

## No. 111

3170/675804-07

### *Memorandum by the Director of Department II*

BERLIN, March 23, 1933.

The Italian Ambassador called on me today in order to discuss various current matters with me. On this occasion he told me on the basis of a telegraphic instruction which he had just received from Rome that the English version of the text of the pact agreed upon with the English statesmen in Rome would reach him by courier tomorrow or the day after tomorrow.<sup>1</sup> According to the dispatch from Rome the same text has already been handed to the French Government in Paris by the English on their return to London. Our Ambassador in Rome, too, had in the meantime received the text and has raised no objections whatever to the changes in the original draft which were agreed upon in the Anglo-Italian discussions in Rome.

I replied to the Ambassador that we had in the meantime received from Herr von Hassell the English text<sup>2</sup> which our Ambassador had sent to us without comment.

The Italian Ambassador asked me whether we had already examined the text and, like Herr von Hassell, agreed to it. I confined myself to the evasive reply that I had just glanced through it hastily together with Herr Gaus. My first impression, however, was that the changes made therein were quite unfavorable to Germany and also questionable in other respects. That, however, was only my personal view.

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<sup>1</sup> This text was handed to the Foreign Ministry by Cerruti on Mar. 24 (3170/-272211 121)

Signor Cerruti told me that the French Ambassador here had also in the meantime received the text from Paris. M. François-Poncet had expressed considerable misgivings about the pact. To be sure, the French Ambassador had unqualifiedly welcomed and approved the tendency and wording of section I of the English text; in contrast he had brought up the argument, among others, against section II that such an agreement would de facto completely set aside the League of Nations. M. François-Poncet was especially opposed, however, to the provision on disarmament and Germany's equality of rights. In this conversation, which took place at some dinner, the French Ambassador again spoke very nervously and excitedly in that connection about the mood in Germany. In spite of vigorous contradiction from his Italian colleague, he had repeatedly asserted that the warlike spirit which had animated Germany since the national revolution had been clearly noticeable at the Potsdam ceremony<sup>3</sup> to anyone who did not want to shut his eyes to facts. The French Ambassador had finally gone so far as to express his apprehension that if this was going to continue here, attempts on his life and that of the English Ambassador might be expected within the next few days. Signor Cerruti shrugged off this fear of his French colleague, but in connection with it read aloud another telegram from his Ministry transmitting to him a report by the Italian Ambassador in Moscow. According to this, the latter had reported that the French Ambassador,<sup>4</sup> who had returned to Moscow from Paris, spoke constantly there, too, of danger of war from Germany. He had told his Italian and other colleagues in Moscow that in France war with Germany was not only considered possible but most menacingly close at hand. The French war industry was in feverish activity and the munitions factories in particular were working day and night, for one wanted to be armed for any contingency.

The Italian Ambassador concluded his statements by pointing out that in view of this threatening world situation the Mussolini pact acquired very special significance. This pact really represented the last appeal to the reason of Europe. If this attempt to maintain peace should also fail, the worst might be expected.

On the basis of a third telegram the Ambassador then suggested that the German Government, too, issue some public statement approving the pact, as had already been done in England, and in France also yesterday through the Havas statement.<sup>5</sup> After all, this was only a matter of an *adhésion de principe*.

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<sup>3</sup> Held on Mar. 21 at the opening of the new Reichstag.

<sup>4</sup> Count François Dejean.

<sup>5</sup> This was published at the end of the talks in which MacDonald and Simon had informed Daladier and Paul-Boncour about their discussions in Rome. For the record of these talks see *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. v, document No. 46.

I replied to the Ambassador that we had already proposed such a passage to the Chancellor for his Government statement today.<sup>6</sup> As for the warlike mood in France, I told the Ambassador that we, too, had such reports but I could not conceive of any French Government which, in view of the feeling among the people themselves, would dare to unleash a preventive war. Once the exaggerated and foolish, partly downright malicious, reports about the events in Germany and the alleged intentions of the new Government had ceased, they would presumably come to their senses also in France, or rather in Paris. I assumed, moreover, that in this respect, too, the Government statement today would contain reassuring expressions addressed to our western neighbors.

KÖPKE

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<sup>6</sup> Hitler's speech in the Reichstag of Mar. 23 contained such a passage. For the text of this speech, see *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik*, vol. I, pp. 34-47.

## No. 112

3086/616458-60

### *Memorandum by the Director of Department II*

BERLIN, March 23, 1933.

The Italian Ambassador asked me today on the basis of a telegram that he had just received from Rome what the circumstances were with respect to the protest which Austrian Federal Chancellor Dollfuss registered with us because of a radio address by the Bavarian Commissioner of Justice, the National Socialist deputy Frank II.<sup>1</sup> I told the

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<sup>1</sup> On Mar. 18, the Bavarian Minister of Justice Hans Frank, who was frequently referred to as Frank II, particularly in the Reichstag so as to distinguish him from other members of the same name, had given an address over the Munich radio warning the Austrian Government not to force the German National Socialists to see to it that liberty remained assured to their fellow Germans in Austria. Senior Counselor Friedberg of Department II recorded on Mar. 22 that the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, Meindl, had protested officially against this speech (3086/616455-57). Also on Mar. 22, Dollfuss had mentioned the matter to Minister Rieth and demanded an authentic text of Frank's speech (8643/E605145-46).

On Apr. 12, Minister Tauschitz told Köpke that he had again been instructed to make a protest unless Germany could supply a text of Frank's speech that was different from the one to which the Austrian Government had taken exception. In reply, Köpke stated that Frank had obviously not spoken in an official capacity and that the matter was to be considered not as interference in Austrian internal affairs by Germany "but only as an attitude taken by the National Socialist Dr. Frank with respect to the struggle of his fellow-party members in Austria" (8643/E605165-67).

On May 11, Hüffer submitted a memorandum recommending that the Austrians be told that an authentic text of Frank's radio speech was not available, and that the latter, in any event, had merely spoken in his capacity as a National Socialist. In a marginal note to this memorandum dated May 15, Köpke commented that such a course was no longer adequate in view of what had just happened in Vienna (8643/E605168-69). See document No. 234.

Ambassador what had happened, while Signor Cerruti compared the text of Frank's radio address, as it had been transmitted to us by the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires with his telegram, and confirmed it. I had the impression that Herr Dollfuss had approached Rome simultaneously and asked there for support of his step in Berlin; for when I wanted to reject the Austrian protest with a few short words as at least exaggerated, the Ambassador surprisingly began to defend Federal Chancellor Dollfuss. In connection with this he raised the question why we were really so unfriendly toward the Dollfuss Government. Would it not be better and more expedient to support the Dollfuss Cabinet, since every change of government in Austria only resulted in new upheavals and political uncertainty? After all, in that small country there were only a few men with statesman-like qualities such as Seipel<sup>2</sup> had had. Even if Dollfuss were overthrown one would probably be jumping from the frying pan into the fire. The Ambassador then described in great detail a lengthy conversation which he had had with the Reich Chancellor about the Dollfuss Cabinet.<sup>3</sup> The Reich Chancellor had told him that he would not support the Dollfuss Cabinet in any circumstances. He, the Reich Chancellor, wanted to have elections which would create clear-cut conditions in Austria and, in particular, would give the National Socialist movement in Austria the place to which it was entitled. A government such as that of Chancellor Dollfuss with only a majority of one vote was a monstrosity in the present restless and difficult times. The Reich Chancellor had then also spoken about the Anschluss, to the effect that he did not wish it at the present time; among other things, the growth of the Center party through the inclusion of the Austrian Catholics would seem dangerous to him. With regard to this the Ambassador had told the Reich Chancellor the following by instruction of Mussolini: It was not wise to quarrel with the Church; the Church had more staying power; moreover, the Reich Chancellor should not forget that in visiting Rome as the Chancellor of the German Reich he also would have to pay his respects to the Pope.<sup>4</sup> As regards the Anschluss question, he had pointed out to the Reich Chancellor by instruction of Mussolini that Italy could never permit the Anschluss.<sup>5</sup>

KÖPKE

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<sup>2</sup> Ignaz Seipel, Austrian Federal Chancellor, 1922-1924, 1926-1929.

<sup>3</sup> No record of this conversation has been found; cf. document No. 128.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 64.

<sup>5</sup> On Mar. 25 Cerruti raised the same questions on Austria in a conversation with Neurath who also referred him to the statements made by Hitler (Neurath memorandum of Mar. 27: 3086/616461).

## No. 113

3170/675809-12

*The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

No. 62 of March 23

LONDON, March 23, 1933—11:15 p. m.

Received March 24—3:55 a. m.

RM 394.

Simon asked me to call on him this morning in order to inform me about the course of the Anglo-Italian discussions before the big debate in the House of Commons, scheduled for the afternoon, on the journey of the English Ministers to Geneva and Rome.

He stated the following:

Since to their regret the English Ministers had been unable to discuss the situation with a German Cabinet member in Geneva and their meeting with the German Ambassador in Rome had also been brief,<sup>1</sup> the English Government was anxious to establish the contact with Germany hitherto lacking by talking with me prior to MacDonald's impending statement in the House of Commons.

After the arrival of the English Ministers Mussolini had handed them the draft of a four power pact. After studying it MacDonald and he had expressed their full agreement with the basic idea of the pact as an instrument for the practical safeguarding of peace and for promoting cooperation, and had also concurred in the view that it would be useful to give the pact project concrete content. In doing so they had emphasized, however, that of course there could be no question of establishing a text among the two Powers without consulting the other presumable participants; on the contrary, the Anglo-Italian discussions could only be in the nature of a preliminary exchange of views.

In the detailed discussion of the Mussolini draft, which I said I knew, the English Ministers had raised two objections in particular: in the first place they had criticized the fact that under section II, which deals with revision, the principle of the inviolability of treaties *until* they are revised, which is inseparable from the idea of revision, is not set forth. They had accordingly proposed the amendment that a clause be inserted before the statement of the principle of revision, to the effect that until they have been revised treaties are to be considered inviolable. Mussolini approved this proposed change. In the second place they had objected to the fact that in section III the hypothesis was set forth that the disarmament problem would be settled only partially. The proclamation of such a hypothesis would have been insupportable for England after the head of the English Government had only a few days previously submitted a practical proposal for a solution in Geneva<sup>2</sup> and had used all his personal influence for the success of the Conference. They had therefore pro-

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 102.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 90 and footnote 1.

posed reverting to point IV of the Five Power Declaration of December 11, 1932,<sup>3</sup> in the wording of point III of the Mussolini project and repeating the statement of determination to work out an agreement which would bring about a substantial reduction and limitation of armaments and at the same time provide for a future revision for the purpose of a further reduction. Mussolini had agreed to this suggestion too.

Besides these two main requests for modification a few additional changes of minor importance had been discussed.

The Ministers had then discussed all the questions in Paris and had there met a certain reserve but not a rejection. Naturally the French attitude was affected by the position taken by the group of states that were friendly toward France, and in this connection he did not wish to disguise the fact that the reaction in Poland and the Little Entente was not favorable. MacDonald would therefore emphasize in his statement to the House of Commons today that the new pact project was not of an exclusive nature and was in no way intended to impair the rights of small states.

In the main I merely listened, but made the general comment that although I did not have any instructions on the position of the German Government my impression was that my Government viewed the project with favor in principle even though it naturally had to reserve the right to submit its own requests for modification. I also said with reference to point II that in my opinion not too much would be gained in practice if the idea of revision were merely referred to the procedure of the League of Nations Covenant, where it was bound to be channeled into the so notoriously sterile article 19. To this, Simon remarked that thought would have to be given to the question of how life might be instilled into this provision.

In conclusion I asked Simon how he visualized further developments, since after all Germany too would have to participate in future discussions. I inquired especially whether he was thinking of a collective discussion or of a discussion through normal diplomatic channels. Simon replied that no final decisions had been made about that yet. First, MacDonald would have to have the House of Commons debate off his hands; then the French would have to be given some time to digest the project and acquire as much taste for it as possible. He thought, however, that the coming weekend would bring some clarification on the basis of which suggestions could then probably be given for the further procedure.

Simon did not hand me the amended passages of the text;<sup>4</sup> nor did I ask him for them, since I noticed that he was not much inclined to release them as yet.

Hoesch

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<sup>3</sup> See Editors' Note, p. 18.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 105.

## No. 114

8510/E597366-68

*The State Secretary to the Embassy in France*

## Telegram

No. 132

BERLIN, March 24, 1933—8:10 p. m.  
zu Ref. D. 300.<sup>1</sup>

For the Ambassador personally.

Major General Bredow (ret.),<sup>2</sup> while traveling to Brussels and Paris, was stopped at Aachen at the request of the Prussian Minister of Interior, and made to return to Berlin.<sup>3</sup>

During interrogation by the political police in Berlin he stated that as early as 1931 he had gone to France and Belgium as chief of the counterintelligence department at the request of Minister Groener<sup>4</sup> and Minister Köster in order to establish relations with important French and Belgian military persons and find out their opinions about the existing situation with respect to foreign policy and about military problems.

For the trip that had now been planned the German Ambassador in Paris, after prior agreement, had promised him quarters with him and his automobile to pick him up. The Ambassador had told him the license number in case he should be prevented from meeting him at the station.

The French Military Attaché in Berlin, General Renondeau, had, along with a letter of recommendation, advised him to visit in Paris Generals Weygand,<sup>5</sup> Gamelin,<sup>6</sup> along with his two direct subordinates, and Bourret.<sup>7</sup> In conformity with the aims of the Foreign Minister he had tried to bring about a good relationship with Renondeau.

Furthermore, before his departure he had called on the Belgian Minister<sup>8</sup> in Berlin. The latter had asked him to go to see the Foreign Minister<sup>9</sup> and the Minister of War<sup>10</sup> in Brussels. Bredow stressed that it was at the suggestion of the Ministerialdirektor at the time,

<sup>1</sup> Ref. D. 300: Not printed (4606/E193026-29). This is a letter of Mar. 19 from General Bredow to Bülow concerning the subject of the document printed.

<sup>2</sup> Major General Bredow had been Chief of the Minister's Office [*Ministeramt*] in the Reichswehr Ministry, June 1932 to Jan. 31, 1933.

<sup>3</sup> In the meeting of the Reich Cabinet held on Mar. 20, Göring reported on this matter, stating "that he had been compelled to have Bredow's passport taken from him." For the record of this Cabinet meeting, see *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. xxxi, document No. 2963-PS, (U. S. Exhibit 656), pp. 409-415.

<sup>4</sup> Wilhelm Groener, Reichswehr Minister, 1928-May 1932.

<sup>5</sup> Inspector General of the French Army.

<sup>6</sup> Chief of the French General Staff.

<sup>7</sup> Military *Chef de Cabinet* of the French Ministry of War.

<sup>8</sup> Count de Kerchove.

<sup>9</sup> Paul Hymans.

<sup>10</sup> Albert Devéze.

Köster, that he had entered into such close relations with representatives of Belgian authorities. The visit to Brussels was to have taken place only after the Paris visit and after consultation with Ambassador Köster.

~~As it is not clear what General von Bredow's aims were in taking this trip,~~<sup>11</sup> please report in detail by the next courier about earlier relations with General von Bredow, and in particular what you know about the trip which had been planned at this time.<sup>12</sup>

BÜLOW

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<sup>11</sup> The words scored through were deleted before the telegram was sent.

<sup>12</sup> No reply from Köster has been found. The following undated and unsigned note is, however, in this file: "The documents on the trip of Major General (ret.) von Bredow to Paris and his arrest at the frontier are now in the secret file (special volume) 83-70-Röhm revolt-in the secret chest of the Head of the Office" (8510/E597369). Neither the secret file nor the secret chest has been found.

## No. 115

8840/615106-20

### *The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy*

BERLIN, March 24, 1933.

[zu] RM 394<sup>1</sup> [I].

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 46,<sup>2</sup> 47,<sup>3</sup> and 48.<sup>4</sup>

It is naturally very gratifying to us that you have been assured by the Foreign Ministry there that the Italian Government is firmly determined not to permit the central points of Mussolini's plan to be touched and in the further negotiations always to take into account the protection of German interests. We do not doubt that this assurance is meant sincerely and seriously. On the other hand, however, we cannot conceal the fact that the result of the conversations with the English Ministers there, as it appears in the English draft pact, has already changed the situation not inconsiderably in our disfavor. The English draft not only ignores entirely our comments on the original Italian text, but is even worse than this text on several important points.<sup>5</sup> Since the Italian Government, according to your telegram No. 46, has expressed its willingness to accept the English amendments, the English version, not the Italian, will be the basis of the diplomatic negotiations now to begin; and it will not be easy for

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<sup>1</sup> RM 394: Document No. 113. The items in brackets are from another copy of this document (3170/675817-31).

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 105, footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (3170/675777).

<sup>4</sup> Document No. 105.

<sup>5</sup> Marginal note in Hassell's handwriting: "Main emphasis is to be placed on the fact that English modification is already diluting M[ussolini]'s good idea."



us and also for the Italians, particularly in view of the French tendencies which are already becoming clearly apparent, to put through the changes that we consider necessary. I therefore consider it necessary that we make our wishes clear to the Italian Government as speedily and emphatically as possible in order that the negotiations should not drift away even further from Mussolini's real purpose, which we thought we discerned in his first draft.

This purpose of Mussolini was undoubtedly to eliminate the present political tension in Europe by having the big problems from which this tension had principally evolved approached in a positive manner by the four Powers—Germany, Italy, England, and France—and subjected to calm, systematic treatment. Contrasted with the repeated attempts of the English Government simply to brush aside the problems by some kind of truce of God,<sup>6</sup> this was a great step forward. We are therefore strongly interested in seeing this plan realized. It would be particularly objectionable, however, if it finally failed, not because of the opposition of France, but because our wishes encountered a solid front of rejection of the three other Powers. This we have to counteract with all the means at our command.

Proceeding from this basic position, I should like to comment as follows on the individual points of the English draft:

1. The reference to the Geneva Agreement of December 11, 1932, incorporated in article I, is explained by the fact that the No-Force Pact<sup>7</sup> as yet has no formal existence and can therefore at present be designated only by reference to the Geneva Agreement. There is involved, therefore, an unobjectionable change of a purely editorial nature.

2. With respect to the Italian draft, article II contains the most extensive change. Having the principle of the conscientious observance of the agreements so solemnly stressed on this occasion is not only superfluous but, from our standpoint, quite undesirable, but could, finally, be tolerated as a compromise, if the principle that the peace treaties can be revised is also expressed in a sufficiently concise and positive form. That is unfortunately not the case, however. Even the Italian text was not entirely satisfactory in this respect, as was emphasized in our preliminary remarks and our aide-mémoire of March 15.<sup>8</sup> But the English text is far less so.

The English version of the idea of revision is, first of all, characterized explicitly as a mere statement and repetition of what the League

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<sup>6</sup> In July 1931, on the occasion of the visit of Chancellor Brüning and Foreign Minister Curtius to Paris, the French Premier, Laval, had proposed that the Germans make various guarantees, notably in the form of a political truce or political moratorium for a period of ten years during which they would undertake not to raise the question of revising existing treaties. The idea was subsequently put forward by the British. For example, at a conversation with Herriot and Alphand on June 11, 1932, Sir John Simon stated it to be the view of the British Government that assurances should be obtained from Germany not to raise any "contentious political question" for a period of, say, fifteen years. See *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. III, documents Nos. 134 and 135.

<sup>7</sup> See document No. 36, footnote 2 and document No. 37.

<sup>8</sup> Document No. 84.

of Nations Covenant provides in article 19 in this respect. (From the standpoint of language, it is to be noted that the words "They also contemplate" obviously do not refer to the "four Powers" but to "the provisions of the Covenant".<sup>9</sup> It is of value, to be sure, that the four Governments confirm the principle of revision contained in article 19, precisely with respect to the treaties of 1919. There would be real progress such as Mussolini contemplates, however, only if there were not a mere repetition of the provision of the League of Nations Covenant, but if a form were adopted indicating the determination of the four Powers to apply this principle as a living factor in European policy. In his speech in the House of Commons yesterday, MacDonald cited a remark made by Mussolini to the effect that article 19 was not to remain a dormant article.<sup>10</sup> That hits the nail on the head. The English version is not in accordance with it, however.

More significant yet is the fact that the English version renders the actual conditions for a revision of the peace treaties in a form that gives wrong direction to the entire principle of revision. With the words "when conditions arise"<sup>11</sup> revision is made entirely contingent upon circumstances that might arise in the future. It is therefore no longer admitted that the peace treaties have created a situation that was untenable from the start or has in any case proved untenable as a result of developments since 1919, but it is only termed a possibility that the peace treaties might sometime in the future prove in need of revision. This form of the revision idea is, moreover, not only to be criticized from the point of view of our own interests, but also from a general point of view. If the possibility of revision is envisaged in the event that conditions arise in the future that could lead to conflict, the world would practically have to consider this as an incentive for bringing about such conditions and conflicts. In order to clarify completely our point of view on this important question, I would add that for us it is not a matter of providing in the pact for the immediate beginning of revision. We realize that this would not be warranted by the general international situation and we therefore agree that the question as to the moment at which the four Powers should take up the problem of revision should remain entirely open. On the other hand, we cannot agree to the omission of the statement characterizing the peace treaties as materially in need of revision even on the basis of the present circumstances. Otherwise the mention of the idea of revision in the pact would not be a step forward, but backward from the present condition. We would admit that, as matters now stand, a revision is out of the question. It may be that this was not the intention of the English Ministers. The English version can perhaps be explained by the desire to substitute for the ambiguous Italian expression of the original text ("under those conditions") [*in quelle condizioni—en telles conditions*] a clearer wording simply by way of editing. However that may be, on this point we must resolutely work for a change.

<sup>9</sup> The parts of this sentence which are in quotation marks are in English in the original.

<sup>10</sup> See *Parliamentary Debates*, fifth series, H of C, vol. 276, cols. 511-520.

<sup>11</sup> In English in the original. Marginal note in Hassell's handwriting: "To be explained as an error in translation and of course (indeed, absolutely) to be eliminated."

Finally there remains to be said with regard to the English version of article II, that in the closing sentence the small Powers are not expressly placed on an equal footing with the four Great Powers, but that practically this equality is nevertheless rather clearly implied in the very cleverly drafted English text. Since, indeed, this text does not speak of an application of the principle of revision by the four Great Powers, but quite generally of application, the following words "agreements based on the mutual recognition of the interests of all concerned"<sup>12</sup> nevertheless lead to the conclusion that the revision may from the outset be introduced only with the participation of the smaller Powers in question.<sup>13</sup> The wording on this point, too, is related entirely to League of Nations procedure. The concluding words, "within the framework of the League of Nations,"<sup>14</sup> point in the same direction. We may admit that it is not possible simply to exclude the League of Nations in the matter of treaty revision. If the unpromising procedure provided for in article 19 of the Covenant were to remain, however, the entire substance of the new pact would be meaningless and *in contradiction with* its fundamental idea according to which the political initiative in the large issues is to be placed in the hands of the four Great Powers. If it is intended to do justice to this fundamental idea, the League of Nations may only be brought in to the extent that it participates in the formal execution of the political initiative of the four Powers, just as naturally the smaller participating Powers must in the end also cooperate in a revision of the peace treaties by way of a treaty.

If these points of view are taken into consideration, then, building upon the original Italian version, a text somewhat as follows could be considered for article II:

"The four Powers reaffirm, in accordance with the clauses of the Covenant, the principle of the revision of such provisions of the Treaty of Peace as might lead to a conflict between the States. They declare that they will try to carry out this principle of revision by taking into account the reciprocal interests in question and with the aid of the organs of the League of Nations."<sup>15</sup>

If the other Powers insist, we might accept the idea of respecting the treaties in somewhat this way—by inserting after the initial words "the four Powers" in the formulation given above, a sentence along the following lines:

"While realizing that the scrupulous respect for treaty obligations is a necessary element in the maintenance of peace and international security . . ."<sup>16</sup>

<sup>12</sup> In English in the original.

<sup>13</sup> Marginal notes in Hassell's handwriting:

"The only, so to speak, substantive objection to article II."

"The four Powers must therefore unmistakably (as was done in the Italian, by the way) be placed ahead of the others. The interests of the others must naturally be considered and the participating Powers be given a hearing at a later stage within the framework of the League of Nations."

<sup>14</sup> In English in the original.

<sup>15</sup> This paragraph is in French in the original and shows the following marginal note in Hassell's handwriting: "For instance, it could be formulated like this."

<sup>16</sup> The passages in quotation marks are in French in the original.

3. The new first sentence of article III is unobjectionable from our point of view. The final phrasing of the article would, to be sure, have to be adapted to the status of the negotiations of the Disarmament Conference at the moment of the signing of the pact. On the central question of article III, namely, the question of Germany's equality of rights, however, the same serious objections that we have previously raised with respect to the Italian formula apply to the English text. I repeat that in case the Disarmament Conference comes to the expected unsatisfactory result, we do not wish to insist on making immediate use of equality of rights to the extent that would seem justified by the inadequate disarmament of countries like France. The limitation of our rights, which we voluntarily declare ourselves prepared to accept, must, nevertheless, be related to the period of about 5 years during which the first disarmament convention<sup>17</sup> will remain in force.<sup>18</sup> The present text stipulates, without any qualification as to time or fact, that Germany may, under all circumstances, obtain her equality only by successive treaty arrangements with the other Powers. This would mean that even beyond the period of the first disarmament convention, we would in our rearmament measures always remain dependent on the consent of the other Powers, even if for some reason or other there should be no further disarmament conventions. The other Powers would in such a case be released from all armament restrictions based on treaties, while in the sphere of armaments, Germany would not be permitted to do anything without the consent of the other Powers. Mussolini, and also the English, cannot possibly desire this. We must make it clear to them that it is an absolutely decisive point for us, that, after the first convention has expired, our legal position must in no way be worse than the position of any other Power. This is also in the interest of the subsequent carrying out of general disarmament, because the liberty given to Germany at the expiration of the first convention would create internationally the strongest means of pressure for the holding of a second disarmament convention. In principle the English have already recognized this point of view of ours in their statements before the Disarmament Conference and in MacDonald's last Geneva proposals,<sup>19</sup> even if the wording chosen by them was not always entirely unobjectionable.

The British version of article III of the new pact on this point is even inferior, moreover, to the Italian text in so far as the latter spoke of successive agreements between the four Powers, while now it is only a question of the four Powers having to participate in the agreement. The possibility therefore remains that the other signatory Powers of Versailles will also be considered eligible for participation.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> According to articles 94-96 of the British draft convention, proposed by MacDonald, this convention, when it expired, would be replaced by a second disarmament convention which in the meantime would be drawn up in negotiations between the Powers at Geneva; see League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (Geneva, 1932): *Conference Documents*, vol. II, p. 493.

<sup>18</sup> Marginal note in Hassell's handwriting: "The only substantial objection to article III."

<sup>19</sup> See document No. 90 and footnote 1.

<sup>20</sup> Marginal note in Hassell's handwriting: "Mistake in drafting, therefore Italian version to be restored."

Our vital interests in the question of equality of rights would in these circumstances only be protected by a version of article III that expresses unequivocally that limitations on German equality of rights by treaty may be laid down only for the duration of the first convention.

Finally, it is still to be observed that the words of the original text "must have an effective application" [*"deve avere una portata effettiva"*] have been considerably watered down by the English words, *must have a practical value*. Here the first version ought to be restored.<sup>21</sup>

The following, which could follow the first sentence of the English text, might be considered as a draft that would, to a certain extent, take into account our point of view:

"... Italy, France, and England declared that in case the Disarmament Conference ends with partial results, the equality of rights granted to Germany must receive practical application. Germany undertakes for the period of the first disarmament convention to effect this equality in accordance with a scale resulting from an agreement to be negotiated without delay between the four Powers through the ordinary channels of diplomacy."<sup>22</sup>

4. As far as the deletion of the original article IV is concerned, it is rather to be regretted that every mention of colonial questions is to be dropped. If Italy wishes to reconcile herself to it, however, we, too, will not be able to raise any objections to it.

We agree to the insertion of the article on the economic measures; likewise to the two final provisions.

Please discuss the matter thoroughly at once with the Government there, and if at all possible with Mussolini himself,<sup>23</sup> using the foregoing statements for emphasis, and at the same time state that we definitely count on understanding from Italy for our point of view. You may give the assurance that it is precisely the new Reich Government that attaches the greatest importance to the success for Mussolini's initiative. We do not by any means stick rigidly to certain words and phrases. Please, therefore, do not submit the above-mentioned phrases as formal German proposals, but use them only as examples and as illustrations of what we want. It is of crucial importance to us that the ideas on which our point of view is based, which also, so far as we can see, are in agreement with Mussolini's basic ideas, should prevail when the pact is given final form.

The objection cannot be raised that our attitude amounts to a demand for consideration of one-sided German interests and that we were not offering the other side, particularly France, anything in return. As a matter of fact, even in the form desired by us, the pact would imply that Germany's performance in return would be very

<sup>21</sup> Marginal note in Hassell's handwriting: "Incorrect rendering of the Italian text."

<sup>22</sup> This paragraph is in French in the original and shows the following marginal note in Hassell's handwriting: "For instance, it could be formulated like this."

<sup>23</sup> See documents Nos. 120 and 122.

extensive. In the large issues of European policy we bind ourselves to the other three Powers, and this is fraught with consequences much more for us than for them, for it is we who, according to the situation, are forced to bring about changes in the status quo. We therefore renounce an entirely free policy, which could be no other than an active policy, attacking present European conditions. That the peace treaties have to be revised is, actually, admitted on all sides. It is therefore an important concession serving the general interest in a peaceful development if we bind ourselves by a treaty to the other Powers with respect to the realization of revision. Still more evident is our accommodating attitude in the disarmament question. In this question we are undoubtedly the creditors of the other Powers. If nevertheless we now commit ourselves even in the event of the collapse or an inadequate result of the Conference for a considerable space of time with respect to the exercise of equality of rights, that is an extraordinary gain for the other Powers.

The Embassies in London and Paris are receiving copies of this instruction and are directed to guide their language accordingly.

NEURATH

## No. 116

9062/E634790-91

*State Secretary Bülow to State Secretary Meissner*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, March 24, 1933.

e. o. IV Po. 2135

With reference to telegram No. 16 of March 22, 1933, from Danzig.<sup>2</sup>

I had a conversation with President of the Senate Ziehm when he was en route from Geneva, in which the President indicated that he was willing, in agreement with the government parties (DNVP, Center and bourgeois bloc), to take representatives of the NSDAP into the Government; however, he had to refuse new elections at least for the present owing to the excited atmosphere in Danzig. Upon his return to Danzig the President repeated this stand to Consul General von Thermann. Tomorrow, negotiations will begin in Danzig between the President of the Senate and the representatives of the

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<sup>1</sup> Of the Office of the Reich President.

<sup>2</sup> This telegram reported: "During the absence of the Senate President in Geneva the conflicts in domestic politics between National Socialists and German Nationalists have, according to the statements of both sides, become further embittered, while at the same time the position of the Government, because of the hesitant attitude of the bourgeois bloc, has appreciably weakened. Therefore in accordance with the views in the above-mentioned telegram [Danzig telegram No. 10 of Mar. 8, document No. 58] please press the Senate President when he passes through Berlin to agree to reconstruct the Government and to hold a new election." (9062/E634785)

NSDAP regarding the reorganization of the Government. Probably during these negotiations difficulties will result from the fact that the National Socialists will demand the right to occupy the posts of the President of the Senate (Ziehm) and the Senator for the Interior (Hintz of the DNVP)—a demand which National Socialist Gauleiter Forster made recently in a large gathering as a basic condition—whereas the DNVP wants to retain the present President of the Senate, Ziehm. Another difficulty will probably develop from the fact that the dissolution of the Volkstag elected in 1930, urgently demanded by the National Socialists, can occur under the Danzig Constitution only through a majority decision of the Volkstag itself. This majority does not exist as yet.

For our part we will first have to await the result of the negotiations.

VON BÜLOW

### No. 117

3170/675849-51

*The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 217 of March 25

PARIS, March 25, 1933.

Received March 26—12:40 a. m.

RM 401.

For the State Secretary personally.

Today's conversation with Paul-Boncour about the Mussolini pact brought out the following views of the Minister: (1) The French Government rejects any treaty commitment within the framework of the four Powers which will give the impression of being a formation of a group of states alongside the League of Nations. (2) The French Government has all the less reason for taking a different position in that the four Powers are at the same time the only permanent members of the Council since the withdrawal of Japan. Moreover, since France has built her entire foreign policy on the League of Nations idea and its articles, she cannot consent to having the permanent members impose their will on the other members of the League. Apart from the fact that the provisions of article II would thereby be violated, such a procedure would only lead to a jeopardizing of the League and might have incalculable effects, especially in view of the unrest now prevalent in Europe.

(3) The French Government had not yet defined its position, but he could say even today that in his opinion all details, such as revision of peace treaties, would have to be shelved until agreement had been

reached on the fundamental question, namely the manner in which the idea of a cooperation of the four Powers was to be realized. Dealing prematurely with a detail might make agreement on the principle impossible from the outset.

(4) He personally was at present still studying the question whether it would not be possible to reach an agreement by applying the Locarno Pact "methods" or by following the old Briand<sup>1</sup> idea of a European union. With the latter idea, however, the difficulty arises that Russia would have to participate therein.

In the course of the discussion of point IV the Minister repeatedly pointed out that it was a question here of purely personal views which he had not yet discussed with his Cabinet colleagues, and he himself had not yet thought through this idea fully.

(5) Concerning the manner of future procedure the Minister said that in his opinion collective discussions could not for the time being be considered but only an exchange of views through normal diplomatic channels.

At the end of the conversation the Minister then brought up article 19 and said that it might perhaps be feasible to agree on possibilities which this article might offer for any wishes for revision.

I had the impression that he would offer least resistance to an exchange of views between the Powers on expanding article 19.

KÖSTER

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<sup>1</sup> Aristide Briand, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1925-1932.

## No. 118

6121/E456338-42

### *Memorandum by an Official of Department II*

BERLIN, March 27, 1933.

zu II Balk. 610 R.<sup>1</sup>

Colonel Haselmayer,<sup>2</sup> whom I had informed in reply to his oral inquiry of March 22,<sup>3</sup> as to our opinion of Captain Friedrich Weber, retired, of Bucharest—correspondent of the *Völkischer Beobachter* in Bucharest—on the basis of the enclosed telegram No. 10 from the Legation in Bucharest,<sup>4</sup> that we had no information prejudicial to

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<sup>1</sup> II Balk. 610 R: Not printed (6121/E456337). This is Bucharest telegram No. 10 of Mar. 23 to which reference is made in the document printed.

<sup>2</sup> Friedrich Haselmayer, a retired Reichswehr Colonel, subsequently executive secretary of the Wehrpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP.

<sup>3</sup> Heeren's memorandum of this conversation is not printed (6121/E456334-35).

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 1.



Herr Weber, appeared at my office with Herr Weber today, who had meanwhile arrived from Bucharest.

In confirmation of what Weber had already told the Legation (see telegram No. 10 of March 23), he stated that he had been asked by Tatarescu, the leader of the Rumanian National Socialists, to forward to the Reich Chancellor, through private channels, a confidential communication from the Rumanian Foreign Minister, Titulescu.

The substance of this communication, which Tatarescu, in his conversation with Titulescu on March 18, had at once put in writing in the presence of Titulescu, translated into German, is as follows:

1. Titulescu is of the opinion that an official rapprochement of Rumania with Germany is desirable and necessary.

2. The Polish problem presents no obstacle to the realization of the above desire. The Poles are a matter of complete indifference to Titulescu.

3. As long as there is no clarity with respect to the relations between Germany and Rumania, it is naturally impossible for Rumania to detach herself from France.

4. Independent of an official diplomatic step in this direction possibly to be taken by Titulescu, he asked that the Reich Chancellor be informed, also via private, political channels, through National Socialist circles, of his wish and idea referred to above.

5. Titulescu would like to know the attitude of the Chancellor on this question, and how, if the occasion arose, such a rapprochement could be effected.

6. Titulescu desires to treat only with the Reich Chancellor personally—not through diplomatic channels—and was awaiting a reply through a personal emissary of the Chancellor's. There was also a possibility, in the opinion of Titulescu, that in the event that the Foreign Minister went to Geneva shortly he might give him an oral reply there.

Weber thinks that this attempt on the part of Titulescu to sound us out has a direct connection with an audience that he—Weber—had had on March 17, that is, the day before, with King Carol. The subject of his conversation with the King was the new development in Germany. At this conversation the question of the German eastern frontier had received especially detailed discussion. The King, too, had intimated that he attached great importance to strengthening the relations between Rumania and Germany, and that the Polish question did not need to present any obstacle to this.

It is entirely possible that Weber's statements are correct in all the essential points. It would be entirely in keeping with the political methods of Titulescu, as they were also expressed shortly before the conclusion of the new pact of organization of the Little Entente, through an especially friendly gesture in the direction of Hungary

(*As Est*—interview<sup>5</sup>), if, immediately before departing for Geneva and making anti-revisionist propaganda there, within the framework of the Little Entente, he made the attempt, through channels that he can at all times repudiate, to establish political ties in the direction of Germany. He would be guided therein by the intention of neutralizing as much as possible the bad impression that his official policy at Geneva necessarily makes on Berlin.

I listened noncommittally to Herr Weber and pointed out, moreover, that Titulescu himself surely could not expect to receive a specific reply to so indefinite and unsubstantiated an inquiry.

Colonel Haselmayer, who, for his part, also regards with skepticism this alleged attempt of Titulescu to sound us out, but who is of the opinion otherwise that we ought to take every opportunity to loosen the relations between Rumania and France, asked me to bring the matter to the attention of the responsible authorities in the Foreign Ministry in order that it could be examined here, and that anything else be done that might be necessary. It is his intention to inquire of me tomorrow about the position taken by the Foreign Ministry.

It might be desirable to give as a reply to Herr Weber to be transmitted to Tatarescu, in agreement with the Chancellor, only that we saw between us and Rumania no immediate areas of political friction, and that we would therefore only be glad if this fact were expressed through an appropriate attitude in Rumanian foreign policy on questions affecting the vital interests of Germany. In this way, the political relationship between Germany and Rumania could quite automatically be strengthened as was desired by both sides.

Count Schulenburg suggested in the concluding paragraph of the enclosed telegram that, if we considered the matter important, we have him come here for an oral discussion. Herr Weber also suggested summoning Counselor of Legation Kirchholtes, who had thorough knowledge of the problems and their importance. I do not, at least for the present, consider this necessary.

It does not appear to me expedient to send a reply, supposedly in accordance with his wish, directly to M. Titulescu, who is to remain some 8 days longer at Geneva.

A carbon copy of this memorandum for possible transmittal to Herr von Huene in the Office of the Reich President is enclosed, with reference to the marginal note of the Reich President, "How does this come about?" on the enclosed carbon copy of telegraphic report No. 10 of March 23, from the Legation in Bucharest.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> See document No. 5 and footnote 3.

<sup>6</sup> The copy of this telegram with Hindenburg's marginal note has not been found.

Herewith respectfully submitted to Ministerialdirektor Köpke, with the request for a decision by the Foreign Minister.<sup>7</sup>

HEEREN

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<sup>7</sup> Marginal notes: "I am in agreement with the opinion of Herr v. Heeren. Köpke, Mar. 27."

"This account is in accordance with reports about Titulescu, which the Foreign Minister has received also from other quarters. The Foreign Minister agrees with the opinion recorded here and with the proposed reply. Herewith re-submitted to Senior Counselor v. Heeren. V[ölckers], Mar. 28."

Heeren's suggestion for a reply to Weber was followed verbatim in an instruction sent by Köpke to the Legation in Rumania in telegram No. 19 of Mar. 30. The following comment was also added to this instruction: "Essentially, we see in the alleged message from Titulescu merely an attempt, to which no major importance is to be attached, to weaken the bad impression made by official Rumanian policy in questions of disarmament and revision" (6121/E456345-46). See, however, document No. 189.

## No. 119

3170/675874

### *The Ambassador in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 159 of March 27

WASHINGTON, March 27, 1933—9:39 p. m.

Received March 28—6:20 a. m.

RM 421.

The Italian Ambassador informs me that he explained the Anglo-Italian proposal for a four power pact at the State Department today and especially set forth the reasons why, in Mussolini's view, the way to a solution of the disarmament question and an easing of political tension could only be reached via an agreement between the European Great Powers. Only in this way could Europe be kept from falling into separate camps and only in this way could bridges be found between the desires for revision and the policy of the status quo.

Rosso told me that they abstained from taking a precise position here, but stressed that they were interested in everything which contributed to the satisfaction of Europe. I believe that it would be useful if I could be instructed to set forth in more detail the German position, as indicated in the Chancellor's speech, for the Government here.<sup>1</sup>

PRITTWITZ

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<sup>1</sup> In telegram No. 110 of Mar. 28 Neurath instructed Prittwitz to take no initiative respecting the four power pact, but to leave the initiative to the Italians. He was told what to say in case he were questioned further in the matter (3170/675875-76).

## No. 120

3170/675870-71

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

No. 52 of March 27

ROME, March 27, 1933—11:40 p. m.

Received March 28—2:30 a. m.

RM 420.

With reference to your instruction RM 394 of March 24, 1933.<sup>1</sup>

I carried out the instruction with Suvich today with detailed statements and a short pro memoria<sup>2</sup> and hope to see Mussolini tomorrow. The Italians are much impressed by the offensive of world opinion and fear new agitation against the German regime also in England and America, especially on account of alleged persecutions of the Jews. In Paris, he said, the frame of mind borders on paroxysm and the idea of a preventive war is toyed with more and more. A protest from the Little Entente<sup>3</sup> had to be expected, but Poland was acting just like a madman, as the resignation of the newly appointed Ambassador also showed.<sup>4</sup> Jouvenel was still sensible and like the English Ambassador was cooperating on (group garbled) agreement, but the English Ambassador in Berlin and the French Ambassador seemed to be reporting in a very unfavorable manner. The Soviet Government was likewise in a very bad humor.

I explained the real German conditions and aims and referred to the Chancellor's speech and statements of German Jews.<sup>5</sup> In reply to my question whether Italy still reckoned with the possibility of success for the pact proposal, he said that hope was not great. When I asked what would happen in case of failure, he replied that something new would then have to be devised in order to avoid war. I said I supposed that the fury over the German regime would calm down as formerly at the time of the first election of Hindenburg and

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 115.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (German text: 8840/E615121-27; Italian text: 8840/E615128-31).

<sup>3</sup> On Mar. 25, the Permanent Council of the Little Entente, meeting at Geneva, had issued a statement objecting to agreements "having as their object to dispose of the rights of third parties" and expressing regret "that the idea of a policy of revisionism had been stressed in the negotiations of the last few days." See *Documents on International Affairs, 1933* (London, 1934), p. 252.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram No. 17 from Warsaw, sent Mar. 25 (3170/675843) Ambassador Moltke had reported on the nervousness and irritation prevailing in Polish Government circles which was also reflected in the "sensational" resignation of Count Potocki, newly appointed Polish Ambassador to Italy, on the eve of his departure for Rome.

<sup>5</sup> In the file containing the draft of this telegram is a clipping from a German newspaper of Mar. 26 showing statements by German Jewish organizations denying the truth of foreign propaganda about persecution of Jews in Germany (9931/E694869).

pointed to the sacrifices that we were prepared to make through the pact in the interest of restoring calm. Suvich said that he, too, hoped for a détente; the French would probably not decline outright, but rather make counterproposals. One would have to take advantage of that in order to get over the critical moment.

HASSELL

No. 121

3170/675853-59

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union*

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, March 27, 1933.

Sent March 28.

RM 408.

I am sending you enclosed herewith for your personal information a copy of the German translation of the original Italian draft of the proposal for a political pact of understanding and cooperation between the four Western Powers,<sup>1</sup> as well as a copy of the aide-mémoire which was handed to the Italian Ambassador here as the first statement of the German position on Mussolini's proposal<sup>2</sup> and a few preliminary observations on the Italian draft pact,<sup>3</sup> which have been used for guidance merely internally. I am likewise enclosing two English-language copies of the draft pact as modified on the occasion of the visit of MacDonald and Simon to Rome,<sup>4</sup> as well as the instruction received by Ambassador von Hassell<sup>5</sup> which sets forth in detail our position on the Italian pact proposal and the English amendments to it. The foregoing material is intended only for your personal information and is to acquaint you with the status of the matter and our position on the individual questions raised in connection with it.

I request you to inform the Government there confidentially along the following lines about the pact and our position with respect to it but without revealing details from the above material. You are authorized to make available to the Government there for strictly confidential information a copy of the English text.

In your statements about the cause and significance of the Italian pact and our attitude toward it, I request that you explain somewhat as follows: The Italian proposal was transmitted to us un-

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<sup>1</sup> Enclosure to document No. 83.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 84.

<sup>3</sup> An undated memorandum with the heading "Preliminary Observations on the Italian Draft Pact" is filmed on 3170/675740-41.

<sup>4</sup> Document No. 105.

<sup>5</sup> Document No. 115.

expectedly and without any diplomatic preparation, although in substance it follows in the main the well-known ideas of Mussolini's Turin speech of October 23, 1932.<sup>6</sup> Also, we were not informed about Mussolini's intentions until immediately before the English visit to Rome or during this visit, so that we were, so to speak, faced with a fait accompli.

According to what we have been told about Italian views Mussolini bases his proposal on the necessity of bringing about a relaxation of tension in the European situation, which he considers—in our opinion, rightly—as the necessary prerequisite for an economic recovery. The proposal for close collaboration of the four Western Powers is in his opinion the only practical way, since the League of Nations has proved to be an institution which is too unwieldy for purposes of reaching an understanding quickly and also because the Geneva institution has repeatedly failed in practice recently and has thereby suffered a loss of prestige. Nevertheless, the proposal is based on the League of Nations structure to the extent that it involves cooperation of the four permanent members of the Council remaining after Japan's withdrawal from the League.

With his proposal Mussolini is undoubtedly pursuing the secondary aim of weakening France's hegemony and upsetting her system of alliances. In a certain sense—this is especially true of the timing of his proposal—it is to be considered as a counteraction against the new alliance of the Little Entente.

The political effect of the pact, whether it is concluded for 10 years, 7 years (until 1940) or 5 years, coincides in a certain sense with the aims formerly pursued by the French and English toward the conclusion of a truce of God. As you know, we repeatedly rejected the conclusion of such a truce of God in 1931 and 1932.<sup>7</sup> The reason for our rejection was, among others, the circumstance that even a temporary recognition of the status quo would be disadvantageous to us and therefore unacceptable. For this reason, obviously, Mussolini has included in article II the principle of the revision of treaties, which, if formulated in accordance with our wishes, would in fact give the pact a tendency much more favorable to us. In the pact Mussolini has, from similar points of view, also taken up German equality of rights in the field of armaments as the second particularly live controversy. The other articles are of secondary importance. Given sufficient good will and a clear recognition of the necessities of the moment, a satisfactory solution of these problems through an appropriate formulation of articles II and III is quite conceivable.

As for our attitude toward the Mussolini proposal, please state to

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 109, footnote 6.

<sup>7</sup> See document No. 115, footnote 6.

the Government there that we could not possibly have rejected the basic ideas because we would thereby have been placed in an entirely false position with respect to the three Western Powers and would outwardly have lent color to the charge that Germany is now thinking of initiating an aggressive foreign policy. We have therefore declared that we are prepared to cooperate closely with the four Western Powers in the proposed form, in the conviction—confirmed by Mussolini—that for all practical purposes the position of the Soviet Government and our relations with it will in no way be impaired thereby. The same applies to the United States of America. We shall not permit modifications of the draft treaty or implementation of the treaty itself in a way that would impair German-Russian relations or be detrimental to Russia. Rather, we will try to help carry out the original ideas of Mussolini, in the conviction that a political relaxation of tension must be desirable for all countries, not least for Russia. One would think that the Soviet Government would also be gratified if it should be possible to strike a blow at the French system of alliances.

Whether the Italian aim can be realized remains to be seen, however. It became apparent already in the conference in Rome that England hesitates to adopt Mussolini's views in their entirety and that she is inclined to give the agreement a character which is detrimental to us by toning down the statement about revision and by changing the article about equality of rights and its application into a commitment unacceptable to us. According to the information we have received thus far,<sup>8</sup> France is also showing a skeptically negative attitude, and it is obvious that the present French Government, which is politically weak internally and externally, will to a great extent be influenced by its allies, namely Poland and the Little Entente, which for their part are entirely opposed to the idea of a four power pact. France's attitude, whose effect on England is unmistakable, makes the prospect for the conclusion of the pact quite problematical. This is a further reason why we should at this stage of the negotiations respond positively to Mussolini's suggestions. About the ultimate fate of his proposals nothing can as yet be predicted, especially since the still unknown future course of the Disarmament Conference must strongly affect the fate of the Italian proposal in a positive and in a negative sense.

You may promise the Russian Government that we will inform it about the further progress of the matter, especially about any change in our attitude. In that connection you may also state that the new Enabling Act [*Ermächtigungsgesetz*]<sup>9</sup> has finally given us the possi-

<sup>8</sup> See document No. 117.

<sup>9</sup> Passed by the Reichstag on Mar. 24, 1933. See *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik* (Berlin, 1939), vol. I, pp. 53-54.

bility of ratifying the protocol on the extension of the Berlin Treaty <sup>10</sup> and that the Foreign Ministry will immediately initiate the steps required for that purpose.<sup>11</sup>

V. NEURATH

<sup>10</sup> See document No. 29, footnote 9.

<sup>11</sup> A subsequent instruction to the Embassy in Moscow (telegram No. 67 Mar. 29: 3170/675890) requested that the text of the draft pact not be handed to the Soviet Government for the time being. "We must make sure that the matter is treated confidentially, as is requested by Italy, particularly since we are rejecting the Italian proposal to publish the draft. There are no objections to having the text read."

## No. 122

3170/675880-82

### *The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

#### Telegram

No. 54 of March 28

ROME, March 28, 1933—8: 30 p. m.

Received March 29—12: 15 a. m.

RM 422.

With reference to my telegram No. 52 of March 27.<sup>1</sup>

Conversation with Mussolini.

Mussolini stated that he had already taken note of the pro memoria I had handed Suvich. Except for details, he was basically in full accord with our remarks, hence with regard to "when conditions arise,"<sup>2</sup> and furthermore with regard to retention of the principle of having revision and armament questions decided by the four Powers alone; likewise with regard to our demand that Germany's freedom to rearm be limited only to the duration of the first disarmament commission,<sup>3</sup> and finally with respect to the wrong rendering of the important concept, "*portata effettiva*," as "practical value." I also pointed out, without mentioning Suvich, that yesterday the dangerous idea had been presented to me that in the revision question Poland's position was somewhat different from that of the Little Entente because Poland's opponent, Germany, is one of the four Powers but not Hungary, so that Poland, as it were, has a stronger claim to consultation for reasons of equality. I had already sharply denied this to Suvich and also did so to Mussolini, who agreed with me.

Mussolini was rather satisfied with the attitude of England. From Paris he had negative reports similar to ours (cf. telegram No. 62 of March 27<sup>4</sup>). The English Ambassador, with whom I spoke this morning, also had similar impressions of the French attitude, while

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 120.

<sup>2</sup> In English in the original.

<sup>3</sup> Apparently this should read "convention"; see document No. 115.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed (3170/675852). This Foreign Ministry telegram transmitted to the Embassy in Italy the contents of Paris telegram No. 217 of Mar. 25 which



the French Ambassador, who joined us, said that this pessimism was unjustified. It was true that a certain passage in MacDonald's speech <sup>5</sup> had not exactly strengthened France's inclination to go along, but he thought that the matter would nevertheless be settled; in such important decisions it was necessary to have patience and not expect success in 24 hours. He had just received a favorable letter from Herriot and on Friday would go to Paris for a week in order to push the matter there. In his opinion the plan could not possibly fail. I told Mussolini about this conversation and pointed out the dangers of the obvious policy of diluting pursued by Jouvenel and other French officials; one must not permit oneself to be intimidated by wild atrocity propaganda against Germany, the French war cry, or threats by Poland and the Little Entente, but must rather, while scrupulously avoiding pretexts for conflict, hold fast absolutely to the fundamental points of the pact proposal. Mussolini said he could assure me again that he was firmly resolved to do so. Without an effective possibility of revision and a satisfactory equality of rights the matter had no value for him.

On the other hand Mussolini reverted at great length to the absolute necessity of getting through the next few months without conflict. Toward the end of 1933 Italian armament, especially on sea and in the air, would be considerably stronger, so that one could then calmly (group garbled) face anything. I interposed the question of what was then to become of us if no clear result was achieved at the Disarmament Conference. He was of the opinion that MacDonald's plan could, for all practical purposes, be regarded already as having failed. For that very reason it had been safe and tactically right to agree to it through Soragna.<sup>6</sup> It would be best for Germany, he indicated, to strengthen her armament very cautiously until the dangerous period was over. In that connection he made reference to the forthcoming visit of Göring<sup>7</sup> and the possibility of cooperation with respect to the air force, which for both countries was after all the most important factor. Except for the excellent Italian Air Force, which he had displayed this morning in a review of all pilots, France would perhaps have attacked Italy before this. To be sure, the French people really had no inclination for it, but the General Staff and other circles were insistent, and from the Little Entente and Poland one could expect anything. That was evident from Poland's attitude regarding the Ambassador here, which sprang from the initiative of the Government and not of the Ambassador.<sup>8</sup> Unless Warsaw gave satisfactory explanations, he would recall the Ambassador there and leave a *Chargé d'Affaires*.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 115, footnote 10.

<sup>6</sup> Italian delegate to the Disarmament Conference.

<sup>7</sup> See document No. 162 and footnote 1.

Mussolini went at length into the subject of anti-German world propaganda of the Jews and Freemasons, which showed the great power and the excellent organization of these circles. In the beginning the same sort of agitation had been carried on against Italy with Henderson and MacDonald taking a leading part in it. A few years later they had made a friendly visit to Rome. I called his attention to démentis of German-Jewish organizations,<sup>9</sup> whereupon he said that he had received reports of the most reassuring kind from Cerruti, while according to his information both the French and, surprisingly, the English Ambassador in Berlin were agitating outrageously against the regime.

HASSELL

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<sup>9</sup> See document No 120, footnote 5.

## No. 123

3170/675887-89

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy*

## Telegram

IMMEDIATE  
No. 65

BERLIN, March 29, 1933—5:30 p. m.  
e. o. RM 428.

The Italian Ambassador informed us yesterday of Mussolini's intention to publish the draft pact, that is, in the English version, in order to counteract anxiety and distrust.<sup>1</sup> He asked for our agreement in this.

The Ambassador was told that we considered publication at the present time to be a mistake. According to all experience, publication would make further objective diplomatic negotiations much more difficult if not impossible. For example, the Reich Government would probably be forced to make public its suggestions for amendment in order to avoid criticism in the German press. But other governments, too, would not be able to avoid committing themselves more or less publicly. Indeed one could hope for success in the further treatment of the plan only if the élan of Mussolini's action is not hampered by public comment and criticism.

The Ambassador showed understanding for this, to be sure, but did not permit himself to be entirely convinced. It was finally arranged with him that he should telegraph our objections to Rome and also state that our final position would be withheld until we knew the result of your discussion with Mussolini.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> A more detailed account of this Italian démarche was recorded by Bülow on Mar. 28 (3170/675872-73).

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 122.

I should like to remark in addition that Mussolini's intention to publish the plan almost gives me the impression that he himself no longer counts on its success and is now merely thinking of tactical aspects. The argument that he wants to prevent anxiety and mistrust is not valid if only for the reason that involved in this connection are only governments such as the Polish Government and the Governments of the Little Entente, which have certainly learned about the draft text long ago from Paris.

I request that you, too, impress upon Mussolini once again how serious publication and its probable consequences would be at the present stage.<sup>3</sup>

NEURATH

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<sup>3</sup> See document No. 125.

### No. 124

9419/E666451

*The State Secretary in the Reich Chancellery to the President  
of the Reichsbank*

BERLIN, March 29, 1933.

Rk. 3119.

DEAR HERR PRESIDENT OF THE REICHSBANK: Upon instruction of the Reich Chancellor I have the honor to communicate to you the desire of the Reich Government that you participate in all meetings of the Reich Government, especially those where matters of finance or economic policy are considered. The Reich Chancellor would be grateful if you complied with this desire as far as your time permits. I shall take the liberty of sending you henceforth the invitations and agenda for the ministerial conferences and Cabinet meetings, together with the necessary background material.

Accept, etc.

L[AMMERS]

### No. 125

3170/675899

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 57 of March 30

ROME, March 30, 1933—8:45 p. m.

Received March 30—10:50 p. m.

RM 438.

With reference to your telegram No. 65.<sup>1</sup>

1. Mussolini has agreed that the draft pact is not to be published at this time.

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<sup>1</sup> Document No. 123.

2. According to confidential information received here the Little Entente is exerting (group garbled) pressure on Bulgaria with the aim of bringing about a kind of uprising of all the small nations against the idea of the four power pact, in a way similar to that known to have been already tried with Austria. Since Bulgaria was following a weak and uncertain policy, it was recommended that Berlin, too, strengthen Bulgaria's back.

3. Poland has given explanations which the Italians consider as a retreat. Potocki's resignation<sup>2</sup> was interpreted as a personal decision, in as much as Potocki was not a professional diplomat and did not feel capable of taking over the post in this difficult political situation; Poland would appoint another Ambassador immediately.

HASSELL

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<sup>2</sup> See document No. 120, footnote 4.

## No. 126

3170/675893-94

### *The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 80 of March 30

LONDON, March 30, 1933—11:02 p. m.

Received March 31—2:05 a. m.

RM 437.

With reference to your instruction RM 394 of March 24.<sup>1</sup>

I just had a detailed conversation with Simon concerning Mussolini's proposal for a pact.

In doing so, I held to the line of the instruction sent to the Ambassador at Rome, stated precisely our objections and wishes, and finally gave Simon the English draft of a new version of points II and III,<sup>2</sup> which Herr von Neurath<sup>3</sup> is bringing with him.

Simon displayed an understanding for my statements, but naturally he was not in a position to state his views on particulars; for this reason I can forgo repeating details of our conversation.

At the start of the discussion Simon stated that with respect to the Anglo-Italian text from Rome it was by no means a question of being definitely committed to this text. The changes in the text proposed by the English and accepted by Mussolini were only impulses of the

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 115.

<sup>2</sup> A new version of points II and III, in French, had been sent to Cerruti by Neurath on Mar. 27 (3170/675868-69). The proposed wording was substantially identical with the revisions suggested in document No. 115.

<sup>3</sup> Presumably a reference to Konstantin Alexander von Neurath, son of the Foreign Minister, an Attaché in the Foreign Ministry.

moment and did not fully exhaust the English position. The text had been submitted in the meantime to experts here for an evaluation. They had made a whole series of comments which still had to be studied. He therefore requested me expressly not to consider the Rome text as anything definitive.

Simon then also spoke of his impressions of the position taken by France and the small Powers with whose representatives he had spoken in Geneva. He felt that the reception in Central Europe was rather unfavorable and considerable resistance was evident there. France's decisions, too, were still very doubtful, and one must not forget that without the cooperation of France the whole plan would collapse.

I then pointed out to Simon the significance in general of the Mussolini pact idea, the sacrifice that we would take upon ourselves by tying German policy to the group of Great Powers, and the great interest that England, in particular, must have in the realization of the alignment planned.

Simon seemed entirely convinced, but on the other hand somewhat concerned as to how the matter should be pursued in practice. He thanked me for our suggestions and promised to study them.<sup>4</sup>

HOESCH

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<sup>4</sup> Cf. *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. v, document No. 61.

## No. 127

8825/E614286-87

### *Memorandum by the Director of Department IV*

BERLIN, March 31, 1933.

The domestic political situation in Danzig has deteriorated considerably in the last few days. The negotiations between President Ziehm on the one hand and the National Socialist faction on the other regarding an expansion of the Government have met with failure. The National Socialists demand that President Ziehm be replaced by Herr Rauschning.

For reasons of foreign policy it is urgently desired that the internal political situation in Danzig not undergo any deterioration and that no unrest of any sort occur there.

There are three possibilities.

1. Formation of a National Socialist Government and resignation of Herr Ziehm.

2. Reorganization of the Government with a National Socialist President and Herr Ziehm as Vice President also responsible for foreign affairs. (Herr Ziehm refuses this.)

3. Formation of a Government with Herr Ziehm as President and occupation of the post of Vice President as well as the other important offices (Interior, etc.) by National Socialists. (The National Socialists refuse this.)

The Gauleiter and the SA Führer of Danzig were with the Reich Chancellor yesterday evening in order to inform him about the internal political situation and to present the demands of the National Socialist party. It would be desirable to know what instructions the Reich Chancellor gave the two men (cf. the report of this morning <sup>1</sup>).

Perhaps the most practical thing to do—if possible as early as the beginning of next week—would be to schedule a joint discussion with Herr Ziehm, the Gauleiter, and the SA Führer from Danzig under the chairmanship of the Reich Chancellor and with the participation of the Foreign Ministry, and settle the questions unequivocally and conclusively.

Submitted herewith to the Reich Minister via the State Secretary.

MEYER

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<sup>1</sup>The *Völkischer Beobachter* of Mar. 31 published an account of Gauleiter Forster's meeting with Hitler on Mar. 30.

## No. 128

3170/675784-88

### *Foreign Minister Neurath to Ambassador Hassell*

BERLIN, March 27, 1933.

By courier

Sent April 1.

DEAR HASSELL: Thank you very much for your letter of March 22.<sup>1</sup> We have recognized in every way Mussolini's loyalty in the handling of the pact question and have also clearly expressed this in the Government declaration of the Chancellor.<sup>2</sup> I confess that I am surprised that this is not recognized by the Italians and that the words used by the Chancellor with reference to Italy are not considered as going far enough.<sup>3</sup> Even Mussolini could hardly expect that we would simply lay aside certain objections which we have to the wording of articles II and III of the pact, especially after their modification by the English. In any case he himself would not have hesitated, if the situation were reversed, to inform us of the Italian objections. Perhaps these objections were not sharply enough expressed in the first instructions you received. In the detailed statement of our position

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed (3170/675780-83).

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 111, footnote 6.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. 50 of Mar. 25 (3170/675844-45) Hassell had reported that the Italians "would have liked more enthusiastic and positive German approval in the Reichstag, although the Chancellor's speech on the whole made an excellent impression."

received by you today,<sup>4</sup> which I also gave Signor Cerruti on Saturday night,<sup>5</sup> these objections are now set forth clearly, however. They are so serious, especially as regards article III, that we must demand consideration if we are to regard the pact as acceptable to us. I hope that Mussolini will also realize this and take it into account in the drafting of the article.

Unfortunately, I can only confirm what you say about MacDonald's lack of understanding of the change in Germany. In view of my knowledge of MacDonald's personality, however, this lack of understanding does not surprise me; I found the same lack of understanding in him still last year with regard to Mussolini and Fascism. In the meantime he seems to have thought better of it, and I hope, therefore, that he will also do so with respect to the conditions in Germany once they have been completely consolidated. The Englishman can always reconcile himself to accomplished facts if he sees that they can no longer be changed. It will take some time, however, before this realization dawns on MacDonald.

As for the much-discussed trip by the Chancellor to Rome, I can inform you that the Chancellor has also recognized that it is inexpedient at present. This would naturally change if the pact should be concluded in a form acceptable to us. In such an event, however, Mussolini has, as far as I know, planned to have the ceremony of signing in Turin. To my knowledge there have been no new negotiations on the Chancellor's trip.

The assertions of the well-known correspondent<sup>6</sup> that the Chancellor is in favor of the pact but I am against it are completely absurd. Still more absurd, however, is the assertion that I would like at the same time to see the Austrian Anschluss assured and conditions in the Danube area settled. Neither the Chancellor nor I advocate such nonsensical ideas. If you want to, you may authoritatively deny this nonsense to the correspondent.

The instruction<sup>7</sup> with reference to your last report concerning German-Italian-Hungarian cooperation in the Danube area has in the meantime been sent to you. The complaints of M. de Kánya about lack of cooperation with Hungary are sufficiently known to me. We are constantly trying to meet the Hungarian wishes. You know your-

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 115.

<sup>5</sup> Neurath recorded this conversation which had taken place on Mar. 25 in a memorandum of Mar. 27 (3170/675866). It was with reference to the same conversation that he sent Cerruti a proposed new wording in French of articles II and III of the Italian proposal for a pact (3170/675868-69). See document No. 126, footnote 2.

<sup>6</sup> In his letter of Mar. 22, Hassell had referred to the "disastrous activity which the correspondent known to you is carrying on here."

<sup>7</sup> In his reply of Apr. 5 to Neurath, Hassell stated: "By way of keeping the files in order I might note that I have not yet received an instruction regarding my last report of Feb. 23—I 368 (document No. 35)—on cooperation in the Danube area." Cf. document No. 64, footnote 2.

self, however, how difficult that is, since these wishes concern the importation of agricultural products into Germany of which we ourselves produce more than enough. Unfortunately, we are unable, owing to our deplorable financial situation, to give the Hungarians a bonus of several millions with which they would be satisfied.

With regard to the editor Ernst Schröder of Flensburg, he is well known to me from my Copenhagen period and I esteem him highly because of his activity at the time of the plebiscite. At the moment I cannot tell to what extent the activity of Herr Schröder is endangered, but I shall be very glad, if necessary, to use my influence in his behalf.

On the Austrian question I should also like to say the following for your personal information.

On March 23 and 24 the Italian Ambassador brought up the question here whether it would not be advisable to support the Dollfuss Cabinet,<sup>8</sup> since every change of government in Austria can only bring new political uncertainty and, owing to the lack of real statesmen, only aggravate the internal situation in Austria. Cerruti has also discussed this question at length with the Chancellor. The Chancellor told him, as he himself said to me, that he could not support the Dollfuss Cabinet. The National Socialist movement in Austria would have to be given the place to which it is entitled. For stabilizing the situation it would therefore be necessary to have new elections. As for the Anschluss problem, that was not on the agenda.

FRHR. V. NEURATH

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<sup>8</sup> Cf. document No. 112 and footnote 3.

## No. 129

4938/E268470

### *The State Secretary to the Legation in Austria*

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, April 1, 1933.

RM 423.

A 374

Enclosed I am sending to you for your personal information a memorandum on Germany's foreign policy situation in March 1933, which was drawn up for the internal use of the Foreign Ministry.<sup>1</sup> Please do not put this enclosure into the files there but hide it away and destroy it in the course of this calendar year. Please acknowledge receipt of this instruction,<sup>2</sup> and, at the appropriate time, the destruction of the enclosure.<sup>3</sup>

BÜLOW

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<sup>1</sup> This memorandum has not been found. Cf. document No. 142.

<sup>2</sup> A note on this document which is from the files of the Legation in Austria indicates that an acknowledgement of the receipt was sent to Berlin on Apr. 19.

<sup>3</sup> A letter of Dec. 9 from the Legation to the Foreign Ministry notes that "the enclosure has been destroyed by burning." (4938/E268469)



## No. 130

6077/E450630-34

*Dr. Joseph Wirth*<sup>1</sup> to State Secretary Bülow

VIENNA, April 2, 1933.

II Oe. 412.

DEAR HERR STATE SECRETARY: Enclosed I have the honor to transmit a short memorandum for your information. I leave it entirely up to you as to what use will be made of it. Since the days of State Secretary von Maltzan<sup>2</sup> I have worked on political problems of the East and Southeast together with Herr von Maltzan and later with Dr. Stresemann and Dr. Curtius. I stood at the cradle of this work at the time as Reich Chancellor with my unforgotten co-worker, Baron von Maltzan. Up to the present time the main part of the work, which was extensive at the time, has remained secret. The change in political conditions has now brought these things to a conclusion. Naturally I am ready and happy at any time to give any information. I also have no objection if you inform your Minister accordingly.<sup>3</sup> Also if any other co-worker of the new era wishes to gain insight my oral report on 12 years of cooperation is available.

Yours, etc.

WIRTH

[Enclosure]

VIENNA, April 2, 1933.

## MEMORANDA

Minister Dr. Rieth is excellently informed about the political conditions in Vienna. His contacts with all political quarters are so extensive that it is impossible to supply information that is essentially new. Herr Rieth has been informed by me very honestly about the following, too. In recent days I talked repeatedly to the prominent leaders of the Christian Socials. On that occasion I was struck by a self-assured attitude. Since the death of prelate Dr. Seipel,<sup>4</sup> whose funeral I attended last year, a real political leader has been lacking so far. This seems to have changed recently. The leadership of Dr. Dollfuss is emerging strongly. He and his circle display a very strong political attitude. At first I thought that this attitude was perhaps only a matter of appearances. From careful inquiries and long discussions there emerged the surprising fact that Dr. Dollfuss

<sup>1</sup> Member of the Center party; Reich Chancellor and Foreign Minister, 1921-1922.

<sup>2</sup> Ago von Maltzan, Director of Department IVa (Eastern Europe) in the Foreign Ministry, December 1921-December 1922; State Secretary, December 1922-1924.

<sup>3</sup> A note on this document indicates that it was submitted to Neurath.

<sup>4</sup> Ignaz Seipel, Austrian Federal Chancellor, 1922-1924, 1926-1929.

and his political circle, which is apparently rather wide, are being strongly supported by Italy. One of the leading men of the Christian Socials, whose name I intend to mention to you, my dear State Secretary, after my return from Austria, maintains direct contact with Rome. Rome watches, so I hear, over the political independence of Austria with the greatest attention. Apparently Austria has obtained strong assurances. Moreover, Austria also received warnings from Italy about dangerous tensions between Germany and France which could arise if Germany should attempt to take Austria, so to speak, under her wings [*Oberaufsicht*]! I shall supply additional necessary information about this. Rome had stated, I was told, that she was not in a position to protect Austria further if the latter committed herself too far, so to say, with respect to Germany. The present political conditions in Germany, the existence of which naturally I am taking into account in a loyal manner, demand therefore a careful assessment of their significance.

These lines merely have as their purpose to submit to you, my dear State Secretary, what I have observed and found out. When Italy, as I discovered, is sounding warnings in Vienna with the added statement that in no circumstances must Vienna venture too far toward the German side, I consider it my duty to bring to the attention of the Foreign Ministry the things which I learned about.

Formerly I had the occasion to discuss developments with Federal Chancellor Dr. Seipel, whose view of Europe's political situation was particularly perspicacious. I was at least 15 times with Dr. Seipel and I have the satisfaction that his successor, Dr. Dollfuss, has also placed his full confidence in me. I have done my patriotic duty with respect to correcting things in Germany as well as defending Germany.

W[IRTH]

## No. 131

8825/E614285

### *Memorandum by the Director of Department IV*

BERLIN, April 3, 1933.  
zu IV Po. 2370.<sup>1</sup>

Herr von Thermann has been instructed to return immediately to Danzig in order to try to reorganize the Government on the following basis:

- 1) New elections will be called for July 1.
- 2) Until then the Government will be reorganized. Herr Ziehm will remain President; the National Socialists will be given the Vice-Presidency and some other posts (Ministry of Interior, etc.).

<sup>1</sup>IV Po. 2370: Not printed (9062/E634792-96), Thermann's report IG 440 of Mar. 31.

Respectfully submitted to the Foreign Minister with the request for approval.<sup>2</sup>

MEYER

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<sup>2</sup>Marginal note: "Approved v. N[eurath], Apr. 3."

On Apr. 4, at 1:30 p. m., Thermann reported from Danzig by telephone on discussions held earlier that day: "President Ziehm takes the position that new elections are now inevitable and should be held as soon as possible. Concerning this question and the date the parties still have to decide. New elections will presumably be held on May 29.

"The question of an interim reconstruction of the Government is therefore also in the opinion of President Ziehm pointless." (3015/598279)

## No. 132

3170/675936-37

*The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 89 of April 3

LONDON, April 3, 1933—12:21 p. m.

Received April 4—4:10 a. m.

RM 462.

With reference to my telegrams Nos. 80<sup>1</sup> and 83.<sup>2</sup>

The reports in this morning's press according to which Lord Tyrell had negotiated in Paris by direction of the English Government on possible changes in the text of the pact of Rome impelled me to call on Vansittart today in order to ask him how matters stand and to urge upon him the necessity of keeping contact with Germany, too, in the pact question. In this connection I repeated to him in broad outline the statements which I had made on March 30 to Sir John Simon and regarding which he was only incompletely informed, and left him another copy of the English draft of a new version of points II and III<sup>3</sup> which Herr von Neurath had brought along.

Vansittart admitted that the wording of the draft pact was being discussed in Paris. He explained this by saying that as was known the draft pact in the first Mussolini version had been published through a Paris indiscretion and that it had therefore been necessary to ease the position of the French Government with respect to the excited public opinion in France and the small countries by beginning discussions on the text which was still by no means in final form.

Upon my question as to the nature and content of this Anglo-French conversation Vansittart at first exhibited great caution and said he

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<sup>1</sup> Document No. 126.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (3170/675903-04). In this telegram of Mar. 31 Hoesch added further details to the report on his conversation with Simon given in telegram No. 80 and mentioned that the British Foreign Secretary had called the second sentence of point I of the Anglo-Italian draft objectionable.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 126, footnote 2.

would inform Simon of my statements. When I mentioned that Simon had already told me he considered sentence 2 of point I questionable, Vansittart said that indeed this sentence was one of the main bones of contention. The English Government therefore now proposed to omit this sentence altogether, since this idea of a more or less authoritative leadership by the Great Powers aroused dissatisfaction. Moreover, he went on to say, the whole problem of the pact depended at the moment more or less on the adroitness of the wording.

Referring to this, I stressed anew how important it was to let Germany participate in the discussion on the wording or to keep her informed, since otherwise the possibility of an agreement could hardly be advanced by such conversations.

Vansittart promised to inform Simon, and I placed myself at his disposal for further information.<sup>4</sup>

Hoesch

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<sup>4</sup> Reports of Anglo-French conversations concerning possible amendments to Mussolini's draft pact had already appeared in the press. On the basis of these reports Neurath instructed Hoesch (telegram No. 80 of Apr. 3, sent at 10 p. m.: 3170/675926) to "call on Sir John Simon at once and ask him for information on the state of the matter. We believe we can expect that there will not be any commitments of any sort between England and other Powers concerning equality of rights without our participation." See document No. 138.

## No. 133

3170/675933-35

### *The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 61 of April 3

ROME (Quir.), April 4, 1933—12:15 a. m.

Received April 4—4:10 a. m.

RM 461.

The English have proposed the following changes in the four power pact: The English text as agreed upon here in Rome is taken as a basis.<sup>1</sup> The last sentence of article I is omitted. The first paragraph of article II is unchanged. The second paragraph, in accordance with the English commentary, is to combine the former second paragraph<sup>2</sup> and the last sentence of the former article I. Text: "In order to facilitate the operation of article 19 of the Covenant, the four Powers recommend that if and when a government raises any particular question involv-

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 105.

<sup>2</sup> Actually the text of the first British draft contained no second paragraph of article II. The reference here is to the second *sentence* of article II. In the new British draft, a copy of which was given to the Foreign Ministry by the British Ambassador on Apr. 5 (3170/675969-72), the two sentences of article II were made into separate paragraphs.

ing treaty revision, the situation shall be clarified in the first instance by means of negotiations to be carried on and agreements to be reached on an equal footing between the four Powers and the governments directly concerned: Such negotiations and agreements to be based on joint recognition of the interests of all concerned and within the framework of the League of Nations. Article III: It is agreed that the principle of equality of rights as conceded to Germany under the conditions laid down in the Five Power resolution of December 11th must be given practical value. The four Powers recognize that the draft disarmament convention submitted by the United Kingdom delegation to the Disarmament Conference on March 16th not only gives effect to this principle but provides a satisfactory first stage of general disarmament, and they accordingly undertake to recommend it to the Disarmament Conference for acceptance. Germany, for homage [sic] part, agrees that the principle of equality of rights shall only be put into practice by degrees under agreements to which each of the four Powers must be a party.”<sup>3</sup> The remaining articles are unchanged. I have stated with respect to the wording of article II that the change relating to “equal footing,” etc., seems to me to be very dubious. Suvich said that according to the latest information the French position went considerably further in this regard, namely by demanding the participation of Poland and all the small countries in all cases. At the same time he reverted to the difficulty that in the case of the Corridor problem, Germany, as a member of the Four Power Directorate, was more or less both judge and party to the case.

In response to this I insisted on the absolute necessity of standing by the basic principles; the situation was not unfavorable for this, since the primary purpose of the Mussolini pact, namely to overcome the atmosphere of conflict, had already been reached and now it was easy for Italy to advance an alibi, whereas without Germany the pact lost all value for France and England. With regard to article III, I raised an objection to accepting the MacDonald plan en bloc. Suvich agreed in the main.

In regard to publication by the *Daily Herald* and others, Suvich said that this probably originated with the French side, which had chosen the original text, in order to create feeling against it—a weapon which had failed, however.

HASSELL

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<sup>3</sup> The passages in quotation marks are in English in the original. For the full text of the British proposal see *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. v, document No. 64.

## No. 134

6613/E498521-23

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, April 4, 1933—1:50 a. m.

SECRET

Received April 4—5:45 a. m.

No. 60 of April 3

zu IV Ru. 1485.<sup>1</sup>

For the Foreign Minister personally.

I. I had a very serious conversation with Litvinov today, who complained of measures taken by German officials and by unauthorized private persons against Soviet offices and individual Soviet citizens. The search of the commercial missions in Hamburg and Leipzig<sup>2</sup> had taken place partly contrary to treaty provisions. The Derop<sup>3</sup> offices and filling stations had for weeks been objects of searches mostly by unauthorized persons, in the course of which excesses had also been committed against property. Numerous Soviet citizens had been mistreated or arrested. In some cases there had been failure to report arrests to Soviet Consulates. Ambassador Khinchuk had been directed to lodge a sharp protest. These events had caused great agitation. The impression had been created that an organized anti-Soviet campaign was in progress in Germany. Confidence in the statements made by the Reich Chancellor, by Your Excellency and by me concerning the unchanged German policy with respect to the Soviet Union was thereby shaken. In particular, economic circles here doubted whether the previous close economic relations could be continued, particularly since the representations of the Soviet Embassy had thus far been unavailing.

Litvinov pointed out how very serious the situation was and asked that the German Government issue statements as soon as possible concerning the points of grievance, which had been brought up.

I replied to Litvinov that the measures taken by the German authorities had, to my knowledge, been legal and in accordance with the treaties. The cases of alleged mistreatment of and injury to Soviet citizens were being officially investigated. Where excesses had

<sup>1</sup> IV Ru. 1485; Document No. 140.

<sup>2</sup> In a note verbale dated Apr. 3 the Soviet Embassy in Berlin protested against the search of the premises of the commercial mission in Leipzig which had taken place on Apr. 1 (6025/H045521-22). In telegram No. 59 of Apr. 3 (6025/H045528-29) Dirksen reported on the attacks in the Soviet press occasioned by the Leipzig incident.

<sup>3</sup> Derop was a contraction for Deutsche Vertriebsgesellschaft für russische Ölprodukte A. G. This was an organization for marketing Soviet petroleum products set up as a German corporation with exclusively Soviet capital; it operated some 2,000 filling stations in Germany.

been committed, as, for instance, in the case (group garbled) Lonsky,<sup>4</sup> regrets had been expressed.

These individual happenings ought not to be pushed over into the political field. We, too, in numerous instances, had valid complaints of blunders committed by the Soviet authorities with respect to German citizens, without drawing political conclusions from them.

Our political and economic line had already been clearly defined by the Chancellor's speech<sup>5</sup> and the forthcoming ratification of the Protocol on extension of the Berlin Treaty.<sup>6</sup>

I wanted to complain about the sharp and unjust attacks of the Soviet press on German official personages and of the repeated use of the radio for such attacks. Likewise about today's comment in *Izvestia*, which casts doubt on the statements of the Chancellor concerning our policy toward the Soviet Union.

II. Litvinov's statements reflect the great agitation which has seized the Soviet Government and the public also in the last few days. They would put up here with isolated official measures as well as isolated excesses committed by private persons. But the persistence of these occurrences was disturbing and agitating, particularly the procedure against the Derop and its filling stations, as well as the alleged molestation, arrests, and mistreatment of Soviet citizens. This gives rise here to the fears that the trends in Germany that are opposed to good German-Soviet relations are gaining the upper hand over the positive attitude in official circles. In an economic respect, there is anxiety over the interference with Derop sales and the resulting loss of foreign exchange, and there is doubt whether Russian activity can continue. It is my conviction that a serious crisis has been reached in our mutual relations. If it should not be possible to eliminate it, the Soviet Government will, with its characteristic recklessness, draw its conclusions for the entire area of our mutual relations and reverse its economic and military policies also. The economic consequences of such a reversal by our largest customer and debtor are obvious. Reversals may also be expected in foreign and military policy in view of the present attitude of France and Poland. After mature consideration, I consider it urgently necessary to report to Your Excellency personally at once concerning the situation that has arisen here and the results that might ensue.

DIRKSEN

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<sup>4</sup> The reference is probably to the case of the Soviet citizen Ishlonsky, alleged to have been mishandled by SA men. Documents on this case are filmed on serial 6025.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 104 and footnote 5.

<sup>6</sup> In telegram No. 70 of Mar. 30 (6613/E498511), Bülow had sent word that the Cabinet was going to discuss ratification and that it would be accepted. See document No. 29, footnote 9; also document No. 140 and footnote 5.

## No. 135

3170/675944-45

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

No. 63 of April 4

ROME (Quir.), April 4, 1933—6:10 p. m.

Received April 4—9:30 p. m.

RM 469.

With reference to your telegram No. 71 of April 3.<sup>1</sup>

Directly after the conversation with Suvich,<sup>2</sup> Mussolini late yesterday evening asked that I call on him this morning. He has just told me the following:

The English modifications, as MacDonald had also informed him by private letter,<sup>3</sup> represented a Cabinet decision. However, he had already told the English Ambassador that after superficial study he thought he could hardly accept the changes. Now he was going to send the Englishman an answer tomorrow in which he would state that in the first place the passage in article II about "equal footing between the four Powers and the Governments directly concerned"<sup>4</sup> was not acceptable, because the principle of four-power decision had to be absolutely adhered to, although naturally other Powers concerned would have to be called in later. In the second place, he could not agree to the inclusion of the MacDonald plan in article III. This would introduce an entirely new element into the pact. At most one could agree that the MacDonald plan be adopted by the four Powers in a special protocol as the basis for further discussions at the Disarmament Conference. Finally, the expression "practical value,"<sup>5</sup> as had been pointed out previously, was not accurate. I remarked to this that we certainly had the same objections,<sup>6</sup> and I pointed again to the importance of our objection to a continued restriction on our freedom to rearm beyond the first convention, to which he expressed agreement. Mussolini said it would be useful if Germany would now also take a position officially, perhaps on the basis of a Cabinet decision, and would communicate her objections to the English and Italian Governments. Tomorrow or the next day he would give me the text of his answers to the English proposal of amendment.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (3170/675927). This telegram informed Hassell of telegram No. 80 of Apr. 3 to London. See document No. 132, footnote 4.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 133.

<sup>3</sup> See *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. v, document No. 66.

<sup>4</sup> In English in the original.

<sup>5</sup> In English in the original. See document No. 105.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. document No. 115.

<sup>7</sup> In telegram No. 65 of Apr. 5, Hassell reported that the Italian Government was delaying its reply to the British proposals until it had seen the French memorandum which was to be handed in shortly (3170/675982). For the text of Mussolini's reply to MacDonald, see *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. v, document No. 71.



Mussolini seemed to me to have no very great hope of success any longer. I pointed out to him, as I had pointed out to Suvich yesterday, that the Italian and German position was not now unfavorable tactically. Actually the French and English side could hardly make any justified objection to Mussolini's original proposal; should such a proposal become the object of various modifications, however, it would lose its essential value. Mussolini stated that his proposal had been a boy at first, the English now wanted to make a hermaphrodite out of it and in the hands of the French it would become a girl. He would not play that game, for he wanted it to stay a boy. I strengthened him in this decision to the best of my ability.

HASSELL

### No. 136

3170/675987-91

#### *The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry*

TOP SECRET

Tgb. No. A/665

Moscow, April 4, 1933.

Received April 7.

RM 493.

Subject: Attitude of the Soviet Government on the draft of a four power pact.

With reference to your instruction RM 408 of March 27,<sup>1</sup> and telegraphic instruction of March 29, 1933.<sup>2</sup>

In a lengthy conversation yesterday with People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs Litvinov, I communicated to him the information for the Soviet Government, as directed in the above-mentioned instruction. In my statements I adhered closely to the train of thought developed in the instruction. I informed M. Litvinov of the substance of the English draft by reading aloud the text of the most important provisions. I particularly emphasized the confidential nature of my communications.

M. Litvinov heard my statements with keen interest and was grateful for the information I gave him. On the draft pact itself he took the position that might be expected of the Soviet Government from its general attitude on questions of West European power groupings and from the editorial on this draft pact which had already appeared in *Izvestia*. (Cf. report Tgb. No. A/666 of April 3 of this year.<sup>3</sup>)

The Soviet Union, as M. Litvinov stated, viewed the Mussolini plan with great reservations and with a certain caution. The original pur-

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 121.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 121, footnote 11.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

pose of the pact might be a limited one. But in political arrangements of this kind one never knew whither they would ultimately lead. It was quite possible that questions directly concerning the Soviet Union would be discussed by this consortium of the four Western Powers. It was also possible that decisions would be taken that would adversely affect the Soviet Union. As long as the four partners to the pact, as permanent members of the Council of the League of Nations, confined themselves to questions belonging more strictly within the competence of the League of Nations, the Soviet Union had less objection.

I replied to M. Litvinov that, at least from Germany and Italy, he could not expect participation in anti-Soviet combinations, and asked him what kind of scheme *he* had in mind.

With some hesitation, M. Litvinov replied that the Soviet Union was interested in most West European questions. It would therefore consider an observer's role as the one best suited to its interests, without, however, having its hands tied in any way.

This formulation embodies most clearly the policy that the Soviet Government takes with respect to all international institutions, groupings, and conferences—be it the Kellogg Pact, the World Economic Conference, the European or Disarmament Conference. To be sure, it wishes to be invited warmly to participate, but it wishes to confine itself only to the role of observer, which assumes no obligations, but reserves the right of unrestricted criticism.

In this "struggle to be present" [*"Kampf ums Dabeisein"*] aside from the mistrust and the inclination not to be committed, the need for prestige also plays a part. This is clearly expressed in the editorial in *Izvestia* of March 30, in the words, "that the Soviet Power as a world power cannot remain indifferent at the sight of the conflicting currents on the world stage and the efforts to create a so-called concert of four Powers that arrogates to itself the right to direct the destinies of the nations."

The position taken by M. Litvinov corresponds also, in the last analysis, to the geopolitical situation of Russia and the foreign policy pursued by her from time immemorial. Russia has always sought political ties with the West European Powers, has then become involved in luckless wars, in disadvantageous conferences and has then for a longer period turned her back on the West in annoyance, disappointment, and mistrust. At present Russia is in a period where, after the terrible shock of the World War and after the Revolution, she is making contact with the West, without, however, having decided on a definite orientation toward the West or the East.

I should like finally, in connection with page 9 of the instruction of March 24 of this year,<sup>4</sup> given to Ambassador von Hassell, to add

<sup>4</sup> Document No. 115.

a comment concerning German-Russian relations: I agree entirely with the statements made in the instruction that the pact implied a very extensive German performance in return, since on the large questions of European policy we would be tying ourselves to the other Powers. In my opinion, this German performance in return is particularly great, especially because we thereby give up to a certain extent our complete freedom to shape our relations with the Soviet Union. While for France the Soviet Union is only a means of pressure against a refractory Poland and Rumania, Soviet Russia has thus far been for us an indispensable second jaw of the pincers against Poland. Since the four power pact is now supposed to constitute the mainstay in the implementation of our policy of revision, the limitations on our freedom of action in the matter of foreign policy at the same time represent a corresponding weakening of the Russian trump card.

In the conversation with M. Litvinov, it appeared that his skepticism regarding the positive outcome of the pending negotiations at the same time tempered his objections to this plan. It is to be expected that he will present these objections all the more strongly, the more prospects improve for a conclusion of the pact.

At the close of my conversation I informed M. Litvinov that the ratification of the protocol of extension to the Berlin Treaty would soon get under way by the Foreign Office on the basis of the new Enabling Act.<sup>5</sup>

VON DIRKSEN

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<sup>5</sup> See document No. 121, footnote 9.

## No. 137

4620/E200276-79

*Ambassador Dirksen to State Secretary Bülow*

Moscow, April 4, 1933.

DEAR BÜLOW: You will have gathered from my telegrams of yesterday<sup>1</sup> that developments of the past few days have led to a very serious crisis. The great tension which already existed here was temporarily relaxed as a result of the Chancellor's speech. The new incidents of recent days then filled the cup to overflowing. You know that I am not in the habit of getting into a panic, and that I have in general judged the situation in the Soviet Union correctly. You will therefore believe me when I say that the situation is very serious and that I consider a trip to Berlin for the purpose of reporting urgently necessary.

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 134 and footnote 2.

The danger of a serious and persisting conflict affecting all aspect of our relations is, in my opinion, only permissible if there are really cogent reasons for it. Otherwise we must try to eliminate the crisis.

If we try to eliminate it, then, in my opinion the following is necessary:

(a) Precautions must be taken that no new incidents occur; particularly that raids on the Derop be avoided—possibly through police protection of the most exposed business offices and filling stations—and that Soviet nationals are not molested—through suitable instructions to the police authorities and formations (just as were issued in the case of the counterboycott operation).

(b) No further house searches of Soviet institutions, such as commercial missions, Soviet schools, etc., unless there is convincing evidence of unlawful activity.

(c) Present the surely ample evidence which has been found, showing participation of Soviet officials in Communist propaganda and punishable offenses and thereby disprove Soviet assertions that the police measures taken had produced no results.

(d) Consideration of the individual cases of Russian complaints. Should blunders have been committed in specific instances, granting of the usual redress.

The principal thing is speed in the examination of the material and *early* rendering of at least a preliminary decision. The greatest danger consists in the crisis acquiring a chronic character.

I do not need to mention especially that I made very serious and detailed statements to Litvinov on the basis of prepared notes: that Hitler's Cabinet had given economic and political proof of his positive attitude toward the Soviet Union but that this had not met with a very lively response on the opposite side; that the Soviet press and radio had used inadmissible, unseemly, and irritating language, and were still doing so; that we, for our part, had reported numerous cases of arrest and complaints and had had to wait for months for their disposition or even a reply. Yet we had not shifted these individual cases to the political arena.

That is the essential point: The individual cases are now all in the political arena. It would take me too far afield to explain in writing how this development came about, and that it was bound to take this course in this country. One thing is certain: If we do not reach a settlement, we must expect a conflict with the Soviet Government, the consequences of which will be *very severe* in a political and economic respect.

I have written these things to you quickly in a private letter because there is not enough time for a studied report, and I hope soon to be able to express myself orally in detail.

Enclosed is a copy for Meyer.

With best regards,

DIRKSEN

## No. 138

8170/875946-51

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy*Telegram <sup>1</sup>

IMMEDIATE

No. 76

BERLIN, April 5, 1933.

zu RM 461 <sup>2</sup> I;  
469.<sup>3</sup>

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 61 <sup>2</sup> and 63.<sup>3</sup>

The new English proposals actually involve such essential changes in the original Italian proposal that the basic ideas of the latter are thereby not only impaired but converted into entirely the opposite. I am of the opinion, however, that the Italian demands alluded to by Signor Mussolini would not be enough to produce a satisfactory pact.

1. It is quite evident that the deletion of the second sentence of article I makes the pact considerably more formless in the political sense; indeed the English want it that way in order to accommodate France and her allies. With this weakened article the entire pact has hardly greater significance in a general political respect than the repeated statements over the last few years about peaceful cooperation, as they were last made, for instance, by the Powers at the Lausanne Conference.<sup>4</sup> Still, this weakening of the pact could be tolerated from the German point of view since it does not injure specifically German interests. But the situation is different on the following points:

2. If article II is modified as proposed by the English, it would no longer strengthen and stimulate the idea of revision but would mean a deterioration of the present situation in our disfavor. Revision is now to be related entirely to article 19 of the League of Nations Covenant. There is no longer any mention of the four Powers explicitly committing themselves to revision of the peace treaties and wanting to make the carrying out of this revision an element of their policy. Moreover, the agreement anticipated between the four Powers and other countries directly involved is nothing other than a radical curtailment of Germany's political freedom of action, since the procedure it provides at the first stage is to take precedence over the procedure in accordance with article 19. Article 19 at least makes it possible for us on our own initiative to take a question of revision before the League of Nations and in so doing to achieve, in certain circumstances, at least a moral victory. Now we are supposed to invoke article 19 only after agreement is reached with the four Powers and with the Power affected by revision, such as Poland, for example. It is clear, however, that if in a concrete case, such an accord could be

<sup>1</sup> According to a marginal note by an official of the State Secretary's Secretariat, this instruction was transmitted to Rome by telephone between 3:15 and 4 p. m. on Apr. 5.

<sup>2</sup> RM 461: Document No. 133.

<sup>3</sup> RM 469: Document No. 135.

<sup>4</sup> This conference on reparations was in session from June 16-July 15, 1932.

reached among the Western Powers plus Poland, revision would thereby in this case be definitively settled so that application of League of Nations procedure would be altogether pointless. This inherent contradiction in the new version results from the fact that the original idea is given up entirely. According to this idea—which in the historical sense is consistent with the League of Nations Covenant, but is in fact independent of it—the four Powers should commit themselves to revision in a positive form and exercise their political leadership in order to carry out the principle. Instead of this, it is intended to lay down certain provisions for carrying out article 19, which make it entirely useless to us and no longer mean that the application of article 19 is facilitated as the introductory words assert. These serious objections would, to be sure, be somewhat modified, but by no means overcome, by the elimination desired by Mussolini of participation on an equal footing of Powers like Poland. What matters is that agreement also between the four Powers should not become a prerequisite and obstacle to the procedure for revision, but that the entire article of the new pact should receive a different structure which sets the question of revision in a positive direction for the future without actually taking it up now.

3. In the new draft, article III first of all brings the important change for the worse that in the first sentence our equality is now only recognized under the terms of the December agreement.<sup>5</sup> In this way the coupling of equality with the question of security, which was still left that way in December, would be established in principle for all time. Second, it is also obviously impossible, in our view, to accept the MacDonald plan in toto. Although we termed this plan at Geneva a possible basis for discussion, we would, however, be able to recognize it as the final solution of the Geneva Conference only in the event of extensive changes in its details, which we cannot go into here. Our objections are by no means disposed of, however, by having the acceptance of the MacDonald plan expunged from article II. There still remains the crucial objection, already set forth in the instruction of March 24<sup>6</sup> and now communicated by you to Signor Mussolini, to binding Germany beyond the duration of the first convention. If Signor Mussolini shares our point of view in this respect, he must urge that sentences 1 and 3 of the new English version of article III also undergo basic revision in accordance with our views.

Since the English Government has now accommodated the wishes of the French group to such an extraordinary degree, it is our principal task to prevent the formation of a united front of Italy, England, and France which would place us in an extremely dangerous situation. Signor Mussolini's latest statements<sup>7</sup> give us a certain confidence in this respect. I consider it advisable, however, to explain to him once more in detail the German points of view by means of the foregoing statements and with reference to the various phrasings. ~~Otherwise there exists perhaps a possibility that he might finally agree with the English and French on versions which, to be sure, would outwardly~~

<sup>5</sup> This refers to the Five Power Declaration of Dec. 11, 1932. See Editors' Note, p. 18.

<sup>6</sup> Document No. 115.

<sup>7</sup> See document No. 135.

satisfy his own wishes to a certain extent, without, however, substantially taking into account the German point of view.<sup>8</sup> It is still to be considered whether and when it will be desirable to come out with a final and formal German position and indeed it cannot be decided until after the French position, which, according to the press, can be expected in the next few days, is known to us. Moreover, we have already presented our views clearly and definitely enough both in Rome and in London. You may also state in this connection that these representations are not at all of a provisional or unofficial nature, but that they are based on my exhaustive discussions with the ministers of the departments concerned and with the Chancellor, so that our official position is already so adequately defined in substance that it may be supported by Mussolini in dealing with the other Powers.<sup>9</sup>

Foreign Minister

<sup>8</sup> The words scored through were deleted before the instruction was sent.

<sup>9</sup> This instruction was sent on the same date to the Embassies in Great Britain and France as telegrams Nos. 83 and 166, respectively (3170/675952-65). The instruction to London, in addition, directed the Ambassador to express to Sir John Simon astonishment at Britain's action and to state that the British Government would not be helping the matter if it sought "to conduct, more or less behind our back, negotiations which affected primarily Germany's vital interests."

## No. 139

3170/675977-79

*The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 260 of April 5

PARIS, April 5, 1933.

Received April 5—9:55 p. m.

RM 475.

For the State Secretary personally.

A leading member of the Radical party informed me that the group of the Left Democratic Radicals and Radical Socialists at a meeting today will take a position on the wording of the French memorandum on the Mussolini pact.<sup>1</sup>

There was a split in the group itself. Herriot was opposed to the entry of France into the four power pact. Caillaux and others would advocate entry if the pact were brought within the League of Nations framework. It could be assumed that the view of Caillaux and his friends would prevail. The latter will probably also recommend that the French memorandum propose as general and brief a draft of the pact as possible, and that in the first article the Powers commit themselves merely to exchange ideas with the aim of keeping the peace in Europe. The drafting of the article regarding armaments questions was causing far greater difficulties since nearly the entire group was

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 151.

very much disturbed over events in Germany in the past weeks. The majority inclined to the view that France must not tolerate any rearmament at all on the part of Germany. Reich Chancellor Hitler had made a reassuring statement in his speech in the Reichstag<sup>2</sup> regarding relations with France, but the impression was that it was not the Reich Chancellor, whose authority over the large masses had aroused great attention, but the Minister of Interior,<sup>3</sup> who exerted a decisive influence on the attitude of the present Government not only in domestic policy but also in foreign policy. This view had developed out of reflections about the action against the Jews. According to various reports of a private nature, the Reich Chancellor had foreseen but not been able to prevent the dangerous effect on foreign policy of this action entrusted to authorities without experience in foreign policy. Nevertheless the fact that the Reich Chancellor had succeeded in having this action confined to one day had been somewhat reassuring. It must not be forgotten, however, that "large quantities of German china had meanwhile been smashed" and new long and difficult explanations were necessary abroad in order to allay unrest. How unfavorable the effects of the action against the Jews had been in France was best shown by the sympathy expressed by high-ranking Catholic and Protestant clergy at the French-Jewish demonstrations against the anti-Jewish movement in Germany. In this connection it ought to be especially considered that the position of the Jews in France in a social respect is much less favorable than in England. There was no doubt, moreover, that the operation had been fully exploited by French circles antagonistic to Germany for material or political reasons and that they had fully attained their purpose of painting again in the blackest of colors, even to the rural population, the danger from a Germany inclining to deeds of violence.

If, therefore, France remained more or less intransigent on the point of armaments questions, it was to be attributed principally to these events. In this connection it must also be considered that the assignment of the SA to police duties and their arming is regarded as rearmament. My informant considered himself authorized to have expressed thereby not only the prevailing view of the Democratic Left but also of the Socialist party. The attempt would nevertheless be made by some members of the Democratic group at today's meeting not to shut completely the door to a further exchange of views between France and Germany regarding armaments questions, since they understood that a question was involved here that was regarded by Germany as a question of prestige.

Likewise, according to my informant, it is to be urged by members who are advocating an understanding with Germany, with the sup-

<sup>2</sup> On Mar. 23. See document No. 104, footnote 5.

<sup>3</sup> This is probably a reference to Göring, who was at this time Acting Prussian Minister of Interior, rather than to Frick, the Reich Minister of Interior.



port of Caillaux and his friends, that article 19 and other pertinent articles be not incorporated in the French memorandum in order not to prevent a more liberal interpretation of these articles in later diplomatic negotiations based on the pact.

At the end of our conversation, my informant warned strongly against the resort to any National Socialist activity of any kind in the Saar region, which might very easily be used as a pretext for the dispatching of French troops and had recently been the subject of an exhaustive discussion among the French authorities.

KÖSTER

## No. 140

6613/E498517-18

### *The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union*

#### Telegram

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, April 5, 1933—11:10 p. m.

No. 79

e. o. IV Ru. 1485.

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 60<sup>1</sup> and 61,<sup>2</sup> as well as with reference to our telegram No. 70.<sup>3</sup>

I. Please inform the Soviet Government that, on the basis of the Enabling Act, the Reich Government is in a position and is also prepared to ratify the Protocol of extension of June 24, 1931,<sup>4</sup> and to exchange instruments of ratification.<sup>5</sup> We desire that the fact of rati-

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 134.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (6613/E498524). In this telegram Dirksen reported that the communiqué in *Pravda* concerning Litvinov's protest had been published by the Soviet Foreign Ministry without prior agreement with the Embassy.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (6613/E498511). See document No. 134, footnote 6.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 29, and footnote 9.

<sup>5</sup> Minutes of the Cabinet session of Apr. 4 contain the following passage under the heading "German-Soviet Protocol on the extension of the Treaty of April 24, 1926, and of the Conciliation Convention of January 25, 1929":

"The Minister of Foreign Affairs stressed the fact that the Protocol on the extension of the German-Soviet Treaty had already been signed on July [sic] 24, 1931, and approved by the then Reich Government. Ratification of the Convention had so far never been possible because of the parliamentary situation.

"The Minister of Foreign Affairs urgently recommended the approval of the extension of the Treaty and ratification immediately following. On the other hand, the fact of ratification should, in no circumstances, be published for the time being in order that it might not become prematurely known to the Russians, with whom the Foreign Ministry was at the moment still negotiating on certain other questions.

"The Chancellor indicated his approval of the statements of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He, too, was of the opinion that for the time being we must refrain from publication because of the general political situation, particularly the relations of England with Russia. Should the Minister of Foreign Affairs consider the time right for publication, he asked that he be consulted in advance.

"The Cabinet decided, in accordance with the proposal of the Foreign Ministry of March 29, 1933—V 4023 [1507/371497-506]—to approve the Protocol on the extension of the German-Soviet Russian Treaty of April 24, 1926, and of the Conciliation Convention procedure of January 25, 1929." (3598/792262, 792266-67)

fication be published in both countries on the same day. The instrument of ratification would be sent there at once.

Since we consider it very important that the instruments of ratification be exchanged as soon as possible, your presence in Moscow seems indispensable. Please therefore, defer your visit to Berlin, to which I agree in principle, particularly since I shall be absent from April 9 to 23.

II. Ambassador Khinchuk gave me on April 4 a written summary of the statement which People's Commissar Litvinov made to you.<sup>6</sup> Khinchuk also delivered a statement showing the drop in Russian sales in Germany as a result of the measures against Derop. He asked that we should see to it that Derop was again enabled to operate undisturbed. I pointed out with emphasis to Khinchuk the results of the police action against Derop (see instruction IV Ru. 1458 of April 4<sup>7</sup>). Khinchuk promised to see to it that the employees of Derop would in future not engage in Communist activities in any way.

III. The Soviet Government is not without blame for the present disturbance in German-Russian relations. Recall the radio propaganda of the Moscow transmitter, continued despite our protests, the communistic activities of the Derop employees, the mistaken personnel policy of Derop, 85 percent of whose employees belong to the Communist party, and other connections with the Communist party of Germany. Please call Litvinov's attention to this and tell him that the Reich Government will look into all cases of molestation of Soviet nationals and will see to it that the Soviet Russian business organizations in Germany are permitted to work without interference, in accordance with the existing treaties, but that it must expect, for its part, that Soviet Russian business organizations drop all connections of whatever kind with the Communist party.

Telegraphic report requested.<sup>8</sup>

NEURATH

<sup>6</sup> Not printed (9459/E667388-95), Völckers' memorandum of the interview and the text of the documents presented by Khinchuk.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed (9459/E667370-73).

<sup>8</sup> Dirksen's reply is document No. 147.

## No. 141

8781/E611944-48

*Chancellor Hitler to President Hindenburg*<sup>1</sup>

APRIL 5, 1933.

Rk. 3569.

DEAR HERR PRESIDENT: The counteraction of the German people against the swamping of certain professions by the Jews is caused by two things:

<sup>1</sup> The unsigned draft of this letter bears corrections in Hitler's handwriting (8781/E611940-48).

First, the obvious injustice that exists on account of the outrageous slighting of the dominant German people [*Staatsvolk*]. For today there is a whole series of learned professions [*Intelligenzberufe*], e. g., the professions of the lawyers and doctors, in which in individual localities in the Reich—in Berlin and in other cities—the Jews occupy up to 80 percent and more of all positions. At the same time hundreds of thousands of German intellectuals, including innumerable veterans of the war, are on the dole or have some sort of entirely subordinate position and become entirely demoralized.

Second, the serious shock to the authority of the State caused by the fact that here an alien body that was never entirely amalgamated with the German people, and whose ability is mainly in the business field, has pushed into governmental positions and furnishes here the mustard seed for a corruption about the extent of which today one still has no conception that would come close to being adequate. The cleanness of the old Prussian State depended in no small degree on the fact that the Jews had only a very limited access to the civil service. The officers' corps kept itself almost entirely clear of it. The German people to an overwhelming majority also recognize these defects emotionally and suffer together from their consequences. The counter-action in the present-day form was set off only by the entirely unjustified attack made by the Jews through their international atrocity and boycott agitation.

It is understandable that in such a muddled situation the counter-action involves serious consequences for the individual. But unemployment is no harder for a Jewish intellectual than the unemployment that has affected millions of our own people. And it has affected them as a result of general conditions for which they cannot be blamed, but for which on the whole one must make alien factors responsible which, even before November 1918 and particularly since then, have pursued a systematic destruction of the Reich.

Herr Field Marshal, in a generous and humane way you are taking up the cause of those members of the Jewish people<sup>2</sup> who at one time were forced to perform war service as a result of general conscription. I have complete understanding for this noble humane sentiment, Herr Field Marshal. May I nevertheless respectfully point out that the members and supporters of my movement, who were Germans, were for years driven from all government positions without regard for wife and child and without regard for the war service they had performed. Even formerly the National Socialist party had the highest percentage of war veterans in its parliamentary group in the Reichstag. Everything was represented in it, beginning with generals and officers with the Pour le Mérite down to the simple private. And it's exactly the same with the members and supporters. Nevertheless the members of this largest movement of millions of the German people, whose

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<sup>2</sup>No immediate record of Hindenburg's intervention has been found. Cf. *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. XIX, pp. 144-145.

primary aim in the struggle was the reestablishment of a German Wehrmacht, were not allowed to work in government enterprises even as workers or clerks. Those responsible for this cruelty were the same Jewish parties who are complaining today when their supporters with a thousand times more justification are barred from access to government positions in which they can be of little use but can do a limitless amount of damage. It was only through your intervention, Herr Field Marshal, that this outlawing of the members of my movement was done away with in individual cases, and then finally in general. Nevertheless, Herr Field Marshal, I respect the noble motives of your sentiment, and I have already discussed with Minister of Interior Frick the preparation of a law that will remove the solution of these questions from the arbitrariness of separate actions and regulate them in general by a law. And in this connection, I have also pointed out to the Minister of Interior the cases that you, Herr Field Marshal, wish to see excepted. The first deliberative discussions of this law were already held at the end of last week and it will provide for consideration for those Jews who either themselves performed war service or suffered injury through the war or who deserve well on any other grounds, or in a long term in office never gave cause for complaint. In general the first aim of this cleansing process is only intended to be the restoration of a certain healthy and natural relationship, and secondly, to remove from certain positions important to the state those elements which cannot be entrusted with the existence or nonexistence of the Reich. For in the coming years we will not be able to avoid taking precautions so that certain events that cannot be told to the rest of the world for higher reasons of state really remain secret. The only way to guarantee this is through the inner homogeneity of the administrative organs involved.

Herr Reich President, please be convinced that I shall try to take into account your noble sentiment to the greatest possible extent. I understand your inner motivations and, moreover, I myself often suffer from the harshness of a fate that forces one to make decisions which for humane reasons one would wish a thousand times to avoid.

The law under consideration will be drafted<sup>3</sup> as quickly as possible, and I am convinced that this question, too, will then have found the best possible solution.

In sincere and deep respect, yours, etc.

ADOLF HITLER

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<sup>3</sup> On Apr. 7, the law "for the restoration of the professional civil service" was promulgated; it became the model for additional legislation aimed at barring the Jews from certain professions and contained also certain provisions in favor of Jewish war veterans. A similar law affecting the legal profession was published at the same time. Text in *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1933, pt. 1, pp. 175-177.

## No. 142

3598/792283-295

*Extract From the Minutes of the Conference of Ministers, Held at the Reich Chancellery, on April 7, 1933, at 4:15 p. m.<sup>1</sup>*

Rk. 4164;  
4165.

*3. Foreign Policy Situation.*

The Foreign Minister made the following statement:

The aims of German foreign policy are determined by the Versailles Treaty. Our demand for revision requires the employment of all possible energies. The possibility of making revision a reality likewise depends on the Versailles Treaty. The weakening which Germany has suffered through the Versailles Treaty is much greater than is generally known. For a long time to come we have no prospect of restoring our military equality with respect to the other countries. Five years are necessary to restore the equilibrium with respect to Poland alone. All of our military measures, particularly in so far as they pertain to the Luftwaffe, attract attention abroad and arouse distrust.

Our security with respect to France is based on the Locarno Treaty, with respect to Poland on her geographical position between Russia and Germany, with respect to all other countries merely on treaties and the general desire of the world for peace.

Germany's situation in the east is particularly exposed. Defense against Poland is possible only if the support of Russia is assured. At the present moment it is uncertain whether this can be counted on.

Our financial situation is exceedingly precarious. If even the pound and the dollar have not withstood the attacks by France, then the mark will certainly stand up against such attacks even less.

Germany's credit has a prospect of recovery only if our balance of trade can develop favorably.

The necessity of imports and of payment for considerable quantities of raw materials remains.

We find ourselves in an economic situation in which all countries are trying to equalize their balance of trade in the international exchange of goods with other countries. Moreover, efforts at autarky are visible everywhere.

The gravity of the dangers threatening us should not be underestimated. There are already threats with the idea of a preventive war from various quarters. When at the time Reich Chancellor Dr. Brüning made the statement that Germany would no longer pay any

<sup>1</sup> The complete minutes of this conference including a list of those present are filmed on 3598/792280-303.

reparations,<sup>2</sup> this resulted in a partial mobilization of France. There can be a repetition of similar situations today, too, particularly in connection with emphasis of our right to have sovereignty with respect to defense.

The assets at our disposal are merely these:

- the geographical situation of Germany;
- the consumption power of the German people;
- the interest of our creditors in our debt;
- finally, the growing realization of the injustice done to Germany by the Versailles Treaty.

As for putting into effect the revision of the Versailles Treaty, the method of revision of individual parts is also to be preferred in the future. A revision of the Treaty as a whole would involve the danger of a compromise with insufficient results. The revision of the Treaty has already been accomplished in the following points:

Lifting of the occupation of the Rhineland, almost total elimination of reparations. It [revision] is in an initial stage with regard to the disarmament provisions. In this connection we must for tactical reasons primarily strive for the disarmament of the other nations. This method is more effective than an armaments race.

The question of war guilt and the question of those accused of responsibility for the war must be further pursued with energy. A revision of the Lausanne Agreement<sup>3</sup> will bring us forward here, too.

In deciding the future fate of the Saar the time set for the year of the plebiscite can be awaited with confidence. An earlier solution in our favor would only require disproportionately high sacrifices.

Territorial border revisions can be broached only when Germany has become strong militarily, politically, and financially. Until that time we must be satisfied with effective propaganda on the basis of Wilson's points. Of great importance is the preservation of the German element in the ceded areas. Our main objective remains revision of the eastern border. Only a total solution comes into question. Interim and partial solutions are to be rejected.

Likewise a special solution for Danzig should be rejected.

Before the Polish question is finally settled neither the Memel question nor the future fate of the Hultschin territory should be broached.

For the recovery of Eupen-Malmédy we should work only on the quiet. A peaceful solution on a financial basis is entirely conceivable. On the other hand, any audible propaganda would increase to the utmost the resistance of the Belgian Government.

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<sup>2</sup> On Jan. 9, 1932, Brüning stated in an interview given to the Wolff Agency that Germany's situation made it impossible to continue "political payments." For the text, see *Documents on International Affairs, 1932*, pp. 6-7.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 2, footnote 8.

We have no interest in bringing up the question of Alsace-Lorraine.

In the colonial question, too, we must restrict ourselves for the time being to propaganda that must be directed in the main against undermining the principle of exercising rule by mandate. [*gegen die Zerrüttung des Grundsatzes von der Ausübung der Mandatherrschaft richten muss.*] In all colonial questions we must make sure in advance of Italy's agreement.

The Anschluss of Austria can not be actively promoted for the time being owing to Italy's opposition.

Our other aims in foreign policy are the result of the formation of states in Europe since 1918. The cultivation and preservation of the German element abroad must be promoted in first line, even by using considerable financial means. In this connection a harmonious union of the German minorities and the national movement in Germany must be striven for.

As far as the relations between Germany and other powers in general are concerned, Germany's dangerous weakness makes it impossible for the time being to conclude alliances. Through an alliance we would merely become dependent upon a stronger partner.

A good relationship with England is of considerable importance. England will never place herself in opposition to America and France for our sake. Nor will she make a choice against France in favor of Italy. England is interested in maintaining the status quo in the Mediterranean, which Italy is striving to alter. For all that, Italy is not a dangerous opponent for England, but is for France.

An understanding between Germany and France is as good as impossible in the foreseeable future. All that we will be able to achieve is that France will not hinder us. Experience has shown that the French are resigned to progress if it is not too precipitate. The French position of power in Europe has suffered a considerable loss. This is particularly noticeable in the evaluation of France by her allies in the East. Also refusal to pay America has singularly damaged French prestige. Nevertheless France remains the strongest military power in the world.

Our political relationship with Italy calls for the closest cooperation everywhere where common interests exist. In the Austrian question and the problems of the Danubian area cooperation with Italy has so far not been possible. No settlement is evident as yet. To be sure, we are entirely willing to cooperate economically in the Danubian area. Italy, however, has predominantly political interests there. Italy is fighting against the hegemony of France, but has never lost sight of the possibility of a settlement with France. Economically Italy is particularly sensitive in regard to the impeding of her agricultural exports to Germany.

With respect to Austria our policy must be directed toward strengthening Austria as much as possible against [the possibility of] her passing into other groupings. What we are able to offer Austria in the economic sphere is in this respect particularly important.

Our relationship with Hungary is a permanently friendly one in accordance with tradition. However, we cannot fully adopt the Hungarian revisionist aspirations, if only on account of the population of German stock in the areas ceded by Hungary. Economically our relations with Hungary suffer from the fact that agricultural exports from Hungary to Germany are entirely cut off as a result of our legislation.

The conclusion of the new pact of organization of the Little Entente has no economic significance owing to the divergent interests of the members. On the other hand, France's political influence has been strengthened once more via Czechoslovakia. We must attempt to support Rumania and Yugoslavia economically, in the first place in order to gain political influence, and furthermore to preserve this important market for our exports. At the moment this is difficult for the same reasons as in the case of Hungary. The attempt must be made, however, to continue the economic policy inaugurated in Stresa,<sup>4</sup> and if possible to grant the needy agricultural countries in the Balkans customs preferences for their economic exports.

We cannot do without Russia's cover for our rear with respect to Poland. Russia has become the largest buyer of German industrial products. Our claims amount to about one billion reichsmarks. The general shrinkage in world commerce will result in a reduction of the export surplus that we have been able to attain in relation to Russia from 250 million reichsmarks in 1932 to about 100 million reichsmarks this year. The fight against communism in Germany does not, as Italy's example shows, need in the long run to affect adversely our relations with Russia.

An understanding with Poland is neither possible nor desirable. The tension with Poland must be maintained if only for the reason that in this way the interest of the world in a revision of the German-Polish border will not die down. It is known that Poland is playing with the idea of a preventive war on account of our territorial demands. Our policy must therefore operate with great circumspection and avoid separate actions. The preservation of the German element in Poland is a matter of particular concern, and considerable financial means must be employed for this as well as for Danzig.

In spite of the bad treatment of the Germans in the Memel area, good relations with Lithuania are desirable because of her geographical location in relation to Poland.

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<sup>4</sup> See document No. 5, footnote 4.



The lack of interest of the United States in European conditions will probably not change under Roosevelt's presidency. We cannot count on active support from Washington for our political demands and wishes. In the foreground of America's interests is the problem of the inter-Allied debts.

Our position in relation to the League of Nations is characterized by the fact that we usually must appear in Geneva as people to whom something is owed. Although the accomplishments of the League of Nations are by no means satisfactory, Germany's withdrawal is out of the question. We would gain nothing by a withdrawal but only worsen our position. Withdrawal would be possible only if continued presence in the League were no longer compatible with Germany's dignity and if a direct, actual advantage were connected with the withdrawal. It should be taken into account that if Germany should withdraw, the League might make decisions that could bring us into a dangerous situation (Saar Territory).

The resulting conclusion is that foreign policy conflicts are to be avoided until we have completely regained our strength. We shall first have to concentrate our political activity on economic questions, in order to avoid in all circumstances warlike complications which we cannot cope with at the present time. To what extent such a policy is tolerable from the standpoint of domestic policy remains outside the discussion in this connection. By means of a statement that the objectives of our policy are exclusively economic and financial we can succeed in breaking up the front that has now been formed against us out of concern about surprise actions by Germany. We must therefore avoid any provocatory demonstration and strive for close cooperation with England and Italy.

The Vice Chancellor proposed that, owing to the extent of the material put forth by the Foreign Minister, the debate on the foreign policy situation be postponed until after Easter.

The Reich Chancellor agreed with this suggestion.

The Reich Cabinet took cognizance of this.

Recorded:

THOMSEN, April 7

4) *Report of the President of the Reichsbank on the foreign exchange situation.*

The President of the Reichsbank stated as follows:

The present German foreign exchange difficulties had their origin in the loan economy, which had been pushed to extremes. The situation became worse when the Austrian Kreditanstalt collapsed in

May 1931. The heavy withdrawals of funds then led to the payment difficulties on July 13, 1931. Upon his earlier resignation as President of the Reichsbank,<sup>5</sup> the gold and foreign exchange reserves amounted to 3.3 billion reichsmarks, as against 450 million at present. In agreement with the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Economics, he had repaid the gold credit. The interest paid on this credit amounted to 57,000,000 reichsmarks. By granting this credit, the creditors had made a profitable deal. The shrinkage in foreign exchange would not be so evident because considerable foreign currency was still coming in from industry. Recently, for example, because a devaluation of the dollar was feared, dollar notes in the amount of \$40,000,000 had flowed into the coffers of the Reichsbank. He did not contemplate introducing penalties because of failure to deliver them sooner. The German economy was now drawing its last reserves from foreign countries into Germany. This process would be completed in the coming months. Foreign exchange would then no longer be available. It was also to be feared that the Russian payments would come to a halt. He had warned the Brüning Cabinet. A preparation of foreign countries for the possibility of a stoppage in payments on German commercial debts was necessary to prevent a hostile attitude from forming abroad. In his conversation on this matter with the Bank of England and with Morgan, he had found a certain understanding for this. The countries abroad were expecting nonpayment of commercial debts within a certain time. He considered it better to make the decision as soon as possible in order to have reserves left for the further maintenance of current business. There had to be a deliberate cessation of transfers. The German debtor had to be committed to payment in marks, by law, if necessary. The debtor had to be guaranteed against the exchange risk that this entailed. Credits in marks at the disposal of the foreigner would accrue at the Reichsbank. A loan for 15 or 16 years could be taken on this. The certificates would be amortized. Four percent interest coupons would have to be issued. Later on settlement negotiations would have to take place. The accrued marks would be reinvested at interest. Either the money would have to be used to consolidate the municipal debts or treasury obligations or for new needs of the Reich. The possibility of a forced loan would also have to be considered. In order to help business, there would have to be a lowering of the interest rates. The financial situation would be eased tremendously. The effort must be made to cause as

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<sup>5</sup> Schacht had been President of the Reichsbank from Dec. 22, 1923, to Apr. 2, 1930, and had again been appointed to that post on Mar. 17, 1933.

little opposition from abroad as possible. The attempt must be made as soon as possible in order to prepare for the World Economic Conference. He asked for an expression of opinion in order to have a directive for the conversation at Basel.<sup>6</sup> The repayment of the \$70,000,000 credit would not be agreeable to the French because they could then make no further political deals on the basis of this demand. A moratorium would be avoided. The debts would continue to be paid. Foreign exchange would not be made available, however, until the foreign exchange level permitted it. Meanwhile he would pay with interim certificates and coupons.

The Reich Minister of Economics stated that he agreed with the statements. The Reichsbank had thus far pursued a disastrous practice. He hoped that in the execution of these intentions an agreement would be reached between the Reichsbank and the Cabinet.

The Reich Minister of Finance stated that he agreed to the plan of the President of the Reichsbank. He, too, was of the opinion that we must retain the initiative in the bargaining in order that we may avoid being forced to bargain. This matter must not be brought into the World Economic Conference as an open question, but as one that has been decided. It was not a moratorium that was involved, but only a deferment of the payments, in order to arrive at a means for maintaining trade and in order to obtain liberation from the foreign exchange restrictions of other countries. These arguments must be advanced at Basel and must constitute the moral platform. He would like to see a discriminatory treatment of debtors or creditors avoided, in order that German assets abroad should not be seized.

The President of the Reichsbank pointed out that the shipping companies had produced enough foreign exchange. It had to be left to them.

The Vice Chancellor stated that a discriminatory treatment of the creditors must not take place.

The Chancellor asked that the conference be opened in Basel now.

The Foreign Minister pointed out that the World Economic Conference would convene sometime between the 1st and the 15th of June.

The Cabinet acceded to the proposal of the President of the Reichsbank for immediate opening of the conference.

Point 4 recorded:  
WILLUHN, April 12

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<sup>6</sup> Schacht was planning to be in Basel for conversations on Apr. 8 and 9 (Schacht to Bülow Apr. 6 and enclosures: 9037/E632724-27).

## No. 143

9037/E632721-22

*The Ambassador in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

No. 187 of April 7

WASHINGTON, April 7, 1933—7:01 p. m.

Received April 8—3:20 a. m.

W 2343.

With reference to my telegram No. 108 of March 16.<sup>1</sup>

Upon instructions from the President, Under Secretary of State Phillips requested me to see him today, chiefly in order to inform me more fully about the proposed visit by MacDonald. MacDonald will leave England on the 15th of this month and will not be accompanied by a delegation, but at most by a small staff and will stay in Washington for 4 days.<sup>2</sup> He will come in his capacity as British Prime Minister, Chairman of the World Economic Conference, and as a proponent of disarmament. In view of the attitude of American public opinion, it was still too early for negotiations regarding debts. So it seemed all the more important that a thorough discussion take place between the principal participating Powers regarding the most outstanding problems. The President considered this especially necessary with a view to practical preparation for the World Economic Conference. In any case it must not happen that the Conference is used by the smaller states for an endless debate and so come in danger of breaking up. It was likewise important to demonstrate to world public opinion that the principal Powers have the will to take definite decisions for the revival of the world's economy and the liberation of international trade from its bonds.

The President did not intend to use MacDonald's stay as a preliminary conference of the principal Powers in Washington. He would, however, be happy to welcome the responsible Prime Ministers [*Ministerpräsidenten*] of the principal Powers in Washington. Under Secretary Phillips asked me to convey an invitation to the German Reich Chancellor in this connection. In case the Reich Chancellor were not able to accept the invitation personally, the President would be happy to receive another member of the Cabinet or a special envoy in case the German Government should not finally decide to carry on the exchange of views through diplomatic channels. Similar invitations were being extended to France and Italy, and probably also to Japan, China, and several of the larger states of Latin America. The visits

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 93.

<sup>2</sup> MacDonald was in Washington from Apr. 21 to 26. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933*, vol. I, pp. 490-494.

of the individual representatives of the various states were being planned as individual visits which would not coincide in point of time. As was stated in telegram No. 108, President Roosevelt places especial importance on personal association with responsible foreign statesmen. I would be glad to have early information as to the point of view there on the above.<sup>3</sup>

PRITTWITZ

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<sup>3</sup> See document No. 149 and footnote 2.

## No. 144

9280/E658946-52

### *Unsigned Memorandum*<sup>1</sup>

[APRIL 7, 1933].  
[W 2397].

## I

### *Formal Questions*

1. Time of the [World Economic] Conference: In his governmental statement the Reich Chancellor said he agreed to having the Conference meet soon.<sup>2</sup>

We agree to the time between June 6 and June 15 which Norman Davis mentioned in Paris to the President of the International Chamber of Commerce, Frowein.

2. We agree to London as the meeting place of the Conference.

3. We likewise consider it appropriate to have a preliminary conference in Washington.

*Question:* What kind of representation—how many and what rank—are they counting on in Washington? (Subject to decision otherwise we should like to propose that Ambassador Dr. Luther be commissioned to represent Germany, and that Ministerialdirektors Posse and Ritter possibly go to Washington to assist him.<sup>3</sup>)

4. Has Norman Davis been able to find out anything in his discussions in Washington, London, and Paris as to the composition of the American, English, and French delegations to the World Eco-

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<sup>1</sup> A covering note reads: "To be submitted to the Foreign Minister for the conversation with Norman Davis. Ritter." Norman Davis had talks with Neurath on Apr. 8 and 9. He also had a conversation with Hitler on Apr. 8 and paid a formal visit on Hindenburg. American reports on these talks are printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933*, vol. I, pp. 85-89, and in *ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 216-220; German records of them have not been found.

<sup>2</sup> The statement was made in Hitler's speech before the Reichstag on Mar. 23, 1933. Text in *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik*, vol. I, pp. 34-47.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 143.

conomic Conference? According to earlier intentions, governmental representatives (thus not private experts) are to be delegated. Will ministers (ministers of economics, finance ministers, foreign ministers) come from the other countries? Will the presidents of the banks of issue come? Have the other governments formed any idea about the length of the Conference?

## II

In case material questions relating to the World Economic Conference can also be discussed with Norman Davis:

The German Government considers the work of the World Economic Conference in the financial area to be more important and urgent than that relating to trade. In the first place because the financial questions are of greater objective significance, and then also because settlement of them is a prerequisite for improvement of international trade.

1. For Germany the most important thing is final settlement of the short-term external debts. Without final settlement of them Germany cannot do away with foreign exchange controls. Many other countries are in the same situation. As long as compulsory foreign exchange controls still exist in important countries, the countries with weaker currencies will not be able to or wish to stabilize their currencies, nor will it be possible to restore a real gold standard generally. Moreover, as long as the free exchange of goods is obstructed in important countries by compulsory foreign exchange controls, the other countries will not give up protecting themselves by import prohibitions and high tariffs.

2. In addition it is necessary to adjust the long-term external debts to the changed commodity prices (primarily by lowering of interest. A change in the capital sums or the amortization service is less advisable.) Problem: How can technical negotiations be carried on between the debtors and the scattered creditors?

3. Germany is willing to participate in all measures for stabilizing the currencies, restoring a real gold standard, and [encouraging] a normal functioning of the international capital and money market. However, these measures are of secondary importance to Germany. Points 1 and 2 are more important for Germany.

Germany is willing to cooperate in all measures for eliminating the obstructions to trade and improving the international exchange of goods (tariff truce, tariff reduction, lifting of import prohibitions, etc.).

However, in this Germany must differentiate between industrial and agricultural products.

For industrial products Germany sees positive possibilities immediately. It must be pointed out, however, that a schematic, percentile reduction of the existing tariffs, such as Secretary of State Hull evidently wishes to propose,<sup>4</sup> is not sufficient. A 10-percent reduction would mean in the case of the United States, for example, that the present average tariff level of 40 percent ad valorem is reduced to 36 percent. In the case of other countries in which the present average tariff level is considerably lower, as for example 23 percent in the case of Germany, a 10-percent reduction would mean a lowering to about 20 percent ad valorem. Of course the countries with a low present tariff level cannot let themselves in for that. Moreover it must be remembered that many countries, e. g., Germany, have considerably lowered their industrial tariffs in commercial treaties, whereas other countries, as for example the United States and England, so far have no tariff reductions by treaty. Thus a schematic, percentile reduction is not sufficient; another method must be chosen to bring the industrial tariffs to the same average level.

For agricultural products Germany must make a reservation at the present time. One of the main reasons for the world economic crisis is the overproduction of foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials in the agricultural export countries. As long as this unhealthy overproduction of the export countries is not corrected and as long as the world market prices for agricultural products has not risen, the agricultural export countries cannot in all fairness expect the other countries to give up the protective tariffs vital to them. Therefore for these countries the measures for restricting production, e. g., of grain, planned by the Government of the United States, are of the greatest importance.

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<sup>4</sup> See document No. 62, footnote 1.

## No. 145

6153/E460615-16

### *Memorandum by an Official of Department II*

SECRET

BERLIN, April 7, 1933.  
e. o. II Vat. 129.

As instructed,<sup>1</sup> I got in touch today with Vice Chancellor von Papen, who confirmed to me his intention to suggest in the Vatican, on the occasion of his pending visit to Rome, the conclusion of a concordat with the Reich. In accordance with instructions, I thereupon gave him a copy of the enclosed memorandum of April 5,<sup>2</sup> and in-

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<sup>1</sup> No record of these instructions has been found.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (6153/E460617-20). This memorandum contains a survey of the discussions concerning a Reich concordat with the Vatican.

formed him in detail regarding the present situation, particularly with respect to the pending negotiations concerning spiritual care in the armed forces. I also placed at his disposal a copy of the following material for his further information and possible use:

1. Guiding principles with reference to a Reich concordat (II Vat. 1016/26<sup>3</sup>),
2. Draft of a Reich concordat (II Vat. 759/24<sup>4</sup>),
3. The pro memoria of the Cardinal Secretary of State of October 25, 1932 (German translation, II Vat. 360/32<sup>5</sup>),
4. Two drafts, now rendered obsolete by circumstances, of a reply<sup>6</sup> to the above-mentioned pro memoria, namely,
  - (a) regarding regulation of spiritual care in the armed forces,
  - (b) attitude of the Reich Government to the four counter-demands of the Holy See.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (6153/E460621-27).

<sup>4</sup> Not printed (6153/E460628-35).

<sup>5</sup> This enclosure is filmed on 6153/E460636-38. The original pro memoria was forwarded to the Foreign Ministry with Vatican Embassy report No. 227 of Oct. 27, 1932 (9934/E694964-70). It was concerned with the organization of the Catholic military chaplain system in Germany, but went on to suggest "that several questions particularly involving the interests of the Catholic Church in Germany, which could not be included in the concordats concluded with the separate Länder as they lay within the competence of the Reich, be brought to a satisfactory settlement at the same time. The Holy See does not consider this to be a mixing of unconnected subjects, but simply considers the regulation of the spiritual care for the armed forces to be the logical occasion for clearing up the most important questions pending between the Holy See and the Reich.

"The following in particular are involved:

1. Elimination of punishment for clergymen who for urgent reasons of conscience consecrate a church marriage before conclusion of the civil ceremony. The Holy See hopes that the Reich Government will not refuse to fulfill this request, which involves the most fundamental principles of freedom of conscience and which moreover was already contained in the points which were delivered on November 15, 1921, to the Foreign Minister by the then Apostolic Nuncio in Berlin as a basis for discussion on the conclusion of a possible Reich concordat. [Filmed as 9933/E694889-95]
2. The agreement that in case the Reich should proceed to issue a law on the liquidation of the financial payments to the Church in accordance with article 138 of the German Reich Constitution this will not be done without amicable agreement with the Holy See in advance. This request is based on legal rights that are recognized in contractual agreements, namely by the circumscription bulls agreed on earlier, which were taken over in content in the new Länder concordats and adapted to present conditions. It is accordingly a question of rights which cannot be changed by unilateral legislation without the agreement of the other party.
3. The Reich Government should, in view of the forthcoming school law, the issuance of which is provided for in article 146, paragraph 2, of the Reich Constitution, give the Holy See binding promises of protection of the rights of Catholics in regard to parochial schools and instruction in religion.
4. The Reich Government should, in agreement with the statement made by the Foreign Minister, II Va. 515 of November 13, 1920 [filmed as 9933/-E694880-85], give the Holy See binding assurances to the effect that any changes in the Constitution or legislation of the Reich will not violate the rights of the Church recognized in solemn concordats."

The pro memoria concluded with the statement that the requests presented therein, which should form the subject of an agreement with the Reich, represented a minimum of the justified requests of the church.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed (6153/E460639-49).



Carbon copies of the documents mentioned under 1 to 4 are enclosed.

The Vice Chancellor replied in the negative to my question as to whether he already had a definite draft available for the new Reich concordat. He added in strict confidence that he intended, as one of the chief counterdemands, to include a provision contained also in the Italian Concordat, to the effect that the clergy are forbidden to register and be active in any political party. As requested, I sent the Vice Chancellor a copy of the corresponding article 43 of the Italian Concordat.<sup>7</sup> I also called his attention to the fact that the Berlin correspondent of the *Journal* had only yesterday reported to his paper that "one of the main points in the Concordat that was being proposed to the Curia by Germany was that the German Catholic clergy be forbidden to permit themselves to be elected deputies." Herr von Papen did not yet know about this statement in the press. He asked that the purpose of his trip to Rome be kept secret from the press, and he expressed the intention of giving a communiqué to the press to the effect that he was only going to Rome for a rest over the Easter holiday.

The Vice Chancellor will leave this evening.

Respectfully submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through Ministerialdirektor Köpke.

MENSHAUSEN

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<sup>7</sup> The text of the Concordat of Feb. 11, 1929, between the Holy See and Italy is in *Raccolta di Concordati su materie ecclesiastiche tra la Santa Sede e le autorità civili*, edited by Angelo Mercati (Vatican, 1954), vol. II, pp. 92-103.

## No. 146

3170/676012-14

*The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

(for reasons of economy sent by airmail)

No. 98 of April 7

LONDON, April 7, 1933.

Received April 8, p. m.

RM 496.

Today I had an almost 2-hour conversation with Simon on the question of the pact during most of which Vansittart was also present.<sup>1</sup>

I began by stating that the failure to consider our counterproposals in the drafting of the new English text delivered in Paris had caused much annoyance in Berlin. Simon thereupon summoned Vansittart,

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. v, document No. 69.

and it was found that Simon's memorandum regarding my conversation with him on March 30<sup>2</sup> had actually not yet reached Vansittart when the latter sent instructions to Tyrrell on March 31.<sup>3</sup> Simon thereupon apologized to me formally, pointing out that the great demands on his time due to the debate on India, conflict with Russia, and preparations for MacDonald's trip to America had made it simply impossible for him to give his full attention to the question of the pact, and that this alone explained the defective functioning of the business machinery.

I then detailed my objections to the new English draft in accordance with instructions.<sup>4</sup>

First I criticized the omission of sentence 2 of point I, which deprives the pact of its general political substance and makes point I a banal repetition of statements that had already often been made.

Then I rejected the present version of point II, stating that for us it was primarily a matter of accepting the principle of revision which should be made an element in the future policy of the Great Powers; naturally, at the final stage, the interested parties would have a voice in this. The new draft brought no improvement in our position, but rather a change for the worse, since it curtailed our freedom of action without offering us any practical prospects of success through its attempt to establish a method of discussion in accordance with article 19.

Of the long discussion that developed from this, I stress the fact that Simon repeatedly emphasized that the proposed method of discussion was by no means intended to be exclusive, but left entirely open to Germany the possibility of renouncing this method and appealing directly to the League of Nations. Whereupon I replied that the pact would then, indeed, have brought Germany no advantage at all. I also stress the fact that Vansittart, who had just had a long conversation with Titulescu, stated frankly that if we persisted in our wishes, there would be no prospect of the conclusion of a pact. The ominous word "revision" was for the first time to appear in an official document. To many people the word was distasteful as it was, but they would not be able to stomach it at all if it should take the form of an acceptance of the idea of revision and a striving for its realization. Advancing the idea of revision in the pact document therefore had a chance of being realized only if some restraint were exercised and not too much demanded at once.

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<sup>2</sup> See document No. 126.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 132.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 138 and footnote 9.

Finally, I objected to all three sentences in point III. Simon met my objection to the reference to the December resolution in the first sentence by observing that if the French accepted the second sentence, they would indeed be thereby admitting that the question of security was satisfactorily settled—a result that would appear to him extremely gratifying. I replied that sentence 2 with its flat acceptance of the MacDonald plan was for us something which we could not even discuss. Simon showed understanding for this. Finally I again stressed the fact, with reference to sentence 3, that for us a commitment was out of the question, unless it was restricted to the duration of the first Disarmament Convention. At the same time I pointed out that Simon had, indeed, himself recognized this principle in previous statements. For this, too, Simon showed understanding. He observed, however, that French opposition to such a limitation, if it were to be established now, was almost insurmountable.

I then also made a serious appeal to Simon not to permit the destruction of the brilliant idea in point III to take all the venom out of the disarmament conference even in the event of an unsatisfactory outcome and to prepare solutions for this contingency. I also again emphasized the importance of a possible readiness on the part of Germany to link her policy to that of the three other Great Powers, and stressed the sacrifice of independence that Germany would be making in this way, while the other Great Powers, certainly England and France, would really only have to assume increased responsibility.

From the entire discussion it appeared that the English themselves have no categorical objections to make to our wishes, but that from their knowledge of the opposition existing to them, they considered them unrealizable. They are therefore trying, in order to save the idea of the pact, to arrive at a compromise formula. They have as yet had no reply from Paris to their draft, and only learned from Daladier's speech of yesterday<sup>5</sup> that France would probably come up with new proposals of revision. Rome, too, has not come forth yet with a statement of its position.

In the course of deliberations on what was now to be done, I was asked whether our wishes had actually been communicated to Paris. Concerning this point I said that I would request information. The statement was then made that England could not at the moment support our wishes in Paris, since France had, after all, to speak first. My renewed representations would of course be given due attention and consideration here. It was desirable in all circumstances, however, that the same representations should soon be made in Paris. It would

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<sup>5</sup> In the Chamber of Deputies on Apr. 6. See *Journal Officiel de la République Française: Débats parlementaires, Chambre des Députés*, No. 50.

be much appreciated if at the beginning of next week I would be able to give information on this score and on how the matter was received in Paris.<sup>6</sup>

HOESCH

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<sup>6</sup> In telegram No. 90 of Apr. 10 (3170/676015), State Secretary Bülow informed Hoesch that direct conversations with the French Government had not taken place, and it was considered inadvisable, furthermore, to engage in such conversations "until we are acquainted with the French memorandum announced in the press and have also found out how Mussolini and possibly the English Government envisage the further procedure."

No. 147

6613/E498527-29

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Moscow, April 8, 1933—11:59 p. m.

SECRET

Received April 9—3:35 a. m.

No. 70 of April 8

IV Ru. 1593.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 79.<sup>1</sup>

I. I made to Litvinov today the statements directed in telegram No. 79, section III. He welcomed the promised investigation of molestations of Soviet nationals which had occurred, and the assurances of undisturbed operation for Soviet business organizations in Germany.

With regard to the Communist activities of Derop employees, the searching of commercial missions and Soviet ships, there followed a lengthy discussion. Litvinov stated that membership in the Communist party had not heretofore been unlawful. Private activities of individual employees could not be controlled by the management of the business. Soviet business organizations as such held completely aloof from all Communist activity. The searching of commercial missions and Soviet ships had apparently not produced anything incriminating, and yet no redress had been made.

I referred to decrees recently enacted for combatting communism, which Derop employees had violated; also to numerous protests that even former personnel of Soviet institutions had given us cause to make. The search of commercial missions and Soviet ships had been legal and in accordance with treaties.

Litvinov did not deny this, but he said they had been fruitless and had had an extremely unfavorable effect here politically. If the

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<sup>1</sup> Document No. 140.

Soviet Government were to search or arrest German business agents here in a legally irreproachable but actually unjustifiable manner, a politically tense situation would undoubtedly arise as a result of indignation in Germany.

I promised Litvinov more incriminating material.

Litvinov then deplored the WTB report concerning Your Excellency's conversation with Khinchuk. This false report of the official news bureau necessarily cast an unfavorable light on our mutual relations. He then asked whether measures had been taken to safeguard the business operations of Soviet institutions in Germany. I replied in the affirmative.

Finally, referring to the mood prevailing here, he insisted on publication of a short press notice. I requested the addition of a passage relating to Communist activities of Derop employees, which he promised.<sup>2</sup>

II. Litvinov declared himself in agreement with our proposal for simultaneous announcement of the completion of ratification of the protocol for extension of the Berlin Treaty.

III. I have the impression that the deep agitation over the events of the past weeks is subsiding and can be ended by joint action of a political sort along the lines of Section II. If we wish to restore mutual relations, then in my opinion we must prevent the favorable effect from being nullified by succeeding or accompanying incidents—as they impaired the effect of the Chancellor's speech. A resumption of police interference without cumulative evidence, further molestation of Soviet citizens, or finally, interference with Soviet institutions would cause a conflict that could not be settled for a long time to come. I would suggest that consideration be given to measures that could be taken to prevent this.

I request particularly that I be informed by telegram about the evidence of Communist propaganda and other lapses on the part of Soviet employees of economic enterprises or Consulates.<sup>3</sup>

IV. In case a political emphasis on the settlement of the conflict stronger than mere simultaneous publication of ratification seems to be indicated, I request consideration of the following suggestions:

1. On the occasion of the ratification, to publish a joint communiqué, analogous to the communiqué of July 13, 1931,<sup>4</sup> or

2. Reception of Khinchuk by the Chancellor on the day of announcement of ratification, with a statement of the Chancellor for publication, or

<sup>2</sup> The Tass statement regarding this interview as published in *Izvestia* on Apr. 9 is in Degras, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, vol. III, pp. 10–11.

<sup>3</sup> No reply to this request has been found.

<sup>4</sup> This sentence appears to have been garbled. The translation gives the most likely meaning.

Concerning the joint communiqué, see document No. 212 and footnote 2.

3. So to time the contemplated visit in May of General von Bockelberg that General von Bockelberg takes part in the parade here on May 1.<sup>5</sup>

DIRKSEN

<sup>5</sup> In a note of Apr. 21, 1933, the Reichswehr Ministry notified the Soviet Military Attaché in Berlin that General von Bockelberg accepted the invitation of Deputy Commissar for War Tukhachevsky to visit the Soviet Union (8074/-E579394-96). The visit took place from May 8 to May 28, 1933. Bockelberg gave a comprehensive account of it in report No. 486/33 of June 13 (8074/-E579398-449). See documents Nos. 232 and 252.

In general, documentation on relations between the German and Soviet Armies, during the first 5 months of 1933, is lacking from the files of the Foreign Ministry. Such material as the Foreign Ministry held on this subject was in the secret political file (*Pol. geheim*), which was badly damaged by fire when the archives were being evacuated by the Germans.

## No. 148

9245/E651815-19

### *Minute by Ministerialdirektor Ritter*

BERLIN, April 10, 1933.

W 2408.

### MY CONVERSATION WITH NORMAN DAVIS<sup>1</sup>

During the Foreign Minister's luncheon on April 8, I first spoke with Mr. Pell<sup>2</sup> about the World Economic Conference, and then after the luncheon for some time with Mr. Norman Davis; on April 9 with Allen Dulles. Common to the conversations was that the three gentlemen somewhat anxiously, and evidently intentionally, avoided binding information and expressions of opinion.

#### I. *World Economic Conference*

In regard to the formal questions N. Davis expressed himself rather definitely to the effect that the Conference is to begin on June 6 or 7 in London. In MacDonald's opinion the full Conference will then last about 2 weeks, at most 3 weeks. The Conference is then to divide up into various committees. In the fall (he mentioned October), the full Conference is then to convene once more in order to approve and formally conclude the work performed in the meantime. Norman Davis said that MacDonald evidently wanted to surround the Conference with considerable outer trappings. N. Davis mentioned briefly that in some quarters the opinion was held that the World Economic Conference would better be held in Washington. I said

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933*, vol. II, pp. 216-220.

<sup>2</sup> Robert T. Pell, Press Officer, United States delegation, General Disarmament Conference.

that would perhaps have some advantages. There was only one party that could suggest this, however, namely the English Government. Such a suggestion could not come from any other quarter. N. Davis agreed.

Regarding the composition of the delegations all three gentlemen said very decidedly that no private experts but only official personages who could speak with authority for the governments could be appointed as delegates; best would be exclusively Cabinet members. Norman Davis and Dulles also mentioned in that connection participation by the presidents of the banks of issue. They said it would be best if the presidents of the banks of issue or representatives of the banks of issue would meet alongside the Conference in the form of a Bank for International Settlements committee in order to be available to the Conference for questions of special concern to the banks of issue. Davis added, however, that naturally each government was free also to appoint presidents of banks of issue or representatives of the banks of issue as main delegates, too. The presence of all the main delegates was necessary during the first two or three weeks and during the whole second meeting in the fall, in the opinion of Davis and Dulles. It was very desirable, however, that at least one Cabinet member who could make binding statements for the governments be present even during the meetings of the committees.

## II. *Preliminary Conference*

President Roosevelt was not thinking at the present time of a real preliminary conference, but of bilateral discussions with the representatives of the principal individual Powers (Germany, England, France, Italy, Japan, China, the ABC countries of South America, and Canada). When I mentioned that this method was very useful for informing the United States about the opinion of the various governments but was not sufficient for bringing the governments to an agreement, Davis said that was correct. Roosevelt also foresaw that these bilateral discussions would nevertheless develop into multilateral discussions. For reasons of domestic policy, however, Roosevelt did not want to talk about a formal preliminary conference. He was afraid in particular that Congress would then intervene in these negotiations.

Davis said that in Paris when they heard of MacDonald's invitation they had become nervous and jealous. In Paris they had the intention to be in Washington at the same time as MacDonald in order if possible to prevent a bilateral talk between Roosevelt and MacDonald by being present. I said thereupon that it was not yet decided whom the German Government would appoint if the need should arise. Perhaps Luther would be appointed. We understood the invitation to mean that bilateral discussions via diplomatic channels were also agreeable to the American Government. This also had the

advantage that Germany had her representative ready in Washington at any time if multilateral discussions should follow a bilateral discussion. Davis agreed, and was very much satisfied with Luther. In answer to my question he said that he could not give definite dates for these preparatory discussions. They could take place at any time. But they must occur soon, for a period of at least 6 weeks must intervene between the formal setting of the date for the Conference and the beginning of the Conference. He was of the opinion that a decision should be made concerning the date of the Conference only when these preliminary discussions were in the main concluded. I doubted whether one could wait that long for setting the date of the Conference.

### III. *Substantive Questions*

I tried to extract something from Davis and Dulles about the American attitude on substantive questions. However, this was rather unproductive. I therefore passed on to the presentation of some German considerations. I pointed out that the financial problems were more important and urgent than the economic ones. I stressed in particular the importance of a permanent solution of the question of the short-term foreign credits. This question might, to be sure, appear to be a predominantly German problem; but after all it had general importance, particularly because otherwise we could not lift the foreign exchange controls and because this had its effect on the maintenance of the foreign exchange controls in a number of other countries. Likewise the willingness of other countries to stabilize their currencies and reduce their import quotas and tariffs was influenced thereby. The possibility of these further effects of the German short-term foreign credits on other problems was not very familiar to Messrs. Davis and Dulles. But I had the impression that they finally realized this connection of the various problems with one another. Davis only used the familiar argument of how could the Conference of Governments concern itself with private debt relationships. After all, it could not do more than recommend with all emphasis to the private creditors that they reach a long-term arrangement instead of the present one-year Standstill Agreement. I also explained to Dulles the situation in regard to the interest service of the long-term debts and their dependence on a German export surplus. These arguments were entirely familiar to Dulles.

I then came to the familiar proposal of Secretary of State Hull to reduce the tariffs by 10 percent.<sup>3</sup> I brought forward the well-known arguments against this, that a schematic 10 percent reduction was not sufficient and meant something different for the countries with a low average tariff level or with a treaty tariff than for the countries

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<sup>3</sup> See document No. 62, footnote 1.



with a high tariff level without a treaty tariff. Dulles admitted this and said that after all this was only to be the beginning and to create a first psychological impression.

R[ITTER]

No. 149

4619/E197655-57

*State Secretary Bülow to Foreign Minister Neurath*

BERLIN, April 10, 1933.

DEAR HERR VON NEURATH: Herr Aschmann has informed me that Herr Funk spoke today with the Reich Chancellor about the invitation to Washington.<sup>1</sup> According to what Herr Funk told him afterwards, the Reich Chancellor is considering sending President of the Reichsbank Schacht, Deputy Rosenberg, and also some gentleman of the chemical industry as a delegation to Washington. I do not believe there will be any decisions before your return, but in any case I wanted to let you know at once. If Schacht were chosen as leader of the delegation, Ambassador Luther would come into a somewhat difficult situation, although as Ambassador he would probably always rank above the President of the Reichsbank, unless the latter were sent as an Ambassador on a special mission. The latter is not to be recommended, since according to the telegram from Prittwitz the Americans doubtless desire, after the exchange of views with the individual countries, to carry out the really comprehensive preparation for the World Economic Conference through diplomatic channels. Also a different course is not even possible, for it is only the Ambassadors constantly in Washington who can be brought into a joint discussion of a constructive plan. The result of the discussions with the individual delegations of the different countries can always only be temporary.<sup>2</sup>

This noon Herr Nadolny called on me and complained in the first place at not having been called in to your discussion with Norman Davis.<sup>3</sup> I explained to him that considering the character of the discussion this would have been out of the question. No harm was done, since Herr Nadolny called on Norman Davis himself Saturday afternoon<sup>4</sup> and had a talk with him.

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 143.

<sup>2</sup> The Embassy in Washington was informed by telegram No. 138 of Apr. 12 that the decision regarding the American invitation would be made upon the return of Cabinet members after Easter. At the moment Germany preferred an exchange of views through diplomatic channels (9245/E651838).

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 144, footnote 1.

<sup>4</sup> i. e., Apr. 8.

Herr Nadolny then brought up the proposal that he go to Rome during Easter in order to arrange with the Italians a unified policy for the next phase of the Disarmament Conference. The point of departure for this suggestion is a proposal Norman Davis made to him, that we should reach an understanding with the Italians before Geneva, so that in Geneva at least only two parties, England-France and Germany-Italy, would confront one another, which could contribute to an important clarification of the situation. I told Herr Nadolny that I had objections to his trip; it would be interpreted as a demonstration in connection with the two ministerial trips.<sup>5</sup> Herr Nadolny said that such a demonstration would not be a bad idea at all, considering the close Anglo-French cooperation. However, I doubt that the Italians would welcome such a demonstration, and I therefore told Herr Nadolny that I would first submit the question to you for a decision. Please send me a word of instruction.<sup>6</sup>

With the best regards and many good wishes for your stay in Wildungen, I remain, etc. BÜLOW

<sup>5</sup> i. e., those of Papen and Göring; see document No. 162 and footnote 1 thereto.

<sup>6</sup> Neurath replied on the following day expressing general agreement with the considerations advanced by Bülow (9245/E651831-32).

## No. 150

8566/E599836-39

### *The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry*

A 266

BERN, April 11, 1933.

Received April 24.

II Sz. 378.

Subject: New establishment of national groups in Switzerland.

With reference to report A 551 of August 8, 1932.<sup>1</sup>

The events of recent weeks in Germany have given a new impetus to the various groups in Switzerland which sympathize with National Socialist ideas. In particular, besides the parties already in existence, the "Association of National Socialist Confederates [*Vereinigung nationalsozialistischer Eidgenossen*]" and the "National Front," there have been added two newly established ones, the "Confederate Front" [*Eidgenössische Front*] and the "Movement for National Revival" [*Bewegung für nationale Erneuerung*], which to be sure pursue different individual aims but nevertheless jointly profess "national revival and independence."

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (9243/E650385-93).

The "Confederate Front," which calls itself more exactly the "Confederate Non-Partisan United Front" [*Eidgenössische ausserparteiliche Einheitsfront*], and which is under the leadership of Dr. Wilhelm Frick (Zürich), is an organization which "aims at the union of like-thinking Swiss citizens for joint political work and for the fight for a sound, independent, patriotic policy on a Christian basis opposed to the ideology of the French Revolution and of Marxism." In particular the program provides for the fight to strengthen national independence and the authority of the government based on independent responsibility to the people. The "Confederate Front" also upholds the obligation to defend the country and the ability of the Swiss people to bear arms, as well as a federalism promoting the political and cultural freedom of the cantons.

In contrast to this group which pursues more political aims, the "Movement for National Revival" is decidedly economic in nature; it is supported by members of the business class and represents their well-known economic demands. The leader of the movement is Nationalrat Joss, a deputy of the Farmers', Businessmen's and Middle Class party [*Bauern-, Gewerbe- und Bürgerpartei*] in the Nationalrat and member of the Zürich Government. At a national meeting which he convened in Zürich he presented the program of the "Movement for National Revival," which is essentially the same as the motion he made in the Nationalrat (cf. report B394 of March 30, 1933<sup>2</sup>). The economic and spiritual revival of the Swiss people is to be attained by having employers and employees combine in occupational organizations and be made responsible for Swiss economic policy. Furthermore, it is necessary to revise article 31 of the Federal Constitution concerning unlimited freedom of trade and business, to abolish the department stores and single-price stores, and to pass a new banking law. Germany's course of action against the Jews should not be copied, but Marxism must be fought "until the Swiss cross is again sewn into the last red flag that flutters in Switzerland."

The national groupings in Switzerland possess a relatively small number of members even today. For the time being they can hardly compete in their importance for domestic policy with the existing large political parties of the country, the Liberals [*Freisinnige*], the Catholic Conservatives and the Social Democrats. However, in circles of the Middle Class, Businessmen's and Farmers' party their efforts and objectives arouse more decided sympathy. The press usually turns against any "establishment of a new party" or "tendency toward splinter groups" and led by the big party organs calls for a strengthen-

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<sup>2</sup> Not printed (8564/E599802).

ing and renewal of the status quo under the leadership of the big party organs. Thus the *Bern Bund* (No. 159 of April 4) writes: "Do we have nothing more urgent to do today than to tear the middle class apart into groups, than to propagate political experiments? Do the various 'fronts' wish to unleash conflicts about the basic forms of our national life that split the people abysmally and endanger the unity and therewith the *existence* of our country? This at a time when it is necessary to overcome the present hardships of the crisis by bringing together all men of good will. Where young forces bestir themselves let them imbue the national parties with their spirit and try to combine the old and the new. But one should beware of accepting alien political concepts uncritically. Switzerland has gone her own way for centuries; she will want to and she must continue to do so. One should also beware of the unintelligent mouthings about the crisis of parliamentarianism. The Swiss Parliament, although it is sometimes very wordy, works with seriousness, intelligence, and success." The *Basler Nachrichten* of April 1 and 2 (No. 91) is similar: "It sounds very attractive, to be sure, when the new bourgeois party of farmers, middle class people and workers now wants to bring the defeat of Marxism in Germany to bear on Switzerland, too, and wants to press beyond economic demands to a patriotic concentration of forces and a reform of the bases of the national community. We also expect from the events in Germany a weakening of the Socialist influence and particularly, what is frequently very necessary, a stiffening of the backbone of the Swiss middle class in opposition to Marxist pressure. But today we want to disavow and warn against an attitude that sees a model in German National Socialism and its methods; also we want to disavow a narrow-minded nationalist economic policy such as is evidently visualized by these bourgeois leaders and such as would inevitably greatly damage our country which is dependent on ties with the world economy and lead it along false paths. In method and content such a venture would necessarily come into sharp conflict with our democratic institutions and our national spirit."

One copy each of the two first issues of the newspaper *Die neue Schweiz* put out by the Movement for National Revival and a copy of a proclamation of the Bern Canton Committee of the Confederate Front which was published in the *Berner Tagblatt*, No. 171 of April 11, are enclosed.<sup>3</sup>

MÜLLER

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<sup>3</sup> Not reprinted.

## No. 151

3170/676021-24

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 73 of April 11

ROME, April 12, 1933—12:10 a. m.

Received April 12—4:00 a. m.

RM 506.

Mussolini just handed me the text of the French draft of the pact. This morning, after a discussion, the memorandum pertaining to it had been withdrawn by Jouvenel for the purpose of changing it; it had referred among other things to events in certain countries, the outcome of which could not yet be foreseen; this obvious reference to Germany he had refused to accept.

Mussolini said the French draft was considerably better than was to be expected; it was also clearer and more sensible than the English. In his opinion it could be used as a basis for further work, although there were perhaps objections to be made on individual points. He read to me the main articles of the draft, whereupon I merely stated that in this form the draft was certainly not acceptable to us; I wanted to make (group garbled) position dependent on a careful study in Berlin. I asked him in any case not to reply until he knew our position and had discussed it with us. He promised this as a matter of course. The matter was now in our hands, for if we stated that we could continue discussion on this basis he would proceed with it, but otherwise not. We should consider, however, that everything depended on getting through the next few months in peace. The state of mind in Paris and many other places was still extremely dangerous, and the world agitation against us had hardly abated. Jouvenel had been of the opinion that an attempt should be made to conclude the pact before the beginning of the Disarmament Conference. He had stated that this was impossible; it would be better, in so far as there was any evident prospect of its being concluded, to postpone the beginning of the Conference for a week or two, so as to appear before the Conference with a concluded pact. Then some partial results could be achieved there, such as the abolition of tanks, heavy artillery, and bombers; through the last-mentioned of these Germany would obtain equal status for her Air Force. For the rest, Germany could then on the basis of the pact formulate her demands in the sense of a first stage of equality of rights and slowly rearm.

Text of the draft:<sup>1</sup>

Draft Pact of Understanding and Cooperation.

Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy, conscious of the special responsibilities imposed on them by their position as permanent members of the Council of the League of Nations with respect to the League itself and its members, and of those resulting from their joint signing of the Locarno Agreements;

Convinced that the state of malaise which prevails in the world cannot be dispelled except by a strengthening of their solidarity capable of affirming confidence in Europe in peace;

Faithful to the obligations which they have assumed under the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Locarno Agreements, and the Briand-Kellogg Pact and referring to the Declaration of No-Resort to Force, the principle of which was adopted on March 2 last<sup>2</sup> by the Political Commission of the Disarmament Conference;

Anxious to give full efficacy to all the provisions of the Covenant while conforming to the methods and procedures which are provided for there, from which they do not intend to depart;

Respectful of the rights of each State, concerning which no disposition can be made without the consent of the interested Party;

Have agreed on the following provisions:

*Article I*

The High Contracting Parties will consult on all questions which appertain to them and will strive within the framework of the League of Nations to pursue an effective policy of cooperation among themselves with a view to maintaining peace.

*Article II*

The High Contracting Parties, with a view to the possible application in Europe of the articles of the Covenant, particularly articles 10, 16, and 19, decide to examine among themselves, without prejudice to the decisions which can only be taken by the regular organs of the League of Nations, any proposal tending to give full efficacy to the methods and procedures provided for by these articles.

*Article III*

Renewing in so far as they are concerned their joint declaration of December 11, 1932, the High Contracting Parties see in the recent British draft convention<sup>3</sup> a practical basis of discussion which should permit the Disarmament Conference to work out as quickly as possible a convention assuring a substantial reduction and limitation of armaments with provisions for its subsequent revision with a view to new reductions. Germany for her part recognizes that equality of rights in a system affording security for all nations cannot be realized except by stages in accordance with article 8 of the Covenant and by virtue of agreements reached to this effect.

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<sup>1</sup> The passages (preamble and articles I-IV of the French draft) are in French in the original.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 38 and footnote 2.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 90 and footnote 1.

*Article IV*

The High Contracting Parties affirm in general their desire to consult on all questions of common interest in Europe, particularly on all questions concerning the restoration of its economy, the regulation of which might, without forming the subject of proceedings before the League of Nations, be profitably sought within the framework of the study commission for European union.

Article V concerns a duration of ten years.

Article VI: ratification.<sup>4</sup>

HASSELL

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<sup>4</sup>The full text of the French draft was sent by Hassell as an enclosure to report No. I 713 of Apr. 12 (3170/676044-47). Cf. enclosure to document No. 170.

## No. 152

5740/H030637-40

### *The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 101 of April 12

LONDON, April 12, 1933—11:17 a. m.

Received April 13—1:30 a. m.

III E 883.

Today I had a conversation with MacDonald in which I pursued the aim, first, of giving the Prime Minister before his trip to America<sup>1</sup> an accurate description of developments in Germany; second, of leaving him in no doubt as to the purposefulness, but also of the peaceable nature, of German foreign policy; and third, of giving him some information about the German position regarding the World Economic Conference.

MacDonald replied to my statements regarding the first point that from the very start he had not believed the reports of excesses and moreover he understood very well the character of and the circumstances attending a revolution. He also understood the movement of young Germany and did not criticize it. As a friend of Germany, however, he must state objectively that in recent weeks Germany had lost an extraordinary amount of ground in England. Since last August the pro-German feeling in England had spread so fast and, at the beginning of this year, had reached such a high point that it had become noticeable in all areas, but especially in regard to the principle of German equality of rights. When Simon and he had started on the trip to Geneva and Rome<sup>2</sup> the movement had come to a halt, to be sure, but they had still left London with the impression of the general

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 143.

<sup>2</sup> This journey took place during the period Mar. 9-22

wish for justice for Germany. Upon their return after an absence of 10 days they had encountered a changed atmosphere and had been compelled to recognize that their actions in Geneva and Rome did not find the favorable reception that they had expected. He was now encountering resistance here in respect to the initiatives started in Geneva and Rome, and precisely from quarters that had supported the rights of Germany a short time ago. It was not so much the Jews as it was the intelligentsia that caused him difficulties. He was therefore a little concerned about future developments.

Regarding point two MacDonald said he believed in the peaceable nature of German foreign policy, but wondered whether the danger did not exist that the young Germany with its desire for action might not after all in the end impose the law of action on the government. For this reason he would consider it a serious misfortune if nothing should come of the Roman idea of a pact. He did not consider the idea of a pact to be actually threatened, but did not hide the feeling that its conclusion would perhaps take a longer time than originally anticipated (group missing), and that the content of the pact might not be as extensive as had at first been contemplated. France was very much concerned about the development in Germany and France's attitude toward the idea of a pact had deteriorated unmistakably since Simon and he had supported it personally in Paris and had there met with a not unsatisfactory degree of understanding. He had approved of acceptance of the principle of revision in the pact because he considered article 19<sup>3</sup> ineffectual and only likely to create tensions in Europe if utilized. He therefore did not understand very well why we, as Simon had reported after his latest conversation with me,<sup>4</sup> rejected the attempt to revive article 19 which was undertaken in the latest English draft text. It was, after all, clear that in an independent action on the basis of article 19 Germany would not be able to achieve any results, whereas the action would appear quite differently if it could be undertaken with the prior agreement of three Great Powers. After I had responded with a description of our position in the usual manner we dropped this theme, since MacDonald said it belonged to Simon's jurisdiction.

In regard to point three I said that Germany was entirely in favor of the World Economic Conference meeting at an early date. Objectively speaking the opinion prevailed in Germany that the finest resolutions in the economic area would be of no use if the condition of torpor prevailing in the world in the financial area were not eliminated at the same time. Thus there arose the necessity for investigating international debt relationships, with the aim of bringing the normal

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<sup>3</sup> Of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 146.



exchange, currency and credit traffic back into operation. MacDonald welcomed, and moreover agreed entirely, with our positive attitude, and termed the problem of finance and debts in connection with the economic questions the essential point of the tasks to be performed.

In conclusion MacDonald stressed once more that he had spoken as a friend and also intended to continue to act as one.

Hoesch

## No. 153

8170/676030-37

### *The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy*

Telegram

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, April 12, 1933—11:00 p. m.

No. 94

zu RM 506<sup>1</sup> II.

With reference to your telegram No. 73.<sup>1</sup>

Since the Reich Chancellor and other Ministers concerned are absent from Berlin over Easter and since we are not as yet acquainted with the French memorandum, it is not possible for us today to take a definitive stand on the French proposal. From our basic position as set forth in previous instructions, it readily becomes apparent, however, how we must judge the French proposal on the points that are substantively most important. It will be advisable to speak about this as soon as possible with Mussolini in order that the French ideas may not get a hold on him and that he may as far as possible adapt himself to our views even before making his official reply to France. I therefore request that you tell him approximately the following while reserving the right of bringing definitively formulated proposals:

The latest English proposal<sup>2</sup> worked out in London was, to be sure, bad enough; however, we cannot see that the French proposal would be better on any point. If it is more clearly formulated, it only becomes all the more clear to what extent its content diverges from our own wishes and also from the original ideas of Mussolini. That appears especially from the following points:

1. *Preamble.* The first paragraph of the preamble speaks of the responsibility of the four Powers only toward the League of Nations and its members. The pact would thereby from the outset be given the false note that it refers only to political activity within the League of Nations. Of course the pact is not to contradict the League of Nations Covenant and it can and must operate also within the League to the latter's advantage. But if it is to have any practical value it must not be limited to concrete activity of the four Powers in the League, for it could then operate only in those cases which the four

<sup>1</sup> RM 506: Document No. 151.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 133.

Powers have to deal with as Council Powers and League members in Geneva. The reference to the position of the four Powers as permanent members of the Council may, all things considered, be retained, in order to make their special position with respect to other Powers understandable. The words, "with respect to the League itself and its members" would, however, have to be omitted.

Our objections to the third paragraph of the preamble are along the same line.<sup>3</sup> When it is stated there that the four Powers may not in any point depart from the methods and procedures provided for in the League of Nations Covenant, the pact thereby really becomes superfluous. The methods and procedures of the League of Nations are after all not the only ones that come into consideration for dealing with political problems. Just as countless problems are handled outside the League of Nations through diplomatic channels or through special negotiations between individual Powers, the new pact too could and should, after all, introduce a new method alongside the League. It holds true here, too, that this need not in any way contradict the League of Nations but will on the contrary make its functions easier. For this reason the words in paragraph three, "while conforming to the methods and procedures which are provided for there, from which they do not intend to depart" would have to be deleted.

We could probably accept the other sentences of the preamble, although they, too, are not in all points to our liking.

2. In *article I* the words, "within the framework of the League of Nations" must be deleted, for the above-mentioned reasons. These words would exclude any cooperation by the Powers not undertaken by them in their capacity as League members and with direct reference to the functions of the League. The relationship of the pact to the League of Nations will be set forth with sufficient clarity in the preamble even if the deletions therein which are indicated above are made.

Moreover, it would naturally be desirable to retain in article I the idea on which the last sentence of this article in the original Mussolini draft was based. As already stated previously, however, we do not want to insist on that if Mussolini, for his part, does not do so.

2. In *article II* nothing remains of the positive recognition of the idea of revision. Quite apart from the fact that the idea of revision is mentioned only in the form of article 19 of the League of Nations Covenant and not as an independent element of the policy of the four Powers, the French, in order to make even the mention of article 19 ineffectual from the outset, now place over against it article 10 on territorial integrity. If interpreted strictly, the French text might even be understood to exclude treaty revision altogether in territorial questions, because article 10 as *lex specialis* prevails over the general article 19. By mentioning the sanction provisions of article 16 alongside of article 10 the necessity of maintaining the territorial status quo is obviously to be emphasized still more strongly. Moreover, the activity of the four Powers is apparently to relate only to the preparation of such proposals as deal with the *general* application of articles 10, 16, and 19, in other words, to provisions supplementing these articles, but not to their application in a concrete case. All this

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<sup>3</sup> The objections made are actually to the fourth paragraph of the preamble.

evades the real problem and makes no sense. If one really wishes to accomplish something which is sensible not only from the German but also from the general European point of view, one must decide on a provision which recognizes the existence of the revision problem and at the same time assures a peaceful treatment of it. That would be done through formulas such as those indicated on pages 8 and 9 of the instruction of March 24.<sup>4</sup> If Mussolini considers it necessary to make further concessions to the French as to form, it will perhaps be possible to find an acceptable wording, the communication of which I reserve. After all, the most important thing now is that we come to an agreement with Mussolini on the fundamental idea itself.

4. *Article III* completely omits the positive statement of the necessity of realizing German equality of rights as found even in the latest English text and is content with a reference in the introductory words to the December agreement. In the last sentence the realization of equality of status is then restricted in the same unacceptable manner as it was also in the English draft. The newly added reference to article 8 of the League of Nations Covenant is apparently intended to mean that German equality of status is to be realized by stages of 10 years each. Over against this it will suffice to refer to previous instructions and emphasize once more that to us any provision is unacceptable which limits German equality of status for more than about 5 years. The position of the French proposal on the MacDonald plan is substantially unobjectionable. However, it is incomprehensible what sense is supposed to be made by including in the pact, which surely is to enter into force only after the conclusion of the Disarmament Conference, if at all, a provision concerning the conduct of the four Powers at the Conference.

5. In *article IV* the concluding part, from the words "the regulation of which" on, would have to be omitted. We do not wish now to resurrect the European Study Commission,<sup>5</sup> created by the French, which proved incapable of practical work and fortunately has disappeared. I assume that Mussolini is of the same opinion.

In *conclusion* I also wish to remark that it does not seem to be entirely correct that the matter is now in our hands as Mussolini told you and that if we agreed to further discussion on this basis he would proceed with it, but otherwise not. The French draft is in itself not such that one could say on the basis of it that any further discussion is out of the question for us. Perhaps the French memorandum indicates that the French reject any essential change in their draft. As long as we do not know that, however, the French proposal is after all only one draft alongside the other drafts that already exist, and the prospects of success for further negotiations can be judged only when the position of the four Powers on the separate drafts and on our own wishes can be clearly discerned.<sup>6</sup>

NEURATH

<sup>4</sup> Document No. 115.

<sup>5</sup> A Commission of Inquiry for European Union had been established by the European member states of the League of Nations on Sept. 17, 1930. The Commission met afterwards Jan. 16-21, May 15-21, Sept. 3-5, 1931, and October 1932.

<sup>6</sup> This instruction was sent for information to the Embassies in Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union.

## No. 154

3170/67603<sup>0</sup>*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 77 of April 12

ROME, April 12, 1933—9:30 p. m.

Received April 12—11:20 p. m.

RM 517.

With reference to my telegram No. 73.<sup>1</sup>

From further conversations of Mussolini with Vice Chancellor von Papen<sup>2</sup> and me it appears that he is obviously inclined to continue negotiating on the basis of the French proposal; he especially welcomes the fact that the French have given up the idea of including the Little Entente and Poland. Both Herr Papen and I pointed out the obvious objections to the French text. Mussolini thought that we should put forward these objections of ours, for he, too, did not intend to accept the plan without change. Both of us indicated to him that the German side would absolutely request a return to the basic idea of the original text. He agreed, but, as stated, will undoubtedly be willing to negotiate further on the basis of the French text. It seems to me therefore to be the right tactics in the German comments on the French text to begin with the advisability of returning to the original plan as a basis, adding that the German comments on the French proposal are intended to make it express more clearly again the original basic idea of Mussolini.

HASSELL

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<sup>1</sup> Document No. 151.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 162.

## No. 155

9072/E636967-68

*The Reich Minister of Food and Agriculture to the Reich Chancellor*

BERLIN, April 12, 1933.

Rk. 4187.

MY DEAR HERR REICH CHANCELLOR: I am sending you enclosed herewith the copy of a minute on a conversation which took place today.

Yours, etc.

HUGENBERG

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, April 12, 1933.

## MINUTE

The State Chairman of the German National People's party, attorney Dr. Weise, called on me in behalf of Danzig Senate President

Ziehm. He asked me to bring the following matter to the attention of the Minister.

On May 28 new elections will be held in Danzig. The election campaign has already assumed such forms that it is to be feared that internal peace and order in the Free State will be disturbed. The League of Nations Commissioner has made it very clear to Senate President Ziehm that in such an event he would be compelled under League of Nations directives to let the Poles march in. Minister Dr. Hugenberg is urgently requested to persuade the party leaders of the NSDAP to change the forms of the election campaign of the NSDAP, which is directed mainly against the DNVP. In view of the danger from Poland described above, an understanding must be reached, since otherwise there is extreme danger that Danzig will be occupied by the Poles.

RICHTER

No. 156

8580/E601869-70

*Senior Counselor Michelsen to Minister Trautmann*

BERLIN, April 11, 1933.

Sent April 13.

zu IV Chi. 869.<sup>1</sup>

Drafting Officer: Dr. Bidder.

DEAR HERR MINISTER: The nature of the matter requires me once more to choose the form of a private letter which may have a more interesting content than an official instruction.

In the last few days General von Seeckt came to the Foreign Minister and told him that he was on the point of making a short trip to China and back via the Netherlands Indies.<sup>2</sup> He added that the trip was suggested by General Wetzell, who hoped that this visit would strengthen his somewhat shaky position with Marshal Chiang Kai-shek.

Supplementing this official version I have now learned the following from a reliable informant behind the scenes.

Of late Herr von Seeckt has on occasion made inquiries of the Chinese Legation here which indicated that he is greatly interested in the work of the German military advisers in Nanking. It is assumed in the Chinese Legation that Herr von Seeckt is counting on the possibility that when he visits Nanking the Chinese Government will

<sup>1</sup> IV Chi. 869: Not printed (8580/E601871). This is a memorandum by Meyer of Mar. 30.

<sup>2</sup> This was recorded in a memorandum by Völckers of Apr. 3 (8985/E630037).

offer him the position of a top military adviser and reorganizer of the Chinese Army. In view of General Wetzell's somewhat impaired position at present, the prospects for this are not unfavorable. The informant concluded, however, by saying that no formal offer has as yet been made to Herr von Seeckt.

On the other hand, as you have known since last summer, Mr. Minister, the Chinese Government at that time approached Reichswehr Minister Groener by way of the Legation here with regard to taking over the reorganization of the Chinese Army. General Groener at that time declined; perhaps Herr von Seeckt would interrupt his short East Asian trip and not decline.

In any case I did not want to neglect informing you promptly about the possible consequences of this trip.

M[ICHELSSEN]

## No. 157

9417/E666268-69

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

Moscow, April 14, 1933—9:36 p. m.

SECRET

Received April 14—11:00 p. m.

No. 73 of April 14

IV Ru. 1715.

For the State Secretary personally.

With reference to my telegram No. 70.<sup>1</sup>

1) Today's press reports a police search of the house of deputy trade representative Feinstein. The house-search was carried out despite presentation of a diplomatic passport and over Feinstein's protest, but proved fruitless. The officers who conducted the search had behaved with extreme rudeness. Please wire me information concerning the circumstances and any incriminating material that was found.<sup>2</sup>

2) Renewed police action contradicts the promises made by me to Litvinov by direction of the Foreign Minister (your telegram No. 79 of April 5<sup>3</sup>) and serves to complicate the situation in so far as the police authorities seem this time to have disregarded diplomatic prerogatives established by treaty.

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 147.

<sup>2</sup> A letter of inquiry on the circumstances of this case was sent to the Reich Ministry of Interior and the Berlin police authorities (9417/E666277), a copy of which was forwarded to the Moscow Embassy (9417/E666279). No further communication to the Embassy on this case has been found.

<sup>3</sup> Document No. 140.

3) With regard to the political effect of continued police raids, I refer to section III of my telegram No. 70 of April 5 [8]. I am afraid that the impending exchange of documents of ratification will also prove politically ineffective if police incidents do not cease.

4) I therefore suggest for consideration that instructions be issued by the Ministry of Interior to the police authorities to the effect that, *before* proceeding against Soviet authorities in Germany (Embassy, Consulates, trade missions, purchasing commissions, etc.) or against the holders of diplomatic passports, they should get in touch with the Foreign Ministry and obtain its consent.<sup>4</sup>

I also request that consideration be given to whether provision has been made for adequate police protection of extraterritorial Soviet personages and their homes, since careful and comprehensive measures have been taken here in this respect.

5) I should appreciate your reaction to section IV of my telegram No. 70 of April 5.<sup>5</sup>

DIRKSEN

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<sup>4</sup> Marginal note: "With regard to 1) and 4). Please prepare an appropriate letter to the Reich Minister of Interior and the Prussian Minister of Interior. v. N[eurath], Apr. 16." The letter written in accordance with these instructions is not printed (9417/E666282-84). The Reich Ministry of Interior replied on Apr. 28 by forwarding a copy of instructions which had been issued that such cases should be brought to the attention of the Foreign Ministry before action was taken. A copy of this directive was forwarded to the Embassy in Moscow on May 8 (9417/E666291-92).

<sup>5</sup> No reply to this request has been found.

## No. 158

2368/493952-53

### *Memorandum by the Director of Department III*

BERLIN, April 14, 1933.  
zu III E 885.<sup>1</sup>

G. A.<sup>2</sup>

By direction of Ministerialdirektor Köpke I informed Herr Rüter by telephone (Count Bernstorff was not there) that yesterday's debate in the House of Commons<sup>3</sup> had had an exceedingly agitating effect on

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<sup>1</sup> III E 885: Not printed (5740/H030642-44). This is London telegram No. 104 of Apr. 13 from Count Bernstorff, the Chargé d'Affaires, which describes the debate on foreign affairs in the House of Commons on the Easter adjournment motion on April 13.

<sup>2</sup> Abbreviation for Gehorsame Anzeige, a memorandum submitted in accordance with instructions.

<sup>3</sup> The proceedings of the debate in the House of Commons are in *Parl. Deb.*, 5th ser., H of C, vol. 276, cols. 2739-2823.

public opinion here. Even the Reich President had mentioned the debate.<sup>4</sup> I called Herr Rüter's attention to Sir John Simon's further statements in his speech which are not contained in telegram No. 104 from the Embassy.<sup>5</sup>

I then transmitted to Herr Rüter the following instruction from the Reich Minister for the Embassy:

The Embassy should register a formal protest as soon as possible to Sir John Simon, or, if he cannot be reached, to the Foreign Office, because Sir John Simon did not object energetically to the insults directed at Germany in the course of the debate in the House of Commons.

I pointed out specifically to Herr Rüter that the instruction must be carried out in any circumstances, even if the text of Simon's speech was perhaps not available. I also told Herr Rüter that a statement would be published through WTB by tomorrow at the latest to the effect that the Embassy had been instructed to register the above protest.

I added in confidence that we were aware that this was an unpleasant instruction, which might bring about a certain tension in the situation, but that something absolutely had to be done since we otherwise had to fear disagreeable repercussions here. Herr Rüter himself said that he was not afraid that there would be any increase in the tenseness of the situation because of our démarche.<sup>6</sup>

PLESSEN

Submitted herewith to the Reich Minister through the State Secretary.<sup>7</sup>

DIECKHOFF, April 18

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<sup>4</sup> A memorandum by Köpke on Apr. 14 (2368/493950-51) recorded that he had been informed that the Reich President was unusually disturbed by the Commons debate as reported in the press and had asked to be informed immediately as to what the Foreign Ministry intended to do about it.

Köpke had replied that he intended to propose to the Foreign Minister that a protest be entered.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 1.

<sup>6</sup> A memorandum by Davidsen on Apr. 15 (2368/493954) recorded that Count Bernstorff called from London at 11:50 a. m. to say that he had read over Simon's speech and did not know exactly what he should protest against.

Davidsen recorded that at 12:15 p. m. by direction of Ministerialdirektor Köpke he had called Bernstorff and told him to please carry out the directive that he had been given. He was not to go into particulars, but to protest against Simon's action in implicitly approving the statements of previous speakers. Count Bernstorff replied that he would carry out the instruction at once.

He reported having done so in London telegram No. 105 of Apr. 15, 3:17 p. m. (5740/H030648); in the absence of Simon and Vansittart he had made the protest to Under Secretary Wellesley, who had received it without discussion.

<sup>7</sup> The memorandum was returned on Apr. 27 through the same channels to the sender, with attention being drawn to a handwritten minute by the Foreign Minister which read: "I also expressed once more to the English Ambassador my astonishment at the attitude of Sir John Simon in the House of Commons. N[eurath], Apr. 26." (2368/493956-57)



## No. 159

8170/676050-51

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

No. 83 of April 15

ROME, April 15, 1933—9:00 p. m.

Received April 16—12:15 a. m.

RM 524.

With reference to your telegram No. 94 of April 12.<sup>1</sup>

Since Mussolini and Suvich are away for Easter, I carried out the instruction today with Baron Aloisi, leaving with him a short pro memoria.<sup>2</sup> In doing so, I emphasized the provisional character of this statement and pointed out that our previous objections, in addition, still hold. In reply to my question about the French memorandum Aloisi indicated that it probably had been intended primarily for the Italian Government only. He wants to request instructions about giving it to me; however, he read all of it to me aloud. According to that, it seems to me to contain nothing essentially new but only to comment on the proposal. The sentence objected to by Mussolini on recent occurrences in certain countries is still included.

The Italians now intend to draw up a counterproposal, utilizing our observations, and discuss it with me in the next few days. Aloisi admitted that the French article on equality of rights was particularly in need of amendment; on the other hand he believed that although the word revision did not occur, the French wording of this article was not at all bad, for it contained a clear recognition of the principle that the four Powers alone are to consult on a proposal for revision. That, subsequently, procedure under the League of Nations must be applied was unavoidable and was also recognized in the first Mussolini pact; the important thing, however, was the preliminary decision of the four Powers. I insisted, on the other hand, on the necessity for clearly recognizing the possibility of revision and with reference to equality of rights emphasized in particular that the old formulation, *portata effettiva*,<sup>3</sup> must be restored and any German commitment beyond the duration of the first convention omitted.

HASSELL

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<sup>1</sup> Document No. 153.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (German text: 8840/E615140-42; Italian text: 8840/E615143-46).

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 115.

## No. 160

9269/E657473

*The President of the Reichsbank to the Reich Chancellor*

BERLIN, April 15, 1933.

Rk. 4239.

DEAR HERR REICH CHANCELLOR: In this as well as all future letters and conversations I shall always be very brief, trusting thereby to make proper allowance for your strenuous activity.

I have some anxiety about our preparations for the World Economic Conference; while fully appreciating the problems relating to trade policy, it seems to me that the central issue at present is the question of private indebtedness. I was unfortunately unable to talk to Norman Davis in Berlin because I had to go to Basel for the first meeting of the Bank of International Settlements.<sup>1</sup> In expressing my views in public and private I have consistently pursued the line of policy discussed in the Cabinet.<sup>2</sup> I shall submit a draft law within the next few days. Now it would be important, at the preliminary talks for the World Economic Conference, to have our line of policy adroitly intimated. Would you please let this matter turn over in your mind and let me hear after the holidays what you have decided?<sup>3</sup>

With the German greeting,

Yours, etc.

HJALMAR SCHACHT

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<sup>1</sup> See documents Nos. 144 and 148.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 142.

<sup>3</sup> Marginal note: "Taken care of. H[itle]."

## No. 161

9269/E657474-83

*The Reich Minister of Economics to the Reich Chancellor*

APRIL 16, 1933.

Rk. 4444.

DEAR HERR REICH CHANCELLOR: Among the matters requiring early and thorough discussion in the Reich Cabinet belongs the German attitude in regard to the World Economic Conference. We have been indicating to the other countries that we would welcome an early convocation of the Conference. In my opinion, the economic situation of neither Germany nor the rest of the world is ripe for successful international treatment. The atmosphere currently is adverse to Ger-

many. The undiminished number of our unemployed does not make it easier for us to play the role of schoolmaster to other countries, as in view of the situation we should. Hardly anything was done under the former government to prepare for the Conference. The elections and other more pressing tasks were initially also preempting the attention of the present Cabinet and particularly myself as the Minister chiefly responsible for matters concerning the economy. The transfer to the Ministry of Economics of responsibility for unemployment relief and social welfare previously agreed upon has so far not been carried into effect, and it has consequently been impossible for me to take action in this basic matter. The fundamental steps for the revival of our economy (law regarding fats, customs measures, etc.) had to begin with agriculture and naturally are slow in taking effect. A positive attack on the problem of interest and indebtedness, which is of fundamental importance to the entire economy, became possible only after the change in the top management of the Reichsbank. That is one area where in certain circumstances an early international conference would be fruitful and necessary as soon as the projected measures have been initiated. As regards the *essentially economic questions*, an early meeting of the Conference would be premature.

But with an early meeting now having gained in probability, I believe that an immediate *active* consideration of the question of our attitude at the Conference is indispensable. Also in the economic field we must not go into this Conference without any constructive ideas to keep us from playing the role of the passive objects, as had happened at earlier conferences. We must arrive with proposals and ideas the rejection of which would at least give us the moral right of rejecting the proposals of the others in the course of the negotiations. But we must also come forward with them early enough, that is to say, at any preliminary conferences which might be held.

The question of whether and in what degree our proposals are capable of realization at this time is at the moment of minor importance compared with our objective of securing for ourselves tactical freedom of action and of decision.

With respect to financial questions, the plans recently outlined by President Schacht of the Reichsbank provide a good point of departure for attacking the *German* debt problem, as contrasted with the *English* or *French* debt problems. These problems are much easier than those of Germany because they are formally problems of political rather than of private debts, whereas our previous governments have acquiesced in the conversion of our *political* debts into private debts. I have stressed for years the crucial importance of these questions. Here I would only repeat the statement I previously made at the

Cabinet meeting<sup>1</sup> that I consider prompt action along the lines proposed by Herr Schacht as an effective means of attacking the German debt problem, which blocks any economic revival.

In regard to the economic sphere, and especially the question of trade policy, I can join in the plans previously developed only with reservations because conditions have greatly changed in the meantime. Then we were in a period of sharply dropping raw material prices. Today the curve is moving upward again. At that time a levy on raw material imports would have been at the expense of foreign countries. Today it would be largely a burden upon Germany. The features of the proposal must be adjusted to this consideration, and we must seek to find European allies for it. The primary purpose of the proposal will be that of exercising an action *preventive of other dangers*.

In the sphere of trade policy it would at present be dangerous in the highest degree to keep harping on the old theme. That would mean returning to the old idea, discredited by painful experience, of purchasing greater opportunities for exporters with the ruin of our farmers and the consequent eventual breakdown of the whole economy. The common interest of all the other Powers, combined with the German inclination to follow the path of least resistance politically, will always tempt us at international conferences or negotiations to let ourselves be caught by such schemes. Besides, when dozens of states are engaged in negotiations on such questions, there is a certain psychological compulsion for the others to rush for our agricultural market. I do not by any means deny the possibility *at some future time* of letting certain neighboring countries, through a *regulated quota system*, have a share in supplying our demand for grain, which is now on the rise again, grain being the principal product of an increasingly extensive system of farming. But prior to that, it is essential to restore absolute national control of our agricultural market, especially the market for the agricultural products processing carried on by our farmers. A beginning in that direction has been made with the law regarding fats, and similar measures. Provision must also be made for the event of war and blockade. Agriculture has itself *no* inherent long-term interest, as a matter of principle, in shutting off the German market with the consequent elimination of German purchasing power as a factor in international trade. That would in the end prevent any autonomous regulation of prices in the domestic agricultural market, which is at the present

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 142.

moment the basic condition of any rehabilitation of German agriculture. Germany would above all lose in the process the advantage accruing from the fact of forming the heart of Central Europe. Germany would also deprive herself of all the potentialities afforded by her eastern hinterland. The result would be a decline of domestic purchasing power, the importance of which agriculture is now willing to recognize.

But it would be suicide if we were to permit these considerations to interfere with our effort at self-preservation in which we are now engaged in the field of trade policy. We can and even must go one step further. No one can, in fact, dispute that the revival of purchasing power on a world-wide scale cannot be brought about by eliminating the mutual customs barriers but only through restoring the internal health of the national economies. Each nation must independently choose its own remedies by which it may be cured. It is quite possible from that standpoint that some tariff measures of other nations, while having an immediate disrupting effect, may in the long run be beneficial to all. Under that heading belong especially the German measures relating to agricultural policy. That became especially clear to me from individual instances in the course of the current negotiations with Holland, to which I shall come back orally later on. The remedy at the present moment lies not in free trade but in a rational regulation of the several national markets. The drawbacks which might arise therefrom to other parties will have to be put up with for the time. The benefits which would accrue to all nations participating in world trade from the rehabilitation of the national markets would soon make themselves felt in a general return to a higher level of purchasing power and trade. We are now on the right track in Germany. The main purpose which an international conference could actually serve would be for us to make the other countries see the point.

That can only be done against the background of the problem of indebtedness. *On the financial side* it must be attacked by the means proposed by Herr Schacht. *On the commercial side* we must take as a starting point the principle now generally recognized that international payments can in the main be effected only by means of goods and services. Central Europe, particularly Germany, is now the heaviest debtor of the rest of the world. Its debts can be paid off only in goods and services. Our goods and services must therefore be *accepted* in the same measure as payment is expected of us. Not until this equilibrium has been established can order be restored to the world markets.

With respect to trade policy, as far as Germany is concerned—of her neighboring countries, especially Italy, I shall speak presently—

this amounts to the principle that Germany must be accorded a *preferential position* to facilitate the gradual discharge of her debts. Such a regime cannot be brought into being through special negotiations with all countries concerned. Most-favored-nation clauses and the diversity of interests would preclude that. Instead, Germany must be explicitly accorded an *autonomous German regime operative as against all other countries*.

To that end the following two mutually complementary proposals could be made:

1. Germany shall levy on goods imported a special *debt service impost* [*Entschuldungsabgabe*] of about 5 to 10 percent ad valorem, irrespective of her customs duties and obligations under trade agreements. To simplify collection, this impost might be converted into an inclusive tariff rate for each commodity class of the tariff schedule. Administrative rules may be enacted requiring that payment of this debt service impost be made in foreign exchange.

2. The yield of this impost might be used to promote German exports. Of the use made for this purpose, a public account would have to be rendered. A fixed percentage of the yield, to be agreed upon, might be used to offset the higher prices of the imported raw materials due to the debt service impost, with the remainder to offset the generally higher German production costs, in both instances in the form of payments to the exporters of German goods on a percentage basis of the value of the goods, calculated on fixed tariff rates.

3. Permission would be granted to include Italy, Holland, Switzerland, the Baltic countries, and the southeastern European countries, including Austria, in the area of operation of the measures under 1 and 2, by agreements between Germany and these states. The aggregate yield of the debt service impost collected at the borders of that area would then be distributed among the associated countries at a ratio to be agreed upon. The debt service impost would *not* be collected *as between* the associated countries. No country might fix the export bonuses at a level higher than that of Germany. All of the foregoing measures would be recognized as not being contrary to the most-favored-nation clause.

I am of course fully aware that such a proposal is asking a great deal of the other states. But such a steep demand is necessary to provide an effective illustration of the desperate situation in which Central Europe finds itself. I have ordered a study of the basic concepts of the proposal at the Ministry of Economics, together with clarification and amplification of the details.

I am forwarding copies of this letter to the Vice Chancellor, the Foreign Minister, the Minister of Finance as well as the President of the Reichsbank.<sup>2</sup>

Yours, etc.

HUGENBERG

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<sup>2</sup> Marginal note on first page of letter: "Taken care of. H[itle]."

## No. 162

6153/E460651

*The Ambassador to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 20 of April 18

ROME, Vatican, April 18, 1933—12:50 p. m.

Received April 18—3:20 p. m.

II Vat. 142.

For the Foreign Minister.

The visit of the Reichstag President and the Vice Chancellor<sup>1</sup> came off, as scheduled, to the complete satisfaction of those concerned, particularly the audiences with the Pope, who stated to third persons that from the explanations and impressions he had received, he entertained the best hope of a continuance of friendly relations between the Holy See and Germany. Herr von Papen discussed the question of the Reich concordat in two lengthy conversations with the Cardinal Secretary of State. Prelate Kaas took part in the conversation. The Vice Chancellor, who is returning home this evening, intends to inform you concerning the result and wishes to retain charge of further negotiations.

BERGEN

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<sup>1</sup>The external aspects of the visits of Göring (Apr. 10-18) and Papen (Apr. 9-18) in Rome were described in Hassell's report No. I 755 of Apr. 20 (5737/H028666-71), which also contained an evaluation of the results of the visits. Hassell said he assumed that the two Ministers would report directly to the Cabinet on the political conversations which they had conducted in Rome. On Apr. 19 Papen had requested by telegraph (8080/E579526) that Hitler receive Neurath and himself on the next day so that he could report on his Rome talks. No record of this meeting has been found, however, nor have memoranda been found covering the talks in Rome of either Göring or Papen. See also document No. 403; footnote 1.

## No. 163

3154/668882-83

*Memorandum by an Official of Department II*

BERLIN, April 18, 1933.

II F Abr. 1335.

General Schönheinz told me the following on the basis of direct information from General von Blomberg regarding the conversation that

took place shortly before Easter between the Reich Chancellor, the Reichswehr Minister, and the French Ambassador: <sup>1</sup>

The conversation had come about on the initiative of M. Poncet. It had kept within general limits and no sort of concrete demands had been discussed by either side. Poncet had in the first place suggested resuming the August discussions of last year, whereupon the Reich Chancellor had stated that he had nothing against this; but so far as the Germans were concerned this could not be on the basis of the resolution of the General Commission of December 12, 1932.<sup>2</sup> Since Germany for her part had nothing to give, concrete proposals had to come from the other side. The Reich Chancellor had then discoursed at some length on the general relations between France and Germany and had stressed very emphatically that if France since the end of the war had not constantly kept insisting on the treaties he himself would not be sitting in this place. For the rest, he had no objectives of any sort in the west, if only because he did not intend to sacrifice additional millions of men in a war against France. The situation was different, however, with regard to the eastern border. Here they had "cut into the flesh" of Germany at Versailles and the revision of the impossible eastern border was and remained a central problem of German foreign policy. Poncet had thereupon offered the usual lamentation about the fear psychosis of the French and had asked in conclusion whether discussions between the military authorities of both sides such as had been planned for the occasion of the last part of the Disarmament Conference should not be resumed. Herr von Blomberg had replied that it was the fault of France that it had not been possible to foster these conferences in Geneva, since France had not sent anyone to Geneva suitable for conducting such negotiations. If this type of discussion between the military authorities was to lead to results, they had to be conducted objectively on a large-scale basis and by persons who were authorized to speak in the name of the French Government.

Submitted herewith to Ministerialdirektor Köpke.

BÜLOW <sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "The Reich Chancellor told me only that the conversation had been unfruitful. v. N[eurath], Apr. 19."

In his *Souvenirs d'une ambassade à Berlin* (Paris, 1946), pp. 142-144, François-Poncet gives an account of this conversation, which he dates at Apr. 8.

<sup>2</sup> See Editors' Note, p. 18.

<sup>3</sup> The signature is that of Adolf von Bülow, an official of Department II.



## No. 164

3170/676085-87

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

URGENT

No. 86 of April 19

ROME, April 19, 1933—3:35 p. m.

Received April 19—7:15 p. m.

RM 541.

With reference to my telegram No. 85 of April 19.<sup>1</sup>

On Mussolini's instructions Aloisi yesterday asked Vice Chancellor v. Papen<sup>2</sup> and me to call on him in order to give the former an opportunity to present to the Cabinet a fresh impression of the Italian view of the situation immediately after his return. On the basis of a memorandum by Mussolini, Aloisi first spoke at length about the threatening situation which had arisen through the violent reaction of the entire world to the new German regime. Except for Italy's friendship, Germany was at the moment almost completely isolated. The all-important thing was to break through this ring quickly and effectively. A prompt conclusion of the pact, which would strike the weapons from the hands of the enemy's propaganda, was the best means toward that end. More important at the moment than its content was its conclusion with German participation. As far as the content was concerned, however, it was a great success that France actually agreed to discussion of revision in the circle of the four Powers. The article on disarmament had to be changed, however. He asked if we could not agree today provisionally on the absolutely indispensable modifications of the French text and obtain Berlin's approval by telephone. I said the latter was impossible and explained further our serious material objections in detail; we said we were willing, however, to define our personal point of view more precisely in a second conversation. A decision could not be made until Thursday<sup>3</sup> in Berlin. In a second conversation with Suvich and Aloisi we thereupon defined, with all reserve, the decisive points that in our opinion constituted the minimum, adding orally that the Berlin objections per se were much more numerous. We furthermore called attention to the colonial problem; if this were not mentioned in the pact, at least a gentlemen's agreement<sup>4</sup> with Italy would be desirable to the effect that questions with England and France will not be settled without our being consulted.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (3170/675083).

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 162, footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> i. e., Apr. 20.

<sup>4</sup> This term is in English in the original.

The text of the points as well as the French memorandum will be brought along by von Papen,<sup>5</sup> who will report orally on the view here of the situation as a whole, which is of great importance for policy regarding the pact.

The points are essentially as follows: <sup>6</sup>

1. In the preamble delete the sentence from "while conforming to" to "depart."

2. In article II insert an opening sentence like the first sentence of article II of the London text, but instead of "when conditions arise", "in conditions".<sup>7</sup> In the French articles following thereafter indicate briefly the content of the articles of the Covenant that are cited after each one (Italian suggestion).

3. Article III. Delete MacDonald's plan or perhaps incorporate it in a separate protocol. After the appropriately modified first French sentence insert the sentence concerning *portée effective* of German equality of rights from the original pact. Then the following sentence essentially in accordance with the previous German proposal: "Germany for her part undertakes to realize this parity only by degrees and within a period of time determined by successive agreements between the four Powers." I reserved in particular reconsideration of the passage on the period of time. Finally, add a sentence on Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria.

4. Article IV. If possible, delete the study commission.<sup>8</sup>

HASSELL

<sup>5</sup> Cf. documents Nos. 151 and 159. The text of the French memorandum was included as an enclosure (3170/676127-31) to an instruction of Apr. 22 informing a number of Missions about the course of the negotiations regarding the four power pact. The memorandum is printed in Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Pacte d'entente et de collaboration paraphé à Rome le 7 juin 1933* (Paris, 1933), pp. 10-11.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. document No. 151.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. document No. 105.

<sup>8</sup> Telegram No. 100 of Apr. 19 from Bülow instructed Hassell to delay his call on Mussolini at least until Friday (Apr. 21) since Neurath would return to Berlin on Thursday night (Apr. 20), Hitler on Friday (3170/676084).

## No. 165

3170/676075-79

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, April 19, 1933.

The French Ambassador visited me today in order, as he said, to tell of his impressions from Paris. He began the conversation immediately, however, with a discussion of the French view of the Mussolini pact. He complained very bitterly about the obviously semi-official statements to the press that France had informed Germany belatedly of her position. This charge was completely unjustified.

The French formulation had been received in Rome and London on Tuesday. On Wednesday the message to Berlin had been drawn up with a commentary and telegraphed here. On Thursday it had been deciphered here, and every effort to have the pertinent communication—which then occurred on Saturday—made on Good Friday failed because no one was present in the Foreign Ministry. Moreover, he could not concede that France was in any way obligated to inform Germany, since Germany, too, for her part, had not sent any information on her position to Paris. The Ambassador knew that we had communicated draft texts to Rome and London.

I told him that I did not take the press report very seriously; it was based on misunderstood information about the statement of Counselor of Embassy Arnal to Ministerialdirektor Köpke.<sup>1</sup>

The Ambassador then spoke about the content of the French memorandum and said that in the opinion of his Government it reproduced Mussolini's idea correctly but much more precisely. Mussolini's original proposal had been indefinite and therefore without limits and had greatly worried France's allies. France had naturally to take that into account, and furthermore the French character was such that it could not endure vagueness.

I told the Ambassador that Mussolini's original proposal had been by far the best, for it fitted the present situation. It was indeed not a reflection of the German view but obviously a compromise between the German views and needs and the views prevailing in France and England. To me it was incomprehensible why the French Government had not seized the opportunity immediately, for it was not required to make any sacrifices whatever. Germany alone bore the expenses by committing herself for 10 years to treat all questions that might arise jointly with the other three Powers. Since Germany was the country which most of all had demands to make for changes, she and, for all practical purposes, she alone was fettered whereas the other countries obtained greater security. In the final analysis Mussolini's proposal was to all intents and purposes tantamount to the truce of God which France had repeatedly asked for and we had always rejected.<sup>2</sup> As matters now stood, I was extremely skeptical about the further course of the negotiations. The French proposal turned the ideas of Mussolini into their opposite. As an illustration of this, I referred him to the insertion of the League of Nations in the crucial article I, without going any further into our objections to the French wording of articles II, III, and IV. It was nonsense to

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<sup>1</sup> Köpke recorded on Apr. 15 that the French Chargé d'Affaires, Arnal, had handed him the French counterproposal to Mussolini's draft pact. Arnal stated on this occasion that "the assertions which had appeared in the press to the effect that in France the project was as good as dead and buried did not represent the attitude of the people in authority." (3170/676048-49)

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 115, footnote 6.

say that Mussolini wished to establish a directorate of the four Powers; it was rather a question of a mutual peace guarantee and the mutual promise to find practical ways of solving difficulties that arise. The restriction to the League of Nations hopelessly compromised the pact in the eyes of the German public after the experiences with Manchuria and other current conflicts. The manner in which France championed the League of Nations weakened its standing further. It was to be foreseen that nothing would be left of the pact except a general declaration such as we had already found so frequently to be ineffectual in the last few years. The Ambassador was somewhat taken aback by these statements and repeatedly insisted that Mussolini had received the French proposal very favorably. He hinted that Germany was in danger of isolating herself politically and putting herself in the wrong. He repeatedly expressed the hope that the negotiations would not be broken off but would be continued. I told the Ambassador in reply that I did not know whether this text was the French Government's last word for I was not familiar with the memorandum which went with it. I only knew that such an explanatory memorandum<sup>3</sup> had been delivered in Rome and in London, but was withheld from us, apparently for the reason that it contained unfriendly things about Germany. The Ambassador refused to admit this. He insisted on his part that success of the World Economic Conference and an economic recovery of Germany, too, were possible only if a reassuring declaration and an act to secure the peace took place. Something of that sort was extremely important also for the Disarmament Conference.

Therewith the conversation turned to the Disarmament Conference, and the Ambassador expressed strong apprehensions. In France the mood had stiffened. No one would grant Germany concessions in the form of rearmament or even French disarmament, unless equivalent concessions were made with respect to French security. We argued about the familiar problems without coming any closer together in our respective views. In this connection the Ambassador told about his discussion with the Reich Chancellor,<sup>4</sup> to whom he had suggested, among other things, the Mutual Assistance Pact. The Chancellor had not been informed of this French proposal,<sup>5</sup> but Herr von Blomberg had, and he had expressed himself quite negatively. But the Mutual Assistance Pact, even if it remained restricted to Germany and France, was possibly the key to the situation, and he urgently recommended that we study this proposal seriously. (I had the definite impression that the Ambassador was striving for German-French negotiations in

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<sup>3</sup> See document No. 164 and footnote 5.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 163.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 9.

order to compromise us with respect to Italy, and that he furthermore was very sure of a certain rapprochement between France and Italy.)

The Ambassador, still with reference to his conversation with the Reich Chancellor, again went into the question of propaganda in Germany and the excitement of nationalistic feeling with a basic orientation of hostility to France. As an example he referred, in particular, to the presentation of the Schlageter<sup>6</sup> play on the birthday of the Chancellor. The subject and the choice of the day would make the most painful impression in France. After all there were enough great moments in German history which could be used for strengthening national feeling, instead of incidents which might justifiably make a painful impression in France and Belgium.

I replied to the Ambassador with complaints about the attitude of France, especially about the criticism which according to our reports from Paris the press has been making of the Reich reform.<sup>7</sup>

The Ambassador expressed himself very cautiously and rather pessimistically about his general impressions from Paris. In the main he merely came out with assurances that he personally would leave nothing undone in order to bring about, or at least facilitate, a German-French rapprochement. He repeatedly recommended acceptance of the Mussolini pact, even if nothing should be left of it except a meeting of the statesmen, and asked that our criticism of the French draft be communicated to him in detail at the proper time.

BÜLOW

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<sup>6</sup> Albert Leo Schlageter, sentenced to death by a French military court in May 1923, under the charge of sabotage activities against French occupation forces in the Ruhr.

<sup>7</sup> This seems to refer to laws issued by the Reich Government on Mar. 31 and Apr. 7 for the *Gleichschaltung* of the German States; see *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1933, I, pp. 153 ff.; 173 ff.

## No. 166

6609/E496992-95

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, April 19, 1933.

The Russian Ambassador visited me today accompanied by M. Weizer. Both pointed out the great difficulties from which German-Russian economic relations are at present suffering. They did not discuss specific cases, but stated that the various house searches, arrests, and other disturbances had practically the effect of a business shut-down and that damage was thereby caused that could not be repaired over-night. The business of Derop had shrunk to half. Here remedial action was especially urgent because otherwise competitors

would capture the German market. At present Derop was practically paralyzed. As a result of various German trade measures, losses of 30 million reichsmarks had already occurred. The duty on oil cake and fish, for instance, was prohibitive. In the case of oil cake, there was the added difficulty that several transports were already en route to Germany. The question thus arose as to what should be done with it. The Russians proposed a settlement similar to the one made previously for butter, whereby the transports at sea should be admitted.

Both Russians further stated that the bases of the last credit arrangement had been destroyed, and that this was all the more difficult since it was precisely in these months that Russia had particularly large payments to meet.

With regard to Derop, [two lines illegible]. A settlement in Prussia alone was not possible, however, and also not expedient, since Derop had agencies throughout the Reich. A general settlement therefore had to be found. It had to be made clear whether and to what extent German interest existed in the trade with Russia and whether on this basis normality should be restored and measures taken to mitigate the damage thus far done. As things stood today, the Russian Government and the trade mission could not do business, and considerable dangers would therefore arise for our mutual trade relations. In conclusion of this portion of the conversation, the Russians suggested a joint conference with the interested authorities concerning the continuation of mutual trade relations. In the further course of the conversation, M. Weizer also referred to a memorandum that he had written to Reich Minister Hugenberg, a copy of which had been sent to the Foreign Ministry,<sup>1</sup> and asked whether a further discussion with Minister Hugenberg would be in order.

I told the Russians that I could in part concur in their reasoning, [and] that our efforts were already moving in the direction of creating clarity and particularly of restoring the situation of Derop to normal again. In this we counted very much on their understanding and co-operation, since considerable mistrust of Derop had undoubtedly grown up. I reserved an expression of opinion on the suggestion of a joint discussion, and I also could not tell whether the present moment was right for a further talk with Minister Hugenberg.

The Russians indicated in that connection that the entire complex of questions was therefore especially urgent, because the spring months were the principal time for trade and the time for closing the books for the year. So far since the commencement of the anti-Russian agitation, the trade mission had not been able to close a single contract.

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<sup>1</sup> Weizer's "memorandum" to Hugenberg (9387/E664636-40), dated Apr. 10, specified the various difficulties which had arisen with respect to German-Soviet trade and made proposals for restoring Soviet trade with Germany. A copy was sent to the Foreign Minister by Khinchuk on Apr. 12 (9387/E664635).

M. Weizer then took his leave, and I continued the conversation with M. Khinchuk. I told him quite bluntly that there was no point in trying to cure particular symptoms. We were therefore trying to effect a general settlement of German-Russian relations in connection with the exchange of ratification documents of the Berlin Treaty.

Ambassador Khinchuk then asked some more questions, by direction, as he said, of Litvinov. First he inquired about the four power pact. I acquainted him with the status of the matter.

Then he asked whether Ministers von Papen and Göring were charged with any political missions when they went to Rome<sup>2</sup> and what they were. I said that questions of foreign policy were not involved, but merely relations with the Vatican and relations in the matter of air navigation between Germany and Italy.

Finally he asked whether there was anything to the rumor that we wanted to conclude a customs union with the Baltic States. He himself, to be sure, did not understand the meaning of this inquiry from Moscow. I told him that the inquiry was probably based on a misunderstanding that had arisen in Kaunas around Christmas. An instruction from here, in which the idea of a customs union had been mentioned in a negative sense, had temporarily been interpreted by the Lithuanians positively, and to that extent had been misunderstood. This misunderstanding had long since been cleared up.

Finally the Ambassador asked when the exchange of documents of ratification of the Berlin Treaty would take place.<sup>3</sup> I told him I hoped in the course of the next few weeks.

BÜLOW

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<sup>2</sup> See document No. 162 and footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 140 and footnote 5.

## No. 167

5752/H036751-59

### *The Minister in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

A 178

WARSAW, April 19, 1933.

Received April 20.

IV Po. 2836.

### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Démarche with Foreign Minister Beck on the subject of anti-German excesses.

I have the honor to submit enclosed herewith a memorandum on my conversation with Foreign Minister Beck on April 12. I should like to call attention to the Foreign Minister's remark reproduced on

page 3<sup>1</sup> that certain elements are obviously interested in aggravating German-Polish relations. M. Beck, as is well known, likes to express himself in imprecise terms. But when he emphasizes twice that he would be interested in finding out whether the same observation has been made in Germany, I believe that should be interpreted as a veiled proposal for direct contact with Germany. Particularly in connection with the discussions on the four power pact here with other diplomats Colonel Beck took the position that Poland needed no mediation, that on the contrary she rejected any mediation, but on the other hand was prepared to enter into direct negotiations with anyone on any dispute. He also pointed out in this connection that treaties are not unchangeable, but at the same time he repeatedly stressed most emphatically that negotiations on territorial questions would of course never come into question.

Perhaps there is in the suggestions made to me by the Foreign Minister a cautious feeler in the direction of the ideas which, according to the statement of the Italian Ambassador in Berlin to the State Secretary, are supposed to be entertained here (cf. instruction of April 18-IV Po. 2655<sup>2</sup>) and which in the last analysis would mean a blotting out of the Corridor boundaries.

I did not consider it advisable to go any further into the Foreign Minister's statement.

MOLTKE

[Enclosure]

WARSAW, April 12, 1933.

#### MEMORANDUM

I went to see Foreign Minister Beck today in order to discuss the German complaints once more in their context, following the protests already made to M. Lipski, Count Romer, and Count Szembek.<sup>3</sup>

I explained to him at length that developments in recent times had created an atmosphere here which gave rise to the gravest anxieties. The entire country was being covered by an anti-German agitation of such proportions and such intensity as had never been observed

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<sup>1</sup> The third paragraph of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> The Italian Ambassador in Berlin in an interview with Bülow on Apr. 10 had stated that according to a report from the Italian Ambassador in Warsaw, Poland intended to undertake a program for improvement of conditions affecting transportation through the Corridor, including construction of a new motor highway. The Ambassador had inquired about the German attitude toward this (Bülow memorandum of Apr. 10, 4602/E189232). The text of the instruction to Rome, IV Po. 2655 of Apr. 18, which the journal indicates was based on Bülow's memorandum of Apr. 10, has not been found.

<sup>3</sup> In report A 170 of Apr. 12 Moltke described the protest he had made to Szembek on Apr. 6 regarding incidents at Katowice (9204/E647408-12).



before. There was hardly a city in which inflammatory speeches and the wildest demands had not been made in the last few days with reference to the occurrences in Germany, which were grossly exaggerated by the Polish press. Everywhere the slogan was: destruction of everything in Poland which is still German, and boycott of everything which comes from Germany. The results of this malevolent agitation had already become evident. Everywhere straw men labeled "Hitler" were being burned. German newspapers had been destroyed in quantity. Against German theatrical performances, even those of a religious character, knives and rubber truncheons were being used, as in Orzegow, where a Reich German had been seriously wounded. In Rybnik and other places in Upper Silesia serious excesses had been committed against Germans and in the last 3 days the senseless destruction of the German *Gymnasium* and of the German printing shop in Lodz, as well as the stoning of the German Consulate in Łódź and of the Legation, had furnished conspicuous proof of how far things had already gone. I had already taken occasion repeatedly to protest against these occurrences to the Foreign Ministry and to request measures which might prevent a repetition of such incidents, but unfortunately my representations had not been successful. On the contrary, matters had become constantly worse, and I could not help feeling that the Polish authorities, at least by their passive attitude, had encouraged this development. I was well aware that the Polish Government, too, had recently made repeated complaints to Germany. If Polish citizens had suffered injury during the German revolution, that was certainly regrettable, but what was happening at present in Poland was not a reaction to what had actually occurred in Germany but to the gross exaggerations, extravagant statements, and lying reports which the Polish press had circulated, with considerable participation of the semiofficial government organs. Obviously it was a planned action, and so far I had not received the impression that the authorities were doing anything to counteract it. I therefore had to repeat my protests once more and request with the utmost urgency that now at last action be taken against the agitation in Poland.

M. Beck replied as follows: He had the impression that certain elements were interested in aggravating German-Polish relations and were active in this sense. Not only for the press but also for certain politicians German-Polish conflicts meant satisfaction of their need for sensations. Even in Peru they found pleasure therein, and in Geneva it would be a disappointment to many if a conflict between German and Polish representatives did not occur at every session of the Council. M. Beck emphasized twice that it would be of special

interest to him to find out whether similar observations had been made also in Germany, and that it would perhaps be useful if both governments took action against such peace-disturbing elements.

M. Beck then reverted to the occurrences I had described, which he called most regrettable. He repeated for his part, too, the regrets expressed already yesterday by Count Romer on account of the stoning of the Consulate in Lodz and of the Legation. Without going into details, M. Beck then referred once more to the Polish complaints which were being made in Berlin and—emphasizing expressly that it was a minority incident which he could not discuss officially—mentioned the case of the three Breslau students, which had been especially provocative. For the rest, however, he could inform me that the Minister President had issued the strictest instructions to all administrative authorities, and he expected definitely that incidents such as I had described would not be repeated in the future. Here in Warsaw very vigorous action had already been taken against the trouble-makers; among other things, a demonstration meeting of students arranged for yesterday evening had been prohibited by the police. Finally, the *Gazeta Polska*, on instructions from the Government, had published an article in which a most urgent appeal was made for peace and order.

I replied that this very article in the *Gazeta Polska* appeared to me extremely dubious. To be sure, it contained an appeal for peace and order, but at the same time it sanctioned the boycott against German goods as legitimate and useful. Colonel Beck protested that the *Gazeta Polska* must have added this part of the article on its own initiative. I replied to M. Beck that I could not believe that in such an extremely important matter an official organ could make additions not in accordance with the intentions of the Government in an article which he himself had said was ordered by the Government. Moreover, the very participation of the Under State Secretary of the Ministry of Trade in the large demonstration meeting of Polish importers in which the boycott of German goods had been decided upon had showed that the Government was sympathetic to the boycott idea. What the Government really had in mind was simply incomprehensible to me, unless it wanted to destroy even the last remnant of German-Polish economic relations. In March of last year when we had signed the minor trade agreement,<sup>4</sup> which had always been considered by the Germans as the beginning of a normalization

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<sup>4</sup> Apparently a reference to an agreement effected by an exchange of notes on Mar. 26, 1932, by which certain Polish and German exports were admitted to the other country with import duties less than the maximum tariff of the importing country. The text of the exchange of notes is filmed as 9981/E697395-400.

of economic relations, this step had been most warmly welcomed not only in Germany but also in Poland. Unfortunately, the Polish Government by introducing the maximum customs duties in Danzig had violated this agreement even before the ink had dried on the signatures, and thereby the hopes which we had held at that time had been destroyed. Now the Polish Government, by the newly issued import prohibitions, had again dealt a heavy blow to German imports and the boycott which it promoted, or at least tolerated, seemed designed to put an end to German-Polish economic relations. In any case I could not believe that the policy now inaugurated by Poland, which was an outright provocation to countermeasures would lead to anything good. On the contrary, I had the impression that perhaps the only area in which there had until then been possibilities of agreement was now also being taken away from us.

The Foreign Minister avoided discussing this any further and pretended that he was not informed in detail about economic matters. With respect to economic relations, too, he referred to the above-mentioned action of the Polish Minister President and again expressed the hope that it would be possible soon to restore normal conditions. He had one worry, however. He had been informed by the Polish Consulate at Essen that far-reaching expulsion measures were being prepared. In this he saw a great danger. If this report was correct, Poland would be forced to take appropriate countermeasures and thereby a development would be inaugurated whose consequences were unforeseeable.

I replied that I knew nothing of such plans. Perhaps this had reference to expulsion measures being considered against the actually very numerous Polish citizens who had entered Germany with short-term visas and were staying there without authorization. Perhaps it had reference also to the question of the unemployed Polish workers, concerning whom negotiations had been conducted for a long time between our two Governments, with Poland refusing thus far to grant our demands, which in view of the financial distress of the municipalities were thoroughly justified. The Foreign Minister replied that he was only superficially oriented on this question. Naturally, no objection could be raised to expulsions if there were special reasons for them in the individual cases. He only hoped that no mass expulsions would result, because otherwise Poland would be forced to take countermeasures. For the rest, he could only assure me again that he for his part would do everything in order to contribute to a pacification of the general situation, and he hoped that the German side intended to do the same. I could only confirm this to him.

## No. 168

9198/E647156-57

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director of Department IV*

BERLIN, April 20, 1933.  
e. o. IV Po. 2864.

The Polish Minister, M. Wysocki, called on me today and repeated the request made before Easter by Counselor of Legation Schimitzek, on instructions of his Government, for a reception of the Minister by the Reich Chancellor.<sup>1</sup> The Minister laid the greatest stress on the urgency of his request and said that he would be held personally responsible by his Government if it should not be possible for him to obtain an interview very soon. He claimed that he did not know what the subject of the conversation would be. He would not receive the instruction until after he had reported the date of the reception. From the way the conversation went I got the impression, however, that it was a question of the incidents which have occurred during the last few weeks involving Polish citizens; faced with this, the Minister said, the Polish Government did not know what to do. On his return from a short vacation he had again found a pile of telegrams in which Polish citizens appealed to him for help.

On taking leave M. Wysocki again asked with the utmost urgency that he be received by the Reich Chancellor as soon as possible.

I informed M. Wysocki that appropriate steps had already been initiated on the basis of the request made by M. Schimitzek, but in view of the absence of the Reich Chancellor from Berlin it could not yet be foreseen when it would be possible to hold the reception.

*Remark:* Since the Russian Ambassador was promised a reception by the Reich Chancellor some time ago, a prior reception of the Polish Minister would probably for political reasons be out of the question. I should like to suggest, however, that both receptions be planned, if possible, for the beginning of next week.<sup>2</sup>

1. To the State Secretary

2. To Ministerialdirektor Meyer; Office of the Foreign Minister; Protocol; IV Po.: for information.

HEY

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<sup>1</sup> In a communication to the Reich Chancellery on Apr. 13 the Foreign Ministry had stated that the Polish Legation had made a request that the Polish Minister be received by the Reich Chancellor (9189/E646432).

<sup>2</sup> The Soviet Ambassador was received by the Reich Chancellor on Apr. 28; see document No. 194. The Polish Minister was received on May 2; see document No. 201.

## No. 169

7892/E571599-601

*Memorandum by an Official of Department II*

APRIL 20, 1933.  
e. o. II SG 823.

On March 30 the Reich Chancellor stated his agreement with the proposal of Kommerzienrat Röchling to receive representatives of the main parties in the Saar Territory in the near future (cf. II SG 648<sup>1</sup>). However, the attempts thereupon undertaken by Herr Röchling to make arrangements with the other parties have been unsuccessful, since the other parties do not want to commit themselves to the leadership of Herr Röchling (!)

The week before last there therefore appeared in Berlin the German member of the Governing Commission of the Saar Territory, Herr Kossmann,<sup>2</sup> and Herr Levacher and Herr Kiefer of the Center party, in order to prepare the reception by the Reich Chancellor. They also called on Vice Chancellor von Papen on this occasion. After a lengthy discussion I arranged the following procedure with the gentlemen: Herr Kossmann should first bring about an agreement in Saarbrücken with the parties that come into consideration and then write me a letter in which he should first suggest an audience with the Reich Chancellor for himself and then an audience for the party representatives for the purpose of discussing the special situation in the Saar Territory and preparing the plebiscite.

However, it was unfortunately not possible to reach an agreement of the parties in this way. In the first place there is a split within the Center party regarding the choice of the persons to be sent. Furthermore, upon the establishment of a unity front, with which they are very much in agreement, the National Socialists claim the leadership, since they are now also the strongest party in the Saar Territory; furthermore they want to see the prohibitions by the Governing Commission which are still in force (SA and SS, swastika, meetings) rescinded in advance, which Herr Kossmann says is not attainable at the present time. In these circumstances Herr Kossmann had to inform me that he considered his efforts unsuccessful and could only request that the Foreign Ministry now take the initiative and simply

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed (7892/E571598). This is a memorandum of Mar. 30 by Voigt briefly recording Röchling's account of his meeting with Hitler on that day.

<sup>2</sup> Herr Kossmann was the native Saarlander member of the Governing Commission.

invite the parties. Herr Röchling expressed himself in the same sense.<sup>3</sup>

The conditions in the Saar Territory seem to be growing gradually clearer. In all the non-Marxist parties there is full realization that they must keep together and that France is the sole opponent. It is only a question of pointing out to them authoritatively the necessity of a certain cessation of party strife and of holding together against the outside foe; the rest will develop naturally. To be sure, on the part of the Communists and particularly the Socialists there is still a great deal of agitation carried on against the new Germany, but there are, however, signs that the masses are gradually denying the leaders their allegiance, especially since the labor unions are evidently making intensive efforts at a changeover.

VOIGT

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\* The next day, Apr. 21, a letter drafted by Voigt for Neurath's signature was sent to the State Secretary of the Reich Chancellery endorsing the "desire" of representatives of four non-Marxist Saar parties to be received by Hitler. The letter also endorsed a request of Kossmann to be received by Hitler. (7892/E571602-03)

State Secretary Lammers replied on Apr. 28 (letter II SG 910) that Hitler had agreed in principle to these proposals and suggested May 12 as a possible date for the meeting with Kossmann; May 15 for that with the party representatives (7892/E571620).

## No. 170

3170/676088-93

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, April 20, 1933.  
zu RM 541.<sup>1</sup>

As I already expected from the enclosed telegram No. 86 from Rome, Vice Chancellor von Papen asked me to see him at 10 o'clock this morning in order to discuss with Ministerialdirektor Gaus and me his negotiations in Rome concerning a pact. On the basis of the instructions received from us—our last telegram<sup>2</sup> with the formulations for articles II and III had not yet been received in Rome—he and Herr von Hassell had drawn up formulations for a minimal program, which they had used in their conversations in Rome but had not handed to the Italians. These formulations did not coincide at all points with the view of the Foreign Ministry, particularly not with

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<sup>1</sup> RM 541: Document No. 164.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (3170/676064-67), telegram No. 99, sent at 4:45 p. m., on Apr. 19 in reply to document No. 159.

yesterday's telegram, which had not yet been received at that time in Rome. The Vice Chancellor discussed the whole problem in detail with Herr Gaus and me, and on the basis of this discussion we produced the enclosed text as a draft acceptable to us and forwarded it to Rome. Herr Gaus also explained the text in detail to Herr von Hassell and in doing so pointed out that the passages in articles II and III which are enclosed in red brackets <sup>3</sup> might if necessary be sacrificed or formulated differently but that on the other hand our formulation of the conclusion of article II and especially the conclusion of article III was of decisive importance. The same text with an accompanying letter of Vice Chancellor von Papen <sup>4</sup> was at the same time sent by plane to the Reich Chancellor in Tegernsee with the request that if possible he approve this text or state his position on it by 5:30, since Herr von Hassell was to be received at 7 o'clock by Mussolini and this opportunity to influence the Italian position in our sense ought to be used. Herr von Hassell was informed of this too.

It was already 6:20 before State Secretary Meissner called me by order of the Vice Chancellor, who was just then at the President's, in order to report that he had received a telegram from Munich from the Chancellor which read: "Too short a time for a decision; I shall talk with you (Papen) and Blomberg again tomorrow." I reported this to Herr von Hassell, who had already been advised that if necessary he might have to negotiate with the reservation that the final decision would be made by the Chancellor.<sup>5</sup>

BÜLOW

[Enclosure] <sup>6</sup>

Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy, conscious of the special responsibilities imposed on them by their position as permanent members of the Council of the League of Nations with respect to the League itself and its members and of those resulting from their joint signing of the Locarno agreements; convinced that the state of malaise which prevails in the world cannot be dispelled except by a strengthening of their solidarity capable of affirming in Europe confidence in peace;

Faithful to the obligations which they have assumed under the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Locarno Treaties, and the Briand-Kellogg Pact and referring to the declaration of No-Resort to Force, the principle of which was adopted on March 2 last <sup>7</sup> by the Political Commission of the Disarmament Conference;

<sup>3</sup> These passages are set off by brackets in the enclosure.

<sup>4</sup> Not found.

<sup>5</sup> Marginal note: "Discussed with the Chancellor. N[eurath], Apr. 21". See footnote 10.

<sup>6</sup> This enclosure is in French in the original.

<sup>7</sup> See document No. 38, and footnote 2.

Anxious to give full efficacy to all the provisions of the Covenant;  
Respectful of the rights of each State, concerning which no disposition may be made without their consent;

Have agreed on the following provisions:

*Article I*

The High Contracting Parties will consult on all questions which appertain to them and will strive within the framework of the League of Nations to pursue a policy of cooperation among themselves with a view to maintaining peace.

*Article II*

[The four Powers confirm that the obligations of the Covenant demand scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations as a means of ensuring peace and security, but they also recognize the possibility of revision of the peace treaties in circumstances that might lead to a conflict among nations. In connection therewith]<sup>8</sup> and with a view to the possible application in Europe of the principles enunciated in articles 10 (summary of the content of the article) and 19 (summary of the content of the article) of the Covenant, they decide to examine among themselves, without prejudice to decisions which can only be taken by the regular organs of the League of Nations, any proposal tending to give full efficacy to these principles.

*Article III*

[The High Contracting Powers undertake to collaborate as quickly as possible with the other Powers in a convention ensuring a substantial reduction and limitation of armaments, with provisions for its subsequent revision with a view to a new reduction. In the event that the Disarmament Conference should end with only partial results]<sup>8</sup> France, Great Britain, and Italy declare that the equality of rights accorded Germany should have an effective application. Germany for her part undertakes for the duration of the first disarmament convention (5 years at the most) to realize this equality of rights only by stages and by virtue of an agreement reached to this effect.<sup>9</sup> (Analogous arrangements concerning Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria.)

*Article IV*

The High Contracting Parties affirm in general their desire to consult on every question of common interest in Europe, particularly on every question concerning the restoration of its economy.

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<sup>8</sup> See footnote 3.

<sup>9</sup> At Hitler's direction the words "in relation to the disarmament measures of the other Powers" were added at this point (telegram No. 104 of Apr. 21, Bülow to Hassell: 3170/676094; telegram No. 90 of Apr. 21, Hassell to the Foreign Ministry, and memorandum of a telephone conversation on the morning of Apr. 22, between Bülow and the Embassy in Rome: 8840/E615169).



*Article V*

The present agreement is concluded for a period of 10 years reckoned from the exchange of ratifications. If at the end of the 8th year none of the High Contracting Parties has notified the others of its intention to terminate it, it shall be considered as renewed and shall remain in force indefinitely, the Contracting Parties retaining the right to terminate it by denouncing it 2 years in advance.

*Article VI*

The present agreement shall be ratified and the signatures shall be exchanged as soon as possible. It shall be registered at the Secretariat of the League of Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant.

## No. 171

3170/676138-39

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

No. 89 of April 20

ROME (Quir.), April 20, 1933—9: 35 p. m.

Received April 21—1: 40 a. m.

RM 549.

I have just explained to Mussolini the German position on the French text in accordance with today's telephone conversation<sup>1</sup> with Berlin, and left with him a short pro memoria,<sup>2</sup> at the same time informing him about the nature of this expression of opinion, particularly of the fact that the final sanction had not yet been given by the Chancellor. I therefore had to reserve communication of the official attitude of my Government until tomorrow. After a brief inspection of the pro memoria and discussion of the individual points, Mussolini explained that he had to concede that our position was justified. He would put it before Jouvenel the day after tomorrow as the German view, approved by him in principle, in order that the latter might obtain the French position as soon as possible. Mussolini then once more confirmed the fact that the presentation of the political situation recently made to Herr von Papen and me by Aloisi<sup>3</sup> had originated with him. In his opinion, the conclusion of the four power pact would be for Germany the best counterblow that could be dealt anti-German propaganda throughout the world. But naturally a national government, such as the present German one, could only accept a pact that had positive content. In this sense he would support the German modifications. Also, speed was imperative because in France

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 170.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (German text: 8840/E615147-52; Italian text: 8840/E615153-56).

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 164.

the policy of the pact stood and fell with Daladier. Herriot was opposed to it. When I alluded to the colonial question with reference to the recent conversation with Aloisi and Suvich,<sup>4</sup> Mussolini stated that in his opinion after the pact had been concluded, an agreement would have to be reached between Rome and Berlin, on the basis of their special relationship, concerning the basic line of policy on the principal issues: for example, with regard to economic collaboration in the Danube area, League of Nations policy, and the colonial question. France was speculating on the German-Italian antagonism in the Austrian question. The problem of the relations between Austria and Germany was not acute today, however, and had better remain untouched. We could agree on a policy in the Southeast even without discussing it. Later, he was convinced that in the Austrian question, too, we would be able to find a common line. On the other hand, it was the right thing for the moment to let Dollfuss work in tranquillity. He had told the latter that he had to crush Marxism in Austria if he wanted to remain at the helm. If Dollfuss did not do this, a new situation would, indeed, arise, and he would suffer the same fate as the German governments before the revolution.

I request instructions on Friday to the effect that I may define the German standpoint which I presented as the official position of the German Government.

HASELL

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<sup>4</sup> See document No. 164.

## No. 172

8840/E615157-58

### *Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in Italy*

ROME, April 20, 1933.

I spoke with Signor Quaroni regarding our wishes with respect to an agreement on the colonial question within the scope of the negotiations for the pact, as discussed at the conversation of the Ambassador with Baron Aloisi in the presence of the Vice Chancellor.<sup>1</sup> I indicated to him without too much beating around the bush that especial importance was attached by Germany to a gentlemen's agreement on this question. We had to make so many sacrifices with respect to the French and English position on the proposals of Mussolini that at least the colonial question in some form or other must again be linked with the negotiations concerning the pact. Signor Quaroni stated that the Italians had complete understanding for this demand and

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 164.

he was convinced that they would be prepared to meet our wishes in some form or other. In his opinion, it was to be sure questionable policy to conclude a special agreement on this subject now within the framework of the negotiations for the pact. Any formal agreement, though it be only a gentlemen's agreement concluded in the loosest form, would eventually become known anyway; and as experience showed, it was precisely those agreements that were to be kept secret which, when they became known eventually, created a special sensation and gave rise to all sorts of misinterpretations. He could tell me on this occasion that when the Mussolini pact in its first version, in which the colonial question was broached, became known, serious apprehensions, which it had been difficult to set at rest, had been expressed immediately by the Portuguese and also by the Dutch. The negotiations, which in any event—precisely with regard to the smaller countries—were extremely delicate must now no longer be encumbered with too much secondary business if the central idea was not to be seriously imperiled. Naturally, this did not preclude that an informal understanding between Germany and Italy of the kind suggested by us might yet be achieved.

SMEND

### No. 173

8048/E578440-45

#### *The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

I 753

ROME, April 20, 1933.

Received April 22.

II Oe. 468.

#### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Visit of the Austrian Chancellor to Rome; Italy's policy toward Austria.

Outward course of the visit. Evasiveness of the Austrians and Italians regarding its political significance. Italian tendency to back Austria over against the National Socialist movement to ensure Austria's independence in the face of Anschluss trend. Bearings on German policy.

#### *Outward course of the visit*

The Austrian Chancellor, Dollfuss, arrived in Rome on April 11 by plane and was greeted on landing by Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs Suvich. He was accompanied among others by his Chief of Cabinet, Regierungsrat Hornbostel, and the Chief of Aviation, Deutelmoser. The Chancellor was received by Mussolini on the 12th,

and had also several prolonged conferences with Under State Secretary Suvich and Ambassador Baron Aloisi. On the 12th, the Italian Government gave a banquet in his honor, which was attended by Mussolini, all members of the Government, representatives of the Royal Court, the Governor of Rome, and numerous other dignitaries. Brief toasts were exchanged at the end of the banquet. On the 13th, the Austrian Minister, von Egger, gave a reception at the Legation in honor of the Federal Chancellor, which was attended by a number of representatives of the Government. Mussolini did not come to this reception. In the course of his visit here, the Chancellor deposited a wreath at the Pantheon and also visited the Exhibition of the Revolution. Herr Dollfuss, accompanied by the Austrian Minister, made a courtesy call on me, as he did on several other diplomats. He also met with Vice Chancellor von Papen, with whom he had several lengthy talks.<sup>1</sup> A report on his visit to the Vatican will be provided from another source.<sup>2</sup> His departure, again by air, took place on the 17th.

*Political significance of the visit*

Extreme reserve is observed here regarding the substance of the talks between the Chancellor and the director of Italian foreign policy. On one occasion the visit is termed an act of courtesy, at another time it is represented as the result of the Chancellor's wish to spend Easter at the holy places. But there can be no doubt that the visit had political character.

*The background of the visit: Austrian preoccupations*

The visit, according to confidential information from a reliable source, is the result of a sudden decision of the Austrian Chancellor, who apparently felt a need to have a personal talk with Mussolini on the evolution of the European situation. The preparation of the concordat, on which negotiations are now going on with the Austrian Minister of Justice, Schuschnigg, who arrived here several days ago, and which is here and there given as the specific purpose of the journey, played only a secondary part in the visit according to this information. The principal subject of the conversations was a discussion of Austria's internal situation. The Chancellor evidently felt impelled to outline to the Italian Government the guiding principles of Austria's domestic policy, especially with regard to its attitude toward Reich German National Socialism and its effects on Austria, and to obtain in Rome some sort of backing against the an-

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 162, footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup> No documents containing details on Dollfuss' visit to the Vatican have been found. Report No. 93 of May 9 from the Vatican stated that he had engaged in negotiations for a concordat (9927/E694717-19).

anticipated progressive strengthening of the National Socialist movement in Austria, with its implication for the Anschluss question.

### *The attitude of Italy*

This request which fits in with the position taken here met with a sympathetic reception, and the Chancellor was not only assured of Italian support in the event that the development of the domestic situation should take a critical turn, but in addition to this it was apparently urged upon the Government, perhaps not without some economic consideration offered in return, to check National Socialism in Austria in all circumstances and not allow it to come to power. As the most efficient means to this end, it was proposed to the Government to launch a campaign, to be conducted with utmost energy, against "Marxism", a movement which constituted the gravest threat to Austria at the moment, not the least because of the pro-Czech tendencies recently exhibited by the Austrian Social Democrats. In order to keep Marxism in check it would be necessary to bring about as quickly as possible an understanding among the Christian Socials, the *Heimwehr*, and the National Socialists, and put aside all political divergencies for the time being. The Chancellor is said to have been in wholehearted agreement with this tactic for preserving Austria's political independence, and to have promised that on his return he would intensify his efforts in that direction. (In this connection it should be noted that according to a report from a reliable source, four Pan-German members of the Parliament—Hanyzel, Brodinger, Zarbock, and Kliman,<sup>3</sup> will come to Rome for the purpose of establishing contact with political circles here.) Not the least significant feature characterizing the trend of the talk is the wording of the short toast given by Mussolini, which was addressed to the "future of the Austrian Republic" and is construed as a deliberate pronouncement in favor of the preservation of Austria's independence. In a similar vein is the Chancellor's farewell telegram to Mussolini, which expressed the confidence based on the impressions won during the visit, that "Austria could count on Italy's friendship and assistance in the future as she had in the past." It is finally a noteworthy fact that the Italian press, while refraining from any comment of its own on the visit and its political significance, is displaying an all the more intensive activity in printing at length reports of its correspondents following the line indicated above, foreign and especially Austrian press comments, and the various interviews with the Chancellor during his visit and after his return to Vienna, as well as other pronounce-

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<sup>3</sup> Apparently the following members of Parliament are referred to here: Josef Hainzl, a member of the Heimatblock; Hans Prodinger and Rudolf Zarbock, members of the Nationaler Wirtschaftsblock; and Thomas Klimann of the Grossdeutsche Volkspartei.

ments of his. Thus, for instance, the press brought out today a radio message of the Chancellor to the Austrian people which, following closely the text of the afore-mentioned telegram, brings out that Italy showed complete understanding for the problems facing Austria and that Austria had in Italy a friend on whom she could depend if she needed support and assistance in the international field during the critical period which the country now had to go through. In this connection mention should also be made of the high distinction conferred on the Chancellor by the bestowal of the Grand Cross of the St. Maurice and Lazarus Order, which was certainly not awarded without a special purpose.

### *Result of the visit*

The close relationship between the two countries by and large has assuredly been further strengthened by the Chancellor's visit during which, we may be certain, other subjects were discussed in addition to the afore-mentioned topic, such as the significance which the four power pact has for Austria, the Austrian loan, and economic questions concerning Austria and Italy. It is most certain that the Chancellor departed with the impression that Italy regards preservation of an independent Austria as one of the cardinal points of her European policy.

### *Political appraisal: Bearings on German policy*

There can be no doubt that this impression is correct. From the numerous conversations which took place during the visit of the German Ministers and of Chancellor Dollfuss, I have to draw the conclusion that Italy still maintains her opposition to the Anschluss. Logic is sacrificed to these political considerations in that there is the wish to see the triumph of Fascism in the whole world, but not in Austria, because it is felt that such a political coordination might sharply increase the danger of Anschluss. A particularly outspoken advocate of this view is Under State Secretary Suvich, a former subject of the old Austria, from Trieste. But I do not think that Mussolini, either, is open to argument on this point, at this time at least. It is therefore my belief that the correct method of German political action in this regard would be, as hitherto, to pursue a plan, as indicated in my successive reports, that would be calculated to bring about the widest possible meshing of German and Italian interests in the Danube Basin so as, for one thing, to preclude the forging of an Italo-Austro-Hungarian bloc excluding Germany, and for another, gradually to establish through this very collaboration in this area the relationship of mutual trust between Italy and Germany that would facilitate attacking the issue of the political relationship to Austria, which cannot yet be directly approached today. In this connection I would appreciate re-

ceiving instructions with regard to my report No. 368 of February 23,<sup>4</sup> especially now that the Mussolini pact for one reason or another is no longer in the forefront of discussion. It is to be expected with some certainty that similarity of the inner-political coloring of the German and Italian Governments will progressively facilitate a German-Italian understanding even in the question of Austria. It is of course also conceivable that under the impact of a sweeping National Socialist victory on the German pattern in Austria, which might take place some time hence, Italy would recognize the accomplished fact and adjust her policy accordingly. Herr Dollfuss, for his part, however, appears to be very confident about the future in this respect. He explained to me that the situations in Austria and Germany were not at all alike. The Austrians, to be sure, had the Reich-German experience before their eyes, but this did not mean that developments would now follow an identical course; on the contrary, what had been witnessed served more in the nature of a warning. This applied particularly to the setting up of the office of Reichsstatthalter in Bavaria,<sup>5</sup> which had given exceptional impetus to the Christian Socials in Austria. If that is true, it is incomprehensible why Herr Dollfuss is then so set against new elections.

HASSELL

<sup>4</sup> Document No. 35. See also document No. 64 and footnote 2.

<sup>5</sup> General Ritter von Epp had been appointed on Apr. 10 as Reichsstatthalter of Bavaria.

## No. 174

9245/E651877

*The Ambassador in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 213 of April 21

WASHINGTON, April 21, 1933—10:01 a. m.

Received April 22—5:45 a. m.

W 2584.

In the conversation on the occasion of the presentation of my credentials the President, after he had welcomed me in an exceedingly cordial manner, spoke to begin with about his school years in Germany. As we had expected, the President then turned the conversation to the impending discussions with MacDonald and Herriot.<sup>1</sup> His first question was about the identity of the German delegate to the negotiations here.<sup>2</sup> When I replied that no decision had been made as yet, a

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 143.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 149.

shadow of disappointment passed over his face. He remarked, however, that even though the personnel question was unsettled, he would like to have a long preliminary conversation with me during MacDonald's and Herriot's visit about the pending problem. In especially cordial words he asked me in conclusion to convey his personal greetings to the Reich President. In view of the announced talk I again request most urgently immediate guidance for my conversation.<sup>3</sup>

LUTHER

<sup>3</sup> This request for guidance crossed with an instruction from Bülow (telegram No. 141 of Apr. 21: 9245/E651873-74), the text of which reads as follows: "I regret that I can still give you no detailed formula for German cooperation at the World Economic Conference for your first conversation with President Roosevelt. The Reich Cabinet has not yet dealt with the problems of the World Economic Conference. In this situation, all that can be done is to limit oneself to pointing out that the Reich Chancellor, in his government statement to the Reichstag on March 23, stated that the Government approved an early meeting of the World Economic Conference and was ready for positive cooperation.

"Please say to President Roosevelt in this connection that, whatever form the response to his invitation to the Reich Chancellor may take, a decision about it will be made in the next few days. At the forthcoming discussions in Washington there will then still be opportunity to inform him in detail about the views of the Reich Government on the problems of the World Economic Conference. In connection with the forthcoming discussion in the Reich Cabinet it would be useful to know what particular problems the American Government especially wants to discuss with Germany."

## No. 175

9293/E660058-60

### *The Foreign Minister to the Reich Minister of Interior*

MOST URGENT  
ACTION THIS DAY

BERLIN, April 21, 1933.  
zu VI A 757.<sup>1</sup>

With reference to the draft of a Reich law against excessive foreign attendance at German schools and universities which was sent to me, and which is on the agenda of tomorrow's Cabinet meeting,<sup>2</sup> I think I ought to direct your personal attention to several points of view that have emerged since the passage of the Law for Officials and Lawyers<sup>3</sup> and which have already acquired for us significance with respect to foreign policy.

It is a question in the first place of certain direct legal effects that are caused by the German-Polish Agreement on Upper Silesia of May 15, 1922,<sup>4</sup> with which you are familiar and which is still valid until

<sup>1</sup> VI A 757: Not printed (9293/E660056-57).

<sup>2</sup> Minutes of the Cabinet meeting of Apr. 22 are filmed on 3598/792374-86, 792390-93.

<sup>3</sup> Apparently a reference to two laws of Apr. 7, 1933, providing for the discharge or disqualification of officials and lawyers by reason of political activity or non-Aryan ancestry. The law on officials is in *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1933, I, p. 175, and that on lawyers, *ibid.*, p. 188.

<sup>4</sup> Signed at Geneva; for the text, see *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1922, II, p. 238.



1937. In this Agreement the Reich obligated itself to accord to all inhabitants of German Upper Silesia, without regard to birth, nationality, language, racial group, or religion, the most comprehensive protection of their lives and their freedom, with the effect that no law, no regulation, and no official act may be contrary or contradictory to these provisions and that no law, no regulation, and no official act may claim validity against them (cf. article 66 ff. of the Geneva Convention).

The German Government representative on the Mixed Commission in Katowice has reported to us <sup>5</sup> that the Swiss Chairman of the Mixed Commission for Upper Silesia, M. Calonder, has already directed his attention in accordance with article 585 of the Geneva Convention to the numerous drastic restrictions which have been imposed by official decrees upon the German nationals of German Upper Silesia of the Jewish race or Jewish religion, in particular the lawyers, notaries, and judges, in the exercise of their professions and their offices.

Now that through this step the basic question has been broached internationally, we will of course also have to take a position on it. We must even expect that the League of Nations Council will also be concerned with the matter, particularly since the Poles have a great interest in reproaching us for not fulfilling our international obligations.

The significance which will be accorded the matter in other foreign countries, too, is shown by the questions in the British House of Commons on whether any action is intended against Germany for her treatment of the Jewish population in Upper Silesia.

Apart from these special repercussions, the draft law has also had strong effects on our general minorities policy, which after all is mainly pursued for the preservation of the German racial group abroad, which is important to the Reich.

In these statements I am of course far from touching on the familiar basic problem on which the new draft law rests. We are all agreed about the basic question. Nevertheless as chief of the Foreign Ministry I cannot refrain from pointing out that the new legislation brings us into conflict with international obligations which the Reich has definitely assumed. I therefore wish to suggest that we immediately, before the bill is passed, discuss whether there are any possibilities, and if so what they are, for harmonizing our legislation with the formal obligations which we have assumed internationally and with our general minorities policy.<sup>6</sup>

Yours, etc.

NEURATH

<sup>5</sup> In Katowice report of Apr. 7 (9198/E647139-41).

<sup>6</sup> An unsigned memorandum of Apr. 24 for submission to the State Secretary and the Foreign Minister read: "The Reich Ministry of Interior has stated that the Reich Minister of Interior was prepared to accept an amendment to the law," and a minute by Rödiger of Apr. 28 read: "The law appeared in a new form. Account was taken of the wishes of the Foreign Ministry." (9293/E660070)

## No. 176

3170/676152

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy*

Telegram

No. 106

BERLIN, April 22, 1933—7:05 p. m.  
e. o. RM 555.

For the Ambassador personally.

Please continue with the Government there the discussions initiated by Vice Chancellor von Papen, concerning a gentlemen's agreement on colonies <sup>1</sup> in such a way that the agreement may not go by the board at the conclusion of the Rome pact.

NEURATH

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<sup>1</sup> See documents Nos. 164 and 172.

## No. 177

2945/575827

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 91 of April 22

ROME (Quir.), April 22, 1933—8:35 p. m.  
Received April 22—11:00 p. m.

Former Reich Chancellor Wirth informed me in strict confidence that he had received information from Czech circles very close to Masaryk that they reckon seriously in Prague with the Polish intention of preventive military action at the German eastern border.<sup>1</sup>

HASSELL

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<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Reported to the Reich President. v[on] N[eurath], Apr. 26."

## No. 178

3170/676154-55

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 92 of April 22

ROME (Quirinal), April 22, 1933—9:40 p. m.  
Received April 23—1:30 a. m.  
RM 559.

At the desire of Suvich and Aloisi I had today a thorough discussion with Aloisi and the Political Director <sup>1</sup> concerning the French

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<sup>1</sup> Gino Buti.

text as revised to correspond to German wishes.<sup>2</sup> Apart from changes primarily of an editorial character the Italians thought that the French, even if they actually accepted the first sentence of article II, would certainly insist that the second sentence be put back to correspond to their version.<sup>3</sup> The Italians therefore wondered whether, in this case, in order to avoid the "methods and procedures" one could not also drop the "principles" and limit oneself to the "articles" without amplification. I replied that I believed we would place more value on the "principles" and "summary of the content" than on the first sentence. The Italians see the greatest difficulty of all in the limitation to 5 years of our obligation to realize equality of rights only in stages, that is, to the duration of the first convention. France and England would certainly not accept that. Would it not suffice for us that the stages were laid down in an agreement concerning whose contents nothing was prescribed and which therefore could even contain stipulations concerning periods? As for the rest Aloisi thought we could express in an accompanying note the idea of limitation to the first convention. I stressed with the greatest emphasis the German position and urgently requested that the German version be pressed upon France and England. In this connection I indicated that one could finally conclude the entire pact for only 5 years, which they however seemed to reject.

Perhaps you have the possibility of making plausible to the French Government, via Poncet, the German position concerning the limitation as to time.

The Italians now want to continue negotiations with the French and English Ambassadors.<sup>4</sup>

HASSELL

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<sup>2</sup> See enclosure to document No. 170.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 151.

<sup>4</sup> On May 2 Suvich gave Hassell an account of the negotiations which had been taking place with the French and British Ambassadors. As Hassell reported it, "The French Ambassador had at first rejected the German proposals for amendment as entirely impossible. Finally, however, a new draft resulted, which is now available in finished form, and will presumably be transmitted by both Ambassadors to London and Paris. In the opinion of the Italians, the result was such that it would be very difficult for France to agree. On the other hand, in view of the general situation in the field of foreign policy, which has been repeatedly discussed, and which is particularly difficult for Germany at the moment, a pact in this form would represent a gain for Germany." (telegram No. 94 of May 2: 3170/676177-80)

## No. 179

9614-E678536-38

*Minister President Gömbös to Reich Chancellor Hitler*

BUDAPEST, April 22, 1933.

Rk. 4927.

EXCELLENCY: When I had the honor to greet you on your accession to the Government,<sup>1</sup> I emphasized the necessity of frank discussion and in the future I myself intend to observe this frankness. For I believe that it is urgently necessary to regulate relations between Germany and Hungary, above all as regards our economic situation.

Here, nationalist Hungary, which always looks toward Berlin with a certain hope and sympathy, is ruled with a firm hand. It is also in Germany's interest, I believe, that this sympathy should not be disturbed in any way by uncertain economic relations. The circumstance, however, that recently Hungarian agricultural products have not been able to enter Germany at all, or could do so only to a very limited extent, has already caused voices to be raised in a kind of criticism of my policy toward Germany which is not entirely unfounded. Your Excellency has no doubt received the report that I have taken disciplinary action against the Jewish racial-nationalist [*rassenschützlerische*] paper which attacked Your Excellency and the Government of Germany, in order to show that I stand by Your Excellency not only for basic ideological reasons but also because of practical political considerations.

I should therefore like to request urgently that the German Government decide to help us in questions of agricultural exports. I am convinced that Your Excellency's strong determination will prevail also in this question, the more so since I know that Your Excellency's principles are in agreement with mine—to the effect, namely, that political and economic policies must, if possible, be the same.

Since the question of agricultural exports is to me not only an economic question but a question of political considerations, and since it would strengthen my political course if it were understood by the German side, I request that Your Excellency take urgent measures of a fundamental nature; and perhaps eminent experts could come here to Budapest as soon as possible in order to discuss details.

I believe that Your Excellency sees the necessity, as I do, of a closer comradely cooperation, and that is the purpose of my letter which I am sending directly to Your Excellency<sup>2</sup> in the hope that we

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 15.

<sup>2</sup> A further message to Hitler from Gömbös in regard to this same matter was telephoned from Minister Schoen in Budapest to the Foreign Ministry on Apr. 28 (unsigned memorandum to the Foreign Minister: 9580/E675064-65).

who are old racial-nationalist comrades holding the same Weltanschauung will also understand one another in the economic sphere and support each other even when the question is of no great importance for Germany.<sup>3</sup>

With high regard, wishing God's blessing on Your Excellency's historic work, I remain,  
GÜMBÖS

\* See document No. 195.

## No. 180

5266/E322629-36

### *The Minister in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

SECRET

WARSAW, April 23, 1933.

A No. 185

IV Po. 2971.

### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Question of a Polish preventive war.

- I. Arguments in favor of a preventive war
- II. Arguments against it
- III. Weighing of these arguments
- IV. Signs of preparation for a preventive war

Recently diplomatic circles here have been discussing more frequently than before the question whether Poland is preparing a preventive war against Germany. For months I have been continuously devoting special attention to this question and have the honor to make the following statement about the present status of this investigation:

#### *I. Arguments in favor of a preventive war*

The growing revisionist tendencies which are asserting themselves everywhere have for a long time been causing extreme unrest and anxiety here, especially since the question entered a more acute stage through the discussion about the four power pact. The same is true of the disarmament question. To be sure, Poland has expressly declared that she does not recognize the equality of rights accorded Germany in the Five Power Agreement of last December and will continue to oppose with all her power the practical application of this principle. But there is no assurance that this resistance operation will be successful. And so they are anticipating here, with growing anxiety, a development which will either lead to the gradual equalizing of the present armament differences or, after failure of the Disarmament Conference, give Germany the possibility to rearm. In both cases the result will be a reduction of the military superiority that Poland now has in relation to Germany. Added to this anxiety

is the development in Germany. They are frightened at the elementary force with which the national idea has burst forth there. They foresee that once the chains of armament limitation are broken, all of Germany's energy will be concentrated on the great goal of the eastern boundaries and that Germany will then not shrink from using force. So the conviction is growing among all those who are determined not to yield a foot of ground—and that includes a large number of the currently influential statesmen—that war cannot be avoided in any case. This means, however, that the Polish statesmen are faced with the big problem: Shall we wait until Germany is militarily strengthened, till the internal consolidation is completed, till the power balance will have shifted to our disadvantage as a result of the final removal of the Communist menace and the complete elimination of all pacifist elements? Or must we not rather, while there is still time, use our military superiority and bring about a radical solution of the Corridor problem by conquering East Prussia? There can hardly be any doubt that, in military circles particularly, passive waiting is considered a crime against the nation.

From the Polish point of view the situation in foreign policy, too, seems to favor an active policy. That France is becoming less and less inclined to go to war for the Corridor is a fact which is causing as much indignation here as anxiety. In spite of everything, however, it is still considered certain that France, if faced with an accomplished fact, will not leave her ally in the lurch. As far as the Little Entente is concerned, they are counting here at least on indirect, if not direct, support. Of special importance for the warmongering elements, however, is the consideration that the Russian menace has lost its terror since the Non-Aggression Pact,<sup>1</sup> and particularly since the recently observed cooling off of Russo-German relations. A political figure especially close to Beck's circle recently affirmed very positively that the Soviet Government had made the binding statement that in case of a Polish-German conflict it would remain absolutely neutral. Although the accuracy of this assertion may be doubted, it does seem to confirm the far-reaching extent of the belief here that they have already covered themselves in the rear. Among the foreign policy considerations there also enters the thought that *faits accomplis* have already brought success in the case of the Zeligowski Putsch<sup>2</sup> and that the Japanese action has now furnished another proof of the expediency of such a policy. The fact that the League of Nations failed in both cases also allays any fears that there might be interference from that quarter, especially if it is possible by clever maneuvers not to appear before the eyes of the world as the aggressor.

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 29, footnote 7.

<sup>2</sup> In October 1920, Polish forces commanded by General Lucian Zeligowski had seized the city of Vilna from Lithuania.

In the field of domestic politics also there are reasons in favor of not delaying any possible military complications too long. As long as Pilsudski is living, the state has a tight organization at its disposal which may not be there after his death.

## II. *Arguments against a preventive war*

Both military reasons and reasons of foreign and domestic policy would therefore lead to an affirmative answer to the question whether a preventive war is expedient, if on the other hand there were not weighty arguments against it, too. These do exist. First of all it is to be noted that the military risk involved in a conflict with Germany is regarded in wide circles here as not inconsiderable. This is true in the first place and particularly of the population in general, among which a pronounced fear psychosis is to be found. But it is also true of military circles, in which unquestionably ideas are entertained about Germany's military capacity, which, unfortunately, are probably not entirely in accordance with the facts. It is believed that the SA formations and the Stahlhelm are to be included in the Reichswehr as a fully effective combat formation. It is furthermore assumed that there are large secret stores of arms on a large scale and, in so far as such stores are not in existence, they fear that the gap can be filled in a very short time by Germany's splendid industrial establishment. In the matter of organization in general, but particularly in the matter of military leadership, they feel inferior to Germany. Besides, the Polish Army is not ready either; weapons and ammunition as well as the condition of the training are termed inadequate in the event of war by expert judges. As regards the reliability of the military personnel, it should be pointed out that one-third of the Army consists of members of minorities that can hardly be considered for use at the front, and furthermore that apparently Communist influences are present, particularly among the noncommissioned officers. The large number of espionage trials, in which officers, too, were involved, shows that the officer corps, too, is not above suspicion. Also to be taken into account is the extremely critical economic situation and the catastrophic strain on the finances—two reasons that can hardly favor the idea of warlike adventures. It is difficult to see how Poland would be able to finance a war unless sufficient help is given to her by some foreign power. The domestic difficulties with which Poland has to contend are great enough to warrant the question whether a war might not possibly jeopardize the social order and also the present regime, particularly if, in the absence of an immediately decisive success, the national enthusiasm, which, like a straw fire, is certainly not difficult to kindle here, should have its true value put to the test.

In the discussion of a preventive war it is often pointed out—in my opinion, correctly—that there is no clear war aim that justifies the stake involved. No doubt there are people here who dream of a conquest of East Prussia and Upper Silesia, but even if Poland should succeed, after occupying these provinces, in laying down the peace terms in Berlin, she could hardly fail to realize that this booty cannot remain a permanent possession. An assimilation of these purely German areas is out of the question. In order to Polonize them it would be necessary to apply far sterner, medieval measures than were employed in Posen and Pomerelia. Above all, however, such a peace of force could be maintained only as long as the power which imposed it actually remained in existence. With all her megalomania, however, Poland will scarcely be able to hope for this in the face of a nation of 80 million, which would never and in no circumstances reconcile itself to such a robbery. This dream could be fulfilled only if a new coalition, like that of 1914, should band together against Germany. Indeed, they are counting here on the possibility that a nationally strengthened Germany will call forth such a coalition against herself. But this factor might rather be regarded as an agreement against a preventive war, for Germany's revisionist aspirations, against which a preventive war would be directed, would then become illusory anyway and Poland would not need to pull the chestnuts out of the fire by herself.

### III. *Weighing of these arguments*

Thus, over against the strong arguments that from the Polish point of view favor a preventive war there are weighty arguments against it, too. It may be that at the moment the arguments for and against it approximately balance each other, but even though this may be the case two unknown quantities enter into the calculations. In the first place it cannot be foreseen what the effect might be of any incidents which, owing to the extremely tense atmosphere, may occur daily and might easily, in view of the well-known hypersensitivity here in questions of prestige, produce a mood in which any reasonable deliberation will cease. Moreover, there is an irrational element in the unpredictability of the persons in authority. Pilsudski, who has never been especially interested in the former German areas, is, to be sure, generally considered an opponent of a conflict with Germany. But no one knows what he thinks or what he wants, and his plans are veiled in impenetrable obscurity. Alongside of him, directing foreign policy, is Colonel Beck, who knows only one aim, the stabilization of Poland's present possessions. He is a man of forcible methods and would certainly not hesitate to use forcible means if he thought he could not achieve his aim in any other way. The uprisings in Posen and



Upper Silesia,<sup>3</sup> as well as the Zeligowski Putsch, show only too plainly what possibilities one has to reckon with in this country, and yesterday's celebration in Vilna and the parade of insurrectionists in Upper Silesia are a new reminder of that.

#### IV. *Signs of preparation for a preventive war*

Whether the plan for a preventive war is actually being prepared quite seriously at this time is difficult to say. All the diplomats and Military Attachés that I have sounded out personally or through others have unanimously answered the question in the negative.

The signs of military preparations listed in the enclosed memorandum may very well be regarded as a completion of armament for any eventuality and hence also as defensive measures against the danger of a German attack, frequently discussed here, and need not be signs of a preventive war planned by Poland. What seems to me to be more serious is the tremendous agitation which has recently been fomented against Germany, with the Government undoubtedly pulling the strings. It is difficult to figure out the reasons why the Government is even supporting the boycott of German goods, although it must know that the countermeasures to be expected would jeopardize almost 20 percent of Polish exports. Likewise the alerting of the Upper Silesian insurrectionists at a time when complete calm has returned to Germany probably can only be explained as an attempt to provoke incidents. This is playing with fire in the same way as Poland did last year in the *Wicher* incident<sup>4</sup> and now again in the question of Westerplatte.<sup>5</sup> However, one thing should be taken into consideration: the saber-rattling method, the fanaticizing of the population, the various warlike gestures of the last few weeks, and the exaggeration of the danger threatening from Germany are important stage props of Polish policy in its fight against disarmament and revision. To these methods there has lately been added the reference to the acute dangers of war. It is hard to tell how much of this is genuine and how much merely serves as bluff.

In any case, however, one can say that the Polish Government is maintaining an atmosphere that gives occasion for anxiety. One gradually gets the impression that it would not be displeased if the provocations were to produce counteraction on the part of Germany.

V. MOLTKE

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<sup>3</sup> See document No. 21, footnote 3.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 74, footnote 1.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 52.

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum*

## POLISH PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

I. During the last few months Polish war industry has increased its production by approximately 100 percent. Reports are coming from all parts of Poland about large orders for airplane engines, munitions, field kitchens, gas protective equipment, stocks of grain for filling the warehouses, etc. At present a Polish commission is negotiating in France with Schneider-Creuzot for the delivery of guns for the heavy artillery and the antiaircraft defense.

II. For the period from the end of April to the middle of September this year six age-classes of reserve officers and officer candidates were called up, whereas previously never more than two or three age-classes were called up, namely for 6 weeks of training in the period from the middle of June to the middle of September.

III. The age-classes of 1913, 1914, and 1915, which are not yet obligated to register for military service, have been called on by the Ministry of War to report voluntarily.

IV. The military preparation of the youth has been placed under the command of active officers since the end of last year. Like the riflemen's associations, into which mainly former soldiers are organized, the youth are trained in the use of rifles and machine guns and the operation of artillery pieces.

V. In the corps areas of Posen, Thorn, and Lodz the reservists who were to be discharged on March 1 have been kept with their units up to 6 weeks beyond their actual period of service.

VI. In connection with the occupation of Westerplatte there was a temporary concentration of smaller units of all arms of the service at the northern tip of the Corridor.

VII. On the occasion of the celebrations in Vilna on April 22 about 30,000 men were concentrated there, namely 7 infantry regiments, 4 cavalry regiments, and 4 artillery regiments, which, however, as far as is known here, have already been sent back to their stations.

## No. 181

3170/676158

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 93 of April 24      ROME, Vatican [sic], April 24, 1933—1:30 p. m.  
 Received April 24—3:40 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 106 of April 22.<sup>1</sup>

Since in the opinion of the Italians, the restoration of the passage on colonies in the pact is hopeless because of opposition of England and other, smaller nations, Vice Chancellor von Papen and I (see telegram No. 86 of April 19<sup>2</sup>) have suggested that we be safeguarded by Italian assurances to us against colonial settlements being made without us. In the case of such a gentleman's agreement, it is not a formal agreement that we had in mind, to which the Italians would also have strong objections. How Mussolini has received my repeated suggestions is shown by telegram No. 89 of April 20.<sup>3</sup> I consider this offer of Mussolini to reach agreement with us, after conclusion of the pact, on the basic lines of policy in all important fields, including the colonial question, as an especially important consequence and supplementation of the pact, which should be accepted by us in due time, and as the best way of protecting our interests in the colonial question.

HASSELL

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<sup>1</sup> Document No. 176.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 164.

<sup>3</sup> Document No. 171.

## No. 182

9269/E657484-97

*Minutes of the Meeting of the Economic Policy Committee of the Reich Government, Held at the Reich Chancellery, on Monday, April 24, 1933, From 6:00 to 9:30 p. m.*

Rk. 4798.

*Present:*<sup>1</sup>

Reich Chancellor  
 Vice Chancellor  
 Foreign Minister  
 Reich Minister of Finance  
 Reich Minister of Labor

Hitler  
 von Papen  
 Freiherr von Neurath  
 Count Schwerin von Krosigk  
 Seldte

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<sup>1</sup> It appears from the minutes that Reich Minister of Economics Hugenberg was also present at the meeting.

Reich Minister without Portfolio and Reich Commissar for Air

President of the Reichsbank  
State Secretary in the Reich

Chancellery

Reich Press Chief:

Recording Official:

Göring

Dr. Schacht

Dr. Lammers

State Secretary Funk

Oberregierungsrat Dr. Thomsen

*Also:*

State Secretaries Bang,<sup>2</sup> Dr. Krohn,<sup>3</sup> Ministerialdirektoren Dr. Ritter, Dr. Posse,<sup>2</sup> Ministerialrat Dr. Willuhn.<sup>4</sup>

Subject of the meeting: World Economic Conference.

The Reich Foreign Minister opened the meeting by giving information on the background of the invitation to Washington for a preliminary discussion of the World Economic Conference. The American Government had invited the Reich Chancellor, a Cabinet member, or another person to be delegated to Washington for such preliminary conversations.<sup>5</sup>

The Reich Foreign Minister renewed his proposal to dispatch the President of the Reichsbank to Washington<sup>6</sup> and with him a number of economic experts. The entire month of May was intended for the preliminary and individual conversations in connection with the World Economic Conference. Thus there was time enough if the President of the Reichsbank started his trip at the beginning of May. A meeting with the delegates of England and France was neither necessary nor desirable.

The Reich Chancellor recalled that the President of the Reichsbank considered his trip to Washington expedient only on condition that the Reich Government defined in advance precisely what our position would be on the various problems which the World Economic Conference was concerned with. The preparation of this position was the task of the Reich Ministry of Economics.

State Secretary Bang expressed the opinion of the Ministry of Economics to the effect that the problems of financial policy should be placed in the foreground of the discussion. If the World Economic Conference was not in a position to solve conclusively the question of debt regulation, then discussions of commercial policy would also bear

<sup>2</sup> Of the Ministry of Economics.

<sup>3</sup> Of the Ministry of Labor.

<sup>4</sup> Of the Reich Chancellery.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 143.

<sup>6</sup> The proposal had been made by Neurath at a Cabinet meeting on Apr. 22, but Hitler asked that discussion of the subject be carried over because of the heavy agenda (3598/792405-06).

no fruit. The ground for this stand was already prepared abroad in that the realization had prevailed that a permanent irrational burdening of the German economy made orderly trade with Germany impossible. A complicating factor was the fluctuations to which some of the main currencies have been subject for some time. The various proposals of the Reich Economics Ministry could be summed up to the effect that either the devaluation of currency in the United States must be balanced by abandonment of the gold standard in Germany, or else the same objective must be reached by imposition of a border levy on all imports into Germany.

The Reich Chancellor stressed that even if it was only a preliminary discussion, our present position could be advanced only with a knowledge of what we were ultimately striving for.

Ministerialdirektor Dr. Posse stated the following in this connection: The American Government conceived of the preliminary discussions in Washington as a preparation for the London World Economic Conference. As Norman Davis had told him,<sup>7</sup> the American Government intended to negotiate according to a definite pattern in order later to impose this pattern on the other parties to the negotiations. The agenda for the World Economic Conference had already been fixed in Lausanne. It was our task to consider which steps we must expect from the other side. In order that the other side should not prescribe the course of negotiations for us, we must proceed actively ourselves. In brief, the individual points of the American program were the following:

- abandonment of foreign exchange legislation,
- raising the prices of raw materials,
- stabilization of currencies,
- alleviation of impediments to trade,
- elimination of the existing export and import prohibitions,
- reduction of tariffs,
- restriction of the planting area for wheat all over the world.

Regarding the last point it should be taken into account that such a restriction of the planting area in which we ourselves had to participate would be quite unthinkable without the participation of Russia.

The Reich Minister of Economics differentiated between financial and economic measures. In his opinion an international agreement was possible only in the financial area. As far as actual economic policy was concerned, he could not see any possibility of coming to a successful international arrangement. The point of departure for all deliberations was the improvement of the economic conditions in the individual countries themselves, for international commerce was basically only an appendage of the national economy. For this reason

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<sup>7</sup> Norman Davis had reported a conversation with Posse in his telegram of Apr. 9; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933*, vol. II, pp. 216-220.

we also must understand, for example, that other countries take measures of economic policy directed against us. Thus of late the following closed off economic areas had developed: Russia, the United States, the British Empire. Europe, on the other hand, was in an unfavorable situation. Since 1918 a plethora of small countries had arisen, all of which were trying to promote their own economies. Moreover we were on the threshold of difficult economic negotiations with numerous European countries. Progress could be made only if we are able, without prejudice to the customs walls with which the individual countries surround themselves, to lay a customs bracket [*Zollkammer*] around the Central European economic area. In this connection he was thinking primarily of Italy, but also of Austria and whatever neighboring countries might express the desire to join. A special customs border should be established around this economic area, not between the separate countries that make it up. Countries overseas would naturally find such a structure displeasing, and one would have to count on sharp resistance. A levy of 5 to 10 percent ad valorem would be charged at the customs border of this common area. We would be in a position to pay our debts only if we were permitted to do so with goods. Our willingness to discharge our private economic debts would have increased pressure to export as its logical consequence. Only in this way could the other countries be made conscious of our situation in regard to commercial policy. The use of a special duty for export premiums was contemplated.

The Reich Chancellor said that it was to be expected of the World Economic Conference that it would be concerned mainly with international problems. The crisis under which the entire world was suffering was based on mistakes that had been made within the various national economies. In addition, however, there were also mistakes of an international nature, in particular the international indebtedness, and also the fact that in the past 20 years we had abandoned the principles that formerly led to the expansion of our economy. This included, for example, bringing the factories to the sources of the raw materials. If this export of the means of production were continued indefinitely, it would simply be the end of the vital prerequisite for European industry. Therefore international agreements on limiting the export of the means of production were necessary.

Going over to the statements of the Reich Minister of Economics, the Reich Chancellor expressed doubt that our finished goods would be better able to compete if the raw material was made more expensive by means of an import levy which was then used as an export premium.

The Reich Minister of Economics remarked in this connection that a levy was intended for all goods, not only raw materials. Not only

would our tariff protection be increased by this levy, but also the tariff protection for all other countries that were willing to cooperate with us in this way. The use again of the levy was not intended exclusively as an export premium, but also as a general equivalent for our higher production costs.

As far as the industrialization of the raw materials countries was concerned, this development could not be halted by artificial means. An international agreement with the objective of preventing this process was hardly conceivable. At any rate the result would be that the demands made upon us to buy raw materials would be much too great if the raw materials countries were excluded from acquiring the means of production.

The Reich Chancellor pointed out that the proposal of a border levy would be interpreted as contrary to the basic idea of the World Economic Conference. Furthermore, the proceeds of a 10 percent tax on imports of raw materials would hardly make itself felt as an export premium for valuable finished goods. He considered it indispensable that a kind of commission be established by the principal industrial nations which would make the decisions about acceptance of orders for means of production.

The Reich Minister of Finance stressed that the important thing was to create the bases of restoration of a healthy world commerce. We were in a position to cooperate actively in this. The transfer moratorium proposed by the President of the Reichsbank must be carried out in such a way that transfer and collection within the country would be separated from one another. In principle every debtor who has incurred foreign obligations must be forced to comply with his obligation to pay.

The Reich Minister of Finance also discussed the border levy proposed by the Reich Minister of Economics from the standpoint of his department. He put the question whether even before the World Economic Conference convened there should be negotiations with the countries concerned regarding establishment of a common customs border.

The Reich Foreign Minister considered the plan of the Reich Minister of Economics not feasible owing to the measures of reprisal to be expected from other countries. He recommended an agreement between the so-called old industrial countries.

The Vice Chancellor was of the opinion that the devaluation of the dollar would probably be permanent.

We would never be able to win back the markets that we would now lose as a consequence. The question of whether we could lower the level of our production costs must be answered in the negative. The same was true of the possibility of a devaluation of our currency. We should strive for a new regulation of our obligations arising out

of the Dawes and Young plans. An international agreement on a quota-type restriction of amounts produced seemed possible to him. It was the task of the Reich Association of German Industry to make suggestions for this. Central European agreements regarding a joint customs area and the like should no longer be sabotaged in the future.

Ministerialdirektor Dr. Posse was of the opinion that an economic understanding on a broad international basis would certainly not be possible at the World Economic Conference. There were too many states represented there with conflicting economic interests and various economic structures. However, out of this impossibility of reaching international agreements a tendency for the separate groups of countries to reach agreement among themselves would become more pronounced.

The Reich Chancellor emphasized in the matter of our external liabilities that of course one could not refuse a reduction or a conversion of interest, but that there was no interest in a full cancellation of our debts. Rather, the conservation of our debts was to be regarded as a political protective measure.

The Reich Minister of Economics remarked regarding the statements of the Vice Chancellor that any establishing of quotas led to an undesirable planned economy. The compulsion to pay interest and pay back our external debts led to pressure to export at any price. This phenomenon was one of the bases for the destruction of purchasing power all over the world.

The President of the Reichsbank summarized his opinion in the following remarks:

He was of the opinion that the preliminary discussions which he was to carry on had mainly the purpose, within the framework of private conversations, of preparing the atmosphere in America for the imminent transfer moratorium and for our stand at the World Economic Conference. Thus in case there was no objection, he considered himself authorized to support the following ideas in his conversations:

1. The payment of 3 billion reichsmarks, agreed upon in Lausanne under certain conditions, must be dropped;<sup>8</sup>

2. The payments to the United States with which we were in arrears were to be considered as finished. Payments for occupation costs and various claims (mixed claims) were not to be resumed;

3. The Belgian mark payments must be stopped;

4. The Saar coal mines must be returned to us without payment. The purchase price would be considered as having been paid by our over-all payments;

5. In stopping transfers no differentiation could be permitted for the Dawes and Young loans. Since these loans circulated among the public, they had become private debt liabilities of Germany.

<sup>8</sup> See document No. 2, footnote 8.



The announcement of the transfer moratorium could result in countermeasures on the side of the creditors, particularly in the form of seizures of German assets. These were possible only, however, in the case of individual debtors. The German shipping companies were in special danger of being thus affected. Therefore they had to be taken into consideration and given preferential treatment in the allotment of foreign exchange now as in the past. Furthermore, a clearing procedure directed against us was conceivable. This would furnish no cause for us to be deterred from our measures, however, for such conduct toward Germany would make it clear in the most compelling way to the participants in the World Economic Conference that we could pay our debts only if our creditors were willing to buy our goods.

As far as the final settlement of the German private debts abroad is concerned, the President of the Reichsbank was also of the opinion that the proposal to reduce interest and the possibility of a conversion would be entirely acceptable, but that we could not agree to a total cancellation of the debt.

After general remarks about the reasons behind the devaluation of the dollar and the recent phenomena on the foreign exchange market, the President of the Reichsbank expressed the opinion that fluctuating currencies ruin any possibility of export, and that therefore there must be a stabilization of currencies. Currency stability in Germany did not necessarily mean, however, that Germany must cling to the gold standard, but it did mean that the saver had to be protected in all circumstances from losses owing to currency devaluation.

The following considerations arise out of the fact that debt payment is possible only through exports:

1. Customs unions are admissible;
2. The plan for an import duty advanced by the Reich Minister of Economics is tactically correct, but its effects would lead to a planned economy that has from time immemorial been the source of all sorts of corruption;
3. As regards the retention or lifting of import and export prohibitions, in this question we were in precisely the same situation as all other nations;
4. A return to the conclusion of long-term commercial treaties was worth working for;
5. The idea of restricting the importation of means of production, brought up for discussion by the Reich Chancellor, should be utilized;
6. The countries poor in industries which could develop an immediate demand for consumer goods should be placed in a position to do so by means of cooperative financing;
7. We could participate in such financial transactions even without providing money. Our participation in long-term credits could be earned by means of deliveries of goods;

8. For Germany a colonial raw materials base was indispensable, not for reasons of power politics but for purely economic reasons. It was a question of a colonial area particularly adapted to settlement and exploitation of raw materials.

A revival of the German-English agreement on the Portuguese colonies<sup>9</sup> was entirely conceivable and would probably not encounter resistance in England. Should Angola, for example, fall to us in this way, then of course provision would have to be made for compensating Italy—possibly with Lourenço Marques.

The President of the Reichsbank asked the Reich Foreign Minister to give him short memoranda about the status of the disarmament and Corridor questions, which he needed purely for his own orientation. He intended to spend a day in Paris while en route to America, in order to pay a visit to the management of the Bank of France, and he believed that an opportunity would thus develop for speaking with leading Frenchmen regarding German relations with France. He could very well imagine that one could reach an agreement with France about joint financial action in colonial questions or in the southeastern European economic area.

Finally the President of the Reichsbank stressed that in his opinion the transfer moratorium should if possible be announced before his departure.

The Reich Minister of Finance objected to this, pointing out the danger that England, France, and America would probably immediately consider countermeasures.

The Reich Chancellor asked the President of the Reichsbank to defer any references during his conversations in Paris to economic cooperation with France in southeastern Europe. The French would only use such communication in order to play it off against Italy. On the other hand, he had no objections to sounding France out concerning joint colonial activity, whereby, however, it would be wise to take account of Italy's colonial claims.

The committee decided that there would be no announcement of the transfer moratorium before the departure of the President of the Reichsbank for Washington, but that the President of the Reichsbank would be authorized to decide after his arrival in Washington, taking account of all the psychological factors, whether announcement of the transfer moratorium should take place only after his return to Germany, or while he was still on his visit in Washington. In the latter case he would telegraph. The committee also agreed that the President of the Reichsbank would be accompanied solely by an official of

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<sup>9</sup> Following an Anglo-German agreement concerning the Portuguese colonies in Africa which had been concluded in 1898, negotiations looking toward their possible annexation had been resumed in 1914, but the War broke out before a treaty was signed.

the Reichsbank and by Ministerialdirigent Dr. Berger of the Reich Ministry of Finance.

For the minutes:  
THOMSEN

### No. 183

2945/575829-30

#### *The Minister in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

##### Telegram

URGENT

WARSAW, April 25, 1933—11:28 a. m.

No. 31 of April 24

Received April 25—1:30 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 66.<sup>1</sup>

With respect to general considerations to be taken into account in evaluating the danger of a preventive war, I refer to my report A 185 of April 23.<sup>2</sup>

Another probing of the available sources of information showed that there are no positive signs of a systematic preparation of a preventive war.

This also seems to be the opinion of Czech Minister Girsá here, with whom the Soviet Minister has been conferring exhaustively about this problem during the last 3 days. The latter called on me today and told me the following on the subject: Girsá, who as a democrat dislikes the Pilsudski regime and heretofore has not by any means been considered an advocate of Polish-Czech rapprochement, has now returned entirely changed from Prague, where he talked for several hours with Beneš. He had stressed the solidarity of the two nations and emphasized that they had to keep together, especially in the question of revision. On the other hand, however, the Czech Government had doubts about a closer connection with Polish policy, because it feared to be thereby involved in adventures, particularly in preventive war. In Prague they were for maintaining peace and in any case they disapproved of aggressive war. When the Soviet Minister asked whether the Poles were preparing a preventive war, Girsá replied that he had no concrete indications of this but it was incontestable that the atmosphere of preventive war did prevail.

The very pro-German Lithuanian Military Attaché here, whom I caused to be sounded out today concerning the Riga report on an attack on East Prussia, communicated in instruction IV Po. 2743 of

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (9183/E645809). This telegram of Apr. 24 communicated to the Legation in Warsaw the substance of document No. 177.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 180.

April 18,<sup>3</sup> stated that he had no reason for believing there were Polish offensive plans. Incidentally, the visit of the Soviet Minister with Pilsudski mentioned in the same report has so far not taken place.

MOLTKE

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<sup>3</sup> Instruction IV Po. 2743 of Apr. 18 (9183/E645808) communicated the text of telegram No. A 360 of Apr. 12 from the Legation in Latvia (9183/E645807) as follows: "(group missing) has just reported that the question of a Polish invasion of East Prussia depends, according to a secret military report from Warsaw, on the outcome of the French and Polish sounding of Soviet Russia which is now taking place. The recent visit of the Russian Ambassador in Warsaw with Pilsudski is connected with this problem.

"According to the same source the Latvian Foreign Ministry recently decided to remain neutral in the above-mentioned eventuality, on the assumption of Russian cover in the rear."

## No. 184

9183/E645804

*The Minister in Czechoslovakia to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL  
No. 20 of April 25

PRAGUE, April 25, 1933—12:45 p. m.  
Received April 25—4:00 p. m.  
IV Po. 2975.

With reference to your telegram No. 32 of April 24.<sup>1</sup>

There is no doubt that a preventive war is being carefully considered at the Prague castle, where the threads of all international plots against Germany come together, even though not much on the subject trickles through. At a diplomatic dinner recently Masaryk spoke of a war as a matter of course. I am convinced that Poland's influence here is constantly pressing for a preventive war, and that the Czechs have the intention to intervene actively themselves at once in the foremost ranks. Distrust more appropriate than ever.<sup>2</sup>

KOCH

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed (9183/E645809). This telegram communicated the substance of document No. 177.

<sup>2</sup> An extract from the minutes of the Reich Cabinet session of Apr. 25, 1933, 6:45 p. m., reads: "The Foreign Minister reported that according to telegrams from the German Ministers in Prague and Warsaw preparations are under way for a preventive war at both the German-Polish and the German-Czechoslovak borders. The situation is so tense that provocations from our side must under all circumstances be avoided. Reports of imminent incursions by armed Polish bands have also come to the Reich Chancellor. In itself such a possibility can be regarded without concern, since the fact of an incursion by a Polish band would only be advantageous from the point of view of foreign policy for our entire political situation. The sharpening of relations, however, shows most clearly the absolute necessity of strengthening our armed forces." (3598/792415)

## No. 185

9245/E651894-95

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the United States*

Telegram

No. 146

BERLIN, April 25, 1933—5:40 p. m.  
e. o. W 2640.

With reference to our telegram No. 141.<sup>1</sup>

As stated in our telegram No. 138,<sup>2</sup> we at first preferred an exchange of opinion through diplomatic channels. However, considering the developments in the meantime in regard to the dollar and the repercussions on the general currency situation, as well as for the reason explained in the special telegram to the Ambassador in person,<sup>3</sup> it is now considered necessary to delegate President of the Reichsbank Schacht.

I now request you by special instruction of the Reich Chancellor to thank President Roosevelt for the invitation communicated in telegram No. 187<sup>4</sup> and to express his regret that owing to political conditions and the business outlook he cannot accept it in person. The Reich Chancellor has delegated President of the Reichsbank Schacht to conduct in his place the conversations proposed by the Government there. Schacht will sail from Cherbourg on April 28 on the *Deutschland* and will arrive in New York on May 5. Schacht does not wish to give great prominence to his trip and will therefore probably be accompanied only by one man from the Reichsbank and one official from the Reich Ministry of Finance, namely Ministerialdirigent Berger.

NEURATH

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 174, footnote 3.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 149, footnote 2.

<sup>3</sup> In a telegram sent to the Consulate General at New York on Apr. 12 for Luther upon his arrival from Germany, it was stated that while the Foreign Ministry favored talks through diplomatic channels different views were entertained elsewhere in the Government (telegram No. 44: 9245/E651834-36).

<sup>4</sup> Document No. 143.

## No. 186

9459/E667403-04

*Memorandum by the Director of Department IV*

BERLIN, April 25, 1933.

The Soviet Ambassador, M. Khinchuk, was received today in the Derop matter by State Secretary von Bülow in the presence of the

undersigned. M. Khinchuk delivered the attached memorandum<sup>1</sup> and explained it. In this connection he stressed primarily the necessity of recalling the Commissioner appointed to Derop yesterday by the Prussian Government.

Herr von Bülow told M. Khinchuk that the Foreign Ministry had found in all departments full understanding for the political and economic relations with the Soviet Union, but that the suspicion entertained by the competent authorities of Communist activity on the part of Derop members could not be downed. The fight on communism was being continued in full force in Germany, and the operation against Derop had been primarily of a police nature. The house searches made at Derop had shown that the suspicion of Communist activity entertained against Derop had been justified. The State Commissioner would first of all undertake a complete reorganization of the personnel of Derop, from which the German Communists would gradually be discharged. Moreover, the State Commissioner, who knew the petroleum business, would promote the commercial activity of Derop to the best of his ability. In view of the increasing aversion to buying products of Derop, this promotional work could best be assured by a Commissioner.

I thereupon set forth to the Ambassador in detail the results of the police action concerning the communistic activities in Derop, as reported by Commissioner Hollmann.

The Ambassador stated that he quite realized the need for a German chief of personnel, and was moreover also prepared to meet the wishes of the German Government as much as possible, but that the appointment of a Commissioner very strongly affected the prestige of the Soviet Government.

Herr von Bülow asked him first of all to find a way to the practical solution of the difficulties and suggested in this connection an early discussion between a representative of the Ambassador and the Commissioner in order to clarify the opposing positions. This conference is planned for this evening in the office of the undersigned in the Foreign Ministry.<sup>2</sup>

MEYER

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<sup>1</sup> The memorandum is a protest against a police raid on the Berlin quarters of Derop in the Budapesterstrasse. During the raid a Herr Wilhelm Hollmann had produced credentials from the Prussian Ministry of Interior appointing him State Commissioner for the management of Derop and Derunapht G. m. b. H., and he had assumed control of the activities of these concerns. The memorandum further protested against these measures and called for their revocation (9459/E667405-08).

<sup>2</sup> On the settlement regarding the administration of Derop, see document No. 198.

## No. 187

6076/E450461-62

*Memorandum by the Director in Charge of Economic Negotiations*

BERLIN, April 25, 1933.

II Oe. 470.

To be submitted to the Foreign Minister for the meeting with the Reich Chancellor.

Negotiations on preferences with Austria. On the basis of the appeal of the Austrian Government of February 1932 <sup>1</sup> the Reich Government stated at the time that it was willing in principle to accord customs preferences to Austria. At the Stresa Conference <sup>2</sup> such customs preferences were internationally approved of in principle.

The two negotiations in Vienna and Munich with an Austrian delegation have led to considerable agreement. However, the agreement finally failed because Austria wanted to have customs preferences for butter and cheese, as well, and likewise for cut wood without quota. We rejected these three points at that time.

In the meantime Dollfuss has waived these three demands (cheese, butter, and cut wood without quota), in order to bring about a quick agreement. Thus substantively there would no longer be any obstacle to an agreement.

Of late the Austrian Government has been pressing very hard for resumption and conclusion of the negotiations, giving the reason, in particular, that the preferential treaties with Poland and France are entering into force. It would be very unfortunate if these two preferential treaties would enter into force without at the same time a preferential treaty with Germany being concluded.

*Question:* Should the negotiations now be concluded? The majority of the Reich Government departments concerned are of the opinion that for political reasons the treaty should not be concluded with the present Austrian Government. Here in the Foreign Ministry opinion is somewhat divided. It is my belief that the negotiations should not be concluded. However, it will then not be possible to conceal the fact that conclusion of the treaty is being refused for purely political reasons.<sup>3</sup>

RITTER

<sup>1</sup> In a statement handed on Feb. 16, 1932, to the Ministers of France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy Federal Chancellor Buresch expressed Austria's willingness to enter into negotiations about closer economic relations with all states willing to do so. Documents on this topic are filmed on serial 9969.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 5, footnote 4.

<sup>3</sup> Marginal note: "The Reich Chancellor has stated that he will not conclude any preferential treaty with the Dollfuss Government. However, the delay must if possible be explained by *non-political* reasons. v. N[eurath], Apr. 25."

## No. 188

8125/E581659-62

*Unsigned Note*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, June 7, 1933.

On April 26 at 2 p. m. Bishop Dr. Berning together with Vicar General Prelate Dr. Steinmann visited Chancellor Hitler as a result of the conference of Diocesan representatives. The following concerns of the church were laid before the Chancellor:

1. freedom of the Church
2. freedom of the Catholic schools
3. freedom and independence of the Catholic associations
4. dismissal of Catholic officials because of their Catholic ideology or their past activity in and for the Center party.

Chancellor Hitler thereupon calmly and objectively made the following statement:

He had been accused of acting against Christianity and this accusation had hurt him keenly. He was most firmly convinced that neither a personal life could be built without Christianity nor a state; and the German State in particular was quite inconceivable without the firm foundation of Christianity. A state could in no case be built on national consciousness alone, because the strongest foundation, namely the religious and moral, would then be lacking. He had come to the conviction, however, that in the last few centuries Christianity had ceased to produce the power and resolution to overcome by itself the forces of the enemy. It had confined itself to refuting the errors scientifically. Consequently he had come to realize that the State must support the Church in this fight against godlessness. Godlessness and Bolshevism could be overcome only by sternness and force. That instances of unjustified sternness should occur in connection therewith was regrettable, but he could not prevent that. In his statements Hitler spoke with the highest regard for the Catholic Church. He then brought up the Jewish question. In justification of his hostility to the Jews he referred to the Catholic Church, which had likewise always regarded the Jews as undesirables and which on account of the moral dangers involved had forbidden Christians to work for Jews. For these very reasons the Church had banished the Jews to the ghetto. He saw in the Jews nothing but pernicious enemies of the State and Church and therefore he wanted to drive the Jews out more and more, especially from academic life and the public professions.

He then spoke about his attitude toward Christianity, of whose great power and deep significance he was fully convinced. And for that reason he would not permit any other founder of a religion to arise. He had therefore even broken with Ludendorff. Rosenberg's

<sup>1</sup> The authorship of this note, a copy of which was found in the files of the Embassy to the Holy See, is not known.



book, for which he had been blamed, was no concern of his; it was a private publication with which the Lutheran pastors might under certain circumstances take issue.

Hitler emphatically rejected any *Kulturkampf*. There was no thought of interfering with the rights of the Church.

With regard to the schools, Hitler stated that he would never tolerate secular schools. Character building was possible only on the basis of religion. To communicate this to the people was the business of the Church and consequently the Church must also exert an influence on the confessional schools. It was not enough, however, to have baptized Catholics employed in the schools; it was also necessary that teachers be employed there who were believers. In the field of education there had to be the closest cooperation between the State and the Church.

With regard to the associations Hitler stated that the Catholic organizations were in no wise to be restricted if they fulfilled their tasks of promoting the Christian spirit in their members, supported the State and fostered the community spirit. Nor would the youth associations be touched if they aided the fight against Marxism. Encroachments may have occurred; they were regretted and would not be repeated in the future.

With regard to the officials Hitler stated that hardships might occur in individual cases. There were two reasons for layoffs: (1) economy and (2) the necessity of making room for the veterans of the National Socialist movement, who had been unjustly repressed in the past. The Marxists must first be put out. With regard to the dismissal of Centrist officials he stated that his primary concern was to make room again for National Socialist officials; but it was necessary to act with consideration. He had asked Prelate Kaas: "Do you agree to having Centrist officials retained in office in the same proportion as that of the Center vote in the last election?" Kaas had made no reply to this question. If irregularities had occurred, he would remedy them. Anyway, the National Socialists did not by any means have enough trained officials to be able to fill all positions, so that there would still be positions left for the Center. Hitler then asked that his statements be treated confidentially. The bishops might be informed thereof. He emphasized again that he attached the greatest importance to cooperation with the Catholic Church.

The statements of the Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs [*Kultusminister*] as well as of Minister President Göring also coincided with these statements. The *Kulturkampf* was rejected by all. The freedom of the Church was not to be infringed in any way; the fullest freedom in the exercise of spiritual care and divine worship would be guaranteed to it. The associations would retain their own independent existence. As Herr Göring emphasized, however, the Catholic organizations must at all events keep aloof from party politics and liberalist and Marxist ideas. With regard to the dismissal of officials he said that all Marxist officials would be dismissed forthwith, in order to make room for National Socialist officials. To be sure, a few Centrist officials would also have to be dismissed in the process.

## No. 189

6121/E456349

*The Chargé d'Affaires in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 16 of April 26

BUCHAREST, April 26, 1933—5:45 p. m.

Received April 26—8:25 p. m.

II Balk. 826 R.

With reference to your No. 19 of March 30.<sup>1</sup>

Tatarescu, the leader of the Rumanian National Socialists, told me yesterday evening:

He had just come from Titulescu, who had confirmed to him the receipt of an invitation from Reich Chancellor Hitler to a personal talk in Munich, which he (Titulescu) had received through private channels. Titulescu had then said that he accepted this invitation with the greatest pleasure but could not at present set any date; he would make it known about a week in advance, however, as soon as he knew definitely about his time. Titulescu had asked him to inform the Reich Chancellor thereof personally and discreetly.<sup>2</sup>

Lacking a messenger of his own, Tatarescu asked me to convey this information in strict confidence.

KIRCHHOLTES

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 118, footnote 6.

<sup>2</sup> Marginal note: "Has been done. The Reich Chancellor said that T[itulescu] has expressed the wish to see him. v. N[eurath]."  
Cf. document No. 395.

## No. 190

3170/676166-68

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, APRIL 27, 1933.

RM 571.

On his visit yesterday, M. François-Poncet brought the conversation around to the subject of negotiations concerning the pact. First he complained that State Secretary von Bülow had designated the French counterproposal as completely unacceptable and as sabotaging the entire negotiations concerning the pact.<sup>1</sup> In general he had the impression that the Foreign Ministry had no interest at all in the conclusion of the four power pact and consequently was not trying to pick out the positive elements from the drafts on hand and to develop them further. I replied that he alone seemed to be of this opinion, and if he had reported to Paris in this manner, I was not surprised that

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 165.

M. Léger, as Ambassador Köster had reported to me,<sup>2</sup> had taken an attitude completely opposed to our counterproposals. It was surely known to him also that from the beginning we had taken a constructive part in the drafting of the pact and had repeatedly proposed new versions for the purpose of obtaining a result. The last draft we had made, which had been delivered and explained to M. Arnal the day before yesterday by Directors Köpke and Gaus,<sup>3</sup> proved how absurd it was to maintain that we did not wish to cooperate in the matter of the pact. I then went on to explain to M. Poncet our draft, particularly articles II and III, and from his statements got the impression that he, too, considered the text of article II acceptable. He at once expressed objections to the closing sentence of article III, whereupon I reciprocated with the question whether he thought that any German government was in a position to accept the permanent unilateral commitment of Germany provided for in the French draft in the question of armaments equality. M. Poncet had to concede that this was not really possible.

He then discussed at some length the idea of a mutual assistance pact between France and Germany, which had also been mentioned in the conversation with the Reich Chancellor<sup>4</sup> and stressed the fact that, in his opinion, the conclusion of such a pact was the only way out of the present difficulties. I replied to M. Poncet that I was not entirely opposed to such a pact of mutual assistance. I should like, however, to know how France visualized such a pact, and I wished he would enlighten me somewhat further on the views of his Government in this respect. M. Poncet then asked whether he might report to Paris that we were not completely opposed to the possible conclusion of a mutual assistance pact but that we would like to have further details on the subject before we could take a position in the matter. I replied in the affirmative and added that I should also like to know whether the French Government was thinking simply of a bilateral pact between Germany and France or of a pact system. I had the impression, moreover, that M. Arnal had reported to the Ambassador in detail on his conversation with Directors Köpke and Gaus.

NEURATH

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 312 of Apr. 25 (3170/676163-64) Köster reported that he had handed Léger a copy of the German revision of the French counterproposals (see document No. 170, enclosure). Léger had remarked particularly on the deletion by the Germans of those passages in the French counterproposals "which were to incorporate the League of Nations Statute in the new pact" and he had "again and again expressed the French view that his Government could only accede to a pact which in all its parts would be operating within the framework of the Covenant."

The German revision of the French counterproposals was given to Sir John Simon by Hoesch on Apr. 27. Simon's comments on questions of detail were reported by Hoesch in telegram No. 111 of Apr. 27 (3170/676173-75). See also *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. v, document No. 97.

<sup>3</sup> Memorandum of the conversation of Arnal with Köpke and Gaus has not been found.

<sup>4</sup> See documents Nos. 163 and 165.

## No. 191

3086/616472

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, April 27, 1933.

RM 575.

The Italian Ambassador who visited me yesterday came, in the course of the conversation, also to speak of the Austrian question. He expressed himself again as greatly concerned about the conduct of the National Socialist party in Austria and asked, as he had already done repeatedly,<sup>1</sup> about our opinion on the Austrian developments. I replied that we would let things take their course in Austria. Support for the present Dollfuss Government was not to be expected of us; a visit by Dollfuss in Berlin, which he had mentioned to Herr von Papen in Rome in the course of a conversation,<sup>2</sup> was out of the question at the present time. But as far as the Anschluss was concerned I could tell him authentically, on the basis of a discussion with Reich Chancellor Hitler only the day before, that this was not an acute question for us, and I asked him to tell this also to Mussolini. We had other and bigger matters to be concerned about than the question of the Austrian Anschluss.

v. N[EURATH]

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 112.

<sup>2</sup> Bülow recorded on Apr. 20 that Papen told him that Dollfuss, during his visit to Rome, had expressed a desire to go personally to Berlin for the signing of the Austro-German commercial treaty (3086/616466).

## No. 192

4620/E200736-39

*Minister Moltke to State Secretary Bülow*

WARSAW, April 26, 1933.

DEAR HERR VON BÜLOW: To supplement my reports I should like today to write you something in this way concerning my numerous misgivings.

In my report of April 23 about the danger of a preventive war<sup>1</sup> I tried to show that the Polish Government has created and is maintaining an atmosphere here that contains within itself the danger of conflicts. It cannot be said with certainty at the moment whether a preventive war is actually being systematically prepared. I could well imagine that the Polish intentions for the time being are directed less at warlike measures than at instituting a League of Nations

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<sup>1</sup> Document No. 180.

action, and I had the intention of writing you about this today. Now I see, however, from your instruction of April 22 which has just arrived,<sup>2</sup> that I would be pushing through an open door in doing so, and that you already know much more about these things than I do. But I nevertheless did not want to neglect informing you in brief of my ideas.

It may well be that the Poles are merely interested in bringing the Jewish question before the forum of the League of Nations Council before which they have heretofore usually been the accused. They could rightly expect this to result in a more favorable position with respect to our constant minority complaints. Moreover, they naturally have quite generally an interest in creating feeling against us in the whole world. Involved here perhaps is the idea of exerting moral pressure, whereby it will be made impossible for us to expel the 80,000 Polish Jews who, according to the statement of the Foreign Ministry here, are in Germany; this is a question that occupies the local authorities to a quite unusual degree. Still, it seems to me at present doubtful that Poland, the classic country of Jewish pogroms, will set herself up as advocate of Jewish interests in a League of Nations action pertaining entirely to Jews. In any case that would make it much easier to defend our position. It is conceivable, however, that another good friend will relieve her of the embarrassing role.

But the fact that the boycott introduced by the Jews here after all makes up only part of the anti-German activity to be observed here permits the question to arise whether Poland really has it as her objective in Geneva only to open up the Jewish question, or whether she is not planning an attack on a broader basis. At any rate it would be very easy to exploit the unusually favorable situation that has arisen through the deterioration in world opinion respecting Germany and in some way to use it for the great objective of Polish policy, which lies in securing the status of her territorial possessions. I wonder whether the Polish provocations do not after all have the purpose of bringing the incidents caused thereby before the League of Nations Council in some form or other, perhaps even by application of article 11,<sup>3</sup> in order to exploit them there as indicated in the House of Commons debate in England:<sup>4</sup> namely, that Germany in her present condition is not ready either for equality of rights or for taking care of further members of minorities. The present state of affairs would, of course, not be sufficient for an action on a very broad basis, but it can hardly

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<sup>2</sup> Not found. A Foreign Ministry circular VDB 625 (3147/664883-905), dated Apr. 20, however, contains a summary account of recent German-Polish disputes at the League of Nations.

<sup>3</sup> Of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 193.

be doubted that the inflammatory campaign under way here is provocative in purpose and that with the ideas held here concerning the conditions in Germany they are counting here on reactions by Germany or also from Danzig.

Whatever intentions Poland may have, however—preventive war or some sort of action before the League of Nations or Disarmament Commission—the most important thing for us to do, it seems to me, is to avoid everything that might exacerbate the situation still further and that would offer the Poles any new device for using against us. Whether plans really exist for removing the Polish Jews from Germany or for finding a radical solution to the question of the Polish workers regarding which I last reported under No. 487 on April 12, 1933,<sup>5</sup> is beyond my knowledge, but I did not want to neglect once more pointing out in particular the inherent dangers. It would also be better to avoid aggressive speeches like that of the new Oberpräsident in Schneidemühl, as well as the radio propaganda that really goes beyond anything that has existed in the past, and that is constantly carried on in spite of the gentlemen's agreement (cf. in particular the lecture on "Protection of Minorities" last Sunday). The anti-Polish temper of the German population is after all already more than adequate for present needs, and I do not understand what such propaganda can now be good for. It is surely obvious that we cannot achieve a border revision at the present time. Whether it will be possible at all without war is a debatable question. I personally still belong to the optimists who consider it possible in certain circumstances. Not at this time, however. Things will look quite different, however, once the power relationship between Germany and Poland has shifted, as the result of disarmament or rearmament, in our favor. It seems to me that we should now do everything to bring about this situation as quietly and with as little disturbance as possible. It is in any case necessary to achieve first this objective. With the excellent propaganda apparatus which we now have in Germany it will not be difficult to make good the rest at the proper time.

I know that I am not telling you, in particular, anything new with my detailed arguments and that you have long been concerned about the same thing. But I can too little judge from here what measures that might have an effect on the German-Polish relationship are being considered at the present time, and I did not want to neglect pointing out a number of dangerous factors.<sup>6</sup>

Yours, etc.

MOLTKE

<sup>5</sup> Not found.

<sup>6</sup> A copy of this letter, except for the last paragraph, was sent by Neurath to Hitler and was initialed by Hitler (9189/E646446-49).

## No. 193

5740/H030675-76

*The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 110 of April 27

LONDON, April 27, 1933—7:50 p. m.

Received April 27—11:50 p. m.

III E 1025.

As is known, in yesterday's session of the House of Commons Simon again had to answer a number of questions regarding internal events in Germany, especially in connection with the Jewish problem. In so doing Simon refused to give information from the reports of the English Ambassador in Berlin and pointed to the ticklish nature of such discussions about internal events in another country. He referred also in the same connection to his statement of April 13 in the House of Commons,<sup>1</sup> in which he had remarked, as is known, that the speakers had expressed the feeling here accurately. Simon's answers may be considered a refusal to discuss further internal events in Germany, with a reference to his earlier position.

I spoke with Simon today about this debate and put to him urgently once more how undesirable it was that German-English relations, which we both after all wanted to cultivate, were constantly being disrupted by the criticism of German governmental measures which reached Germany from England.

Simon replied that it was an undeniable fact that Germany had lost a great deal of sympathy in England during the past weeks, and precisely with the very persons who had formerly been staunch advocates of Germany. The English Government regretted this exceedingly, since it disrupted its policy, and it was very hopeful of a speedy improvement in feeling. He had always tried in answering the questions in Parliament, which had often caused him great embarrassment, to avoid any injury to German feelings. Thus even in what he said on April 13, which we had protested against, he had not approved of the factual contents of the statements of the various speakers, but had only remarked in a purely objective way that these had accurately expressed the *feeling* prevailing here. Had he turned directly *against* these statements the storm might have been much greater, particularly as regards the character of the debate. In the formulation of his answer he had intended to bring the discussion to a close, and accordingly he had also consistently refused further discussion yesterday.

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 158.

Simon thereupon expressed the hope that the younger generation in England, which without a doubt showed a certain understanding and a certain sympathy for the movement of the German youth, would be an intermediary for a revival of English sympathies for Germany, since the older generation, in which sympathy for Germany had been constantly growing until recently, was at the moment laboring under a kind of painful disillusionment.

HOESCH

No. 194

2860/562440-46

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, April 28, 1933.

RM 580.

This morning the Reich Chancellor received Russian Ambassador Khinchuk in my presence. The Ambassador read on that occasion the accompanying statement, to which the Chancellor replied approximately as follows:

He shared thoroughly the opinion that no change must occur in the friendly relations between the German Government and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. These good relations were based on the interest that both states had in maintaining them. Both states had common enemies, and their economic interests were complementary in many ways. However, it was a prerequisite for the permanence of these good relations that each country could arrange its internal affairs according to its needs. Thus it was necessary for the Russians to recognize fully the new development in Germany and to refrain from any support of the opponents of the national Government, whether by moral or material aid. Just as the German Government did not intervene in domestic Russian affairs in Russia and refrained from all propaganda against the Soviet Government, we for our part also must ask that the Russians act similarly. He was thinking thereby mainly of the radio propaganda in the German language recently carried on from Moscow. If both states strengthened their domestic institutions at their discretion, this was the best means for maintaining permanently good relations. The Russian Ambassador might be assured that the Chancellor was trying, and would continue to try, to order German-Russian relations on a permanently friendly basis.



When the Ambassador asked about the restoration of normal relations in Derop A. G.<sup>1</sup> and Derunapht G.m.b.H., the Chancellor gave the Ambassador the assurances I have recorded elsewhere.<sup>2</sup>

V. N[EURATH]

[Enclosure]

HERR REICH CHANCELLOR: The statements of the Foreign Ministry concerning the effort of the German Reich Government to maintain friendly relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as your speech in the German Reichstag on March 23, 1933, have in each case been received with satisfaction by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and contributed toward consolidating the confidence in the continuation and unhampered development of the friendship which has existed for years between our two countries.

Nonetheless, I unfortunately see myself compelled to make use of your kind attention in order to stress that the confidence of my Government in the future of our mutual relations has of late often been subjected to great stress owing to the actions of the official and non-official government organs all over Germany in regard to the interests of the USSR.

Such incidents as the so-called "individual actions" affecting nationals and institutions of the USSR in Germany and their improper treatment; disregard of the rights of the commercial representation of the USSR in Germany and its extraterritorial employees guaranteed under international law and by treaty, such as house searches in the quarters of the trade representation of the USSR in Hamburg and Leipzig and in the case of a member of the council of the trade representation of the USSR; discriminatory measures against Derop A. G. and Derunapht G.m.b.H., which are companies under German law, to be sure, but represent important economic interests of the USSR; a number of commercial policy measures of the German Reich which are directed harshly against the interests of USSR exports to Germany; the hostile attitude of the overwhelming ma-

<sup>1</sup> A minute by Völckers of Apr. 25 (6613/E498542) recorded that Neurath had that day discussed with Hitler the Derop matter and the question of ratifying the protocol for the extension of the Berlin Treaty. The Chancellor had decided that exchange of the instruments of ratification and their publication should occur after he received the Soviet Ambassador. Instructions to proceed with the exchange of the instruments of ratification were sent to Dirksen by telegram No. 98 of Apr. 28 (6613/E498537-38).

<sup>2</sup> Notation in Neurath's handwriting:

1. Personnel questions—Commissioner.
2. Economic, commercial, and financial interests—on an equal footing [*paritätisch*].
3. Board of directors and management—on an equal footing.
4. Promotion of sales."

Cf. document No. 198.

majority of the German press organs toward the USSR; these are in contradiction to the intentions expressed in the statements of the German Government of continuing to cultivate without change friendly relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and they undermine the possibility of relying on and considering these statements as a foundation of German policy respecting the USSR.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is always willing to adhere steadfastly to the principles of the friendly relations existing between our countries and to develop them in the spirit of the existing treaties and agreements. But in order to pass over the excesses that have already occurred affecting the interests of the USSR, it would first be absolutely necessary to bring about a decisive change in the method of action which has been mentioned, and then also to make known to the general public the friendly foreign policy attitude of the German Government toward the USSR in the sense of the existing treaties in the political area and at least in the same direction in the economic area. For otherwise it would soon be hardly possible to find people inside and outside both countries who, in the face of the systematic repetition and continuation of the above-mentioned actions, would be able to believe that the previous relationship had actually been maintained between the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and the German Reich.

If I may sketch briefly what is desirable in this direction I would submit the following for your attention:

*a.* The protocol for extension of the Berlin Treaty of 1926 should be ratified at once.

*b.* The domestic reorganization of Germany would not need to affect the foreign policy needs of our two countries and should no longer produce actions of the official and nonofficial government organs toward nationals and other interests of the USSR such as have been described.

*c.* The German press should be provided with information, designed to inform the people who support the German Government in a way corresponding to the actual intentions of the Reich Cabinet toward the USSR.

*d.* The bases and prerequisites for creating a balance of trade and payments with the German Reich tolerable for the USSR should be studied jointly once more and the interests of Soviet export to Germany should be brought into harmony with those of the German economy; also the German public should be informed that a careful treatment of German-Soviet trade is likewise in the German interest.

*d* [sic]. The authority of the State Commissioner for Derop A. G. and Derunapht G.m.b.H. should be restricted to questions of personnel policy, whereas the management of the economic, commercial, and financial interests of the USSR at Derop and Derunapht should be left untouched in the hands of the stockholders and their authorized agents.

Impelled by the sincere desire to clarify and settle the atmosphere in regard to the relations between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I urge you, Herr Reich Chancellor, to give adequate attention to my statements.

## No. 195

9564/E673165

*Reich Chancellor Hitler to Minister President Gömbös*

BERLIN, April 28, 1933.

II Ung. 251.

EXCELLENCY: I read Your Excellency's letter of April 22 <sup>1</sup> with the feelings of a sincere friend. Let me assure you that the men of the National Government desire nothing more ardently than to develop into actual political harmony the spiritual harmony already existing in the political leadership on both sides. In so far as economic difficulties might tend to trouble this relationship we will leave nothing undone in seeking and finding ways and means of settlement and improvement. It will not have escaped Your Excellency's notice, however, that our German agriculture, too, has fallen into terrible distress. Nevertheless we are determined to view this question not as purely economic, but in dealing with it to consider the political aspects as decisive. To this effect, I am informing the Minister of Economics and the Foreign Minister of Your Excellency's letter and hope confidently that some way will be found to satisfy both countries.

Thanking Your Excellency for having seen to the protection of my honor in Hungary, I remain,

Yours, etc.

ADOLF HITLER

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<sup>1</sup> Document No. 179.

## No. 196

8115/E581018-22

*Reich Chancellor Hitler to Cardinal Bertram* <sup>1</sup>

Rk. 40/35

BERLIN, April 28, 1933.

YOUR EMINENCE: Your Eminence was pleased to direct a number of memorials to the Reich President and to various departmental min-

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<sup>1</sup> This copy of Hitler's letter to Cardinal Bertram was furnished by the Reich Chancellery to the Foreign Ministry under a cover note of Jan. 4, 1935 (8115/E581017). The other letters to which reference is made in the course of this document have not been found.

isters which were submitted to me for my information. The letter of April 16 addressed directly to me—for which I thank Your Eminence most respectfully—gives me the opportunity to express an opinion myself on the points and questions dealt with in the different memorials.

Your Eminence expresses concern in the letter of April 6 to the Reich President in regard to the threat to the maintenance of public order, which could be followed by a reduction of the national feeling for law and justice.

No one regrets more than myself, Cardinal, the necessity of saving Germany from the fate of Bolshevization by means of a revolution. For many years I was of the opinion that it might perhaps be possible to persuade the governments and particularly the Center as one of the main government parties, in appreciation of the meaning of the constitution of the National Socialist party, to accord it the influence it deserved. Unfortunately these hopes were bitterly disappointed. When Field Marshal von Hindenburg finally decided to call the National Socialist movement and me into the Government on his own initiative the question of the threatening Communist uprising had become an acute danger. The sins that had been committed in this regard by the various governments during the past decade and a half can still not be made known today for reasons of state and public security. However, I should be glad to give an insight into conditions to a priest whom Your Eminence might select for this purpose, in the knowledge of which Your Eminence will surely excuse much that occurred in the course of the national revolution. Compared to the misfortune that the regime now behind us brought upon Germany since November 1918, the depth of the destruction into which it drew us, as well as the danger which confronted us, the entire course of the national revolt is uniquely moderate and disciplined in the history of such events. I should like to point out to Your Eminence that my movement, which has always acted solely from ardent love of fatherland, had to lament over 350 dead and more than 40,000 wounded in the few years of its political struggle. I should like to point out further that many tens of thousands had to pay with prison sentences for their love and avowal of their people and fatherland. Hardly one of the leaders of this movement—with pride I can include myself—has not suffered long imprisonment owing to what were often really outrageous distortions of justice and law. I should like to say further that hundreds of thousands of my followers lost their offices and positions without regard for wives and children, that they were removed from their places of work and driven to the greatest distress only because they dared to oppose the Marxist deterioration of our people. I shall say nothing of the further persecution, the eternal prohibitions,

the continual house searches, the confiscations, the silencing of speech, etc.

History will someday be able to refer to the national revolution of this year only as an uprising but by no means as a retaliation. I do not believe that in the course of this historical event more than 20 persons at the most lost their lives. I regret even this, although I have not found the same regret among our opponents in regard to the murder of the hundreds of my followers.

The work that is before us is very difficult, Your Eminence. The sins of many years must now be atoned for. If countless industrious Germans have lost their businesses, homes, and land owing to the pressure of intolerable taxes, no small responsibility is borne by our swollen administration, which we could not have afforded even in the happy time of our German life. If today we are forced to do away with part of our corps of officials, we are doing what other governments could not have avoided in the long run. I take upon myself before the nation the unpopularity that this interference must involve. I wish to assure Your Eminence, however, that no official will be removed because of his religion, and certainly not because of his Catholic beliefs. Your Eminence has pointed especially to Upper Silesia and has complained that such interference occurred there in particular. Your Eminence fears that particularly in the border areas the national spirit could be injured—beaten and oppressed as it is by years of enemy occupation. But I regret that it is precisely in Upper Silesia that countless adherents to my movement have been treated in the most unjust way for many years without regard for this dangerous situation. Today, however, they are demanding the restoration of their rights, which have been violated.

Your Eminence has pointed further to house searches of unexampled brutality. I am very sorry if such a case should have occurred and request more detailed information. I wish to reply, however, that under the regime of Minister of Interior Wirth<sup>2</sup> the houses of innumerable National Socialists were searched without any cause or reason, during which the wives and children were driven out of their beds and into the corridors in the night, or were put out into the yard in only the most scanty clothing to stand for hours in the icy cold. We could not complain about that for we were without rights and means of defense. On the occasion of my interrogation as witness before the court at Leipzig my former highest SA Führer told the German Supreme Court as a witness under oath of such a procedure to which he was subjected. And that did not happen to 10, 20, or 100 of us,

<sup>2</sup> Joseph Wirth was Reich Minister of Interior in the first Brüning Cabinet from March 30, 1930, to October 7, 1931. From October 1931 to June 1932, Reichswehr Minister Groener was acting Reich Minister of Interior.

but to tens of thousands. Even at the beginning of last year numerous SA comrades of mine were driven out of their quarters in Berlin by Minister of Interior Wirth; their beds were set out into the street where they were rained on until sympathetic people took care of them.

But nevertheless I am sincerely sorry, Cardinal, if something similar should have happened to a priest. Furthermore, I am convinced that if attacks have been made anywhere against state officials in high positions, these attacks were not made because they were Catholics or state officials but because they were considered enemies of the party. In this regard I believe, however, that condemn as one may separate excesses, one can on the whole come only to the conclusion that these reprisals bear no comparison to the injury done to the adherents of my movement in part by these same officials.

However, I shall strive to do everything, Your Eminence, to re-establish complete peace and order in Germany as quickly as possible. For not hatred toward our former foes but love of our people should be the characteristic of this revolution.

I request once more, however, that you kindly have the individual names for the cases mentioned sent to me and I shall then at once order that an investigation be instituted. Your Eminence mentions in the various memorials the situation of the Catholic associations and adds that it is expected that they will not be injured in any way by the new regime. I can assure you, Cardinal, that in so far as such associations do not entertain any partisan tendencies hostile to the present regime there is also no intention to proceed against them. The Government would be happy if it should develop that these conditions exist. For it does not desire conflicts with the two churches in Germany, but a sincere cooperation for the good of the state as well as also for the good of the churches.

The questions concerning the Labor Service will be taken care of by the institution of general compulsory labor service in the near future.

I should like to request Your Eminence to accept with trust the good will and the good intentions of the National Government. The National Socialist movement has no more sincere wish than that the two churches might regard with kindly understanding the fight to overcome Bolshevism and to restore real authority as well as the strengthening and consolidation of our life as a whole. I believe, Your Eminence, that in so doing we are only helping in the fight to protect Christianity, too, at least in Germany, from one of the greatest dangers that has arisen for many centuries.

With sincere respect, etc.

ADOLF HITLER

## No. 197

9325/E661305-08

*Ambassador Dirksen to Ministerialdirektor Meyer*

CONFIDENTIAL

Moscow, April 28, 1933.

DEAR MEYER: My best thanks for your long letter of April 22;<sup>1</sup> it already answers a large part of the questions that I had transmitted to you in my last letter. I found exceedingly interesting your information about the order of priority of the actions immediately impending: reception of Khinchuk by the Reich Chancellor, exchange of instruments of ratification, communiqué\* on the occasion of the announcement; I am very grateful to you that you have worked so diligently for all these actions, so that the "malaise" which has arisen in German-Russian relations will be eliminated in so far as possible. Today I am now awaiting very eagerly an informational telegram regarding Khinchuk's visit with the Reich Chancellor<sup>2</sup> and the instructions regarding the exchange of instruments of ratification.<sup>3</sup>

I was also greatly interested in the materials sent me regarding the Derop incident.<sup>4</sup> Here, too, I am glad that the Ministry is already working intensively to make it possible for Derop to return to normal business and to smooth over the unfavorable political repercussions of this incident. I have had the opportunity at various times in recent days to observe that the "coordination" [*Gleichschaltung*] of Derop has after all left a considerable imprint here. In particular it is considered an injury to Soviet prestige that the management of Derop is taken over *outwardly* by a special commissioner and is therewith taken away from the Soviet appointees. If a way could be found for giving the management of the plants *outwardly* to the Soviet directors once more and having control exercised from *inside*, I would consider that very important.

I approve of the suggestion to hold economic discussions for the settlement of the Derop question and other economic questions that have come up in the meantime. In the first place, these discussions

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<sup>1</sup> Not found.

\* I am not yet familiar with the supplement to the communiqué to which you refer in your letter. I assume that it will be a joint communiqué and therefore the text will be arranged in advance with the Russians. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 198.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 194, footnote 1.

<sup>4</sup> Foreign Ministry telegrams to Moscow No. 93 of Apr. 24 and No. 95 of Apr. 25 (9459/E667383, E667387) contained material on the Derop incident and indicated the intention to bring about a complete reorganization of Derop personnel.

seem to me to be the best means to put Derop in operation again as soon as possible, and after all we have a very direct financial interest in this; then by holding such discussions a political clearing of the air will be brought about; and finally, through such negotiations there would be offered the possibility of our influencing *our own* domestic and commercial authorities, which have had their personnel very much reorganized in the last few months and consequently also have to be introduced to the way of thinking of German-Soviet economic relations. I shall report on this by letter or telegram.<sup>5</sup>

I hope that through the further treatment of the above-mentioned points, especially through the ratification of the Berlin Treaty, there will be reached the general clarification for which we are striving. However, annoyance, distrust, and a certain embitterment are rather deeply entrenched here; we should not be in doubt as to this even though the Soviet Government has held back rather considerably in view of its conflict with England. This circumstance should be given all the more attention since Khinchuk reproduces the mood prevailing here only in a very much weakened form; he is under increasing attack here because of his "too soft" manner.

Now the Russians have loosened the bonds in the area of military policy, too, in that they do not want to continue one of the plants [*Betriebe*].<sup>6</sup> I received the information only yesterday and cannot evaluate it fully as yet, particularly not in regard to whether political reasons, too, are to be sought for this decision.<sup>7</sup> I hope to obtain further clarification on this through Colonel Hartmann, who returns today from his trip to Germany and to Kaunas.

I have read with great interest the reports sent me regarding the growing tension in German-Polish relations and the telegraphic report from Herr Koch from Prague<sup>8</sup> regarding the prevailing Czechoslovak tendencies in this regard. These reports are very serious. If an opportunity should arise in the near future for an oral talk with you regarding the entire complex of questions I should be very happy.

With best regards, etc.

DIRKSEN

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<sup>5</sup> Dirksen elaborated somewhat his views on German-Soviet economic relations in telegram No. 86, sent at 10:43 p. m., Apr. 28 (9416/E666247/1).

<sup>6</sup> A reference to one of the three stations maintained by the Reichswehr in the Soviet Union in conjunction with the Red Army: Lipetsk (Air Force); Tomka (chemical warfare); Kazan (armored vehicles).

<sup>7</sup> Cf. documents Nos. 232 and 252.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. document No. 184.



## No. 198

9459/E667424

*The Director of Department IV to the Embassy in the Soviet Union*

Telegram

No. 101 of April 29

BERLIN, April 29, 1933—5:30 p. m.

Received April 29—11:20 p. m.

During yesterday's conversation between the Reich Chancellor and the Soviet Ambassador<sup>1</sup> the Reich Chancellor made the following decision regarding Derop, which the Reich Cabinet agreed to in yesterday's meeting.<sup>2</sup>

The State Commissioner will restrict himself to personnel matters; all economic and financial matters will be taken care of on an equal footing by the Germans and Russians. The board of directors and management will be composed of Germans and Russians on an equal footing. Derop gave the Reich Government a purchase option. The Reich Chancellor will see that there are instructions to purchase Derop products to the greatest possible extent.

MEYER

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 194 and footnote 2.

<sup>2</sup> No record has been found of this decision in the minutes of Cabinet meetings at 4:15 p. m. and 5:15 p. m. on Apr. 28 (3598/792484-87; 792535-36).

## No. 199

6212/E469652

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

SECRET

No. 89 of April 29

Moscow, April 29, 1933—10:36 p. m.

Received April 29—11:35 p. m.

IV Po. 3108.

With reference to your telegram No. 91.<sup>1</sup>

I discussed today with Litvinov the increasing tension in German-Polish relations and the attempts evidently being made by Poland to find out particulars concerning the attitude of the Soviet Government in case of a German-Polish clash. Litvinov replied that no attempts of this sort had been undertaken by official Polish quarters, but private Polish individuals did broach the question with the Soviet Minister in Warsaw. Litvinov stated that there could be no question of a change in the standpoint of the Soviet Government.

DIRKSEN

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<sup>1</sup> Of Apr. 23, not printed (9204/E647423-24).

## No. 200

7360/E536589

*The Head of the German Delegation at Geneva to the  
Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

Del. No. 310 of April 29

GENEVA, April 29, 1933.

Received April 30—12:30 a. m.

II F Abr. 1566.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

It is not impossible that there will soon be an opportunity for private discussions on the putting into practice of Germany's equality of rights.<sup>1</sup> I would consider it advisable if in these discussions or in other conversations I might as a last resort for exerting pressure make the demand that France establish a demilitarized zone on her territory along the Franco-German border corresponding to the demilitarized Rhineland zone in order fully to implement the equality of rights. With respect to this, I realize that our real interest is rather in abolishing our demilitarized zone than in establishing another such zone along the border. The possibility of such a demand might, however, be used as a means of exerting pressure.

In view of the instruction accompanying the directives for the German Disarmament delegation, of January 19, 1933, (group garbled) 193,<sup>2</sup> according to which the question of the demilitarized Rhineland zone is not to be brought up at the Disarmament Conference but reference may be made in some form still to be considered to the injustice and inequality of the one-sided demilitarization, I do not consider myself justified without express authorization in making use of this expedient for exerting pressure. I should be grateful for such authorization at the earliest possible date.<sup>3</sup>

NADOLNY

<sup>1</sup> The General Commission of the Disarmament Commission had resumed sessions on Apr. 25. See document No. 106, footnote 3.

<sup>2</sup> Instruction 193 and the directive referred to are not printed (7616/H188347-48, H188329-37).

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 202.

## No. 201

2945/575833-36

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, May 2, 1933.

RM 600.

This morning the Reich Chancellor received in my presence the Polish Minister, who by order of his Government pointed to the un-

easiness produced in Poland especially by the conduct of the National Socialist party in Danzig.<sup>1</sup> The Minister stated that since the National Socialist party had taken over the government in Germany, a growing uneasiness was spreading in Poland, and had in part assumed panic-like proportions. He stressed Poland's right to a free access to the sea, which could no longer be given up by any Polish Government. For this reason Poland had to maintain her right to Danzig, and he was commissioned to obtain from the Reich Chancellor an assurance that Germany did not intend to change anything in the present situation in Danzig.

The Chancellor replied to M. Wysocki that in the first place he must deny any special right of Poland to Danzig. If there was uneasiness in Poland, he could only say that Germany had considerably more cause for such uneasiness and constantly felt herself threatened by the occurrences in Upper Silesia, the concentration of military forces at the border and the occupation of the Westerplatte in Danzig. The border between Poland and Germany had been drawn in such a way, owing to the short-sightedness of the statesmen, lack of understanding, and ill will, that a peaceful coexistence of the two nations was practically inconceivable as long as this border demarcation existed. He himself, said the Chancellor, was a nationalist, and a nationalist to such a degree that he would at all times refuse to annex foreign nationalities to Germany by conquest and try to rob them of their language and customs. He respected every nationality and considered Poland to be a reality which he took into account as such. However, he required that Poland also treat Germany as a reality. If minds had not been thoroughly confused at the time the Treaty of Versailles was concluded, Poland would never have agreed to the creation of a Corridor through German territory, for it was clear that this must result in lasting tension between Germany and Poland. It would have been really much wiser to have sought access to the sea, of which the Minister had spoken as an inalienable right of the Poles, on the other side of East Prussia. In this case a good relationship would long ago have existed between Germany and Poland, and there would also have been a possibility of an economic agreement. He, the Chancellor, only hoped that the political questions pending between Germany and Poland would at some time be studied and dealt with unemotionally by the statesmen on both sides. He was convinced that then a way could be found out of the present untenable situation. Germany desired peace. A forceful ex-

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<sup>1</sup> Wysocki's report to Beck on this interview is in the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs publication *Official Documents Concerning Polish-German and Polish-Soviet Relations, 1933-1939* (London, n. d.), pp. 11-13.

propriation of Polish territory was far from her thoughts. She reserved the right, however, to utilize at any time and at her discretion the privileges that were hers by treaty.

At the request of the Polish Minister the Reich Chancellor said he was willing to issue a communiqué<sup>2</sup> on the reception of the Minister and the conversation, the text of which is attached.<sup>3</sup>

The Polish Minister asked if he might communicate this communiqué to his Government.

I told M. Wysocki this evening on my own initiative that I could not agree to the publication of the communiqué in a one-sided form. I must request that M. Beck have Minister von Moltke call on him tomorrow and that an analogous communiqué then be issued at the same time in Warsaw on the basis of the conversation held with him. M. Wysocki promised to communicate this request to Warsaw at once and let me know tomorrow. I proposed that the Polish communiqué be introduced with the words: "After the German Reich Chancellor received the Polish Minister yesterday, the Polish Foreign Minister asked German Minister von Moltke to call on him."

The rest of the communiqué should then correspond to the text of the German communiqué.<sup>4</sup>

V[ON] N[EURATH]

[Enclosure]

The Polish Minister M. Wysocki today called on the German Reich Chancellor. The conversation, at which the German Foreign Minister was present,<sup>5</sup> dealt with the pending political questions which affect Germany's relations with Poland. The Reich Chancellor stressed the firm intention of the German Government to keep its attitude and its conduct strictly within the limits of the existing treaties. The Reich Chancellor expressed the wish that both countries might review and deal with their common interests dispassionately.

<sup>2</sup> In the file is a draft, apparently prepared by Wysocki, which is labeled in Neurath's hand "Polish draft." It reads: "... taking account of the situation created by the treaties, the Reich Chancellor opposes activity which would be directed against the rights and rightful interests of Poland in the Free City of Danzig." (2945/575837)

<sup>3</sup> See enclosure, which is the form in which the German communiqué was issued on the following day.

<sup>4</sup> The file copy of this draft communiqué is marked "canceled" (*cessat*) (2945/575838). Concerning the communiqué as actually issued in Warsaw, see document No. 206.

<sup>5</sup> The preceding phrase was added in the margin in Neurath's handwriting.

## No. 202

7860/E538590-91

*The Foreign Minister to the German Delegation at Geneva*

Telegram

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, May 2, 1933—9:20 p. m.

No. 190

II F Abrii. 1566.

For Ambassador Nadolny personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 310.<sup>1</sup>

I, too, agree with you that in the discussions about giving effect to our equality of rights, we should turn to our advantage, as much as we can, the fact of Germany's one-sided obligation regarding the demilitarized zone. In doing so, however, we must avoid a double danger. If we formally demand in the discussions that a zone corresponding to the Rhineland zone be established on French territory, we must expect that this will be publicized by the French, who will add the charge that we are seeking to sabotage the Conference by this entirely new demand. Such charges would probably find a considerable echo also in other countries. On the other side, since we would undoubtedly be unable to get such a demand accepted or find any backers for it, we would risk creating abroad the appearance of a setback. Neither must we provoke any discussion of a demilitarized zone at our eastern border, which would be intolerable for us. In these circumstances we shall be able to operate with the issue of the zone at the Conference only in such a way that, without making a formal proposal, we take substantially the following position:

Putting into effect the equality of rights in a truly just way requires either establishment of a corresponding zone on French territory, or else abolishing the demilitarization of the Rhineland. Given her whole attitude, France, we regretted to say, would agree to neither the one nor the other approach. The resulting serious impairment of Germany's equality of rights must not for a moment be lost sight of in settling the other rearmament questions. In other words it is a question of plainly showing the trump card we have in our hands without, however, playing it ~~already at this time.~~<sup>2</sup>

NEURATH

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<sup>1</sup> Document No. 200.

<sup>2</sup> The words scored through were deleted before the telegram was sent.

## No. 203

7892/E571688-93

*Minute by an Official of Department II*

BERLIN, May 2, 1933.

II SG 933.

The German member of the Governing Commission of the Saar Territory, Herr Kossmann,<sup>1</sup> informed me on April 30 in Heidelberg that Chairman Knox had asked him to call on him the evening of April 26 and had asked him first of all whether he would see anyone from Berlin in the next few days. Upon the reply that Herr Kossmann would meet me in the near future, the Chairman, who on the same day in the meeting of the Governing Commission had been calm and conciliatory in the flag question and the question of May 1,<sup>2</sup> asked Herr Kossmann in a discussion lasting about an hour, with increasing agitation, to make the following statements to me meant for State Secretary von Bülow:

He, Knox, had hitherto made every effort to exert a conciliatory influence in the Saar Territory and to preserve peace and order. For a long time he had believed he was successful. Thus a few weeks ago he had done everything in his power in Paris in order to "put a stop to the French propaganda regarding the Saar Territory" (he meant by this the demand raised in the French press for re-entry of French troops).<sup>3</sup> He had been able to do this only by giving emphatic assurance in Paris that there was no danger in the Saar either to the security of the French or to peace and order in general; the police and the rifle corps [*Landjägerkorps*] were fully adequate, if one disregarded small clashes. Even M. Morize had exerted influence in Paris along the same lines, although great unrest had made itself felt in the French colony and Morize had been reproached for not upholding French interests adequately. Even M. Heimburger (the French director of

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 169, footnote 2.

<sup>2</sup> This concerned the official German colors at that time. The Saar Government maintained that the black, red, and yellow colors of the Republic were still the official colors of the German Reich, whereas the Nazi party and its sympathizers insisted it was the black-white-red colors and the swastika flag. This dispute was complicated by the fact that no official pronouncement by the German Government had been made up to this time. An interim regulation was issued on Mar. 12, 1933 (9979/E697385-88). This dispute was further aggravated by the desire of the nationalist elements in the Saar to celebrate the first of May as a national holiday with public demonstrations and the display of the national colors. Since this day was not an official holiday in the Saar, the Governing Commission, under pressure from the various parties, authorized the management of the state plants to approve a day of leave for the workers. The showing of the swastika flag was at first prohibited by the Gauleiter, but this restriction was lifted at the last minute (9978/E697377-82).

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 139.

the Department of the Interior) had taken the same position and had stated that the police could cope with its tasks. Thus he, Knox, had had such success that the French propaganda had come almost to a standstill. Now, however, he had come into a difficult situation, since the events of the last few days showed that the misgivings of certain people could after all not be dismissed lightly. In the first place a number of Frenchmen had been beaten in Saarbrücken. When Kossmann objected that this incident, which had taken place after 2:00 a. m. and doubtless under the influence of alcohol, was after all not sufficiently "interesting," Knox had replied that the important thing was that when an alarm was given a whole column of National Socialists had appeared and started a beating. Evidently the National Socialists kept squads in readiness for intervention on a push-button basis. That was an intolerable situation. In the second case, the freeing of the prisoner in Neunkirchen, a National Socialist had also been involved, and still worse was the existing suspicion that the police themselves had facilitated the flight of the prisoner, and two policemen had gone over the border. The case was very regrettable and was symptomatic of the state of mind prevailing among at least a portion of the police.<sup>4</sup>

The Governing Commission could not regard such things calmly. He wanted State Secretary von Bülow to be informed that he, Knox, would have to resort to the "sharpest measures" if things went on like this. "I assure you, Herr Colleague, I would find a majority in the Governing Commission in favor of this. Tell Herr von Bülow that it simply doesn't go for Herr Goebbels to have his hand in the Saar Territory." The Saar Territory could not be coordinated [*gleichgeschaltet*] in any circumstances; the special conditions did not permit this. If things continued as in the past he would have to take measures that would probably be felt on the German side to be very unpleasant; it would then not be impossible that the entire German propaganda would be greatly reduced, but he could then not take any account of these German interests, for the highest law for him was to secure peace and order and everything else had to be subordinated to this. If the National Socialists had no understanding for this they had to answer for the consequences, not he. He was filled with the best intentions and had repeatedly furnished proof that he meant well and wanted to exert a conciliatory influence. He had always demonstrated his neutrality, but this required of him that he work purely objectively for the general order. What certain people wrote about him in the press did not affect him. It was really stupid and ridiculous when they tried in the press to teach him what his functions were,

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<sup>4</sup> Kossmann had given Voigt an account by telephone of these two incidents on Apr. 26 (Voigt memorandum of Apr. 27: 9976/E697369-70).

such as for example the article on "The German Saar" in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* No. 304/06 of April 25, which he suspected was written or inspired by Herr Braun von Stumm (Herr Kossmann was not acquainted with this article). Such articles proved only that the author did not know either him or the situation. After a few more very sharp remarks about the campaign in the German press against him, Mr. Knox stressed once more that Herr von Bülow should please be told that things such as those mentioned absolutely had to stop; otherwise measures would be taken that would be very detrimental to the German interests.

Herr Kossmann remarked by way of supplement that the Chairman had probably not meant bringing in French troops when he hinted at "measures," but certain measures of the Brüning Government, possibly even prior press censorship, prohibition of the National Socialist party, etc.; however, this had not been clear.

I replied that I would naturally see that these communications got to the State Secretary at once and must reserve further steps to him. Purely personally I could only say that I was quite surprised at these remarks by Mr. Knox. There had not been any important disturbances of the peace in the Saar Territory. It was impossible to take the Saarbrücken incident too seriously. In former years Frenchmen had also been beaten, and most often precisely at the time when the French troops had been in the country; at that time French soldiers even had repeatedly had a good beating up. The Neunkirchen incident was not cleared up yet, but everything indicated that it could by no means be blamed on the National Socialists (neither the arrested person nor the police are said to be National Socialists; the police are said to have fled in order to avoid prosecution for ordinary punishable acts—rape, among other things). There was no reason of any kind to believe that the National Socialists in the Saar Territory wanted to take over power illegally; on the contrary, it could be gathered from the statements of their responsible authorities that they fully recognized the special situation of the Saar Territory. However, the National Socialists did, and evidently not without reason, complain about the appearance of provocateurs in the Saar Territory. As far as the sharp measures which had been mentioned were concerned, they would doubtless not have a pacifying effect but an irritating and embittering one and would increase the tension. If Mr. Knox took this questionable course he would be pushed further and further, and one day whether he would or no, would be confronted by the troop question after all; what bringing in the French military signified, however, did not need to be further explained. On the whole I thus had the impression that Mr. Knox was exaggerating and was overly anxious.



Herr Kossmann remarked that he had had the same impression. The great excitement with which Mr. Knox had spoken must have had some special reason, but in this respect he knew nothing further.

In the course of the discussion Herr Kossmann suggested that I go with him to Saarbrücken and there perhaps speak with Mr. Knox. I replied that without special authorization I was not in a position to do this. For my part I asked whether one could perhaps ask Mr. Knox to Berlin, which Herr Kossmann termed very desirable.<sup>5</sup>

VOIGT

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<sup>5</sup> Marginal comment on the first page of this minute (E571688): "Foreign Minister: It appears good to me, too, to invite Knox to Berlin. He should then have an opportunity, however, to speak with *leading* National Socialists. B[ülow], May 4."

The minute was initialed by Neurath on May 6.

A further memorandum by Bülow on May 8 stated that no definite date could be set at the moment for an invitation for Knox to come to Berlin (7892/E571694).

## No. 204

9325/E661297-302

*Ambassador Dirksen to Ministerialdirektor Meyer*

Moscow, May 2, 1933.

DEAR MEYER: I have meanwhile received the telegram of Herr von Neurath concerning the exchange of instruments of ratification,<sup>1</sup> and you know the result of my conversation with Litvinov.<sup>2</sup> As I heard Saturday evening<sup>3</sup> at a banquet at the Japanese Embassy from the gentlemen of the Foreign Commissariat, the technical preparations (printing, making of the folder) will require more time, so that we may expect the ceremony to take place in about 5 or 6 days. With regard to the joint communiqué, Litvinov was somewhat hesitant. I assume that the Soviet Government will accede to it, however. The hesitation is intended to show how reserved the Russians can be if they feel injured!

I am very glad that as a result of the Chancellor's conversation with Khinchuk, the Derop matter seems to be settled in a thorough and satisfactory manner. Very encouraging, too, was the attitude of *Angriff*.

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 194, footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 88 of Apr. 29 (6613/E498546) Dirksen reported that he had discussed with Litvinov the exchange of instruments of ratification as instructed. Litvinov had welcomed the possibility of an early exchange and was going to arrange for a date immediately after May 2.

<sup>3</sup> i. e., Apr. 29.

Now I would be very glad if, on the occasion of the publication of the joint communiqué concerning the exchange of instruments of ratification, the German press in some of its more serious organs would appraise German-Russian political and economic relations in general. Such comments would naturally be especially valuable from the National Socialist press.<sup>4</sup> I also assume as a matter of course that *Deutsche Diplomatische Korrespondenz* will express itself on this subject. I can take for granted the ideas that will be most suitably discussed on such an occasion: a strong attack on communism in Germany itself is entirely compatible with friendly German-Russian relations; the Soviet Union is the only power that has from the beginning and consistently fought the Versailles Treaty; the Soviet Union and Germany have, moreover, numerous political interests in common in the shaping of Near Eastern policy; proof of this: Rapallo and the Berlin Treaty; value of the economic relations to both countries, etc.

Then, another question: Do you know whether the von der Lübbe case,<sup>5</sup> which will shortly be tried, also compromises the Soviet Russians or whether the preliminary inquiry has furnished proof of a direct connection between the culprit and the Russian Communist party?

Yesterday passed without incidents: Voroshilov's speech offered no occasion for special objections; the throngs of demonstrators refrained from calumny of National Socialism or of leading Germans; the ceremony at the Embassy was extraordinarily well attended (550 persons); after my speech 3 or 4 German Communists, apparently sent to start a row, tried to "heckle" me, but they were gently ousted.

With best regards,

Yours, etc.

DIRKSEN

Moscow, May 2, 1933.

P. S. I am sending you herewith the carbon copy of a brief report from me on Soviet-Polish relations, particularly because of the report about Radek's trip to the ceded territories.<sup>6</sup> What importance such a trip and an attitude by Radek favoring the Polish points of view would have, I do not need particularly to emphasize. The importance would, indeed, lie not only in the fact that a man of Radek's literary stature inclines to the Polish thesis, but rather indirectly in the fact that the political world might and would have to infer from these circumstances a complete devaluation of the political relations between Germany and the Soviet Union.

<sup>4</sup> In a letter of May 9, Meyer told Dirksen that he could inform him confidentially that he had himself written the leading editorials in *Angriff* and *Völkischer Beobachter* on the subject (9325/E661285-87).

<sup>5</sup> In connection with the Reichstag fire.

<sup>6</sup> Report No. A 840 of May 2, not printed (9325/E661303-04). Radek's trip to eastern Poland was to take place in June.

In what manner this action could be countered, I am unable to judge. A trip by Radek to Germany is naturally out of the question, the more so since already last October he was refused an entry permit when he wished to have political talks on German-Russian relations with influential Germans.

Perhaps it might be considered having Danzig invite Radek for a visit, which could, indeed, easily be arranged through the Soviet Consul General there. Should this method be considered feasible, it would be desirable to have this invitation issued to Radek *before* the trip to the Corridor and eastern Upper Silesia and independent of it.

Another counteraction might be, at a convenient time, to give to Rayevsky, the foreign policy editor of *Izvestia*, an entry permit for Germany so that he could have political talks with leading German personages.

All these are naturally non-binding suggestions and ideas. I am not at all able to tell from here to what extent the conditions at present exist in Berlin for the realization of such things.

Yesterday's parade very interesting as a result of the great number of planes and tanks, definitely for exhibition purposes. Several hundred of each. More detailed report by next courier.

Yours,

D[IRKSEN]

## No. 205

3015/598286

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

MAY 3, 1933.

Herr Aschmann transmitted the question of Reich Minister Goebbels as to whether there was any objection on the part of the Foreign Ministry to his going to Danzig and giving a speech there on May 24 (shortly before the elections<sup>1</sup>).

I told Aschmann that a trip by a Reich Minister to Danzig at the present time was out of the question.

I believe you should speak with Reich Minister Goebbels about this.<sup>2</sup>

BÜLOW

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<sup>1</sup> The Danzig elections were to be held on May 28.

<sup>2</sup> Marginal notation: "Discussed by the Foreign Minister with the Reich Chancellor today. Vö[ickers], May 4."

## No. 206

9189/E646444-45

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, May 3, 1933.

RM 604.

The Polish Minister called on me today and brought the counter-statement of the Polish Government<sup>1</sup> which I asked for yesterday.<sup>2</sup> At the same time, in behalf of the Polish Minister President, he expressed to the Reich Chancellor the thanks of the Polish Government for the statement made by him. This statement was of a nature to bring about a real relaxation of tension in German-Polish relations. The Polish Government for its part shared the wish of the Reich Chancellor that German-Polish questions might be handled in a dispassionate atmosphere.

NEURATH

[Enclosure]

To be released by the P. A. T.<sup>3</sup> in Warsaw.

The conversation which the Reich Chancellor accorded the Polish Minister, Dr. Wysocki, in the presence of Foreign Minister von Neurath and which was released by the Wolff Bureau, has exerted a quieting influence on German-Polish relations.

In connection with this conversation, the Polish Foreign Minister, M. Beck, has received the German Minister in Warsaw, Herr von Moltke, and has stressed that the Polish Government, on its part, has the firm intention to keep its attitude and its actions strictly within the bounds of existing treaties. The Polish Foreign Minister expressed further the wish that both countries might review their common interests and deal with them dispassionately.

<sup>1</sup> See enclosure.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 201.

<sup>3</sup> The official Polish news agency.

## No. 207

7892/E571697-700

*Minute by an Official of Department II*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, May 4, 1933.

e. o. II SG 950.

Yesterday afternoon after he had previously called on the Foreign Minister, Kommerzienrat Dr. H. Röchling, accompanied by his son-

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Has been submitted to the Foreign Minister. V[ölkers], May 6."

in-law, Baron von Gemmingen, had another conversation which lasted half an hour with the Reich Chancellor regarding the course of which he told me the following:

He had first called the Reich Chancellor's attention to the leadership problem of the National Socialist movement as regards the Saar Territory. In the long run it would hardly be possible to have the Saar question controlled by a Gauleiter located outside the Saar Territory (in Neustadt a. d. Hardt); the leading persons must be located in the Saar Territory itself. He had then pointed to the quick growth of National Socialism in the Saar Territory and to the corresponding decrease in members of the other parties, particularly his own. The Center, too, suffered losses, but would always remain strong precisely in the Saar Territory. He, Röchling, did not attach the least value to retaining old party organizations. However, in his opinion one should retain the most important existing parties in the Saar Territory until the decision in 1935; what came afterward was another question. For this reason his party, the German-Saarland People's party, had decided in spite of undeniably large losses not to dissolve itself. He had asked himself whether he could help the new Germany and the National Socialist movement more by joining or by staying outside. He had decided on the second alternative.

The Reich Chancellor fully agreed with the latter remark and added that he was not especially pleased about the quick growth of the National Socialist movement around the periphery of the Reich, because it could easily lead to the masses of his followers soon demanding deeds from which foreign policy difficulties might arise. Naturally he hated the Versailles Treaty at least as strongly as Marxism, but one had to stand on that basis long enough for Germany to grow really strong, which would require another 8-10 years.

Herr Röchling, referring to the pending reception of the representatives of the parties of the Saar Territory,<sup>2</sup> had told the Reich Chancellor further that he would certainly have a good impression of the majority of the men who would appear. In the national question no party had failed in the Saar. For this reason, however, all parties, and particularly also the Center, attached value to decent treatment and would feel nothing more bitterly than any sort of ostracism.

The Reich Chancellor had agreed and remarked that everyone who had acted irreproachably would be remembered.

After discussion of a number of individual questions (position of the Communists and Socialists in the Saar Territory, observing of caution in appointing commissioners), Herr Röchling had broached the question whether the old project of the Saar-Pfalz Canal could not be taken up once more in connection with the program of providing work. If projects involving billions, such as the expansion of the entire network of roads, were being taken up, it really ought to be possible to make room, too, for a project whose cost had been estimated in times of a higher level of costs at 280 million reichsmarks. The Reich Chancellor was interested in the matter and replied to the question of whether Herr Röchling should get in con-

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<sup>2</sup> See document No. 169 and footnote 3; see also document No. 240.

tact with another office to the effect that he would broach the subject himself at the discussions on providing work.<sup>3</sup>

Herr Röchling remarked in conclusion that this discussion naturally canceled out his earlier request to be received alone by the Reich Chancellor a quarter of an hour before the impending joint discussion.<sup>4</sup>

VOIGT

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\* A memorandum of May 12 by Voigt for State Secretary Bülow noted that the Reich Ministry of Transport opposed the project of the Saar-Pfalz Canal as being an economically unsound means of lowering the freight charges on Saar coal for southern Germany. Other means were recommended to achieve the desired purpose. (7892/E571701)

<sup>4</sup> Röchling had made this request in a letter of Apr. 28 to Hitler (7892/-E571686-87).

## No. 208

3170/676260-61

### *Unsigned Memorandum*<sup>1</sup>

[MAY 4, 1933.]

#### *Article I*

The High Contracting Parties will consult on all questions which appertain to them and will strive within the framework of the League of Nations to pursue a policy of cooperation among themselves, as well as with third Powers, with a view to maintaining peace.<sup>2</sup>

(It would be very desirable if the newly added words "as well as with third Powers," could be stricken again.)

#### *Article II*

The High Contracting Parties, with a view to the application in Europe of articles 10, 16,<sup>3</sup> and 19 concerning territorial integrity, sanctions, and the reconsideration of treaties, decide to examine among themselves, without prejudice to the decisions which can only be taken by the regular organs of the League of Nations, any proposal tending to give full efficacy to the above-mentioned articles.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> On May 2 Hassell had sent to Berlin a summary of the new version of the draft pact which had resulted from the discussions of the French and British Ambassadors at the Italian Foreign Ministry (see document No. 178 and footnote 4). Thereupon the new draft, printed here, was drawn up at the Foreign Ministry. The original of the draft is in French. It bears the marginal note: "Accepted by the Chancellor. Alternative: immediate conclusion of the accord. v. N[eurath], May 4." On May 5 an instruction went out to Hassell informing him in detail of the reasons for the latest position taken by the German Government (telegram No. 121: 3170/676181-88). See document No. 220.

<sup>2</sup> Cf enclosure to document No. 170.

<sup>3</sup> The instructions sent to Hassell on May 5 (see footnote 1) expressed the hope that the Italians would still succeed in winning the French over to the deletion of article 16, "since it has nothing at all to do with the entire complex of questions here at issue."

<sup>4</sup> Cf. document No. 151 and enclosure to document No. 170.

*Article III*

The High Contracting Parties recognize that the maintenance of peace makes necessary the reduction of national armaments to the minimum compatible with national security and that the success of the Disarmament Conference will be the best means of realizing this objective. They renew their desire to cooperate with the other Powers represented there in this effort to work out as quickly as possible a convention assuring a substantial reduction and a limitation of armaments with provision for its subsequent revision with a view to new reductions. France, Great Britain, and Italy on their part declare that the principle of equality of rights must have a practical value for Germany, and Germany, in what concerns her, undertakes to realize this principle of equality of rights only by virtue of an accord to be concluded on the general basis of the recent British draft convention, to which each of the four Powers will be a party. The four Powers recognize that these same principles apply to the other states disarmed by treaty.

*Article VI*

The present agreement will be ratified and ratifications will be exchanged within a period of 3 months. It will be registered at the Secretariat of the League of Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant.

## No. 209

7360/E536592-94

*The Head of the German Delegation at Geneva to the  
Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

URGENT      GENEVA, German Delegation, May 5, 1933—2:35 a. m.  
No. 327 of May 4      Received May 5—3:00 a. m.  
II F Abr. 1586.

The consultations of the last few days on the effectives section of the English draft have clearly revealed the present situation at the Conference. England, the United States, and France have apparently agreed, as is also confirmed by the recent telegram from the Washington Embassy,<sup>1</sup> to accept the English plan with as little change as possible; the tactical consideration was certainly the decisive factor involved so far as France was concerned. Italy takes the same attitude, also allegedly for tactical reasons, and has merely reserved

<sup>1</sup> Telegram No. 229 of May 1 (7360/E536583); sent to Geneva on May 2 (7360/E536585).

proposals for the amendment of individual points. The other Powers, in so far as they have any influence at all at the Conference, naturally align themselves with the bloc of Great Powers. Apart from the Soviet Union and a few states of little political weight, such as Turkey and China, we are consequently the only ones who desire substantial modifications. Furthermore the Soviet Union is already showing indications of trying to become integrated within the framework of the draft convention. This isolation of Germany, as far as can be ascertained here, is based especially on currents of international politics and not on the treatment of the disarmament problem at the Conference itself.

Strong forces are now at work here at present to wreck the Conference while Germany is isolated; our alleged demands for rearmament, but especially our opposition to the generally desired conversion of the Reich Army to short-term service, would provide the excuse. The latter question in particular is obviously to be placed in the center of discussion and to be made decisive for the success or failure of the Conference. In order to bring about this outcome efforts are being made by certain delegations to postpone the first reading of the material section of the English draft, which should now come up, and to proceed immediately to the second reading of the section on effectives in order to confront us with the final decision on the question of the standardization of types of armies, so that the opposing side will not have to take any position on the important section on material, which calls for certain sacrifices from it, especially in the field of aviation. Even if it will be possible, as I hope, to avoid this danger, persistent attempts to end the Conference prematurely to our disadvantage will have to be reckoned with, and in view of the prevailing prejudice against us here at present it is impossible to foresee how long this can be prevented by means of tactical maneuvers at the Conference.

According to what I hear, it is to be expected that after the return of Herriot the Americans will come forward with a new move designed to hasten the conclusion of the Disarmament Conference, and it may be assumed that it will be directed essentially toward acceptance of the English draft. This move, which apparently has been agreed upon with MacDonald and Herriot,<sup>2</sup> would confront us directly with the alternative of acceptance or rejection.

In these circumstances it seems necessary to take steps with the Governments in Washington, London, and Rome in order to bring about an agreement in principle. For this purpose I believe it should be pointed out to these Governments how serious the situation would

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<sup>2</sup> See document No. 143.



be if we were, so to speak, confronted with a dictate in the question of the conversion of the Reichswehr.<sup>3</sup> Rather, the essential points of difference should be ascertained in a further preliminary discussion of the entire draft, so that it may become possible for the parties especially interested to negotiate about it as a whole, in which case we would not show ourselves intransigent. In such negotiations the question of the standardization of the continental European armies will—we must realize—play a decisive role.

Since the Bureau is having a session on Monday, I should be grateful for the earliest possible information on any steps that are to be taken.

NADOLNY

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<sup>3</sup> Instructions along the lines requested were sent on May 5 in telegrams Nos. 116 to London, 120 to Rome, and 169 to Washington (7360/E536601-05). The results of this step are indicated in the retrospective memorandum of May 15, printed as document No. 239, which summarizes the German diplomatic activity relating to the Disarmament Conference for the period Apr. 28 to May 13.

## No. 210

3598/792547-48

*Extract From the Minutes of the Cabinet Session of May 5, 1933*<sup>1</sup>

Rk. 5547.

6. *Tariff truce in the period preceding the opening of the World Economic Conference.*

The Foreign Minister presented the annexed material<sup>2</sup> in a somewhat modified and abridged form.

The Minister of Economics feared that any concession in principle made by us in this question would weaken our position in the impending trade agreement negotiations. In the field of agriculture Germany could not give up her freedom with regard to tariffs. As respects tariffs in the field of industry the situation was similar. If Germany was not in a position to strengthen her tariff armament, we would enter the negotiations weakened from the outset. It was to be feared, moreover, that the other Powers might reach an agreement at our expense. He, the Minister of Economics, therefore proposed

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<sup>1</sup> The remainder of the minutes, including a list of those present, is filmed on 3598/792538-46.

<sup>2</sup> This refers to the contents of a letter from Neurath to Lammers of May 4 (9245/E652004-08) which contained suggestions for an instruction to the German Ambassador in London stating the German position toward the American proposal, made in the Organizing Committee for the World Economic Conference on Apr. 29, for a tariff truce in the period preceding the opening of the Conference. On the American proposal, see also documents in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933*, vol. 1, pp. 578-606.

that an effort be made in the direction of strengthening our tariff defense. Instead of agreeing to the proposed tariff truce, even in an evasive manner, it was better to hold up our plight before the other participating states.

The Foreign Minister argued in opposition to him that we would incur the odium of the world at large if we should strengthen our tariff armament at this time. It would give the general impression that we wanted to sabotage the World Economic Conference. An evasive reply was probably conceivable; a flat "no," however, seemed to him impossible. Moreover it was only a question of the time between now and June 15.

The Reichswehr Minister supported the proposal of the Foreign Minister, emphasizing the circumstance that it was risky to do anything which could further aggravate the already critical position of Germany in foreign politics.

After the Vice Chancellor had also spoken in favor of an evasive reply, the Cabinet adopted the proposal of the Foreign Minister in principle. The latter will come to an agreement with the Minister of Economics on the text of the reply to be given by Germany to the proposal of the Government of the United States.<sup>3</sup>

For part 6 of the minutes:

THOMSEN

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\* Instructions to Ambassador Hoesch in London to convey the German Government's approval in principle of the American proposal were forwarded in telegram No. 123 of May 8 (9245/E652020-24), while in a supplemental instruction (telegram No. 125 of May 9) Hoesch was informed that the Foreign Ministry had tried to make the reply more positive, but had been unable to do so because of the attitude of the Ministry of Economics and the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (9245/E652059-60).

## No. 211

9996/E698044-51

### *Circular of the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

BERLIN, May 5, 1933.

IMMEDIATE

zu W 2658.<sup>2</sup>

With reference to the circular instruction W 2336 of April 8, 1933,<sup>3</sup> the Missions primarily interested are being informed as follows of the essential details as they are at present contemplated in the event of a moratorium on transfers.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> This circular was directed to the principal German Missions in European capitals and to the Embassies in Washington, Tokyo, and Ankara.

<sup>2</sup> W 2658: Not printed (9037/E632737), dated Apr. 25.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (9037/E632717-20).

<sup>4</sup> The text of the law on the moratorium on transfers as eventually issued on June 9, 1933, is in *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1933, I, p. 349. The law provided for a transfer moratorium on payments on German foreign debts incurred up to July 15, 1931, to take effect on July 1, 1933.

I. Affected by the measure are interest, amortizations, and similar regularly recurring payments and yield on foreign assets, in so far as they flowed into the German economy before July 15, 1931. The transfer of this interest, etc., has still been permitted under present German foreign exchange legislation. These transfers are to be suspended. (The foreign assets which flowed into the German economy after July 15, 1931, in which, moreover, relatively small amounts are involved, are to be exempted from the measure. The intent of this exemption is that new foreign capital investments in Germany inaugurated after the banking crisis are not to be interfered with. The idea of the Standstill on so-called old claims dating back to before July 15, 1931, which is fundamental to German foreign exchange legislation, is thereby at the same time given expression.)

II. The German debtor must meet his interest, etc., obligations by payment of corresponding amounts in reichsmarks into an *independent conversion fund* [*Konversionskasse*] in favor of his foreign creditor. The German debtor is to be released from his interest, etc., obligations in his legal relation to the foreign creditor. The autonomous *Konversionskasse* is to take his place in this respect. The foreign creditor shall, however, if his claim is in foreign currency, receive credit for the amount paid into the *Konversionskasse* in foreign currency, in the amount of the original liability. In the relationship between the *Konversionskasse* and the foreign creditor the debt relationship will therefore in these cases continue in foreign currency. The foreign creditor shall, moreover, have the right to demand of the *Konversionskasse* the issuance and delivery of foreign exchange debentures to the extent of the foreign exchange amounts credited to him. It is assumed that a trading market will develop in these foreign exchange debentures.

The *Konversionskasse* will pay interest of 3 percent on the accounts of the foreign creditors. The interest is to be made available to them semi-annually in foreign currency. The interest, amortization, etc., affected by the moratorium on transfers, at present amount to about a billion reichsmarks a year. Three percent of this is 30 million reichsmarks a year. This then, is the amount which, according to the proposed regulations, the Reichsbank will have to raise in cash in foreign currency until further notice.

The foreign exchange debentures are later on to be bought up or redeemed at par, if the foreign exchange holdings of the Reichsbank and the entire currency situation warrant it.

III. Exceptions. Certain credits, in the case of which there are special conditions, shall be excepted from the proposed transfer deferment. This applies primarily to the obligations of the Reichsbank itself and to the credit of the Golddiskontbank, which is accounted to be 45 million dollars.

There shall be excepted—at least formally—those liabilities that are the subject of the Credit Agreement of 1933.<sup>5</sup> According to article 16 of this Credit Agreement, however, the Reichsbank can inform the foreign creditors' committees that the foreign exchange situation makes it impossible for it to make further transfers of the payments provided for in the Credit Agreement. At the same time the Reichsbank must submit to the creditors' committees proposals for another arrangement. If the Reichsbank proposes to the creditors' committees that the same arrangement be allowed to apply to the claims that are subject to the Credit Agreement of 1933 as will now automatically apply to the claims outside the scope of the Credit Agreement, the creditors' committees will be faced with the choice of accepting this proposal (satisfaction by payment into the *Konversionskasse*) or not. If they do not accept the proposal, they will have the right to terminate the Credit Agreement. Since, with the termination of the contractual Standstill regulations, the debt relations concerned would immediately come under the general German foreign exchange legislation, the creditors will have to give careful consideration to the exercise of the right of termination. Although, therefore, the debt relationships under the Credit Agreement of 1933 do not formally come under the automatic regulation, nevertheless, indirectly, via article 16 of the Credit Agreement, they will actually, perhaps, be placed under the automatic arrangement.

Obligations of the Reich, the Länder, and the municipalities will not be excepted from the proposed regulation. Particular consideration was given to whether the transfer of the interest and amortization payments could not at least be exempted for the Dawes and Young loans, in view of their special character. Because of the gravity of the German foreign exchange situation, however, this has not proved possible.

In cases in which the proposed arrangement may lead to unfair hardship for the creditor or debtor, the Reich Government will be able to arrange a different settlement of the obligations. An unfair hardship will certainly be found to exist for the foreign creditor if the suspension of transfers threatens to destroy his economic livelihood. In including the debtor in the hardship paragraph, the consideration prevailed, *as we state in strict confidence*, that in view of the new German automatic arrangement, many debtors (shipping companies and other enterprises with foreign operating capital) might run the risk of suffering serious losses through seizure by the foreign creditor of assets located abroad.

IV. Timing. When the recent currency measures of the United States, particularly the gold embargo, became known here, the inten-

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 30.

tion here was first to publish the contemplated transfer moratorium at once, in order to launch it, as it were, in the wake of these dollar events and at the same time to justify it by these events. But this was not done after all because it seemed inexpedient to come out with this measure precisely at the time when Messrs. MacDonald and Herriot were conferring with Mr. Roosevelt. It seemed advisable, moreover, to have the Government and the circles of interested parties of the chief creditor country, the United States, prepared in advance by Reichsbank President Schacht. It is the intention at present to come out in public with the measure when this preparation has taken place. The Reichsbank President will probably leave the United States again on May 11. It is therefore to be assumed that the transfer moratorium will be declared at approximately that time, provided that in the meantime events do not occur that may lead to new decisions as to the timing.

V. No unilateral interference with debt relationships. The fact that now an automatic transfer moratorium for interest, etc., obligations is being declared, could first of all be construed to mean that the Reich Government intended after all, despite repeated declarations, to alter unilaterally debt relations with other countries. In answer to this, it should be pointed out that the capital amounts and rates of interest, etc., owed would remain unaffected; that the impending new measure affects only the interest, amortization, etc., obligations, not the capital obligations, etc., and that through the measures explained in section II, a subsequent payment in full and, in the meantime, interest on the outstanding amounts due are provided for.

If the Reich Government now proceeds to restriction of the transfers independently, it is owing, first, to urgent necessity in consequence of the decline in German foreign trade balances and the imperative duty to support the German currency, and to guarantee indispensable imports of merchandise from abroad. This independent action is also based on the assumption that the creditors could not in any other way be brought to the bargaining table at all for the purpose of a bilateral arrangement, quite apart from the technical difficulty of convening for negotiations the group of creditors who are not already included in the Standstill. The Reich Government assumes that the World Economic Conference must take up the problem of foreign debts in general—that is, not only with regard to Germany. The independent action which is pending therefore represents, so to speak, only the prelude to later negotiations on a possible bilateral arrangement.

V. [sic] For guidance in your language. I am informing the Missions now in confidence concerning these details because, if the con-

templated measure is finally passed and published, this will be done between one day and the next, and then there will be no time to inform the Missions in writing. A telegraphic communication of the required scope is, on the contrary, not possible. The above details are, therefore, until further notice, intended only for your strictly confidential information. I reserve further instructions as to when and to what extent you may make use of them. The confidential remark in the fourth paragraph of section III, that for certain imperiled debtors (shipping companies, etc.) exceptions may perhaps be made later on, must probably, even after publication of the entire measure, continue until further notice to be treated *as confidential*. If this possible exception were announced at the start, it would actually encourage the filing of applications for granting of exceptions.

Meanwhile it may be generally admitted in conversations that conditions in Germany are making early restrictive measures in the sphere of transfers necessary and that it must be expected that such decisions will be reached any day.

By order:  
RITTER

## No. 212

6609/E497009-18

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry*

SECRET  
A 885

Moscow, May 5, 1933.  
Received May 11.  
IV Ru. 2170.

### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Ratification of the Protocol for extension of the Berlin Treaty and German-Soviet relations.

- I. Preliminary history and political effect of ratification.
- II. Comparison with the joint communiqué of 1930.
- III. Three obstacles on the Soviet side:
  - a) Uncertainty as to Germany's foreign policy.
  - b) A feeling of injured prestige.
  - c) Franco-Polish counteraction.
- IV. The foreign policy of the Soviet Government at the crossroads.
- V. Bases of German-Soviet relations.

### I

The exchange of instruments of ratification of the Protocol for extension of the Berlin Treaty, which took place today,<sup>1</sup> put into force

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 194, footnote 1.

a treaty which—as hardly any other German-Soviet treaty—has a difficult and complicated history. Outwardly this is already apparent through the fact that it enters into force nearly 2 years after the signing on June 24, 1931, and almost on the day when it can again be terminated—on June 30, 1933. These difficulties began on the very day of the signing of the Protocol, when, at the request of the then Reich Chancellor Brüning, the knowledge of the extension of the Berlin Treaty resulting from it was to be withheld from the public for a few days in view of the financial negotiations pending with France. Then came the repeated attempts, which always failed, to get the Treaty through a Reichstag which was incapable of functioning, since the device of an emergency decree was not considered feasible. The tension in mutual relations prevailing in the last few months finally made it appear advisable to choose for the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification a moment when political significance could be assigned to this act—the significance of putting an end to this tension. The revalidation of the Berlin Treaty and the conciliation agreement is intended to emphasize the will of the national German Government for its part also to live in friendly political and economic relations with the Soviet Union, such as would be advantageous to both countries. The publication of a joint communiqué is to serve to give special emphasis to this will.<sup>2</sup>

## II

A comparison can be readily drawn with the political situation which led on June 14, 1930, to the publication of a joint communiqué, whereby the controversial material accumulated on both sides was referred to the conciliation commission, interference in the internal affairs of the other party was disapproved and expression given to the positive political intentions of the two Contracting Parties. Then, too, a tense atmosphere lasting for months, numerous incidents, and sharp discussions had preceded it. Then, too, a joint communiqué was chosen as the means for evidencing mutual good will. And then a relatively long period of comparatively smooth relations actually set in.

Now, too, it is undoubtedly the wish of the Soviet Government to eliminate the tensions that have arisen. But it would mean indulging in self-deception if Germany were to expect with complete certainty that the exchange of instruments of ratification and the joint communiqué will possess the same political effect as the joint declaration in 1930. In addition, in the course of the past year, the foreign relations of the Soviet Union in general and with Germany in particu-

<sup>2</sup> A Soviet draft for the joint communiqué was proposed on May 4 and accepted by the Germans with minor variations (Moscow telegram No. 91 of May 4 and Foreign Ministry telegram to Moscow, No. 105 of May 4: 6613/E498547; E498550).

lar have been affected by too many different trends. Important factors operating in this connection are a rather deep-seated uncertainty or mistrust of Germany, a feeling of injured prestige, and a very strong Franco-Polish counteraction.

### III

The uncertainty concerning the political intentions of Germany does not date only from the formation of the present Government of the National Revolution in Germany. This event in itself would not have been bound to exert an unfavorable effect on German-Soviet relations. Russian mistrust arose during the Lausanne Conference in the summer of 1932 when the falsehood was circulated that the then Chancellor von Papen had offered to the French Premier Herriot a military alliance directed against the Soviet Union, and it was only owing to France's rejection that it did not materialize. The sharpest German denials in private conversations with Soviet politicians were not completely effective, as the Russians noted the fact that no publicity was given such statements. The fact that Herriot himself in a newspaper article, and then other French papers, continually repeated this statement, gave new sustenance to the mistrust of the Soviet Government—its most prominent characteristic.

The change of government in Germany on January 30 of this year filled the Soviet Government with anxiety. It sought out from the past evidence of anti-Russian sentiment of National Socialist leaders and feared that now a policy in accordance with this would be adopted. The unequivocal positive statements of the Chancellor, particularly in his Reichstag speech of March 23 of this year, dispelled these fears and showed that Germany knew how to separate the fight against communism at home from a positive policy with respect to Russia.

The continual police measures taken in Germany against Soviet institutions (trade missions, Derop, etc.), against Soviet citizens, and in places where prestige is sensitively involved, however, had a more radical and disadvantageous effect. Energetic action, even in sensitive spots, if it had occurred but *once* would have been put up with. But to have to admit for about two months before the world public that one had nothing to say in one's own house—and the world had been made to think that the Derop was something like a pure Soviet enterprise—this dealt a serious and permanent injury to the sensibilities of the Soviet Government. Added to this was the doubt whether it would really be possible to maintain economic relations with Germany on the former large scale.

Because of political developments since the summer of 1932, the Soviet attitude toward Germany was an anxious, mistrustful, uncertain one; as a result of the police interventions of the past few



months, a further disturbing factor had been brought into our mutual relations—and now a third element, operating in a negative sense, was added in the deliberate policy of the French and Poles, pursued in every possible way, of furthering the cooling off between Germany and Russia, which they cordially welcomed, and putting themselves in the place of Germany. This is not the place to cite the special reasons that cause the two allies, from motives that are not always identical, to pursue this pro-Russian policy. Suffice it to say, that these efforts do not fall on entirely stony ground in Moscow. For the time being, it is in accord with the healthy egotism of the Soviet Government to cash in on all the friendliness tendered it. Also, there is the fact that it finds the attentiveness of the French at the moment of the conflict with England<sup>3</sup> especially desirable. And finally, above all: The Polish demonstrations of sympathy are for the Soviet Government, as a protection of its western flank, of vital importance in a period of constantly growing irritation in its relations with Japan.

#### IV

The negative elements in the relations with Germany and the positive ones in the relations with Poland and France have here created a mood that finds expression in the following signs: M. Krestinsky, one of the warmest adherents of German-Soviet friendship, told me a few days ago that it would take months yet before the old relations were restored—so deep had been the impact of the last incidents on the Soviet public. He then stated with regret that it would indeed not be possible this year for Soviet leaders to visit German physicians and sanatoriums because they would have difficulties to fear in such cases.

Radek, one of the most influential and until now one of the most pronouncedly anti-Polish publicists of the Soviet Union, when asked recently why he now spoke of "Pomerelia" [*Pommerellen*] and no longer of "Corridor," replied, "Why should I propagandize for the Germans also? Much has changed just recently."

A certain aloofness from the foreign political aims and basic ideas heretofore pursued jointly with Germany is beginning to appear in the press and the public here. Unrestrained opposition to the Versailles *Diktat* is no longer manifested. Instead, the argument that revision means war is beginning to sink in.

The common policy formerly pursued in disarmament questions has been so much transformed into the opposite that the semi-official

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<sup>3</sup> Tension had arisen over the arrest, by the Soviet Government in March 1933, of six British officials of the Metropolitan-Vickers Company in the Soviet Union.

Geneva correspondent of *Izvestia*, on the 5th of this month completely falsified the attitude of the German delegation on the question of the definition of "aggressor" by including the German delegation, which had refrained from voting, in the number of delegations voting "No."

The adverse and tricky attitude on various questions of military policy is to be regarded as an extremely significant further touch.

It may be said in recapitulation that the inclination of the Soviet Government toward a restoration of friendly relations with Germany is at present counterbalanced by the tendency to practice reserve and watchful waiting toward Germany, in order possibly to enter the French-Polish orbit.

## V

It would be entirely conceivable and defensible for Germany to watch this development with a certain composure. The Soviet Union on the whole is at present not an object to tempt other powers to take a particularly positive attitude toward her. In broad stretches of the country famine prevails; agriculture lies prostrate; industrialization has not justified the hopes placed in it; transportation is on the downgrade; political solidarity at home has declined as a result of the failure of the economic experiment. It will be possible only in a very modest degree in the next few years to make use of the Soviet Union as a power factor, particularly in a military respect.

But such an attitude would be short-sighted from the political standpoint generally, particularly, however, from the German standpoint. In German-Russian relations it was never the *present* ratio of strength that exerted a political effect with respect to third countries. The world has always been aware of the present weakness of Germany and of Russia. To this extent it has been entirely correct to speak of a Rapallo bluff. The strong positive political effect which the Rapallo policy has always had, despite this realization of the weakness of the two partners, lay in the realization of the *potential* strength of the two countries. The world realized that both Germany and Russia would in the foreseeable future grow to be political factors to be reckoned with. The collaboration and friendship of two states with so certain a political future necessarily represented for the world an important positive factor. Even today nothing has changed in regard to this basic fact. Even today, therefore, for Germany the same reasons which in 1922 led to the conclusion of the Rapallo Treaty, and in 1926 to the conclusion of the Berlin Treaty, are alive and operative.

## No. 213

3015/598288

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, May 6, 1933.

RM 625.

According to a statement by Federal Chancellor Dollfuss in the Ministerial Council in Vienna which has become known here, the Polish Government has the intention in case the National Socialist German Workers' party should take over the government in Danzig to use this fact as an excuse for occupying Danzig militarily.<sup>1</sup>

I therefore summoned the Polish Minister this morning and, referring to the statements made on both sides in the last few days,<sup>2</sup> informed him of the above communication with the remark that I did not believe in the authenticity of this information, to be sure, but that I nevertheless thought it might be a good idea if the Polish side took pains to ensure that this report was not disseminated. It was very probable that the National Socialists would take over the government in Danzig. It would be well if the Polish Government got used to this now. According to the statements of the Reich Chancellor to the Polish Minister even if the National Socialists took over the government there would be no cause for concern.

M. Wysocki told me he could inform me now that the information spread by Herr Dollfuss was entirely untrue. However, he would immediately inform his Minister of it and ask him to take steps to prevent the dissemination of this report.

v. N[EURATH]

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<sup>1</sup> On May 10 there was sent to Neurath personally a confidential report which had reached the Reich Chancellery concerning a session of the Austrian Ministerial Council on May 4 (3086/616477-81).

<sup>2</sup> See documents Nos. 201 and 206.

## No. 214

9037/E632796-802

*The President of the Reichsbank to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, May 6, 1933—11:33 p. m.

Del. Schacht No. 3 of May 6

Received May 7—10:15 a. m.

W 2906.

At 12 noon today, together with the Ambassador, I made my first visit to Secretary of State Hull. Since it was merely a first visit, the

conversation did not last long. Hull was very friendly and hopes for support from our collaboration, particularly in the financial field.

The only thing of note in the short conversation was Hull's criticism of the fact that so big an idea as the tariff truce had been received with such petty objections as was the case in France. He was glad that I had already expressed myself so approvingly of (group garbled) to the press.

At 1 o'clock the luncheon of welcome took place at the President's house. President Roosevelt received me standing in front of the house, where photographs were first taken. Then in the vestibule we were greeted with military music and the German anthem. At table I sat between the President and Senator Shipstead, with whom I was formerly very well acquainted. The conversation was very animated on both sides and dealt mainly with the economic situation in the United States.

Shipstead described the plight of the farmers in the usual light of heavy indebtedness and decline in prices in the trade balance. Shipstead sees no remedy in an inflation, but in price control on the basis of consultation of an index. If the world price is under an index price to be computed, the price of the grain consumed at home (and possibly the same would apply to cotton) is to be adjusted in favor of the farmer by a tax on the first purchaser (miller or broker). Shipstead said that this was a system that had not been tried out anywhere before. To this I gave my lively assent. But he seemed to believe in the possibility of its being done.

The President also gave me the impression, in his statements, of not desiring any inflation. He seemed to justify the measures on the devaluation of the dollar entirely on grounds of their psychological effect, which alone had already led to an increase in the prices of the products. He related to me the instance of a farmer who had placed a \$5,000 mortgage on a \$15,000 farm, in order to equip himself with modern machinery, and then, as a result of the decline in prices, had not been able to pay either interest or amortization. His creditor bank had refrained from a foreclosure, because it, too, naturally, could do nothing with the farm. Recently the farmer had come and told the bank that the price of wheat was now 72 cents. Even at a price of 65 cents he could pay interest and a little on the principal. I took the liberty of adding the words: that is, if the price of wheat stays high until the fall.

From both conversations, both with the President and with Shipstead, I did not get the impression that they were very clear as to definite measures to be taken.

At the close of the luncheon, the President proposed a toast to the President of the Reich, and referred to his sojourn in Germany in his

youth. Conveying the regards and best wishes of the Chancellor, I replied with a toast to him.

After dinner, exactly half an hour remained for a private conversation between the President and me. He began with the Jewish question, which had undoubtedly done a great deal of harm, probably not out of particular sympathy for the Jews, but from the old Anglo-Saxon sense of chivalry toward the weak. But he did not elaborate on this theme and said that this hurdle would be cleared even if its importance should not be underestimated. The American people were also unfortunately not quite sympathetic when they saw in the motion picture theaters the marching, uniformed columns of Nazis. The Americans considered every uniformed formation as such a military one.

He then went on to speak of questions of economic policy and developed two ideas. The first was that agreement should be reached on a reduction of tariffs on a number of articles and that a beginning should preferably first be made with a few articles with the object of including more and more articles as time went on. There would have to be a commitment to refrain, for at least a long time, if not forever, from increasing such duties again. He mentioned that his Secretary of State was personally a believer in free trade.

The second idea was the following: Assuming that the American-German trade ratio was today 300 to 100, a way had to be found to increase this trade volume by, absolutely speaking, the same figure on both sides; for example, each by 100. The total ratio would thereby change in favor of Germany; it would thus no longer be 3 to 1, but 2 to 1. This plan would be applied to the debtor countries and would make it possible for them to liquidate their debts. In reply to my question as to what material he had found for the implementation of this idea, he replied that his experts would tell me the details, although they themselves did not believe in the feasibility of his idea.

The President then spoke of the external course of the World Economic Conference. MacDonald had told him that the Conference would last from June to December. Roosevelt had replied that that was impossible. It must be brought to a successful close in 2 months at most. When MacDonald replied that that was impossible, Roosevelt had said that it might perhaps be possible so to proceed that an agreement might be reached in plenary conference on the large and fundamental problems within 2 months and that the committees on details should then be authorized to decide on the details of its implementation.

In the last and longest part of his statements, the President then spoke of the disarmament question. He approved of the MacDonald plan in principle, but said MacDonald had not understood how to

make this plan quite clear to the great masses of the people. This should be done, however, with the use of the following argument: All the world today feared military aggression. The reason was that the weapons of aggression were today very much stronger than the weapons of defense. Weapons of aggression therefore must be banned or scaled down to such an extent that the defensive weapons would be found adequate. The principal weapons of aggression were gas, large cannon, tanks, and planes, and he emphasized "of every kind, not only bombing." With respect to defense and attack, Germany was at present at a low level and France with respect to defense and attack at a high level. The President accompanied his statement with corresponding gestures. Now France fears that we want to ascend to a higher level while she herself is to descend to the present level of Germany. He, Roosevelt, was now of the opinion that if France would really do what she had promised, namely, descend "by stages" to the present level of Germany, this was a course that must be taken, on the condition, to be sure, that one stage would follow another at short intervals (he used the term "from year to year"). To these statements I replied that I possessed no political or military understanding of any kind, and could simply take cognizance of statements. In the course of the discussion I made appropriate objections, however. The one was "and Poland?" To which the reply was: the same must apply to Poland. My second objection was: "and meanwhile Germany remains at the mercy of her neighbor." To this there was no reply.

This was followed by a brief comment on the Kellogg Pact, which he considered inadequate, and which, if he had his way, he would replace with another pact, in which each state would pledge itself to send not a single armed soldier across the border of its territory during the next 10 years. With this the conversation, in which I was practically only a listener, came to an end. Another conversation is to follow tomorrow, Sunday, if the weather is bad; in case of good weather, on Monday.

Both at table and afterward, the President gave indication of undoubted sympathy for the person of the Reich Chancellor, and stated that he hoped to see him some time soon. He once made use in his conversation of the expression that when it came to the speedy execution of governmental measures, there were not everywhere such efficient managers [*handlungsfähige Faktoren*] as (literally) Mussolini, Hitler, and Roosevelt.

Referring to the President's toast to the Reich President, I think I ought to suggest that the Reich President authorize me by special telegram to convey the thanks and greetings of the Reich President.

SCHACHT

## No. 215

9245/E652056

*The President of the Reichsbank to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1933—10:53 p. m.

Del. Schacht No. 7 of May 8

Received May 9—7:30 a. m.

W 2939.

This morning there was a 2-hour conference on a financial and economic program, with Hull presiding. In the course of it the opportunity arose to make known our impending action<sup>1</sup> and give the reasons for it; also, to state that out of courtesy we had postponed the action until today.<sup>2</sup> The reaction was completely calm and did not bring objections of any kind. In the afternoon I visited the President with the Ambassador. I was likewise able to take the opportunity to make a statement about our action, with absolutely the same effect. I now request quick action and early information about the program and when it will be carried out, so as to be able to deal with the public here.<sup>3</sup>

SCHACHT

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 211.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 6 of May 8 (9245/E652055) Schacht sent word to Berlin that a letter should go from the Reichsbank Directorate to Hitler proposing a moratorium on the transfer of payments on foreign debts incurred before July 15, 1931. But see document No. 217.

<sup>3</sup> No reply has been found.

## No. 216

9062/E634843-44

*The Consul General at Danzig to the Foreign Ministry*

IG 620

DANZIG, May 8, 1933.

Received May 12.

IV Po. 3507.

## POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Volkstag election in Danzig.

President Ziehm pointed out to me in a conference to which he invited me today that according to newspaper reports the Reich

Chancellor and three Reich Ministers had promised to participate in the Danzig election campaign in such a way that the Reich Chancellor would speak over the radio to the Danzig voters on Saturday, May 27, which is the day before the election, and Reich Minister Dr. Frick would speak personally in Danzig on Monday, May 22, Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels on Wednesday, May 24, and Reich Minister Göring on Friday, May 26.<sup>1</sup> The President of the Senate stated that he personally would refrain from taking any position and that he did not consider himself to be in a situation to cause the Senate to adopt any position, since such a procedure could be interpreted both for him and for the Senate as a party political countermeasure in the electoral campaign. However, he could not hide from me the fact that he considered the personal appearance of the Reich Ministers exceedingly objectionable for reasons of foreign policy; he assumed that I could appreciate these objections, and he left it to me to call the attention of the German Government to these dangers on my own initiative.

I have the distinct impression that for President Ziehm the foreign political aspects really are decisive in this case and that it is really by no means an electoral campaign maneuver with him; he probably also realizes that, particularly since the recent withdrawal of the local Stahlhelm from the black-white-red fighting front, his party, the German Nationals, have only very slight chances in the electoral contest and will probably win only 2 or at the most 3 seats in the Volkstag out of the former 10.<sup>2</sup>

Thermann

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<sup>1</sup> Marginal note in Neurath's handwriting: "Nothing of this is known to me."

"The matter settled by consultation with the Foreign Minister. M[eyer], May 15."

<sup>2</sup> An unsigned Foreign Ministry memorandum dated May 24 reads: "A radio speech by the Reich Chancellor on the Danzig elections will doubtless be regarded by the Poles very decidedly as interference in the internal affairs of Danzig. Furthermore, it will probably also be used to underline the thesis disseminated by the Poles that the future Danzig government would be by no means an independent Danzig government, but would be greatly dependent on the Berlin leadership of the NSDAP and the German Reich Government; it would therefore be dependent on a foreign government, contrary to the existing stipulations of the Versailles Treaty."

"Consul General von Thermann in Danzig and the German Minister in Warsaw, Herr von Moltke, have asked that the question of a radio speech by the Reich Chancellor be reexamined." (9062/E634886)

Hitler did make the radio address directed to the Danzig electorate on May 27. Extracts from the text are in Baynes, *The Speeches of Adolf Hitler*, vol. II, pp. 1060-1062.



## No. 217

9245/E652086

*The President of the Reichsbank to the Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

MOST URGENT

WASHINGTON, May 9, 1933—6:18 p. m.

Del. Schacht No. 11 of May 9

Received May 10—3:15 a. m.

W 2974.

With reference to my telegram No. 6.<sup>1</sup>

The mood has changed completely since yesterday,<sup>2</sup> because the fear has arisen that the Government here has to a certain degree approved our step or even intervened. With the concurrence of the Ambassador I request most urgently that you stop the action immediately and wait for a further report, which will follow after a conference tomorrow afternoon with the President.<sup>3</sup>

SCHACHT

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 215, footnote 2.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Schacht's account in his memoirs, *76 Jahre meines Lebens* (Bad Wörishofen, 1953).

<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. 15 of May 10 (9245/E652113), Schacht reported that he and Luther had had another conversation with President Roosevelt which had produced no results. Meanwhile, in telegram No. 13, sent at 10:56 p.m. of May 9, Schacht had directed that the letter to Hitler (see document No. 215, footnote 2) not be sent after all. The letter, dated May 9 (7188/E528218-24), had already gone out, however, but subsequently another letter was sent; see document No. 288.

## No. 218

8643/E605176-78

*The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry*

A. Nr. 76 P. 34

BUDAPEST, May 9, 1933.

Received May 12.

II Oe. 558.

## POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: The Anschluss as a means of creating anti-German feeling. Proposal of the Yugoslav Minister here for the formation of an Italian-Yugoslav-Hungarian defensive front.

The anxiety over the Anschluss prevailing here is being exploited not only by France but also by her satellites of the Little Entente for creating feeling against us. Sometimes statements are made by the Legitimists, which (also according to the official Hungarian view) are obviously attributable to French influence; at other times statements are made by the Social Democratic and Jewish-Democratic press, whose connections with Prague are known. Recently—and

that is characteristic of the operation with assigned roles—the Yugoslav Minister here also took part in the attempt to turn Hungary against Germany because of the Pan-German danger allegedly threatening from the Anschluss. M. de Kánya told me that recently Minister Dučić had called on him and, pointing out that as a “thinker and poet” he was the most conciliatory of all Yugoslav diplomats, had assured him with a torrent of fine phrases of the friendly feelings of Serbia for Hungary. After this “almost lyrical” introduction the Minister had then proposed an alliance of Italy, Yugoslavia, and Hungary as a defense against the dangers from the Anschluss threatening the three states equally. M. de Kánya had, he told me, replied to the Minister that he knew definitely that the leadership of the Reich did not consider the question of Anschluss as being imminent at present. Therefore he was not in a position to submit the proposal of the Minister to the Hungarian Council of Ministers. He was somewhat surprised, moreover, at this attitude of the Minister, for it was inconsistent with statements by M. Balugdžić<sup>1</sup> in Berlin, who had repeatedly told him that in Belgrade they looked upon the Anschluss as in many ways advantageous to Yugoslavia.

M. de Kánya asked me to report the foregoing to the leaders of the Reich Government. He believed that, besides the intention of creating feeling against Germany, the aim of the Minister’s proposal had been—he knew the Serbs well enough for that—to induce him to make a statement against the Anschluss so that he could use it later to intrigue against him in Berlin.<sup>2</sup>

SCHOEN

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<sup>1</sup> Živojin Balugdžić, Yugoslav Minister to Germany 1927–1935.

<sup>2</sup> Marginal note: “The Reich Chancellor has been informed. L[ammers], May 16.”

## No. 219

3086/616484–85

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, May 10, 1933.

This morning the Reich Chancellor received the Austrian Minister<sup>1</sup> in my presence. The latter put forward complaints<sup>2</sup> (in a hardly

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<sup>1</sup> Stephan Tauschitz.

<sup>2</sup> The Austrian Minister had called on Köpke on Apr. 29 and had complained about a cartoon hostile to Dollfuss that had appeared in the *Völkische Beobachter* and also about other German attacks on the Austrian Chancellor. Köpke’s memorandum of this conversation has a marginal note indicating that the Reich Chancellor had been informed of this Austrian step and that he wished to see the Austrian Minister, with the Foreign Minister also present (8674/E606937–38).

skillful manner) about alleged slandering of Federal Chancellor Dollfuss by the German press, whereupon the Reich Chancellor called his attention with sharp words to the attitude of the Austrian press. In particular he pointed to the article in the *Reichspost*, in which the presence of members of the German Government in Austria was termed undesirable. The Chancellor also complained about the tone of the speech by Vice Chancellor Winkler and called Vienna and the Vienna press one of the centers of anti-German agitation.

Since the conversation became more and more excited, I intervened and stressed that in my opinion it was not expedient by an intensification of the press campaign to give the world the undesirable spectacle of Germany and Austria violently feuding with one another instead of going together. In my opinion one should try to put an end to this situation as soon as possible, and both governments had the duty to exercise a moderating influence on their press. Since the Austrian Minister tried to register objections to the statements of the Chancellor regarding the attitude of the Austrian Government toward the Austrian National Socialist party, and a discussion of this did not seem to me to be expedient, I interrupted the conference. I took from the Austrian Minister the enclosed compilation of complaints<sup>3</sup> which he wanted to hand to the Chancellor, and asked him to address in the future such complaints to the authority into whose jurisdiction they fell, namely the Foreign Ministry. I later tried in a lengthy conversation to make clear to the Minister, who conducted himself during the entire conversation in an exceedingly clumsy and unskillful manner, the points which had to be taken into account in his reports to Vienna in the present situation. Unfortunately the Minister did not have any great understanding for this situation.<sup>4</sup>

V. N[EURATH]

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<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> According to an official Austrian publication Hitler informed Tauschitz on this occasion that it was being considered "by way of an experiment to prevent for one year any visits to Austria by German citizens." Bundeskommissariat für Heimatdienst, *Beiträge zur Vorgeschichte und Geschichte der Julirevolte*, (Vienna, 1934), p. 22. Cf. document No. 262. See also *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. v, document No. 147.

## No. 220

3170/676269-71

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

No. 102 of May 10

ROME, May 10, 1933—8:00 p. m.

Received May 10—11:45 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 121 of May 5.<sup>1</sup>

I personally conveyed today to Mussolini the contents of the telegram, discussing them in detail and leaving behind a pro memoria.<sup>2</sup> I particularly stressed our concessions on the time limitations with respect to the commitment in article III,<sup>3</sup> outlining the extraordinary scope of these concessions and our expectations based on them. Mussolini went over the pro memoria with me point by point and expressed general approval of our proposals and demands; he would continue negotiating with the French and English on this basis and seek to obtain acceptance of our proposals. No reply had yet been received from Paris and London. In reply to my question whether he actually still believed in the possibility of a conclusion of the pact, he answered in the affirmative. Subsequently he explained to me once more, with the familiar arguments, the moral importance which the pact had especially for Germany in her present situation. I pointed out the improvement in Germany's position as a result of the extension of the German treaty with Russia<sup>4</sup> and the conversations with Poland,<sup>5</sup> on both of which he expressed extreme satisfaction. He also suggested that France's position was weaker than even a short time ago since Herriot's visit to Washington<sup>6</sup> had not been a success; also there existed sharp differences between Herriot and Daladier, and the financial situation of the French state was serious. Still, it was of critical importance for Germany to gain a breathing spell, for which three things were essential: 1. Conclusion of the pact; 2. Exerting influence on public opinion in England, which had been roused to a fury against Germany; Rosenberg's visit,<sup>7</sup> it is hoped, will help achieve this; 3. Propaganda for the new Germany in the United States with the aid of German elements there.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (3170/676181-88). This telegram contained comments in detail on various changes in the text of the draft pact which were reported to have resulted from the negotiations in Rome with the French and British Ambassadors. See document No. 178, footnote 4, and document No. 208, footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (8903/E621673-77).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. documents Nos. 170 and 208.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 212.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 201.

<sup>6</sup> As representative of Minister President Daladier, Herriot had visited Washington Apr. 23-28 for talks with President Roosevelt on disarmament, intergovernmental debts, and the coming World Economic Conference.

<sup>7</sup> See document No. 223.

Reverting to the principal points of the pact he remarked that the stressing of the possibility of revision through mention of article 19 in article III of the pact was not to be underestimated. No one could fail to realize any longer that the idea of revision would thus be given impetus. Even Beneš, in his great exposé,<sup>8</sup> had unequivocally conceded revision. He himself had asked Gömbös after Kánya's visit,<sup>9</sup> to present to him the Hungarian revision program, that is, not the maximum program but a program that could be realized, so that he could know what Hungary really wanted. Gömbös had responded by writing him a letter containing reasonable demands against all three sides, but only on general lines. The Hungarian Government, on his request, was now preparing a detailed elaboration of this program in writing which he hoped to receive soon. I then remarked that probably the time was not yet ripe for raising the issue of revision at our eastern border, or would he perhaps wish to receive a program also from us. He asked whether we actually had such a program. I stated that our program was clear in regard to the Corridor, to which he replied: "That means that you would want to get it back." We then dropped the subject.

Regarding the equality of rights we were agreed that its stabilization in article III would be of practical value to us if our new proposal, which appeared very plausible to him, is adopted. But Suvich, with whom I talked afterwards, was much more skeptical, particularly because its present formulation would leave everything in a state of suspense. It would be hardly possible [he said] that such an accord could be carried into effect at an early date as long as it was not yet established to what degree and in what manner disarmament would be carried out. I rejected this objection and argued that it would surely be possible to establish a ratio. If this new German version was not desired, then the time limitation originally demanded by us would have to be incorporated in the pact. Suvich suggested that agreement on the practical realization of equality of rights would in any case be very difficult to achieve, especially after the Americans also had committed themselves so strongly against any kind of rearmament by any state.<sup>10</sup>

HASSELL

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<sup>8</sup> After criticizing the project of the four power pact in a speech of Apr. 25 to the two houses of the Czechoslovak Parliament, Beneš had set forth certain conditions under which the revision of treaties might be considered. For the text of this speech, see *Sources et documents tchécoslovaques*, No. 21: *La Question du directoire européen et la revision des frontières* (Prague, 1933).

<sup>9</sup> See document No. 100.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. document No. 209.

## No. 221

9182/E645795-800

*The Military Attaché in Poland to the Reichswehr Ministry and  
to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 25

WARSAW, May 10, 1933.

Having entered my name in Marshal Pilsudski's book at the Belvedere Palace on May 5 of this year, I was summoned on the morning of May 8 to appear in audience at the Marshal's at 6 o'clock in the evening. As I was informed by leading officers of the Second Section, the speedy audience came as a surprise to the Second Section, too. Heretofore only the French Military Attaché, at that time Colonel, now General D'Arbonneau, had been granted an audience that speedily.

On arrival at the Belvedere Palace, I was received by two aides of the Marshal, and with a certain solemnity I was led through several rooms into the reception parlor. Immediately following this the Marshal entered the room through the French doors on the opposite side.

He is of medium height, rather stocky and gives the impression of being older than he is. One would suppose him to be a man in his late seventies. His gait is shuffling and tired, his posture bent over. The Marshal's extraordinarily striking head is set off effectively against the blue tunic which fits well even though it is somewhat loose. His bushy eyebrows as well as the sparse white mustache which is brushed far back under the lower lip lend his appearance at first a somewhat somber character which may be intentional.

The Marshal extended his hand toward me and received my address spoken in French. Immediately he replied in German and welcomed me to Poland. After having asked me to sit down, he began a somewhat extended conversation about his knowledge of languages, his travels, and the danger of forgetting languages, as he had experienced it even with respect to Russian, in addition to German. He gave me many kind words about my appearance and the favorable reports that he had received about me. The conversation then turned to memories of the War and in this connection he referred to my being a member of the 11th Division with respect to which he still had clear and good memories. He made mention of an episode in which he was involved with General von Kneuhse, at that time Commanding Officer of the Division, and he told about it in a broad and exceedingly humorous manner. He offered me a cigarette which is named after him and which he himself was smoking. Afterwards the conversation turned to athletic matters. As soon as he starts talking, his essentially somber countenance relaxes. In this process, his facial expression loosened up and became friendly. The impression is that his whole

personality acquires a certain charm. He speaks softly, somewhat awkwardly, and since there are obviously no teeth in his mouth, his speech is to a large part very hard to understand. His German can be understood sufficiently, even though he sometimes is painfully searching for words. His French on the other hand, which is not much better, requires strained attention. His manner of making conversation is broad. He repeats himself, and sometimes the conversation is interrupted by noisy hilarity. A certain undertone of kindness is unmistakable.

The part of the conversation which then followed was obviously felt by himself to be a further phase, and it took place after a certain break had been indicated in his carriage, facial expression and voice, as if he were now coming to the official part of the conversation. At this moment I already had the impression that he would say something which he had planned or which someone else had told him to do. There was no element of hostility or harshness in this part of the conversation either. He spoke more decisively than at first, but by no means in an unfriendly way, and rather with a certain benevolence.

When I expressed thanks for the reception which I had met with in Poland, he replied that he had something else to say which he had better express in French. He himself was opposed in principle to the institution of military attachés. For what purpose were 14 military attachés needed in a state like Poland? As was known, Poland was "tied up" [*lié*] with France. Germany "had done much against Poland in the last few years." At this point noticeable anger was expressed in his countenance and voice. For this reason, the Polish public looked with distrust at a German Military Attaché.<sup>1</sup> He was telling me frankly that for these general reasons he had been opposed to my appointment as Military Attaché. This attitude was in no way directed against my person. On the contrary, I personally was welcome in Poland, I would enjoy every possible hospitality, could move about as I wished and could make and cultivate acquaintances. Only direct relations with the troops were not admissible. At the end he emphasized once more that the reports about me which he had received through reports from Germany as well as from the officers who had met me so far were extremely favorable, and that he personally had been able, as he put it, to convince himself of my charm. I replied to him that I had instructions to perform my duty in the most strictly loyal manner and that I would interpret it in the same excellent spirit as did the Polish Military Attaché in Berlin. I thanked him [*Piłsudski*] for the soldier-like candor of his words and his good wishes that I may get used to Poland.

Nobody but the Marshal and myself was present at the conversation. The sentences at the beginning of this phase of the conversation fol-

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 22 and footnote 1.

lowed one another with a certain logical rigor, as seems to be a frequent characteristic of the Marshal in his conversations. According to what people of his entourage told me, it is often very difficult to recognize the coherence and the intention of his thoughts which follow one another abruptly. I have the impression that he wanted to explain that the position of the German Military Attaché with respect to the Polish public was particularly difficult. Perhaps he also wanted to forestall excessive hopes for finding an accommodating attitude in the performance of my duties. I did consider replying to his remark about Germany, but having thought it over briefly, I abstained from doing so because I lacked the data for a conversation that might possibly turn to concrete cases and because it did not seem appropriate at that moment to interrupt his speech.

The somewhat serious tone of this phase of the conversation shifted again to a phase of the greatest possible friendliness and amiability in the last stage, when a picture was taken showing the Marshal and his immediate staff together with me. A copy of this picture was sent to me yesterday. It was published in the press today and is enclosed.

The picture of Pilsudski's personality underwent a slight change during the second phase of the conversation. Notwithstanding the entirely kind keynote, his tone became more decisive, his words somewhat more concise, the impression of his personality more taut. It was possible to sense that this personality, in addition to an alert mind, contained great energies which one day perhaps might seek a release in a kind of eruption. It is indisputable that a certain suggestive power emanates from Pilsudski which explains the fact that his entourage clings to him with such fanaticism. His great successes have certainly contributed to increasing within himself the consciousness of the value of his personality. It is impossible to escape the impression of being confronted with a particularly striking personality.

SCHINDLER

## No. 222

9245/E652125

*The President of the Reichsbank to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

WASHINGTON, May 11, 1933—4:29 p. m.

Del. Schacht No. 16 of May 11

Received May 12—12:40 a. m.

W 3043.

This morning discussions among the experts were resumed.<sup>1</sup> Usual group. The Ambassador was present. I developed the three positive suggestions which are known to you:

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933*, vol. I, pp. 532-533.



1. International industrial cooperation in the delivery to undeveloped countries of transport facilities and the like, but not of industrial machinery which would be competitive.
2. International financing of such exports.
3. Colonial possibilities for Germany as a special help to her as a debtor country.

All three were received without counterargument. The other side reverted to the exchange problem and emphasized again the highly regrettable effect on American public opinion as soon as [our impending action] <sup>2</sup> became known. They pointed to the progress so far in the attitude, especially in Congress, in favor of rectifying certain political treaty provisions, and would not like this attitude to be disturbed or allowed to swing around to the opposite point of view. In any case the American public must see that Germany at first made the greatest efforts to master the situation, although one admitted the difficulties in the development of the exchange situation. It was precisely the task of the London Conference, however, to change such a development. In response to continued urging that something be done in this direction, I proposed immediate discussion with the banks of issue of participating countries in Berlin. I declined responsibility, however, in case events meanwhile should lead of necessity to certain consequences. The proposal will be presented immediately to the President, as well as to the Treasury and Federal Reserve Board. The entire operation should be regarded as a private action. Meanwhile the experts are working on a joint communiqué.<sup>3</sup> Farewell visit with the President presumably tomorrow morning,<sup>4</sup> at noon return to New York. Departure Saturday night.

SCHACHT

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<sup>2</sup> A corrected reading was supplied in delegation telegram No. 17 of May 12 (9245/E652126).

<sup>3</sup> Printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933*, vol. I, p. 505.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. document No. 233.

## No. 223

2368/493960-62

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

MAY 11, 1933.  
RM 657.

The Chancellor received the English Ambassador today in my presence.<sup>1</sup> After the introductory remarks Sir Horace Rumbold inquired about the purpose of Herr Rosenberg's trip to London.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> For the British Ambassador's report on this conversation see *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. v, document No. 139.

<sup>2</sup> Rosenberg's trip to England took place during the period May 5-14. See *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. v, documents Nos. 118, 126, and 138.

The Chancellor replied that Herr Rosenberg, who held the position of Chief of the Foreign Political Information Division of the National Socialist party, had gone to London in a private capacity in order to form a personal picture of sentiment in England and, if possible, bring about a greater understanding for the occurrences in Germany. Herr Rosenberg had no official mission, as was evident, moreover, from the fact that he held no official position in the government.

The Ambassador then spoke of the regrettable change of feeling in England, explaining in that connection how much better the understanding for Germany had become in England in the last few years and how a great deal of interest and understanding had been shown even for the revisionist aspirations, especially for the question of the Polish Corridor. Now, that had all vanished again. The reason for this was found in the English concept of the freedom of the individual and consideration for foreign races.

The Chancellor explained to the Ambassador at length the reasons for the action against the Jews. He emphasized how much he regretted it personally that there was so little understanding in England for what went on in Germany, especially for his aims of destroying communism. He himself had always contended—often in opposition to the governing circles in Germany—that close collaboration between England, Germany, and Italy was necessary in the interest of European peace and economic recovery. On account of this attitude of his he now found himself subjected to the most violent attacks from his own followers and accused of taking the wrong attitude. He did not understand why England refused to see that his fight was only against communism, which he had made his mission in life to destroy in Germany. In so doing he thought that this was also in the interest of England, although he admitted that the soil there was perhaps less prepared for communism than in Germany.

The Ambassador then spoke about the impression which the uniformed masses had made on him and his colleagues at the demonstration on May 1 at the Tempelhof Field. Having seen these disciplined, strong young men, equivalent in number to about eight army corps, one could not but think that Germany had a reserve army ready for commitment at any time.

The Chancellor tried to show by detailed explanations that this view of the Ambassador's was wrong.

At the end of the conversation the Ambassador also read a telegram from Sir John Simon,<sup>3</sup> which in the well-known phraseology of the English Foreign Minister admonished Germany didactically and pharisaically to be calm and patient. The Chancellor said he would

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<sup>3</sup> Cf. *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. v, document No. 126.

answer these statements personally in writing<sup>4</sup> and therefore asked for a copy from the Ambassador.<sup>5</sup>

In conclusion the Ambassador also complained that in spite of repeated requests no explanation had been given in reply to various protests about the arrest of English subjects, especially Mr. Fraser.<sup>6</sup> The Chancellor regretted this and instructed me to try to have the Prussian Ministry of Interior expedite the matter.<sup>7</sup>

V. N[EURATH]

<sup>4</sup> Not found.

<sup>5</sup> On the following day the British Ambassador sent a letter to Neurath which read:

"The following is a summary of the last part of the telegram which I read to the Chancellor this morning:

"It is clearly as much to the interest of Germany as to that of the world as a whole that at the present critical stage of the Disarmament Conference and shortly before the opening of the World Economic Conference international tranquillity and confidence in Europe should be maintained and, so far as may be possible, augmented. His Majesty's Government trust that in the difficult days which lie ahead the German Government may be counted upon both to refrain from saying or doing anything which might augment the present nervousness in European public opinion and also to cooperate, within the framework and spirit of the League of Nations Covenant, in the task of creating that feeling of confidence which is essential if the Disarmament Conference is to succeed, which it is the aim of the negotiations for the four power pact to create and which is vital if the World Economic Conference is to be a success." (3154/669066-67)

<sup>6</sup> A British subject living in Berlin who had been arrested on Apr. 4 after a search of his residence in which it was alleged that Communist literature had been found. The British Ambassador had thus far been unable to secure his release from custody (5740/H030735-37).

<sup>7</sup> Marginal note: "In accordance with instructions I asked Ministerialrat Hall to expedite the Fraser matter. He will make a report to Daluge and instruct the competent officials. Völckers, May 12"

On May 13 Neurath informed the British Ambassador that Fraser had been released and ordered to leave Germany at once (5740/H030742).

## No. 224

3598/792596-98

*Extract From the Minutes of the Cabinet Session of May 12, 1933,  
11:45 a.m.<sup>1</sup>*

Rk. 6050.

### 5. Outside the agenda: Tariff Truce.

The Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs mentioned by way of introduction that the Cabinet had decided in its meeting on May 5<sup>2</sup> not to enter into any commitments of any sort in the matter of the tariff truce proposed by America, but also not to limit itself to a mere "No." Corresponding instructions had been transmitted to the Embassy in London at that time.<sup>3</sup> In London, however, serious difficulties had

<sup>1</sup> The remainder of the minutes, including a list of those present, is filmed on 3598/792592-95.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 210.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 210, footnote 3.

developed owing to the objections expressed by other countries, so that our own objections could not be brought to bear. Therefore the Organizing Committee for preparing the World Economic Conference had worked out a new formula with extensive participation by the American representative.<sup>4</sup> In this formula it is stated in the first place that no new initiative of any kind should be taken for increasing trade barriers, but, in the second place, *certain* measures are not to be prevented by the customs truce. With this elastic formula every reasonable protective measure could be justified, and the objections of the Reich Ministry of Food must be considered as eliminated thereby. This afternoon there was to be a vote on the formula which was dependent on our attitude alone, for it was known that all other governments would vote in the affirmative. Since President of the Reichsbank Schacht had in principle agreed in Washington to the idea of a tariff truce, we could not now go back on it. The telegrams of the President of the Reichsbank regarding the change in sentiment in America must suggest caution.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, we were interested in helping President Roosevelt's program prevail. He therefore asked for a decision that would empower the Embassy in London to agree to the new formula. The foreign policy situation was not such as to permit Germany to be the only country not to accede.

The Vice Chancellor suggested attaching to our statement of approval a remark approximately to the effect that our agreement was contingent upon whether the development of the political situation did not force us to a different adjustment of our economic interests.

The Reich Minister of Economics, Food and Agriculture thought it was wrong in principle to continue with a policy that was ready to make concessions out of concern about the opinion of the other side. If Germany showed that she feared isolation, she would be unsuccessful in Geneva, too. If, however, we took the offensive in regard to our decisions in trade policy, then it would perhaps be possible to check a fateful development. It would have been more suitable to create accomplished facts in the area of the currency problem and then to negotiate with the creditors. If the Cabinet believed that it could no longer carry out the plan of the President of the Reichsbank, then he suggested that this also disposed of the basis for the debt relief law [*Entschuldungsgesetz*]. We were free in the area of commercial policy and therefore must make a statement to the effect that our situation was intolerable, that we had a special position and that we

<sup>4</sup> The new formula had been communicated to Berlin in London telegram No. 124 of May 10 (9245/E652100-102). See *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1933, vol. 1, pp. 595, 596.

<sup>5</sup> See documents Nos. 214 and 217. Schacht had also advised that Germany should agree to the customs truce in his telegrams Nos. 4 of May 7, (9245/-E652061-62) and 14 of May 10 (9245/E652092).

must reserve freedom of decision based on independent legislation of our own.

After the Reich Chancellor had stated that the proposal of the Reich Minister of Economics was approximately the same as that of the Vice Chancellor, and the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs had advised against getting lost in details, as it was only a question of the time up to July 31 and reservations could be made at any time at the beginning of the World Economic Conference, the Reich Cabinet decided to agree to the proposal regarding conclusion of a tariff truce, with the addition of a general reservation. The formula was decided on in the course of meeting between the ministers of the departments concerned.<sup>6</sup>

Recorded:  
THOMSEN, May 12

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<sup>6</sup> See document No. 225.

## No. 225

9280/E658937-38

### *Minute by Ministerialdirektor Ritter*

BERLIN, May 12, 1933.

#### I

After today's Cabinet meeting<sup>1</sup> the following instruction for the German Embassy in London for today's session of the Organizing Committee was formulated, with Reich Ministers von Neurath, Schwerin von Krosigk, and Hugenberg, as well as Herr Funk and Herr Ritter present:

"Germany's situation in the financial and economic sphere is fundamentally different from that of the other states represented here, especially because Germany is the most burdened debtor country in the world. Therefore in the near future situations can develop for Germany in the sphere of currency and commercial policy which are out of the question for other countries.

Nevertheless, the German Government agrees to the proposal.

In case it considers the vital interests of the German people endangered, however, it reserves for itself a free hand, for the reasons given, to take the measures then necessary at any time."

#### II

I communicated this text to Herr von Hoesch today at 2:10 o'clock by telephone. Herr von Hoesch repeated it to me over the telephone, and thus understood it correctly.

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 224.

## III

I told him that he should deliver this statement orally, but see that it was taken down in the minutes. That would probably best be done by his communicating the text to the keeper of the minutes in writing.<sup>2</sup>

I also passed on to him the desire of Reich Minister Hugenberg that in case a subsequent discussion should furnish an opportunity he should say that the German Government was reserving for the World Economic Conference itself the proposals arising from this special position of Germany.

R[ITTER]

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<sup>2</sup> Concerning the circumstances of the presentation of the German reply, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933*, vol. I, pp. 601-606, and League of Nations, Council Committee for the Organisation of the Monetary and Economic Conference, *Minutes of the Meeting, Held at the Foreign Office, London, May 12th, 1933 at 3.0 p. m.* (C. O. C./Conf.ME/P.V.7. (1), annex to C.328.1933.II).

## No. 226

3598/792586-91

*Minutes of the Conference of Ministers on May 12, 1933, 4:50 p. m.*Rk. 6001;  
6002.*Present:*

Reich Chancellor	Hitler
Vice Chancellor	v. Papen
Foreign Minister	Freiherr von Neurath
Reich Minister of Interior	Dr. Frick
Reich Minister of Finance	Count Schwerin von Krosigk
Reich Minister of Economics, Food and Agriculture	Dr. Hugenberg
Reich Minister of Labor	Seldte
Reich Minister of Justice	Dr. Gürtner
Reichswehr Minister	von Blomberg
Reich Minister of Posts and Transport	Freiherr von Eltz-Rübenach
Reich Minister of Public En- lightenment and Propaganda	Dr. Goebbels
Reich Minister for Air	Göring
Reich Commissar (former Reich Minister)	Dr. Popitz
President of the Reichsbank	Dr. Schacht (represented by Vice President Dreyse)
State Secretary in the Reich Chancellery	Dr. Lammers

State Secretary in the Office  
of the Reich President

Reich Press Chief

Recording Official:

*Also present:*

Dr. Meissner

State Secretary Funk

Oberregierungsrat Dr. Thomsen

Ministerialrat Willuhn

Subject of Conference: The Foreign Political Situation.

The Foreign Minister presented a picture of the climate of opinion in the other countries which was daily deteriorating despite all our efforts to influence it. At the Disarmament Conference in Geneva the attempt was being made to blame us for the failure of the negotiations on the grounds that we were unwilling to give up the Reichswehr.<sup>1</sup> We were facing a solid front which was unwilling to make any concessions, and were running the risk of being outvoted in Geneva in the next few days. Even Italy was no longer going along. This situation could be met only by a public declaration by the Government delivered before the Reichstag.

With respect to the situation in Geneva, the Reich Chancellor made the following remarks: The disarmament question will not be solved at the conference table. There is no historical instance where a victor accorded arms to the vanquished through negotiations. It cannot be in Germany's interest to lower even more the level of her present weak armaments even if the opponents, for their part also, should be prepared under these conditions to carry out a partial disarmament. There is no doubt that there is a desire to blame us for the failure of the Conference. The demand for eliminating the Reichswehr was prompted solely by the desire to weaken Germany. To be sure, the desire to deprive the German Government of a factor of stability played perhaps also a part in this. Unless we were accorded heavy weapons, any departure from the system of the Reichswehr was unthinkable for us.

The Reich Chancellor is convinced that rearmament could be accomplished only through a new approach. He himself did not believe that rearmament by normal means was possible at the present moment. It was obvious that the sole purpose of the Disarmament Conference was either to break up the Reichswehr or saddle Germany with the blame for the failure of the Conference. Geneva was not the suitable forum for replying to these tactics. The German people were united on the disarmament question. This unity must be demonstrated to the world. To this end a declaration of the Reich Government must spell out the ultimate consequences of a failure of the Disarmament Conference which Germany was ready to accept. In the face of threats of sanctions, which had been uttered in English quarters, it was neces-

<sup>1</sup> See documents Nos. 209 and 239.

sary to muster the courage to declare that the application of sanctions would be regarded by us as the tearing up of the peace treaties.

For a reply to the Ministers' speeches of the last days,<sup>2</sup> there was no better forum than the Reichstag. The only item to be put on the agenda of the session would be acceptance of a declaration by the Government on the Disarmament Conference. This declaration would be followed by a brief discussion with speakers and statements previously arranged. The Reichstag would then express its confidence in the Reich Government. The declaration of the Government would have to indicate that Germany's further remaining in the League of Nations had been made exceedingly doubtful by the actions of our opponents.

The Minister of Economics called attention to the fact that the opposing side would probably confront us with two demands having the character of an ultimatum namely, first, renunciation of any rearmament, and second, disbanding of the paramilitary organizations [*Wehrverbände*]. One ought to be clear about the fact that the declaration of the Government in the Reichstag would have the desired effect only if one was prepared to reject these demands.

As regards the date for calling the Reichstag into session, he would like to propose for consideration whether it would not be more advisable to wait for the return of the President of the Reichsbank from America.<sup>3</sup>

The Reich Chancellor declined this by saying that it was to be feared that accomplished facts might be created prior to the return of the President of the Reichsbank. Concerning the demands having the character of ultimatums, to which the Minister of Economics had referred, he could only repeat that we would have to exercise the greatest restraint in proceeding with rearmament. The charge made by the opposite side that the paramilitary formations possessed military character would have to be conclusively refuted by the Government declaration.

The Reichswehr Minister stressed that it was necessary for us to be present at Geneva in the future but not to take part in negotiations any longer. If being outvoted at Geneva was going to make us appear as having been put in the wrong, the consequences would have to be accepted because of compelling reasons. It was therefore necessary

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<sup>2</sup> On May 11, Viscount Hailsham, British Secretary for War, stated in a debate in the House of Lords that in case of a German withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference, Germany would still be bound by the Versailles Treaty and that consequently German attempts at rearmament would constitute a breach of the Treaty and call forth the sanctions provided therein.

Similarly, on May 12, French Foreign Minister Paul-Boncour in a statement to the press declared that the Versailles Treaty would continue to be applied if, owing to Germany's uncompromising attitude, no Disarmament convention were adopted.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 233.



to make major retrenchments in the areas where action had already been taken.

The Foreign Minister stated that it would be an advantage if we no longer took part in the negotiations at Geneva. Although Lord Cecil had declared that the other participants of the Disarmament Conference would continue negotiating among themselves on a draft convention after Germany's withdrawal,<sup>4</sup> such negotiations would undoubtedly result in quarrels among the other Powers, which previously had been united against us.

The Reich Cabinet accordingly resolved to call the Reichstag into session for Wednesday, the 17th instant, for acceptance of a declaration of the Government with respect to Geneva.

Recorded:  
THOMSEN, May 12

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<sup>4</sup> Viscount Cecil of Chelwood made a statement to this effect in the House of Lords on May 11. See *Parliamentary Debates*, fifth series, H of L, vol. 87, col. 881.

## No. 227

7892/E571642

### *Minute by an Official of Department II*

BERLIN, May 15, 1933.  
zu II SG 910.<sup>1</sup>

Herr Kossmann, the German member of the Governing Commission of the Saar Territory, was, as arranged, received on May 12 by the Reich Chancellor in the presence of State Secretary Lammers.<sup>2</sup> At the request of the Reich Chancellor, Herr Kossmann gave him a survey of the situation in the Saar Territory, in which he referred particularly to the attitude of his four foreign colleagues on the Governing Commission. Herr Kossmann's remark that the Jews in the Saar Territory were very much upset gave the Reich Chancellor occasion for a lengthy discourse on his attitude regarding the Jewish question. The Reich Chancellor agreed with the main point stressed by Herr Kossmann, that all Germans must stand together, saying that it was not at all important how strong the one or the other party was, but that all German circles stood together.

The question of changes in the personnel makeup of the Governing Commission was not discussed. Herr Kossmann also, as I learned

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<sup>1</sup> II SG 910: Not printed (7892/E571620); see document No. 169, footnote 3.

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum by Voigt regarding Kossmann was submitted to the Foreign Minister and the Chancellor prior to this interview. Concerning the question of replacing Kossmann, Voigt wrote that there "was not sufficient cause, nor did it appear politically expedient, to undertake a change of personnel." (7892/E571634-38)

from his later statements, did not broach the subject of whether his own continued presence on the Governing Commission could be called in question.

VOIGT

## No. 228

8125/E581651

*Ambassador Bergen to Foreign Minister Neurath*

[Excerpt] <sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

ROME, May 12, 1933.

DEAR NEURATH:

... Papen had promised me at the time to let you know about the outcome of his exchange of ideas here in regard to the Reich concordat and to keep you informed.<sup>2</sup> The conversations with the Cardinal Secretary of State were continued after his departure on his instruction by Prelate Kaas, who in my opinion, as matters stand, should now also be officially authorized and empowered to continue and conclude the negotiations. Kaas asked Papen a short time ago for permission to discuss the various questions relating to the concordat with me. I am not oriented on the details; it appears that Papen has a draft agreement in his hands that has not been rejected here.<sup>3</sup>

...

VON BERGEN

<sup>1</sup> Only an excerpt of this document has been found.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 162.

<sup>3</sup> Apparently a reference to the undated text which bears the notation: "so-called second draft sent to Vice Chancellor von Papen by Prelate Kaas." (6153/E460704-19)

## No. 229

9245/E652138

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, May 13, 1933.

zu W 3047.<sup>1</sup>

The Italian Ambassador spoke to me about a proposal by Reich Minister Hugenberg, according to which not only the debtor states, but also most European states would join together and, while maintaining their own previous customs systems, would jointly collect a special levy of about 5% at the outward limits of the bloc, which would

<sup>1</sup> W 3047: Not printed (9245/E652127-33), a letter of May 9 from Hugenberg to Neurath, forwarding a copy of the memorandum described below, which he had sent to the Italian Ambassador.

be used for debt reduction.<sup>2</sup> Herr Hugenberg had not concealed the fact that this bloc would be directed against America, against Russia, as well as against France and Spain-Portugal. He, the Ambassador, had answered Herr Hugenberg at once that Italy could not go along with a policy directed against America and against Russia and also, for political reasons, could not associate herself with an action against France. This stand would be approved by his Government. Reich Minister Hugenberg had then handed him a memorandum,<sup>3</sup> which the Ambassador showed to me. I said to the Ambassador that Hugenberg's ideas were known to us, even though perhaps not in such precise form, that they had not yet been presented to the Cabinet and that the memorandum was still unknown<sup>4</sup> to us.

BÜLOW

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<sup>2</sup> Cf. document No. 161.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 1.

<sup>4</sup> Marginal note: "I informed Cerruti that we have this memorandum; I also informed the State Secretary that the Hugenberg idea was discussed in the Cabinet several weeks ago and rejected on all sides, although without a formal vote. R[itter]."

## No. 230

3170/676275-77

### *The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

#### Telegram

No. 103 of May 13

ROME, May 13, 1933—7:10 p. m.

Received May 13—11:30 p. m.

Suvich requested me to call on him this morning to inform me that after detailed study of the latest German proposal,<sup>1</sup> the Italian Government has reached the conclusion that the German demand that stages be fixed with respect to equality of rights by means of an agreement prior to ratification of the pact, would irretrievably wreck the negotiations for the pact. In the atmosphere prevailing now, an agreement of such far-reaching scope could not be accomplished in so short a time. In view of the dangerous reaction that could be expected in England and France, Cerruti had been instructed by telegraph to request the German Government to refrain from conveying the proposal to Paris and London.<sup>2</sup> I remarked in reply that to my knowledge London at any rate was already informed<sup>3</sup> and had not

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 208.

<sup>2</sup> Bülow recorded on May 13 that this request by the Italian Government had been conveyed by Cerruti and that he had promised the latter that the request would be complied with (3170/676274).

<sup>3</sup> Hoesch had reported in telegram No. 125 of May 10 that he had communicated the latest German proposals to Vansittart who "quite appreciated our accommodating attitude." (3170/676272-73)

shown by any means irritation at the German proposal to the extent anticipated here. Suvich then recapitulated the familiar arguments that Germany's opposition to the original formulation was not entirely understandable to him; no one was able to foresee what his situation would be 5 years hence, and nobody could seriously believe that in accepting the pact Germany would be renouncing her freedom for a period of 10 years. Nothing was being said about the substance and the duration of the agreement; moreover, to reach agreements it obviously took two who must be in agreement, so that any obligation to conclude them would be legally void. The termination of any agreement or the failure of negotiations for an accord will therefore always create a new situation for Germany. The present moment would seem to him to be decisive in view of the situation in Geneva and the political situation generally; conclusion of the pact was in the general interest and specifically in Germany's interest. He thought it was possible that Mussolini might yet personally intervene with the Reich Chancellor to this end. I pointed out to Suvich at length that the significance of our objection had apparently still not been fully grasped. The issue was not the substance and duration of specific clauses of the agreement but the fact that we could not undertake a commitment for a period of 10 years, that we would make the realization of our equality of rights dependent upon agreements and thus accept new commitments on top of existing ones. The continuous strong emphasis placed on this point of view made a certain impression on Suvich, but he nevertheless insisted on his urgent appeal that we revise our position; after all, it was a fact that we had from the outset been in fundamental accord with the proposal put forth by Mussolini. I replied that we had in all our statements from the beginning raised precisely this objection. Cerruti had been told already in the Berlin memorandum <sup>4</sup> that we could agree to a 10 year pact only if our commitments as to equality of rights were not to exceed 5 years. In these circumstances it would have been preferable to limit the duration of the pact to 5 years only, which would have surmounted and perhaps today still could surmount this difficulty. This idea, which could conceivably provide a way out even now, seemed to Suvich worthy of consideration.

In a conversation with me yesterday, the English Ambassador showed very great interest in the conclusion of the pact, but little interest in its substance. He thought that omission of the words "as well as with third Powers" <sup>5</sup> from article I would be acceptable even though the passage was desirable from the English point of view. The idea came from the Italian side, which wished to avoid any semblance of a directorate, while the French were more likely to oppose it because

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<sup>4</sup> Document No. 84.

<sup>5</sup> In French in the original.

the Poles and the Little Entente did not want any communications [*Eröffnungen*] in this form. It seemed to me that Suvich was not insisting on this passage today. Reference to article 16 in article II has been made an absolute condition sine qua non by Jouvenel as well as Suvich and the English Ambassador, because the French, in order to satisfy French public opinion and their own allies, needed this emphasis on sanctions in the event of revisions effected by force, so as to offset reference to article 19.\*

I request earliest possible instructions regarding the further handling of the question of the pact.<sup>6</sup>

HASSELL

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\* Apparently the instructions requested were not sent because of the change in the situation brought about by the new Italian draft. See document No. 254, footnote 4.

## No. 231

7360/E536702-05

### *The Reichswehr Minister to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 129/33 geh. V. G. H. I

BERLIN, May 13, 1933.

II F Abr. 1715.

Reference: II F Abr. 1664 of May 11, 1933,<sup>1</sup> and telegram Germ. Del. No. 356.<sup>2</sup>

To my regret I am not in a position to supply the desired information about the organization of the future army. The army organization is greatly influenced by the number of officers and personnel of long-term service, the extent to which the paramilitary formations are to be included in the calculation of the army strength, the length of service and armament and equipment. As long as these bases are not established it is not possible to determine the details of an army organization. For the present it can only be said, for the use of our delegation, that it is important to get as large a number of personnel of long-term service as possible. The relative figures for officers and

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed (7360/E536645-47). This letter from the Foreign Ministry sent over Bülow's signature referred to the recent discussions in Geneva between Eden and Nadolny with respect to standardization of armies (see document No. 239) and requested the Reichswehr Ministry to express its views on "how we specifically visualize the reorganization of the Reichswehr and within what periods we could put into effect its transformation into an army with a shorter term of service."

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (7649/E546989). In this telegram of May 12 Nadolny had urged that the delegation be authorized to supply information on the size of the membership of paramilitary formations as well as on the frequency of training exercises held by them, since the Committee on Effectives had now decided that these formations had military character. Nadolny warned that refusal to give this information might create the impression that Germany wanted to conceal these facts.

personnel of long-term service suggested by Hungary<sup>3</sup> are not sufficient for our requirements in any way.

According to information from the Foreign Ministry the French are supposed to have demanded a clarification of the question of our future army organization. A reply to this question is in my opinion entirely out of the question. In the future convention, if the English plan is taken as a basis, only specific provisions regarding army organization will be laid down, such as average daily effectives, relation of officers and personnel of long-term service to the total strength, and maximum total period of service. Naturally, after the conclusion of a convention these provisions must be taken into account in the organization of the army. For the rest, however, all countries, and therefore Germany also, have the right to organize their armies as they wish provided they observe the established provisions. To impose any sort of shackles on Germany in this regard and to restrict her in her army organization beyond the extent generally customary contradicts the equality of rights which has been recognized and must be rejected unconditionally.

As regards the time that we need for reorganizing the army, I stated in my interview<sup>4</sup> that for us a transition period of considerable length is indispensable. Theoretically, in consideration of the obligation to serve 12 years, we need a transition period of 12 years. In practice, however, the length of the transition period depends mainly, apart from the necessities of domestic policy, on the extent of reorganization of the army that is required. For example, the more personnel of long-term service we are allowed, the shorter can be the transition period from the purely technical point of view. Thus we can get along militarily with a shorter transition period, and must do so if the opponents consider the length of the transition period as identical with the period of validity of the convention. This, however, comes into consideration only if in return for our cooperation in establishing the length of the transition period the future figure for personnel of long-term service is not below the present figure, if no stages are set up in the transition period, and if during this time we have full freedom of action with respect to the way in which we transform the present Army into the new army in conformity with the provisions of the convention until the convention expires. The necessity for this freedom of action and the present number of long-term service personnel can be justified on the basis of considerations of domestic policy that cannot be visualized as yet.

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<sup>3</sup> For the amendments to the section on effectives in the British draft convention, which were submitted by the Hungarian delegation in the meeting of the General Commission on May 8, see League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (Geneva, 1933): *Records of the Conference*, ser. B, *Minutes of the General Commission*, vol. II, pp. 459-460.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 239.

With regard to the question asked by the head of the delegation as to whether information can be supplied about the membership of the paramilitary organizations and the training exercises taking place, in order to determine the average daily effectives, we must for the time being definitely try to refuse giving this information. For determining the average daily effectives only that number of members who are receiving military training can be considered. However, since according to the position heretofore taken by us, no military training is being conducted, the number of members in question is zero. Should we not be able to prevail with this reasoning, supplying information on numbers is to be considered only if other states, too, supply corresponding information on organizations which in contradiction to actual conditions have been characterized by the Effectives Committee as carrying on military training and accordingly as to be included in the calculation of army strength. In any case only that many members may be reported as annually receive physical training characterized by the other side as military in nature. In so doing, the length of the training period should be given in hours. However, in communicating a figure there is always implied a certain recognition that the number of members reported, nevertheless, do receive military or paramilitary training. For this reason I am stressing once again that it is necessary to refuse for the time being to supply a figure, making use of the above-mentioned reasons, and if this is impossible, to state that the disclosure of a figure does not imply acknowledgment of military training, to say nothing of training in weapons.

BLOMBERG

## No. 232

6609/E497022-31

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry*

SECRET

A 970

Moscow, May 14, 1933.

Received May 18.

IV Ru. 2287.

### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Conversations on German-Soviet relations.

The past week brought a further development of the factors characterizing the state of mind mentioned in my report A 885 of May 5.<sup>1</sup> The Soviet press has not responded to the positive position of the entire German press toward the Soviet Union on the occasion of the extension of the Berlin Treaty; on the contrary, the papers here have

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 212.

continued to expatiate on every single, meaningless incident that has occurred in connection with a Soviet citizen in Germany; the reports on the domestic developments were usually without editorial comment but always of a tendentious nature somewhat according to the pattern of: reversion of Germany to the Middle Ages. Moreover, Radek has published in *Pravda* a malicious article very unfavorable to Germany and her demands for revision, regarding which I am reporting separately.<sup>2</sup>

Since the views and statements from the German side, which are characterized politically by good will for the adjustment and improvement of mutual relations, have not met with a corresponding response, and since there is danger of a real, fundamental, far-reaching estrangement as a result of this attitude of the Soviet Government, I have had a number of serious conversations in the last few days with responsible figures such as, for example, Voroshilov and Krestinsky, in which I have expressly warned the Soviet side against persevering in the present position.

I pointed out to M. Krestinsky that everything had been done on the German side to straighten out any misunderstandings caused by local incidents. In addition to this the German Government had incontestably, emphatically and at various times given public expression to its desire for maintenance of friendly relations with the Soviet Union. And it was precisely the National Socialist press that had emphasized these ideas with full clarity. By way of contrast the Soviet press had not only been silent, and silent even when positive German press comments were at hand, but it had continued to pour oil on the fire by blowing up every smallest police action in connection with any Soviet citizen in Germany; it had reproduced the positive articles of the National Socialist press only very incompletely and in excerpts; nothing had been done officially on the Soviet side to oppose this attitude. Thereby an atmosphere was being created that was unfavorable and threatening to German-Soviet relations; for one could not demand of our public that it be silent about this attitude of the Soviet public.

In addition, however, I had the impression that there was also a growing estrangement in the fundamental questions of German-Soviet political cooperation owing to the attitude of Soviet policy and of the Soviet public in general. It seemed to me that the fight against Versailles that had always been emphatically demanded by the Soviet side was now letting up; instead the opposite and for us entirely unacceptable slogan was being publicized which was expressed in Radek's

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<sup>2</sup> Radek had published in *Pravda* on May 10 an article entitled "Revision of the Versailles Treaty." The Embassy in Moscow sent a German translation of the article to the Foreign Ministry with report A 974 of May 16 (9529/E671799-816). See also document No. 245.



statements and which could be briefly summarized in the sentence "revision means war." Moreover, the cooperation at the Disarmament Conference, which in any case had not been altogether untroubled owing to the general attitude of the Soviet delegation in recent months, was bound to be badly affected if the semi-official reporter for *Izvestia* furnished articles that were biased concerning the attitude of Germany and in some cases were directly contrary to the facts. Even the military relations, that had otherwise remained intact in time of political stress, seemed to me of late to have suffered from a not entirely friendly reserve on the Soviet side.

I closed my statements by observing that I considered it my duty to point out these facts in time. In particular I considered a different attitude of the Soviet press to be urgently necessary; if we for our part would treat in the same way, and publicly, the complaints to be brought against Soviet agencies regarding the injustices committed against Reich citizens living in Russia, then it would be evident that there was incomparably more reason for complaint on our side.

M. Krestinsky began his reply with the already familiar statement that it was precisely the considerable number of incidents and their continuation over such a long period of time that had so aroused public opinion in the Soviet Union. It had been unfortunate that on the very day after the exchange of the instruments of ratification the raid on the Soviet club in Hamburg had taken place,<sup>3</sup> which had been characterized by particularly unpleasant incidents. For that reason even the regrets expressed immediately thereafter by the Hamburg authorities had been unable to clear the atmosphere entirely.

In authoritative Soviet circles a very great doubt still prevailed as to whether the circles in Germany favoring cooperation with the Soviet Union would win out over the tendencies in the other direction. The Foreign Commissariat itself fully appreciated the positive efforts to be noted on the German side and possessed the requisite training in foreign policy for a proper evaluation of conditions in Germany. However, other Soviet circles, from the average party member up to the People's Commissar, did not to the same extent possess such thorough knowledge. Therefore the negative factors operated there particularly strongly, as for example Herr Rosenberg's trip to London and his general anti-Soviet political attitude. I replied to M. Krestinsky very emphatically that this false attitude toward Germany of the average party man in the Soviet Union was created precisely by

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<sup>3</sup> During the night of May 6-7, 1933, a detachment of SA and police raided the club of the employees of the Commercial Attaché's office and of the Consulate General of the Soviet Union at Hamburg. In the course of this action considerable damage was inflicted. In a note to the Soviet Embassy of May 16, 1933, the Foreign Ministry expressed the regrets of the Mayor of Hamburg as well as its own and promised indemnification and punishment of the culprits (6025/H045653-74).

the false and tendentious reporting of the Soviet press about Germany. It was also not our fault if owing to dissemination of all sorts of sensational reports about the trip of Herr Rosenberg—who was not an official German figure—local public opinion was being further agitated.<sup>4</sup>

Herr Krestinsky continued by going into the military relations. Certainly no relaxation was intended in this regard; at most it was possible that the one or other military office inclined to a certain reserve in the present situation in Germany. Relations in the field of military policy had without doubt always proved to be a stable and unifying political bond in former German-Soviet crises; but he nevertheless had to admit that the period now behind us had been by far the most difficult in German-Soviet relations; the burden had been much greater than for example during the police action against the trade mission in 1924 or during other incidents.

M. Krestinsky discussed finally the cooperation at the Disarmament Conference; he reminded me that in the course of the past year the Soviet side had several times complained about the lack of contact; however, just now since the presence of Herr von Twardowski in Geneva<sup>5</sup> personal contact had been very satisfactorily restored.

If cooler statements about the Versailles *Diktat* appeared in the Soviet press now and then, this was to be explained on the basis of the atmosphere he had described; the Soviet Government was still, as in the past, an opponent of the Versailles Treaty, and its whole attitude toward Germany had as such not changed.

The demonstratively friendly attitude which People's Commissar Voroshilov and the Red Army displayed on the occasion of General von Bockelberg's visit<sup>6</sup> can be regarded as a direct consequence of this conversation. The decision regarding relaxation of the cooperation in one area, which had already been made and communicated to us by the Soviet side, was reversed.<sup>7</sup> War Commissar Voroshilov, whom I had invited to the Embassy to a dinner given for General von Bockelberg, rearranged his schedule, which would have prevented him from appearing, and accepted the invitation. Furthermore, he announced that all of the members of the War Council would attend this dinner.

This dinner took place yesterday in a very harmonious and gratifying atmosphere; M. Voroshilov underlined his friendly attitude toward Germany in a little speech which he made at the table.

After the dinner I had a long private conversation with M. Voroshilov. I explained to him my misgivings regarding the development of

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 223.

<sup>5</sup> Twardowski had been serving on temporary duty with the German delegation to the Disarmament Conference since Jan. 22. He returned to his post at Moscow on July 17 (3881/E047340).

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 147 and footnote 5.

<sup>7</sup> See document No. 197 and footnote 6.

German-Soviet relations; I said that during the formation of the Cabinet of the National Awakening in Germany the basic question had come up, whether it would be possible to continue the past friendly relations between National Socialist Germany and Bolshevik Russia. This question had been answered unanimously and emphatically in the affirmative by both partners. Once this main question was decided everything else was of only secondary importance; all the incidents which the Soviet press had complained about would not have had to assume such importance if they had not been blown up to such an extent. With good will it was possible to get over this without further ado. I then elaborated to M. Voroshilov the same reasons that I had mentioned in the conversation with M. Krestinsky, namely that the German side had now done everything to convince the Soviet Union of the friendly attitude of the new German Government toward Russia; but that these statements had found no response in Russia; that on the contrary public opinion here took such an attitude toward German-Russian relations that it must lead to an estrangement rather than to a rapprochement.

M. Voroshilov replied that I was aware that he was a good friend of Germany; he had not changed his attitude toward Germany. It was also the desire of the Soviet Government to continue this policy. Certainly in recent months considerable ill feeling had arisen in local political circles. The isolated incident may have been insignificant and harmless, but owing to the constant accumulation the sum of the separate incidents grew to be a burden. When I pointed out that extensive Communist propaganda had been carried on in Derop and other Soviet institutions, he could only reply that the Soviet Government made it the duty of its functionaries to refrain from any interference in the domestic affairs of Germany. He had ordered his Military Attachés on pain of severe punishment not to carry on any espionage activity of any sort whatsoever. He summed up his statements to the effect that he requested me when I was in Berlin to inform the authoritative German offices that the Soviet Government wanted to continue its good relations with Germany as in the past; a sign of this attitude of the War Commissariat in particular might be the friendly reception accorded General von Bockelberg.

If one seeks to become clear about the present attitude of the Soviet Government toward Germany at this time, one comes to the conclusion that this feeling is not uniform. One can say neither that the indignation about the incidents in Germany continues in its old strength, nor that a more friendly atmosphere is uniformly noticeable. Perhaps one can characterize the present attitude of the Soviet public most accurately by saying that part of the politically authoritative circles, particularly the Red Army and the politicians close to it, regard Germany in a positive and friendly way as in the past; on

the other hand, among the intellectual Soviet politicians, particularly those of them who are Jews—therefore among the Soviet publicists and also individual members of government bodies—a sullen and embittered feeling toward Germany has retained its old strength.

DIRKSEN

## No. 233

9245/E652186-88

### *The President of the Reichsbank to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram [via radio]

URGENT

NORDDEICH, May 15, 1933—1:42 a. m.

Del. Schacht No. 19 of May 15

Received May 16—6:30 a. m.

W 3156.

For the Chancellor.

I am herewith supplementing the report of Friday-Saturday.<sup>1</sup> My farewell to the President was very friendly; he placed me alongside his sofa, put his hand on my knee and said: "You made an excellent impression by your frankness."<sup>2</sup> He touched briefly on the transfer question, approved the proposal according to telegram 16,<sup>3</sup> and then passed on to the disarmament question, speaking persuasively, as usual. I became very serious and assured him that the German people were unwilling, after 15 years of boundless injustice, to be treated any longer as a second-class nation. If Allied disarmament could not be achieved, I hoped that America would not assume any joint responsibility for it. The President asked me to greet the Reich President and the Reich Chancellor and accompanied me to the car. Thereafter I had a three-quarter-hour conversation with Under Secretary of State Phillips, in which I repeated and reinforced my arguments. Obviously we could not and did not want to wage war, but all attempts to restore world economic peace would be in vain.

Friday evening I had a discussion in New York with leading Jews. My warning that any pressure from outside would only make matters worse made some impression. On Saturday I had banking discussions at the Federal Reserve throughout the day, and late in the afternoon a discussion with Macdonald, head of the Foreign Policy Association, who recently saw the Chancellor in Berlin. Macdonald had seen the President after I did and telephoned that it was urgent for him to speak to me. When he visited me, he stated that the mood in Paris and elsewhere was alarming. There was talk of partitioning

<sup>1</sup> i. e., May 12-13. No report of that date has been found.

<sup>2</sup> The quoted passage is in English in the original.

<sup>3</sup> Document No. 222. See also document No. 244.

Germany and making up for what had been left undone in Versailles. He asked me urgently to try to persuade the Chancellor to make a great conciliatory gesture in his speech on Wednesday before the Reichstag. What gesture, he did not know. I answered MacDonald very sharply that it would be a shame if America remained silent about such a policy. A surprise was in store for the Allies if any attempt were made to partition Germany. The threatening policy of the last 15 years was no longer of any avail.

The total impression of my stay is as follows.

The recently increased American sympathies for a more just treatment of Germany have sharply diminished as a result of the newspaper agitation on the Jewish question, but serious circles do not take too gloomy a view of this question. I recommend that it be not mentioned at all. There is a certain amount of sympathy in Congress and among the public for colonial participation and a solution for the Corridor. The plan to arm Germany is meeting with the strongest opposition everywhere, although there is some understanding of the immorality and injustice of France's arming. I believe that this is what we should emphasize. It is very important to stress our love of peace. The hope for success of the World Economic Conference is not very strong in America, especially not if the agreement on disarmament falls through. The President told me that the newspapers were urging him to go to London, which he would not do. My remark that in the event of failure he might hold in reserve a continuation of the conference in Washington was favorably received by him.

SCHACHT

No. 234

8674/E606943

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, May 15, 1933.

Rk. 6019.

This morning the Austrian Minister visited me in order to state, on instructions from his Government, the following:

Yesterday evening at a gathering in Graz, the Reich Commissar for Justice and Bavarian Minister of Justice Frank II had uttered vile insults against the Austrian Government and, among other things, had referred to Federal Chancellor Dollfuss as "the little Metternich." He had further threatened that no German would come to Austria this summer.

The Austrian Government therefore requests that it be arranged in Berlin for Herr Frank II (who is going to Salzburg today in order to make a speech there) to leave Austrian territory as soon as possible, since otherwise it will be necessary to have him expelled.

I reminded the Austrian Minister that Herr Frank's excitement had its origin in the incredible incident at the airfield in Aspern on Saturday,<sup>1</sup> and I informed the Minister of the step in Vienna which I had directed to be made.<sup>2</sup>

NEURATH <sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> On his arrival at the Vienna airport on May 13, Frank, who was accompanying the Prussian Minister of Justice, Kerrl, and several high German officials was told by the deputy police president of Vienna that his visit was "not especially desired by the Austrian Government in view of the well known matter which had not yet been settled." This referred to Frank's speech in Munich on Mar. 18 and its aftermath; cf. document No. 112 and footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup> Neurath had instructed Rieth by telephone on the morning of May 15 to express astonishment at the reception given Frank at Aspern and to say that the German Government expected the Austrian Government to clear up the matter. These instructions were confirmed by telegram No. 42 of May 15 from Köpke to the Legation in Vienna (6077/E450677-78).

<sup>3</sup> This memorandum was sent to the Reich Chancellery with a handwritten note from Neurath to Lammers suggesting that something be done to stop Frank from speaking in Salzburg (8674/E606944-45). A minute by Lammers of May 15 notes: "The Chancellor is informed. Nothing is to be done." (8674/E606947)

## No. 235

7892/E571648-56

### *Memorandum by an Official of Department II*

BERLIN, May 15, 1933.  
zu II SG 910.<sup>1</sup>

The representatives of the Saar Territory who are being received this afternoon by the Reich Chancellor and the Reich Foreign Minister called on me this morning for a preliminary conference. I had asked Ministerialdirektor Dr. Loehrs of the Prussian Ministry of Interior to attend it.

The following appeared:

For the NSDAP:

Kreisleiter Spaniol from Saarlouis;  
Editor Selzner of Neustadt, member of the Reichstag;  
Dr. Obé of Saarlouis; also  
Artur Stegner of Berlin (Foreign Gau of the NSDAP) as well  
as Dr. Stolz accompanying him.

For the Center party:

Lawyer Levacher;  
Trade Union Secretary Kiefer;  
Trade Union Secretary Kuhnen, member of the Reichstag;  
Landessekretär Hillenbrand, member of the Landesrat;  
Chief Editor Hoffmann;  
Wholesale Merchant Richard Becker;  
Secretary General Meijer.

<sup>1</sup> II SG 910: Not printed (7892/E571620); see document No. 169, footnote 3.

For the German-Saarland People's party :

Kommerzienrat Dr. honoris causa Röchling;

Master Painter Schmelzer.

For the German-National People's party :

Regierungsrat Spring of Saarlouis;

Business Manager Dr. Deubert of Neunkirchen.

For the Bourgeois Center :

Architect Schmoll, Saarbrücken.

After greeting those present I stated that of course I could not anticipate the Reich Chancellor and the Reich Foreign Minister and therefore had to request that all substantive matters in view for the afternoon conference be omitted. I did not know how that conference would turn out. I recommended to the gentlemen that they give the Reich Chancellor a clear picture of the situation in the Saar Territory, but restrict themselves to basic matters and avoid details, and that they furthermore avoid bringing up economic questions as far as possible. For the rest I was prepared to answer questions. Moreover, I suggested another conference tomorrow morning at 10:30 at which the results of the audience with the Reich Chancellor could perhaps be evaluated.

At the desire of several gentlemen I agreed to discuss the program for the afternoon reception by the Reich Chancellor.

It was agreed without further ado that the formation of a German unity front (voting front) should be given the main emphasis. Particularly Herr Kiefer pointed to the necessity of setting up a smaller committee and to the present separatist danger in the Saar Territory.

Then Herr Schmoll mentioned as the second point the question whether the small parties should continue to exist or not. He admitted that after the developments of the last few months these parties no longer had any justification for their existence, and that his own party as such was ready to be dissolved at once, but perhaps the special situation in the Saar Territory required them to continue in existence.

Herr Röchling said the same for his party. The party was not an end in itself, and could therefore disappear at any time. He believed, however, that the present parties were still necessary for the interim period, whereby he wanted to point out quite openly that over 5,000 Jews were in the Saar Territory who could not be allowed simply to drift. He then pointed out that probably difficult times would come for the Saar Territory. England's attitude toward Germany and therewith also toward the Saar question had changed; Chairman Knox had been in London in the last few days, evidently to obtain instructions. It was to be expected that there would be a stringent regime by the Governing Commission, as was already evident from its latest bills submitted to the Landesrat. In the last analysis it was

a question of reoccupation by French troops. One should not give the Governing Commission any pretext of any sort, considering this prospect.

Herr Hillenbrand mentioned that since they were obligated to be entirely frank they also had to mention the relationship with Social Democracy. Naturally the Social Democrats had learned of today's conference and were angry at not having been invited. The question of the relationship with the Marxists, particularly with the Social Democrats, would thus have to be discussed.

Herr Stegner and Herr Levacher agreed with the previous speaker, while Herr Levacher stressed that the question had particular importance for the Saar Territory for the reason that the Communists were very numerous precisely in the endangered border districts.

I explained that for tactical reasons the non-Marxist parties only had been invited for today's discussion.

Herr Kiefer broached the question of the trade unions, particularly the free trade unions. He mentioned that the *Chronik* was now buttering up the free trade unions very decidedly; the purpose was of course clear.

Herr Schmoll came again to speak of the question of the small parties; he pointed to the special position of his party, whose members would join several parties in case of its dissolution, probably mainly the Center. He remarked further that certain jealousies had existed in the past; these now must stop in the higher national interest, and they must respect one another.

Herr Spaniol summarized his position on the various points as follows: The small and very small parties naturally must continue to exist, if only in order to keep down the seeds of separatism. It was quite right not to invite the Marxists today, since they were entirely in the tow of the Jews or the French. It would be the task of the NSDAP in particular to win over spiritually the adherents of Marxism, for we did not want to bring Marxists back into the fatherland, but Germans. It must be said, however, that people who did not seem entirely in place were still participating in the one or the other party. Of course in foreign policy absolute peace had to reign, particularly in the Saar Territory; they were at listening posts there, after all, and a listening post had to keep still and watch, but not attack the enemy directly. Unity was necessary for the common fight; petty rivalries had to be avoided, one had to steer toward the great objective in a quiet, calm, and disciplined way.

Herr Röchling pointed out that after all the main desire was to bring back the *area* into the Reich, particularly the endangered Warndt,<sup>2</sup> and everything must be subordinated to this objective. If

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<sup>2</sup> A district in the western part of the Saar on the border of Lorraine, center of the Saar coal mines.



the NSDAP tried to win over the Marxists this was quite in order, but they should not be trampled on [*"vor den Bauch getreten werden"*] in doing so. In this connection Herr Röchling for his part, too, pointed to the importance of the question of the free trade unions.

Herr Hillenbrand took up the latter point and stressed that so far they had always worked together with the free trade unions and that these had never left any doubt about their German leanings. By and large the same could be said of the SPD, which had taken an unpleasant course only after the appearance of Braun,<sup>3</sup> that is, only since 1924. Without a doubt the trade union question, which had only become so acute because of the incidents of the recent weeks, was very important. Probably the free trade unions still had 35-40,000 members today. He could not share the opinion that one could convert all of the members to another way of thinking in that relatively short period of time. Therefore in the Saar Territory one had at least to maintain contact with that side, or else one would actually drive the free trade unions into the other camp.

Herr Spaniol remarked that the free trade unions in the last few weeks went over to the NSDAP or to the NSBO<sup>4</sup> with flying colors. Today the front of 30-40,000 no longer existed.

Herr Kuhnen expressed certain doubts as to this. He furthermore pointed to the special situation in the mining industry, where the French employers were courting the free trade unions today and were turning out the rightist miners. The danger of separatist ideas could come from this.

Herr Spaniol replied that he did not consider it so difficult at all to win over the Marxists supporters spiritually, to transform them intellectually.

Herr Selzner said that he had learned that today a conference was being held in Saarbrücken between representatives of the free trade unions of the Saar Territory and the free trade unions of Lorraine. Perhaps this was to be regarded as an attempt to orient the remainder of the free trade unions toward the West. This communication aroused considerable attention.

Herr Levacher referred in this connection to the fact that the Communists who had fled from Germany to the Saar Territory, those who were not followers but leaders, were evidently carrying on lively agitation; this was another factor in the importance of the question of the relationship with the Marxists and the free trade unions.

Herr Schmoll stressed likewise that one should not underestimate the danger of communism; he believed that he knew the conditions in

<sup>3</sup> i. e., Max Braun, leader of the Social Democratic party of the Saar.

<sup>4</sup> Nationalsozialistische Betriebszellen Organisation (National Socialist Shop Organization).

Saarbrücken rather well. Certainly the conversion was being made rather quickly, but Herr Spaniol probably still judged the situation too optimistically.

Herr Selzner suggested that they consider setting up a very small action committee in Saarbrücken, consisting of one National Socialist and one joint representative of all other groups.

I asked that such organizational questions be left aside; they seemed premature. While a small committee seemed to me very desirable as such, to form it of only two members was after all hardly expedient. Various of the gentlemen agreed with this view.

Herr Röchling remarked that if one composed the committee correctly, that is, of one National Socialist and one worker, then this was perhaps quite a good solution.

Herr Selzner replied that this committee should naturally form only the head; an organization on a broader basis could exist alongside it.

Herr Deubert stressed the significance for foreign policy of the Saar question, particularly the approaching plebiscite. The Governing Commission took what was at least a very peculiar position, as demonstrated by its latest bills presented to the Landesrat. Therefore in the coordination [*Gleichschaltung*] one had to observe caution and possibly retain certain forms even though they were already antiquated.

Herr Levacher made similar statements and pointed out that the present bills submitted by the Governing Commission to the Landesrat had great similarity to the well-known emergency order of 1923,<sup>5</sup> just as the general situation today, too, showed certain parallels with that time. Germany's situation today, however, was unfortunately very different. He had read through the speech he had made in the Landesrat just 10 years ago today, on May 15, 1923, and noted that at that time he had been able to refer to the strong support of the German Saar population by England, by Lord Robert Cecil and even by the well-known Saar interpellation in the English House of Commons.<sup>6</sup> Today the situation was unfortunately different. One heard of no support from England, only attacks. All the more caution would have to be observed.

With this the discussion of the program of the afternoon conference with the Reich Chancellor was closed. I noted as the outcome that the following points should be discussed:

1. General cooperation of all those with German leanings.
2. Continued existence of the small parties.
3. Relationship with the Marxists.

<sup>5</sup> During the course of the miners' strike in the Saar in 1923, the Governing Commission on Mar. 7, 1923, issued a provisional decree restricting freedom of speech and the press.

<sup>6</sup> The reference is to the discussion of the Saar situation in the House of Commons on May 10, 1923.

4. Question of the trade unions.
5. Foreign policy situation.

It was agreed that additional questions should if possible not be broached, particularly questions of an organizational kind.

Then a number of details regarding the technique of the coming plebiscite were discussed (voting lists, right to vote, voting right of the former occupation troops, etc.).

Hereupon I closed the conference and asked those present to participate in tomorrow's conference at 10:30 a. m.

As Herr Selzner informed me before the start of the conference, Dr. Ley will also be present at the afternoon reception for the purpose of discussing the trade union question.

VOIGT

### No. 236

7892/E571657-61

*Minutes on the Reception of the Parliamentary Delegation From the Saar Territory by the Reich Chancellor in the Reich Chancellery on May 15, 1933*

zu II SG 910.<sup>1</sup>

*Those present:*

Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler  
 Vice Chancellor von Papen  
 Minister of Foreign Affairs Freiherr von Neurath  
 President of the Prussian Staatsrat Dr. Ley  
 State Secretary Dr. Lammers

*NSDAP:*

Spaniol, Kreisleiter, Saarlouis  
 Selzner, member of the Reichstag, Neustadt a. d. Hardt  
 Dr. Vei (Obé), political economist

*German-Saarland People's Party:*

Kommerzienrat Röchling, Völklingen  
 Master Painter Schmelzer

*Center:*

Lawyer Levacher  
 Trade Union Secretary Kiefer  
 Trade Union Secretary Kuhn, member of the Reichstag  
 Trade Union Secretary Hillenbrand, member of the Landesrat

*German-National Front:*

Regierungsrat Spring  
 Director Deubert

*Bourgeois Center:*

Architect Schmoll

<sup>1</sup> II SG 910: Not printed (7892/E571620); see document No. 169, footnote 3.

*Also:*

Engineer Stolze }  
Engineer Stegner } NSDAP

Oberregierungsrat Dr. Thomsen as Keeper of the Minutes.

After a detailed report by Trade Union Secretary Kiefer (Center) about the political situation, foreign and domestic, of the Saar Territory the Reich Chancellor took the floor for a lengthy discussion of the tactics of the plebiscite campaign. He pointed to the attitude of the Marxist parties, whose leaders lacked national consciousness not only in the Saar Territory but also in other German border areas. In the Saar Territory, too, the members of the trade unions would come to realize that the leaders of the Social Democratic party have worked against the interests of the working people. There would have been no reason for proceeding against the trade unions if the free trade unions had not been the source of the finances of the Social Democratic party. Considering the pending plebiscite campaign the two most important political factors in the Saar Territory must reach an understanding between themselves; these were the NSDAP and the Christian trade unions. A bloc composed of these two factors had strong drawing power and created a central point around which the other parties and organizations could crystallize. One must always keep in mind that what was involved in the Saar Territory in the next year and a half was a fight carrying an essentially foreign political accent. For this reason it was not desirable for the other parties, as had happened in part in the Reich, to stop their activity of their own accord. Rather, it was entirely probable that more people could be mobilized for the final battle over the plebiscite if they could march in several columns. No German in the Saar Territory who had heretofore been a member of a Marxist party need fear personal disadvantage, to say nothing of punishment, on this account. Even in the Reich, Marxists had been accorded punishment only if they had deserved it under the rule of law. However, in order to have a calming effect on the atmosphere in the Saar Territory there might be considered the issuance of a general amnesty on the day the Saar Territory returned to the German Reich. Germans do not long support a lost cause. That would also be shown in the case of the Social Democrats in the Saarland. Basically the Social Democratic party was composed of an exceedingly able core of honest, industrious, and respectable workers. They now felt that they had been abandoned or even betrayed by their leaders. It was also by no means the intention of the leaders of the NSDAP to flood the Saar Territory after its return with people particularly trained in the spirit of the NSDAP.

As the representative of the Bourgeois Center, Architect Schmoll expressed the opinion that in the Saar Territory, too, in the light of

the great events which had taken place, the small parties no longer had any right to existence. Nevertheless he considered it proper for the small parties to continue in existence until the plebiscite, so that as many votes as possible could be won in this way.

The Reich Chancellor was entirely in agreement with this view. In the Saar Territory there was only one single political task, and that was the return to Germany. If a number of organizations and parties worked equally at this task, then this would have a strong psychological effect on the Germans.

Summing up, the Reich Chancellor considered it necessary for the delegation members present here to arrange a meeting with the leaders of the free trade unions and to discuss with them on this occasion the advantages which would result for the free trade unions if they returned at this time to the national unity front.

Spaniol, the Kreisleiter of the NSDAP, confirmed for his part that the members of the free trade unions in the Saar Territory had a decidedly national character. But detailed work in the separate plants by the National Socialist Shop Organization, which was so far not prohibited, was urgently necessary. Furthermore, an effort should be made to organize the work for the German nationality in the Saar Territory into four divisions, if possible under National Socialist leadership. These four divisions were composed of the cultural, economic, sport, and defense organizations. The organization of the Saar sections of the separate ministries in Berlin under the leadership of an official who would if possible be a Saarlander was also urgently desirable.

The President of the Prussian Staatsrat stated that the action committee to be established in the near future should be composed of three members, namely one member from the NSDAP, one member of the Christian trade unions, and one member for liaison with the Reich Government.

It was decided not to make any announcement of any sort to the press concerning the fact that the delegation had been received and concerning the contents of the conversation.

T[HOMSEN]

## No. 237

2368/493970-73

*The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 132 of May 15

LONDON, May 15, 1933—6:11 p. m.

Received May 15—9:45 p. m.

RM 687.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

As soon as the report about Rosenberg's trip to England<sup>1</sup> leaked out, opposition became noticeable here against the attempt to make the English people better acquainted with the thinking of the new Germany by means of such a mission.

Rosenberg got in touch with the Embassy immediately after his arrival and this contact was maintained during his entire stay. He undertook the laying of the wreath without consulting me.<sup>2</sup> I told him that I would have advised him unqualifiedly against it.

After conferring with Rosenberg I then made appointments for him to visit leading English statesmen. The visit with Lady Oxford was made at her special request.

Rosenberg was then received in the Foreign Office by Vansittart and Sir John Simon. He was also received by War Minister Hailsham. In the House of Commons Simon expressly emphasized upon inquiry that Rosenberg had been received at my request and an announcement to that effect also appeared in the newspapers. MacDonald and Baldwin declined a reception on the grounds that it appeared unnecessary after the conversation with the Foreign Minister. Rosenberg thereupon asked that no further appointments be made with official personages.

I arranged a dinner for Rosenberg at the Embassy, at which distinguished figures in politics and society were present and which went off harmoniously. Besides, Rosenberg has also seen a number of unofficial personalities of politics and the press, and has furthermore received German and English representatives of the press.

Rosenberg's stay has not led to any improvement in the atmosphere here; on the contrary, it has caused England's hostility toward the new Germany to break out with full force. This is in no wise due to the personality of Rosenberg, who in my opinion has upheld the neo-German standpoint here with both faithfulness to his conviction and moderation and also made an especially good impression on German and English journalists; it is rather due simply to the fact that whereas previously English criticism was directed beyond the distant borders to Germany, it now saw all at once in the coming of Rosenberg an incarnation of the new Germany right in England itself and took up arms against it.

Moreover, the English hate the idea of propaganda coming to their own country from the outside and were inclined to look upon Rosenberg as an emissary who wanted to force strange doctrines upon them.

Consequently, the final press comments characterize Rosenberg's visit as a complete failure, although they include expressions of dis-

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 223.

<sup>2</sup> On May 11 Sir John Simon expressed the British Government's regrets over the removal of the wreath which Rosenberg had placed at the Cenotaph in Whitehall (London telegram No. 130 of May 12, 1:15 p. m., 5740/H030766).

approval about the demonstrations directed against Rosenberg, especially the removal of his wreath.

Undoubtedly Rosenberg also found various willing listeners, including, among others, Lord Hailsham, who told me that he had been glad to see Rosenberg again, whom he had received before upon his first visit to England, and had listened to him with interest. On the whole, however, public opinion is now more hostile than ever before, as is also quite clearly shown by the situation here, which may be characterized as follows:

The Labor party and the entire working class, which had formerly shown most understanding for Germany's sufferings, regard the new Germany with implacable enmity. Precisely the same is true of the Liberal circles, which are sympathetic to the ideas advocated in the League of Nations Union and embodied in Lord Cecil. The conservative left which is of the complexion of the *Daily Telegraph*—a paper which is closely connected with the Jewish elements and is under the influence of the City, disapproves of the developments in Germany just as much on account of the treatment of the Jewish question as from fear of the spread of the military spirit in Germany and the resultant danger of war. With the exception of some individuals, only the extreme right as a group shows a certain understanding, but again in accordance with tradition it is pro-French and rather anti-German. So we have the peculiar paradox that the *Morning Post*, which has never been very friendly to Germany, without changing its actual orientation now writes the most calm and understanding articles on the reorganization in Germany.

In view of this general situation we can proceed here in England only with great caution and quiet persistence. It will not be possible to recover lost terrain quickly, and certainly not by propaganda, but rather by a suitable coincidence of events.

Grandi also has expressed himself to this effect to Rosenberg and me. He spoke regretfully to me about the serious losses suffered by our position in England, which only recently had been so good. When it was pointed out that the very same thing had happened to Italy after the victory of Fascism, Grandi remarked that he had realized from the very beginning of his 8-year-long service in the Italian Foreign Ministry that the winning of Anglo-Saxon public opinion was the key to potential success. He had therefore immediately concentrated all his activity on winning the Anglo-Saxon world while he had disregarded France and, at the time, Germany, too, as without prospects and secondary. If his work in the Ministry had left anything of permanent value to Italy, it was precisely this re-establishment of close relations with England and America, without which a newly formed state could not prosper or survive. Such far-sighted, careful, and considerate wooing would be necessary also for Germany.

## No. 238

3650/813095-98

*Memorandum by the Reichswehr Minister*<sup>1</sup>

No. 130/33 geh. V.G.H. I

BERLIN, May 15, 1933.

Rk. 6081.

DISARMAMENT NOTES FOR THE GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON  
MAY 17, 1933

It is demanded of Germany that she accept the English plan without any change.

Germany must reject such a demand. It is tantamount to a new dictation and is damaging to the honor and dignity of a great nation.<sup>2</sup>

The position in its particulars depends, however, on the extent to which the plan permits actual disarmament to be realized and takes into account Germany's equality of rights and national security.

To give reality to her national security, Germany agrees to the transition period of 5 years provided by the English plan. However, part V and article 115 (Heligoland) of the Versailles Treaty must be replaced in their entirety by the convention to be concluded, and the transitional period must be followed by placing Germany on a footing of complete equality with the other countries.

In the sphere of personnel, Germany had declared her willingness to negotiate on the structure of her army organization. She must demand, however, that the special conditions and requirements be taken into account in the process, that the same criteria be used, and that there be a guarantee of an organic build-up.

According to the statement made by the French War Minister before the Chamber in February 1932, in case of war the overseas armed forces will be utilized in France at once. He therefore expressly counts them as part of the home forces.

Thus it is contrary to all justice if the overseas armed forces that are stationed in the vicinity of the mother country or even in the mother country itself are not included in the standardized system and, contrary to the statement of the French War Minister, are not counted as part of the home forces.

It is further contrary to all justice if the militarily fully trained reservists are not counted as long as they are on leave, whereas police forces that are only armed and trained for police functions are counted in full as part of the army strength.

This injustice is still greatly surpassed by the intention of likewise counting as part of the army strength groups which serve purely

<sup>1</sup> This document is initialed by Hitler.

<sup>2</sup> Typewritten marginal note: "Germany immediately accepted the English plan as a basis for discussion."



political or national educational purposes, do not own any military equipment and do not receive any military training.

In the field of material, Germany demands the realization of her equality of rights which was recognized by disarmament in and destruction of those weapons which are prohibited for Germany by the Versailles Treaty.

The period of discrimination against Germany, of different treatment for victor and vanquished, must be over once and for all. The honor and dignity of the German people do not permit different treatment.

In the future Germany may not be prohibited from taking any measure or having any weapons that are permitted to other countries. Never, never can Germany depart from this demand. Whoever interprets this demand as an intention to rearm proves that he wishes to retain heavy aggressive weapons and air forces as well as submarines and does not wish to disarm. The German demand for qualitative equality of rights would be satisfied by actual abolition and destruction of these weapons. Germany cannot, however, accept a sham disarmament in these weapons such as is made possible by the English plan. Similarly, the national security of Germany does not permit a postponement of the decision on the abolition or retention of heavy aggressive weapons and air forces, as well as submarines, to a later time.

The extent to which Germany's national security is threatened and the strong effects of discrimination are shown by the following figures:

According to their own statements made to the League of Nations, France has 3,046 airplanes in service, Belgium 350, Poland 700, and Czechoslovakia 670.

Thus 4,766 military planes in service in the peacetime armed forces confront a Germany without military planes. In addition there are still the incalculable numbers of reserve planes in case of war.

The situation in regard to tanks and heavy artillery is similar.

Whereas Germany has no tanks and no heavy guns outside the Königsberg fortress, France alone has a peacetime supply of 1,717 tanks and 1,044 heavy guns outside the fortresses and without counting coastal artillery. Here, too, must be added in case of war the tremendous amounts of material in reserve that is complete and ready for the wartime army.

The lack of national security for Germany cannot be more strikingly demonstrated than by the threatening speech of the English War Minister<sup>3</sup> and the references of the French press to a preventive war. Such outrageous threats are possible only toward a defenseless people.<sup>4</sup>

BLOMBERG

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<sup>3</sup> See document No. 226, footnote 2.

<sup>4</sup> Attached to these notes is a supplement, also by Blomberg, which provides illustrations for the statements expressed in the main document (3650/813099-102).

## No. 239

7360/E536708-13

*Unsigned Memorandum*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, May 15, 1933.

e. o. II F Abr. 1718.

THE CRISIS OF THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE  
APRIL 28-MAY 13, 1933

After the Disarmament Conference had reconvened on April 25, a crisis developed soon after, on April 28. Its cause was the reaction on the part of anti-disarmament Powers to the German amendments to the MacDonald plan,<sup>2</sup> which Ambassador Nadolny presented and explained in the General Commission on that day. The amendments, the content of which is set forth in telegram No. 306, II F Abr. 1502 (enclosure 1) of April 28,<sup>3</sup> and in particular the proposal to refer the question of standardizing the armies to the Permanent Disarmament Commission for examination, were sharply opposed by Massigli and Eden. Norman Davis took a conciliatory position. At Henderson's suggestion it was decided that an attempt should be made to seek to arrive at an understanding through private talks between Nadolny and Eden.

These talks, which began on the following day and were subsequently expanded to take in the representatives of Germany, England, France, the United States, and Italy continued to May 12, but brought no result.

The position of the major Powers on the English plan, which was expressed in these talks and in the General Commission, was as follows:

Adoption of the unmodified English plan was supported by America and Italy, the latter reserving the right of proposing amendments of her own in case those proposed by other Powers should be accepted. France proposed only one amendment to part I of the English plan which deals with security, but none to the parts referring to disarmament as such. The aforesaid three Powers thus were agreed to accept the English plan as nearly in its original form as possible, and the bloc formed by them was joined by most of the other Powers represented at the Conference. Outwardly this situation found expression and came to a head in a procedural question, that is, the issue was

<sup>1</sup> The Foreign Ministry registers indicate that the memorandum was drawn up by Counselor Feine.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 90, footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (8618/E604392-94). The texts of the German amendments and the minutes of the discussion concerning them at the meetings of the General Commission on May 1 and May 3 are printed in League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (Geneva, 1933): *Records of the Conference*, ser. B, *Minutes of the General Commission*, vol. II, pp. 431-452.

raised whether part I, section 1 of the English plan (effectives) should be decided on by adopting it forthwith at the second reading before considering part II, section 2 (material). The intention was to force us to take a position on the question of the transformation of the Reichswehr before the other Powers would disclose their position on disarmament in the field of war material. We on the other hand demanded that the English plan be considered as a whole, i. e., including the part on material, before we would state our position on the question of the standardization of armies. In order to ease the situation of our delegation in Geneva, our Embassies in London, Washington, and Rome were instructed on May 5 to undertake a démarche with a view to bringing about a relaxation of tension (telegraphic instruction II F Abr. 1586/II of May 5 to London, Washington, and Rome—enclosure 2<sup>4</sup>). The démarche was unsuccessful in London; <sup>5</sup> Washington sent Norman Davis a noncommittal instruction leaving the decision to his judgment; <sup>6</sup> only Rome promised to support us. <sup>7</sup> There was no relaxation of tension, as indicated by the talks in Geneva on May 8. This was followed in the evening of May 8 by the issuance of War Minister von Blomberg's interview <sup>8</sup> which stated our willingness to negotiate on the question of the standardization of armies, while rejecting acceptance of any dictated solution in this question. This German concession was equally unsuccessful in producing the desired easing of the situation in Geneva, as shown by the attached telegrams Nos. 340, 341, and 344 of May 9 from the delegation (enclosures 3, 4, and 5).<sup>9</sup> Now that we had opened the way to reaching an understanding in the question of the transformation of the Reichswehr, the question of material was placed in the foreground and we were denied the right to give effect to equality of rights in this field even on a modest scale. The details of the talks and the unsuccessful efforts to reach agreement on this point are outlined in telegrams Nos. 346, 349, and 350 of May 10 (enclosures 6, 7, and 8) <sup>10</sup> and especially telegram No. 353 of May 11 (enclosure 9).<sup>11</sup> A new démarche in London and Washington, instructions for which were issued from here on the same day, No. 182 of May 11 (enclosure 10),<sup>12</sup> did not alter the situation.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed (7360/E536601-05). See document No. 209, footnote 3.

<sup>5</sup> This was reported by Hoesch in telegram No. 118 of May 5 (7360/E536617-18). See also *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. v, document No. 113.

<sup>6</sup> In telegram No. 240 of May 6, Luther reported that he had carried out the instruction with Under Secretary of State Phillips, who stated that "on the face of it" the German request seemed to him reasonable (8618/E604400-01). Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933*, vol. I, p. 128.

<sup>7</sup> Rome telegram No. 99 of May 6, not printed (8618/E604404-05).

<sup>8</sup> Given to a representative of Wolff Telegraph Bureau.

<sup>9</sup> Not printed (7360/E536622); (7360/E536627-29); and (7360/E536625), respectively.

<sup>10</sup> Not printed (7360/E536630-32); (7360/E536642); and (7360/E536644), respectively.

<sup>11</sup> Not printed (7360/E536648-51).

<sup>12</sup> Not printed (7360/E536662-63).

The situation continued to become more dangerously acute. The negotiations of the Committee on Effectives, which had gone on during the talks described above, had meanwhile led to a result acceptable to us, to be sure, in the question of the police, but on May 11 it was decided that the units of the SS, the SA, and the Stahlhelm would be regarded as having military usefulness and therefore included in the compilation of German effectives. Although it has not yet been decided to what extent they would be counted as effectives so that Germany still has a certain chance, the outcome of the voting when we found ourselves alone with Hungary is an indication of Germany's present isolation. Against us voted France, England, Belgium, Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Portugal, and Holland, with the United States, Italy, Japan, Turkey, Austria, Spain, Sweden, and Finland abstaining.

In view of this situation Massigli could afford to reject flatly even the halting attempts at mediation with which the British approached him in the question of effectives. Since Eden, moreover, supported by the American Wilson, also adopted a wholly intransigent attitude toward our moderate demands in the question of material, our situation was extremely serious, the more so as no support was forthcoming from the Italian side, either (telegram No. 357 from the delegation of May 13 [12], enclosure 11<sup>13</sup>). To judge the atmosphere it is further necessary to refer to the speeches of Paul-Boncour and Lord Hailsham, which were delivered during that period,<sup>14</sup> together with the fact that publication of an article on the disarmament question by the Foreign Minister in the May 12 issue of the *Leipziger Illustrierte Zeitung*<sup>15</sup> was made the occasion for vehement attacks on the German point of view. A systematic effort was launched by the French side to confront Germany by a vote of the Bureau with the choice of accepting the transformation of the Reichswehr without receiving even the least concession in the matter of taking account of the trained reserves of the other Powers and in regard to material. In this situation Ambassador Nadolny decided that at the forthcoming meeting of the Bureau he would express—if necessary at the time of the vote on the part on effectives of the English plan—acceptance of the principle of standardization of the armies and our willingness to negotiate about

<sup>13</sup> Not printed (7360/E536680-81). Nadolny's report on his talk with the Italian representative Soragna was continued in telegram No. 358, also sent on May 12. It quoted Soragna as stating confidentially that Rome had instructed him to support the Germans "but that he should exercise restraint since the Italian Government, too, opposed German rearmament." In Soragna's opinion "this was the regrettable consequence of raising the Austrian question." (7360/E536677)

<sup>14</sup> See document No. 226, footnote 2.

<sup>15</sup> In this article Neurath stated that no agreement on limitation and reduction of armaments would be acceptable to Germany unless it gave Germany equality of rights. He further declared that Germany could no longer do without those weapons which others considered to be necessary for their security.

this, in conformity with the statement by the Reichswehr Minister, subject to the general reservation that a satisfactory convention is concluded. The Foreign Ministry stated its agreement with this.

A compromise proposal presented by Henderson, however, offered a way out, so that the Bureau decided at its meeting on May 12, that the General Commission should open a general discussion of the section on material of the British draft convention, in the course of which each delegation would have an opportunity to bring up the other parts of the convention which were related to the subject, particularly with respect to effectives. No amendments, however, were to be taken up.<sup>16</sup>

The meeting of the Bureau<sup>17</sup> was originally set for May 15, but it was postponed to May 18 when it was announced that the Reichstag had been called into session. As a result of this decision the fate of the Disarmament Conference, whose crisis continues unchanged, has been made largely dependent on the statements which the Reich Chancellor is going to make on May 17.

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<sup>16</sup> For the record of these proceedings, see League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (Geneva, 1933): *Records of the Conference*, Series C, *Minutes of the Bureau*, vol. I, pp. 171-172.

<sup>17</sup> Should read "General Commission."

## No. 240

7892/E571662-69

### *Memorandum by an Official of Department II*

BERLIN, May 16, 1933.

zu II SG 910.<sup>1</sup>

As agreed, following yesterday's reception by the Reich Chancellor, the representatives of the Saar Territory came to my office this morning for a further discussion. The same representatives appeared as at yesterday's conference, with the exception of Kommerzienrat Röchling and Regierungsrat Spring, who had already left. Participating on behalf of Prussia were Ministerialdirektor Dr. Loehrs and Regierungsrat Globke; for Bavaria, Minister Sperr.

It should be mentioned at the outset that Editor Hoffmann<sup>2</sup> had not been present at the reception in the Reich Chancellor's office. The National Socialists had sent him word that his presence was not desired. Since we had announced his coming in our letter to the Reich Chancellery, Vice Chancellor von Papen had made inquiry, shortly before the conference, of the gentlemen waiting in the anteroom, as to whether Herr Hoffmann had also come. Since he had not, the matter was closed. Had he, too, appeared, the Vice Chancellor would undoubtedly have caused his exclusion.

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<sup>1</sup> II SG 910: Not printed (7892/E571620); see document No. 169, footnote 3.

<sup>2</sup> Editor of the *Saarbrücker Landeszeitung*.

In today's conversation, at my request, Herr Kiefer first gave a detailed report on the course of the conference with the Reich Chancellor. I supplemented the report by reading the minutes sent me meanwhile by Herr Thomsen.<sup>3</sup>

Since it had been stated by State Secretary Lammers at the close of the meeting (see the minutes), that there was to be no publicity, this question was first discussed. Various gentlemen stated that, upon their return, the members of the delegation would naturally be questioned from many directions concerning the results of the conference, and it would not do to publish the results piecemeal. During the discussion a report came in to the effect that a notice had already appeared in the Saar press concerning the meeting. It was therefore decided to send a brief joint communiqué to the press (see enclosure<sup>4</sup>) immediately after today's conference, as well as to summarize the substance of the conference in the Chancellor's office in a short statement, which might serve the gentlemen of the Saar area as a basis for their reports (see enclosure.<sup>5</sup>) It was decided that after the conference, Herren Selzner, Kiefer, Levacher, and the undersigned should continue to meet as an editorial committee.

The various points of the conference in the Chancellor's office were then discussed in turn.

On the question of the general merger of all pro-German groups, there was nothing special to mention, nor was there on the question of the continuance of the small parties.

On the question of the appointment of as small an executive committee as possible, I suggested appointing this committee at once. Herr Selzner designated as representative of the NSDAP Gauleiter Bürckel (with power of substitution). The proposal was unanimously adopted. With reference to yesterday's statements by Herr Röchling, I proposed as second member Herr Kiefer, who seems especially appropriate because of his membership in the Center, because he represents labor and particularly the mine workers, as well as because of his years of political activity. This proposal, too, was unanimously adopted. As the third member I proposed Kommerzienrat Röchling, less in view of his party chairmanship than because of his high personal qualities and his extensive, even international connections. Herr Spaniol made the counterproposal that Herr Spring be considered as representative of all the small parties, of the Stahlhelm and the military formations. I replied that Herr Spring would doubtless be highly qualified personally and as the representative of the said groups, but it was quite probable that his position as a government official would be a handicap to him. From various other directions (Schmoll,

<sup>3</sup> Document No. 236.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed (7892/E571670).

<sup>5</sup> Not printed (7892/E571680-82).

Kiefer, and Selzner), the candidacy of Röchling was supported, whereupon Herr Spaniol ceased to press his counterproposal. The executive committee accordingly consists of Herren Bürckel, Kiefer, and Röchling. I remarked that everything further, particularly the creation of a larger representative body from the political parties and collaboration with the other groups, must first be left to the committee.

At my request, Herr Spaniol then explained his ideas for a new official Saar organization. They seemed to envisage the establishment of a larger Saar office, composed of the Saar specialists from the various ministries, with a Saarlander at the head. The office would include a press officer who at the same time would have to exercise the function of a liaison man between the Saar region and the official Berlin authorities. I replied that decisions concerning the official organization could naturally not be taken here, since this was a matter for the Reich Government alone. The question could not only be handled in an informatory way. I expected no improvement from the proposed reorganization, but only a change for the worse. It would mean only the establishment of a new office, without uniting in one office all the authorities having to do with questions of the Saar, since every ministry would naturally retain its special jurisdiction. There seemed to me no reason for changing a smoothly operating organization, which had stood the test of years, and was, moreover, very inexpensive. There might be a different arrangement for the period of the plebiscite, but that question must be dismissed as premature. Also I considered a liaison man to the Saar Territory, at least at present, unnecessary, particularly since I considered it important to make direct contact with all elements of the Saar population.

Herr Spaniol's suggestions failed to receive support from other quarters.

On the question of the trade unions, it was decided that it would be the task of the Christian trade unions to negotiate with the free trade unions concerning an ordered relationship. Herr Hillenbrand and Herr Kuhnen asked how it could be arranged so that no friction and rivalry would arise between the members of the NSBO (National Socialist Shop Organization) and the trade unions. Herr Selzner replied that membership in the NSBO was based on membership in another union, so that such difficulties could not occur at all.

Finally I also went into the situation in the Saar from the point of view of foreign policy and referred to the Governing Commission, which was, on the one hand, very mistrustful; on the other, very sensitive. It was necessary to take into account the existence of that Commission, particularly by scrupulously avoiding giving it any pretexts at all for use of force. The impression unfortunately existed that some members of the Governing Commission were still toying with the idea, in the event of disorders—and they considered even relatively unim-

portant incidents disorders—of bringing French troops into the country. Naturally, in no circumstances must things come to this pass.

After the general discussion had closed with this statement, Herr Stegner, at my request, explained his ideas concerning a closer bond between the nonpolitical and semireligious [*überkonfessionellen*] associations. He referred to a resolution of these associations, particularly of the League of Saar Singers [*Saarsängerbund*], the Saar Gymnastic League [*Saarturnerschaft*], the Kyffhäuserbund, the Swimming Association [*Schwimmverband*], etc., and spoke also of conversations that he had had with several Cabinet members. He himself mentioned, to be sure, that the plans were not yet matured. I observed that it would seem to me desirable for this question to be taken up after a time by the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, which was particularly experienced in such matters, together with Bavaria. Ministerialdirektor Loehrs agreed with me.

I then referred to the question of the Saar delegations to Geneva and remarked that on this question, in general, the previous practice could continue. Naturally it would be desirable if the NSDAP could also send a representative to Geneva. This was supported by Herr Levacher.

I also mentioned the fact that the Foreign Ministry would perhaps very soon invite the authorities concerned and one or another of the representatives of the Saar Territory to a conference on the Saar Union, particularly on the large Saar demonstration at the Niederwald, planned for September 3.

Herr Richard Becker referred to the newspaper reports about German-French negotiations regarding a clearing<sup>a</sup> on prohibitions of newspapers. He reminded us that the most important newspapers of the Saar Territory (*Saarbrücker Zeitung*, *Saarbrücker Landeszeitung*) had been banned for years in France. Perhaps this question could also be discussed now. I promised to get in touch with the Press Department in this matter.

Finally there was also discussed the question of the attitude of the parties and the Saar press on the well-known new proposals of the Governing Commission concerning a more rigorous law on associations and assembly, etc. It was agreed that this proposal must be quietly but very resolutely rejected.

I thereupon closed the meeting with especial thanks to the representatives of the Saar Territory, and with the statement that, as a result of the negotiations of recent days, particularly as a result of the reception by the Chancellor, we had made good progress and had created a promising basis for harmonious collaboration in the service of the great national aim.

VOIGT

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<sup>a</sup> The word "clearing" is in English in the original.



## No. 241

7360/E536746-48

*Memorandum by the Head of the German Delegation at Geneva*

BERLIN, May 16, 1933.

e. o. II F Abr. 1737.

NOTE ON THE SITUATION AND OUR POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE  
DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

The negotiations to date and the statements made by the leading figures give the following picture of the situation at the Conference and the intentions of the opposing side:

The situation can be summed up in the brief proposition that the foremost question now is whether the English draft convention will be adopted before the opening of the World Economic Conference or whether the Conference ends in failure. The decisive factors on the opposing side are the two Anglo-Saxon Powers and France. The Anglo-Saxon Powers want to make every effort in view of the World Economic Conference, to get the draft adopted before then. The French are making every effort to make the Conference fail on account of Germany's resistance.

From this results the following position to be adopted by us:

What we are interested in, above all, is equality of rights with respect to the hitherto forbidden arms, and consideration for our special situation in the carrying out of the standardization of European continental armies. To be sure, we have so far been demanding primarily disarmament by the other Powers and we must continue to insist on this in principle. But this demand can be partly satisfied by the grant of equality of rights, and it has moreover already been realized to a certain extent—at least in a formal sense—by the English plan, while disarmament down to our level is met by the opponents' argument with respect to a reduction of armaments by stages.

If, confronted with the English draft, we keep insisting on all three of our demands, i. e. disarmament, preservation of the Reichswehr, and equal rights with respect to material, the Conference will undoubtedly end in failure, and the blame for it will be put on us. We would thus be doing the work of the French and seriously antagonize the Anglo-Saxon Powers. The only thing for us to do in the circumstances is to make a last attempt at assisting in the adoption of the English plan by declaring that we are in principle prepared to accept the English plan and withdraw our far-reaching disarmament proposals, subject to the condition that our two vital demands, namely preservation of the Reichswehr and equal rights with respect to material are complied with in a form yet to be discussed.

This would have to be put forward as a very last attempt to assure the success of the Conference through a great sacrifice on our part. But this would have to be linked, on the one hand, to the added condition that the new conference, which is to convene after 5 years, must result in further substantial disarmament; on the other hand, we would have to state that should this effort fail, we would be compelled to approach the problem of a pacification and reconstruction of the world from a different angle, namely through the question of the responsibility for the World War and its tragic consequences.

NADOLNY

## No. 242

3170/676311-13

### *The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry*

#### Telegram

MOST URGENT

LONDON, May 16, 1933—5:00 p. m.

No. 134 of May 16

Received May 16—7:00 p. m.

The tense situation here has been accentuated by the Vice Chancellor's speech on Sunday,<sup>1</sup> which was interpreted as glorifying war due to the emphasis given to some sentences by making them sound more vehement. I would in this connection call your attention to today's editorial in the *Times*, the concluding portion of which I have telegraphed in telegram No. 133,<sup>2</sup> and which substantially reflects the climate of opinion.

In these circumstances the attention not only of England but of the entire world is concentrated on the Reich Chancellor's declaration tomorrow, which is regarded as crucial for the development of the world situation. On it, it is believed, will depend the fate of the Disarmament Conference and the World Economic Conference, the formation of American policy, and perhaps even war and peace.

It is significant in this regard that Simon yesterday declined to deal with an inquiry relating to world politics by referring to forthcoming events. Equally noteworthy is Simon's evasive attitude when asked yesterday whether Lord Hailsham's speech in the House of Lords<sup>3</sup> reflected the opinion of the Cabinet. I now know, as I already told Rosenberg<sup>4</sup> confidentially for the purpose of having it reported to Berlin, that Hailsham's remarks need not be regarded as a deliberate political statement. (Group garbled) have caused astonishment in the Cabinet and that Hailsham himself is dismayed by their effect

<sup>1</sup> Papen's speech had been delivered at Münster on May 13.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (8689/E607496/1-497).

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 226, footnote 2.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 237.

abroad. The absurdity of talking about "sanctions" when, as a matter of fact, sanctions for treaty violations are not even provided for in the Peace Treaty, sufficiently characterizes Hailsham's speech as an improvisation which had not received detailed consideration; moreover, it must be borne in mind that the word "sanctions" does not have the same concrete and ominous meaning in English that it has in French.

It is interesting to observe how the anti-German attitude of all the groups here which are now so up in arms against Germany on account of her domestic politics and her alleged war spirit and militarism, at a certain point comes in conflict with England's aversion to becoming involved in any war on the Continent. Where taking a stand against Germany leads to the emergence of a serious danger of war, which is precisely the case in pronouncements of the kind indulged in by Lord Hailsham, serious opposition arises here and alarm is felt at the thought that France might possibly draw encouragement for rash action from England's anti-German attitude. England will therefore, as in the past, be willing to pursue a policy of understanding provided that this is still regarded as an existing possibility on the German side. No decisions appear to have been taken as yet with respect to the opposite case.

In the circumstances, interest in the four power pact is at present almost completely in abeyance. Grandi, who has instructions to push negotiations for the pact, told me a few days ago that he had the impression that there was little enthusiasm for the idea of the pact at the moment. I had the same feeling as late as last Saturday when, in a talk with Simon, I referred in the conversation to a rapprochement in the negotiations for the pact, and he merely replied that that was very nice indeed.

It is my impression, gained from talks with Norman Davis,<sup>5</sup> whom I have met several times, that America's foreign policy is closely linked to the success of the Disarmament Conference and the World Economic Conference, and that it will be virtually blown to pieces if these conferences should end in failure. Davis assured me time and again that if Germany were to show an accommodating attitude in the question of the standardization of the armies, France would in the question of material be put under concentric pressure under American leadership, from which she could extricate herself only by making extensive concessions or else accept an unhappy isolation. Davis also urged a meeting of the Chancellor, Mussolini, MacDonald, Daladier, and himself, which could take place in Switzerland or Austria, on which

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933*, vol. I, pp. 138-139.

occasion a bold solution of the disarmament question would have to be found.

All plans and proposals, however, are held in suspense at the moment and the whole world is awaiting tomorrow's speech of the Chancellor, which is expected to furnish the key to the coming decisions.

Hoesch

## No. 243

3154/669134-35

### *The Foreign Minister to the Reich Chancellor*

BERLIN, May 16, 1933.

DEAR HERR CHANCELLOR: This afternoon the Reich President received a telegram from President Roosevelt, already announced by the press,<sup>1</sup> a copy of which is enclosed herewith. It will not be feasible to avoid referring to it in general terms in your speech tomorrow. The formulated reply must be addressed by the Reich President directly to President Roosevelt and requires careful drafting.<sup>2</sup>

We can, by and large, concur with the principles set forth by the Americans. The only substantive difficulty is presented by figure 3 on page 4, which states that no nation is to increase its existing armaments over and above the limitations laid down by treaty while the first and the following steps are being taken. But it may perhaps be possible to get around this difficulty by referring to the reasons given on page 2 and declaring that 1) Germany was not demanding any weapons for the purpose of making territorial conquests, and 2) Germany, of all nations, was least capable of defending her territory since she had been stripped not only of the weapons of offense, but also of her means of defense. At the Disarmament Conference Germany had never demanded more than to be permitted to possess the same means of defense as all other States.

I believe that it will not be necessary for you to go much beyond this in referring to the telegram in your speech tomorrow.

I shall be constantly at your disposal tomorrow morning, if you should wish to discuss your speech with me.<sup>3</sup>

Yours, etc.

FRHR. V. NEURATH

<sup>1</sup> The Roosevelt message had been addressed to the Chiefs of State of all countries participating in the general Disarmament and international Monetary and Economic Conferences. For the text, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933*, vol. I, pp. 143-145.

<sup>2</sup> The telegram drafted in the Foreign Ministry and approved by Hitler was sent to President Roosevelt on May 18 (8595/E603526-27); its text was published in the press.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 246.

## No. 244

9994/E698028-29

*Circular of the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

BERLIN, May 16, 1933.  
zu W 3086<sup>2</sup> II.

With reference to instruction W 2658 of May 5.<sup>3</sup>

For information:<sup>4</sup> The course of events indicates that a temporary postponement of the transfer moratorium is advisable. The Reichsbank will first of all explain the foreign exchange position and the necessity of a transfer postponement to Standstill creditors' committees and representatives of foreign banking houses issuing German bonds. It has already requested the banks of issue in New York, London, Paris, Stockholm, Amsterdam, and Zurich for that purpose to see that their countries are represented at a conference on May 25 in Berlin.<sup>5</sup> The final decisions of the Reich Government will presumably be deferred until after the end of this conference.

For guidance in your conversations: Please emphasize that the convocation of the creditors' conference is exclusively a Reichsbank measure, not instigated by the Reich Government. Therefore the repeated German declarations, that reduction of loan capital and interest and a change in the priority of creditors by unilateral German measures are not contemplated, will not be affected by the step of the Reichsbank. In a radio message published by the Wolff Telegraph Bureau the Reichsbank President, moreover, has expressed himself to the same effect.<sup>6</sup>

Only to the Legation in The Hague: Inform Amsterdam.

Only to the Legation in Bern: Inform Zurich.

ULRICH

<sup>1</sup> This circular was sent to the German Missions in the principal European capitals. Times of dispatch were 7 p. m. and 8:10 p. m. on May 16.

<sup>2</sup> W 3086: Not printed (9037/E632609-10), Schacht's telegram No. 18 of May 14.

<sup>3</sup> Document No. 211.

<sup>4</sup> Marginal note in Baer's handwriting: "Minute. Vice President Dreyse has requested that the orientation of the press be left to the Reichsbank. Herr Aschmann has been correspondingly informed."

<sup>5</sup> The meeting date was later postponed and it took place May 29-June 2.

<sup>6</sup> WTB release No. 1155 of May 15, 1933 (9994/E698027).

## No. 245

1908/429633-36

*Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union*

SECRET

Moscow, May 16, 1933.

A 978

CONVERSATION WITH PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR LITVINOV ON MAY 16, 1933,  
ON GERMAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

During my conversation with M. Litvinov today I first brought up my misgivings regarding the attitude of the Soviet public toward Germany. I employed in general the same points of view as in my conversations with MM. Voroshilov, Krestinsky, Stern, and Bossonov,<sup>1</sup> and developed them with particularly strong emphasis on the Radek article in *Pravda*<sup>2</sup> as well as on today's treatment in *Izvestia* of the Schacht interview on German bankruptcy. I furthermore placed great importance on the inadmissibility of the agitation against Rosenberg's trip to London,<sup>3</sup> pointing out that there were no indications of any sort that Rosenberg's activity in London was anti-Soviet, that Rosenberg's newspaper, the *Völkischer Beobachter*, had taken a decidedly pro-Soviet attitude, and that it was not admissible to bring up constantly anew, years later, statements of a politician out of the past. This general attitude of the Soviet press made me pessimistic about the further development of German-Soviet relations. On the German side really everything had been done that could be asked for, and the complaints that we could bring forward many times exceeded those of the Soviets. I discussed this with particulars by citing a typical case among many hundreds, as, for example, the economic destruction of Reich German farmers in the Soviet Union through confiscatory taxation, called their nationality into question, etc.

M. Litvinov replied with lengthy statements during which he became increasingly excited. In so doing he repeated in large part the already familiar material in regard to the separate incidents (Derop, Soviet club in Hamburg, Bobrowitzer in the internment camp<sup>4</sup>), trying to prove that the percentage of interference with the individual Soviet nationals in Germany was much greater than with the Reich Germans in the Soviet Union. He then went thoroughly into Rosenberg's trip to England in particular and the attitude of the National Socialist leaders toward Bolshevism in general. In regard to Herr

<sup>1</sup> For Dirksen's account of his conversations with Krestinsky and Voroshilov see document No. 232. No account has been found of those with Stern and Bossonov.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 232 and footnote 2.

<sup>3</sup> See documents Nos. 223 and 237.

<sup>4</sup> Documents on the Bobrowitzer incident have not been found.

Rosenberg he stated that he simply was the head of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the dominant party in Germany; that he himself came from the former Russia; that he had maintained and perhaps still did maintain close relations with Russian and in particular Ukrainian emigrants.

I refuted the statements of this sort made by the People's Commissar, stressed that Rosenberg's visit in England certainly had no relation to the German-Soviet relationship; that Rosenberg's paper, the *Völkischer Beobachter*, had expressed itself in an entirely positive way in regard to the Soviet Union. If one considered Rosenberg to be an official person, the same must be true of Radek and the other Soviet publicists who were now writing against Germany.

M. Litvinov tried unsuccessfully to withdraw from this argumentation and to represent M. Radek as a private author who in this case had not even been able to get his article into *Izvestia* and had had to take refuge in *Pravda*. M. Litvinov contradicted himself, however, by emphasizing on the other hand that unity of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was very well ensured because it was brought together in the Foreign Commissariat.

Whereas this part of M. Litvinov's statements was pure fencing, he said afterwards that Soviet public opinion was reserved in regard to the attitude of the National Socialist party toward the Soviet Union for the reason that it was not yet convinced that this policy would last. In party circles it was feared that after German-French and German-English relations had improved an anti-Soviet attitude would again prevail.

I contested this possibility and told M. Litvinov that he could after all not ask for anything more than that both the actions and deeds of the German Government and the language of the press were positive and pro-Soviet.

M. Litvinov closed his remarks with the words that the basic attitude of the Soviet Government toward Germany had remained entirely the same: that the Soviet Government was convinced that it could have just as friendly relations with a National Socialist Germany as with a fascist Italy. The same was true of the other basic questions of German-Soviet policy: the relations with Poland and the fight against the Versailles Treaty. There were simply fluctuations now in public opinion in the Soviet Union, which are evident, for example, in Radek's article, too; these fluctuations were to be attributed to the uncertainty which still existed about German policy.

*Unsigned Memorandum*<sup>1</sup>

It would be advisable for the Chancellor not to take any position on Roosevelt's proclamation at the beginning of his speech today but only after he has developed independently of the proclamation our own principles of disarmament policy. After the German principles have been set forth, something to the following effect might then be said with reference to Roosevelt's:

I have noted with great satisfaction that with the principles which I have just developed we are in complete agreement on all essential points with the principles which the President of the United States of America enunciated in his significant proclamation yesterday. Germany has no intention of making territorial conquests by force of arms. Her policy in the field of armament is designed solely for the defense of her native soil. We, too, hold that the cardinal point is to focus disarmament policy primarily on the abolition of aggressive weapons and that the same weapons cannot be considered as weapons of defense in the hands of one power but as aggressive weapons in the hands of another power.

Moreover, as I have just stated, we also want to take our stand on the basis of the British plan, although we are in agreement with President Roosevelt in regretting that the plan does not go far enough in the disarmament of the strongly armed nations.

Finally, the radical prohibition against sending armed forces into foreign territory is also entirely in harmony with the line we are following in our defense policy. If all governments recognize the American principles, as we do, then a big step has been taken toward understanding and it will then only be a question of one thing: These principles must be embodied in the convention to be concluded, equitably and with equality for all nations, in the spirit of yesterday's proclamation.

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<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Delivered to the Chancellor at 11 a. m., May 17, v. N[eurath], May 17."

[EDITORS' NOTE. On May 17 Hitler delivered an address before a special session of the Reichstag. The first part of the address contained a general discussion of various problems of foreign policy, particularly with reference to the Versailles Treaty. The second part was a statement of policy, translation of which is as follows:

On behalf of the German people and the German Government I have to make the following statement:

Germany has disarmed. She has complied with all obligations imposed upon her in the Peace Treaty to an extent far beyond the limits of equity and reason. Her army consists of 100,000 men. The strength and the character of her police are internationally regulated. The auxiliary police established in the days of the revolution have an



exclusively political character. In the critical days of the revolution they had to replace that part of the regular police force which was considered by the new regime to be unreliable, and after the success of the revolution they are already being reduced and will be completely disbanded before the end of the year.

Germany has thus a fully justified moral claim to the fulfillment by the fully armed powers of their obligations under the Treaty of Versailles.

The equality of status accorded to Germany in December has not yet been given practical expression. With regard to the renewed French contention that the safety of France must be secured to the same extent as the equality of Germany, I would like to ask two questions:

(1) Germany has so far accepted all the obligations of security arising from the signing of the Versailles Treaty, the adherence to the League of Nations, to the Locarno Pact, the Kellogg Pact, the Treaties of Arbitration, the Pact of Non-Aggression, etc. What other concrete assurances are left for Germany to give?

(2) On the other hand, how much security has Germany? According to the figures published by the League, France alone has 3,046 airplanes in service, Belgium 350, Poland 700, Czechoslovakia 670. In addition to this there are innumerable reserve airplanes, thousands of tanks, thousands of heavy guns, and all the necessary technical equipment for chemical warfare. Has not Germany, in her state of defenselessness and disarmament, greater justification in demanding security than the over-armed states bound together in military alliances?

Nevertheless, Germany is at any time willing to undertake further obligations of international security if all the other nations are ready on their side to do the same, and if this security is also to benefit Germany.

Germany would also be perfectly ready to disband her entire military establishment and destroy the small amount of arms remaining to her, if the neighboring countries will do the same thing with equal thoroughness. But if these countries are not willing to carry out the disarmament measures to which they are also bound by the Treaty of Versailles, Germany must at least maintain her demand for equality.

The German Government sees in the British plan a possible basis for the solution of this question, but it must demand that the defense force existing in Germany shall not be abolished unless at least qualitative equality be accorded to Germany. She must further demand that any change in her present defense force organization, which was not chosen by her but imposed on her from abroad, shall follow step by step in the same degree as the actual disarmament of the other States. Germany agrees in principle to a transitional period of 5 years during which to build up her national security, in the expectation that at the end of this period she will really be put on a footing of equality with the other States. She is also entirely ready to renounce all aggressive weapons of every sort if the armed nations, on their side, will destroy their aggressive weapons within a specified period, and if their use is forbidden by an international convention. Germany has only one desire, to be able to preserve her independence and defend her frontiers.

According to a statement made by the French Minister of War in February 1932, the French colonial troops, a large number of whom are colored, would be immediately used on the French mainland. He thus expressly includes them in the forces of the home country. It is, therefore, only just that these forces should be taken into consideration in any solution of this question. It is contrary to all principles of justice not to include fully trained reserves during their term of leave but to include, in the case of Germany, police who have no other arms or training but what their calling requires. But it is out of the question to include in the German effectives associations and organizations which merely serve educational and sporting purposes and enjoy no military training whatever, but to overlook them completely in the other countries. Germany would at any time be prepared, in the event of a mutual international supervision of armaments and of equal readiness on the part of the other states, to subject these associations to such supervision in order to prove beyond doubt to the whole world that they are of an entirely unmilitary character.

Moreover, the German Government will not reject any prohibition of arms as being too drastic if it is applied in the same manner to all other states. As long as armaments are allowed to other powers Germany cannot be permanently deprived of all weapons of defense. We are fully prepared only to make use of an equal status to an extent to be settled by negotiation.

These demands do not imply rearmament but only a desire for the disarmament of the other states.

In this connection I again welcome on behalf of the German Government the far-sighted and reasonable plan of the head of the Italian Government to create, by means of a special pact, close relations of confidence and cooperation between the four great European Powers, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Germany. The German Government is in whole-hearted agreement with Mussolini's view that this would pave the way to a permanent agreement, and will show the greatest good will, provided the other nations are prepared really to overcome any difficulties which may arise.

The proposal made by President Roosevelt of which I learned last night has therefore earned the warmest thanks of the German Government. They are prepared to agree to this method of overcoming the international crisis, for they are also of the opinion that no permanent economic reconstruction is possible unless the disarmament question is solved. They are prepared to take part unselfishly in this work of bringing order into the political and economic conditions of the world. As I stated at the outset, they are also convinced that there is today only one great task: to safeguard the peace of the world. They also recognize without hesitation the justice of the reasons which, among others, account for present-day armaments. I am obliged to state that the reason for the present armaments of France or Poland can under no circumstances be the fear of German invasion of those nations, for such fear would be only justified by the possession by Germany of modern offensive weapons which are considerably more effective than modern defensive weapons. Germany, however, does not possess such modern offensive weapons at all; she has neither heavy artillery nor tanks nor bombing airplanes nor poisonous gases. The only nation therefore which might justifiably fear invasion is the

German nation, which not only may not possess offensive weapons, but is also restricted in its right to defensive weapons and is even forbidden to erect frontier fortifications. Germany is at all times prepared to renounce offensive weapons if the rest of the world does the same. Germany is prepared to agree to any solemn pact of non-aggression because she does not think of attacking but only of acquiring security. She would welcome the possibility suggested in President Roosevelt's magnanimous proposal of bringing the United States into European relations as a guarantor of peace. The President's proposal denotes a great pacification for all who wish to co-operate in the maintenance of honest peace. We have no more earnest desire than to contribute to the final healing of the wounds caused by the War and the Treaty of Versailles. Germany does not wish to take any other path than that recognized as justified by the Treaties themselves. The German Government wishes to come to a peaceful agreement with other nations on all difficult questions. It knows that in any military action in Europe, even if completely successful, the sacrifice would be out of all proportion to any possible gains.

The German Government and the German people will under no circumstances allow themselves to be forced to sign what would mean a perpetuation of the degradation of Germany. The attempt to work on Government and people by threats will make no impression.

It is conceivable that Germany might be violated in defiance of justice and morality, but it is inconceivable and out of the question that such an act should be given legal validity by our own signature.

The attempt has been made in newspaper articles and in regrettable speeches to threaten Germany with sanctions, but such a monstrous step would only be our punishment for having pressed for the carrying out of the Treaties by our demand for disarmament. Such a measure could only lead to the definite moral and effective invalidation of the Treaties. Germany, however, even in this case, would never renounce her peaceful claims. The political and economic consequences, the chaos which such an attempt would bring on Europe, would be the responsibility of those who used such means against a people which is doing the world no harm.

Any such attempt or any attempt to do violence to Germany by means of a simple majority vote contrary to the clear meaning of the Treaties could only be dictated by the intention of excluding us from the conferences. The German people, however, today possess sufficient character in such a case not to impose their cooperation on other nations but, though with a heavy heart, to draw the only possible consequence. It would be difficult for us as a constantly defamed nation to continue to belong to the League of Nations.

The German Government and the German nation are only too fully aware of the crisis of the present time. For many years Germany has given warnings regarding the methods which would and did inevitably lead to these political and economic results. If the present direction and the present methods are continued there can be no doubt as to the ultimate result. After apparent political successes of individual nations, the resultant economic and political disasters for all will be all the more severe. We regard it as our first and most important task to avoid these results. Hitherto no effective measures have been taken. When we are told by the rest of the world that certain sympathies were formerly felt for Germany, we have at any

rate experienced the results and effects of these 'sympathies' in Germany. Since the Peace Treaty of Versailles, the German people have been in the grip of a political and economic misery the extent of which cannot be imagined by the rest of the world. Millions of destroyed existences, the ruin of entire professions, and an enormous army of unemployed—all these facts constitute a state of wretchedness the extent of which I should like to impress on the rest of the world by a single figure: since the signature of this Treaty, which was to form the foundation-stone of a new and better world for all nations, 224,900 people, men, women, old people and children, have taken their own lives, almost exclusively out of distress and misery. These unbribable witnesses bring an accusation against the spirit and fulfillment of a Treaty, from which not only the rest of the world but also millions of people in Germany awaited salvation and peace.

May the other nations realize the resolute will of Germany to put an end to a period of blundering and to find the way to a final understanding between all on the basis of equal rights.

The full text of the speech is printed in *Verhandlungen des Reichstags*, volume 457, pages 47-54. An English translation is in *Documents on International Affairs, 1933*, pages 196-208.]

## No. 247

9583/E675113-14

*The Foreign Minister to the Minister of Food and Agriculture*

BERLIN, May 17, 1933.

Sent May 18.

zu W 3127<sup>1</sup> II.

DEAR HERR HUGENBERG: The Hungarian Legation has addressed to us the enclosed note verbale of May 13, 1933,<sup>1</sup> in which it informs us that the Hungarian Government is denouncing the German-Hungarian Clearing Agreement of April 13, 1932,<sup>2</sup> as of May 31, 1933.

This step by the Hungarian Government is very undesirable from the point of view of foreign policy. It is being justified by the dilatory treatment given by the German Government to Hungarian requests for negotiations. For reasons of foreign policy, I consider it necessary that the state of affairs brought about by the Hungarian denunciation be settled immediately. To do this, it is necessary to take into account, to a sufficient extent, the Hungarian requests with respect to agricultural imports, particularly of early vegetables, fruits, and horses.

In this connection, I would like to draw attention to the recent exchange of letters between the Hungarian Minister President and the Reich Chancellor.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> W 3127: Not printed (9583/E675106-07).

<sup>2</sup> For the published text, see *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1932, pt. II, pp. 129 ff. A secret exchange of notes of the same date is filmed on 9837/E691996-2000.

<sup>3</sup> See documents Nos. 179 and 195.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Ministries of Finance and Economics, to the State Secretary in the Reich Chancellery, and to the Managing Board of the Reichsbank.\*

Yours, etc.

NEURATH

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\*Negotiations between German and Hungarian representatives began finally on May 24 and led to the signing of an agreement and protocol on June 2. Under the terms of this agreement, Hungary undertook to withdraw her denunciation of the Clearing Agreement of Apr. 13, 1932; furthermore a new compensation arrangement between the Reichsbank and the Hungarian National Bank dealt with the problems resulting from the previous clearing arrangements (9841/-E692261-65). Supplementary documents are filmed on 6145/E459902-03; 9583/-E625123-31.

## No. 248

7892/E571671-77

*Hermann Röchling to Geheimrat Voigt*

VÖLKLINGEN, May 17, 1933.  
zu II SG 910.<sup>1</sup>

DEAR HERR VOIGT: I take the liberty of sending in the enclosure the memorandum requested concerning the negotiations of the Saar representatives with Reich Chancellor Hitler which took place on May 15.

Yours, etc.

H. RÖCHLING

[Enclosure]

MARCH [sic] 17, 1933.

The conference with Reich Chancellor Hitler on May 15, 1933, was carried on in the presence of Vice Chancellor von Papen, Foreign Minister von Neurath, State Secretary Lammers, President of the Staatsrat Dr. Ley, and Herr Selzner of the Gau leadership of the NSDAP in Neustadt; the following men from the Saar Territory were also present: Levacher, Kiefer, Kuhn, Hillenbrand, Dr. Spring, Dr. Deubert, Schmoll, Spaniol, Dr. Obé of the NSDAP, Schmelzer, and the undersigned.<sup>2</sup> Counselor of Legation Thomsen kept the minutes.

After Reich Chancellor Hitler had greeted us, Herr Kiefer reported for all the men present from the Saar Territory (also for the National Socialists) the results of the morning's conference. He stressed that in the future as in the past a very careful cooperation among the political parties in the Saar Territory was necessary in order to attain as extensive an assurance as possible of the political aim of reincorporation by 100 percent in the plebiscite. As a consequence means must be sought for finding the form for this cooperation, which had to be supported by complete trust, even under the new and in part greatly

<sup>1</sup> II SG 910: Not printed (7892/E571620); see document No. 169, footnote 3.

<sup>2</sup> The positions of the Saar representatives are given in the lists appearing in documents Nos. 235 and 236.

changed conditions and in consideration of the approaching date of the plebiscite. But after all it was not simply a question of winning—or keeping—the parties gathered here, and of their cooperation for the plebiscite, but it was also a question of preventing the Marxists from coming into a situation where substantial elements from them split off to the separatists. In the past the separatists with us had consisted purely of riffraff, some of whom had already taken French citizenship, who were thus in any case lost to us and who were also not much of a loss. He was in the strange position here of having to advocate that all ways and means be sought for preventing them from being repelled by our policy, especially in the Warndt border area (where there were many Communists who were not anti-German). Therefore the policy toward the free trade unions, whom they assuredly did not love, also had to be carried on in such a way that no dangers developed here. The temptation was very great for the free trade unions in some circumstances to combine with the Lorraine unions; the latter had retained their earlier German structure and had very little in common with the French unions. In addition the French State was dismissing from the Saar mines without notice everyone it recognized as a National Socialist. With us there were about 15–16,000 miners who could be dispensed with according to the current situation at the Saar mines. In the neighboring Lorraine there was a whole mass of unemployed miners. The danger existed that at the first opportunity they would dismiss our people and bring in the Lorrainers daily by train. Thus our entire policy in the Saar Territory had to be formed from the point of view that nothing should happen in this respect. Prior to his statements about the Marxists and the trade unions Herr Kiefer had pointed out that the question of the maintenance of the various parties besides the NSDAP (particularly the small ones such as the Bourgeois Center and the German-Saarland People's party) also had to be dealt with. With us the opinion was that the existence of these parties at least until the plebiscite was desirable, since to some extent population groups rallied around these parties which were not accessible to the NSDAP. Thus for the future work three columns came into question: 1) the political parties, 2) the Christian trade unions, 3) the cultural and supraparty associations. The fighting front had to be made up of these three columns. Finally the foreign policy situation should be discussed.

To this the Reich Chancellor replied: It was also his aim to conduct policy in the Saar Territory in such a way that the return of the Saar Territory in full freedom and to the full extent was guaranteed by as favorable a vote as possible. Close cooperation of the population groups represented here had to be assured. As far as the smaller parties were concerned, whether they should continue to exist or not,

he certainly had no objection to their existence provided that they themselves had the vitality to continue it. Incidentally, it had been reported to him that a great many people were leaving the Marxist parties. The most important thing was that the success of the Reich policy internally be so great that the power of attraction would make itself felt on the members of the Marxist parties in the Saar Territory as well. For the rest, the Socialists had failed everywhere from the national point of view. That had always been the case in Austria; in Czechoslovakia they had failed time and again in national questions, in that they had either abstained from voting or had even come forward against the German parties. In Austria today it was no better. The national questions were simply not the most important thing for this internationally oriented party. Incidentally, he did not dream of tossing the simple people who constituted the membership in the same pot with the leaders and bigwigs by any means. The latter were either out-and-out traitors to their fatherland, as was the case with Herr Braun (I do not know whether he mentioned this name directly), or people with whom nothing could be done any longer. But the absolute collapse of the Social Democratic party in Germany would gradually have a great effect on all the surrounding countries. By reason of its size and its strong influence that party had had such tremendous prestige among the neighboring states, particularly the German-speaking ones, that the total collapse and disappearance of that party would have a tremendous effect everywhere. One could note this even today at all sorts of places. And so within the foreseeable future the SPD would no longer have to be reckoned with in the Saar Territory. The question of the free trade unions was another matter. In the Reich they had let the free trade unions know that nothing would be undertaken against them if they restricted themselves to representing the interests of the workers and detached themselves from the SPD. The backing which the SPD had had from the free trade unions (also financially) had been entirely impossible. But the trade unions had not wanted to listen to anything on that subject; as a consequence the action against them had been necessary. With this there naturally existed the possibility, in some circumstances, of proceeding against the free trade unions in the Saar Territory. As far as those people were concerned who had not acted correctly in respect to the fatherland in the past, of course the Reich Government could even today promise an amnesty at the time of the reincorporation. But this amnesty would not help those who were killed by the people because of their conduct. It had happened in the Rhineland that the separatists had known this, and many had fled for that reason. And those who had not fled had been killed. In any case all of our actions and measures had to be adapted in such a way that

through maintaining the parties that represent circles of the population that are inaccessible to the NSDAP a 100 percent success will be attained in the plebiscite. If they marched in several columns this success would be better assured than if there were only one column. Perhaps there was concern here and there that after the reincorporation the Saar Territory would be flooded with new officials. He was even now in the greatest embarrassment as to where in the Reich he should obtain all the people he needed for performing the existing tasks. In consequence one need have no great concern in the Saar Territory in this regard. And the further development in the Reich toward a corporate state [*Ständestaat*] would be instituted only after the reincorporation had been completed, in so far as it had not developed of itself by that time, without causing difficulties. Nothing was to be done in this regard that could in any way make difficulties. For him the two great supporting forces in the Saar Territory were the NSDAP and the Christian trade unions. They had to be the supporting columns of the whole; and the Christian trade unions must try to draw in all those circles which were out of reach of his movement. He was convinced that in this way the task could be accomplished.

After Hitler Dr. Ley spoke briefly, pointing out that he had discussed the question of the free trade unions with Herr Hillenbrand on the occasion of the Workers' Congress. He had obtained a number of seats in the Herrenhaus for him with the request that he give them to whomever he wished, even free trade unionists. He was still of the opinion that by confiscating the property of the SPD and the free trade unions and by outlawing their leaders one could destroy the free trade unions. But if through the negotiations of the leaders of the Christian trade unions with the free trade unions the latter could be persuaded to separate from the SPD, then of course that was much better.

Herr Hillenbrand indicated briefly that they wanted to try this, whereas Herr Kuhn expressed the conviction that they would be successful.

The Reich Chancellor said he agreed with these speakers.

Herr Spaniol pointed out that from the experience of late he was convinced that it would be possible for them to bring over a great many Communists, too. Incidentally, the rest of the parties represented here and their leaders were obligated to see that their people stayed with them and that they kept together.

Herr Schmoll remarked twice again that his party had no reason for existence; he himself had a heart ailment, but they would be glad to remain until the reincorporation. He then made the suggestion that there be made available to the Hypotheken-bank 40 million French



francs so that it would be in a position to redeem the French mortgages that were being withdrawn today. Herr Kiefer cut this off as not appropriate to today's conference and once more stressed the importance of all population groups holding together, and he thanked the Reich Chancellor in everyone's name for the conference.

The Reich Chancellor stressed that if the Saar Territory were able to bring the plebiscite record close to 100 percent for the Reich, then it would have fulfilled its task 100 percent.

H. RÖCHLING

## No. 249

6077/E450699-701

### *Memorandum by the Director of Department II*

BERLIN, May 19, 1933.  
zu II Oe. 599.<sup>1</sup>

Notwithstanding the statements which for tactical reasons I considered proper to make to the Austrian Minister during his last conversation about the complaint in the Frank affair, I should nevertheless like to express my personal opinion to the effect that the complaint of the Austrian Government about the conduct of the Bavarian Minister of Justice in Graz seems justified. In my opinion the question whether the Austrians should not be given the desired satisfaction in one form or another will still have to be carefully studied. The attacks on Federal Chancellor Dollfuss as the "little Metternich,"<sup>2</sup> the insulting remarks about the Vienna police and the inflammatory invitation to "take the clubs away from the police and throw them in the canal" surely exceed the limits of what can be excused by Herr Frank's indignation about his reception in Vienna, his political temperament, and even the excitement of the electoral campaign. As a member of the Reich Government he should definitely have exercised greater restraint, at least on Austrian soil. Consideration should be given as to whether in the electoral campaign in Austria, which will certainly increase in vehemence and severity, it would be better not to use precisely those German personages who have official positions as leaders of the movement. In this connection I also anticipate with great concern the assignment of party members to the German Legation.<sup>3</sup> Would it perhaps be possible to give the Austrians privately at least

<sup>1</sup> II Oe. 599: Not printed (6077/E450690-95), a memorandum by Köpke of May 19 concerning a talk with the Austrian Minister. Tauschitz had left an excerpt (6077/E450696-98) from Frank's speech at Graz (see document No. 234) and made further protest regarding it. Tauschitz also referred to indications that the Reich Government was considering a ban on travel to Austria; he expressed the hope that Germany would not resort to such measures.

<sup>2</sup> Handwritten note in margin: "Millimetternich."

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 256, footnote 2.

a pacifying assurance that Herr Frank and other members of the Reich and provincial governments would not appear personally in the electoral campaign in Austria? <sup>4</sup>

KÖPKE

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<sup>4</sup> This document bears the marginal notation, "submitted to the Reich Minister," but there is no further indication of action taken.

## No. 250

8125/E581652

### *Foreign Minister Neurath to Ambassador Bergen*

BERLIN, May 19, 1933.

DEAR BERGEN: I have myself taken care of the matter mentioned in your letter of May 12.<sup>1</sup> Menshausen will tell you the result. It went off without any difficulties.

Concerning the outcome of the exchange of views between Papen, Kaas, and the Curia, Papen has kept me informed. Menshausen is bringing you the current draft <sup>2</sup> along with a letter containing proposals for modifications.<sup>3</sup> I am of the opinion that it would be best to have the communications run between Kaas and Papen. However

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. document No. 228. The matter referred to was evidently discussed in the portion of Bergen's letter which had been left out of the excerpt found in the file.

<sup>2</sup> Apparently this draft is the same as that cited at document No. 228, footnote 2.

<sup>3</sup> Papen's proposals for modifications in the draft concordat were contained in a letter to Kaas dated May 17 (6153/E460720-24). Concerning article 31, around which much of the subsequent discussion was to occur, Papen wrote: "The Chancellor, as I have already written to you, wishes here a clear decision, for which I propose the following text: 'In view of the guarantees provided for by the provisions of this concordat of legislation protecting the rights and freedoms of the Catholic Church in the Reich and its Länder, the Holy See forbids, within the meaning of Canon 139, sec. 4, first sentence, all clergy to accept an official function in a political organization. The Holy See will empower the bishops, by special directions issued to them for guidance, to approve exceptions in occasional especially well-grounded cases where the interests of the Church are involved.'"

Papen went on to say that the second paragraph of article 31, as drafted, was satisfactory except for certain needed verbal changes. This paragraph as modified by Papen would read: 'Provided that the equality of rights as citizens of the Catholic clergy continues to be protected, the Holy See is further prepared to extend the requirement to obtain permission, Canon 139, sec. 4, C. I. C., beyond the actual parliaments to include membership of the clergy in communal and similar economic-political bodies.'

In explanation of his proposed text of article 31 Papen stated: "by means of the version proposed by me, it is intended that clergy who are now in the parliamentary bodies, and whose further membership appears especially urgently desirable, can remain there."

"You remark several times, Herr Prelate, on the great concessions in the Austrian Concordat. I may note that the relations are completely different with us, and that the assurances which the Holy See obtains from us in the Concordat in its present form, include everything which has been sought for in vain for many years."

"I would not therefore assume that, in view of the entire situation in Germany, the Holy See can let this opportunity slip away because of considerations involving article 31, for I think I ought to say that this article, in the form desired by us, will be a *sine qua non*."

Papen has no objection at all to Kaas talking to you about the various questions relating to the concordat, and I have told him that you must be kept informed about the progress of the negotiations; he is in agreement with this.

Yours, etc.

NEURATH

## No. 251

7360/E536819-23

### *Circular of the State Secretary*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, May 19, 1933—7:50 p. m.  
e. o. II F Abr. 1786.

Drafting Officer: Counselor of Legation Feine.

The following, for your strictly confidential information, is the text of an internal instruction to the delegation at Geneva, approved by the Chancellor of the Reich, concerning the attitude to be taken toward the MacDonald plan on the basis of the Chancellor's speech on May 17.<sup>2</sup>

BÜLOW

### *Instruction approved by the Reich Chancellor:*

The attitude to be observed at Geneva with respect to the MacDonald plan on the basis of the Chancellor's speech on May 17.

1. Germany's claim at the Disarmament Conference is, as before: security through disarmament of the heavily armed states and equality of rights for Germany.

2. Germany sees in the English draft a possible basis for the solution of these questions and therefore accepts the draft as a basis of the convention to be concluded.

3. Germany is willing to negotiate further guarantees of security by treaty in addition to those already existing, in particular to adhere to a solemn nonaggression pact, provided that all other nations are prepared to do the same and Germany will equally benefit from it.

4. Germany is prepared within the framework of the English plan to assimilate her long-term service professional army to the armies of the other European continental states, taking into account her special situation, provided she is accorded at least qualitative equality. The transformation must be effected concurrently with the reduction in armaments of the other states. In this arrangement we must insist on

<sup>1</sup> This circular telegram was sent to the Embassies in Great Britain (No. 146), the United States (No. 201), France (No. 259), Italy (No. 135), the Soviet Union (No. 119), Spain (No. 53), Japan (No. 62), Turkey (No. 65), and Poland (No. 78); and to the Legations in Belgium (No. 49), Switzerland (No. 41), Yugoslavia (No. 40), Hungary (No. 31), the Netherlands (No. 41), Czechoslovakia (No. 38), Norway (No. 27), and Sweden (No. 47).

<sup>2</sup> See Editors' Note, p. 451.

the maximum number of long-term service soldiers; any limitation of their number can be considered only after the superiority in personnel of the other states has been eliminated by reduction in armaments.

5. All trained reserves as well as the overseas forces of the other states, which can be used in the home country, must be included in the calculation of effectives.

6. In regard to the determination of army strength, Germany objects to including the German political formations, which possess no military character whatsoever. Germany, however, is prepared to extend international control of armaments to include also the extramilitary [*aussermilitärischen*] formations, subject to a similar disposition being shown on the part of the other states.

7. Germany accepts every prohibition of weapons which equally and with equal effect applies also to the other states. She is ready to waive allocation of *offensive* weapons if the armed nations destroy such offensive weapons within a definite space of time and their use is thereafter prohibited internationally. As to the definition of weapons of offense, Germany refers to the definition in the public statement of the President of the United States of America. (Weapons of offense accordingly are such weapons which make possible a successful attack on defensive installations, i. e., bombing planes, *mobile* heavy artillery, tanks (~~land cruisers~~), poison gas. Coastal fortifications and fixed heavy artillery are not included.) As for arms not provided for in the English draft as regards Germany (defensive planes, light tanks, and submarines), Germany agrees to make use of her equal rights only to an extent to be determined by negotiations.

8. With respect to the restoration of her national security, Germany agrees to a transition period of 5 years. Germany must receive real and full equality with the other states at the end of the 5-year period of transition.

9. With regard to the navy the period of transition terminates at the end of 1936. This date follows from the expiration of the Treaties of Washington and London. In 1935, Germany will, according to the MacDonald plan, participate in the negotiations for further reduction of naval armaments. Germany undertakes during the period terminating at the end of 1936:

a) not to exceed the number of surface vessels to which she has been bound until now, and

b) not to lay down more than one ship in replacement of one of her overage capital ships.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> With reference to this instruction, the following additional instruction by Bülow was sent by telegram to the Embassies in Great Britain (No. 147), the United States (No. 202), France (No. 260), and Italy (No. 136):

"I request you at the earliest opportunity, while the impact of the Chancellor's speech is still felt, to state to the appropriate authorities that by the statements of the Reich Chancellor on the disarmament question, Germany has given evidence of a very accommodating attitude and has done her part to help bring about securing the success of the Disarmament Conference. It is now the responsibility of the other states to make clear their positions on the disarmament question. There is now a possibility in our opinion of reaching speedy decisions in Geneva if the other side will show the same accommodating attitude which we have shown. This is the command of the hour in view of the impending World Economic Conference."

The Embassy in the United States, moreover, was instructed to say "that the message of President Roosevelt has shown that the United States is working toward this goal in the same manner as we are."

## No. 252

8068/E579257-69

*The Reichswehr Ministry to the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

T. A. Nr. 380/33 geh. R. T 3 V

BERLIN, May 19, 1933.  
IV Ru. 2342.

Two reports from the Military Attaché in Moscow, Colonel Hartmann, are transmitted in the annex.

The reports deal exclusively with questions of the stations.

They are being transmitted at the desire of Ambassador von Dirksen, who expressed the wish that these reports be brought to the knowledge of the Foreign Ministry.

By order:  
JODL

[Enclosure 1]

*The Military Attaché in the Soviet Union to the Head of the Troop Office in the Reichswehr Ministry*

No. 142/33

Moscow, May 16, 1933.

Subject: Experiments in *To*.<sup>2</sup>

On May 11 the following telegram went to the Reichswehr Ministry:

"Consultation on May 10. Tukhachevsky agrees to carrying out experiments *To* 1933 even without new material. Preparations continue. The time when maneuvers will begin will be discussed here with Fischmann.<sup>3</sup> Hartmann."

With reference to the report on the preceding conversation with Sukhorukov <sup>4</sup> (my report 139/33 of May 9, paragraph 4 <sup>5</sup>) the following is to be reported in addition:

I reported on the entire *To* matter to Tukhachevsky as I had to Sukhorukov previously, oriented him on the predominantly negative information received from Sukhorukov, and asked him for his opinion [word missing] all past statements by Russian [word missing] did not in our opinion have any final character.

Tukhachevsky now first tried to push the matter aside rhetorically by saying that in the fall of 1932 it had been stated in Berlin that Germany was forced for financial reasons to proceed to the liquidation of the Russian stations; <sup>6</sup> he had considered that this statement applied to all three stations. I replied that so far there had only been

<sup>1</sup> The pages of the original of this document have been burned around the edges, so that a number of words are missing or illegible.

<sup>2</sup> Abbreviation for Tomka, code name of the experimental station for chemical warfare. See document No. 197 and footnote 6.

<sup>3</sup> Chief of the Chemical Troops of the Red Army; see enclosure 2.

<sup>4</sup> Of the Department of Foreign Liaison of the Red Army staff.

<sup>5</sup> Not found.

<sup>6</sup> Tukhachevsky headed a Russian delegation to attend German maneuvers in September and October 1932.

talk of dissolving *Lip*<sup>7</sup> and that actually a portion of the experiments at *Lip* were then by agreement to be transferred to *To*.

Tukhachevsky then resolutely took the stand that even the cessation of the experiments in *To*, if this had to happen, would not mean any basic change in the military cooperation. However, the results in the chemical area were so far minimal. If the German side wished to start up the work in *To* once more, however, he would agree without further ado.

In order to define the decision clearly I pointed out to Tukhachevsky Fischmann's previous condition that first a new, chemical warfare agent [*Kampfstoff*] should be furnished and asked whether this demand was actually maintained by the Russian side as a *conditio sine qua non*. Tukhachevsky avoided the subject once more and said that if it were necessary to continue the experiments in *To* this would be done; he must ask, however, that the Russians in German laboratories be made acquainted with the newest chemical warfare agents. Tukhachevsky once again ignored the repetition of my previous question and continued to follow his train of thought: Fischmann requested a program of what he could see in Germany; it was necessary for him to gain complete clarity about the latest situation with regard to chemical warfare agents. It was only after my third question whether the actual presence of a new chemical warfare agent, as Fischmann has asked in the past, was considered to be the indispensable prerequisite for the further [word missing] in *To*, that Tukhachevsky defined his position exactly to the effect that the work could proceed on the present basis even [word missing] new agents of chemical warfare. Tukhachevsky digressed once more and said that one should really give Fischmann insight into the chemical process in Germany, however, and not only show him "buildings."

Several times I assured Tukhachevsky that we actually did not possess a new agent of chemical warfare and that we had an interest in such an agent in the same way as did the Russians. Foreign work in this area was also being attentively observed, if only from the point of view of *defense against gas*. To our knowledge other states, too, which could work on this question with quite different means, had so far not trodden on any fundamentally new paths. Moreover I was convinced that the Russians observed the foreign research in this area at least as zealously; possibly the Russians knew more about this than we. Schrott,<sup>8</sup> who was also present, let slip the significant admission: "perhaps."

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<sup>7</sup> Abbreviation for Lipetsk, the German air training station in the Soviet Union. Dirksen had discussed this problem at length in a memorandum which he sent to Meyer on Jan. 6 (9325/E661354-61). Dirksen stressed that on political grounds it was highly desirable to maintain the station.

<sup>8</sup> Commander Schrott was in the Department of Foreign Liaison of the Red Army staff.

As regards the work of the year 1934 Tukhachevsky said that the Russian side would in all probability not be able to provide funds in the budget for the continuation of *To*. Therefore the promise for 1933 was not binding for the subsequent years.

In order once more to be entirely sure and prevent any subsequent divergent interpretation I asked Tukhachevsky whether according to the affirmative information he had received the transports heretofore suspended and other preparations for *To* could proceed. He answered this question in the affirmative and only asked that an agreement be reached with Fischmann regarding the time for beginning the work. Tukhachevsky stressed once more that the present scientific status no longer justified a continuation of the work in *To* for 1934, unless in the meantime new bases of special interest were gained. In that case it would be possible to divert funds from another position in the budget in order to free them for continuing *To*.

A party at the Ambassador's on May 11 in honor of the German military [word missing]<sup>9</sup> provided an opportunity for a detailed discussion by the Chief of Wa A<sup>10</sup> with People's Commissar Voroshilov and his deputy, Tukhachevsky. It resulted in full agreement regarding the necessity and sincerity of the military cooperation, though not without the repeated indication that this military policy line could not be adhered to without full agreement with the general political line. Regarding the *To* matter, no dates had been obtained as yet from Fischmann; however, he made sure for his part of the most far-reaching support of his desires, unrelated to this, for the advancement of the Russian interest in the area of military chemistry, which was also promised him to a full extent and more or less with a personal guarantee by the Chief of Wa A.

May 15 resulted in a further rapprochement in connection with the inspection of the chemical combine in Bobriki accompanied by Fischmann.<sup>11</sup>

In the night of May 15 there occurred the [illegible] hour conversation about the *To* time schedule. At first Fischmann clung stubbornly to his position that a considerable shortening of the stay in *To* was possible and that because the place will be otherwise occupied it would be necessary to carry out the experiment as late as possible. At the same time he desired an extension of the experiment in a number of points, which was willingly promised him by the Chief of Wa A. Fischmann did not want to go beyond a 2-month period (September and October). Our position was to the effect that the original period (3 months) and time of the experiments (July through September) should be maintained if possible. For a long time it was

<sup>9</sup> See document No. 232.

<sup>10</sup> Abbreviation for Heereswaffenamt, of which General Bockelberg was Chief.

<sup>11</sup> See enclosure 2.

not possible to bring our two positions close together, so that the specter of a renewed appeal for a decision by Tukhachevsky appeared. In particular Fischmann wanted to make any compliance in the time of the experiments dependent on the success of further discussions and information in Berlin, which was entirely [un] acceptable to us. Finally Fischmann came around to agree to a compromise proposal which provided for an experimental period of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  months in all, to last from August 15 until the end of October. (Cf. the telegram of May 16 with this text: "Dates for *To* definitely agreed upon: preliminary detachment to arrive on August 1, experimental period August 15 to October 31, connecting up with the terminating detachment. On May 29, two representatives of Fischmann will arrive for conversations on the substantive *To* program. Hartmann." and the minutes of the discussion of May 16.)

On the whole my opinion is as follows:

a. There *is* among the highest-placed Russians a serious and sincere willingness to deepen our military cooperation.

b. This line can be followed, however, *only* if the disturbances in the general political relations can be finally and permanently liquidated in a form convincing for the Russians. The Russian mistrust, as such [word illegible] active, keeps getting new nourishment from the actual events [in] Germany and their repercussions in the Russian press. In my opinion it is at the moment *not* as though the military cooperation that has been tested over the years could smooth over political unevennesses elsewhere, whereas it has often contributed greatly to doing so in earlier cases.

c. Regarded from the German military side, the cooperation likewise presupposes full sincerity. In my opinion it is not possible to hold back from the Russians small innovations and improvements in our equipment. They are *in any case* always excellently informed via foreign countries, their industrial espionage, numerous visits and—not least important—through unintentional but unavoidable differences in the German information.

Only a complete "either/or" is possible. With the increasing industrial consolidation and independence of Russia, the friendship with this country can only gain in importance from the military point of view.<sup>12</sup>

HARTMANN

<sup>12</sup> In his comprehensive report of June 13 (see document No. 147, footnote 5) Bockelberg had the following to say concerning his reception by the Red Army: "The reception by the officers of the Red Army was pronouncedly friendly. One had the impression that Deputy Commissar for War Tukhachevsky, in gratitude for his reception in Germany, had given directions to treat the German delegation in every way in a favored and friendly manner. It was emphasized by the leading persons of the Red Army at every occasion which presented itself that they placed the greatest value on close cooperation with the German Army and German technology. *People's Commissar for War Voroshilov and Chief of the General Staff Yegorov* to be sure pointed out in this connection that the armies were members of their respective states, and *that a close cooperation was only possible if the high policy of the Governments pursued the same goals.* The same thing was stressed many times by the representatives of the Russian



[Enclosure 2]

*The Military Attaché in the Soviet Union to the Reichswehr Ministry  
(Division T 3)*

No. 143/33

Moscow, May 16, 1933.

MINUTES OF THE CONFERENCE WITH THE CHIEF OF THE CHEMICAL  
TROOPS, M. FISCHMANN

On May 15 on the occasion of an inspection trip to the Bobriki chemical factory there developed a lengthy discussion with M. Fischmann.

A. The To  
matter.

Present :

Lieutenant General von Bockelberg  
Colonel Hartmann  
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas  
Captain Krebs  
Chief of the Chemical Troops Fischmann  
Chief of Staff of the Chemical Troops Rockinson,  
Commander [*Kommandeur*] Schrott<sup>18</sup>

M. Fischmann first explained in a lengthy statement the reasons that would necessarily lead this year to a [word illegible—curtailment?] of the experimental work. Troops were billeted at the training grounds all year long and it was exceedingly difficult to arrange a time for the experiments. However, with the continuation of [word illegible] technical program the attempt was also to be made to make the necessary time available. The previous program permitted considerable reductions (decantation, tactical experiments). He therefore suggested for the experiments the period from September 1 to November 1 with a 2-week preparatory period.

However, should the program permit expansion in several points, the Russian side would also make the concession of setting the trial period at a total of 3 months (as was later added, *inclusive* of the pre-

Footnote (12)—Continued

Foreign Office. The activity and speeches of the Head of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP, Rosenberg, were felt by all Soviet offices to be especially disturbing. The Russians thought that the "double-dealing" of German foreign policy could be regarded as proven by this.

"Tukhachevsky emphasized many times at a luncheon, which he gave in his office with only a small group present when we first reported to him, that he wished to see Germany have an air force of 2,000 bombers as soon as possible in order to get out of the difficult political situation."

In concluding his report Bockelberg made the following recommendation: "Cooperation with the Red Army and the Soviet armaments industry is, in view of the extent of Russian plans and their demonstrated energy in carrying them out, urgently desirable not only for reasons of defense policy but also for technical reasons with respect to armament." (8074/E579398-449)

<sup>18</sup> Of the Department of Foreign Liaison of the Red Army staff.

paratory period). M. Fischmann mentioned several of these wishes, to which General von Bockelberg at once stated an opinion:

1. Experiments with the improved German gas mask also in *To*.

*Answer:* It is possible to show improvements of gas masks 17/18 and gas mask 24 probably also in *To*.

2. Experiments with improved protective suits likewise in *To*.

*Answer:* In so far as improvements exist they will be shown in *To*.

3. Experiments with new degassing media.

*Answer:* So far no other media but chlorine are available.

4. Experiments with gas projectors.

*Answer:* It is known that Spain has had good experience with the Stokes mortar; the German [word illegible] will try to purchase such a mortar [word illegible] if possible to show the Russians.

5. New chemical warfare agent.

*Answer:* There is no new chemical warfare agent [words illegible] iron carbonyl can be made available [words illegible].

With reference to these wishes Colonel Hartmann termed it necessary, in accordance with the past preparations and the promise of M. Tukhachevsky, to set the entire work duration exclusive of preparatory time at 3 months.

M. Fischmann termed this demand unworkable; after a lengthy discussion the following agreement was reached:

August 1: start of the work of the preparatory detachment.

August 15: start of the experimental work.

November 1: conclusion of the experimental work; directly thereafter the necessary concluding and clean-up work can be carried out.

General von Bockelberg gave assurance that everything would be done from his side to fulfill the Russian wishes as far as possible. M. Fischmann will send two representatives to discuss the technical execution of the program; they are to arrive in Berlin on May 29 and presumably remain in Berlin until June 10.

M. Fischmann expressed the wish that permission be given in this [word illegible] to dispatch several of his Russian [word illegible] for several months to various laboratories. He suggested the following places:

B. Special requests by the Russian side.

1. Professor Wirth

2. Auer firm

3. Dräger firm

4. A laboratory where the synthesis of chemical warfare agents is carried out.

5. Professor Flury in Würzburg

6. Hanseatische Gesellschaft

7. Several laboratories.

General Bockelberg stated that a decision could not be made at once on this request. After the return trip contact would be made in

Berlin with the various agencies; an answer could not be made before June 10.

M. Fischmann then expressed the intention of coming to Germany himself to conclude the laboratory work applied for; he is considering November for this trip. The wishes with regard to inspections will be transmitted in writing. M. Fischmann is particularly interested also in participating in a few war games, etc., relating to employment of gas.

HARTMANN

No. 253

2945/575847

*The Minister in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 36 of May 19

WARSAW, May 20, 1933—1:10 a. m.

Received May 20—5:40 a. m.

Foreign Minister Beck, whom I visited today in order to inform him of my impressions received in Berlin about the favorable effect of the communiqué,<sup>1</sup> received my statements with visible satisfaction and referred for his part to the progressive relaxation which was still to be noted in Poland. Together with the Minister of Interior he had taken measures to prevent anti-German agitation, particularly in so far as the person of the Reich Chancellor was affected. Corresponding influence had likewise been exerted on the press. Regarding the Reich Chancellor's speech,<sup>2</sup> Beck did not express himself so enthusiastically as Count Szembek yesterday, to be sure (cf. report of May 18<sup>3</sup>), but he did remark that it contained ideas that in Poland (group missing) were sure of a friendly response and which the Government, too, would be glad to follow. In government circles the speech had produced a favorable impression, and he hoped that it would also facilitate the progress of the Geneva negotiations. To be sure, he had always warned in Geneva against setting the goal of the first stage too far off, but he admitted that the conclusion of the first stage must lead to a real reduction of armaments.

When I asked about the situation in Danzig Beck replied that there was a certain amount of relaxation there now, to which praiseworthy statements of the Gauleiter had also contributed. The danger of incidents during the elections always existed, to be sure. To a certain extent this opinion was shared by Rosting, too, with whom he had spoken today. The Polish Government considered the elections and

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 201.

<sup>2</sup> See Editors' Note, p. 451.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

the reorganization of the Danzig Senate as an internal affair of the Free City of Danzig by which Poland was not affected if the elections took a normal course and neither the Statute nor the Treaties were violated.<sup>4</sup>

Rosting had me informed today that he was bringing reassuring impressions from his negotiations with Beck.

MOLTKE

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<sup>4</sup> In the Danzig elections held on May 28 the NSDAP secured 38 of 72 seats in the Volkstag. Thermann reported on the election in his report I G 731 of May 29 (9062/E634890-98).

## No. 254

3170/676321-22

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, May 20, 1933—2:45 p. m.

Minister Göring (Rome)<sup>2</sup> asked whether anything had been changed in the instruction given him by Reich Chancellor<sup>3</sup> (demand for practical equality of rights and rejection of the commitment in the closing sentence of article III of the last Italian draft<sup>4</sup>). I told him this was not the case, but to facilitate continuation of the negotiations on the four power pact we had proposed a new version of article III.<sup>5</sup> Göring then also asked whether I agreed to limiting the pact to 5 years, and I answered in the affirmative. Göring further said that Mussolini had asked the French and English Ambassadors to call on him today in order to inform them of the German position. Göring will return Sunday evening.

v. N[EURATH]

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<sup>1</sup> Neurath wrote this memorandum below a short memorandum of the same day submitted to him by Völkens which recorded that Göring had telephoned from Rome at 1 p. m. with the request that Neurath return his call as soon as possible.

<sup>2</sup> Göring had flown to Rome on May 19.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> A new Italian draft of the pact, dated May 13 (3170/67627-80) had been handed to Hitler by Cerruti on May 15. No memorandum on the Hitler-Cerruti conversation has been found.

The last sentence of article III in the Italian draft read: "France, Great Britain, and Italy on their part declare that the principle of equality of rights must have a practical value for Germany and the other states disarmed by treaty, and Germany, in what concerns her, recognizes that effect ought to be given to this principle of equality of rights only by stages and it ought to be realized by virtue of accords to which each of the four Powers will be a party."

<sup>5</sup> The new version of the last sentence of article III reads as follows: "The High Contracting Parties declare that the principle of equality of rights must have a practical value for Germany and that they will consult on the methods to be used in order to realize this principle of equality of rights. The procedure will be analogous with respect to the other states disarmed by treaty." (Note of the German Government to the Italian Government, handed to the Italian Ambassador by Neurath on May 19: 3170/676316-20.)

## No. 255

7360/E536846-48

*The Head of the German Delegation at Geneva to the  
Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

MOST URGENT

Del. No. 393 of May 20

GENEVA, May 20, 1933.

Received May 20—3:00 p. m.

II F Abr. 1811.

This morning I had a long conversation with Eden about the further course of the Conference. He told me in reply to my question that in his opinion the main problems would not be solved in official proceedings of the Conference; it would be necessary instead to adopt the method of private discussions. It was difficult, to be sure, to say how such discussions should be conducted, whether by twos or by threes, or in the circle of the five Powers, to which, as we knew, there was opposition. Norman Davis would, he could tell me confidentially, make an important statement on Monday on the attitude of the United States on the questions of consultation and definition of the aggressor.<sup>1</sup> Consequently the General Commission would be able to devote more attention again to part I of the English draft. He feared, however, that unsolved problems of the section on material and effectives would then soon be encountered again and that unless a settlement had been reached in private discussions a further deadlock with regard to them would then develop. When I thereupon asked him how he envisaged the private discussions, Eden remarked that Simon would be in Geneva from Monday on and he had heard that Paul-Boncour, too, would come. He then hinted at the possibility of participation by the German Foreign Minister in private discussions here, expressly emphasizing that he had no desire to interfere with any dispositions that the Germans might have made or to say anything whatever against negotiations with me. Since Eden in his speech before the General Commission yesterday had already emphasized his willingness to enter into private negotiations<sup>2</sup> and Cadogan had asked me whether the Foreign Minister would come to Geneva, I picked up this thread and told Eden that I considered the Minister's coming here possible if the situation should indicate that this was advisable, but that we

<sup>1</sup> It was made in the meeting of the General Commission on May 22. For the text, see League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (Geneva, 1933): *Records of the Conference*, ser. B, *Minutes of the General Commission*, vol. II, pp. 474-476.

<sup>2</sup> See League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (Geneva, 1933): *Records of the Conference*, ser. B, *Minutes of the General Commission*, vol. II, p. 466.

naturally would not take any initiative in the matter. Eden, gratified, thereupon said that he would get in touch with London about it this very day so that a suggestion to that effect might be sent directly from there to Berlin. I did not say anything about the possibility of the Reichswehr Minister's coming here, in order not to show any eagerness at the same time. I remarked, however, that the discussions would also to a great extent be of a military-technical nature, which Eden immediately confirmed with the remark that of course the appropriate arrangements would have to be made in this respect, too.

Judging from my observations here the Chancellor's speech<sup>3</sup> and my corresponding statements yesterday in the General Commission<sup>4</sup> have greatly eased the situation here, brought the French into a difficult position and made the situation ripe for making decisions on the armament questions in a small group. I would therefore recommend that we take advantage of the present moment and agree to any suggestion coming from London; in this connection the question of military participation could also be settled. In any case I should appreciate being informed promptly of your position so that, if necessary, I can influence the Conference proceedings here in such a way that the discussion by the Ministers will not be disturbed. There would be a possibility of doing this in so far as the General Commission might, after discussing the American declaration expected on Monday, take up less important parts of the draft convention for the time being, such as chemical warfare and supervision, to which the English would presumably agree.<sup>5</sup>

NADOLNY

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<sup>3</sup> See Editors' Note, p. 451.

<sup>4</sup> League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (Geneva, 1933) : *Records of the Conference*, ser. B, *Minutes of the General Commission*, vol. II, p. 464.

<sup>5</sup> The following marginal notes are found on two other copies of this document (7360/E536849-51; 7360/E536852-54) :

"The Foreign Minister requests that Nadolny be informed by teletype that he will not receive any reply until Monday at the earliest. V[ölkers], May 20."

"Geneva should be informed as quickly as possible about our willingness to have a discussion by the Ministers but not do anything until we have received a request for it from London. [Feine], May 21."

"The State Secretary has just telegraphed Nadolny that Conference cannot take place till Monday. F[eine], May 21."

On May 22 (Monday) Bülow informed Nadolny in telegram No. 233 as follows :

"The British Ambassador has merely informed us that Simon was going to Geneva and inquired whether the Foreign Minister was going there too. No suggestion to that effect, let alone an urgent request, was made.

"The Foreign Minister sees no reason for his going to Geneva prior to a clarification of the American, and particularly the French position, the more so, as Simon is returning to London apparently as early as Thursday." (7360/E536860)

## No. 256

6077/E450702-06

*Memorandum by an Official of Department II*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, May 20, 1933.

II Oe. 603.

The deterioration of our relationship to Austria and the measures and possible reprisals contemplated in this connection give rise to the following observations:

## I

It is readily apparent that restoration of the relationship of friendship which ought logically to follow from the fact of the ethnic ties linking us with Austria is quite impossible in the present circumstances as long as the National Socialist movement in Austria remains in opposition to the Government. The fundamental conflict between the Reich Government and the Austrian Government cannot be resolved as long as this situation prevails, and the question can only be whether it is advisable to conceal this inner conflict to some extent in public by maintaining correct relations.

In giving an answer to this question, two considerations will be decisive:

1. The conduct of our official relations with Austria must be directed as far as possible toward the objective of strengthening the National Socialist movement in Austria.

2. With regard to our official attitude toward Austria and Austrian affairs it will be necessary to bear in mind at all times that Italy and France must not in any circumstances be furnished a pretext for active intervention, either in such a way that Italy would bring political pressure to bear on us, or that France would be given an opportunity to accuse Germany of interfering in Austria's internal affairs and of openly violating the terms of the peace dictate.

To the extent that the National Socialist movement in Austria attains power through its own strength, supported solely by the inspiring example set by the course of events in the Reich, such an evolution would have to be considered as being completely and absolutely in accord with democratic principles. By measures and reprisals of the German Government against Austria we would supply the Dollfuss regime with weapons that must not be underestimated in its fight against this irresistible development. This would enable the Dollfuss regime, for one thing, to mobilize in its favor the self-respect of large sections of the Austrian population, which are at this time still undecided in their attitude toward the National Socialist movement, by denouncing the measures of the German Reich as an attempted op-

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "The original was given by the State Secretary to the Reich Minister. K[ordt], [May] 20."

pression of a weaker country; and furthermore the Austrian Government would be placed in a position where it would be able to demand in Rome and Paris even more active support of its aims than it is receiving now. That all these drawbacks might be offset by the propaganda value which the progressive aggravation of the situation might perhaps have for the National Socialist movement in Austria is unlikely, even if we should feel capable of resisting the political pressure that must be expected to be applied by Italy. In any case, there can be no doubt that any attempt to bring the Austrian problem to a head at this time by the means of official policy entails very considerable risks for us. There does not seem to be adequate justification for accepting such risks at a time when we are so dependent, as we are today, on an atmosphere as favorable as possible for the solution of other questions of vital importance to the German people which have still greater priority. There is all the less reason for this, since its momentum will undoubtedly carry the National Socialist movement to its goal sooner or later, even without such artificial support. Such a development would preclude the possibility of intervention by a third party and in no way impose a liability on the policy of the Reich.

## II

With respect to the individual measures contemplated, the following comments are to be made:

1. Appointing the Reich German Landesinspekteur of the National Socialist party in Austria, Herr Habicht, and the Reich citizen, Herr Cohrs, as Attachés to the Legation in Vienna <sup>2</sup> with a view to protecting them against the possibility of expulsion, gives absolutely no complete assurance that they can remain in Austria. Rather, it is to be expected that the Austrian Government will officially inform us that these two persons are undesirable as members of the Legation. In accordance with the international practices, which we have always insisted must be complied with in cases involving ourselves, we would then be compelled to cancel the appointment of these two gentlemen.

<sup>2</sup> On May 19, Völckers recorded a conversation with the officials of the Austrian National Socialist party, Schneider and Cohrs, in the course of which he was informed that the leader of the Austrian party, Reichstag deputy Habicht, had been assigned to the German Legation in Vienna on instructions from the Reich Chancellor. "With respect to Habicht's employment at the Legation in Vienna, the gentlemen pointed out that the assignment was, of course, only temporary and for the sake of appearances, that he was not claiming any salary, and that he would not be able, although being a 'Press Attaché,' to devote himself to press matters or any other business at the Legation, as he was completely occupied with his activities in the Austrian party office [*Landesinspektion*], which he had to continue. In accordance with instructions I raised the objection that in the event of his being assigned to the Legation, continuation of his party and propaganda activities was out of the question." On this occasion the two party officials also made the request that Cohrs be assigned to Vienna as Habicht's assistant, that Schneider be appointed a German courier, and that Kothen, the Gauleiter of Carinthia, be assigned to the Consulate in Klagenfurt (3086/-616495-97). On May 19, the Foreign Minister instructed Department I to issue the necessary papers for the appointment of Habicht and Cohrs (3086/616494).



Failure to do so would be regarded as such a demonstrative act that it would be very difficult to justify our action before public opinion abroad.

2. Measures calculated to restrict travel to Austria, such as a ban on exit visas for travel of Reich citizens to Austria, or denunciation of the foreign exchange agreement with Austria, would unquestionably hit hard very large sections of the Austrian population, and to a large extent would jeopardize their livelihood. It is obvious that the Austrian Government, the groups in Austria not yet won over to National Socialism, and in particular the Great Powers opposed to Anschluss would do everything in their power to exploit the resentment of the Austrian population resulting from such measures to promote a campaign against the policy of the Reich. Our only chance would be that this might fail and that the mass of the Austrian population would then blame the Dollfuss regime for this state of affairs, thereby bringing about the fall of that Government. The prospects for such a development in our favor increasingly diminish, however, with the further worsening of the situation, as this is rendering quite remote the chances of forming a Black-Brown coalition while, on the other hand, the National Socialist movement in Austria is not yet strong enough to assume power all by itself.

H[ERREN]

## No. 257

7360/E536877-79

### *The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry*

#### Telegram

No. 388 of May 20

PARIS, May 21, 1933.

Received May 21—6:40 p.m.

II F Abr. 1827.

For the State Secretary personally.

In a conversation with Minister Paul-Boncour today I made use of the ideas outlined in telegraphic instruction No. 260.<sup>1</sup> He stated that the Reich Chancellor's speech had made continuation of the work in Geneva possible. Despite the exceedingly friendly atmosphere, however, in which the conversation took place, his frame of mind, I noticed, was anything but happy. He characterized it as a misfortune—which was the fault of neither France nor Germany—that the Disarmament Conference happened to be held at a time when the internal affairs of Germany, one of the principal participants, were undergoing a fundamental change. This change had created an entirely new situation and no one could tell what direction the developments in Germany might take. He mentioned in this connection the statements which Deputy Viénot<sup>2</sup> had made to the Chamber's Commission for Foreign

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 251, footnote 3.

<sup>2</sup> Pierre Viénot was a member of the Socialist group in the French Chamber of Deputies.

Affairs concerning the impressions he gathered on his trip through Germany: The Hitler movement [he said] was nothing other than communism in disguise. This was shown by the speed with which the Communist and Marxist electorate had adjusted itself. Mussolini's Fascism was fundamentally different from that of Hitler. The former was conservative, the latter destructive. Mussolini had saved the national economy, Hitler was trying to wreck his. Anti-Semitism in Germany, according to Viénot, was merely the precursor of further violent measures against German nationals. Paul-Boncour seemed to be impressed by these statements.

The conversation convinced me that the current Government will not have the courage to commit itself at Geneva to any measures of disarmament. It is fearful of public opinion, which, as previously reported, has been greatly disturbed by events in Germany during the past months and is demanding security for France through keeping the army at its present strength. The climate of opinion in the country is best illustrated by the fact that the Senate decided at yesterday's session with respect to the substantial army appropriation, that it will not carry out the 5 percent cut affecting all major budget items. Talks with several leading figures of Parliament, industry, and the press, whom I had invited in honor of the visit of Herr von Stauss,<sup>3</sup> were also indicative. All declared that the book burning<sup>4</sup> and in particular Papen's speech in Münster<sup>5</sup> had cast a pall over the Chancellor's speech and partially undone its very favorable effect. The above-named individual will certainly be glad to report personally about his impressions, if he is requested to do so.

The Government is actually in an extremely difficult situation. It has the feeling that Nadolny's statement<sup>6</sup>—which is here regarded as a very skillful move—leaves it holding the joker spelling the danger of isolation in the Geneva card game, and that there is no chance at the moment of unloading it onto someone else. Pertinax writes in the *Echo de Paris* that in a few days the French delegation will find itself faced with the responsibility of holding off the MacDonald plan. Up until now the naive belief had prevailed that others would take it upon themselves, in the place of France, to block a disarmament plan which was inconsistent with French interests. The well-meaning words addressed to MacDonald and Roosevelt had brought about a situation that made it necessary to put the cards on the table, although it ought to be clear that the MacDonald plan was unacceptable. Paul-Boncour spoke in the same vein as Pertinax. France would have to make use of the probationary 5-year period in question to watch how

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<sup>3</sup> Emil von Stauss, Chairman of the Board of the Deutsche Bank and Disconto-Gesellschaft.

<sup>4</sup> The public burning of "un-German writings" on May 10.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 242, footnote 1.

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 255, footnote 4.

matters continued to develop, in particular whether the mutual arrangements for supervision in fact accomplished their purpose and whether the League of Nations actually had the strength to enforce appropriate sanctions against states which failed to observe their obligations. Among other ideas mentioned by Paul-Boncour was the opinion that there could be not even a moment's doubt in anybody's mind that we were in the process of rearming, and that such rearmament could not go on at the same time while France was reducing her armaments.

I shall dispense with repeating here all my counterarguments, to which Paul-Boncour listened attentively enough, but which also made me realize that there is nothing more difficult than trying to talk someone out of his fear of the future, a fear which is based on a guilty conscience. Added to this is the fact that the Government is determined to stay in power at any cost and is certain that any yielding at Geneva would mean its overthrow. A new government also would neither be willing nor able to support disarmament with any better prospects of obtaining the approval of the Chamber and the public.

KÖSTER

## No. 258

3170/676338-39

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, May 22, 1933.

e. o. RM 712.

This morning Herr Göring, the Prussian Minister President, called on me to report on his discussions in Rome.<sup>1</sup> Herr Göring began by saying that he had now entirely allayed Mussolini's doubts on the score of our Austrian policy, on the basis of the instructions of the Chancellor.<sup>2</sup> He then told about his negotiations on the four power pact, negotiations which had been carried on partly with Mussolini and partly with Suvich. Herr Göring handed me the text of the amended draft for the treaty.<sup>3</sup> In reply to my objection that although

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 254.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> In the files is an undated and unlabeled typescript, which appears to be the text of the draft pact as agreed between Mussolini and Göring after their talks on May 19 and 20 (3170/676365-69). In the margin are changes in Neurath's handwriting which appear to correspond to changes subsequently suggested by the Italian Government in an attempt to work out a formula also acceptable to the French. A difference between the two versions which caused much subsequent discussion was in the wording of the first sentence of article III. The earlier draft read: "France, Great Britain, and Italy declare that the principle of equality of rights recognized in the resolution (*reconnu dans la résolution*) of December 11, 1932, must have a practical value for Germany . . ." The subsequent draft read: ". . . declare that the principle of equality of rights such as was recognized by the resolution . . . (*telle qu'elle a été reconnue par la résolution*)".

in the new draft treaty the Italians took over our last proposal on the wording of the last sentence of article III, it had been made worse by changing it around, Herr Göring said that Mussolini had told him that he would, of his own accord, declare the pact had not been observed in case no agreement could be reached in the negotiations on the numbers of weapons and men to be conceded to us owing to the resistance of the others. I furthermore pointed out to Herr Göring that through the sentence "equality of rights such as was recognized by the resolution of December 11" the French would be placed in a position to toss the security thesis into the negotiations at any time and thereby bring about their failure. Herr Göring stated: Mussolini had said that the French were in a position to do this at any time and could not be prevented from doing so. To Herr Göring's further question what I thought of the draft treaty in its present form, I replied that it had now not only become entirely worthless for us, but in addition contained commitments that could become very inconvenient for us at some later time. Herr Göring said the advantage was that through the treaty we had to deal only with a small body of four, and in this Mussolini had promised us his support at all times.

The Italian Ambassador, who called on me later, brought along only the wording of the sentence "equality of rights such as was recognized by the resolution of December 11," changed as late as yesterday evening. When he asked what I had to say to this new draft, I replied to Signor Cerruti that I first had to study it carefully and would have our objections advanced by Ambassador von Hassell in Rome. As the pact now stood it had no longer any attraction for us, but we would probably be willing, in order to do Mussolini a favor, to initial it if the undesirable wording still present in article III were eliminated. Moreover we wanted to learn the position of the French Government on the draft pact, too, regarding which we had so far heard nothing at all.

V. N[EURATH]

## No. 259

7360/E536888-91

*The Ambassador in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 287 of May 22

WASHINGTON, May 23, 1933—12:09 a. m.

Received May 23—9:30 a. m.

11 F Abr. 1836.

With reference to my telegram No. 284<sup>1</sup> and others.

I had a three-quarter-hour conversation alone with the President.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (7360/E536874).

1. After I had carried out instruction No. 202<sup>2</sup> the President spoke with warm words about the Reich Chancellor's speech. The feeling here in this country, which had been unfavorable even during Schacht's sojourn and had further deteriorated through (evidently group missing) which von Papen's speech<sup>3</sup> found here, had experienced a change owing to the Reich Chancellor's speech and had improved, as the President said, by 40 percent. The President came to speak of the four power agreement at once; he asked whether I had any further information than in the press, particularly concerning mention of the territorial question. He added that in his opinion problems of Southeastern Europe had to be cleaned out [*kanalisiert*], for example, Hungary and Rumania; he had also told the Italian Ambassador this. He also mentioned the Corridor question briefly in the same sense as recently to Schacht and me (cf. my telegram 242<sup>4</sup>).

2. In the disarmament question he had instructed Davis<sup>5</sup> that the disarmament must be "actual" and "practical" and begin "quickly."<sup>6</sup> America would be willing for example if other powers agreed on a certain number of airplanes, to join with them, even if agencies here demanded three times as many, and would be willing to destroy her 15.5 guns if the others did. He was also against placing these guns in coastal forts, since France would then do the same, and they could quickly be mounted on wheels again. The President made these specific statements in such a way that I must consider them as being particularly confidential.

a. The President said that he was also willing, if the others should do so, to subject America to supervision by an international commission with respect to her state of disarmament, in spite of misgivings about this within his own administration and in particular by the Hearst press. Such supervision would have to be made in the individual case without prior announcement. He explained this with examples, naming as the first example Birmingham and Vickers, and as the second Essen and Düsseldorf, thereafter America. When I said France, too, I hoped, and also dropped a word about the *Comité des forges*, he agreed thoroughly and made a general remark to the effect that the French were suspicious by nature, they always needed a week to get used to an idea. I used this to recall something from the postwar history of Germany and France. Thereupon the President said he had specifically asked Herriot how France would conduct herself in regard to international military supervision, whereupon Herriot had replied that France would not violate any regulations. The President had objected that if, for instance, someone in

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 251, footnote 3.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 242 and footnote 1.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed (3154/669018-9).

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 255.

<sup>6</sup> The words in quotation marks are in English in the original.

China thought France had violated the regulations he ought to be able after all to look into the matter. The British, too, had resisted, and when he asked about the reason they had replied that it might too easily be found out that they were not so well prepared as was generally assumed. The President was clearly aware of the amusing contrast between the French and British answers.

b. As for the consultative agreement, America could not fulfill France's demand. He would not get such a commitment through the Senate either today or 50 years from now. His proposal, according to which America would take part in the deliberations and then when the others were in agreement decide for her part, was a big step forward and it was a thousand to one that America would join in a decision taken by the others as to who was the aggressor. Then he would prevent American citizens from making use of neutrality rights in regard to the aggressor.

c. If Japan did not sign, this was a general danger for the Disarmament Conference that was perhaps not yet adequately appreciated. Then Russia would not sign, nor would Poland then sign either. The President asked me, as did Hull day before yesterday, whether we had troops in China, a guard for the Legation or something of the sort, from which it was again clear that the American worries (group garbled) (cf. telegram 285<sup>7</sup>).

d. The President said further that he had given Davis instructions to work fast, quite in accordance with the German position which I transmitted. The Conference should be finished in all essentials by June 12.

3. He had given definite instructions to the delegation for the World Economic Conference that the debt question should not be discussed at the Conference. He held to the position he had taken in November, that if a debtor could not pay he had to come to the creditor, and then surely a possibility of an "adjustment"<sup>8</sup> would be found. That was a fair standpoint. He hoped, too, that England and France would finally act accordingly. During their visits here, to be sure, both [MacDonald and Herriot]<sup>9</sup> had said that in case the idea of Lausanne were given up, he must see that Germany paid.

He had replied that this however was impossible; Lausanne was a fait accompli. Before he mentioned the instructions he stated specifically that he had no objection to his view of the debt question being transmitted unofficially to the German Government.

4. The German transfer question was also touched on. The President reverted time and again to the idea already expressed to Schacht and me, that a reduction in interest might be entirely reasonable in case the debtor had difficulties in payment; the important thing, also as a principle, was the preservation of the capital claim. Roose-

<sup>7</sup> Not found.

<sup>8</sup> In English in the original.

<sup>9</sup> See document No. 143.

velt again mentioned the connection with his own domestic mortgage policy. This and the preceding paragraph also for the Reichsbank.

5. Regarding the discussion of the mixed claims matter a separate dispatch [is being sent.] <sup>10</sup>

LUTHER

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<sup>10</sup> Not found.

## No. 260

3170/676340

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, May 24, 1933.

RM 725.

Yesterday there was a conference in the Reich Chancellery of the Reich Chancellor, the Vice Chancellor, the Reichswehr Minister, the Air Minister, and myself on the question of the Mussolini pact. The result of this conference was that we should first await the position of the French and English Governments on the last draft of the pact which Herr Göring had brought with him.<sup>1</sup> The Reich Chancellor shared the opinion of the Foreign Ministry that consent to the Mussolini pact should only be given if the Disarmament Conference in Geneva had either broken up or had come to a result totally inadequate for us. It was further agreed that in any case a protocol or some other statement on the question of procedure must be appended to the draft pact and that mention of the Roosevelt message and the Hitler speech referred to in point 4 of the protocol [transmitted] in telegram No. 140 of May 21 from Rome<sup>2</sup> must in any case be omitted.

V. N[EURATH]

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 258, and footnote 3.

<sup>2</sup> A clerical error is involved here. The reference is actually to telegram No. 110 of May 21 from Rome (3170/676326-28). This telegram gave some details on the discussions in Rome during Göring's visit and stated that Mussolini and Göring agreed that the pact itself ought to be supplemented by a protocol containing the following points:

"1. Always only one person from each side, and this person a responsible Minister, is to participate in conferences on the basis of the pact.

2. The first meeting within 4 weeks.

3. Otherwise every 6 months or by special request.

4. If the MacDonald plan is mentioned in the protocol, then also the Roosevelt message and the Hitler speech."

For the Roosevelt message, see document No. 243, footnote 1.

## No. 261

9094/E639659-63

*Minutes of the Conference of Heads of Departments,  
Wednesday, May 24, 1933, at 5:00 p. m.*

Rk. 6663.

*Present:*

The Reich Chancellor,  
 The Foreign Minister,  
 The Reich Ministers of Interior <sup>1</sup> and Finance,<sup>2</sup>  
 The Reichswehr Minister,  
 The Reich Minister of Transport,<sup>3</sup>  
 The Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda,  
 State Secretary von Bülow,  
 State Secretary Funk,<sup>4</sup>  
 State Secretary Reinhardt,<sup>5</sup>  
 Minister Stieve,<sup>6</sup>  
 Dr. A. Rosenberg, Head of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the  
 NSDAP, Member of the Reichstag.  
 Recording Official: Oberregierungsrat Dr. Thomsen.

*Agenda: Propaganda abroad.*

The Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda:

The purpose of today's conference is the delimitation of duties between the Ministry of Propaganda and the Foreign Ministry. The chief task of the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda must be the influencing of public opinion abroad. For this purpose larger funds will be needed than for domestic propaganda. The propaganda abroad must be performed by a group of people who understand their problem and are able to cope with it.<sup>7</sup> The Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda must be put in a position to take immediate action at any threatened point abroad. For this purpose it is necessary that Attachés be dispatched to the most important German Missions abroad. These Attachés should be

<sup>1</sup> Wilhelm Frick.<sup>2</sup> Count von Schwerin-Krosigk.<sup>3</sup> Eltz-Rübenach.<sup>4</sup> Press Chief of the Reich Government, State Secretary in the Ministry of Propaganda.<sup>5</sup> State Secretary in the Ministry of Finance.<sup>6</sup> Director of the Cultural Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry.<sup>7</sup> A conference held in the Propaganda Ministry earlier in the month came to the conclusion that the Foreign Ministry's Press Department together with its funds should be taken into the Propaganda Ministry. A memorandum of May 10 by Bülow indicates that he was alone in arguing against these proposals as Blomberg, Frick, and Schwerin-Krosigk opposed his views (4603/E190934-35).



in about the same relation to the official German representative and the authorities at home as the Military Attachés are. While there is agreement in principle on these questions, the position of the Press Department of the Foreign Ministry still has to be clarified.

The Foreign Minister:

The Foreign Ministry cannot get along without its own press department. Therefore, if the present Press Department should be incorporated into the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, a pressing need would arise for the Foreign Ministry to create a new instrument for itself. The task of the Press Department of the Foreign Ministry is essentially to transmit information from abroad, to maintain relations with foreign press representatives in Berlin and to maintain contact with the geographical desk officers of the Foreign Ministry. Within this sphere of duties it could very well remain intact and still be, through State Secretary Funk, in personal union with the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda.

The Reich Chancellor:

The discussion shows that, in order to influence public opinion abroad, an organization is necessary which is not at present available. A new organization must be developed which in time will create its own working tradition. The Foreign Ministry cannot, of course, do without the instrument of the Press Department, for its work furnishes the Foreign Ministry with the basis for the taking of political decisions. But the task of spreading abroad the meaning of our decisions (for example the defense against atrocity propaganda) can be performed only by an agency specially equipped for that. A way must be found which does not paralyze the activity of the Foreign Ministry's Press Department, but which also enables the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda to take action. The Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, through systematic work, would have to concern itself with the most varied methods of aggressive propaganda, especially for exerting influence on the foreign press. At a given moment the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda receives from the political leadership the order for action. The execution of the task is a matter for the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda.

The Foreign Minister:

The question of jurisdiction can be solved relatively simply. The officials of the Press Department of the Foreign Ministry shall furnish factual information, but not engage in propaganda. For the latter purpose the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda must build up a special department. Cooperation between the Press Department of the Foreign Ministry and the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda naturally has to be very close.

The Reich Chancellor :

The task of the Press Department of the Foreign Ministry is to communicate to world public opinion the definite official political view of the Government ; the task of the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda is to see to it that the knowledge of this official point of view is supported by propaganda among the peoples. Substantial means are needed for this, since experience shows that propaganda abroad is very expensive.

The Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda proposes that officials of the Press Department of the Foreign Ministry who hitherto have dealt with propaganda, as well as the funds and positions provided in the budget therefor, be assigned to the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda.

State Secretary von Bülow explains in detail the propaganda activities hitherto performed by the Foreign Ministry, for which only very limited means have been available. If there were special tasks, special funds were approved or appropriated.

The Reich Minister of Finance admits that the funds for propaganda abroad have hitherto been insufficient. But until the new organization had been established, the amount of the required funds could not be known. He hoped to be able to put at the service of propaganda abroad funds which would soon become available.

The Reich Chancellor :

No amount was too high for a good working propaganda establishment. In future the Press Department of the Foreign Ministry will limit itself to its previous traditional activity. Active propaganda abroad is taken over by the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda which is setting up a press office of its own. The Reich Chancellor discusses the importance of this propagandistic work by giving an account of our foreign policy situation. We find ourselves politically in an isolation in the world from which we can only emerge if we are able to improve the mood abroad. In the work of propaganda it must not be overlooked that the Reich Government is conducting a Cabinet policy while in other countries policy is made by altogether different driving forces. The Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda had now to consider how and by what means it could carry on propaganda abroad, and arrive at a decision on the establishment of a suitable organization and the use of already available forces.

Recorded :

THOMSEN, May 26

## No. 262

1529/374018-21 ;  
1549/376376-81

*Extracts From the Minutes of the Conference of Ministers  
on May 26, 1933, 4:15 p. m.<sup>1</sup>*

Rk. 6885;  
zu Rk. 6889.<sup>2</sup>

*I. Report of the President of the Reichsbank concerning his trip to  
America.*

Before commencing with the agenda the Reich Chancellor expressed the thanks of the Reich Government to the President of the Reichsbank on his return from America for his activity in America and England, and requested him to report on his observations and experiences.

The President of the Reichsbank: His sojourn in the United States was mainly for the purpose of discussing the following 3 points: the World Economic Conference, transfer, and disarmament.

For this purpose he had four official conversations with President Roosevelt and four official negotiations with the other advisers of the President. In addition there were unofficial discussions with Senator Borah, the leading men at the Federal Reserve Bank, Under Secretary of State Phillips, and Secretary of State Hull. The latter, the actual director of American foreign policy, was termed entirely unsuitable for this post by the President of the Reichsbank. Nevertheless he was intended as the leader of the American delegation in London.

*1. The World Economic Conference*

It developed that the American Government has no program of any sort for the impending London Conference. The only positive idea that has been advanced so far by the American side was the tariff truce. It made a good impression in America that this proposal was supported by Germany.

The President of the Reichsbank had ample opportunity, in the face of the total lack of American proposals, to present the position of the Reich Government on the most important economic questions (colonial question, prohibition on the financing of new industries, financial co-operation, long-term tariff obligations).

*2. Transfer*

The main objection of the American side to the moratorium planned by us consisted in the fact that Germany intended to carry out such drastic measures shortly before the opening of the World Economic Conference. In view of the American objection it was agreed to seek

<sup>1</sup> The complete minutes of this Conference have not been found.

<sup>2</sup> Rk. 6889: Not found.

a way out, which was found by having the main creditors called together in the immediate future in order to discuss with the Reichsbank the arrangements for the cessation of transfer. President Roosevelt expressed his agreement with this. If the creditors come together next week in Berlin, they will find themselves faced with the following situation: Germany will continue the transfers due until June 30. Then further transfers cease, unless the World Economic Conference finds ways and means by which we may be able to continue the transfers.

### 3. *Disarmament*

Upon the arrival of the President of the Reichsbank he found Roosevelt entirely under the influence of Herriot. Three long conversations with Under Secretary of State Phillips, however, contributed toward influencing the President's stand. The President of the Reichsbank pointed out to Under Secretary Phillips in the sharpest manner that for 15 years Germany had experienced a chain of disappointments, in that the responsibility which America had originally assumed with Wilson's Fourteen Points had in no way been carried out. The method was continuing even now. Germany must consider the arbitrary devaluation of the English and American currencies a measure directed against Germany. Germany also felt that it had been deceived in the long drawn-out negotiations on disarmament and therefore would have to set up its defenses. President Roosevelt finally came around to the opinion that German rearmament must be avoided, to be sure, but the disarmament of the other Powers must be forced.

In New York the President of the Reichsbank had a meeting with prominent American Jews, to whom he gave the assurance that no difficulties of any sort would be made for the German Jews in the business world.

Going over to the attitude of the American press, the President of the Reichsbank stressed that our foreign propaganda should be pursued much more energetically. The Reich Government would have to be in a position to denounce immediately any false report that appeared in the newspaper in which it was published. The American press was used to this procedure.

The sojourn of the President of the Reichsbank in London served mainly as preparation of the Berlin conference of creditors through discussion with Montague Norman, the Governor of the Bank of England.

## II. *Germany's relations with Austria.*

The Reich Chancellor: In view of the recent events in Austria it was important not to commit again the blunder made before the World War in making a wrong evaluation of Austria. The pre-

World War alliance with Austria had been nothing but harmful to the German people. Faced with the Slavization efforts pursued by the Hapsburgs, the German element in Austria felt betrayed as the Reich was an ally of the official rulers of Austria.

The situation in Austria today was one where 6 million Austrians were for the most part subject to the influence of the half-Jews of Vienna and the Legitimists. The Austrian Governments in the past had stressed their pro-Anschluss sentiments only when they needed more money from France. In their hearts they were hostile to the Reich. This would not change as long as Austria remained in the hands of her present rulers. If elections were held in Austria today, the NSDAP would emerge not as the largest party, to be sure, but certainly as the most powerful one. National Germany must steer an unequivocal course. He would therefore propose that the same method be applied to Austria which had brought prompt success in Bavaria. An accommodating attitude or willingness to negotiate on our part would be exploited by the present Austrian regime merely to take the wind out of the sails of the national-minded opposition in Austria. Its goal is the expulsion of the idea of German nationalism from Austria and to replace it by the Austrian idea. There is great danger that Germany might thereby definitively lose 6 million people, who are in the process of becoming something like the Swiss [*Verschweizerungsprozess*]. The Austrian Government had in recent times furnished enough grounds for us to take up the battle. Of course, this would have to be done in the form which was most adroit from the political point of view, that is, by issuing a statement to the effect that the measures against German tourists taken by the Austrian Government in recent times had unfortunately brought about a situation where the German Government, mindful of its desire to live on friendly and peaceful terms with the Austrian Government, felt constrained to inaugurate a visa requirement for German tourists going abroad, in order "to preclude visits by German guests, not wanted by Austria, which might possibly lead to diplomatic complications." Visas for travel to Austria will be issued only on payment of 1,000 reichsmarks. This measure will presumably lead to the collapse of the Dollfuss Government and bring new elections. Such new elections will result in Austria's internal *Gleichschaltung*, which will obviate the need for actual Anschluss. Italy's position on the Anschluss is entirely understandable. Her consent will have to be paid for with concessions in other areas. But this [question] is not acute at present because such consent to the Anschluss depends also on the agreement of the other signatory Powers of the Peace Treaty and is not to be expected.

The Austrian Minister had called attention to the consequences which the steps contemplated by us would have on commercial policy.<sup>3</sup> The situation is much more serious, however, for Austria than for Germany, because Austria would lose income in the amount of 250 million schillings if she lost the tourist business. As soon as the visa requirement is announced, the NSDAP will immediately launch its propaganda in Austria. Through hundreds of thousands of leaflets it will explain to the Austrian people the reasons behind the step taken. The existing relation of forces in Austria already threatened the continued existence of the Dollfuss regime.

The Foreign Minister expressed his agreement in principle with the Reich Chancellor's proposal, though he voiced some misgivings in regard to the economic aspect. We would lose a market for our industry where we had a substantial active balance, without the prospects of anything to take its place. Nor was it certain whether the Alpine provinces, which were most strongly interested in the tourist business, would be in a position to overthrow the Dollfuss Government. One must expect in certain circumstances a general resentment against Germany.

The Reich Minister of Economics:<sup>4</sup> Germany, in 1932, imported goods from Austria for 65 million reichsmarks and exported goods to Austria for 160 million reichsmarks. Austria's exports of agricultural products to Germany were very insignificant. The major portion of Austrian exports was made up of manufactured goods in the amount of 40 million reichsmarks. There was reason to fear, as the figures indicate, that rupture of commercial relations with Austria might lead to an increase in unemployment in this country. Experience with fees for exit visas in the past showed that not only would many exceptions have to be made, but also that there were many ways of circumventing these fees. We are faced with the loss of an export surplus of 120 million reichsmarks which cannot be made up elsewhere. Czechoslovakia, whose industry was closely linked with Austria anyway, would benefit from developments.

State Secretary Funk:<sup>5</sup> The threatening economic losses can be accepted if the propaganda campaign in Austria is promptly launched, because its probable result will be a restoration of normal relations after the fall of the Dollfuss Government. Although our balance in German-Austrian trade is active, our balance of payments is undoubtedly passive owing to the spending of German tourists. The fact that the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* is still, from earlier days, financially dependent on Berlin affords opportunities for conducting propaganda through the Austrian press. It would be highly desirable if

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 249, footnote 1; cf. document No. 219, footnote 4.

<sup>4</sup> Alfred Hugenberg.

<sup>5</sup> Of the Propaganda Ministry.

the Reich Government were to provide a sum of about 100,000 reichsmarks for the purpose of intensifying this propaganda effort. The NSDAP for its part would finance this propaganda with substantially larger sums out of its own funds.

The Prussian Minister President <sup>6</sup> recalled that in introducing an exit visa fee, allowance would have to be made for certain exceptions, namely the small border traffic, travel for business purposes, and the transit traffic.

The Reich Minister of Interior <sup>7</sup> will take into account these exceptions in a draft law which he is going to draw up jointly with the Minister of Finance. Particularly drastic penalties are to be introduced for any circumvention of the provisions on exit fees. June 1 is being considered as the date when they shall enter into effect which will severely affect tourist travel already during the Whitsun holidays.

The Vice Chancellor stressed the historic significance of the conflict with Austria. Its treatment in the press must be in accordance with this. He thought it would be desirable, in order to eliminate all doubts and suspicions, to have the leadership of the NSDAP in Austria pass into purely Austrian hands.

The Reich Chancellor: The contest will be decided before the end of the summer. The sacrifices which Germany must make now are nothing compared to the sacrifices which would have to be borne if the development in Austria continued in its present course. The Little Entente was only waiting for the moment when Austria would fall into its lap. Italy, too, could not remain indifferent to this prospect, because Italy would likewise be threatened by such an increase in the power of the Little Entente. In explaining the reasons for the measures taken by us, it would obviously not be advisable to advance the arguments of a Greater Germany. The Anschluss issue must similarly be put aside entirely for the time being. We would have to confine ourselves to stating that Germany felt that it was unfortunate that the visits of Germans to Austria were prevented by Austrian measures. The Reich Government, however, had felt compelled to enact these measures because it did not wish to incur even the shadow of a doubt that by means of the travel of German tourists to Austria it wished to force upon the Austrian people certain opinions which were objectionable to the present Austrian Government. The Reich Cabinet took action in conformity with the Reich Chancellor's proposal.

The Reich Minister of Interior and the Reich Minister of Finance <sup>8</sup> were instructed to draft speedily the required legislation.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Hermann Göring.

<sup>7</sup> Wilhelm Frick.

<sup>8</sup> Count von Schwerin-Krosigk.

<sup>9</sup> It was published on May 27.

## No. 263

8125/E581655-58

*Vice Chancellor Papen to Ambassador Bergen*

BERLIN, May 26, 1933.

DEAR HERR VON BERGEN: I have noted with interest your telegram of May 24.<sup>1</sup> Although I have not yet received the more detailed account from Prelate Kaas that was promised,<sup>2</sup> I should like to make the following statement for your personal information:

The crucial point in connection with the conclusion of our agreements will presumably be article 31. It is hard for me to see that the position which the German episcopate intends to take corresponds to the position that we hold. The episcopate is still too much under the influence of the ideas of the Center party and of the forces which have decisively influenced the policy of the party in the last decade. For these reasons it would also seem urgently desirable to introduce into the episcopate young men who are not steeped in the resentments of the period of the *Kulturkampf* and who have an understanding of the spiritual revolution of our day. It also seems completely wrong to me to want to preserve the Center party as such, and I sincerely regret that Chancellor Dr. Brüning has devoted himself to this task.<sup>3</sup> Parties as understood by the liberal thought of the past epoch will no longer have any place if only for the reason that coalitions or majority decisions will in the future be inconceivable. The task of Catholic Germany is on an entirely different plane:

Catholic Germany must see to it that the new conception of the State, its tasks and its limits, is underpinned by the moral and social principles of the Church. In order to point the way in this direction I—as you know—some time ago formed the association Cross and Eagle [*Kreuz und Adler*], which is designed as a loose association of intellectual Catholics with the sole aim of making Catholic principles effective in the life of the State. For the Center with its present partisan stamp is not capable of doing this; nor is the so-called Catholic Committee of the NSDAP, because from the period of struggle it has been partly composed of persons who themselves have fought the Church. I shall now go a step further and officially sever *Germania*

<sup>1</sup>Telegram No. 25, signed by Kaas and Bergen (8115/E579895), gives a summary reply to Papen's letter of May 17 (see document No. 250, footnote 3). The telegram stated that discussions concerning a mutually acceptable formula for article 31 were continuing. The Holy See was disposed to await the attitude of the German bishops at a conference called at Fulda, before taking a definite position.

<sup>2</sup>The letter from Kaas, dated May 23, is not printed (6153/E460670-76).

<sup>3</sup>Brüning had succeeded Kaas as chairman of the Center party on May 6, 1933.



from the party in order to make it an independent Catholic paper and a tribune for the political and social outlook of the new period.

In Italy the Holy See some time ago banned the *Popolari* on account of its too intimate connection with politics. At the same time it founded the purely religious Catholic Action, which can naturally represent the purely religious factors much more effectively. In Germany the Catholic Action was copied but unfortunately it was placed too much within the framework of the political development of the Center (note Klausener,<sup>4</sup> Berlin). The Action is thereby deprived of its really great power for propaganda and religion. I believe that if the Vatican could decide, in accordance with the Italian model, to comply with our wish as regards article 31, the purely religious life of Catholic Germany would at the same time experience an extraordinary strengthening. For it would then be evident that Catholic Action really has nothing to do with politics. I now see these difficulties again in a special way in connection with the projected greater German Catholic congress in Vienna. While the cardinal there wants to make this congress purely religious, the central committee of the German Catholic congress, which is a copy of the Center, is trying to give the event much more of a political note. I can very well understand that Prelate Kaas, who was so closely linked with the politics of the party, will find it hard to urge the Holy See to adopt a measure in accordance with our views. I therefore think it would be well if you yourself, my dear Herr von Bergen, would sometime speak quite frankly about these questions with Cardinal Pacelli or the Holy Father himself.

I am urging a certain haste, because—as you know—I should like to combine the settlement with the acceptance of the four power pact, if that should materialize. To be sure, it is impossible to tell at the moment when the latter may be expected. It seems to me, however, that the Geneva negotiations will hardly lead to any result before June 12, and that in order to save the situation the four power pact will perhaps then be concluded at the last moment.

Yours, etc.

FRANZ V. PAPEN

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<sup>4</sup> Erich Klausener was head of the Catholic Action in Germany.

## No. 264

2980/581381-82

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, May 27, 1933.  
RM 737.

The Reich Chancellor yesterday received in my presence the Rumanian Minister, Comnen, who wanted to set forth in great detail his

and his Government's complaints about the decline of German-Rumanian trade. M. Comnen stated in this connection that naturally the decline of Rumanian imports to Germany could not fail to affect the political attitude of his country toward Germany. In conclusion the Minister also expressed the specific Rumanian wishes set forth on page 6 of the enclosed memorandum.<sup>1</sup>

The Reich Chancellor replied to the Minister that the decline of Rumanian imports to Germany was caused by the poor general economic condition of Germany herself and the political unrest created by the attitude of the victorious states. Rumania, which as a member of the Little Entente had on all occasions constantly opposed Germany and her demands for treatment as an equal, could not complain, for on account of her behavior she was herself to blame for preventing an economic revival in Germany. If Germany were freed from the discrimination forced upon her and in this way reintegrated into European politics as a factor with equal rights, calm and confidence would return to the German economy and it would thus become possible to absorb the main articles exported by Rumania.

The Reich Chancellor spoke very sharply and, in reply to a statement by M. Comnen that the Rumanian Government and the Rumanian Foreign Minister, M. Titulescu, attached the greatest importance to good relations with Germany, remarked that this was a general phrase; the actual attitude of the Rumanian Government and M. Titulescu was not in accordance with his words. The Reich Chancellor did not go into the Minister's specific wishes. M. Comnen will bring these up again at the Foreign Ministry.

V. N[EURATH]

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed (9696/E682623-27).

## No. 265

3170/676358-59

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, May 27, 1933.  
RM 739.

The Italian Ambassador appeared again this afternoon in order to press, by instruction of Mussolini, for prompt initialing of the four power pact. Mussolini was of the opinion that the pact should be concluded as soon as possible in order to render ineffective the strong pressure against signature of the pact being exerted on France by Poland and the Little Entente. He then read me a telegram accord-

ing to which there was agreement on all points of the draft pact of May 20.<sup>1</sup> Only about article 16 were there still negotiations between France and England. I told him that we, too, aside from our objections to adoption of article 16, were not in agreement with the changed text of article III—namely, “such as was recognized,” but had to insist on restoration of the May 20 text, that is solely with the word “recognized”. We agreed to restoration of article IV in the version cited by him which he had communicated to us yesterday.<sup>2</sup>

I then brought up also the protocol mentioned in Ambassador Hassell's telegram of May 21,<sup>3</sup> regarding whose contents Cerruti knew nothing. I stated that in any case we attached importance to a better definition of the term “stages” and to the establishment of an interval for these.

Finally, I asked the Ambassador what the meaning was of Aloisi suddenly wanting to undertake the editing of the four power pact in Geneva.<sup>4</sup> Cerruti said that must be an error, for he had a telegram from Rome dated this morning according to which the initialing was to be done in Rome. I told Cerruti that this was also in accord with our opinions, always under the assumption that the points still open would be clarified. The Ambassador promised to telegraph to Rome at once accordingly.<sup>5</sup>

Foreign Minister

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 258, footnote 3.

<sup>2</sup> The memorandum by Bülow on this communication from Cerruti is not printed (3170/676354-55).

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 260, footnote 2.

<sup>4</sup> Bülow recorded on May 27 that Minister Göppert of the German delegation at Geneva had telephoned at noon, saying that Aloisi had invited him to join the legal experts of the other countries concerned in working out the final wording of the four power pact. Bülow told Göppert to accept the invitation but to express at the same time Germany's objections to the negotiations being conducted in Geneva rather than in Rome (3170/676356-57).

<sup>5</sup> Also under the date of May 27, Cerruti sent a letter to Neurath informing him that on returning to his Embassy he had found a message from his Government transmitting a British proposal for a new version of article II of the pact. The text in English, as transmitted by Cerruti to Neurath, reads as follows: “The High Contracting Parties in respect of the articles 10, 16 and 19 of the Covenant, decide to examine between themselves, and under reserve of the decision which can only be taken by the regular organs of the League of Nations, all proposals relative to these methods and procedures calculated in case of need to give effect to those articles.”

Cerruti stated further that his Government considered the phrase “in case of need” as not suitable but felt that if it were deleted, the British version could be accepted (3170/676371-72). The same information on this British proposal and the Italian reaction to it was contained in Hassell's telegram No. 122 of May 27 from Rome (3170/676362). On May 28, Cerruti wrote Neurath another letter stating that the British Government had agreed to the deletion of the phrase “in case of need” and mentioning also that the French Foreign Ministry had proposed a slight change in the word order of article II. Cerruti emphasized that his Government urgently desired to learn Germany's views on the new text of the article (3170/676375-76).

## No. 266

5885/E430996-97

*The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Turkey and to the Legations  
in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Greece*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL  
(for a-e)

BERLIN, May 27, 1933.  
e. o. II Ts. 602.

To:

- a) German Legation in Prague—sent May 29, 1933.
- b) German Legation in Bucharest—sent June 7, 1933.
- c) German Legation in Belgrade—sent May 29, 1933.
- d) German Legation in Athens—sent May 30, 1933.
- e) German Embassy in Ankara—sent May 29, 1933.

In view of the possibility that the peaceful revision of the territorial provisions of the dictated peace treaties may some day be the subject of international negotiations, it is desirable also with respect to the problems that do not immediately concern us to get a picture of the prospects and the practicable scope of any boundary revision which can conceivably be put into effect by peaceful means.

I should therefore be grateful if you would examine and express an opinion, in as detailed a manner as possible, as to the extent to which it seems possible that concessions with reference to the vital political and economic interests of the country to which you are accredited will be made, in an extreme case, with respect to: (for a): the Hungarian revisionist wishes set forth in the enclosed memorandum of the Legation in Budapest;<sup>1</sup> (for b and c): the Hungarian revisionist wishes set forth in the enclosed memorandum of the Legation in Budapest and the Bulgarian revisionist wishes set forth in the enclosed memorandum of the Legation in Sofia;<sup>2</sup> (for d and e): the Bulgarian revisionist wishes set forth in the enclosed memorandum of the Legation in Sofia.

In procuring any material that may be necessary for expression of this opinion, I would like to request strictly confidential treatment of the matter.<sup>3</sup>

By order:  
D[irector]

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (5885/E430999-431024).

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (5885/E431025-144).

<sup>3</sup> A Foreign Ministry instruction of the same day informed the Embassy in Italy of the contents of this instruction, enclosing also copies of the memoranda on the Hungarian and Bulgarian revisionist demands (5885/E430998). In addition, this instruction to Rome requested more precise information about a letter from Gömbös to Mussolini on Hungary's revisionist demands, which had been mentioned in document No. 220. For replies, see documents Nos. 299, 344, and 345. The other replies are not printed: Ankara report of June 10 (5885/E431063-67); Athens report of July 24 (5885/E431086-88); Bucharest report of Aug. 10 (5885/E431097-100).

## No. 267

4938/E268224

*Note Verbale From the Austrian Government*<sup>1</sup>

28.361-K

VIENNA, May 27, 1933.

With reference to your esteemed note verbale A 566 of May 27, 1933,<sup>2</sup> in which the German Legation had the courtesy to inform this office that Herr Theo Habicht has been assigned to the German Legation as Press Attaché and Herr Heinz Cohrs as assistant to the Press Attaché, the Federal Chancellery, [Department of] Foreign Affairs, has the honor respectfully to inform the German Legation that it regrets that it is unable to take cognizance of this notification.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Rieth reported receipt of this note verbale in telegram No. 26 of May 27 (4938/E268426-27).

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (4938/E268225).

<sup>3</sup> On May 29 Rieth, acting upon instructions, handed the Austrians a note protesting this decision. Two days later, upon being informed by Habicht that the police had made a search of his apartment in Linz, Rieth sent a further protest to the Austrian Chancellery. The Austrian Government rejected both these German steps of protest on May 31, stating that it must refuse "to grant these gentlemen such privileges in Austria as would result from investiture with a diplomatic function." (Rieth telegram No. 27 of May 31: 3086/616512-14; Bülow memorandum of June 8: 8665/E606648-51)

## No. 268

3170/676373-74

*The Italian Ambassador in Germany to the Foreign Minister*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, May 28, 1938/XI.

DEAR MR. MINISTER: I have the honor to transmit to Your Excellency enclosed the complete text of the pact<sup>2</sup> as it was communicated to me from Rome.

I took care to underline the purely formal changes which have been recently introduced.

A conversation which I had this morning with Rome has unfortunately made me realize that the information which I was obliged to transmit to my Government yesterday after my conversation with Your Excellency<sup>3</sup> has produced an exceedingly unfortunate impression. They are unable to comprehend in Rome the attitude which the Government of the Reich has assumed in the last few days, an attitude which, at the present stage of the negotiations, constitutes the sole obstacle to the initialing of the pact. My Government continues to consider it not only expedient but also necessary to reach

<sup>1</sup> This letter is in French in the original.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (3170/676377-79).

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 265.

a conclusion of the pact, above all in view of the probable failure of the Disarmament Conference.

I have received advance notice of the instructions which I am going to receive this evening or tomorrow morning, in view of the conversation which I shall have the honor to have with His Excellency the Chancellor of the Reich at 12:30 p. m.<sup>4</sup> I know already that it will be a question of drawing all his attention to the responsibility which the German Government assumes in delaying the conclusion of the pact.

I wish that in this matter which is so important for everyone I could count on the support of Your Excellency so that it can be brought to a good conclusion.

Accept, Mr. Minister, etc.

CERRUTI

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<sup>4</sup> See document No. 269.

## No. 269

3170/676390

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, May 29, 1933.

RM 743.

In the conference with the Reich Chancellor this morning, at which the Italian Ambassador, the Reichswehr Minister, later also Prussian State [sic] President Göring, were present and at which the Italian Ambassador on instructions of his Government again urged a speedy approval of the new text<sup>1</sup> of the four power pact presented by him, the Reich Chancellor requested: (1) that Mussolini give an authentic statement of his view of the significance of the words, "such as was recognized," on which our decision on whether to accept this wording would then depend; (2) that Mussolini declare himself willing after the initialing of the pact and not later than the time of the signing to define for us the exact details of the procedure for the practical implementation of the equality of rights. The Chancellor stated further that if the content of a guarantee protocol of the French Foreign Minister, Paul-Boncour, was correctly reported in *Matin*,<sup>2</sup> the four power pact had no more value for us.

V. N[EURATH]

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 268.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 272.

## No. 270

3086/616507-08

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, May 29, 1933.

RM 747.

Deputy Dr. Wirth telephoned this morning at 10 from Geneva and told me that he had been confined 3 weeks with a heart ailment in Baden, near Vienna, and that just before his departure Chancellor Dollfuss had paid him a visit and explained to him the present difficulties between Germany and Austria.<sup>1</sup>

Dr. Wirth made the personal suggestion that Dr. Brüning be instructed to call on Herr Dollfuss for the purpose of exploring the possibilities of a reconciliation of the German and Austrian positions. He—Dr. Wirth—would be prepared to assist in such an attempt at conciliation.<sup>2</sup> Neither Minister Dr. Rieth nor Dr. Brüning knew anything about Wirth's proposal, but he had discussed this possibility with Herr Dollfuss and was certain that his suggestion would be accepted by the Austrian side. Herr Dollfuss would welcome such a proposal for reconciliation.

Dr. Wirth further stated that he was convinced that a fundamental change had taken place in Austria, comparable only to the change that had occurred in Germany, and that a new feeling of patriotism [*Staatsgefühl*] had awakened in Austria. A capitulation of the Vienna Government was out of the question. Austria was fully conscious that she was now playing the part that was once performed by Belgium. She regards herself with no little reason, as Herr Wirth put it, as the "darling of the gods" in Europe.

He asked for the earliest possible reply (today or tomorrow) and hinted that questions regarding commercial policy could very easily be included in negotiations concerning a reconciliation such as he had in mind.<sup>3</sup>

I promised Dr. Wirth that I would inform the Foreign Minister as soon as possible, but told him that it would probably not be possible to present the matter to the Reich Chancellor today, and that as far as I could see it was not likely that his suggestion would be taken up. We agreed that I would telephone him at the Hotel Richmond in Geneva tonight at 7, to let him know.

I telephoned Dr. Wirth in Geneva tonight and informed him that I had presented his proposal to the Foreign Minister, but that the latter

<sup>1</sup> Cf. document No. 130.

<sup>2</sup> Exclamation point penciled on the margin.

<sup>3</sup> Question mark penciled on the margin.

had not yet had an opportunity to discuss the matter with the Reich Chancellor. Dr. Wirth can be reached in Geneva until tomorrow afternoon, and afterwards in Bern.<sup>4</sup>

BÜLOW

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\*Marginal note: "A mediation by Dr. Wirth is entirely out of the question. v. Neurath, May 31."

Marginal note in Neurath's handwriting: "Dr. Wirth has been informed in accordance with the statement above."

## No. 271

8806/E621719-20

### *The State Secretary to the Embassy in France*

BERLIN, May 29, 1933.

II F Abr. 1897.

The Wolff Telegraph Bureau has reported from London under date of May 28:

"According to the *Sunday Times* the four power pact is now a certainty. Complete agreement has been reached between Great Britain and France. Germany and Italy have agreed to the plan; France only has to inform Poland and the Little Entente of the content of the agreement. It is hoped that the pact, which would guarantee European peace for a period of 10 years, will be concluded within the next few days."

We also know from a completely secret but reliable source that the French Government recently informed the English Government with reference to the pact negotiations that it was bound by its treaty commitments to inform Yugoslavia and Rumania and consult with Poland and Czechoslovakia before entering into any new commitment of a political nature.

It is obvious that commitments of this kind stand in the way of a direct German-French understanding such as has repeatedly been proposed by both sides in the course of years. I therefore request that when a suitable occasion presents itself you inquire at the Quai d'Orsay, with reference to the report of the *Sunday Times*, what the nature of these obligations of the French Government is. Please report on the result of the inquiry.<sup>1</sup>

BÜLOW

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 303.



## No. 272

3170/676393-94

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassies in Italy, France, and Great Britain*<sup>1</sup>Draft Telegram<sup>2</sup>

BERLIN, May 29, 1933.

II It. 665.

The Wolff Telegraph Bureau reports from Paris under date of May 28:

The Geneva correspondent of *Matin* claims to be able to publish the content of a so-called guarantee protocol which the French Foreign Minister, Paul-Boncour, is said to have arranged for as a supplement to the four power pact.

This document, which would be handed to Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Italy, Germany, and Great Britain, in the form of a diplomatic note on the date of the signing of the four power pact, is said to contain the following four points:

1. The four power pact of Rome does not in any way impair the treaties which bind France to her allies.

2. France will not permit any problem of territorial revision being raised.

3. When procedural questions alone are considered, France will demand that they be submitted to the responsible international organ, that is, the League of Nations.

4. In the League of Nations France will advocate the principle of unanimity, including the vote of the interested Power.

End of the Wolff Telegraph Bureau report.

I request that you call the attention of the Italian Government to the report in *Matin* and its significance and suggest that it obtain clarification about the alleged project of a French guarantee protocol.<sup>3</sup> It goes without saying that such parallel agreements between France and her allies as we have already experienced in previous settlements,

<sup>1</sup> The text of this telegram was to be sent to Rome by telephone.

<sup>2</sup> The initialed copy of this document, giving the numbers of the telegrams and the times of dispatch, as well as the appropriate modifications for Paris and London, has not been found. (See document No. 83, footnote 1.) The Journal, however, indicates that the telegram was sent as No. 274 to Paris and as No. 154 to London. For the report of the Ambassador in France upon carrying out his instructions, see document No. 275.

<sup>3</sup> Hassell's interim report on his conversation with Mussolini and Suvich carrying out these instructions was sent as telegram No. 125 on May 30 (3170/676400). On June 17, while Neurath was in London, Heeren of Department II of the Foreign Ministry had occasion to check up further on what had been done. He telephoned to the Embassy in Rome and learned that the Italian Government, upon receiving the German request that it ask the French for clarification, had taken up the question in Paris. The French Government had thereupon made the statement quoted in document No. 321. This statement had been communicated to Neurath by Hassell in a telephone conversation at 7:00 p. m. of May 30 (memorandum by Heeren, June 17: 6058/E447213-14).

especially Locarno, would not only nullify the political and practical significance of article II of the Rome pact but transform it into its opposite. Whereas in the previous cases the French separate agreements were merely an adaptation to the pacts concluded with Germany, the present case constitutes a complete nullification of the agreement concluded between the four Powers and a political contradiction which would again bring to naught the effect of a political détente hoped for from the pact.

NEURATH

No. 273

6203/E468406

*The Foreign Ministry to the Reich Minister of Finance*

BERLIN, May 30, 1933.

IV Po. 3956.

Dr. Rauschning from Danzig conferred today in the Foreign Ministry and in that connection gave an account of the conversation which he had had with the Reich Minister of Finance. In behalf of the Foreign Ministry I would like to express approval of meeting the requests of Dr. Rauschning within the limits of what is economically and financially possible. For reasons of foreign policy I consider it extremely important that the economic and financial situation in Danzig, characterized by the severe defensive struggle in which the Free City is engaged with Poland, especially in the economic field, be strengthened and fortified. I would also welcome it if the Reich Ministry of Finance were in a position to make available the financial aid which can be afforded to the Free City, as soon as possible, in order in this way as well to facilitate the activity of the new Government in Danzig to whatever extent possible.<sup>1</sup>

By order:  
B[ülow]

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<sup>1</sup> On June 2, Dr. Rauschning addressed a letter to State Secretary Lammers in the Reich Chancellery stating: "At an audience granted to the representatives of the future Danzig Government on June 1, the Reich Chancellor stated that he on his part was prepared to support a request presented to the Reich Minister of Finance for financial support for Danzig." (9072/E636969)

## No. 274

3170/676402

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry*

BERLIN, May 30, 1933.

The Chancellor, in the presence of the Foreign Minister, this evening received the Italian Ambassador, who brought him the announced message from Mussolini.<sup>1</sup>

A discussion was thereupon held at the Chancellor's, in which the Foreign Minister and General von Blomberg took part. It has been decided that we are prepared to initial the four power pact in its latest version after we have approved the editing of the text now taking place in Geneva.<sup>2</sup> This is to be communicated this very evening by telephone to Herr von Hassell with the addition that he must still wait for instructions for the initialing.

The Foreign Minister will inform the Italian Ambassador of the situation this evening.<sup>3</sup>

VÖLCKERS

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<sup>1</sup> According to a memorandum of May 29 by Völckers, Cerruti had telephoned that afternoon that a telegram from Mussolini addressed to Hitler would be sent shortly (3170/676391). For the contents of this telegram, see document No. 276.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. document No. 265, footnote 4. In telegram No. 434 from Geneva, sent on May 29, Göppert gave a detailed report on the discussions conducted by the legal experts on the editing of the text of the pact (3170/676395-97).

<sup>3</sup> Marginal notes: "Has been done. v. N[eurath], May 31."  
"Herr v. Hassell was informed by me at 8:30 p. m. by telephone. V[ölckers], May 30."

## No. 275

3170/676412-13

*The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

No. 409 of May 31

PARIS, May 31, 1933.

Received May 31—10:40 p. m.

On the occasion of a conversation with Léger I asked him whether the *Matin* report of May 28 from Geneva<sup>1</sup> was correct which stated that the French Government intended to send to the four Powers and the Little Entente a note concerning a so-called guarantee protocol corresponding to the text given in *Matin*. Léger replied that the report was incorrect. It originated with the journalist Henri de Korab, who was a Pole; this explained the content. The Government merely intended to make known its own interpretation of the four power pact, which revolved around the idea that the pact gave the Powers the right

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 272.

(1) to discuss all matters which concern them (*qui leur sont propres*),

(2) to confer on all questions which in their opinion are likely to guarantee peace in Europe. This implied that they could consult on all problems which served to improve the provisions of the League of Nations Covenant. They could consequently also include in the scope of their discussions matters which—like boundary questions, for example—required unanimous decisions by all members of the League; however, a practical application of the solution found by means of such consultations would never be possible without the consent of the interested state. Consequently it might happen, for example, that all the members of the League of Nations took the view that change of a boundary was justified but the state affected thereby refused to agree to the decision. This would have the effect of making it impossible to change the boundary, but the state concerned would stand isolated before all the members and hence before world opinion as well.

Moreover, the French Government was following Italy's line entirely in this interpretation. The Italian Government had often stated in reply to the fears expressed to it by the members of the Little Entente and also Belgium that the pact might give the four Powers the right to make boundary changes without the consent of the state affected thereby, that such fears were unfounded since the Italian Government itself did not wish any change made without the consent of the state concerned.

Finally, there were a number of questions on which the Covenant did not require that decisions be unanimous and which might be reviewed through consultation of the four Powers and their weight as permanent members of the Council. As matters stood the four Powers would probably, to begin with, concern themselves mainly with such questions. Unfortunately there was not enough time to have Léger indicate these questions more specifically. I shall revert to this next week.<sup>2</sup>

KÖSTER

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<sup>2</sup> See document No. 302.

## No. 276

3170/676433-36

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, June 1, 1933.

In the talk on Tuesday evening<sup>1</sup> the Italian Ambassador gave the Reich Chancellor a message from Mussolini of the following content:

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 274.

Mussolini was of the opinion that the text of the four power pact which had now been established would undoubtedly be accepted by the other Powers. In spite of Germany's agreement in principle the Reich Government had, however, not yet taken any definitive position on article II, and he urgently requested that Germany should not stick obstinately to her opposition to the questions connected therewith. The German opposition would be interpreted by the rest of the world in the worst possible way and would give France a favorable political opportunity. The really excellent effect of the Reichstag speech of the Reich Chancellor<sup>2</sup> would be spoiled and the good position thereby won would be lost. Nor could Germany have any interest in postponing further the conclusion of the four power pact. The Reich Government should indeed realize this. In Paris the parliamentary situation was so unstable that even a delay of only a few days might jeopardize the entire agreement. Conclusion of the pact would improve and strengthen Germany's position. It was entirely out of the question that, on the basis of the four power pact, Germany would be put in a minority or be outvoted by the other three Powers in the negotiations envisaged therein. Germany would always have an opportunity to assert her demands and wishes and would on the other hand obtain the possibility of maintaining her rights.

With regard to the German request that a protocol be drawn up *now* in which the four Powers would undertake to meet within 4 weeks after the signing of the pact and decide on the first stage of disarmament, it would undoubtedly be inopportune at the moment to approach the other signatories of the pact with such requests. This would only jeopardize the chances for the signing of the pact, whereas the prospects for unanimous acceptance of such a protocol would be much more favorable after the conclusion of the pact. Mussolini was astonished at the lack of confidence evinced by the German demands and inquiries and pointed out that during the entire 3 months of negotiations he had never lost sight of the German interests. He now saw his work endangered if the Germans should try to lay down conditions which could not be met or were merely superfluous. His personal view of the question of German equality of rights in relation to the French wishes for security was after all sufficiently known from his public statements, and he had always maintained his well-known position on this question during the entire period of the negotiations. After all, Germany had signed the Protocol of December 11 of last year; it would be going too far if she were to demand that between the initialing and the signing of the four power pact the norms for the German equality of rights should be set forth in a protocol. Such

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<sup>2</sup> See Editors' Note, p. 451.

a procedure would make a bad impression throughout the world. It would bring about a discussion of all the problems of disarmament and equality of rights, the treatment of which, if limited to the four Powers, could take place in an atmosphere much more favorable to Germany. Mussolini most certainly appreciated quick action and quick decisions, but in the interest of the matter he could not precipitate things. He appealed to the Chancellor's trust and pointed out that in the period when the new German regime met with hostile rejection in all European countries, Italy was not sparing in her demonstrations of sympathy. Moreover, Germany was not asked to be patient altogether too long. First of all, the four power pact had to be assured, and then the rest would surely take care of itself; to precipitate matters would be politically and tactically wrong.

As for the possibility of a deliberate sabotaging of the provisions of the pact by the other Powers, it was self-evident that in such a case Mussolini would turn against it immediately. It was out of the question, however, for him to announce this in advance, and it was unreasonable to demand such a thing of him.

As regards the *Matin* report<sup>3</sup> about a simultaneous French statement concerning opposition to territorial revisions, etc., this report was altogether implausible. France had probably made statements to her allies to the effect that she would permit a revision of the peace treaties only within the framework of the League of Nations Covenant. After all, this had been provided for from the outset also in the pact itself.

The Ambassador had been instructed by Mussolini to point out to the Chancellor the significance of the hour and the responsibility that would be incurred by raising objections to the now established content of the pact, especially since our objections concerned unimportant points. Failure of the pact would benefit only those circles that were working for a preventive war or were threatening the new regime in Germany in some other way or that wanted to unite against Germany—those through whose ring the Chancellor had successfully broken in his Reichstag speech. Despite all changes which the wishes of the individual Powers had made necessary, the pact still contained the basic ideas of Mussolini's first draft, in particular, the two principles of revision of treaties and the practical realization of German equality of rights. The value of the pact could be measured by the attitude of Poland and the Little Entente, which had fought it to the utmost. Germany should by no means assume that in the event of a postponement of the Disarmament Conference and failure of the four power pact she would be able to rearm without hindrance. Such an illusion

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<sup>3</sup> See document No. 272.

might cost Germany dearly; at least Poland, but also other Powers, would in such circumstances hinder the rearmament of Germany by all available means, and in so doing they would meet with the approval and support of all the enemies of the new German regime.

The important thing in the question of the four power pact was to create a period of calm which would enable Germany to solve the difficult problems of domestic politics undisturbed. In urging immediate conclusion Mussolini was in no way motivated by vanity as father of the idea or by concern for the prestige of Italy.

BÜLOW

No. 277

9245/E652393

*The Foreign Minister to the Reich Minister of Economics*

BERLIN, June 1, 1933.  
zu W 3623 <sup>1</sup> I.

DEAR HERR HUGENBERG: After our discussion yesterday about the composition of the German delegation to the World Economic Conference I spoke with the Reich Chancellor once more, on which occasion I submitted to him the final list of names and also asked him about the leadership of the delegation. The Reich Chancellor thereupon designated me as leader of the delegation. This, incidentally, also corresponds with international custom. In these circumstances I shall have the invitation to the discussion which we agreed upon for next Thursday <sup>2</sup> issued from here, and will also invite the two gentlemen of the National Socialist party to it.

I only wished to inform you of this at once so that no misunderstandings would arise. It is a matter of course that in the material respect the Reich Ministry of Economics stands in first place.

Yours, etc.

V. N[EURATH]

<sup>1</sup> W 3623: Not printed (9245/E652386). This is a letter of June 1 from Lammer to Neurath conveying Hitler's approval of the proposed composition of the German delegation to the World Economic Conference.

The principal German delegates were Foreign Minister Neurath, Ambassador Hoesch, Finance Minister Schwerin-Krosigk, Minister of Economics Hugenberg, President of the Reichsbank Schacht, Nazi party economic expert Keppler, and the Burgomaster of Hamburg, Krogmann.

<sup>2</sup> i. e., June 8.

## No. 278

6153/E460697-98

*The Ambassador to the Holy See to Vice Chancellor Papen*

## Cipher Letter

ROME, June 1, 1933.

Received June 6.

II Vat. 219.

For the Vice Chancellor personally.

Your friendly letter of May 26<sup>1</sup> was delivered to me yesterday evening; thank you sincerely. I assume that you have in the meantime received Menshausen. I asked him to tell you and Neurath that in my opinion we should absolutely insist on the demand for taking the clergy out of politics so far as possible, even at the risk of failure of the negotiations. The demand is substantively warranted and in view of the far-reaching political concessions altogether justified. The Holy See will oppose the granting of concessions to us in conformity with the wording of the Italian article 43, paragraph 2<sup>2</sup>—which it regrets—and will try in the usual manner to limit its concessions by provisos and water them down; it seems to me dubious, however, under article 31<sup>3</sup> to leave the decision in individual cases to the judgment of the bishops. The Bishop of Osnabrück,<sup>4</sup> during his recent stay in Rome, showed a gratifying understanding of the wishes of the Government and of the needs of the new times. This is not true however of all the heads of bishoprics, especially not of Cardinal Bertram, with whom any negotiation has always been extremely difficult. The convocation of the Fulda conference of bishops makes one wonder; I consider it quite possible that Cardinal Pacelli suggested it in order to be able to counter disagreeable political demands with contrary wishes of the German episcopate. I would therefore ask that you establish a formulation of article 31 that will do justice to the political requirements and then transmit it to Kaas. On the other hand, any material change in the concessions already made would no longer be possible at this advanced stage of the negotiations. Dollfuss is expected soon for the signing of the Austrian Concordat; the reference made by Cardinal Pacelli with his usual insistence to the accom-

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<sup>1</sup> Document No. 263.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 145, footnote 7.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 250, footnote 3.

<sup>4</sup> Wilhelm Berning.



modating attitude shown by Austria should be rejected by us hereafter, too, as not having any application.<sup>5</sup>

BERGEN

<sup>5</sup> In telegram No. 20 of June 1, Neurath forwarded to Bergen a message from Papen for Kaas as follows:

"Thank you for your last communication. Since the conclusion of the four power pact is imminent I consider it urgently necessary that our negotiations be accelerated. Without acceptance of our position on article 31 the agreement appears to me unacceptable. I would advise finding out the attitude of the Fulda conference by telegraph if necessary, in so far as the decision there is dependent upon that." (6153/E460694-95)

No. 279

6064/E448643-50

*The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry*

G 37

BELGRADE, June 1, 1933.

Received June 9.

II Balk. 1069 Js.

Subject: Conversation with King Alexander.

King Alexander, who arrived here for a few days' stay from Nishka Banya and from his estate, Topola, in the immediate vicinity of which is the mausoleum of the Karageorges, built with his own money, asked me to visit him yesterday and received me, as usual, at Dedinje.

After the usual friendly words of introduction, His Majesty at once asked me what I thought of the four power pact and why Germany, too, obviously attached so much importance to its conclusion. I replied that I was unacquainted with the final text of the pact and could not therefore form any judgment of its importance and value. I assumed, however, that if my Government decided to sign the pact, the chief reason was to assure to Europe a 10-year peace—for the pact was to last so long—a peace of which we were, indeed, all so urgently in need, so that after the perpetual disturbances we might finally have tranquillity for rebuilding our countries. This reply seemed to satisfy the King, but he thought the pact had, nevertheless, in the course of negotiations, acquired quite a different aspect. The question of revision, which Mussolini had raised, must not be dealt with by the four Great Powers alone, but only within the framework of the League of Nations. I replied that, according to press reports, this seemed to me indeed the case and I had the impression that this decision had been made principally at the request of the Little Entente. His Majesty said Mussolini was always making suggestions disturbing to the peace, especially such as were bound to disturb Yugoslavia. It obviously annoyed him that, despite some internal

difficulties still existing, Yugoslavia did not collapse. And the country would gradually become consolidated; there was absolutely no doubt of this. He also failed to understand how Mussolini, of all people, could speak of revision, when he would quite certainly not be ready to yield even so much as an inch of the South Tirol and the northeastern part of Italy.

The King asked whether I thought that the question of revision would be brought up one day in spite of everything. I replied in the affirmative, adding, however, that I naturally did not know when, and that the question did not seem to me at the moment acute. His Majesty said that, since the question of revision could, indeed, be dealt with only by the Council of the League of Nations, a success in accordance with the thinking of the revisionists could hardly be expected. I replied that, nevertheless, it [revision] would certainly have to be taken up some day. It was clear to me that he, the King, was opposed to any territorial change of the status quo, but it must be just as comprehensible to him that Germany could not declare herself satisfied with her present eastern borders. His Majesty gave me to understand that he realized this fully, but he was afraid it would be very hard to effect a revision of these borders because the Poles would oppose it with all the means at their command.

After we had discussed in detail Zaleski's<sup>1</sup> request to Lloyd George in 1917 not to give Poland any outlet to the sea at the expense of Germany, Pilsudski's statement in 1918-1919 to Count Harry Kessler<sup>2</sup> that he desired no outlet to the sea for Poland, and, in regard to Upper Silesia, Sir Eyre Crowe's<sup>3</sup> cynical remark to me in 1921, that it had been necessary to transfer the ceded portion of Upper Silesia to Poland in order that this new state might obtain a ready-made heavy industry, and the King had again shown understanding for our dissatisfaction, he asked me whether I had received a confirmation of the rumor that a customs union of Italy, Austria, and Hungary had been formed—a question to which I replied in the negative. The King thereupon told me that he would prefer a customs union of Germany and Austria. To have Germany as a neighbor would suit him quite well, for an understanding between Germany and Austria would finally solve the Austrian question. Whereupon I told His Majesty that I was pleased with his statement. In 1931, I added, the German-Austrian plan for a customs union had, as he would recall, failed because of the opposition of France. France was at that time at the peak of her power, and most of the delegates at Geneva had bowed to

<sup>1</sup> This seems to refer to August Zaleski, Polish Foreign Minister 1926-1932, who was the representative in London of the Polish Political Movement during the 1914-1918 War.

<sup>2</sup> German Minister to Poland at the time.

<sup>3</sup> Permanent Under Secretary in the British Foreign Office 1920-1925.

this power; M. Marinković<sup>4</sup> too, had at a meeting of the committee for European Union expressed himself in the sharpest form against the customs union. "Yes, Marinković," said the King, "but his statements do not in any way reflect my wishes." (?) (The next day there appeared in *Politika* an article entitled: "What about Austria?" in which the King's ideas on the question of Anschluss are to some extent expressed. See enclosure.<sup>5</sup>

His Majesty then told me that he had heard that I had been in Berlin, and asked me to tell him about the new Germany. This I did in detail. He was particularly interested in the method by which the German States had been unified, an action that the King considered very fortunate. He also openly expressed his satisfaction at the suppression of communism, which always collapsed when opposed by a really strong will. He had personally had much experience in this field. (In fact, communism in this country has been suppressed by truly draconian, partly quite medieval, means.) What surprised him, the King, however, was the fact that Social Democracy had proved to be so extremely weak. It had, indeed, grown old, tired, and bourgeois and had had no new ideas. He went on to say that he had a certain understanding for the manner in which the Jewish question had been handled, but he feared that some difficulties of one kind or another might yet arise from it for Germany. There were, in his opinion, quite excellent Jews; for example, the Jews in Yugoslavia, that is, in Zagreb, Sarajevo, and Skoplje, were very patriotic, while in Rumania they were actually a curse for the morals of the country. Germany was now exposed to sharp attacks from abroad, and he therefore had a certain sympathy for Germany, for he, too, for other reasons, to be sure, in recent years had had to endure numerous and vehement reproaches. But every government had to try to put through vigorously what it considered right, and if no danger resulted from this for the outside world, the other countries that employed different, possibly democratic methods would gradually calm down. This would in time surely be the case in England and France also. (As far as the Jews are concerned, it must be said that in Yugoslavia there has been a certain amount of immigration by Jewish emigrants from Germany, for example in the Voivodina. And the University here has given appointments to two suspended professors, the Orientalist, Professor Ostrogowski, of Breslau, and the physicist, Professor Born, of Göttingen.)

His Majesty then asked me whether I had made the acquaintance of the Chancellor and whether I thought he still had the National Socialist movement firmly in hand. I was able to answer both questions in the affirmative, the latter decidedly so.

<sup>4</sup> Voislav Marinković, Yugoslav Foreign Minister at the time.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed (6064/E448641-42).

Since the King seemed to be afraid that the national awakening of Germany, nevertheless, might perhaps lead to armed conflict, I told him that, in my opinion, National Socialism, as the Chancellor himself has publicly stated, had arisen from a burning patriotism; that its aim was to free Germany from the shackles laid upon her and obtain for her equality in all spheres; that National Socialism was not harboring aggressive designs, but was on the defensive, in order to liberate Germany from an excessive alien influence [*Überfremdung*] and externally from foreign interference.

The King also showed full understanding for this, but since, in the matter of foreign policy, Italy, particularly Mussolini, was for him the alpha and omega of almost all his thoughts and cares, he wondered whether I could tell him what the meaning was of the numerous visits of German Ministers to Rome. I replied that in many respects a community of ideas existed between Mussolini and our present Government, and that also in many respects the situation of Germany and Italy was similar. It was therefore entirely comprehensible that our Ministers should be seeking opportunities for an exchange of opinion with Mussolini, which—of this the King could, in my opinion, rest fully assured—in no way affected the interests of Yugoslavia or threatened to disturb the peace of Europe. His Majesty replied that he was glad to believe me that the German Ministers did not intend to do anything to the disadvantage of Yugoslavia, but he was afraid that a closer collaboration between Germany and Italy would strengthen the latter country and might possibly induce Italy to take a more aggressive attitude toward Yugoslavia—an opinion which I tried to refute.

We then spoke briefly about the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Little Entente in Prague.<sup>6</sup> The King seemed to be very well satisfied with the development of closer solidarity among the Little Entente States and considered a hoax the newspaper report that Italy was attempting to bring about cooperation of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey as a counterpoise to the Little Entente, in the hope of finally winning over Rumania also to this association. The King replied in the negative to my question whether it was the intention of Yugoslavia, as reported in a Prague newspaper, to alter her attitude toward the Soviet Government and to recognize it.

He finally expressed the hope that there might soon be a provisional trade agreement between Germany and Yugoslavia, and also his pleasure at the fact that Professor Franz Beyschlag, the former President of the Geological *Landesanstalt* in Berlin, despite his 77 years, had not shrunk from making the trip to Macedonia in order to explore the large petroleum deposits which were alleged to be there. He was

<sup>6</sup> The Permanent Council of the Little Entente met there May 30–June 1.

deeply obligated to Professor Beyschlag and Consul General Reinhold, who had suggested Professor Beyschlag's trip, and he hoped that the investigations of Professor Beyschlag would have favorable results, for a large deposit of petroleum would be of prime importance to Yugoslavia. His Majesty hoped that he might continue to receive similar assistance from Germany, and stated that this could only lead to increasingly close relations between his country and Germany, in the field of industry, also. (Professor Beyschlag visited me, too, and expressed himself very optimistically about the terrain to be explored, which he knew from the war period. It must be said, however, that in order to extract the oil, relatively large industrial installations will be needed, and that it will take relatively large sums of money to build them which for the time being, at least, are not available.)

I took my leave of the King, and he expressed the hope that we would meet again in Bled in a few weeks. As may be seen from the above, this conversation was extremely pleasant, almost unnaturally amiable on the King's side.<sup>7</sup>

ALBERT DUFOUR

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<sup>7</sup> Marginal note: "Note: Ambassador v. Hassell has learned of this report here. v. Heeren."

## No. 280

9565/E673544

### *The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 23 of June 2

BUDAPEST, June 2, 1933—2:40 p. m.

Received June 2—4:20 p. m.

II Ung. 315.

Gömbös informs me confidentially that Mussolini had summoned him and Dollfuss for a simultaneous visit in Rome at Whitsuntide; however, a meeting of the three did not seem advisable, particularly in view of the delay in concluding the four power pact, and therefore the journey to Rome was postponed.

With respect to his wish transmitted through Herr Daitz<sup>1</sup> for a meeting with the Reich Chancellor, Herr Gömbös stated that, after the conclusion of the debate on the Hungarian budget a personal contact and a discussion about political questions (including the problem of Austria), economic and military questions would be desirable to him. He had asked Herr Daitz to inform him of the decisions of the Reich Chancellor with respect to a suitable time and

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<sup>1</sup> In telegram No. 22 of June 1, Schoen reported on the lecture which Werner Daitz, head of the Foreign Trade Section in the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP, had given in Budapest. Subsequently Daitz had been received by Gömbös who had a long conversation with him (2980/580455).

place (perhaps Munich or Berchtesgaden).<sup>2</sup> In case of a meeting, the Hungarian side would maintain the strictest silence about it; a subsequent announcement on the other hand would be desirable, if only in order to cut the ground from under the Swastika movement of Deputy Meskó.<sup>3</sup>

SCHOEN

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 324.

<sup>3</sup> The Swastika party was founded in 1932 by Zoltan Meskó, a former member of the Government coalition.

## No. 281

8918/E622253

### *The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Lithuania*

BERLIN, May 31, 1933.<sup>1</sup>

Sent June 2.

zu IV Rd. 1731.<sup>2</sup>

The Chancellor today received the Lithuanian Minister in the presence of the Foreign Minister. The Lithuanian Minister wanted to have a statement such as was previously given to the Polish Minister. The Foreign Minister refused the request at once, however.<sup>3</sup>

As the Foreign Minister told me, both he and the Chancellor were very much annoyed over the request of the Lithuanian Minister. Herr von Neurath told him that the relations of Lithuania to Germany depended entirely on Lithuania, particularly on the observance of autonomy in the Memel Territory. The Chancellor added that we did not want to change our policy; he had said so in the Reichstag; that had to suffice. The Lithuanian Minister said nothing in reply.

D[irector]

[MEYER]

<sup>1</sup> A marginal note by Meyer indicated that the instruction was to be submitted to the Foreign Minister for approval before being dispatched. It is initialed "v. N[eurath], June 1."

<sup>2</sup> IV Rd. 1731: Not printed (8918/E622250-51), an unsigned memorandum for use in a conversation with Saulys.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 201.

## No. 282

3170/676443-45

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, June 3, 1933.

Herr von Hassell telephoned this morning at 10:35 a. m. and told me that the confusion that had arisen in Rome was due to the

fact that the French, having on May 19 presented a proposed draft of the four power pact,<sup>1</sup> had used it as a basis of all subsequent negotiations on the text, while the three other Powers negotiated on the basis of the Italian text of May 20.<sup>2</sup> This confusion was the result of some muddle, as Herr von Hassell put it, in the French files. The matter took on political significance from the fact that the French had communicated their text of May 19, together with the changes agreed to in the meantime, to the Little Entente and obtained their agreement to the four power pact on that basis.<sup>3</sup> This mix-up in the basic texts was only discovered at the meeting of the legal experts in Geneva. Rome and Paris thus have two divergent texts, and the crucial point in this is that the concluding paragraph of article III reads quite differently in the French wording as compared with the Rome wording. The French now claim that they must insist on their wording for the reason that the rearmament provisions for Austria and Bulgaria, according to the Rome wording, were laid down by the four Powers alone, without the Little Entente, whereas the French appear to have promised the Little Entente that they would have a say in this decision. The concluding paragraph of article III in the French text, as Herr von Hassell informed me, reads as follows:

"Germany, for her part, acknowledges that this principle will be given effect only by stages and on the basis of agreements yet to be concluded and which she (Germany) will not enter without the participation of the three other Powers."<sup>4</sup>

The Italians declared on this point that they could not consider anything additional because, with respect to us, they were committed to the Roman text.

The English are reported to have made a strongly worded *démarche* in Paris yesterday, apparently in favor of the Rome text; this *démarche* was taken very much amiss as the French find themselves in a difficult parliamentary situation with regard to foreign policy, the latter on account of their commitments to and agreements with the Little Entente. The English have declared that if this was the only reason for France's rejection of the Rome text, the difficulty could be removed by inserting before the concluding paragraph of article III in the Rome text the words: ". . . as regards Germany (Germany, etc., will consult with each other . . .)." <sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not found.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 258, footnote 3.

<sup>3</sup> In a statement issued from Prague by the Council of the Little Entente on May 30. For the text, see French Blue Book, *Pacte d'entente et de collaboration*, 1933, pp. 19-20.

<sup>4</sup> The paragraph in quotation marks is in French in the original.

<sup>5</sup> The passage in quotation marks is in French in the original.

Suvich told him that he did not think that this English proposal would be satisfactory to the French. He, Hassell, replied to him that this was a closed matter for us. We would adhere to the Rome text and oppose any reopening of talks on article III. The English formula was acceptable to us as a basis of discussion. I confirmed this to Herr von Hassell and told him that we could agree to the English formula provided the language of the concluding paragraph of article III remained otherwise unchanged. Hassell had finally told Suvich that Germany's unilateral commitment with respect to the three other Powers, in accordance with the French formula, was totally unacceptable. This, too, I confirmed to Herr von Hassell. He said that he was about to leave to see the English Ambassador to talk this question over with him once more.

According to his information, the domestic political situation is very difficult in Paris and it is therefore most unlikely that any understanding will be reached.

Mussolini's speech in the Senate, which is to contain the declarations previously indicated,<sup>6</sup> has been postponed until Tuesday afternoon. Last night the mood was very pessimistic in Rome; it was felt that the four power pact was finished. The mood is a little brighter today because there were telephone conversations between Daladier and the French Ambassador in Rome in which the French unqualifiedly admitted their responsibility for the new complication and did not seek to blame any other state for it.

In conclusion I told Herr von Hassell that the English formula was acceptable to us; if, however, it should fail to be adopted, he should try to have all negotiations on the four power pact put off until Tuesday because the Reich Chancellor and the Foreign Minister are not in Berlin and we officials must decline to accept any responsibility for basic decisions alone. These were matters which could not possibly be settled with the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister over the telephone. He should also keep in mind to make sure, whenever the pact is concluded, whether still today or at some later date, that we are given ample time to prepare an authentic German text for our press and to enable us to provide it with adequate information on the pact and its significance.<sup>7</sup>

BÜLOW

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<sup>6</sup> According to a memorandum by Neurath of June 1, he had told Cerruti that he would welcome it if Mussolini, in the statements he intended to make on initialing the four power pact, would draw attention to the fact "that the question of qualitative equality of rights for Germany had already been settled by the agreement of Dec. 11 and that therefore the agreement on stages, provided for in the last sentence of article III of the four power pact, referred only to quantitative equality of rights." (3170/676438)

<sup>7</sup> Marginal note: "Transmitted to the Foreign Minister by telephone (Leinfelden). No decision is to be reached before Tuesday. V[ölckers], June 3."



## No. 283

7360/E536914-17

*The Head of the German Delegation at Geneva to the  
Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 457 of June 3

GENEVA, German Delegation, June 3, 1933.

Received June 3—12:45 p. m.

II F Abr. 1975.

With reference to my telegram No. 456 of June 3.<sup>1</sup>

On the basis of the Treaties (article 8 of the Covenant and the Preamble to part V of the Versailles Treaty) and as a member of the League of Nations, Germany has the right to claim that, after she herself has disarmed, the disarmament of the other states should be carried through and that the limitations applying to Germany should be adapted to the general system of disarmament. Even in the Versailles Treaty the arms allowed to the German Army are not laid down as incapable of change (article 164, paragraph 2). Moreover, under article 8 of the Covenant Germany is entitled to demand that when the limits of armaments are being laid down, her need for national security should be considered in the same way as that of the other states.

By the Agreement of December 11, 1932,<sup>2</sup> Germany's equality of rights is recognized as one of the guiding principles of the Disarmament Conference, and it is further stipulated:

- 1) That the respective limitations of the armaments of all states should be laid down in the coming convention;
- 2) That the principle of Germany's equality of rights and that of the other disarmed states must be embodied in the convention;
- 3) That equality of rights is to be granted in a system which would provide security for all nations, and
- 4) That the methods of application of such equality of rights shall be discussed by the Conference.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (7360/E536912-13). This telegram of June 3 reported a conversation which Nadolny had had the day before with Eden and Lord Londonderry, British Secretary for Air, about questions of Germany's equality of rights with respect to aviation. "Eden then stated," Nadolny reported, "that since it was impossible for Sir John Simon to undertake the journey, Lord Londonderry, he himself, and Norman Davis were traveling yesterday evening to Paris to discuss disarmament with Daladier at his request. Upon my objecting that such a conversation could confront us with the decision of the three Powers, he assured me that the meeting would only involve an exchange of information on their side, and result in influencing the French and avoiding conclusions. We nevertheless agreed that I should send over to the Englishmen our position on the principal questions in writing as a personal memorandum for the conversation. I thereupon transmitted to Lord Londonderry that evening the following memorandum in English." Telegram No. 457 printed here reproduces the text of Nadolny's memorandum. See also *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. v, documents Nos. 200 and 201.

<sup>2</sup> See Editors' Note, p. 18.

In accordance with this agreement Germany's equality of rights must be carried into agreement in the Conference, and the signatory states are under the obligation to cooperate to this end. Germany holds the view that the system of security mentioned in the Agreement should be put into practice chiefly through a just and a reasonable settlement of the proportion between the armaments of the different countries. She has moreover always declared herself ready to cooperate in the development of security by treaty, but she considers that in view of what has already been done in this field the realization of equality of rights can no longer be denied her.

Although in the Agreement of December 11, 1932, no mention has been made of the realization of equality of rights by stages, Germany is prepared, in so far as quantities of armaments are concerned, to remain during the period of the first convention below the level to which she would be entitled in relation to the other states, if the principles of article 8 were equally applied. As regards qualitative equality it must be effected by the first convention, since Germany can neither tolerate further discrimination, nor recognize it anew in a treaty. She is, however, prepared to take into account the principle of a period of transition. But the smallest consideration of her national security demands that she should be equipped with the same types of weapons as all other states find necessary for the defense of their territory. If, further, a uniform type is introduced for the effectives of all European continental armies, their arms must also be of a uniform type; otherwise the comparability of armies, which it is sought to attain through a standardized organization of their personnel, would not be achieved. In a spirit of conciliation and cooperation Germany is willing to declare her agreement with the following points:

- 1) The insertion of new security clauses in the convention (part I of the British plan) provided that agreement is reached regarding the contents of certain of these clauses;

- 2) The standardization of continental armies, that is to say, the transformation of the Reichswehr along the lines of the British proposal within 5 years, and by methods which take into account the special position of Germany;

- 3) A system of control, provided it be generally and equally applied and restricted to what is needful and expedient;

- 4) The renunciation of all aggressive weapons, which are then to be abolished and destroyed by all states within 5 years;

- 5) As regards defensive weapons hitherto forbidden to Germany but allowed and fixed in number for the other states, Germany will content herself for the space of 5 years with a smaller quantity than she would be entitled to claim under an equal standard for all states;

- 6) Germany is prepared not to make use until December 31, 1936, of her right to replace her over-age capital ships, with the exception of one keel to be laid down in replacement;

7) Germany accepts the publication of military expenditure; she considers the limitation by treaty of military budgets to be impossible at the present time for technical reasons;

8) Germany accepts in the question of manufacture of and traffic in arms:

- a) international publicity;
- b) state supervision;
- c) a control on the lines of the general stipulation laid down in the British plan.

However, in the interest of the security for all states and her own defensive needs, Germany cannot abandon her following demands:

1) Abolition and prohibition of aggressive weapons by all states within fixed periods.

2) A strength of effectives and such methods of uniformization which take into account the existence in other countries of 14 annual levies of trained reserves and of overseas troops which are stationed in the metropole or in the proximity thereof.

3) At least a certain quantity, fixed by treaty, of all those defensive weapons which are permitted to the other states during the period of the convention and which they regard as necessary for their national defense.

The above statement is made on the assumption that the British draft convention will not be altered to the disadvantage of Germany.

NADOLNY

## No. 284

2860/562455-68

*Ambassador Dirksen to Foreign Minister Neurath*

SECRET

Moscow, June 5, 1933.

DEAR HERR FOREIGN MINISTER: Enclosed I am sending you a memorandum of a conversation with M. Krestinsky, which is of rather fundamental importance. Since very confidential questions were also discussed at this conversation, I considered it better not to report on them in the ordinary course of business, but to communicate them to you by this personal letter.

In the matter itself I do not need to add anything further to the memorandum. You will also infer from it the various indications that caused me to take up this complex of questions again upon my return.

Naturally Krestinsky's answer did not entirely convince me, and did not dispose of my objections. For this the attitude of the Soviet Government with respect to France has been too positive and toward us not positive enough. We shall have to watch very carefully the further course of Russia's relations with France and Poland. I personally believe and hope that the positive trends in Soviet policy

with respect to Germany will triumph in the end, but that we will for some time to come have to reckon with a mistrustful attitude of watchful waiting.

The foreign policy of the Soviet Government seems to me now to a large extent determined by a considerable feeling of internal weakness. Because of the feeling of weakness with respect to the catastrophic internal situation, and with respect to the threat by Japan, they are striving to suck honey from all flowers and to demonstrate achievements in foreign policy wherever opportunity offers.

It would be very effective if you, Herr Foreign Minister, would avail yourself of the opportunity of your meeting with M. Litvinov in London to make the same remonstrances to him, particularly since you already brought up this subject in your last conversation with Litvinov in Berlin on May 29.<sup>1</sup>

I have sent Herren von Bülow and Meyer copies of the memorandum.<sup>2</sup>

With kindest regards, I am

Yours, etc.

DIRKSEN

[Enclosure]

TOP SECRET  
A 1117

Moscow, June 5, 1933.

MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION WITH DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR  
KRESTINSKY ON JUNE 3, 1933

At the beginning of our conversation I told M. Krestinsky that I was anxious to speak with him confidentially and frankly about the present status of German-Soviet relations, since I had no clear conception of it; and not, to be sure, because of the attitude of Germany on the complex of German-Soviet questions, but because of the attitude of the Soviet Union.

I had taken advantage of my stay in Berlin to report to all the leading persons on German-Soviet relations.<sup>3</sup> I now returned to Moscow with the encouraging and very definite impression that the policy to be pursued by Germany with respect to the Soviet Union

<sup>1</sup>No record of this conversation has been found. Concerning it, however, marginal notes to Moscow telegram No. 118 of May 27 (9528/E671742) read as follows:

"The Reich Minister received Litvinov with Khinchuk at 11 a. m. v. T[ippelskirch], May 29."

"The State Police is informed; will take care of inconspicuous surveillance. Ambassador Dirksen was at the station. v. T[ippelskirch], May 29."

<sup>2</sup>Dirksen's letters to Bülow (9325/E661275) and Meyer (9325/E661257-59) are not printed.

<sup>3</sup>Dirksen had been in Berlin for 10 days at the end of May, during which time he had had conferences with Hitler, Göring, Frick, and Goebbels (Dirksen manuscript on his mission in Moscow, 1655/392634-35).

was entirely positive and definite. Both the Chancellor and the other leading personages with whom I had spoken had assured me definitely that the policy of the Reich Government with respect to the Soviet Union would hew to the line established by the statements and actions of the Government; granting of the interim loan;<sup>4</sup> Reichstag speech of the Chancellor on March 23 of this year;<sup>5</sup> reception of Ambassador Khinchuk by the Chancellor<sup>6</sup> and Minister President Göring;<sup>7</sup> ratification of the extension of the Berlin Treaty and positive comments of the National Socialist press on this event.

If, accordingly, I was entirely confident with regard to our intentions, I nevertheless had misgivings with regard to the trends that I had noted in political circles of the Soviet Union until very recently. It was of great importance for our attitude and for the policy to be pursued in the immediate future, to obtain a clear conception of the political intentions of Russia. I was therefore reverting to the questions that I had discussed with M. Krestinsky before my departure for Berlin (see report No. A 970 of May 14<sup>8</sup>). Following this conversation, People's Commissar Voroshilov had then appeared with his most distinguished colleagues at the dinner that I gave for General von Bockelberg. By this fact, by his speech, and by his words to me, he pledged himself to continuance of the present policy of friendly collaboration. In the field of military policy this had also found expression in the fact that cooperation, for which notice of termination had been given by the Soviets, had nevertheless been resumed in a special field.<sup>9</sup>

Since then I had again become very dubious as to the value that should be attached to these positive manifestations. First of all, in the special field of military policy just mentioned, after the promise recently made, notice of termination had nevertheless been sent; in another field, cooperation had likewise been discontinued<sup>10</sup>—in both cases in a rather sudden and unfriendly manner, in contrast to the cordial reception accorded to General von Bockelberg by the military authorities here.

In connection with other indications, the thought inevitably occurred whether the Soviet Government still desired this cooperation in the sphere of military policy at all, or whether it had not perhaps already committed itself to France to break off these relations with us.

The same doubts cropped up in my mind when I observed the negative attitude of the Soviet Government toward our inquiry regarding

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<sup>4</sup> See document No. 43, footnote 7.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 104, footnote 5.

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 194.

<sup>7</sup> A record of Khinchuk's reception by Göring has not been found.

<sup>8</sup> Document No. 232.

<sup>9</sup> See enclosure 1 to document No. 252.

<sup>10</sup> Documents recording these steps by the Soviet Government have not been found.

the taking over of Lithuanian hogs for the purpose of effecting a German-Lithuanian trade treaty.<sup>11</sup> I fully realized the objections from an economic point of view on the Soviet side to the realization of this idea.

But the fact that a purely negative reply—without an attempt being made to discuss the number of Lithuanian livestock to be purchased, or prices and credit terms—had come from the Soviet Government had, however, staggered me. I wondered whether a German-Soviet-Lithuanian collaboration was still desired politically at all by the Soviet Government, or whether it was shying away from the realization of a plan that after all harbored a certain anti-Polish purpose; whether the Soviet Government, in its desire for good relations with Poland, was already going so far as to wish to avoid a collaboration with Germany in the sphere of Lithuanian policy.

Of less importance, though perhaps symptomatic, was the fact that the joint shipping service between Stettin and Leningrad, which was based on the agreements of the year 1928, was likewise terminated by the Soviets.

In addition to these individual symptoms, there was also the great political question of Franco-Soviet relations, concerning which I spoke before my departure, with MM. Litvinov, Voroshilov, and him. Radek's article with its altered attitude with regard to Versailles and its dangerous thesis: revision means war—had already been characterized by me even at the time as a pronouncement of great political significance and as having an extremely dangerous effect on German-Soviet relations.<sup>12</sup> The reply had at the time been made to me: This article should not be taken too seriously; Radek did not always speak as a semi-official publicist, particularly not in this article, which had appeared only in *Pravda*. Further events unfortunately proved that I was right. Quite apart from the subjective purpose pursued by this article on the Soviet side, its objective effect was as I had anticipated: The article had been construed by the world press in general as a departure of Russia from the Rapallo course and a deflection into the French orbit. The French press and public had even established and enumerated the various stages of the rapidly developing Franco-Soviet rapprochement: conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact—Litvinov's behavior at the Disarmament Conference—Radek's article—unanimous acceptance of the pact in the French Parliament—warm telegraphic message of greeting from Litvinov to Paul-Boncour.

<sup>11</sup> German and Lithuanian experts had discussed an economic agreement between the two countries at talks held in Kaunas at the end of May. The chief problem was the disposal of the Lithuanian surplus of 150,000 to 200,000 hogs annually. The principal documents on these negotiations have been filmed on serial 8957. A memorandum by Meyer of June 9 (3015/596288-89) noted that an offer by the Germans of credit to the Soviets to finance Soviet importation of the Lithuanian hogs had been rejected.

<sup>12</sup> See document No. 232 and footnote 2.

Before I resumed my political work, I was anxious to be clear as to the attitude of the Soviet Government in order that I might draw my conclusions from it and report to my Government accordingly.

M. Krestinsky, who had listened attentively and made copious notes, replied that he would gladly give me a frank reply. I knew, he said, that the Soviet Government had often been in doubt in recent months as to whether Germany wished to continue her former policy with respect to the Soviet Union. I also knew that the numerous incidents and raids on Soviet institutions had caused great bitterness here. These incidents were unfortunately recurring until very recently and were interrupting the tranquilization process that was gradually taking place. M. Krestinsky then spoke about the last incident that had taken place in Hamburg, where the police had wanted to enter the extraterritorial residence of the trade representative there and conduct a house search. He described this incident with great agitation and said that if we were anxious to produce a peaceful atmosphere, it *had* to be possible to prevent such excesses and to punish offending officials. He then went into the last developments in the Derop affair, in which the proposals made by German authorities with respect to the staffing of the board of directors<sup>13</sup> had been accepted in good faith by the Soviet side. These official German proposals had now been countermanded by Minister President Göring. He earnestly hoped that the final solution would now eventually be found.

The feeling of insecurity concerning German policy with regard to the Soviet Union and the uncertainty as to whether the words of leading German personages would now also be followed by deeds, still persisted in the case of some of the politicians here. This skeptical element of the Soviet public still wondered whether the old relations with Germany would and could be restored.

The greater and more influential portion of the Soviet political public and the Soviet Government itself, however, desired a continuation of the present positive policy with respect to Germany. Only a certain attitude of watchful waiting was to be noted, which was directed particularly at the reply to the question of what trend within the National Socialist party would prevail: whether the pro-Soviet or the anti-Soviet trend led by Herr Rosenberg. No other orientation of Soviet policy had in any case occurred. It could by no means be said that the Soviet Government had cooled toward Germany and turned to France. The statement that Stalin had made to Emil Ludwig was still valid; the Soviet Government was still fighting the Versailles Treaty.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> See documents Nos. 194 and 198.

<sup>14</sup> Apparently a reference to Stalin's remarks to Emil Ludwig on Dec. 31, 1931.

In Franco-Soviet relations the French side was the active one. It was French policy that pinned definite hopes on the reorganization of relations with the Soviet Union and took this stand by reason of its own purely French interests. The fact that France took a friendly attitude toward the Soviet Union was advantageous to and welcomed by the latter. It could not be said, however, that the French demonstrations of friendship had received the same active response from the Soviet side.

As far as military relations were concerned, the Soviet side had never spoken even a word about the matter with the French. M. Krestinsky said neither he nor the Soviet Government knew to what extent the French were informed about the question as such and about the details. Since the French and the English intelligence services were very active, it could be expected that the other side would have a certain amount of information. The French were naturally constantly repeating their accounts of the extensive disclosures which the then Chancellor von Papen had made to M. Herriot in Lausanne. They said that Herr von Papen had shown them all the German-Russian treaties [*Verträge*] on this question. M. Krestinsky added that since no treaties had been concluded in this field, the French statements apparently did not deserve much credence.

If the Soviet side was now anxious to discontinue military cooperation in one field or another, this had nothing whatever to do with consideration for Franco-Soviet relations or with pressure from the French. The governing consideration, on the contrary, was that at the time when the Disarmament Conference was shaping up and the Western Powers in particular were making pacifist speeches, it was perhaps more advantageous and safe for both sides—the German and the Soviet—to undertake to reduce cooperation and forestall possible attacks.

I replied to M. Krestinsky that I would have been glad if we had been informed quite openly of these motives. The fact that the termination had occurred without any valid reason being given, and contrary to the statements previously made and to the preparatory measures which had already been taken, had necessarily astonished us and aroused our mistrust.

M. Krestinsky repeated that no other reasons than the ones mentioned had influenced the Soviet Government. Reverting to relations with France, he stated further that it had always been an aim of the Soviet Government's foreign policy to make a breach in the ring of capitalistic countries surrounding it. For this purpose the friendly relations with Germany had thus far sufficed. It had attached no importance to the reorganization of its relations with third powers. As M. Litvinov had already informed me, however, the Soviet Govern-



ment now wished, without prejudice to its relations with Germany, to try to pursue a positive policy with respect to other countries also, as for example, France.

I confirmed in conclusion that the Soviet Government then intended no reorientation of its foreign policy, that its attitude toward the Versailles Treaty was still a hostile one, and that it strove for a continuance of friendly relations. I expressed the hope that this policy would shortly also receive open expression.

The conversation then turned to the Lithuanian project.

VON DIRKSEN

## No. 285

3170/676456-57

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, June 6, 1933.

The Italian Ambassador called on me this noon and brought the new text of article III<sup>1</sup> of the four power pact, which we know already from telegrams Nos. 132 and 133 from Rome.<sup>2</sup> He was instructed to ascertain what we thought of the new wording. He was not instructed to ask for an immediate decision. When I told him that Herr von Hassell was urging that a position be taken not later than 1 o'clock, he remarked that this must have to do with the fact that the Ambassadors in Rome are scheduled to meet this afternoon at 4 o'clock. When I asked him whether this wording was now the final one or whether it would be worked over some more, he replied that he knew from a telephone conversation he had had with Suvich, that the French Ambassador was authorized to initial this text.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (6058/E447066).

<sup>2</sup> Sent June 4, neither printed (3170/676448-51) and (6058/E447051-52), respectively. In the first of these telegrams, Hassell reported that the French were no longer willing to accept article III in its present form since, according to an instruction received by Jouvenel, "the French Government was compelled to realize that as a result of misunderstandings between the French authorities concerned, a text was considered approved which no longer contained any obligation on the part of Germany to give effect to the equality of rights by stages only and on the basis of agreements." Attempts at a compromise made by the Italians and the Ambassadors of the Great Powers finally resulted in a new version of article III formulated jointly by Jouvenel and officials of the Italian Foreign Ministry. Hassell cited the text of this new version of article III in telegram No. 132, while a slight change in the wording was added in his telegram No. 133. The new wording of the article which is in French in the original reads as follows: "The High Contracting Parties undertake to make every effort to ensure the success of the Disarmament Conference and, should questions which particularly concern them remain in suspense on the conclusion of that Conference, they reserve the right to re-examine these questions among themselves in pursuance of the present agreement with a view to ensuring their solution through the appropriate channels."

I told the Ambassador that what was being put before us now was an entirely new pact and that this ought to be fully realized. The Ambassador did indeed admit this. Of Mussolini's original proposal, I told him, only a weakened version of article I was left. The word "revision" had been struck from article II, which now was moreover burdened with [reference to] articles 10 and 16. For us the positive feature of the Rome pact until the end of last week had been the recognition of Germany's equality of rights in article III. Now this was also gone. It was impossible for us to decide either for or against the new proposal within a few hours. Regard for the London Conference and for world opinion were factors in favor of signing the new pact, but there were many other arguments against doing this, as he knew from his last talk with the Reich Chancellor.<sup>3</sup> What seemed to me to be particularly serious was the fact that it was now left unsettled as to what was to happen in the disarmament question. Failure of the Conference in Geneva was threatening; this had appeared less serious last week when article III of the Rome pact, as it was then worded, still provided a solid foundation for subsequent negotiations. Now this foundation had disappeared and the prospects offered by the pact were very unsatisfactory. The French would undoubtedly still maintain that the disarmament question, or the modification of Germany's military status, is not an issue "especially" <sup>4</sup> concerning the four Powers alone. Neither does it say that the question of armaments is to be dealt with in accordance with the four power pact, but rather that the four Powers should see to it that a solution "through the appropriate channels" <sup>4</sup> is found. It was not clear what channels should be used. The Ambassador suggested that "appropriate channels" unquestionably referred to the League of Nations, at least in the French view. I told him that in that case the disarmament issue would be bogged down all the more and that this would make it twice as easy for the French to enforce participation of the Little Entente and Poland in all decisions with respect to this.

The Ambassador did not fail to appreciate these points of view and gave an account of his talk with Suvich. Suvich had argued that, while it was true that German equality of rights and any practical value had gone by the boards, the new formula on the other hand was very elastic and for that reason of greater advantage to us because we had been dubious before about committing ourselves to the three other Powers for a period of 10 years. The Ambassador, on his own part, then pointed out the importance of conclusion of

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<sup>3</sup> See document No. 274.

<sup>4</sup> In French in the original.

the pact for the London Conference, the opening of which was in every respect under such unfavorable auspices.

The Ambassador also told me that his English colleague had a slightly different text. According to the English version the text would read: "For application of the present agreement."<sup>5</sup>

BÜLOW

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<sup>5</sup> In another memorandum of June 6 Bülow recorded that he telephoned Hassell at noon about this conversation with Cerruti, telling him also that it was absolutely impossible to provide him with instructions by 1 p. m. as Hassell had requested. Bülow also pointed out that the most recent wording of article III was a change for the worse and that Hassell, if he had the opportunity, should try to have the former text restored (3170/676458).

## No. 286

3170/676459

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, June 6, 1933.

The English Ambassador made an urgent request for an appointment this morning and came to see me shortly before 2 o'clock. He presented to me the text of article III of the four power pact, which we know from telegrams Nos. 132 and 133 from Rome.<sup>1</sup> He requested information on our position in regard to it. I told him approximately the same that I had told the Italian Ambassador when he called,<sup>2</sup> but took a slightly more negative attitude as Ministerialdirektor Gaus informed me during the talk with the English Ambassador that Herr von Blomberg had expressed opposition to the new proposal. I put the main emphasis on the danger of a subsequent complication of the disarmament problem, for which provisions had been made in the original version of article III, while the new version contained nothing that would prevent a worsening of the situation. Referring the disarmament question back to the League of Nations constituted a serious danger for the whole world. Elimination of article III in its original wording was a loss not for Germany alone, but for all Powers directly and indirectly concerned. I also told the Ambassador, explaining why, that a decision was not possible at the moment and could not be expected before Thursday morning.

BÜLOW

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 285, footnote 2.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 285.

## No. 287

6058/E447061-62

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

URGENT

No. 135 of June 6

ROME, June 6, 1933—8:25 p. m.

Received June 6—11:00 p. m.

II It. 715.

I presented the situation to Suvich in accordance with the telephoned instructions of the State Secretary.<sup>1</sup> Since Cerruti's reports emphasize the technical difficulty inherent in the absence of the Ministers,<sup>2</sup> I stressed that we had to proceed on the basis that an agreement had been reached; moreover, even with all the Ministers present, such an important political question as a decision about an entirely changed pact could not be settled in a trice. If, as some foreign press reports indicated, the impression was being spread that the three others were in agreement and the delay was only our fault, this could only serve to bring about a decided deterioration in the Berlin atmosphere. The fault lay entirely with the French. Suvich stated most emphatically that Italy shared our point of view; there was no alignment of three against one; Italy would not agree to any solution which we did not accept. He had just spoken with the English Ambassador to the same effect and pointed to the danger of the attempt to depict the situation incorrectly. The English Ambassador just telephoned me to confirm this view. Both gentlemen, after conferring with Jouvenel, are of the opinion that the Paris Government desires the pact to fail because it otherwise considers it very probable that the Cabinet will fall on the pact issue. Daladier had given full powers to initial it only after Jouvenel had pointed out that practically all the French proposals had been taken into account and therefore to break from the ranks would be morally impossible. The greatest speed was advisable in order to get the pact initialed; it would be much more difficult for Paris to refuse to ratify it later. Suvich stated once more with the familiar arguments that the new article III was actually much more favorable for us because of the elimination of the previous commitments. The last French addition at the end, too, permitted all interpretations regarding the meaning of "appropriate channels." Both requested urgently that we not make agreement dependent upon elimination of the addition, since Paris was unable to yield.

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 285, footnote 5.

<sup>2</sup> In reply to Cerruti's telephone requests of the same day, that a direct telephone conversation between Hitler and Mussolini be arranged in order to ascertain the official German position on the new article III prior to Mussolini's Senate speech scheduled for 5 p. m., Bülow had pointed out that Hitler was in Bavaria at the moment and could not be reached (3170/676460).

As a result of my communications Mussolini decided to postpone his speech until tomorrow afternoon as the last possible date in the expectation of receiving the German decision by noon. Therefore please give me instructions by telephone in any case before 1:00 p. m.<sup>3</sup>

HASSELL

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<sup>3</sup> See document No. 295, and footnote 1.

## No. 288

7188/E528240-48

### *The President of the Reichsbank to the State Secretary in the Reich Chancellery*

IIa 16316

BERLIN, June 6, 1933.  
Rk. 7286.

DEAR HERR STATE SECRETARY: A proposal to be submitted to the Cabinet, along with a draft law on the payment obligations toward foreign countries, is being sent to you from the Reich Ministry of Economics. The accompanying letter from the Directorate of the Reichsbank to the Reich Chancellor, which I am sending you in draft for the time being,<sup>1</sup> refers to this draft law. I think that this letter would best be used as a justification for the law and be published as such. Since there exists the possibility that, considering this purpose of the letter, one or another Cabinet member will still desire changes in the text, it appears advisable to me to submit the letter first in draft. Considering the urgency of the matter I should be grateful if the draft law could be placed on the agenda of the Cabinet meeting of June 8.

With the assurance, etc.

HJALMAR SCHACHT

[Enclosure]

### *The Directorate of the Reichsbank to the Reich Chancellor*

IIa 16316

BERLIN, June 6, 1933.  
zu Rk. 7286.

DEAR HERR REICH CHANCELLOR: The Reichsbank's supply of gold of its own and foreign exchange valid as legal cover, which at the end of June 1930 had attained the highest point since the stabilization of the currency, 3078 million reichsmarks, has experienced a rapid reduction owing to the calling in of credits abroad following the collapse of the Austrian Kreditanstalt in May 1931. The Standstill Agreements and foreign exchange measures undertaken after the

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<sup>1</sup> Unsigned marginal note: "Original arrived later and is appended." Cf. document No. 217 and footnote 3.

crisis in July 1931 have slowed down the reduction, to be sure, but they have not been able to prevent there being only about 280 million reichsmarks of its own gold and foreign exchange valid as legal cover left in the Reichsbank on May 31, 1933.

Even though the amount of gold coverage no longer plays the former decisive role in domestic payments when foreign exchange control is maintained to keep the reichsmark stable, nevertheless the continued shrinkage of gold and foreign exchange at the Reichsbank is leading to the great danger that the amounts of foreign exchange available are not even adequate any longer for the orderly payment of the millions needed daily in German foreign trade transactions. This danger is all the greater, since the constant reduction of available foreign exchange reserves causes foreign trade to shrink more and more. The course of the German balance of trade during recent months, with its sharply sinking export surplus (monthly average of the first 4 months of 1932=94 million reichsmarks as compared with 44 million reichsmarks in the corresponding period of 1933) is an excellent illustration of this. The arbitrary currency measures taken by a number of other countries have created a further danger. In the past Germany got along on the foreign exchange income from the higher export surpluses of earlier months, but a total melting away of the foreign exchange reserves and therewith a further decline in trade has become dangerously imminent.

We should not wait for such a situation to occur if we do not want to jeopardize the payment of imports, especially of raw materials and semi-finished goods, the processing of which forms the basis for the *employment of a highly qualified German labor force*. Not only the German workers are interested in German foreign trade, however, but also the *creditors of Germany*. Germany can transfer debt payments into the creditor currencies only if the German export trade remains in existence. The transfer conversations just concluded with representatives of the foreign creditors of Germany have furnished new proof that this is understood everywhere in the world.

This situation gives rise to the urgent necessity of taking effective measures immediately in order to prevent a further weakening of the Reichsbank and to prepare the way instead for a gradual strengthening of its reserves again. This necessity has also been recognized by Germany's foreign creditors both in the Standstill negotiations and in the above-mentioned discussion of the representatives of the foreign creditors with us. The measures so far employed for defending or strengthening the Reichsbank reserves have remained ineffective. Not only all our foreign trade surpluses but also the covering reserves of the Reichsbank have been sacrificed again and again in order to maintain to some extent the service of the debt.

The situation has now deteriorated to such an extent that the Reichsbank feels impelled for the purpose of maintaining foreign trade and therewith Germany's ability to pay to put into effect a decisive measure in the control of foreign exchange. As of July 1, 1933, the Reichsbank will for a temporary period no longer make foreign exchange available for the transfer of all such obligations as existed at the time of the bank crisis on July 15, 1931, in so far as they are not specifically provided for in the so-called Standstill Agreement. This measure is meant to place the Reichsbank in a position to protect effectively its currency reserves still in existence and restore them gradually to appropriate proportions, as well as at the same time to make available sufficient foreign exchange *for all the requirements of the current credit and trade transactions with foreign countries*. The Reichsbank has in mind, as the final aim of its measures, fitting the German currency into the free international payments system again as soon as possible and letting Germany's future ability to pay her creditors become fully effective again as soon as possible.

We are aware that the proposed measure will involve temporary inconveniences for the creditors, but we believe that it is more in the interest of the creditors to make such a temporary sacrifice that will strengthen Germany's future ability to pay than to run the danger of a complete suspension of payments. The Reichsbank is most desirous of avoiding such a suspension of payments. It is therefore addressing to the Reich Government the request that by means of an appropriate law it be provided that all German debtors to whom the Reichsbank cannot give the necessary transfer foreign exchange at the present moment be obligated to make their payments as they become due for the contractual service of all foreign debts that were incurred before July 15, 1931—unless they are otherwise regulated in a present or future standstill agreement—in reichsmarks at the current rate of exchange of the foreign currency at any given time to an independent *Konversionskasse* to be established under the supervision of the Reichsbank. In case a debtor does not pay, the foreign creditor must have available all regular legal rights for obtaining the payment in reichsmarks, so that it is entirely clear that the Reichsbank measure is purely a matter of foreign exchange policy, but not one permitting suspension of payments.

In taking the above measure the Reichsbank is guided by the desire to contribute as quickly as possible toward a revival of world trade. It hopes that as a result the time will come very soon when the Reichsbank will be able again to make available enough foreign exchange not only for the current trade transactions but also for the service of the long-term debts. It also wishes thereby to take the initiative in inducing the other countries and banks of issue also to take measures

to revive world trade as soon as possible, and would therefore like to recommend that this problem be treated on an urgent basis at the World Economic Conference soon to convene, in order to bring about cooperation of all interested countries for a speedy solution of the problem.

Such cooperation, put into effect as soon as possible, is also in accord with the wishes of Germany's creditors who were represented, as you know, at the transfer conference held at the Reichsbank from May 29 to June 2. The unanimous desire for establishment of close contact is the important positive result of this meeting. For information on this we have the honor to submit a copy of the joint press communiqué<sup>2</sup> meant for both home and abroad, and to point out in particular the establishment of a standing committee of creditors' representatives for Germany's long-term debts, as mentioned in the third from the last paragraph. Now that a meeting is in prospect in London in the course of the World Economic Conference for the committees of the creditors for the German short-term private and public debts, we believe we should also ask the members of the new committees to meet at the same time in London in order to discuss with all of them at the same time the question of further procedure and in particular the treatment of the limited stocks of foreign exchange and their increase with the aim of changing over the new procedure as soon as possible into a resumption of free transfer.

Directorate of the Reichsbank:  
HJALMAR SCHACHT  
DREYSE

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<sup>2</sup> Not printed (7188/E528249-51).

## No. 289

2406/510856

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, June 7, 1933.  
RM 797.

The French Ambassador came to see me this evening in order, by direction of his Government, to protest against the plan of a German transfer moratorium. He pointed out that this measure violated both the Lausanne agreements of last year<sup>1</sup> and the agreements of December 1932 concerning a clearing procedure between France and Germany.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Texts of these agreements are in British Cmd. 4126, Misc. No. 7 (1932): *Final Act of the Lausanne Conference, Lausanne, July 9, 1932* and British Cmd. 4129, Misc. No. 8, (1932): *Further Documents Relating to Settlement Reached at the Lausanne Conference*.

<sup>2</sup> Text in *Journal Officiel de la République Française: Lois et Décrets*, 1933, No. 3, p. 151.



I replied to M. Poncet that, to my knowledge, the final decisions on this question had not yet been taken, but that it was inevitable in the circumstances that payments to other countries should be suspended. This was a natural consequence of the constant decline in our export surplus and the resultant drain on the gold reserves of the Reichsbank which, he knew, had now shrunk to some 300 millions. I referred, moreover, to events in England and in America which, even if they do not mean a complete moratorium, do mean a considerable diminution of the claims of the foreign creditors. To my knowledge, apart from platonic declarations, no objections were raised to this from any direction. Our proposed measures were dictated by urgent necessity. I knew, moreover, that they have been prepared abroad for months for this step.

V. N[EURATH]

### No. 290

3170/676495-96

#### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

JUNE 7, 1933.

Today the Reich Chancellor agreed to the acceptance of the latest version of article III of the pact and therewith also to acceptance of the entire pact. He ordered that the initialing *and* the signing be done by Ambassador von Hassell.

V. N[EURATH]

### No. 291

6058/E447069-72

#### *Circular of the Foreign Minister*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

BERLIN, June 7, 1933.

e. o. II Italien 729.

For your information and guidance of your conversation.

The four power pact in the version now decided upon certainly does not fulfill by far all the wishes that we had harbored in connection with the significant initiative of Mussolini. The counteraction of the French group and England's lukewarm attitude led to a strong dilution of the ideas of the original Italian draft. Nevertheless the pact represents political progress even in its present form. Al-

<sup>1</sup>This circular was sent to all Missions in Europe, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, and Luxembourg, and to the Embassies in the United States and Japan and to the Legation in Argentina.

though the French have succeeded on the one hand in placing the functions of the pact within the framework of the League of Nations, nevertheless the four Western Powers were left with having assigned to them the de facto role of political leadership in Europe. In this way a new form and new point of departure for the treatment of political problems have been established. Neither did the counterproposals of the French Government of April<sup>2</sup> prevail in any way in the individual provisions of article II on treaty revision or article III on disarmament. Although the revision and disarmament questions were not directly advanced, it is nevertheless important that the application of article 19 has for the first time been made the subject of a solemn treaty, and that after a possible failure of the Disarmament Conference we have the possibility of bringing up once more for discussion among the pact Powers the equality of rights for Germany.

More important for us than the content of the treaty itself, however, is the fact that a general political treaty of this kind is now being concluded at all. It disavows all attempts at isolating Germany and gives expression to the idea that Germany can be, not an object, but only the participating subject of European policy. This observation is all the more important since we know that the hostility to the pact in France and her satellite states is mainly to be attributed to the feeling that such a pact must necessarily increase the prestige of the Reich Government.

Toward the outside it should be stressed that it is primarily owing to the moderate attitude of the Reich Government that the pact was concluded. By our agreement we gave another striking proof of our policy of peace and therewith deprived France of any pretext for further postponement of effective disarmament. Naturally, Germany's relation to other European and extra-European Powers is not affected by the pact. Germany's freedom of action toward all third powers and with regard to the problems to be settled with these powers has been fully retained.

V. N[EURATH]

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<sup>2</sup> See document No. 151.

## No. 292

8909/E621736-41

### *Agreement of Understanding and Co-Operation*<sup>1</sup>

[ROME, June 7, 1933.]

The President of the French Republic, the President of the German Reich, His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the

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<sup>1</sup> The entire text of this agreement, including the heading, reproduces the official English language text as found in the Foreign Ministry files. This copy of the agreement shows the official text in German, English, French, and Italian in parallel columns.

British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the King of Italy;

Conscious of the special responsibilities incumbent on them as possessing permanent representation on the Council of the League of Nations, where the League itself and its members are concerned, and of the responsibilities resulting from their common signature of the Locarno agreements;

Convinced that the state of disquiet which obtains throughout the world can only be dissipated by reinforcing their solidarity in such a way as to strengthen confidence in peace in Europe;

Faithful to the obligations which they have assumed in virtue of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Locarno Treaties, and the Briand-Kellogg Pact, and taking into account the Declaration of the Renunciation of Force, the principle of which was proclaimed in the declaration signed at Geneva on the 11th December, 1932, by their delegates at the Disarmament Conference and adopted on the 2nd March, 1933, by the Political Commission of that Conference;

Anxious to give full effect to all the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, while conforming to the methods and procedure laid down therein, from which they have no intention of departing:

Mindful of the rights of every State, which cannot be affected without the consent of the interested party;

Have resolved to conclude an agreement with these objects, and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

The President of the French Republic:

His Excellency M. Henry de Jouvenel, Ambassador of the French Republic, Senator:

The President of the German Reich:

His Excellency Herr Ulrich von Hassell, Ambassador of the German Reich:

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, for Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

His Excellency the Right Honourable Sir Ronald Graham, G. C. B., G. C. M. G., G. C. V. O., His Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at the Court of the Quirinal;

His Majesty the King of Italy:

His Excellency Cavaliere Benito Mussolini Head of the Government, Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

## Article 1

The High Contracting Parties will consult together as regards all questions which appertain to them. They undertake to make every effort to pursue, within the framework of the League of Nations, a policy of effective co-operation between all Powers with a view to the maintenance of peace.

## Article 2

In respect of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and particularly articles 10, 16, and 19, the High Contracting Parties decide to examine between themselves and without prejudice to decisions which can only be taken by the regular organs of the League of Nations, all proposals relating to methods and procedure calculated to give due effect to these articles.

## Article 3

The High Contracting Parties undertake to make every effort to ensure the success of the Disarmament Conference and, should questions which particularly concern them remain in suspense on the conclusion of that Conference, they reserve the right to re-examine these questions between themselves in pursuance of the present agreement with a view to ensuring their solution through the appropriate channels.

## Article 4

The High Contracting Parties affirm their desire to consult together as regards all economic questions which have a common interest for Europe and particularly for its economic restoration, with a view to seeking a settlement within the framework of the League of Nations.

## Article 5

The present agreement is concluded for a period of ten years from the date of its entry into force. If, before the end of the eighth year, none of the High Contracting Parties shall have notified to the others his intention to terminate the agreement, it shall be regarded as renewed and will remain in force indefinitely, each of the High Contracting Parties possessing in that event the right to terminate it by a declaration to that effect on giving two years' notice.

## Article 6

The present agreement, drawn up in English, French, German and Italian, of which the French text prevails in case of divergence, shall be ratified and the ratifications shall be deposited at Rome as soon as possible. The Government of the Kingdom of Italy will deliver to each of the High Contracting Parties a certified copy of the procès-verbaux of deposit.

The present agreement will enter into force as soon as all the ratifications have been deposited.

It shall be registered at the League of Nations in conformity with the Covenant of the League.

Done at Rome, the 7th June 1933, in a single copy, which will remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the Kingdom of Italy, certified copies will be delivered to each of the High Contracting Parties.

In faith whereof the above-mentioned plenipotentiaries have signed the present agreement.<sup>2</sup>

HENRY DE JOUVENEL  
ULRICH VON HASSELL  
RONALD GRAHAM  
BENITO MUSSOLINI

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<sup>2</sup> Actually the Pact was only initialed on June 7. For the signing see document No. 368.

## No. 293

9119/E640801-04

### *Circular of the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

BERLIN, June 7, 1933.  
W 3754.

For your information.

The Reich Cabinet will probably approve the law concerning the transfer moratorium on Thursday.<sup>2</sup> The law will at once be made public, together with the letter of the Reichsbank to the Reich Government,<sup>3</sup> which gives, as it were, the reasons for the law. A press communiqué will also be issued through WTB, to the substance and arguments of which I direct the attention of the Missions.

The law will not enter into force until July 1. The purpose of this postponement is to allow a few weeks' time for further discussion of the situation with the creditors' committees before it takes effect. For this purpose the Standstill Committee has been invited by the Reichsbank to go to London on June 13. Moreover, the newly constituted committee of long-term creditors and the Bank for International Settlements in Basel will also be invited to go to London next week. The

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<sup>1</sup> This circular was sent to the principal German Missions in European capitals and to the Embassy in Washington.

<sup>2</sup> i. e., June 8. See document No. 296.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 288.

purpose of these tactics is not to confront private creditors or governments immediately with the decision as to whether they wish to take any countermeasures or not, whether they be legal seizures or unilateral clearings. Henceforward also reference to the negotiations begun and dragging out in London will continue to furnish the pretext for countermeasures.

Especially important and difficult in this connection is the position of the Dawes and the Young loans. The Cabinet will probably decide that the transfer service will also be suspended for these two loans. The following line of argument can be used :

Germany is, on the one hand, naturally aware of the special legal and political character of these two loans, which are regulated by international agreements between governments. On the other hand, it might, however, be construed as disloyal and discriminatory toward all the other foreign creditors if the Reich Government were to decide itself unilaterally that the transfer service should be continued for these two loans, but suspended for the other foreign debts. The future treatment of the Dawes and Young loans is therefore properly part of the whole complex of the conferences scheduled with the creditors. It is precisely for this reason that the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, which is the trustee for these two loans, will also be invited to London.

Addendum for : Washington, London, Paris, Rome, Bern, Brussels, The Hague, Stockholm :

CONFIDENTIAL

It will be up to the Basel bank primarily, as trustee for these two loans, to decide whether the competent court of arbitration will be called upon to decide whether Germany is justified in suspending the transfer for these two loans. Germany's legal position in connection with such a decision is not particularly strong. It must therefore be expected at the outset that in the event of a decision that is unfavorable to us, the transfer service on these two loans will be resumed later on. Importance should therefore be attached from the start to seeing that the arbitral settlement made by the court of arbitration is not in the nature of an embittered litigation but of a friendly, objective clarification, which is the result of agreement. If the court decides that Germany is to continue the transfer service on the two loans, Germany would also not then be open to the charge of discriminating against all the other foreign creditors by unilateral action.

RITTER

## No. 294

9119/E640808-15

*The Directorate of the Reichsbank to the Foreign Minister*

IIa 16419

BERLIN, June 7, 1933.

W 3816.

In the enclosure we have the honor to send you a memorandum, which the American attorney and representative of the interests of the American bondholders, John Foster Dulles, has transmitted in connection with the transfer conversations being held here and in which the problem of the American holders of German obligations is discussed.

The offices principally concerned have received copies.

Directorate of the Reichsbank:

[signatures illegible]

[Enclosure] <sup>1</sup>

*John Foster Dulles to Hjalmar Schacht*

BERLIN, June 3, 1933.

MY DEAR DR. SCHACHT: I enclose a memorandum summarizing the dollar bond situation generally. Also, at your request, I append a list of bonds issued by debtors who presumably have substantial assets or business abroad which could be attached. There are doubtless others, as I do not pretend to have a full knowledge of the situation of the various debtors.

As I said to you at dinner last night, I seriously question the wisdom of Germany approaching the problem from the standpoint of paying where the particular creditor has weapons which he can use against Germany abroad, and not paying anything where the creditor is disarmed due to the fact that his legal remedies exist only in Germany where they are suspended by German legislation.

This system has no moral basis; it definitely establishes the criterion of force and is, in effect, an economic war system. Unless it obviously is to be of very short duration, it creates the incentive for every creditor to try to find ways to coerce and harass Germany, as Germany has herself made this the test of whether she will pay.

I believe that if Germany inaugurates such a system your outgo of devisen will continue to be very substantial and your income of devisen will be very sharply reduced due to increased obstacles and prejudices against the use of German goods and services.

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<sup>1</sup>The enclosures are in English.

It would seem to me the part of wisdom for the Reichsbank to offer to continue transfer of some appreciable interest payments on a basis of equality to all creditors of solvent debtors—giving preference only in the two or three very exceptional situations where the creditors themselves would generally recognize this to be proper and in the common interest. I believe that there is such appreciation of the efforts which Germany has made to maintain her credit and such realization of the difficulties of the present exchange situation that very substantial relief in debt service would be accepted by the creditors generally, provided it were fairly applied to all. If this were not the case and if the proposal failed because certain debtors had the ability and intention to enforce more, then they and not Germany would have assumed the responsibility for inaugurating the “economic war” system.

I hope that you may find it possible to keep open the possibility of dealing with the situation along the lines I suggest until I can have a talk with you further at lunch next Thursday.

I am,

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

[Subenclosure 1]

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The stated purpose of the contemplated restriction on transfers is to permit the Reichsbank to maintain and even replenish its gold reserves through being able to divert to this purpose foreign exchange arising from German exports and German services and which foreign exchange would otherwise be absorbed by the service of external debts. The desired result of strengthening the Reichsbank would, however, not be achieved if the proposed action involved such economic and political consequences as would destroy the possibility of an international balance in favor of Germany. In this connection the American holders of German bonds are at least one factor of great importance.

There are probably between 200,000 and 300,000 different American individuals or institutions who hold German bonds. The holders of these bonds are essentially those who would like to be friendly to Germany. They with their families and friends comprise a particularly influential solid middle class.

There is already in our country considerable misgiving with reference to current events in Germany. There is already a considerable element which is discriminating against the use of German goods and services. This may prove to be merely a passing phase, or it may crystallize into a well defined national attitude. In my opinion it will crystallize if, at this particular juncture, action were taken which



alienated that important element of our population which is represented by the holders of German bonds.

Any wholesale stoppage of service payments would undoubtedly tend to such alienation. Quite apart from the special considerations of the moment, it is always a difficult task to bring to hundreds of thousands of scattered investors an appreciation of why a solvent debtor cannot pay. Bankers would understand problems of foreign exchange and be accustomed to making intelligent allowance where serious transfer difficulties impede the strict performance of a debtor's obligation in foreign exchange. The typical holder of German dollar bonds has no understanding of such problems. To locate and to educate him would be a long and arduous task.

It is also to be borne in mind that there are very serious difficulties, of a purely mechanical order, in reaching and dealing with hundreds of thousands of scattered holders of bearer bonds. For example, a system of issuing, in place of interest, "scrip" representing blocked marks, would, however perfect theoretically, almost inevitably break down under the weight of some two million separate operations per annum, each involving about \$30—quite apart from the difficulty of educating bondholders as to the nature and value and acceptability of the "scrip".

The difficulty, approaching impossibility, of dealing with a vast number of scattered bondholders in a foreign country has long been recognized. It is because once such "commercialization" has been effected it cannot be undone that the German Government steadfastly rejected the idea of "commercialization" of its political debt. This was a sound position and the reasoning which dictated it must not now be forgotten, particularly at the present juncture when conditions render unusually difficult the bringing about of any friendly composition between the debtors and the bondholders.

It must, furthermore, be borne in mind that debt action which failed of general voluntary acceptance and led to widespread defaults would not be a mere passing episode. Defaulted bonds do not evaporate. There are in the United States alone over 1,000,000 separate bonds which would remain in the family box, handed down from generation to generation, a subject of periodic discussion, a perpetual impediment to close economic and political relations.

A further consideration which assumes great importance in this connection is the fact that many of the important obligors of German dollar bonds have abroad very substantial assets necessary for the maintenance of Germany's international trade and the production of foreign exchange. A rough estimate indicates that approximately \$175,000,000 of bonds have been issued by companies which have valuable assets abroad subject to attachment by creditors. A German

moratorium will have no extraterritorial effect to prevent such attachments. The obligors include the great shipping companies, the German-Atlantic cable, banks which finance foreign trade, and the important export industries themselves such as chemicals and dyes, steel products, electrical equipment, etc. Unilateral action involving default by these companies would risk the virtually wiping out of Germany's economic activities beyond her own borders and would certainly nullify any beneficial effect to Germany of the debt relief. On the other hand, to grant an exceptional status to such debtors would inevitably involve serious difficulties with the creditors of other German debtors.

No one familiar with problems of finance, and particularly with the extraordinary exchange difficulties of recent years, can fail to recognize the effort which Germany has made to maintain her external credit. No such person can deny that, in the absence of a rapid improvement in world conditions, continuance on precisely the old basis has become so difficult as to create a problem which should be dealt with. The task is to find a way of dealing with it which will not create such economic and political difficulties as would render vain the great sacrifices which German economy has already made, and, on the net balance, work against Germany's interest. Preliminary study indicates that the exchange problem, while serious, fortunately does not call for such drastic action as would involve these consequences.

JUNE 1, 1933.

[Subenclosure 2]

	<i>Approximate original Amounts</i>
<i>Shipping</i>	
Norddeutscher Lloyd	\$20,000,000
Hapag	6,500,000
Hansa	5,000,000
<i>Cable</i>	
German Atlantic Cable	4,000,000
<i>Foreign Banking</i>	
Deutsche Bank u. Disconto-Ges.	25,000,000
Commerz- und Privatbank A.G.	20,000,000
<i>Steel</i>	
Vereinigte Stahlwerke A.G. and affiliated companies	50,000,000
<i>Electric:</i>	
A.E.G.	20,000,000
Gesfürel	5,000,000
	<hr/>
	\$155,500,000

*Note:* The foregoing are cases in which the debtor's own property is subject to seizure abroad. Even though a debtor has no property

of his own abroad a creditor may be able to find methods of proceeding abroad against one who is indebted to the debtor. In this way creditors could proceed against a debtor with no property abroad but with a deposit in a German bank by action against the property abroad of the German bank.

## No. 295

6058/E447076-77

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

[Telegram]

No. 137 of June 7

ROME (Quir), June 8, 1933—12:05 a. m.

Received June 8—4:30 a. m.

II It. 730.

On the basis of the instruction by telephone from the Foreign Minister<sup>1</sup> immediately informed Suvich that we accept the Pact in its present form. Mussolini then went to the Senate committee at once, where the benches and galleries were crowded in expectation. Mussolini gave a speech<sup>2</sup> lasting about half an hour, in which he praised the conclusion of the Pact and which made an extraordinary impression. The strong emphasis on revision and equality of rights was noteworthy. In discussing the revision question he spoke of the familiar Beneš speech,<sup>3</sup> which is no longer absolutely hostile toward revision. Speaking at some length he recognized English cooperation with applause from the house, then he spoke some friendly words about France and, accompanied by lively applause, expressed the hope of better cooperation on the basis of the Pact. Finally, he spoke very sympathetically and effectively about the new Germany, to the tune of loud applause. When the three Ambassadors who were present were mentioned the senators and the people in the galleries arose in lively demonstrations. Most impressive was finally the juxtaposition of the first Mussolini text and the present Pact. The close of the speech was accompanied by long and enthusiastic demonstrations that continued out in the street and in front of the Palazzo Venezia, also when the Ambassadors drove by.

Immediately afterwards, the initialing was done in the Palazzo Venezia by Mussolini and the three Ambassadors. Mussolini spoke to me about the Pact—while appreciating our misgivings, which I strongly emphasized—to the effect that it was after all an important event for us, too, that would certainly satisfy us in the long run.

<sup>1</sup> According to a memorandum by Neurath of June 7, Hassell was informed by telephone at 5:50 p. m. of Germany's acceptance of the Pact and was given authorization to initial it. At the same time he was instructed to see that publication of the text was postponed until the next evening (3170/676497-98).

<sup>2</sup> For the text, see *Scritti e discorsi di Benito Mussolini* vol. VIII, pp. 197-211.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 220, footnote 8.

He referred to his speech and stressed in particular the juxtaposition of the two texts and his words about the new Germany which had so far only been defamed and had now for the first time been honored and recognized by a foreign government. I thanked him for this, whereupon he expressed the hope that Hitler would be satisfied with the speech. I replied that his satisfaction would surely be great, greater than over the Pact, to which he reacted with a smile.

A delay in the publication until tomorrow evening is impossible, since the English Government has committed itself to having the text distributed in the House of Commons at the moment it is initialed; therefore publication in the morning newspapers is unavoidable.

HASSELL

## No. 296

3598/792918-22

*Extract From the Minutes of the Cabinet Session of June 8, 1933*<sup>1</sup>

Rk. 7392.

### 1. Draft of a law relating to payment obligations abroad.

President of the Reichsbank Dr. Schacht: Now that conferences with the representatives of our foreign creditors took place last week, the question of the transfer postponement must be finally settled today. In the negotiations with the creditors it appeared that our general view, as expressed also in the communiqué,<sup>2</sup> may be sharply assailed abroad. But something definite must be done in order that the constantly recurring uncertainties may be relieved by an accomplished fact. A discriminatory treatment of the creditors must be avoided most scrupulously from our side. The proposed law will only decide *what* has to be done. *How* the measures are to be carried out is a matter to be left to the conferences with the creditors.

Three important objections are to be expected:

1) *In the sphere of private law.* Example: A foreign private creditor impounds an account of his debtor abroad, or has a German ship tied up. Protection against such action lies in the fact that the Reichsbank must be given the opportunity to satisfy certain obligations in foreign currency. An important argument against the procedure in the field of private law is, moreover, the fact that such a procedure would, in the last analysis, result in the paralyzation of German trade.

2) *Political dangers.* Germany has assumed obligations that are based on international agreements. Among them are the obligations arising out of the Dawes and Young loans; possibly also out of the Kreuger loan. There is no doubt that a certain cooperativeness must be shown in connection with the payment of interest on these loans.

<sup>1</sup>The complete minutes of this meeting including a list of those present are filmed on 3598/792916-27.

<sup>2</sup>See document No. 288 and footnote 2.

The President of the Reichsbank therefore proposed that the representatives of the creditors be invited to meet with him as soon as possible in London and discuss the matter of effecting interest payments. The Bank for International Settlements, as trustee of the Dawes and Young loans, should also be invited. In the matter of this preferential treatment, sums are involved that we are able to pay—even in foreign exchange.

3) *Economic dangers.* Individual countries, with which trade shows a balance in our favor, have already threatened to introduce a compulsory clearing. According to this, the export surpluses we have achieved are to be held up and used for the payment of coupons that become due. This danger, too, the President of the Reichsbank did not consider serious, because the resulting practice of compulsory clearing would eventually lead to a disruption of trade.

The President of the Reichsbank referred to the letter from the Directorate of the Reichsbank to the Chancellor,<sup>3</sup> which contains the request that, at the proposal of Germany, the World Economic Conference take up the transfer problem. The Reichsbank had given up the idea of promising the creditors at the start an exchange guarantee or the payment of interest on the balances accruing in the blocked accounts in Germany. These concessions are, on the contrary, to be dealt with on the occasion of the London negotiations.

After the President of the Reichsbank had read aloud the justification of the law intended for the press, he warned against tendencies that advocate the cutting off of Germany from the world market. The mere fact that Germany owes 20 billion marks to other countries will for the future involve us in the world economy.

The Foreign Minister pointed out that the Dawes and Young loans differed from all other German foreign loans in that they were defined by legal conditions in which the relationship between private debtor and private creditor is not involved. On the other hand, the conditions for these two loans have been determined by international agreements with foreign governments. If, therefore, the interest on the Dawes and Young loans is not paid, it is to be feared that the creditors will lay claim to the monopoly revenues of the German Treasury, which are the security for the interest payments. It should, moreover, be considered that the creditor governments will appeal to the arbitral tribunal established in the Young plan, or the International Court of Arbitration at The Hague for the purpose of determining that Germany is actually in a position to transfer the necessary amounts.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 288.

<sup>4</sup> Ritter had prepared a memorandum for the Foreign Minister advocating exemption of both the Dawes and Young loans from the transfer moratorium (9507/E670037, 9119/E640823-26). He also produced a set of minutes of the Cabinet session of June 8 with a somewhat lengthier account of the discussion on financial questions than that appearing here in the Thomsen minutes (9119/E640818-21).

The Reich Minister of Finance <sup>5</sup> declared himself in agreement with the draft bill and the tactical procedure proposed by the President of the Reichsbank. In his opinion, neither the Kreuger loan, nor the Lee-Higginson credit were on a par with the Dawes and Young loans. On the other hand, the Belgian mark obligations would presumably play a role in the negotiations. He considered extreme restraint on the part of Germany advisable in the matter of the inter-allied debts, in order that Germany should not allow herself to be pushed into the common front of European debtors against the United States.

The Reich Minister of Justice, <sup>6</sup> too, referred to the danger that the trustees might attach not only a portion, but all monopoly revenues in order to compel the payment of interest on the Dawes and Young loans. For the fact that we cannot keep up interest service we have available only the argument that no one can be obliged to pay more than he is able.

The Reich Minister of Economics, Food and Agriculture <sup>7</sup> pointed out that the American Government will probably propose a general reduction of tariffs at the World Economic Conference. This proposal was entirely unacceptable to us; America had prohibitive duties and could consequently propose a 10 percent reduction. This was not the case with us. Also, the four countries with the largest wheat production, namely, the United States, Canada, Argentina, and Australia, intended to propose a reduction of the wheat-growing area in order thereby to bring up the price of wheat. They would exploit such a price increase in order to obtain from us concessions in the commercial field. He therefore asked the Cabinet to agree that the German delegation at the World Economic Conference should not allow itself to be pushed in the direction of destruction of the protection for German agriculture.

The Reich Chancellor stated at the end of the discussion that the bill relating to payment obligations abroad was passed and the Reich Cabinet was in agreement with the tactical procedure explained by the President of the Reichsbank, as well as with the opinion of the Minister of Economics, Food and Agriculture concerning tariff protection for German agriculture.<sup>8</sup>

For the minute on 1) :

THOMSEN

<sup>5</sup> Count von Schwerin-Krosigk.

<sup>6</sup> Franz Gürtner.

<sup>7</sup> Alfred Hugenberg.

<sup>8</sup> The text of the law as promulgated on June 9 is printed in *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1933, pt. I, p. 349.

In a circular telegram by Ritter sent on June 8, 8 p. m. to the German Missions in the principal European capitals and Washington the Missions were informed :

"The Reich Cabinet today approved the law on the transfer moratorium.

"The following is strictly confidential. The Reich Cabinet did not thereby determine to halt transfers for the Dawes and Young loans also. Rather it left

[EDITORS' NOTE. On June 8, the General Commission, having completed the first reading of the British draft convention (see document No. 90), adopted the following recommendation of the Bureau:

"That the draft convention submitted by the United Kingdom delegation and accepted as a basis of discussion by a formal decision of the General Commission should be accepted as the basis of the future convention. This acceptance would be without prejudice to amendments or proposals submitted before or during the second reading, particularly as regarded additional chapters concerning the manufacture of and trade in arms and budgetary limitation." See League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, *Records of the Conference*, ser. B, *Minutes of the General Commission*, volume II, page 630.

Meanwhile it had been agreed that the General Commission should adjourn upon termination of the first reading, and that during this adjournment the President of the Conference in conjunction with the Bureau should prepare a text for the second reading of the draft convention. In line with this procedure as agreed, the Bureau convened again on June 27 and the General Commission on June 29. See document No. 322.

A German Foreign Ministry memorandum of June 9 summarizing the position on the various technical subjects before the Conference is not printed (3154/669371-87). See document No. 314, footnote 2.]

Footnote (8)—Continued

that question open for negotiations with the creditors in the coming weeks. If these negotiations establish the position [*Plattform*] that we are not exposing ourselves to the charge of insincerity and unfair discrimination against all of our other foreign creditors, it may be assumed that transfers for the Dawes and Young loans will be continued." (9119/E640805)

The subsequent negotiations with the creditors led to an arrangement by which the payments for interest and amortization on the Dawes loan were to be transferred in full, as well as payments of interest on the Young loan. However, amortization payments on the Young loan were not to be transferred.

## No. 297

7360/E536961-62

*The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 448 of June 9

PARIS, June 9, 1933.

Received June 9—10:00 p. m.

II F Abr. 2032.

For the State Secretary personally.

The result of Daladier's conversation <sup>1</sup> with the Americans and English may be summarized as follows:

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 283, footnote 1. For an American record of this conversation, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933*, vol. I, pp. 190-192. For a British record see *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. V, documents Nos. 207 and 208.

The American and English wish for disarmament of land forces was categorically rejected by Daladier, who pointed out that disarmament without security was impossible. After hours-long conversations Daladier agreed to recognize the system of reciprocal supervision as a satisfactory security factor *in principle* and not to demand any supplements to the security system. He did, however, demand that the supervisory machinery be in operation for at least 4 years. Finally he seems to have accepted a shorter period, that is 2 to 3 years. Such a period was absolutely necessary for the French Government in order to get French public opinion used to the idea through the press, etc., that the greatest factor of security is found in reciprocal supervision. Daladier constantly brought the conversations back to the question of defining the aggressor, and in this he encountered absolute opposition from the English. The Americans seem to have been somewhat less stubborn. On the naval question they were not able to agree and intend to continue the conversations next week on the occasion of Daladier's visit to London and try to reach an agreement on this as well as on the points mentioned above. Apparently Herriot also intends to go to England, where he plans to give a lecture in Glasgow on June 21. In that case it may be expected that Herriot will try during his stay in England to disturb the London conversations on account of his well-known personal attitude toward Daladier. Herriot is about to publish a series of articles against the Four Power Pact.

KÖSTER

## No. 298

8665/E606647

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry*

BERLIN, June 9, 1933.

The Foreign Minister reported to the Reich Chancellor today regarding the further handling of the Habicht-Cohrs matter.<sup>1</sup> The Reich Chancellor directed that in case Habicht or Cohrs or both should be expelled, the head of the press section of the Austrian Legation in Berlin, Sektionsrat Dr. Wasserbäck, is to be expelled from Germany.

Resubmitted herewith to the State Secretary.

VÖLCKERS

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 267 and footnote 3.



## No. 299

5885/E431060-62

*The Minister in Czechoslovakia to the Foreign Ministry*

A. IV. 1. c.

PRAGUE, June 9, 1933.

Received June 16.

II Ts. 707.

Subject: Czechoslovak-Hungarian revisionistic aspirations.

With reference to your instruction II Ts. 602 of May 27.<sup>1</sup>

The question as to the extent to which from the point of view of Czechoslovakia's vital political and economic interests compliance with Hungary's revisionistic aspirations in an extreme case appears possible should be answered as follows:

The Czechoslovak Government is opposed in principle—as the statements on the occasion of the conference of the Little Entente in Prague<sup>2</sup> have also recently shown—to all wishes for territorial revision. This stand is also taken by the entire Czech population. Although the awarding of large areas inhabited by a purely Hungarian population and of the Carpatho-Ukraine was linked by the peace treaty to certain tacit conditions, these conditions have passed into oblivion and these areas are regarded as inalienable parts of the state. Territorial concessions to Hungary—thus it is argued particularly by Beneš and Krofta—cannot for the time being be made, because one never knows where the demands of Hungary will really stop. (The idea was to make the Hungarian-Slovak regions a subject of barter for negotiations, and the Carpatho-Ukraine a corridor to Russia, which meanwhile did not come about as a result of the awarding of the western Ukraine to Poland.)

Nevertheless Beneš, and particularly Masaryk, feel that the areas of Slovakia inhabited by Hungarians, as well as the Carpatho-Ukraine, which is inhabited by Ruthenians and Russians, are political and moreover also economic liabilities to the state. (Economically important are only the Carpatho-Ukrainian salt deposits as the basis of the Government monopoly, but they cannot balance the considerable investments of the state.) Therefore Masaryk in particular, in conversations and interviews, has repeatedly shown a certain inclination to negotiate with Hungary about border revisions. This idea has also time and again received cautious airing in a moderate sector of the Czech press, always, of course with the result that the nationalist press most vehemently presented arguments for the sacrosanct integrity of the territorial borders of the state, and did not hesitate to

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 266.

<sup>2</sup> On May 30–June 1, 1933. Cf. document No. 282, footnote 3.

repudiate Masaryk. It remains very unlikely, therefore, that the question of a frontier settlement with Hungary could ever be dissociated from the element of prestige. This would only be possible if Hungary could be actively integrated into the framework of the Little Entente—a goal toward which Beneš is, indeed, clearly working.

To sum up, it may be said that the vital economic interests of Czechoslovakia by no means prohibit a compliance with Hungary's aspirations for revision; the vital political interests, to be sure, are not fundamentally in conflict with such a compliance but make it appear to be practically out of the question, as long as Hungary has not become an entirely obedient instrument of the Little Entente policy of French orientation in the Danubian area. And even in that case I consider it entirely improbable: It is against the nature of the Czechs to give up something once they have it.

DR. KOCH

### No. 300

6058/E447118-21

#### *The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy*

Telegram

No. 164

BERLIN, June 10, 1933—5:35 p. m.

[zu] II Ital. 739.<sup>1</sup>

Ang. 1.

The exchange of notes between France and Czechoslovakia on the Four Power Pact, published yesterday, occasioned extreme surprise here. According to press reports regarding the French Blue Book,<sup>2</sup> France apparently addressed similar notes to the other Powers of the Little Entente also, as well as to Poland. The report in *Matin* of May 28, to which my telegram of May 29,<sup>3</sup> transmitted by telephone, referred, proves, therefore, as matters stand, to be correct on all the essential points. The exchange of notes, which represents a binding agreement, contains, above all, three points that enter into consideration for us:

1. It is stated that article II of the Pact "precludes consideration of the principle of revision and of concrete cases of application." This is an interpretation of the article that is objectively untenable. It may be said that article II, which refers only to proposals regarding methods and procedures, does not explicitly provide for consideration of the principle of revision and of concrete cases of application. It cannot

<sup>1</sup> II Ital. 739: Not printed (6058/E447114-17). This telegram No. 439 transmitted the text of the Franco-Czech exchange of notes, as published in the French press.

<sup>2</sup> French Blue Book, *Pacte d'entente et de collaboration*, 1933, pp. 23-30.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 272.

be said, however, that it precludes it. That is an important difference.

2. The exchange of notes maintains that there can be no question of raising a question of revision outside of the provisions laid down in article 19. This, too, is a construction of the Four Power Pact which is factually incorrect. In the first place, the question of revision could be raised, for example, also on the basis of article 15 of the League of Nations Covenant and on this basis be made the subject of deliberations within the framework of the Four Power Pact. There is in certain circumstances, moreover, the possibility of raising questions having to do with revision, on the basis of the general provision of article I of the Four Power Pact.

3. France commits herself contractually in advance in no circumstances to accept certain kinds of suggestions for the widening of procedures in accordance with article 19, and claims at the same time that the procedure of the Assembly of the League, pursuant to article 19, requires in each case the unanimous agreement of the League of Nations members who are present, including that of the parties. In the case of the latter assertion, an interpretation of article 19 is involved which is by no means generally recognized, and which, at any rate, was rejected officially by Germany on former occasions.

If we were to accept tacitly the exchange of notes, we would thereby be admitting the correctness of the French interpretations and the admissibility of the obligations undertaken by France with respect to the Little Entente. This would mean that article II of the Four Power Pact would not only lose its whole political value, but that it would receive the imprint of an anti-revisionist provision. We will not be able to demand or bring it about that now perhaps a different interpretation in accordance with our views be made instead of the factually incorrect interpretations of the Four Power Pact by France. What we have to protest against as inadmissible, however, is the twin fact that France is committing herself contractually with respect to a third power to certain interpretations of the Four Power Pact and that she is, in addition, pledging herself in advance to this power, to take such or such a stand with respect to the contracting parties in pursuance of the Four Power Pact.

Please take up the matter with Mussolini at once, referring to your previous conversation on this point (cf. your telegram No. 125 of May 29 <sup>4</sup>) and tell him that we considered a suitable clarification of the situation created by France's disloyal and incorrect action to be necessary. Before deciding on further steps, we were anxious to hear what he thought about the exchange of notes and what he intended to do about it.

With regard to your telegram No. 138, <sup>5</sup> I wish to state that as soon as the above-mentioned question is settled, we shall at all times be prepared to sign the Pact. We would consider it expedient to sign

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 272, footnote 2.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed (3170/676529).

in Rome and would obtain for you for this purpose full powers from the President of the Reich.

Should no change be necessary as a result of signing, I am in agreement with your travel arrangements.

NEURATH<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>The last sentence and Neurath's signature were added in Bülow's handwriting. The following typewritten marginal note is on the document: "For the information of the Embassy in London, a copy of the telegram is being taken along by the delegation, which leaves today."

## No. 301

8907/E621724-26

### *Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy*

ROME, June 10, 1933.

Yesterday, on the occasion of the signing of the rice agreement, I had a conversation with Suvich about the Pact, and subsequently also with Mussolini, and finally with Mussolini and Suvich together. Suvich, who leaves for London today, said that the obvious thing to do now was to have the Pact signed in London at once. I asked whether Mussolini would go to London for this purpose. He replied in the negative; the principal thing had, indeed, been the initialing, so that he, together with the statesmen present in London, could sign. He related also that De Jouvenel had told him that, in his opinion, the attempt should be made right now to effect an understanding among the four Powers about real progress in the disarmament question. He asked me not to report yet on either matter, since they had not yet made up their minds here. He would let me know later in the morning, but he did not do so.

In the conversation with Mussolini, I asked him whether he was satisfied with the reaction to his speech<sup>1</sup> in Germany. He replied in the affirmative. I added that naturally the reaction to his speech was much more favorable than to the Pact itself, regarding the contents of which some skepticism was, indeed, felt. Mussolini expressed himself as very well satisfied with the statements in the German press about his speech, and said that we would in the end also arrive at a better appreciation of the Pact, for it was indeed an important matter that Germany had now for the first time and finally as a subject of equal rank entered world politics whose object she had heretofore been. I also remarked that the pleasure in France seemed to be very great and that Daladier would surely receive a large vote of confidence. At this Mussolini traced a question mark and referred

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 295, footnote 2.

to the strong opposition in a portion of the press. On the question of the signing and an immediate understanding on the disarmament question, which Suvich also raised with him, he did not yet take a position.

We then spoke about the internal political situation in Germany. Mussolini claimed to have read that Jews also had been admitted to our Olympic teams. He used this report for expressing a warning to us not to weaken now and to beat a retreat; this was very dangerous, precisely with respect to a power like the Jews. Certainly there had been much clumsiness and excesses at the beginning, but in no circumstances must weakness be shown now. With regard to this, I observed further that the accounts in the world press of what had happened even in the beginning had been entirely incorrect and exaggerated. In this connection I pointed out the great number of Jewish attorneys who had been allowed to continue practicing. These figures surprised him and he asked why they were not publicized more widely. I replied that they had been published in Italy, but in the rest of the world press they had been suppressed for the most part.

In the conversation about the Pact, I indicated for the present only in general the need for practical German-Italian cooperation on the basis of the Pact. In my opinion, it will be necessary to come to an agreement with Italy in a suitable manner that neither Italy nor Germany will conclude any agreement with France which is detrimental to the interests of the other and with respect to which they do not keep the other party accurately informed.

H[ASSELL]

## No. 302

6058/E447165-66

*The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 452 of June 11

PARIS, June 11, 1933.

Received June 11—6:10 p.m.

II It. 758.

With reference to my telegram No. 409 of May 31.<sup>1</sup>

I raised with the Secretary General today the matter of the extent of the possibilities for negotiation on the basis of the Pact, particularly in view of the statement of Paul-Boncour to Osuský and of the other exchanges of notes published in the Blue Book under XII to XVIII;<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 275.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 300.

and I had to realize that he was now giving me a negative reply when I repeated the question as to whether it was possible for the four Powers to include in their deliberations matters which—such as, for example, frontier questions—required a unanimous decision by the members of the League of Nations. The Powers could only discuss methods and procedures which tended to give greater effectiveness to articles 19, 16, 10. France would have to refuse to conduct conversations in this body on questions of revision. On this point negotiations could only take place through diplomatic channels.

I referred to the fundamental difference between these statements and those of May 31, and stated that, in my opinion, the value of the Four Power Pact was thereby reduced to almost nil. Léger denied this. Conversations on problems with respect to the maintenance of peace, pursuant to article I, would provide abundant opportunity for discussion and thereby in this way would be apt in time to create an atmosphere which might be of great political significance. No problems, however, in which unanimous decisions were necessary could be made the subject of deliberations. To my question as to which problems he was thinking of primarily, he failed to reply this time also.

KÖSTER

### No. 303

6058/E447159-61

#### *The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry*

#### Telegram

No. 453 of June 11

PARIS, June 11, 1933.

Received June 11—5: 10 p. m., part 1-8;

6: 10 p. m., part 9-13.

II It. 757.

Daladier's speech Tuesday morning,<sup>1</sup> which I went to hear, was characterized by the fact that the Premier in particularly warm words mentioned Mussolini and his *paroles émouvantes* [moving words], which the latter had addressed to France in the Roman Senate.<sup>2</sup> His words were applauded from right to left; only the Communists indulged in heckling of a hardly amiable nature, and in this connection the word "guillotine" could be heard. They were silenced, however, by the President of the Chamber and the other members of the House. The official report about the Chamber makes no mention of the incident. Daladier also referred to Soviet Russia, stating that he had al-

<sup>1</sup> For this speech held in the Chamber of Deputies on June 9, see *Journal Officiel: Débats parlementaires, Chambre des Députés*, 1933, No. 78.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 295.

ways deplored the regrettable misunderstandings which had for years existed between the two great nations, just as he had always and still regretted that misunderstandings and difficulties had for years divided the great Latin sister nations, between which an agreement based on good faith was so necessary for the organization of European peace. Finally he thanked England for her efforts and spiritual cooperation, which were decisive for the achievement of the Pact. Germany was mentioned by the Premier only in connection with the critical attitude of the German press toward the French counterproposal and article III of the Pact. In the present version there was no longer any talk of German rearmament, for which Germany would have been able to find a juridical basis in the first draft. The legality of this had been clearly established by the statement of December 11 and would be decided by a convention after the termination of the Disarmament Conference. The statements regarding article 19 and its close connection with articles 10 and 16 are well known to you. The Premier finally also stated that relations with the Little Entente had not only not become looser, but, on the contrary, have become closer in all fields. This was followed by the statement that the dignity of Poland, the great European nation, had not suffered.

In today's conversation with the Secretary General, I did not withhold from him my personal opinion of the net result of Daladier's speech, which was unfavorable to us. The latter told me that he had drafted for Paul-Boncour, the Foreign Minister, a speech which would surely have been more in accord with our wishes, particularly since he knew that the Chancellor had brushed aside the objections of the Wilhelmstrasse and had decided on initialing the Pact in view of its high purpose. A few hours before the opening of the session, and even during the session, Herriot had tried to have debate on the Four Power Pact removed from the agenda and postponed for a later special session. The danger of the adoption of the motion had been very great, since the Socialists had vacillated a great deal, not because of a hostile attitude toward the Pact policy, but out of hostility toward the present German Government. The same was true of the Radical Socialists. The negative attitude of the Right was well known. The consequence would most probably have been rejection of the Pact at the special session and the fall of the Government. The Government therefore let the speech be made not by the responsible Foreign Minister, who attended the session, but rather by the Premier, and this, moreover, through giving his statements about the Pact the coating of a domestic policy speech on the economic situation, world price policy, the currency question, and protection of the in-

terests of French agriculture, on the occasion of the London Economic Conference, pointing out in this connection that the world crisis could be overcome only through the cooperation of all the nations.

I can confirm the statements of the Secretary General by and large from my own observations during the session.

In this connection the question mentioned in the instruction of May 29—II F Abr. 1897<sup>3</sup>—was also discussed. At the urging of the British Government to initial the new Italian draft of May 20, the French Government did, indeed, reply that it could not comply with the wish, since it first had to examine the draft carefully; that it was, moreover, committed under the agreement with Poland of February 19, 1921,<sup>4</sup> with Czechoslovakia of January 25, 1924,<sup>5</sup> with Rumania of June 10, 1926,<sup>6</sup> with Yugoslavia of November 11, 1927,<sup>7</sup> to consult with these powers before concluding new agreements that affected policy in Central Europe, etc. This commitment to consult had a juridical character. The French Government, however, was free to draw its conclusions from this consultation.

KÖSTER

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<sup>3</sup> Document No. 271.

<sup>4</sup> For the text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. xviii, p. 11.

<sup>5</sup> For the text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. xxiii, p. 163.

<sup>6</sup> For the text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. lviii, p. 225.

<sup>7</sup> For the text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. lxviii, p. 373.

## No. 304

3170/676546

### *The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry*

#### Telegram

No. 1

LONDON, June 12, 1933—8:00 p. m.

Suvich spoke to me today on the matter of the signing of the Four Power Pact in London. I replied that before we signed, there would have to be a clarification of the situation created by the notes of the French Government to the Little Entente and Poland.<sup>1</sup> Suvich tried to minimize the importance of the notes, whereupon I replied that we could not let go unchallenged a unilateral interpretation of a treaty text just agreed upon.

NEURATH

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<sup>1</sup> See documents Nos. 300 and 302.



## No. 305

8665/E606652

*Memorandum by an Official of Department II*

BERLIN, June 13, 1933.  
e. o. II Oe. 731 I.

## FIRST MEMORANDUM

Minister Rieth of Vienna informed me this morning at 11:30 a. m. by telephone that according to reports whose authenticity he did not doubt, even though they had not yet been officially confirmed, Herr Habicht and Herr Cohrs were placed under arrest yesterday evening and this morning, respectively, by the Austrian police authorities.<sup>1</sup> Herr Habicht, in whose house in Linz another search is supposed to have been made, is said to have tried to barricade himself in his house, whereupon he was arrested. Herr Cohrs is said to have been arrested in his apartment in Vienna. Herr Rieth intends to make inquiries at once in person at the Federal Chancellery and, if the arrest is confirmed or if a satisfactory answer otherwise is not given, to register the sharpest protest and reserve to his Government the right of taking any further steps. Herr Rieth requested, moreover, that he be provided with instructions as soon as possible for his further conduct in this matter, in case Herr Habicht and Herr Cohrs should be expelled.

v. HEEREN

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<sup>1</sup>On June 11 an attempt had been made to assassinate Dr. Steidle, leader of the Tirol Heimwehr, and other acts of violence had occurred at various places in Austria during the next 48 hours. Rieth gave a long account of these events in report A 654 of June 14 (8664/E606620-28). Subsequently the German National Socialist Werner von Alvensleben was arrested and charged with having attempted to assassinate Dr. Steidle.

## No. 306

8665/E606653-54

*Memorandum by an Official of Department II*

BERLIN, June 13, 1933.  
II Oe. 731 II.

## SECOND MEMORANDUM

At 12:30 p. m. Herr Schneider, the Chief of the Southeast Division of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP, called on me on instruction from the Reich Chancellor in order to obtain information about the action taken by the Austrian Government against the leader of the National Socialists in Austria. From a telephone conversation with the Legation in Vienna there emerged the following additional

details in confirmation of the statements of Minister Rieth contained in the first memorandum: <sup>1</sup>

It is established that house searches were undertaken both at Herr Habicht's in Linz and at Herr Cohrs' in Vienna. Both gentlemen are in the police jail of the respective cities. According to a report from our Consul in Linz which was received by the Legation, preparations for the deportation ["*Abschiebung*"] of Herr Habicht are supposedly already being made.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, another 80 or so Reich German National Socialists all over Austria are supposed to have been arrested by order of the Chief of the State Police, some of them without any reason being given, some of them because of participation in demonstrations.

Herr Schneider said that he was instructed by the Reich Chancellor to request immediate countermeasures of the Foreign Ministry after it had been established that Herr Habicht had actually been arrested.

I promised Herr Schneider that I would pass on this instruction at once.

HÜFFER

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 305.

<sup>2</sup> Rieth reported on June 14 that Habicht had been brought to the German border under police escort at 5 p. m. on June 13, but that Cohrs, who was still in the police jail in Vienna, had appealed the decision that he be expelled (8664/E606620-28).

## No. 307

8674/E606948-49

*The State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry to the State Secretary  
in the Reich Chancellery*

II Oe. 731 III

BERLIN, June 13, 1933.

Rk. 7533.

Enclosed I am transmitting a memorandum <sup>1</sup> on the steps taken by the Legation in Vienna to protest against the action of the Austrian Government against Herr Habicht and Herr Cohrs and a number of other Reich citizens, and on the countermeasures which have been instituted or proposed here.

I should be grateful if the consent of the Reich Chancellor to these measures could be obtained as soon as possible and I could be informed thereof.<sup>2</sup>

BÜLOW

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (8674/E606950-52).

<sup>2</sup> A minute typewritten on the text of the document reads as follows:

"1) The Reich Chancellor has been informed. He has directed that the Press Attaché of the Austrian Legation, Wasserbäck, who was arrested during the night of June 14, is to be released and the agrément is to be withdrawn from him immediately.

2) State Secretary von Bülow at the Foreign Ministry, the Prussian Minister President, and the Minister of Interior have been informed.

3) To the officer in charge for information.

4) To the files.

L[ammers], B[erlin], June 14."

## No. 308

3170/676552-56

*The State Secretary to the German Delegation at London*

Telegram

No. 6 of June 13

BERLIN, June 13, 1933.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

Hassell wired as follows on June 12:<sup>1</sup>

"I explained the German position with reference to the exchange of notes between France and the Little Entente to Mussolini today in detail and with the strongest emphasis and left a short pro memoria<sup>2</sup> on the main points, which he took note of in my presence. I called attention to the well-known French maneuver with reference to article III, in the course of which equality of rights disappeared, and emphasized that now article II was to be completely deprived of any value and interpreted in an anti-revisionist sense. Germany had two alternatives: either to demand of France correction of the interpretation or to publish her own interpretation. As for the Pact, the consequences of the two steps were rather clear. We did not like either of these two ways—since we wanted to support the Pact, now that we had made a decision in favor of it in spite of the most serious misgivings—but would prefer it if Mussolini would find another way. On the other hand, unless this question were settled, signing, for which we were otherwise ready at any time, was not possible, especially since enthusiasm for the content of the Pact was very slight in Germany anyhow. In that connection I called attention to the Italian press campaign, which obviously was designed merely to facilitate France's ratification and showed an absence of consideration for German points of view. Mussolini stated that he understood the German position on the exchange of notes and considered the arguments with respect to the interpretation of article II to be valid. The assertion that consideration of the principle of revision and concrete cases of application were excluded was especially unacceptable. (Baron Aloisi, with whom I spoke afterwards, also acknowledged that the French interpretation went beyond the assurances as to content given to the Little Entente according to De Jouvenel.) Mussolini requested that no steps be taken by the Germans for the time being. The correct procedure seemed to him to be that Italy and England come to an understanding and take some joint action; for that purpose he would transmit the content of my memorandum to Suvich in London today and instruct him correspondingly. Only if this attempt proved fruitless should Germany explain her position publicly. As for the press campaign which I had asserted to exist, it would now cease, since its purpose had been achieved for the time being. Nevertheless it must be remembered that in spite of Daladier's large majority his position was still in danger. I replied that reconciling a correct interpretation and the assurances to the Little Entente would

<sup>1</sup> Telegram No. 143 of June 12, not printed (3170/676549-51).<sup>2</sup> Not printed (German text: 8910/E621746-49; Italian text: 8910/E621750-53).

be somewhat difficult; in general the maneuver with reference to article III and this exchange of notes were a poor prelude to close cooperation. Mussolini replied that this was indeed the result of the policy which France pursued with her vassals. The elimination of Franco-Italian antagonisms also would not be so simple. That was not a matter of political agreements which no longer had any place under the Four Power Pact, but of the settlement of individual questions such as parity of naval armament, the status of Italians in Tunis, and the Tripolitan boundary. I replied that for me the program under the Pact was quite simple: no German-French understanding directed against Italy and without currently providing information, and no Franco-Italian understanding without something corresponding with respect to Germany. Mussolini stated that he was absolutely of the same opinion. In conclusion I again asked him urgently to do everything he could to settle the question of the exchange of notes if he wanted the Pact signed.

On the question of the signing of the Pact Mussolini said, as already reported, that he thought it would be appropriate to have the signing take place in London on the occasion of the conference."

I should like to suggest for consideration that we speak to Suvich about the matter on our own initiative and also get in touch with the English directly. The possibilities indicated by Mussolini that Italy and England undertake some joint action might perhaps actually open a way out of the situation. For example, I should think it would satisfy us if the Italian Government and the English Government were to inform us in writing that for their part they reserved freedom of decision with respect to the position taken by the French Government in the exchange of notes. We would accordingly not demand of them that they substantively contradict the statements of the French but only that they do not identify themselves with them and *inform* us to that effect *in writing*. If it is impossible for us to get even such a watered-down and so to speak neutral statement from the Italians and the English, then, of course, there would probably be nothing else for us to do than to send a formal note to the other three parties to the treaty. Naturally the approval of the Chancellor would have to be obtained for that. It might be advisable, however, to report to him on the matter only when it is known what the outcome will be of the Italian, and possibly your own, contact with the English. In case this outcome should not satisfy us, I should like even now to submit to you below the draft of a note, which is worded in such a way that we could not be blamed if the French should thereupon raise new difficulties with regard to the signing.

*Draft of the note:* Through the Blue Book published by the French press on the Pact of Understanding and Cooperation, initialed on June 7, the German Government has learned of an exchange of notes between the French Government on the one hand and the Rumanian, Czechoslovak, and Yugoslav Governments on the other, as well as

of a declaration by the French Government transmitted to the Polish Government. The exchange of notes and the declaration contain identical statements on the interpretation of the initialed Treaty and of article 19 of the League of Nations Covenant. Moreover, it is stated there that the French Government would in no case agree to certain proposals which might be made on the basis of the Treaty with respect to the procedure provided for in article 19.

The German Government regrets that the French Government has seen fit to enter into agreements in this way with third states about the interpretation and application of the Treaty. In the view of the German Government such action is not of a kind to promote the objective aimed at with the Treaty, which can be achieved only if the four Governments are really resolved to treat all questions relating to the Treaty in the spirit of sincere cooperation based on mutual confidence. In any case the German Government feels constrained to state that the interpretation given by the French Government to the Treaty and article 19 in the exchange of notes and the declaration can by no means be decisive in the future application of the Treaty.

BÜLOW

No. 309

9245/E652504

*The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 5 of June 13

LONDON, German Delegation, June 14, 1933.

Received June 14—9:30 a.m.

W 3928.

Also for Reich Chancellery, Ministry of Economics, Ministry of Food, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Propaganda.

The World Economic Conference, introduced by the speech of the King and the address of MacDonald, does not differ from similar previous League of Nations gatherings.<sup>1</sup> So far, no speaker has followed MacDonald's appeal for precise proposals. The general debate, which is to last until Thursday noon, is given over to general statements. The text of my speech today is being transmitted by WTB. In it I pointed to the community of interests of creditors and debtors, and I emphasized the necessity of solving the great political problems. I mentioned especially the Chancellor's speech to the Reichstag and Mussolini's initiative in the Pact of Rome.

NEURATH

<sup>1</sup> For the general course of the Conference, see League of Nations, *Journal of the Monetary and Economic Conference, London, 1933*. Documents from the main file containing reports from the German delegation are filmed on serial 9245.

## No. 310

3086/616520

*The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 10

LONDON, June 14, 1933—4:15 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 7 of today's date.<sup>1</sup>

Federal Chancellor Dollfuss<sup>2</sup> telephoned to me last night at 2:30 and again at 4:30 in order to inform me of Wasserbäck's arrest<sup>3</sup> and to request immediate redress. This morning on the basis of a telephone consultation with the State Secretary I told him the following: On the basis of the conversations during the night I had immediately got in touch with Berlin this morning. I had then learned that the arrest had actually taken place. The Foreign Ministry had attempted to obtain a release. In the meantime the Reich Chancellor had ordered the release.<sup>3</sup> This morning a note had been sent to Tauschitz informing him that Wasserbäck was no longer considered persona grata, and that it was therefore requested that he be ordered to depart immediately from the territory of the Reich.

NEURATH

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (3086/616522). In this telegram Bülow informed Neurath that a note had been handed to the Austrian Minister requesting the recall of Press Attaché Wasserbäck as persona non grata.

<sup>2</sup> Dollfuss was in London for the World Economic Conference.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 307 and footnote 2.

## No. 311

3170/676565

*The State Secretary to the German Delegation at London*

Telegram

URGENT

BERLIN, June 14, 1933.

No. 9 of June 14

For the Foreign Minister personally.

I wish to note the following with reference to Hassell's telegram of today<sup>1</sup> on the Four Power Pact.

The suggestion by the Italians to clarify the situation by a press communiqué or a speech or by an instruction to Hassell for publication does not seem very satisfactory to me. We have before us a formal exchange of notes of the French, which ought to be confronted with

<sup>1</sup> No. 144, not printed (3170/676557-58) ; sent from Berlin to London as telegram No. 8. This telegram dealt with the attention being given by the Italian Foreign Ministry to find a way of meeting German objections to the exchange of notes between France and the Little Entente. Cf. document No. 308.

something of equal diplomatic value. However, neither a press communiqué nor a speech, nor even an instruction to Hassell, can be considered as something of equal value unless the other Governments are officially notified of the German publication. The *qui tacet consentire videtur* would not be thereby eliminated. It is particularly significant that the German publication suggested by Italy does not even argue against the French and that it is meant to be published only after signature. It is also very noticeable that the Italians are now saying that the French interpretation of article II is more correct than ours, whereas Mussolini and Aloisi said the opposite in their first conversation with Hassell.<sup>2</sup> I should like to recommend that we do not yet give up the attempt to find a better solution.

BÜLOW

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 308.

## No. 312

9237/E649112-21

### *Unsigned Memorandum*<sup>1</sup>

LONDON, June 14, 1933.

In my homeland the Westphalians and the Frisians are considered to be among the tribes which are least diplomatic and most rustic, blunt, and stubborn. I am a cross between these two tribes. You must therefore have the great kindness to overlook it as a hereditary fault of mine if you do not like everything I say.<sup>2</sup>

Given the situation in which my country finds itself it is impossible for me to try to skip lightly over the gulf of deep problems which are

<sup>1</sup> This document is the text of a speech which Hugenberg intended to deliver before the Economic Commission of the World Economic Conference. As Willuhn recorded in a memorandum of June 16 (9269/E657535) which was brought to Hitler's attention, Dr. Hans Thomsen telephoned from London to say that the German delegation was not in agreement with the contents of the speech, but that Hugenberg, without the consent of the delegation, had nevertheless sent the text to the chairman, Colijn. "The German delegation will inform Colijn," Thomsen had continued, "that this paper is to be considered merely as the private work of a member of the German delegation." In response to a question as to why the delegation opposed the speech, Thomsen had replied "that the basic idea was objected to, particularly with regard to a complete autarky of Germany, especially in the agricultural sphere."

<sup>2</sup> Hugenberg's memorandum was also issued as WTB release No. 1459 of June 16 (9245/E652617-18), in which the following sentence appeared in place of the first paragraph:

"London, June 16. In response to the request from the chairman of the Economic Commission, Colijn, to the members of the Commission to bring forward such practical proposals as might contribute to the work of the Commission, the Reich Minister of Economics, Food and Agriculture, Dr. Hugenberg, released to the press the following remarks on the subject of economic policy."

Elsewhere in the memorandum there are minor verbal differences between the text as it appears here and that of the WTB release. The text of the last two paragraphs, however, is identical in each version. This was confirmed in London telegram No. 48 of June 20 to the Foreign Ministry (9245/E652623).

agitating not only us Germans but to an increasing extent the entire Western world, including America. The philosopher who entitled a well-known book *Decline of the West*<sup>3</sup> thereby pointed prophetically to a danger which appears as a dark storm cloud on the horizon of the world. The government of the country in which this book was written many years ago is today, under the leadership of Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler, fighting the battle against this decline of the West. The esteemed President of this Conference, Mr. MacDonald, has described this danger in other words but with all desirable clarity as follows: "The world is drifting toward a state in which life revolts against hardship and the gains of the past are swept away by the forces of despair."<sup>4</sup> In the sense of this struggle there is a *family of nations*. Those that belong to it are all basically permeated with this feeling: *We do not want to lose the courage and the spirit of our forefathers; nor do we want to let ourselves be exterminated by the subhumanity [Untermenschentum] growing up in our own nations.*

In the hour when the nations of the world are meeting in the hospitable capital of the British Empire there is a serious thought which Germans cannot refrain from expressing: prices, goods, credits, economy, etc.—these are all subordinate concepts in comparison with the concept of the *freely creating man*, which the Western nations have received from their forefathers. In Germany—you must realize—we are fighting for this concept. We have been doing so for years in the face of death but with an irrepressible will to live. If we should succumb, the other Western nations would succumb with us or after us. If, on the other hand, the world is to be restored to health, it must first *permit us* to become well again. We are now experts on the illness which this meeting aims to cure. We have passed through and suffered everything connected with this illness. We are fully aware of the possibility of recovery and carry the prescriptions for it within ourselves. Only a couple of simple, great decisions are needed. In reality they are no sacrifice for those of whom they seemingly demand sacrifice. For it is really no sacrifice to give up a poison by which one would oneself be destroyed in the end.

It must be made quite clear here that:

World economy is the coexistence of *independent national economies*. World economy is the varying exchange of goods between the individual, constant national economies. The world economy can therefore be repaired only if each individual national economy first puts its own house in order. Anyone who believes that the cure for the

<sup>3</sup> Oswald Spengler.

<sup>4</sup> The passage in quotation marks is not entirely an exact quotation of a passage from MacDonald's speech on June 12 at the opening session of the World Economic Conference. See League of Nations, *Journal of the Monetary and Economic Conference, London, 1933*, No. 3, p. 8.



individual economies can come only from the world economy is putting the cart before the horse. He remains in the same error that first brought the world economy into the condition in which it finds itself today.

What for years was believed to bring *well-being*, namely the *interlocking of international debts*, is precisely what brought the individual national economies, one after the other, into disorder. The intertwining of international debts is the main cause of the derangement of all markets and the destruction of the purchasing power of the nations. It had been deliberately forgotten that importation of capital means importation of goods, that the importation of goods means importation of foreign labor, and that interest and amortization payments on imposed and contracted debts are likewise possible only by way of importation of goods and labor. If credits in the form of goods are poured into a noncolonial country, its economy is disorganized. In trying to pay its interest and amortization installments in the form of goods at any price the debtor country avenges itself so to speak on its money lender and those to whom it owes tribute. The disorganization of the world economy through this development is also the real cause of all the protectionism of the postwar period. This is also the real cause of the currency fluctuations on the international market.

It is therefore natural, and a thoroughly wholesome development, that in all states the tendency is first of all, by satisfying and developing the domestic markets, to free one's own economy as far as possible from the ruinous consequences of international interlocking of debts. I should like to point out that the *last* of all countries to take this road was Germany and that she consciously joined the world economic development described above only under the present government.

It is obvious that the above-mentioned trend of development must continue and deepen as long as the sum of the international interest and capital claims *exceeds what the debtor countries can pay in deliveries of goods* and what the creditor countries can accept in such payments without destroying their own economies.

From this, two things follow:

1) Only through the recovery of the individual national economies can the world economy become healthy again. Only through restoration of the domestic markets will it be possible again to increase the capacity of countries to absorb foreign goods and thereby increase world trade.

2) That requires a proper settlement of the international debts. There is no way to get around this truth. The settlement of international debts is the first step in saving all the nations concerned.

The following consideration leads us to the same results.

The entire economy is based on one economic principle. That principle is: free exchange of services [*Leistungsaustausch*]. Free ex-

change of services means that for every service there must be a corresponding service in return. If that economic principle is violated in any field, the economy finally collapses. If in a national economy any economic sector is forced to *produce without an equivalent return*, as for example, agriculture in Germany during the last decade, not only that economic sector but the *whole* national economy suffers. The agricultural crisis and the resulting purchasing-power crisis of the domestic market lead inevitably to an industrial crisis.

The economic service principle is the immutable basic law of economics which no one in the world, no economic or political power, can abrogate without being ruined. The penalty for its permanent violation is national death.

This basic law of economics also applies to the world economy. If one member of the world economy is forced for long to produce without any compensation, not only it, but the world economy, collapses. Neither between independent nations nor internally in a national economy is prosperity in reality based on what one takes away from another by all sorts of expenditures of energy and time or on what one prevents another from earning, but *on the development of all existing forces*. One of the most disastrous of errors, which from time to time has dominated the nations, is that a nation can become richer by the impoverishment of another nation.

I fully agree with the statement of Mr. MacDonald:

"No nation can permanently enrich itself at the expense of others. Mutual enrichment is the condition of individual enrichment."<sup>5</sup>

*The history of the last 20 years is based on the fiction of the opposite.* I shall not cite any examples because I might thereby easily create the impression that I am speaking only as a German and not as a member of this Conference. If it is desired to get out of the world economic depression, then the free exchange of services must be restored in the world economy. That does not mean free trade between the independent nations; in the situation described above, that can *not* be achieved by dropping the international customs barriers or by similar means dealing only with trade policy. It can *be achieved only by eliminating the basic causes that obstruct and destroy free exchange of services*. This again means, however, that the solution of the world economic exchange problem is absolutely dependent on a correct debt settlement. Not only the debtors but also the creditors have a vital interest in this. The restoration of free exchange of services in the world economy is therefore in reality not mainly a problem of trade policy but a financial problem of debts. If the World Economic Con-

<sup>5</sup> From the speech of MacDonald at the opening session of the World Economic Conference on June 12. See League of Nations, *Journal of the Monetary and Economic Conference*, London, 1933, No. 3, p. 9.

ference is to lead to a beneficent outcome, it can do so only by first creating, on the basis of this understanding, the *indispensable conditions* for healthy trade conditions.

We Germans are now poor devils and have nothing more to give or to lose. But, in spite of all assertions to the contrary, we attach importance to our good name and have at our disposition the experience gained from misfortune. We can only state here what we have learned and act accordingly ourselves. If this knowledge should not as yet be general, we must wait until it is or, in other words, until the nations on whom the matter depends have reached such a state of distress that the same knowledge becomes for them, too, a spur to action. We shall always be mindful of contributing our small share so that action will not come too late.

In order to make the crux of the matter quite clear, I wish to add the following points. The receiving and granting of political credits from nation to nation is an offense against the economy of nations. It would be in the common interest of the world if a sensible agreement were concluded sufficiently early between the creditor countries and the debtor countries, making it possible for the creditor countries gradually to obtain their capital and for the debtor countries to pay their debts on tolerable terms. In the future there should be creditor and debtor countries only on the old, solid basis of capital grants for large works of peace. For profitable works of peace a colonial country can have large foreign debts that can gradually be paid off with goods. A country with a developed industry should be granted credit by another country only with extreme caution, unless the credit is regarded only as a way, so to speak, of burning unmarketable commodities, like wheat, for example, in order to relieve the domestic market (which could be done more cheaply and more advantageously for both countries at the place of production). If such mistaken credits are granted, however, and if they are to be repaid, the repayment is essentially the same mistake from the point of view of "world economy" as the grant. It is possible only in the form of goods, on account of which the receiving country must then restrict the employment of its own workers. One of the most elementary social demands from the point of view of any country is that its development and the employment of its workers should not suffer through the exported capital of other countries, that is, through the importation of foreign goods. But there are other periods—so-called boom periods—in which a country's own workers are fully employed. *Those are the periods in which a debtor country with less employment can repay debts to the creditor country in the form of goods.*

From Germany's point of view it would be possible with wise and peaceable cooperation between creditor and debtor countries to take two impartial steps by which Germany could again be made internationally solvent. One of these steps would be to give Germany a colonial empire again in Africa, out from which she would build all over this new continent large works and installations that would otherwise not be constructed. The second step would be to open up to the "nation without space" [*"Volk ohne Raum"*] areas in which it could provide space for the settlement of its vigorous race and construct great works of peace.

For it is a mistaken viewpoint if one says that the world suffers from *overproduction*—just as it is a wrong view if one says that the cause of the present distress is to be found in the spread of *mechanized operations*. In reality we do *not* suffer from *overproduction* but from *forced underconsumption*. The real cause of the present conditions is to be found in the *loss of purchasing power*, and thereby *power of consumption*. War, revolution, and internal decay made a beginning in Russia and large parts of the east. This development, instead of being met with healing counteraction, has gradually been intensified to an extreme point by artificial impoverishment of the civilized countries of the world having the greatest power of consumption. This destructive process is in the meantime still going on. It is necessary that it be stopped.

## No. 313

3086/616526-27

*The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 14

LONDON, June 15, 1933—11:50 a. m.

For the Reich Chancellor.

The further deterioration in Austro-German relations, particularly the precipitous action taken by the Prussian police against Dr. Wasserbäck<sup>1</sup> before the Austrian Government was officially informed of the undesirability of Wasserbäck's further presence in Germany, has aggravated the already very bad feeling toward Germany here. Today's *Times* article is an accurate reflection of this feeling. The possibility of intervention by foreign powers because of violation of the extraterritoriality of a diplomatic representative, which was

<sup>1</sup> See documents Nos. 307 and 310.

hinted at there and is circulating here as a rumor, has already turned up here in conversation of English politicians. I immediately opposed these attempts and shall reject them vigorously in case they should be mentioned to me in responsible quarters. The demonstrative applause yesterday for the speech of Federal Chancellor Dollfuss at the Economic Conference was meant, as has been confirmed to me from various sides, to give expression to the sympathy for Austria existing in wide circles of the delegations. It cannot be denied that this atmosphere is exceedingly detrimental to the discussion of any kind of political questions.<sup>2</sup>

NEURATH

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<sup>2</sup> In a letter to Hitler sent from London on June 19 which was introduced by the defense at the Nuremberg Trial, Neurath drew Hitler's attention to the fact that the French were following the Austro-German conflict most attentively and were trying to create an atmosphere for intervention, even of a military kind. Neurath suggested that this "tendency must be kept in mind in our conduct toward Austria." See *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. XL, document No. Neurath-12, pp. 469-470.

## No. 314

7360/E536974

*The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

Del. No. 16 of June 15      LONDON, German Delegation, June 15, 1933.  
 Received June 15—1:15 p. m.  
 II F Abr. 2066.

I had several brief talks with French Minister President Daladier, but it was impossible in their course to go more deeply into the questions which interest us in regard to disarmament<sup>2</sup> and interpretation of the Four Power Pact, because Daladier was apparently disinclined to enter into discussions. I hear that the French are said to have declined altogether to enter into any negotiations here on disarmament.

NEURATH

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<sup>1</sup> This telegram was sent for information to the Embassies in France, Italy, and the United States.

<sup>2</sup> On June 6, Bülow had informed Köpke that Neurath expected "he would have to conduct negotiations about general political questions during the London Conference" and that therefore he was requesting a memorandum on the present state of the Disarmament Conference (7360/E536923). Such a memorandum was submitted by Counselor of Legation Feine on June 9 (3154/669371-87). See Editors' Note, p. 546.

## No. 315

6058/E447184-85

*The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

No. 462 of June 15

PARIS, June 15, 1933.

Received June 15—10:20 p. m.

II It. 787.

With reference to my No. 452 of June 11.<sup>1</sup>

During a conversation which I had with him today Paul-Boncour said regarding the Four Power Pact that one must not underestimate the value of the Pact. It signified a great advance that the four Powers had agreed to treat jointly questions that could be of basic importance for the peace of Europe. I replied to this that the value he described had been made rather illusory by the exchange of notes with the Little Entente and Poland, since France had prejudiced her position toward the questions of revision and had thus immobilized article 19. The Minister denied this; France had committed herself with respect to the Little Entente and Poland in only one point, namely, that a change in the territorial status, that is, the shifting of frontier posts, must be done only with the consent of the country to whose disadvantage the change was undertaken. The French Government refused any discussion on this point, but on the other hand it was willing to exchange ideas for the purpose of lending a more elastic character to article 19. In order to obtain this it was first necessary, considering the present political situation, to make the countries interested in the fate of Europe and public opinion used to the conversations based on the Four Power Pact by making the subject of the discussions for the time being only economic questions and problems which hamper intercourse between neighboring countries and by solving them satisfactorily. On this occasion devaluation [*dévalorisation*] of the political borders, in a wider or a narrower sense, could be attained; this in turn might have the effect that a country which was asked to make a sacrifice with respect to territorial matters would realize the necessity and usefulness of border revision and agree to the new arrangement.

The Minister closed the conversation by stressing once again that consequently all questions except those deriving from article 19, excluding purely territorial questions, could be discussed in the Four Power meeting, and that only in this regard had France committed herself with respect to the Little Entente and Poland.

KÖSTER

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<sup>1</sup> Document No. 302.

## No. 316

9119/E640848-51

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, June 15, 1933.

zu W 3971.<sup>1</sup>

The American Chargé d'Affaires<sup>2</sup> called on me today in order, by direction of his Government, to make representations regarding the alleged statements of the President of the Reichsbank concerning a discrimination to be made among the creditor countries, according to the German balance of payments with respect to the creditor. He left with me the enclosed aide-mémoire.<sup>3</sup> The Chargé d'Affaires informed me that he had a written version of the speech of Dr. Schacht at the final session of the Standstill Conference (of June 2?) and that the sentence in quotation marks actually occurred in it. The foregoing statement concerning the differentiated treatment was not in the text, but could very well be inferred from it.

I told the Chargé d'Affaires that I could not recall the speech of the President of the Reichsbank well enough to be able to give an opinion on the various points. It was quite certain, however, that the interpretation of the American Government was wrong. Dr. Schacht had always, in agreement with the Reich Government, taken the stand that the creditors must be treated alike. I considered it out of the question that he should have advocated another course at the Standstill Conference. The sentence in quotation marks, which was taken verbatim from the speech, was obviously not an illustration of the intention to discriminate among the creditors, but an illustration of the familiar argument, and one also confirmed to a certain extent by American Secretary of State Hull in his London speech,<sup>4</sup> that the creditors had to be prepared to accept the payment of debts in goods or in services. If, as the Chargé d'Affaires had particularly objected, America was being cited as a bad example, this was entirely right in this connection, for America was the biggest creditor in the world and the biggest protective tariff country as well, and therefore made it impossible for her creditors to discharge their obligations.

The Chargé d'Affaires promised to report to his Government in accordance with my statements. I promised that the alleged statements of the President of the Reichsbank would be examined and that he

<sup>1</sup> W 3971: The aide-mémoire of the American Embassy annexed to this memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> George A. Gordon.

<sup>3</sup> American documents relating to the presentation of this aide-mémoire are in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933*, vol. II, pp. 439-445.

<sup>4</sup> The text of Hull's speech of June 14 is in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933*, vol. I, pp. 636-640.

would be further informed should there be anything to add on the subject of the American aide-mémoire.<sup>5</sup>

BÜLOW

[Enclosure]

### AIDE-MÉMOIRE

I have been instructed by my Government to call the attention of the German Government to reports that the President of the Reichsbank stated at his recent conference with foreign creditor interests that he was giving consideration to discriminating in the treatment of creditors of different countries in accordance with the German balance of payments vis-à-vis each particular country and that he is reported to have illustrated the idea by stating: "For instance all the European countries differ favorably in this regard from the United States of America and amongst the European countries there are some which give us a greater chance to export and therefore there is greater balance in our favor from commerce than with others."

My Government feels that the adoption of a principle whereby the payment of a German debtor to a non-German creditor should be made to depend on the ratio of imports and exports in the exchange of goods and services between Germany and the creditor's country would be an unprecedented departure from the rule of non-discrimination among creditors. The adoption of such a policy by Germany would have a most unfortunate repercussion on opinion in the United States in view of the confidence in German credit which has led American investors to purchase some one billion two hundred million dollars of German bonds, thus furnishing an indispensable element in the economic and financial restoration of Germany after the war. The Government of the United States cannot believe that the reported expressions of the President of the Reichsbank represent a policy which could receive serious consideration by the Government of Germany.

BERLIN, June 14, 1933.

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<sup>5</sup> The Foreign Ministry's further explanation on the Schacht speech was reported by Gordon on June 17, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933*, vol. II, pp. 444-445. Copies of the Bülow memorandum and the aide-mémoire were forwarded to Ritter in London on June 15 for Schacht's information (9119/E640852).



## No. 317

6058/E447211-12

*The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 32 of June 16

LONDON, German Delegation, June 16, 1933.

Received June 16—10:35 p. m.

II It. 796.

This afternoon I had another lengthy conversation with Suvich on the question of the Pact.<sup>1</sup> I told him I had brought with me the draft of the note sent me,<sup>2</sup> expressing our position in the matter of the French interpretation of article 19 of the Covenant. Suvich answered that he had had a lengthy conversation with Vansittart today, since Simon was still sick. The two of them had come to the conviction that to send such a note to France would immediately arouse the opponents of the Pact and presumably delay the signing, if not make it impossible altogether. It had occurred to them that it might be sufficient if we would express our objections to the French notes in a note to Mussolini as the father of the Four Power Pact, who would then have to inform the French and English of it. I told him that this might be a possible procedure; however, since the French notes had been made public we had to publish our note, too, at the proper time. We had to reserve the decision on the form in which we wished to do this. I would give thought to this proposal and convey an answer to him very soon.

Please study this possibility and if necessary inform the Chancellor.<sup>3</sup> If he is in agreement, the note could be sent to Hassell at once. Suvich also inquired whether it might not be useful to refer in the note to the French statement,<sup>4</sup> communicated to us via the Italians, in reply to our question about the intention of the French exchange of notes that had been published by *Matin*.

NEURATH

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<sup>1</sup> See documents No. 304 and No. 318, footnote 2.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 308.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 321.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 272, footnote 3.

## No. 318

3170/676572

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, June 16, 1933.

Today the Italian Ambassador read me a lengthy telegram from Mussolini in which the Italian Government takes a position on the memorandum of Herr von Hassell regarding the French exchange

of notes with the Little Entente on the Four Power Pact.<sup>1</sup> The general line of the telegram is to state that the French interpretation does not refer to the Four Power Pact but to the League of Nations Covenant. The telegram says in effect that Germany should really content herself with the fact that the commentaries on the Four Power Pact put out by WTB and Conti had been accepted without argument, and closes with Mussolini's remark that Germany could not have any interest in restricting the Four Power Pact by means of interpretations and redefinitions.

I explained our position once more to the Ambassador and informed him of what I knew regarding the conversations between the Foreign Minister and Signor Suvich,<sup>2</sup> in particular that Herr von Neurath intended to speak with Suvich today about the text of a German note to the three other Pact Powers. The Ambassador expressed himself as quite satisfied with this information.<sup>3</sup>

BÜLOW

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 308 and footnote 2.

<sup>2</sup> Neurath's telegram No. 22 of June 15 had described a conversation with Suvich and drawn the conclusion from it that Germany would have to notify the signatories of the Pact by a note of her reservations with respect to the French notes to the Little Entente Powers and Poland (6058/E447183).

<sup>3</sup> This conversation was written up by Bülow in a more detailed memorandum of the same day which is not printed (3170/676573-75).

## No. 319

6153/E460770

### *Vice Chancellor Papen to Counselor Menshausen*

BERLIN, June 16, 1933.

II Vat. 233.

DEAR MENSHAUSEN: Will you please send the following telegram in code to Ambassador von Bergen after informing your chief:<sup>1</sup>

"The Reich Chancellor has agreed that I should come to Rome in order to complete the negotiation in person, if possible before the arrival of Cardinal Bertram.<sup>2</sup> My journey only has point, however, if enough is done by the Vatican to meet our wishes regarding article 31.<sup>3</sup> Please settle this with the Cardinal Secretary of State. Cardinal Faulhaber informed me that the Fulda Conference had indeed

<sup>1</sup> This was sent as telegram No. 21 to Rome (Vatican) at 9:10 p. m., and to London for Neurath's information as telegram No. 22 (6153/E460771).

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 29 of June 6 Bergen had wired the Foreign Ministry as follows: "I learn privately that it has been suggested to Cardinal Bertram that he come to Rome as soon as possible in order to take part in the negotiations concerning the concordat. I am hereby strengthened in the supposition expressed in my communication of June 1 that the Cardinal Secretary of State is seeking support from the German Episcopate against our demands. Bertram is willing to visit Rome from the 19th until the 23rd of the month." (6153/E460701)

A marginal note by Neurath on June 6 states that Hitler had been informed.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 250 and footnote 3

taken a different position with respect to article 31, but they did not at all want to let the conclusion of the concordat break down over that. In order to avoid having Kaas appear openly in connection with our negotiations, Faulhaber has proposed putting a member of the German Episcopate in the negotiations and if occasion arises would send Bishop Preysing for this purpose. Please indicate to the Cardinal Secretary of State that occurrences in the Evangelical Church as well as other incidents ought to make the conclusion of the concordats appear very desirable there. Papen."

With best wishes,  
Yours, etc.

PAPEN

### No. 320

7810/E566603-08

*Ambassador Köster to State Secretary Bülow*

PARIS, June 16, 1933.

II Fr. 1853.

DEAR BÜLOW: Permit me to make a few observations in a private letter on the political situation created in France by the Four Power Pact.

The Cabinet here (especially M. Daladier and M. Paul-Boncour) and Secretary General Léger are exceedingly well satisfied with the fact that the French wishes were taken into account almost without exception in the editing of the Pact. Evidently they expected major struggles and were themselves somewhat surprised at winning this victory—and the present text is considered as such. This doubtless has a number of not very pleasant consequences for us: Above all they think they know that Mussolini in the negotiations was less interested in taking account of our wishes and stressing a uniform line with us than in carrying off a personal success. They think they can conclude from this that by complying with Mussolini's wishes on future problems to the greatest possible extent they can achieve the hoped-for improvement in Franco-Italian relations. In this it is assumed that the Italian antagonist will be willing to take account of wishes which may be expressed by the German side only to the extent that these accord with the Italian policy.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, they expect that Mussolini will keep aloof from Germany on account of the internal events in Germany (persecution of the Jews, etc., etc.) and the attitude of the German Government in matters of foreign policy, as for example in the Austrian question, and they hope to be able to convince him that his foreign policy aims can be reached more quickly through an ar-

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note in Neurath's handwriting: "Correct!"

rangement with France rather than with Germany, whose foreign policy is too restless and inconsistent. It can further be clearly observed that the feeling of fear of Germany that has almost entirely dominated French foreign policy heretofore has greatly receded, at least for the moment. No one doubts here that we would have refused to initial the Pact if we did not fear the danger of isolation; last but not least,<sup>2</sup> it is supposed that presumably we also did not want to deprive our supposed ally, Signor Mussolini, of his victory laurels. Unfortunately it is believed that the danger of isolation has not yet been eliminated for us with the signature of the Pact, but that owing to our present domestic and foreign policy we will quite inevitably get into this scarcely enviable position. Therefore they believe that they can oppose without any great difficulty the German wishes for practical realization of equality of rights in disarmament questions. In these efforts they are counting on the certain support of England, on America's rather benevolent neutrality, and no serious opposition by Italy. They regard further developments in Germany with great skepticism and believe that the coming months will lead to a further weakening of the body politic, which in turn results in the belief that they do not have to reckon seriously with the eastern neighbor in the near future. On the basis of these considerations they take the position that no power on earth will be able to force France to disarm and they are firmly resolved to follow in military matters only the principles that they themselves consider proper and necessary in order to attain their foreign policy aims in the coming years. Symptomatic of this attitude is the result of my conversations with various politicians and parliamentarians, in which I expressed regret that the Premier in his major speech to the Chamber<sup>3</sup> in no way recalled the sacrifices made by the Chancellor in order to bring about the Four Power Pact. They answered me almost in one voice that public opinion would not understand this sort of friendly utterance which could only serve to make the Government unpopular with the Rightist parties. Well-tried friends expressed the same ideas. Most of the time there was no answer to the question whether the Chancellor's speech and the fact that the Chancellor had initialed the Pact did not provide a definitely favorable basis for such statements, or otherwise the reply was made that the value of this speech was decidedly impaired by the statements in the book *Mein Kampf* and one would first have to see the practical results. M. Léger, too, could not bring himself to acknowledge that my statements were correct.

The reference to these few incidents will doubtless suffice to show you that the balance is anything but favorable for us.

<sup>2</sup> This phrase is in English in the original.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 303.

As far as the Pact is concerned, they seem here to want to use it only as a basis for an improvement in Franco-Italian relations and to consider this as its real purpose. With us I could imagine that one is inclined to classify the Pact rather among those agreements that, like the *pacte de confiance*,<sup>4</sup> have little practical importance. At the risk of being wrong, I should like to recommend that its value not be underestimated and in particular that it not be made too easy for the French to exploit the Pact exclusively for the purposes of French policy with respect to Italy. Perhaps one should really examine whether it would not be well to utilize it as soon as possible as an instrument for the solution of difficulties lying in the economic sphere or arising out of everyday life between two countries. The easier the problems are which are submitted to the Pact organization at the start, the greater the prospect of a solution satisfactory to all parties, and moreover the impression will be created among the public that conversations on the basis of the Pact are of practical value for European questions after all. In the course of time one could increase the difficulty of the problems to be discussed and therewith succeed in slowly getting close to the objective that one actually had in mind. This procedure would be of fourfold value:

1. The four Powers would be forced to meet at regular and frequent intervals;

2. Public opinion and the Powers that had been interested in the sterilization of the Pact would become accustomed to the meetings and would no longer regard them with such great distrust;

3. The Pact would not become dormant and the meetings would, in particular, not be restricted only to occasions when very weighty political conversations would have to be held. They would thereby acquire regular character similar to Council meetings and the latter would lose their value to a certain extent.

4. The French would be deprived of the possibility of letting it [the Pact] operate only when the time seemed right to them, i. e., when it is only a question of improving Franco-Italian relations or when they want to apply it against Germany.

If you think these ideas to be worthy of consideration I should be happy to be able to talk with you during my stay in Berlin. In the meantime I remain, yours, etc.<sup>5</sup>

KÖSTER

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<sup>4</sup> See document No. 13, footnote 2.

<sup>5</sup> This document, which was initialed by Hindenburg, also has a marginal note stating: "The Reich Chancellor is informed. L[ammers], June 27; Th[omsen], June 27."

## No. 321

6058/E447215-17

*The State Secretary to the German Delegation at London*

## Telegram

No. 25

BERLIN, June 17, 1933—4:25 p. m.  
zu II It. 796.<sup>1</sup>

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 32.<sup>1</sup>

It has been ascertained in Rome that the French Ambassador there made the following statements in reply to Italy's inquiry in Paris regarding the article in *Le Matin*:<sup>2</sup>

1. The report in *Le Matin* would be officially denied;
2. France would merely assure the Little Entente that she would continue to insist on the requirement of unanimity in the League of Nations on all questions relating to territorial revisions.

This promise has not been kept by France. The exchange of notes with the Little Entente is substantially identical with the report in *Le Matin*, and also contains an interpretation of article [II]<sup>3</sup> of the Rome pact. In these circumstances it would seem undesirable to proceed from this French statement, as suggested by Suvich, because it would then be necessary for us to establish in our note further instances of bad faith on the part of the French.

In order to take into account Italian and English fears that the Pact might be imperiled, the concluding paragraph of the draft of the note in your hands might be softened as follows: "The German Government regrets that the French Government has seen fit to enter into agreements in this way with third states about the interpretation and application of the Treaty. In the view of the German Government, such action is not of a kind to promote the objective aimed at with the Treaty, which can be achieved only if the four Governments are resolved to treat all questions relating to the Treaty in the spirit of sincere cooperation based on mutual confidence. In any case, the German Government feels constrained to declare that questions concerning the interpretation and application of the Treaty cannot be settled unilaterally by any one of the four Governments concerned, but only by these Governments jointly."

In the event that the plan of a note to the three other Powers is maintained, it would be advisable to state at the end of the note that it is being simultaneously presented in Rome, Paris, and London, so as

<sup>1</sup> II It. 796: Document No. 317.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 272 and footnote 2.

<sup>3</sup> The original of the copy printed was damaged by fire along the edges and some passages had consequently become illegible. It was possible, however, to restore the full text from another copy (3170/676578-79).

to make it difficult for the French Government to give a separate reply.

The suggestion to address our note only to Mussolini appears well worth considering and in that case the above softened version would be sufficient in our opinion. Reference could then be made orally to the contradiction between the French statement regarding the *Le Matin* article and the exchange of notes with the Little Entente. The important thing is that our note should remain unanswered by the other Pact Powers, and the best means of accomplishing this is through Mussolini.

It does not appear necessary to us to insist on publication of either the note to the three Powers or the note to Mussolini, because the German public has paid no attention whatever to the whole matter. But we would naturally have to reserve to ourselves the right to publish them at some later date.

As regards delivery of the note in Rome, Herr von Hassell has already left. If it is decided to go through Mussolini, one possibility would be that you address the note to Suvich in London.

Since the Reichswehr Minister \* will be away until Monday, I have not submitted the matter to the Reich Chancellor, particularly as it seems to me that sufficient material for a decision is not yet available. The Reich Chancellor will be away on Sunday and Monday, and no decision can therefore be reached before Tuesday at the earliest.

BÜLOW

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\* On June 12, Bülow had sent a letter to Blomberg informing him of the situation created by the French exchange of notes with the Little Entente, and of the German steps which had already been taken or which were being planned (6058/E447131-32).

## No. 322

7360/E536991-92

*The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

LONDON, German Delegation, June 19, 1933—4: 25 p. m.

No. 41 of June 19

Received June 19—5: 10 p. m.

II F Abr. 2112.

I had this morning a lengthy conversation with Henderson on the status of the disarmament question.<sup>1</sup> Henderson began by saying

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<sup>1</sup> At the meeting of the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference on June 7 Henderson had stated that he hoped to take advantage of the presence in London for the World Economic Conference of the large number of heads of delegations "in order to institute with them the negotiations with which the General Commission had entrusted him." See League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (Geneva, 1933) : ser. C, *Minutes of the Bureau*, vol. I, pp. 174-175.

that he had spent a week here to no purpose at all. No one had wanted to talk about disarmament with him. Norman Davis had merely passed through and told him that he hoped to return to Geneva about July 10. It was unlikely that any decisions would be reached here. To my question how he pictured the continuation of the Disarmament Conference, Henderson replied that he was planning, after the reconvening of the Bureau and the [General] Commission,<sup>2</sup> to arrange, first of all, for a second reading of those parts of the MacDonald plan on which he hoped agreement could be brought about. On the remaining portion, negotiations would have to continue. But he realized even now that it would be impossible to reach a decision before the beginning of the summer recess, which he would set for the end of July. I told Henderson that we were interested in knowing at last where we stood and therefore wanted either the earliest possible conclusion of a convention or else have the fact established that nothing was to be achieved at the Disarmament Conference. For this reason I would in any case also have to oppose emphatically any suggestion of the adjournment sine die of the Conference. Henderson stated that he, too, opposed such an adjournment sine die which would be tantamount to putting the Disarmament Conference to its final rest. He said he had to tell me, however, that in view of the prevailing attitude toward Germany, which was unfavorable also at Geneva, it would be difficult to induce the Governments concerned to take the decisions which are necessary for conclusion of a convention. I answered Henderson that we had to reserve our decision as to our attitude, in the event that the Conference should continue endlessly without reaching any decision, and stressed once more that we attached the greatest importance to our knowing at long last where we stood. Henderson appeared to be very distressed over the negative result of his stay here. He finally told me that he would be back again in Geneva on June 27.<sup>3</sup>

So far I have had no other conversations on disarmament, but I shall also see Eden tomorrow.<sup>4</sup>

NEURATH

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<sup>2</sup> See Editors' Note, p. 546.

<sup>3</sup> On June 29, following a statement by Henderson that no progress had been made on the text of the British draft convention for the second reading, the General Commission adjourned until October 16 in order to give Henderson time to visit leading European capitals and carry on talks preparatory to a satisfactory continuation of the Conference. The German representative at the Conference, supported only by the Hungarian representative, opposed the adjournment.

<sup>4</sup> No record of this meeting has been found.



## No. 323

6058/E447242

*The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

LONDON, German Delegation, June 19, 1933—4:40 p. m.  
No. 42 of June 19 Received June 19—5:15 p. m.  
II It. 811.

I just had a visit from Signor Suvich, with whom I discussed once more the further treatment of the Four Power Pact. I showed him the new draft of our note,<sup>1</sup> with the contents of which he expressed agreement. He suggested, however, that the note be delivered in Rome. The French Government before signing the Pact wanted to await the debates in the Senate, which would probably take place at the end of this week. Daladier wants to put off the actual signing until after the Chamber and the Senate have gone on vacation, which in any case would be before July 14. Where the signing was then to take place, Suvich did not know. He said that he was leaving for Rome tonight. Since Hassell is coming to Berlin this week, the note could be given to him which he is to take to Mussolini. A similar démarche in London and Paris should not be considered. However, Hassell ought to request Mussolini to communicate the contents of our note to Paris and London.

NEURATH

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<sup>1</sup> This draft which followed the text suggested in document No. 308, and amended in document No. 321, was sent the same day by pouch to the Foreign Ministry by Counselor Völckers of the Foreign Minister's staff (6058/E447251; E447253-54).

## No. 324

2980/580459-60

*Memorandum by an Official of Department II*

BERLIN, June 19, 1933.  
[e. o. II Ung. 355].<sup>1</sup>

The Hungarian Minister M. de Masirevich called on me today and came at once to speak of the visit of Minister President Gömbös.<sup>2</sup>

He told me that he had been informed only in a general way about the plan of a meeting which actually was supposed to have taken place in Munich. It was only last Saturday noon that he had learned of the arrival of the Minister President in Berlin through telephone

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<sup>1</sup> The file number is from another copy of this document (9565/E673548-49).

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 280. The meeting between Hitler and Gömbös took place in Berlin on June 17. No minute of the meeting has been found.

calls of newspaper reporters. After he had verified the report by telephoning the Foreign Ministry in Budapest, he had succeeded only after many attempts in obtaining a telephone connection with M. Gömbös here. Gömbös had then received him toward evening and informed him in broad outline of his discussions with the Reich Chancellor. According to him practically all political and economic questions affecting Germany and Hungary jointly had been discussed in these talks, also including the favorite ideas of M. Gömbös, namely the question of the economic coordination of Italy, Austria, Hungary, and Germany on the basis of a common autarky and intensified political cooperation of these states by means of frequent personal meetings of their leading statesmen. The German-Austrian question had also been discussed. It had turned out that both sides considered a normalization of this relationship to be desirable. The question on what basis such a normalization could be sought seemed to have remained open, however. M. de Masirevich mentioned nothing about minorities questions also having been discussed. Minister President Gömbös had evidently been very deeply impressed by the personality of the Reich Chancellor.

The Minister did not see M. Gömbös any more on Sunday, since the latter had already left Berlin in the morning. He expressed some misgivings about Gömbös' participation in the SA and SS parade in Erfurt, since he is afraid that the French press might see in this the proof of a close cooperation between Germany and Hungary in the military sphere, too.

HEEREN

## No. 325

9245/E652613-14

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

No. 134 of June 19

Moscow, June 19, 1933.

Received June 20—2:20 a. m.

W 4122.

For the State Secretary personally.

With reference to my telegram No. 132 of June 18.<sup>1</sup>

On the occasion of my visit today with Krestinsky in connection with current questions he immediately began a serious conversation about Reich Minister Hugenberg's so-called memorandum. Krestinsky, who began his remarks by saying that during the 12 years

<sup>1</sup> In this telegram (9245/E652588) Dirksen asked for information concerning the content and meaning of Hugenberg's memorandum. See document No. 312.

that he had been occupied with German-Russian affairs he had never had such a serious and unpleasant question to discuss, said that the Soviet Government had at first supposed that Minister Hugenberg had written his memorandum without the approval of the German delegation. That in itself would have been significant enough. According to a statement made to the Telegraph Union by Minister Hugenberg, however, the memorandum had the approval of the Reich Government. The Soviet Government was consequently confronted with the fact that the Reich Government had taken as its own a memorandum which directly attacked the Soviet Union and contained harmful and inimical proposals. The memorandum proposed that an area of settlement be granted to Germany in eastern Europe. Such a scheme could only be at the expense of Russia. In spite of friendly statements by authoritative Germans, the Soviet Government could not but fear that the German Government had espoused the Rosenberg ideas.

In view of the friendly relations existing in fact and by treaty between the two states, with a provision for open discussion of the political aims and acts of the two contracting parties, he asked me to obtain a statement from the Reich Government on his remarks.

I replied to M. Krestinsky that the reports received thus far were obviously incomplete and distorted. I did not doubt that acquaintance with the complete text of the memorandum would dispel the fear of the Soviet Government. From Krestinsky's statements as well as a number of other indications I have the impression that great alarm, indignation, and uncertainty prevail in authoritative circles here with regard to Germany's future policy toward the Soviet Union. I should therefore be grateful for precise information about the facts in the case, which are not evident from the press here, and request authorization to issue an appropriate statement.<sup>2</sup>

Such a statement would be fully effective only if it were followed by an official pronouncement.

If the assertion made here is true that Minister Hugenberg demanded an area of settlement in the east or economic participation by Germany in the east in order to relieve Germany's lack of space, I request instructions as to what practical proposals we envisage for the implementation of this principle.

When I spoke with Krestinsky I did not as yet know about the *Pravda* editorial reported by press telegram No. 133 of June 19,<sup>3</sup> owing to the delay in the publication of the paper.

DIRKSEN

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<sup>2</sup> See document No. 327.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (9245/E652605).

## No. 326

9127/E641945-47

*The Minister in Czechoslovakia to the Foreign Ministry*

A. III. 2. h.

PRAGUE, June 19, 1933.

Received June 21.

VI A 1253.

Subject: The political situation of the Sudeten Germans.

The extraordinary deterioration in the whole situation of the national Sudeten Germans is characterized by the circumstance that at present no fewer than 1500 political suits are pending against national Sudeten Germans and that close to 700 persons are in prison awaiting trial. House searches and arrests are daily occurrences. Particularly the national student corporations in Prague have to suffer under the pressure of the authorities and have to take care to avoid any kind of connection with German organizations in the Reich. The tendencies of the young Sudeten German students toward making an uncompromising national spirit prevail at the Prague University encounter the opposition not only of all the other German parties but naturally also that of the Government and the entire Czech people. On the Czech side, at any rate, they are resolved not to tolerate a definitely national atmosphere at the University; they are even considering converting the University from a German one into a university for all national minorities of the state (thus including Jews and Hungarians). In this way any element of a consciously German character of the University would be finished for good. Even now such sharp protests are being raised among the Czech public against planned new constructions of German university institutes that they will probably result in a long postponement of these projects, heretofore under concrete discussion.

The bulk of the "laws (press law and state of emergency) for the protection of democracy," some of them already issued and some being planned, which make possible intensifying all punitive measures for actions against the governmental order, are not directed merely against Czech fascists but in particular against German National Socialists and Nationals. They not only find the approval of the German Government parties; it is also noticeable that German opposition parties like the Christian Social party or the Labor and Economy Group [*Arbeits- und Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*] do not oppose this legislation with any elementary resistance, but merely display a lame sort of opposition.

The Pilsen decision pronounced last week against 42 National Socialists from Asch (including 10 Reich Germans), concerning which

I reported under A. II. e. Asch of June 14,<sup>1</sup> signifies after the *Volkssport* and *Jungsturm* trials<sup>2</sup> a further stage in the fight against the nationally conscious German element. This decision will be followed by trial after trial. For the assurances by the Sudeten German National Socialist party that it is pursuing a policy within the framework of the state find as little credence as the repeated Reich German statements denying a connection between the National Socialism of the German Reich and of the Sudeten Germans. The consequences of the Pilsen decision for the Sudeten Germans and the 30,000 Reich Germans living in Czechoslovakia are incalculable. Any connection, no matter how innocent, with national Germany and the leading movement there and the *gleichgeschaltet* groups can result in dangerous judicial proceedings.

The prohibition of another 98 Reich German newspapers, just issued, has now cut a further tie between Sudeten Germans and the Germans in the Reich. Both countries have come into the situation of almost total mutual blockade. The result is that the political atmosphere among the Sudeten Germans is becoming charged with new inflammables, since National Socialism is indeed growing just as much as the activity of the Czech rulers, the Sudeten German activists,<sup>3</sup> the Social Democrats, and the Reich German émigrés who dominate the Czech press and the major part of the German language press with their political opinions.

DR. KOCH

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (9151/E643998-644001). The defendants had been tried for having participated in a National Socialist meeting across the border in Germany during the German electoral campaign early in March.

<sup>2</sup>A number of National Socialists had been sentenced by the Brno district court in September 1932 to jail terms from 1 to 3 years on charges of having attacked the safety of the state by organizing National Socialist storm troops disguised as sports organizations, such as *Volkssport* and *Jungsturm*.

<sup>3</sup>"Activists" were those parties of the German minority who actively participated in the formation of majorities in the Czechoslovak Parliament.

## No. 327

9245/E652615-16

*The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union*

Telegram

URGENT  
No. 141

BERLIN, June 20, 1933—10:00 p. m.  
zu W 4122.<sup>1</sup>

With reference to your telegram 132.<sup>2</sup>

The passage of Hugenberg's speech in question<sup>3</sup> reads as follows:

<sup>1</sup> W 4122: Document No. 325.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 325, footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 312.

(Insert from WTB No. 1459 [the last two paragraphs of the Hugenberg memorandum, document No. 312].)

The following should be said regarding this: There is no question at all of any idea of a German settlement in Russia or in the East. Herr Hugenberg simply said that areas should be opened to the nation without space [*Volk ohne Raum*] where it could make room for settlement and perform works of peace. M. Krestinsky's interpretation that the memorandum in any way attacks or injures the Soviet Union and contains damaging or inimical proposals is entirely incomprehensible. The mention of Russia and large parts of the East in the final paragraph of the memorandum is entirely unconnected with the question of the area of settlement. This connection was artificially constructed by the anti-German press and I request you to express astonishment that the Russian Government has adopted this entirely untenable interpretation contrary to the clear text of the memorandum, which surely must be available. Germany's policy toward Russia has not been changed in any way.

BÜLOW

## No. 328

2980/581386-88

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

LONDON, June 21, 1933.

RM 869.

Today Rumanian Foreign Minister Titulescu called on me in order, as he said, to talk with me about Rumanian policy and the attitude of the Little Entente toward Germany. M. Titulescu began by saying that he was, of course, an anti-revisionist. For this reason he had also opposed the Four Power Pact with every possible means. Rumania could never agree to Hungary's revisionist plans as supported by Italy. It was mainly for this reason that she had joined the Little Entente. He knew that Italy was at the moment energetically supporting the reunion of Austria and Hungary, and was also seeking France's agreement on this. Such a reunion, however, meant war for Rumania and the Little Entente. Rumania had no objection to the Anschluss of Austria with Germany. As far as the Hungarian revisionist aspirations were concerned, he took the position that it would be much more practical if Hungary would enter into a customs union with Rumania, whereby the minorities question would be as good as solved. Italian policy was ambiguous. Fear of the Anschluss was driving Italy to seek an understanding with France which likewise wished to prevent the Anschluss with every possible means. On the

other hand she was flirting with Germany in order to extort concessions from the French. As long as Germany did not actively support the Hungarian revisionist aspirations, M. Titulescu saw no reason to oppose the German revisionist aspirations.

I told M. Titulescu that his visit with me had doubtless been occasioned by M. Gömbös' visit in Berlin,<sup>1</sup> and he did not deny this. I also told him that to my knowledge mainly the economic relations between Hungary and Germany had been discussed in Berlin; naturally the Austrian question also played a role in this. I doubted, however, that any wishes had been expressed on the Hungarian side in regard to support for the Hungarian revisionist policy. On the other hand it was entirely clear that we wanted to bring about a revision of the Versailles Treaty. One could not ask to have the present impossible situation last forever. When and to what extent we would pursue revision would depend upon the general political situation. Of course the disarmament question was also included in this revision, and I regretted to have to state that in spite of M. Titulescu's friendly assurance the Rumanians had been on the opposite side in all the questions which interested us.

M. Titulescu then also came to speak of the Rumanian export wishes that have already been advanced in Berlin by Minister Comnen.<sup>2</sup> In this regard I told Titulescu that I did not know how we could buy more from Rumania, since Germany's recovery was constantly being impeded with the aid of Rumanian policy. M. Titulescu indicated in conclusion that he might come to Berlin for a visit in a few months.

v. N[EURATH]

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 324.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 264.

## No. 329

9565/E673554-60

### *The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry*

A. No. 104 P. 3

BUDAPEST, June 21, 1933.

Received June 23.

II Ung. 372.

### POLITICAL REPORT<sup>1</sup>

Subject: Trip of Minister President Gömbös to Berlin.<sup>2</sup>

The trip of the Hungarian Minister President to Germany, that became known here only through the telegrams from Berlin, had the

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<sup>1</sup> Marginal Note: "The Reich Chancellor is informed. L[ammers], June 27."

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 324.

effect of a great sensation in the Hungarian public. As I know through M. de Kánya, who incidentally was himself told in confidence only the day before Gömbös' departure, the latter wavered repeatedly as to whether he should undertake the trip, in view of the tension between Berlin and Vienna at the present moment. What turned the scales in favor was the recently intensified anti-Hungarian attitude of the Little Entente and the concern that the Dollfuss Government could involve itself more closely with France and Czechoslovakia.

M. de Gömbös, with whom I spoke today, is exceedingly satisfied with the result of his trip. Both the personality of the Reich Chancellor, whom he praised for his great amiability, and the dynamic force of the National Socialist Movement, of which he could convince himself in the Berlin stadium and particularly in Erfurt, have made a deep impression on him. M. Gömbös spoke in really enthusiastic terms of the overwhelming impression made by the psychological bond between the masses of the German people, particularly the workers, and the Führer, and he said he had carried home the conviction that the National Socialist regime was not a passing thing but was firmly and permanently established. He had felt that he should stress this in his speech in the House of Deputies yesterday, too, and point to the historic service that the Reich Chancellor had rendered to *Europe* by crushing communism.

As for the relations between Germany and Hungary, he had the impression that the old alliance had been sealed anew by the Reich Chancellor and himself. He hoped that this could be further developed economically and militarily, but also politically, and that the two Governments would remain in permanent contact. M. Gömbös did not go any further into details; on the other hand M. de Mecsér<sup>3</sup> mentioned the plan of forming a German-Hungarian study commission with the task of making suggestions on expanding economic relations. M. de Mecsér reported further that he has been charged with the establishment of the Hungarian Export and Import Corporation, likewise planned, whose counterpart is represented by the Foreign Trade Office of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP. The purpose of these corporations, to be supplemented later by similar ones in Vienna and Bucharest, would be to facilitate mutual trade (somewhat in the pattern of the Brocchi Treaties<sup>4</sup>).

Gömbös' commitment to a political and economic orientation of Hungary on the side of Germany, which resulted also psychologically from the Berlin visit, has unmistakably had an effect that is

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<sup>3</sup> In Budapest telegram No. 25 of June 7, Mecsér had been described as a former officer and landowner, who was now a confidant of Gömbös and had recently been in contact with "important National Socialist personages." (9565/-E673545)

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 14, footnote 6.



desirable for us on the Minister President's attitude in the Austrian question. Gömbös has completely adopted as his own the German position in the Austrian question, and he told me that he would also express his opinion clearly to Prince Starhemberg, who was going to call on him here today. Moreover, he also intended to tell Federal Chancellor Dollfuss that it was not a matter of indifference to Hungary if France's influence increased in Austria. I should like to remark here parenthetically that it has been held up to M. Gömbös by the Legitimist side that his Berlin visit signified a weakening of Dollfuss.<sup>5</sup> At the same time the fact that on the return trip through Vienna he had not paid a visit to the Federal Chancellor was criticized. As I have learned confidentially in this regard, Gömbös refrained from getting in touch with Dollfuss because he felt that "when you come from a friend you can't turn around and shake hands with his enemy." However, Hungary would be very much interested in a reconciliation between Germany and Austria, as Kánya has also told me, but they do not think here that it is their affair to intervene in any way in the quarrel between brothers.

Should Gömbös, as he expects, be invited by Mussolini to visit Rome in the near future, he intends to prevail on the Duce to influence Dollfuss in the direction of an understanding with the Austrian National Socialists. According to information from M. de Mecsér, Gömbös wanted to convince Mussolini that the Anschluss would not be pushed by the German side and that Germany only wanted the National Socialists in Austria to share in the power according to the will of the people. Gömbös, who had even in the past avoided commitment to the triangular coalition Rome-Vienna-Budapest advocated by Italy, now considered the economic coordination of Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Italy, with the later inclusion of Rumania, as the big objective to be striven for. Austria would belong to this economic area as an independent state. Gömbös did not go into the minorities question in his talk with me today. On the other hand, M. de Kánya told me that the Minister President had explained to the Reich Chancellor in detail his position in this matter, which "was the sole encumbrance on German-Hungarian relations."<sup>6</sup> It had been felt here as particularly painful that the German minorities had participated in the latest anti-revisionist demonstrations in the countries of the Little Entente.

At the conclusion of our conversation the Prime Minister remarked that the Hungarian Minister of Finance had informed him by telephone from London that his Berlin visit had been accepted calmly there.

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<sup>5</sup> Marginal note in the handwriting of Attaché Siegfried: "!"

<sup>6</sup> Marginal note in Bülow's handwriting: "?"

As for the reception of Gömbös' trip among the Hungarian public, the liberal-Jewish press—as was to be expected—expressed itself in a highly derogatory manner and especially stressed that it was contrary to Hungarian interests to draw closer to Germany at a moment when she was entirely isolated.

In the Parliament, too, the democratic and likewise the Legitimist spokesmen sharply criticized the trip. On the other hand it was warmly welcomed by the government press and particularly also in agricultural circles. There, as Gömbös told me himself, it was stated that he had rendered a historic service by his visit in Berlin.

I enclose the two speeches in which Gömbös dealt with his trip.<sup>7</sup>

SCHOEN

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<sup>7</sup>Not printed (9565/E673561-70).

## No. 330

3086/616551

### *Memorandum by the Director of Department II*

BERLIN, June 22, 1933.

[II Ung. 366.] <sup>1</sup>

Ambassador von Hassell stated that on the occasion of his visit today Chancellor Hitler had also told him something about the conversations with Hungarian Minister President Gömbös. The Reich Chancellor had expressed his satisfaction with the cordial character of the visit and emphasized that on both sides there was complete agreement that closest contact would be maintained. Especially gratifying was Gömbös' statement that Hungary did not desire a restoration of the Hapsburgs in Austria and Hungary. The question of the King of Hungary was a strictly Hungarian affair and would always be treated by Hungary as such.<sup>2</sup> A restoration of the Hapsburg monarchy in Hungary and simultaneously in Austria was out of the question.

In Herr von Hassell's conversation with the Reich Chancellor there was no indication that at this visit the problem of the German minorities in Hungary had also been discussed between the Chancellor and the Hungarian Minister President.

KÖPKE

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<sup>1</sup>The file number is from another copy of this document.

<sup>2</sup>Marginal note: "The Reich Chancellor told the same thing to me, too. v. N[eurath], June 23."

## No. 331

9245/E652666-70

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*BERLIN, June 22, 1933.  
zu W 4174.<sup>1</sup>

The Russian Ambassador today handed me the enclosed note, the text of which, as he told me later, had been dictated to him by Moscow. In the note a protest is made against the memorandum of the Reich Minister of Economics delivered to the London Conference.<sup>2</sup>

My conversation with the Ambassador was from the outset unusually sharp and became somewhat conciliatory only at the end. I told the Ambassador that we would reply to his note and that he should not be surprised if our note was couched in very sharp language. For days we had been aroused by the unbelievable insinuations indulged in in Moscow both by Krestinsky in speaking to Ambassador von Dirksen<sup>3</sup> and by the Russian press. Nothing in the speech of Reich Minister of Economics Hugenberg justified the insinuation that Germany was seeking Russian territory as an area of settlement, to say nothing of calling upon the Conference for a crusade against Russia. The last two paragraphs of the Hugenberg memorandum dealt with two different problems. In the section dealing with space for settlement the colonial question and the question of profitable use of the surplus population were discussed. I knew of no project for settling Germans in Russia, but there were numberless projects of that kind for the settlement of Germans in Brazil, Paraguay, Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Canada, and other countries. We had obtained great economic benefits from older German settlements; for years obstacles had been placed in the way of our emigration owing to economic and political reasons. That was a matter which had nothing whatever to do with Russia. Only in the last paragraph of the Hugenberg memorandum was Russia mentioned, together with China, in the discussion of the question of underconsumption as opposed to overproduction which was often falsely claimed to exist. It was a historical fact that war, revolution, and internal decay (the latter obviously referred to China) had inaugurated a development which was today affecting almost all countries, namely involuntary underconsumption.

The Ambassador replied that Russia was after all sensitive and on the basis of her experiences had every reason for being so. The statements of Reich Minister Hugenberg were downright insulting to Russia. At the London Conference everyone had understood them as they were interpreted in the note, and it was intolerable to give the

<sup>1</sup> W 4174: The enclosed note of the Soviet Ambassador.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 312.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 327.

powers assembled in London the spectacle of German-Russian quarrels of this kind. Everybody in London had naturally asked what Litvinov would say in reply to the Germans.

I replied to the Ambassador that Russian sensitivity was really carried to extremes. What Reich Minister Hugenberg had said about Russia was a historical fact and could not be denied; everything else consisted of imputations drawn from the books of Deputy Rosenberg, who did not at all determine the foreign policy of the German Reich and whose ideas about the East were not shared by any authoritative quarters in Germany. It was also an enormous exaggeration to assert that the entire London Conference had given Hugenberg's memorandum the Russian interpretation. As far as I knew, only the *Daily Herald*, which was not friendly either to us or to Russia, had suggested this absurd idea, and some other newspapers had taken up the misleading ideas of that paper. From the experiences which Russia had had I could to some extent understand Russian sensitivity with regard to the idea of a crusade against Russia. But the unshakable rock on which German-Russian relations were built was that we would never participate in any such action and that owing to our geographical position any possibility of such an anti-Russian alliance was eliminated.

Through these remarks of mine the conversation took a more conciliatory turn and ended in a discussion of the present difficulties in our mutual relations.<sup>4</sup>

BÜLOW

[Enclosure]

*The Soviet Ambassador to the State Secretary*

BERLIN, June 22, 1933.

W 4174.

**HERR STATE SECRETARY:** The German delegation to the World Economic Conference in London submitted to the Chairman of the Economic Commission of the Conference a memorandum which among other things contains the following sentences relating to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

The second step would be to open up to the "nation without space" [*"Volk ohne Raum"*] areas in which it could provide space for the settlement of its vigorous race and construct great works of peace. . . . In reality we do not suffer from overproduction but from forced underconsumption. . . . War, revolution, and internal decay made a beginning in Russia and large parts of the east. . . . This destructive process is in the meantime still going on. It is necessary that it be stopped.

<sup>4</sup> The German reply of June 29 rejected the Soviet protest (9245/E652716-17).

In this portion of the memorandum there is a direct appeal by the German delegation to the delegates of other Powers for joint efforts to put a stop to conditions which "made a beginning in Russia owing to revolution and internal decay," which amounts to an appeal for war against the USSR.

Moreover, it is clear from the context of this portion that Germany demands that she be given the territory of the Soviet Union for settlement purposes.

Since such demands are in sharp contradiction to the obligations which Germany took upon herself in the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality concluded in Berlin on April 24, 1926,<sup>5</sup> which was based on the conviction that the interests of the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the German people now require constant trustworthy cooperation, and on the consciousness of the need "to strengthen the friendly relations existing between them by means of a special treaty", on instructions of my Government I am submitting to the German Government through you, Herr State Secretary, by order of my Government, an earnest protest against this violation of the treaty relations between our countries which the German side has permitted.

Accept, etc.

L. KHINCHUK

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<sup>5</sup> Text in League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. LIII, p. 387.

## No. 332

3170/676595-96

### *Memorandum by the Director of Department II*

BERLIN, June 23, 1933.

II It. 833.

The Foreign Minister, in a discussion which the State Secretary and I had with him this morning about the further handling of the Four Power Pact, has ordered the following in this regard:

I. Ambassador von Hassell in Rome will shortly present to Mussolini personally a note, the terms of which are identical with the text of the enclosure to dispatch II It. 818 <sup>1</sup> (letter of Consul General Dr. Völckers of June 19, from London, in which the draft of the note intended for Mussolini was forwarded). This draft of the note has so far not been handed to Suvich in London. Instead, the Minister merely read the text to him, but he gave his approval to its wording.<sup>2</sup>

II. On presenting the note in Rome, Herr von Hassell, referring to the *Le Matin* report some time ago and the statement which the French Government thereupon delivered in Rome,<sup>3</sup> is to explain orally in de-

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 323, footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 323.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 321.

tail once more that the unheard of action of the French has compelled us to take a stand.

III. Mussolini is to be asked to convey the contents of our note, in whatever form he may deem suitable, to the other Governments concerned. We shall not of our own accord take any steps in Paris or in London with a view to the publication of the note.

IV. We attach no importance to publication of the note. But we must reserve to ourselves the right to publish the text of our note to Mussolini at some future date in the event that special circumstances make this appear desirable in Germany's interest.

V. Herr von Hassell is to be given an instruction in writing<sup>4</sup> for his conversation with Mussolini.

KÖPKE

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<sup>4</sup> See document No. 337.

## No. 333

6153/E460814-15

### *Vice Chancellor Papen to Counselor Menshausen*

SECRET

BERLIN, June 23, 1933.

II Vat. 251.

DEAR MENSHAUSEN: I made a detailed report yesterday to the Chancellor on the status of the negotiations,<sup>1</sup> whereupon he instructed me to go to Rome at the beginning of next week for conclusion of the negotiations. If agreement is reached on the points which are still at issue he would then authorize me to bring it to a conclusion and initial it. As suggested by Herr von Bergen, I consider it advisable to go there myself, because the formulation of article 31 can be negotiated only personally.

I request that after obtaining the consent of your Minister you send the following telegram to Herr von Bergen:

"The Chancellor in the main approves the content of the agreements. In article 27<sup>2</sup> he wishes the right of nominating the Army Bishop accorded to the German Episcopate and the Reich Government jointly so that in this case the political proviso could be left out. On article 31 the Chancellor still maintains that the clergy are to be forbidden

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<sup>1</sup> A further draft of the concordat (6153/E460725-46) based on the discussions by Kaas in Rome had been studied in the Foreign Ministry and detailed comments had been set forth in a memorandum by Menshausen on June 17 (6153/E460797-809).

<sup>2</sup> Article 27 of the draft concordat dealt with spiritual care in the armed forces and the position and nomination of the Army Bishop and military chaplains. In the draft of the concordat then under consideration (6153/E460725-46), article 27 contained a paragraph which read:

"The direction of spiritual care in the armed forces is the function of the Army Bishop. His nomination shall be made by the Holy See, after the latter has inquired confidentially from the President of the German Reich whether there are objections of a political character to the proposed nomination."

all political activity, hence not only the holding of special offices in political parties. Article 32<sup>3</sup> is to apply only to cultural, religious, and charitable associations but is to contain a guarantee that in sport organizations the observance of religious duties will be allowed. I consider it advisable to negotiate about these questions there myself unless you should wire me that an agreement is impossible. In the event of a satisfactory formulation the Chancellor will authorize me to conclude a settlement. I intend to leave on Monday evening. Please reserve a room at the Eden. Keep my whereabouts as secret as possible. I request you to suggest that the Archbishop of Freiburg<sup>4</sup> be consulted at the Curia.<sup>5</sup> Papen"<sup>6</sup>

With best wishes,

PAPEN

<sup>3</sup> Article 32 of the draft under consideration (6153/E460725-46) read as follows: "Those Catholic organizations which serve predominantly religious and cultural purposes and as such are either directly subordinate to the ecclesiastical authority or in special relations to it, retain their existence, their activity, and their establishments."

<sup>4</sup> Conrad Gröber.

<sup>5</sup> The last sentence was added in pencil. According to a marginal note by Menshausen this was done in accordance with telephonic instructions by Papen.

<sup>6</sup> Papen's message was sent as telegram No. 23 of June 23 (6153/E460816).

## No. 334

9151/E643961-67

### *The Minister in Czechoslovakia to the Foreign Ministry*

A. II. e. Hauer/Heitzer

PRAGUE, June 23, 1933.

II Ts. 769.

Subject: I. Sentencing of the two Reich Germans, Hauer and Heitzer.

II. Prosecution of the National Socialists in the Czechoslovak Republic.

With reference to instruction II Ts. 663 of June 16.<sup>1</sup>

I. On the basis of the opinion already reported (report of June 14, A. II. e. Asch<sup>2</sup>) of the justice authorities here that the NSDAP was to be viewed as a "secret organization" within the meaning of the Law for the Protection of the Czechoslovak Republic, and that accordingly any connection with it is high treason within the meaning of the said law, the second sentencing of Germans took place here yesterday. There are involved seven young people from Cheb, who on May 1 of this year participated in the festivities of the "Day of National Labor" in the Reich German border town of Waldsassen. Two of them, the journeyman-tailor, Max Hauer, and the store clerk, Max Heitzer, are citizens of the German Reich (cf. report of June 10, A. II. e. Asch/Schröder/Hauer/Heitzer-enclosure, case 2<sup>3</sup>).

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (9151/E643981-85).

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 326, footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (9151/E643987-92).

They were sentenced to relatively light prison terms. Nevertheless the two Reich Germans were held in jail for 7 weeks pending trial. There is also the danger that as a result of their involvement in a political trial, they will suffer injury to their livelihood.

A clipping from the *Prager Tagblatt* of June 23 giving a report of the trial, together with reasons for the verdict is enclosed.\*

II. Such and similar legal prosecutions of Reich and Sudeten Germans are also to be expected in the future in unpredictable numbers, whereas the Legation has no effective remedy of any kind available. I am anxious, therefore, to give once more a clear picture of the legal position.

1. The legal basis. The provisions of the Law for the Protection of the Republic of March 19, 1923, which enter primarily into question here are:

#### "Paragraph 2

##### "Preparation of Conspiracies

"Whoever combines with anyone in a plot against the Republic,

"Whoever for this purpose enters into direct or indirect contact with a foreign power or with foreign, and particularly military or financial agents,

"Whoever for this purpose assembles, organizes, or trains armed or auxiliary forces,

"Whoever for the same purpose furnishes or procures arms, ammunition, or other material

"shall be punished for the crime with penal servitude of from 1 to 5 years, and under especially aggravating circumstances, with penal servitude of from 5 to 10 years."

#### "Paragraph 17, section 1

##### "Subversive [*staatsfeindliche*] organizations

"1. Whoever founds a secret organization, the aim of which is to undermine the independence, the constitutional unity, or the democratic-republican form of government of the State,

"Whoever knowing the aim of such an organization, joins it, enters into relations with it, participates in its activities in any manner whatsoever, assists it or its members materially or in any other way whatsoever in their revolutionary endeavors

"shall be punished for the offense with close confinement of from 1 month to 2 years.

"A secret organization is also one which, while in reality pursuing the aim mentioned in paragraph 1, pretends having another aim."

2. The actual basis for action [by the authorities] is section 1 of the program of the National Socialist German Workers' party:

We demand the union of all Germans in a Greater Germany on the basis of the right of self-determination of nations.

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\* Not reprinted.



Section 2 of the principles of this party describes the program as unalterable.

3. The Czechoslovak Courts and government officials now argue as follows:

One of the aims of the National Socialist German Workers' party is the creation of a Greater Germany comprising all Germans. This aim is attainable only by the severance of large areas from Czechoslovakia. Consequently the German National Socialist party is an organization aimed and operating against the integrity of Czechoslovakia. In so far as it continues to pursue this goal silently and unobserved, it is a secret organization.

Whoever, then—be he Reich German or Czechoslovak—lends a helping hand in any way to the Reich German National Socialist Workers' party in the attainment of the aforementioned goal, is a criminal, in accordance with paragraph 2 of the Law for the Protection of the Republic, and any one who, without promoting this special aim, by his own action

joins the party,

enters "into relations" with it (!)

participates in its other activities in any manner whatsoever,

assists it or its members . . . materially, or otherwise,

is punishable in accordance with Paragraph 17.

4. It is clearly apparent from what has been said, at any rate, that in view of the elasticity of this law and this kind of reasoning, every Reich German coming into the country who is a member of the National Socialist party, every Reich German living in the country who has relations with the party, with Reich German party members, with Reich German officials, or with bodies and organizations which are *gleichgeschaltet*, every *Sudeten* German who enters into relations with a Reich German who, for his part, has relations with the party or with *gleichgeschaltet* organizations is constantly running the risk of imprisonment and is in serious danger of losing his freedom. It is significant that all such cases are treated as jail cases. It is impossible to obtain one's release from imprisonment pending trial in less than 4 weeks, no matter how the case turns out. When the proceedings end, Reich Germans, moreover, have to expect expulsion from the country; that is, in numerous cases, economic ruin.

5. The motive of the Czechs in their malicious and also at times actually childish prosecutions is fear, which is the strongest motive force of this people anyway. It is not a fear that the German regions of Czechoslovakia might be severed. In that event they could rely on the help of their numerous friends, that is, all the enemies of Germany. Nor is it a fear that the *Sudeten* Germans might become too powerful because of the Nationalist Socialist movement in the country. That is, indeed, the tragic thing about this movement in Czechoslovakia,

that it is not a movement within the entire population, but only within the German minority. But it is the fear, indeed, that the National Socialists might one day (completely ignorant of the fact that all Fascism is the inexorable foe of the minorities) help the Czech fascists into the saddle.

6. Perhaps the Czechs would gradually calm down with respect to paragraph 2 of the National Socialist party program as being not an immediate practical supreme goal. But they are constantly being prevented from doing so by speeches that are constantly broadcast from Germany, whether on the radio or in the press. All such utterances that claim Germans abroad for the Reich certainly and with good reason meet with enthusiastic applause from all pro-Germans. But for the Germans in Czechoslovakia they are actually a disaster. A sentence such as Bavarian Minister of the Interior Wagner, according to newspaper reports, is supposed to have spoken a few days ago, "The new Germany shall include all German regions as far as the German tongue is heard" fills the Czech prisons with innocent people.

If, accordingly, the utmost caution and restraint on the part of Reich Germans are desirable, such a recommendation applies no less to the Sudeten Germans, particularly the students. In this respect we are doing what we can, but we are only partly heeded. People often won't listen to reason. A young lawyer recently said to me: "It is actually a disgrace for a National Socialist still to be walking around at large."

So far so good; *volenti non fit injuria*. But the bad thing comes later: As soon as one of these people is in jail, he, his family, and his friends, beseech the Legation demanding categorically that they beat the drums to get him out again as speedily as possible, and he is generous with expressions of indignation if they do not succeed. Every day we have the most unpleasant arguments on the subject at the Legation. I need not explain to the Foreign Ministry that in reality the Legation has no effective remedy at all in such cases. It can intervene, protest, request information, present legal arguments, which never come to the attention of the Court, and can request that matters be speeded up. In view of the ineffectiveness of all these means, we are trying, however, to help mostly in still another way, namely, by supplying those under arrest with a competent lawyer and providing the latter with the necessary instructions.

7. Purpose of these statements is twofold:

On the one hand, to request that efforts be made in the direction of the greatest moderation in speech and in writings in Germany, so far as the ultimate goal of Greater Germany is concerned. If the prosecutions by the Czechs of National Socialism should increase in severity, life for the Germans in this country will become a hell.

And then, to request that when thoughtless criticism of "inactivity" is being expressed in the Reich to leading officials or in public, that the Legation be vigorously defended.<sup>5</sup>

DR. KOCH

<sup>5</sup> In reply to this report and to some earlier reports from Prague on the same subject, the following instruction (II Ts. 730) was sent to the Legation by Köpke on July 4:

"Please inform the Czechoslovak Government of the text of the communiqué on the Pilsen verdict circulated by WTB and point out, in a manner that seems appropriate to you, the consequences for all Germans which are bound to result from the verdict. In doing so, please express the expectation that this miscarriage of justice will remain an isolated case, since otherwise grave consequences will arise with respect to Czechoslovak citizens living in Germany, in as much as they are members, for example, of the Sokol associations, the Society of Lusatian Wends, or of other associations with political purposes." (9151/E644005-06)

The text of the WTB communiqué referred to in the instruction, its timing, and also the timing of the instruction itself were agreed upon between the Foreign Ministry, the Legation in Prague, and the Reich Chancellery. The communiqué was published on July 8 (9151/E644002-010).

## No. 335

3598/792987;  
3598/792989-97

*Extract From the Minutes of the Conference of Ministers, Held at the Reich Chancellery, Following the Cabinet Session on June 23, 1933, 4:15 p. m.<sup>1</sup>*

Rk. 8451;  
8452.

### *Present:*

Reich Chancellor  
Vice Chancellor  
Foreign Minister  
Reich Minister of Interior  
Reich Minister of Finance  
Reich Minister of Economics,  
Food and Agriculture  
Reich Minister of Labor  
Reich Minister of Justice  
Reichswehr Minister  
Reich Minister of Posts and  
Transport  
Reich Minister of Public En-  
lightenment and Propaganda  
Reich Minister for Air and  
Prussian Minister President  
Prussian Finance Minister

Hitler  
von Papen  
Freiherr von Neurath  
Dr. Frick  
Count Schwerin von Krosigk  
  
Dr. Hugenberg  
Seldte  
Dr. Gürtner  
von Blomberg  
  
Freiherr von Eltz-Rübenach  
  
Dr. Goebbels  
  
Göring  
Dr. Popitz

<sup>1</sup> The remainder of the record is not printed (3598/792997-3008).

President of the Reichsbank  
 State Secretary in the Reich  
 Chancellery  
 State Secretary in the Office  
 of the Reich President  
 Reich Press Chief:  
 Recording Officials:

Dr. Schacht  
 Dr. Lammers  
 Dr. Meissner  
 State Secretary Funk  
 Ministerialrat Dr. Willuhn  
 Ministerialrat Wienstein  
 Ministerialrat Dr. Killy and  
 Regierungsrat Dr. Hoffmann

*Also present:*

From the Reich Ministry of  
 Finance  
 From the Reich Ministry of  
 Economics  
 From the Reich Ministry of  
 Transport  
 From the Reich Ministry for  
 Food and Agriculture  
 From the Prussian Ministry of  
 Interior

Ministerialrat Dr. Fischbach  
 Ministerialdirektor Dr.  
 Reichardt

State Secretary Koenigs

State Secretary von Rohr

State Secretary Dr. Grauert

1a) Political situation

The Foreign Minister:

After the solemn opening of the World Economic Conference it quickly became evident that great differences existed. The substantive conditions for successful work by the conference (debt settlement and currency stabilization) were still far off. Currency stabilization was made quite impossible by the intervention of the American President. At present subcommissions were at work, the duration of whose labor it was still impossible to foresee.

Pessimistic as were the expectations with which the delegation went to London, they were outdistanced by far. Germany found among all the states an attitude that could hardly be worse.<sup>2</sup> Given this political situation, German successes cannot be expected in the near future in other fields either (e. g., rearmament). Germany must therefore be patient and careful so that ill-considered actions may be avoided as far as possible. The bad general feeling against Germany at the Conference is indicated by the arrogant statement of

<sup>2</sup> For an account of the sentiment regarding Germany prevailing at the World Economic Conference, given in a letter from Neurath to Reich President Hindenburg of June 19, 1933, see *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. XL, document Neurath-11, pp. 465-468.

M. Litvinov<sup>3</sup> and the insolently worded Russian note, delivered yesterday,<sup>4</sup> on Hugenberg's memorandum, which Litvinov had not even read.

The President of the Reichsbank confirmed the statements of the Foreign Minister. It was difficult to make the world understand what had happened in Germany. It was therefore necessary to avoid anything which could make the existing impression worse.

The President of the Reichsbank had encountered no difficulties in his negotiations with the creditors. On the contrary, they showed an understanding for the German position and exceptional confidence in the Reichsbank. Agreements had been reached very quickly with the short-term creditors. (No amortization payments, reduction of interest.)

With the long-term creditors the negotiations had been more difficult. Yielding to the general demands, he had consented to the preferential treatment of the Dawes loan with respect to interest and amortization, as he had already intimated in the Cabinet session of June 8, 1933.<sup>5</sup> In the case of the Young loan three countries had declared themselves for and three against a preferential treatment of the Young loan. He had accordingly promised preferential treatment for the payment of interest but, in agreement with the creditors, had rejected special treatment for capital payments. The Bank for International Settlements, too, as trustee of the Young loan had declared in writing that it had no objection to the failure to make capital payments in the case of the Young loan. Consent regarding interest would, however, be made conditional on the creditors' not raising any more difficulties in connection with the capital payments.

For the negotiations still to be conducted with the creditors two basic ideas had been brought out:

1. As far as possible part of the interest, about 3 percent, was to be paid in order to prevent retaliatory measures.

2. The rest of the interest was to be withheld and these funds would then be used for the promotion of exports. This was necessary because the export industry had found the market competitive as a result of the devaluation of the dollar and the pound. In addition to promoting exports, however, it would be possible to cover the needs of agriculture, presumably in their entirety, from the *Konversionskasse*.<sup>6</sup>

The Minister of Economics felt that his anxieties concerning the satisfaction of the needs of agriculture from the *Konversionskasse* had been dispelled by the statement of the President of the Reichsbank. He considered it necessary, however, that separate negotia-

<sup>3</sup> The text of Litvinov's statement is in Degras, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, 1933-1941*, vol. III, pp. 21-22.

<sup>4</sup> The enclosure to document No. 331.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 296.

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 211.

tions be inaugurated as soon as possible with the individual countries with which Germany had an active trade balance.

The Minister of Economics agreed with the statements of the Foreign Minister and of the President of the Reichsbank on the German prospects in London. The originally favorable appraisal of the national revolution had been completely overshadowed in England by the persecutions of the Jews and the occurrences in Austria. He called attention to the dangers which came especially from English and American quarters and aimed at import prohibitions and attacks on the monopolies. For this reason he had considered it his duty to publish his memorandum on economic questions, which had in no way contributed toward aggravating the feeling against Germany.

In this connection the Minister of Economics brought up two complaints:

1. The report had appeared in the English press originally, and had been taken over by the rest of the press, that there had been no agreement on his memorandum in the delegation and that it was a private work of the Minister of Economics. This idea had obviously reached the public through some indiscretion.

2. The interview denying this idea given on the day of his departure from London to a representative of the Telegraphen-Union (T. U.) had been prohibited for the German press or in any case had not been transmitted. This had made it possible for the impression to arise in Germany that he had acted on his own initiative. This was not correct, however, since he had first explained his view to all the members of the German delegation and no objection to it had been raised. The delivery of the memorandum had been necessary because, in accordance with a decision suddenly taken by the Economic Committee of the World Economic Conference, no more speeches were to be given, memoranda being requested instead. He had been sure of the approval of the delegation, especially since he had first reached an understanding about his memorandum with the head of the delegation, Foreign Minister Freiherr von Neurath. And objections to his memorandum had been raised only shortly before his departure and especially since his departure. He had considered it his duty to issue a denial in the matter. In his opinion a denial would have had to be issued even if there had been disagreements in the delegation, which he denied. He therefore considered his memorandum fully justified, formally and substantively, and could therefore not understand why the publication of this denial in the German press had been prohibited.

The Foreign Minister regretted that these things had been brought up in the Cabinet. He therefore preferred not to make any further statements. The transmittal of the denial given to the T. U. had obviously been blocked by a member of the Press Department by mistake. He felt obliged to point out, however, that the memorandum of the Minister of Economics had not further aggravated the general ill-will prevailing against Germany.

The Chancellor agreed with the Foreign Minister that the Cabinet must confine itself to the political and financial situation of the World Economic Conference. What was past and had already happened was no longer of any interest. It was agreed, however, that the head of the delegation alone was responsible and that he remained responsible and alone was to decide about the nature of further participation in the London Conference.

The Minister of Economics pointed out that in his opinion he had an obligation to bring up these occurrences. It was intolerable that a memorandum of the Minister of Economics as a member of the delegation should be considered a purely private study and be treated as such by the press.

In the negotiations in London he had become convinced that Ministerialdirektor Dr. Posse, who had been sent in his behalf to the negotiations, did not sufficiently advocate the economic views which he, the Minister of Economics, held, and that Ministerialdirektor Dr. Posse had not fulfilled the expectation placed in him. He therefore proposed to the Cabinet 1) that Ministerialdirektor Dr. Posse be temporarily retired and 2) that Consul General Dr. von Hentig, employed in the Foreign Ministry,<sup>7</sup> be appointed as member of the delegation.

The Foreign Minister brought up the objection that Dr. von Hentig surely could not be assumed to have the qualifications as an economic expert that Ministerialdirektor Posse undoubtedly had as a result of his years of conference experience. Nor was there any evidence that Ministerialdirektor Dr. Posse had advocated other views than his minister.

He did not consider it necessary at present to be represented at the conference by Reich Ministers, since subcommissions were now working, on which Reich Ministers did not have to be present. He also considered it inadvisable to have individual negotiations with countries in the limelight of this conference, because all discussions would be torpedoed immediately in the initial stage. Other places therefore must be provided for negotiations.

The Minister of Economics was of the opinion that he must return to London if he thought it necessary from the point of view of his field of work.

The Chancellor pointed out on the other hand that the Foreign Minister alone, as head of the delegation, made the decision as to the periods during which the delegation members concerned should participate and be present in London.

State Secretary Dr. Lammers pointed out that the consent of the Cabinet was not required for temporarily retiring Ministerialdirektor

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<sup>7</sup> Georg Werner Otto von Hentig was in the Foreign Ministry awaiting assignment.

Dr. Posse. All that was required was a communication from the departmental minister to the Reich President for the purpose of obtaining his consent.

The Minister of Economics requested the consent of the Cabinet to the appointment of Consul General Dr. von Hentig.

The Vice Chancellor, the Foreign Minister, the Minister of Finance, and the President of the Reichsbank pointed out that there would be serious objections to recalling Ministerialdirektor Dr. Posse, who was known internationally as an expert. They considered it undesirable and politically intolerable to make such a conspicuous change in the German delegation during the negotiations in London.

The Chancellor shared the view that it was not possible during the negotiations in London to recall a delegation member of such note and standing as Ministerialdirektor Dr. Posse. A recall of Ministerialdirektor Dr. Posse would have exactly the opposite effect of that aimed at. Ministerialdirektor Dr. Posse would also, as a result of it, be regarded as the responsible author of the memorandum of the Minister of Economics. He believed that Ministerialdirektor Dr. Posse would follow loyally if he received precise directions. Later, the Minister of Economics would be free to use his authority to place him in temporary retirement.

The Minister of Interior believed that a Cabinet decision was no longer necessary after the statements by the Chancellor. Nor did it come into consideration under the regulations.

The Minister of Labor was of the opinion that the recall of a delegation member during the negotiations was out of the question and that the same procedure had to be followed in London as in Geneva. There, too, a delegation member had been shielded [*gedeckt*] although he had advocated a different view from that held by the competent departmental minister.

No decision was taken.

For the minutes, point 1:  
HOFFMANN

### No. 336

9245/E652713-15

*The Reich Minister of Economics to the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, June 24, 1933.  
W 4296.

DEAR HERR VON NEURATH: I acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your esteemed letter of June 23.<sup>1</sup> In the first place the memorandum

<sup>1</sup> The letter, which was given by Neurath to Hugenberg at the time of the Conference of Ministers on June 23 (9245/E652671-73), referred to the Soviet protests against Hugenberg's statement at the London Economic Conference, ex-



delivered in the name of the German delegation<sup>2</sup> contains the following paragraph:

"From Germany's point of view it would be possible with wise and peaceable cooperation between creditor and debtor countries to take two impartial steps by which Germany could again be made internationally solvent. One of these steps would be to give Germany a colonial empire again in Africa, out from which she would build all over this new continent large works and installations that would otherwise not be constructed. The second step would be to open up to the "nation without space" [*Volk ohne Raum*"] areas in which it could provide space for the settlement of its vigorous race and construct great works of peace."

There follow two sentences dealing with the point that the *loss of power of consumption* in widening areas, not overproduction and the spread of mechanized operations, is the real characteristic of the world economic crisis. It is then stated further:

"War, revolution, and internal decay made a beginning in Russia and large parts of the east. This development, instead of being met with healing counteraction, has gradually been intensified to an extreme point by artificial impoverishment of the civilized countries of the world having the greatest power of consumption. This destructive process is in the meantime still going on. It is necessary that it be stopped."

There was not, nor is there, any occasion either for M. Litvinov, who significantly said himself in his interview<sup>3</sup> that he had *not read* the memorandum, or for the Russian Government to object to any phrase or any word in these statements. I do not think there is any reason why I should give any explanations, because the text quoted above is so clear that any addition is superfluous.

Since the Russians apparently want to establish an ideological connection between my words and the statements which Herr Rosenberg allegedly made in London<sup>4</sup> and also elsewhere recently, I consider it important to point out that I know these statements only from hearsay and that they do not correspond to my views. The content of my words gives no occasion for connecting them up with Rosenberg's statements.

If, dear Herr von Neurath, you should plan to use the content of this letter in any quarter, I should like to request that this be done only by reproducing it in full.

Yours, etc.

HUGENBERG

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Footnote (1)—Continued

plained the line which had been adopted in answering these protests, and requested that Hugenberg supply a statement concerning his position on the Soviet complaints, since a written reply to the Soviet Ambassador's note of June 22 (enclosure to document No. 331) was still necessary.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 312.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 335, footnote 3.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 237.

## No. 337

8170/676603-08

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy*

BERLIN, June 26, 1933.

II It. 833.

At the earliest opportunity please present a note with the following text to the Chief of the Italian Government in person.

"Through the Blue Book published by the French press on the Pact of Understanding and Cooperation, initialed on June 7, the German Government has learned of an exchange of notes between the French Government on the one hand and the Rumanian, Czechoslovakian, and Yugoslavian Governments on the other, as well as of a declaration by the French Government transmitted to the Polish Government. The exchange of notes and the declaration contain identical statements on the interpretation of the initialed Treaty and of article 19 of the League of Nations Covenant. Moreover it is stated there that the French Government would in no case agree to certain proposals which might be made on the basis of the Treaty with respect to the procedure provided for in article 19.

Germany regrets that the French Government has seen fit to enter into agreements in this way with third states about the interpretation and application of the Treaty. In the view of the German Government, such action is not of a kind to promote the objective aimed at with the Treaty, which can be achieved only if the four Governments are really resolved to treat all questions relating to the Treaty in the spirit of sincere cooperation based on mutual confidence. In any case, the German Government feels constrained to declare that questions concerning the interpretation and application of the Treaty cannot be settled unilaterally by any one of the four Governments concerned, but only by these Governments jointly."

In this matter I want you to make, orally, statements approximately to the following effect:

When the intention of the French Government to commit itself, with respect to the states of the Little Entente, to a definite interpretation and application of the Four Power Pact became known as a result of a report in *Le Matin* of May 28, you immediately, under instructions from your Government,<sup>1</sup> pointed out to the Italian Government the grave objection which we must raise against such action on the part of the French and requested that this matter be clarified. You were then orally informed<sup>2</sup> by the responsible Italian Government office on May 30 that the French Ambassador acting upon authorization from his Government had made the solemn declaration that the *Le Matin* report was false and that France would merely assure the Little Entente that she would insist on the requirement of unanimity in the League of Nations in questions of territorial revision.

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 272.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 272, footnote 3.

On the basis of this statement the German Government refrained from taking any further steps and decided to initial the Pact.

Thereafter the German Government took cognizance with very great satisfaction of the statement made by the Chief of the Italian Government in the Senate<sup>3</sup> immediately prior to the initialing of the Pact, which referred to the significance of the Pact and its implications for the problems relating to a revision of the Treaty of Versailles.

All the greater therefore was our surprise and amazement when we received information through the French Blue Book of the exchange of notes between the French Government and the Governments of the states of the Little Entente as well as of the statement of the French Government addressed to the Polish Government. The commitments, with respect to French policy, entered into in binding form in these texts not only included nearly everything that had been indicated in the *Le Matin* report at the time, but even went beyond it on some points. They were in any case in complete contradiction with the statement by the French Ambassador in Rome communicated to us on May 30.

In these circumstances it is impossible for the German Government to accept this unparalleled action of the French Government in silence. Rather, we are compelled to assert explicitly that questions relating to the interpretation and application of the Four Power Pact cannot be settled unilaterally by any one of the four Governments concerned, but only by these Governments jointly. Should we fail to do so now, it might be justly argued against us later that by our signature of the Pact, which had been done in awareness of the commitments entered into by France with respect to the Little Entente and Poland, and which were tacitly accepted by us, we had acquiesced in the interpretation and application of the Pact implied therein.

Conscious of the great political importance which we, too, attach to the conclusion of the Four Power Pact, and in the desire to avoid as far as possible anything that might unnecessarily imperil the Pact, we have chosen to give our protest the form of a note to the Italian Government and phrased this note in a way which, we are convinced, cannot be objected to from any quarter, least of all by France.

We do not intend to publish this note, but we must reserve to ourselves the right of publishing it in the event that subsequent developments should at some date compel us to do so.

We would like to ask Mussolini to apprise the French and British Governments of the note in any form that may appear suitable to him. If he accepts this task we will ourselves take no steps with respect to this in Paris or London.

In disposing of the matter in this fashion we have acted on the assumption that no reply to our note will be forthcoming from any quarter. In the event that a reply should be made, nevertheless, we must of course reserve to ourselves full freedom of action in the future handling of the matter.<sup>4</sup>

FREIHERR VON NEURATH

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 295.

<sup>4</sup> Marginal note: "Sent by special messenger to Herr von Hassell personally at the hospice on Gendarmenmarkt. S[iegfried], June 26, 5:30 p. m." According to telegram No. 178 of June 26, Neurath to Rome (6058/E447257), Hassell intended to return to his post from Berlin on June 28.

## No. 338

3598/7931-49

*Extract From the Minutes of the Conference of Ministers and  
Cabinet Session on June 27, 1933, 5:30 p. m.<sup>1</sup>*

Rk. 8521;  
8522.

*Present:*

Reich Chancellor  
Foreign Minister  
Reich Minister of Interior  
Reich Minister of Finance  
Reich Minister of Labor  
Reich Minister of Justice  
Reichswehr Minister  
Reich Minister of Posts and  
Transport  
Reich Minister of Public En-  
lightenment and Propaganda  
Reich Minister for Air and  
Prussian Minister President  
Prussian Minister of Finance  
State Secretary in the Reich  
Chancellery  
State Secretary in the Office  
of the Reich President  
Reich Press Chief:  
Recording Officials:

Hitler  
Freiherr von Neurath  
Dr. Frick  
Count Schwerin von Krosigk  
Seldte  
Dr. Gürtner  
von Blomberg

Freiherr von Eltz-Rübenach

Dr. Goebbels

Göring  
Dr. Popitz

Dr. Lammers

Dr. Meissner  
State Secretary Funk  
Ministerialrat Wienstein  
Ministerialrat Dr. Willuhn  
Ministerialrat Dr. Killy

*Also:*

From Reich Ministry of  
Economics

Reich Ministry of Labor  
Reich Ministry for Air  
Reich Chancellery

Office of the Vice Chancellor

Ministerialdirektor  
Dr. Reichardt  
State Secretary Dr. Krohn  
State Secretary Milch  
Oberregierungsrat Dr. Thomsen  
Regierungsrat Dr. Hoffmann  
Oberregierungsrat Sabath

<sup>1</sup>The remainder of the record is not printed (3598/793149-51).

## 1. Subject of Discussion: The Political Situation.

The Reich Chancellor stated that Reich Minister Dr. Hugenberg had called on him today and informed him of his intention of resigning from his posts.

He, the Reich Chancellor, had asked Reich Minister Dr. Hugenberg to think this matter over carefully. At the same time he had told Reich Minister Dr. Hugenberg that if he should remain in his posts, he, the Reich Chancellor, thought that it would be essential to appoint members of the National Socialist party as State Secretaries in all or at least some of the departments directed by him.

Reich Minister Dr. Hugenberg had replied that he would in any case abide by his intention to resign because he had received a vote of non-confidence for his stand in London, and furthermore because he had not obtained concurrence for his plan to propose to the Reich President the temporary retirement of Ministerialdirektor Dr. Posse. Reich Minister Dr. Hugenberg would discuss the whole issue with his party associates today.

Personally he, the Reich Chancellor, regretted the step that was contemplated by Reich Minister Dr. Hugenberg. Yet he felt that conflicts between the National Socialists and the German National People's party could not be avoided in the long run because of the organization of the new formations by the German National People's party, e. g., the Combat Staff [*Kampfstaffel*], etc. He thought it would be for the best if the German National People's party were to go out of existence.

State Secretary Dr. Meissner reported that Reich Minister Dr. Hugenberg had told him that he, Reich Minister Dr. Hugenberg, thought that self-liquidation of the German National People's party would be the best thing. But even if the party should not go through with self-liquidation, Reich Minister Dr. Hugenberg had explicitly stated that he would not go into opposition to the Reich Government because the German National People's party had nothing in common spiritually with the opponents of the Government.

Apart from this, Reich Minister Dr. Hugenberg had also said that he still believed it would be useful to concentrate in one hand all departments having to do with economic affairs.

The Reich Chancellor stated that he had not asked for Reich Minister Dr. Hugenberg's resignation from the Economics post.

In accordance with the Reich Chancellor's desire, a Conference of Ministers for a further discussion of the political situation was set for Friday, June 30, 11 a. m.<sup>2</sup>

For the minutes:  
WIENSTEIN, June 29

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<sup>2</sup> The Conference of Ministers of Friday, June 30, was held at 6:00 p. m. (3598/-793192-94).

## No. 339

5892/E432448-49

*The Military Attaché in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

No. 149/33

Moscow, June 28, 1933.

Received June 30.

II F 2002.

With respect to military policy, the relations of army to army, which were formerly excellent and then deteriorated more and more, have unfortunately proceeded further toward dissolution. In a communication of June 26, the Russians have logically but in an unpleasantly noticeable way released themselves still more plainly from the previous form of joint military cooperation. The details are contained in a memorandum which was submitted to the Ambassador,<sup>2</sup> and, in view of the fuller treatment of secret military matters, which is indispensable, it will be submitted directly to the Reichswehr Ministry with the request that the Foreign Ministry be informed.

Although heretofore the close and tested collaboration between the Reichswehr and the Red Army has been, so to speak, the bridge which in recent years has easily brought the two parties together, even in times of tension, and although this bridge seemed to have withstood even the last test of the national revolutionary turnover in Germany, this bridge seems now to have to a certain extent been closed "because it was unsafe for general traffic" and only occasionally are individuals still permitted access to it.

This measure of the Russians is certainly no expression of consciousness of strength, but it is surely also not mere bluff. Soberly and unemotionally as we may take this, because one can naturally not ask the Soviet Union to pursue a policy other than her own, one may not set aside one's own interests or purchase them too dearly for the sake of Soviet friendship, which has declined in its military-political value. The question therefore arises—in my opinion, still without urgency—whether to allow the former military friendship to undergo a further cooling or whether, subject to definite alternatives, to effect a clarification.

HARTMANN

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<sup>1</sup> This report was also addressed to the Reichswehr Ministry for the attention of the head of the Troop Office.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

## No. 340

8080/E579527

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, June 30, 1933.

RM 904.

The Italian Ambassador, who has just returned from Rome, called on me this morning and informed me that Mussolini hoped shortly to effect the signing of the Four Power Pact. He would welcome it if this signing were done by the Foreign Ministers of the four Powers. Mussolini hoped that then in a few months the four Chiefs of Government would meet in order on this occasion to discuss the disarmament question. The Disarmament Conference was now, indeed, definitely finished. If our concrete wishes with respect to disarmament became known at the meeting of the four Chiefs of Government, he thought that it would be possible to find a satisfactory solution.

I replied to Signor Cerruti that we had thought of having the signing of the Four Power Pact, which was now only a formality, done by our Ambassador. If, however, Signor Mussolini was anxious for the Foreign Ministers to do the signing, and if the Foreign Ministers of England and France were likewise ready for it, I, too, would make an appearance. As far as the meeting of the four Chiefs of Government was then concerned, it would have to be thoroughly prepared in advance. I thought that first of all consultation between Italy and us about the topics to be discussed at the meeting would be useful. Signor Cerruti said this was also entirely the intention of Mussolini.<sup>1</sup>

NEURATH

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<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "The Reich Chancellor has been informed. L[ammers], July 4."

## No. 341

6153/E460818

*The Ambassador to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

No. 36 of June 29

ROME, June 30, 1933—10:45 a. m.

Received June 30—1:35 p. m.

II Vat. 256.

For the Foreign Minister.

I accompanied the Vice Chancellor this evening to the first conversation with Pacelli in which the general situation in Germany and

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<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Has been submitted to the Reich Chancellor. V[ölkers], June 31."

the attacks of the foreign press, especially on account of the arrests of Catholic priests, were discussed. It is obvious that enemy powers are using all their influence in order to dissuade the Vatican from concluding a treaty with Germany. The Vice Chancellor gave a vivid picture of the development and reasons why National Socialism is being attacked today by all the world. He urged the Cardinal Secretary of State to contribute to the general pacification by quick conclusion of the concordat. The talks will be continued tomorrow. The Secretary of State is very much stirred up about the repeated opening of official diplomatic letters to him and the Pope by the currency control officials. The Vice Chancellor requests that steps be urgently taken to stop this.<sup>2</sup>

BERGEN

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<sup>2</sup> Neurath recorded on July 1 that Papen had telephoned from Rome the previous evening and informed him that the negotiations were making good progress (RM 917:3241/702253). On July 2 at 4:00 p. m. Papen wired that the final conference with Pacelli had just taken place and the Pope had approved the text of the concordat. Arrangements had been made to send the text to Hitler by courier plane, and it was hoped that he would authorize Papen to initial the concordat on Tuesday, July 4 (telegram No. 37:3241/702254). See document No. 347.

## No. 342

6616/E499524-26

### *Memorandum by the Director of Department IV*

BERLIN, June 30, 1933.

About a month and a half ago, on the occasion of the visit of Polish delegates to Moscow, reports were being heard to the effect that the Soviet Government was seeking *bilateral* agreements with Poland and her western neighbor states, in which the definition of the aggressor was to be incorporated, in accordance with Litvinov's Geneva proposal.<sup>1</sup> In reply to an inquiry which we caused Herr von Dirksen to make in Moscow,<sup>2</sup> M. Stomoniakov replied on May 14 that no negotiations of any kind were pending between Poland and the Soviet Union. Only an agreement on rafting was being discussed. Herr von Dirksen also reported on his own initiative that—as he had learned—the negotiations mentioned had indeed taken place, but they had been broken off because Poland had made her consent to the Soviet proposal contingent upon the simultaneous conclusion of such an agreement with Rumania.

Herr von Dirksen has now reported that Litvinov had offered the Baltic States, Poland, the Little Entente, Persia, Turkey, and Afghanistan, that is, all the neighbors of the Soviet Union, with the

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 29 and footnote 4.

<sup>2</sup> This inquiry was made in Meyer's telegram No. 109 of May 9 (6189/E465047) and Dirksen's reply was Moscow telegram No. 102 of May 14 (6189/E465049).



exception of Japan and China, a *multilateral* nonaggression pact, on the basis of Litvinov's definition of the aggressor. It is said that this proposal has already been accepted in principle and that the negotiations are about to be concluded. Allegedly only the authorizations for the London representatives of the Governments to whom it has been proposed are still lacking (enclosure, telegram No. 146 of June 29, 1933<sup>3</sup>).

The Soviet Government has not told either the German Ambassador in Moscow or the gentlemen in London or the Foreign Ministry anything about these negotiations. The negotiations again prove the extraordinary need of the Russians for safeguarding their borders to the west and south. The fact of the conclusion of a multilateral agreement represents a departure from the practice of the Soviet Government in the former nonaggression pact negotiations. To be sure, in the past a collective agreement, namely, the Litvinov Protocol, was already negotiated between the Soviet Union and her neighbor

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (6616/E499520). A retrospective Foreign Ministry memorandum of Aug. 7 (6616/E499794-98) summarized the negotiations referred to above as follows: "On the occasion of the World Economic Conference a regional convention concerning a definition of the aggressor was concluded by People's Commissar Litvinov in London on July 3 with the states adjacent to the Soviet Union: Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Rumania, Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan. The definition of the aggressor is that which Litvinov submitted to the Disarmament Conference and which was incorporated by the Security Committee with some modifications in the so-called Politis Report of May 24. After hesitating at first (misgivings about Poland, election for the Finnish Diet in progress) Finland later adhered to the convention through a special protocol. The regional convention has therefore been concluded by all the states adjacent to the Soviet Union with the exception of China and Japan.

"In London the Soviet Union, the states of the Little Entente, and Turkey, moreover, signed a convention which is identical with the regional convention but contains an addition making it open for accession to all states.

"The Lithuanian Government was unwilling either to sign the regional convention together with Poland or to sign the convention open to all states; on the other hand it could not remain aloof from the efforts of Litvinov. In the special convention which Lithuania thereupon concluded no reference is made to the Politis Report, however, because this report contains a definition of territory which the Lithuanian Government did not wish to be bound by, on account of Vilna. A number of more far-reaching special wishes of Lithuania were rejected by Litvinov.

"That no uniform convention was signed in London between the Soviet Union and the other states concerned is to be explained by the conflicting interests of the signatories. Apparently the Soviet Government at first wanted to conclude a convention on the definition of the aggressor only with Poland and the Baltic States. Only later did Poland urge the inclusion of Rumania, and France the inclusion of the states of the Little Entente. Certain conflicts of interest of the states concerned then appeared and made it necessary for the Soviet Government to conclude separate conventions in order to achieve the political aim it had in mind. This aim corresponds to the Soviet Government's previous policy, which is directed toward ensuring peace and normalizing relations with the neighboring states. In view of the domestic difficulties of the Soviet Union a success in foreign policy—which also lends itself so well to propaganda purposes—could not but be welcome."

For the text of the convention concluded at London on July 3, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cXLVII, p. 67.

states to the west,<sup>4</sup> whereby the Kellogg Pact was prematurely put into force between the said States. The contemplated agreement also represents an innovation in so far as, whether individually or collectively, the states of the Little Entente are included in it. It might confirm the trends which had already been noted in the past weeks that the Little Entente is prepared to resume relations with the Soviet Union, and that the path is being prepared for a settlement between Rumania and Soviet Russia, as well as between Yugoslavia and Soviet Russia.

For the definition of the aggressor to be incorporated in this form in an international security pact has thus far not been customary. At Geneva, as is well known, we opposed a formal definition of the aggressor because there were involved at Geneva the conditions for *assistance mutuelle* and because, through prior acceptance of a definition, the states would assume obligations, the practical import of which could not be anticipated. This point of view might play no role in the case of the new nonaggression pact, because there is no talk in the new pact of mutual assistance.

I take the liberty of proposing that the Soviet Ambassador be approached in the matter and astonishment be expressed that the Soviet Government has in no way informed us of its intentions.<sup>5</sup>

MEYER

<sup>4</sup> The text of the protocol signed at Moscow, Feb. 9, 1929, between Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Rumania, and USSR is printed in League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. LXXXIX, p. 369.

<sup>5</sup> No documents concerning such an approach have been found.

## No. 343

6058/E447283-85

### *The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

#### Telegram

No. 157 of June 30

ROME, June 30, 1933—11:00 p. m.

Received July 1—1:30 a. m.

II It. 873.

I personally carried out today with Mussolini the instruction contained in instruction No. RM II It. 833 of June 26,<sup>1</sup> by delivering the note and supplying oral amplifications. Mussolini noted the contents of the note, characterized it as mild, and promised that he would adjust his action to it.<sup>2</sup>

I took this occasion to convey the greetings of the Chancellor and of the Foreign Minister, and affirmed explicitly in conformity with the instruction given me by the Chancellor that the German Government has no plans about an Austrian Anschluss and that every care

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 337.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 358.

would be exercised on Germany's part to prevent the Austrian question from straining or obstructing the German-Italian relationship in any way. Mussolini replied that he was very grateful for this statement, to which he attached great value. Moreover, such a statement was very much in their mutual interest because the French game was quite obviously designed to make Austria the apple of contention between Italy and Germany, while the Little Entente was trying at the same time to draw Austria into its orbit. I replied that it was a widespread impression in German circles that there was a desire among certain elements to reorganize the Danube Basin without German participation. Rumors of a plan to unite Austria and Hungary<sup>a</sup> had given this impression new support and what were we to think of it. Mussolini replied that no consideration should be given to such rumors, for such a plan had no real substance, and Italy had always been opposed to any Hapsburg restoration. On my remark that an Austro-Hungarian union was conceivable even without the Hapsburgs, he observed that the political and economic relations between Austria and Hungary and also those with Italy fully answered every need and that it would be hard to see what else could possibly be accomplished in that respect. I asked whether this meant then that he continued to adhere to his purpose of reaching an understanding with Germany on economic policy in the southeast; he assented vigorously, adding that already some time ago he had outlined to me some practical ideas on the subject. I replied that in that case it would be possible to discuss this and other questions of common interest sometime soon, the best time probably being after the signing of the Pact. Mussolini concurred, suggesting that signature of the Pact could be effected in a simple procedure by the Ambassadors in Rome as soon as the French Parliament had been sent on vacation, following which the first conference of the four Powers ought to be held at once, preferably between the Minister Presidents, perhaps somewhere in northern Italy. This would be all the more urgent because it was apparent that both the London and the Disarmament Conferences were ending with negative results. He considers the Pact as fully effective as soon as signed, ratification being a mere formality, and it would therefore be possible to hold four power talks at once and attack the two foremost issues, disarmament and the world economy. These talks could be followed by two power negotiations on questions concerning these Powers, especially between Germany and Italy, and also to settle the pending issues between France and Italy. In regard to this last matter he had so far heard nothing positive from the French side, but thought that some progress would be possible with respect

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<sup>a</sup> A detailed account of these rumors was sent by Hassell as report No. I 1084 of June 30 (8048/E578455-60).

to the status of the Italians in Tunisia and the boundary rectifications between the French and Italian colonial possessions; the other issues would be more difficult.

At the end, Mussolini affirmed once more that he was convinced that the Pact would now prove itself of political value to Germany by providing a breathing space, particularly with respect to military affairs.

HASSELL

## No. 344

5885/E431074-76

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

I 1089

ROME, June 30, 1933.

Received July 3.

II Ts. 797.

### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Alleged Hungarian démarche with Mussolini on the question of revision. Italian views on Gömbös' visit to Berlin. Hungary characterizes the question of revision as not being especially urgent. Gömbös' journey to Berlin is viewed here with calm.

With reference to your instruction II Ts. 602 of May 27.<sup>2</sup>

So far it has not been possible to obtain particulars about the letter, mentioned in telegram 102 of May 10,<sup>3</sup> from the Hungarian Minister President to Mussolini about the Hungarian demands for revision. Both at the Foreign Ministry and at the Hungarian Legation here, where inquiries were made, people knew, or pretended to know, nothing. It was significant that both in Italian and especially in authoritative Hungarian quarters apparently special importance was attached to making the Hungarian revisionist demands appear as not at all urgent. In particular it was emphasized in Hungarian quarters that at present there were more important things for Hungary than the question of revision, which was by no means ripe for a solution and which had better be left alone for the moment. Hungary was more interested in the early attainment of concrete aims, especially the recognition of her equality of rights, for which the Quadripartite Pact, if properly applied, was clearing the path. As far as the Pact itself was concerned, it was by no means being rejected in Hungary, as frequently asserted. To be sure, here and there, especially in Legitimist circles, it was said that the Pact, after the various modifications

<sup>1</sup> Copies of this dispatch were forwarded on July 11 to the Embassies in Paris and London, and on July 12 to the Legation in Budapest (5885/E431077-78).

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 266 and footnote 3.

<sup>3</sup> Document No. 220.

which it underwent, had become meaningless, but this view was not shared by the Government. Viewed in terms of political realism the Pact offered various advantages compared with the present situation; but above all, through the initiative of Mussolini, a source of tension had been removed at a critical moment, which could have endangered European peace. Similar ideas, by the way, can be found in an interview published on the 27th of this month in the *Popolo d'Italia*, which the Hungarian Foreign Minister granted to a representative of this paper at about the same time the conversation outlined above took place.

The visit of Minister President Gömbös in Berlin at first annoyed people here, especially since the Government was informed of it only at the eleventh hour and at first could not form a clear picture with respect to the meaning of the journey. But after an explanation by the Hungarian Minister <sup>4</sup> they quickly calmed down and approved of the visit as an entirely welcome establishment of contact between the leading statesmen. Even though they do not seem completely clear as to the real cause of the visit, they see nothing to make Italy uneasy in a conversation on economic questions concerning Germany and Hungary, on the German-Austrian problem, and the internal situation in both countries, which, according to the official statements of the Minister President, formed the most important subjects of the conversation. All the less so as Gömbös did not hesitate to state again in his declaration in the Hungarian Upper House that the friendship with Italy was the pivotal point of Hungarian foreign policy. The possibility that the unexpected visit might be connected with the rumors about an Italian initiative in Paris and London for the purpose of establishing a closer community between Austria and Hungary, <sup>5</sup> was mentioned neither in conversations nor in the press. The latter, incidentally, observed the greatest restraint on the occasion of the journey and restricted itself to the publication of reports from correspondents about the public events of the visit.

A clipping from the above-mentioned issue of the *Popolo d'Italia* is enclosed.<sup>6</sup>

HASSELL

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<sup>4</sup> Andreas de Hory.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. document No. 343 and footnote 3.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed (9605/E677675).

## No. 345

5885/E431079-82

*The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry*

1117 Fri. 4

BELGRADE, June 30, 1933.

Received July 7.

II Ts. 819.

Subject: Peaceful revision of the territorial clauses of the dictated peace treaties.

With reference to instruction No. II Ts. 602 of May 27<sup>1</sup> with the interesting remarks of the Legations in Budapest and Sofia, I have the honor to reply that as far as Yugoslavia is concerned, the answer to the question whether Yugoslavia would be willing to return territories she was awarded by the dictated peace treaties is quite simple.

The answer would be "No", and I have not succeeded in eliciting, whether directly or indirectly, even the slightest hint from any authoritative quarter that there was willingness to enter negotiations about a possible cession of territory in the interest of justice. On the contrary, it is being stated that in case the Great Powers should attempt to force Yugoslavia to cede part of her territory to Hungary or Bulgaria, the Government would reply to such pressure by mobilization.

This is at any rate how the situation looks to me at this moment. Until recently the mass of the population was indifferent toward the issue of revision. But after the publication of Mussolini's plan for the Quadripartite Pact it was lashed into fury. In several towns large rallies of thousands of people have been held, in which prominent Yugoslavs, and Rumanian and Czech orators as well, spoke in order to reject categorically the very idea of territorial revision and in order to demand, as at least one speaker did, the incorporation of the Gorizia and Trieste areas into Yugoslavia. The very fact that Mussolini, whose name acts on practically all Yugoslavs like a red rag on a bull, has again injected the idea of revision into the debate causes this entirely negative attitude and, at any rate for the present, eliminates any possibility of calm negotiations. It may be, of course, that later, at a more favorable time, a more reasonable attitude will prevail, but if at any time one is to succeed with the revisionist question in the ruling circles here, it will be necessary to proceed with the greatest caution and prudence and to avoid letting the Italian hand become at all visible in this matter.

The Italians and Hungarians are nourishing the hope that parts of Yugoslavia, e. g., Croatia and Slovenia, will detach themselves from

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 266.

the existing state. It is true that there is dissatisfaction among Croats and Slovenes, as well as among the minorities and those Serbs who were born not in Serbia but in Austria-Hungary and became Yugoslav citizens only under the dictated peace treaties, about the fact that inhabitants of Old Serbia are given preference in appointments to high and highest government positions and to military posts. In the circles of the political opposition, which allegedly comprises two thirds of the population, there is also dissatisfaction with the present autocratic regime, because a majority allegedly so substantial is excluded from the business of government. It is my conviction, however, that this dissatisfaction does not mean that the overwhelming majority of these less favored elements wants to depose the King or wishes for the secession of some parts of the country. To be sure, they say that if Old Serbia had remained by herself and had not burdened herself with the present increase in territory, the business of governing would have been much simpler. Yet their aim is not to make the state smaller, but rather to obtain greater autonomy and a more just distribution of government positions within the existing state. At this time therefore I cannot believe in Yugoslavia's disintegration, and I think that any hope in that direction will prove deceptive. At any rate, as long as the army and police remain faithful to the King, and at present there is no reason whatever to doubt it, the state, in my opinion, will hold together. Quite apart from military and police power it seems to me that within the last 6 months a certain domestic pacification has taken place. Through the new [Little] Entente alliance<sup>2</sup> the self-confidence of all the Yugoslavs has been strengthened, and I have the impression that even among the Croats the realization is growing that in the long run they are better off in present Yugoslavia than in any small new structure.

The Hungarians seem to harbor hopes that a plebiscite in the territories ceded to Yugoslavia would show a majority in favor of Hungary. I have great doubts whether this calculation is correct. The Hungarian minority would indeed make a choice in favor of Hungary, but whether the German minority would do the same seems doubtful to me. Nor do I know whether it would be in the interest of the German community if the German minority in the Voivodina should again revert to Hungary. The minority policies of the Hungarian Government certainly do not make it attractive for Germans to live in Hungary and, to judge from utterances of leaders of the German community here, the Germans in Yugoslavia would prefer to remain in this country, if the Yugoslav Government would show them more good will, of which right now there are some very slight indications.

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<sup>2</sup> See document No. 26, footnote 3.

As far as Bulgaria is concerned, the Yugoslav Government simply does not recognize the existence of a Bulgarian minority in Yugoslavia and curtly and without discussion rejects the very idea of any territorial cessions to Bulgaria.

ALBERT DUFOUR

No. 346

6114/E454056-59

*Minister Rieth to State Secretary Bülow*

VIENNA, July 1, 1933.

II Oe. 903.

DEAR HERR VON BÜLOW: For a long time Herr Dollfuss has avoided speaking with me about the present situation, and I have also not thought it expedient to bring about a conversation because the situation did not seem to me to be ripe for it as yet. After I had already concluded from a number of recent indications that for various reasons the wish to clear up the present unpleasant situation was growing, at least in the Christian Social camp, Herr Dollfuss of his own accord asked me to have a talk with him in which in an hour and a half's quiet discussion we tried to establish and define the position on both sides. I should like to give you the main content of the conversation. For the report on the present domestic political situation I should like to refer to the oral statements which Herr von Broich,<sup>1</sup> who arrives in Berlin today, will make to you if you will be so kind as to receive him.

Herr Dollfuss was obviously primarily interested in determining whether it was not possible to bring about more friendly relations between the two Governments once more, and whether the Reich Chancellor and the Reich Government would decide to leave the local National Socialist party to its own devices, without continuing to provide it with moral and material support. Having recently traveled about the country and held a number of meetings, he wanted to make it clear to me that he had now strengthened the so-called "Fatherland Front" to such a degree that he would be able to cope with local National Socialism if the latter felt that it was no longer supported by the Reich.<sup>2</sup>

I have tried to remove some of Herr Dollfuss' illusions in this regard and I have made clear to him that even in the situation he desires he would not be able to cope so easily with local National Social-

<sup>1</sup> Georg von Broich-Oppert, Secretary of Legation at the German Legation in Austria.

<sup>2</sup> Marginal note in Köpke's handwriting: "Naive!"



ism, so that the present state of conflict would continue unless he found a way to come to an understanding with National Socialism. But I also gave him to understand very plainly as my personal opinion that I considered it exceedingly unlikely that German National Socialism would disinterest itself in Austrian National Socialism if this were to result in Herr Dollfuss being able then to fight the latter all the more effectively here.<sup>3</sup> I finally pointed out to Herr Dollfuss the dangers to be expected from an increasing radicalization of the masses and the fact that they would become more and more fanatical owing to the repressive measures of the Government. Through the arrest or elimination of the leaders this danger would be increased rather than reduced.

I believe that I succeeded in this very thorough discussion in dissipating at least a few of the false ideas which had been instilled in the Federal Chancellor by that part of his entourage which tries to frustrate any understanding with National Socialism. Nevertheless I was forced to note that the struggle which has been carried on here in recent weeks<sup>4</sup> with unprecedented severity has after all had the result that, at least at the present moment, Herr Dollfuss is not yet ready for an understanding with the National Socialists here, to say nothing of yielding to their demands. On the other hand, he would obviously like very much to restore peace with the German Reich. I believe, however, that after our conversation it has become clearer to him that the one would hardly be possible without the other.<sup>5</sup>

Finally, I tried to influence him to the effect that more than heretofore he should resist the attempts of the Heimwehr leaders to aggravate the mood further by stringent measures such as the arrest of National Socialist leaders, etc. He said he would make efforts in this regard; he would succeed in this, however, only if the situation were not made worse by the other side, either, and if in particular they refrained from throwing bombs or from other violent measures or from organizing them. I held out to him the possibility of a settlement of the conflicts with the German Reich only in the event that an atmosphere of calm was first created, which alone would make it possible to seek a settlement satisfactory to all parties.

I did not go into the particulars of a possible understanding with the National Socialists in this conversation because this still seemed to me hopeless at this time. Herr Dollfuss told me, however, that he also wanted to think about this problem and we could have a further

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<sup>3</sup> Marginal note in Köpke's handwriting: "Correct!"

<sup>4</sup> Following a series of terroristic acts by National Socialists the Austrian Government issued a decree on June 19, banning the Austrian National Socialist party and all its auxiliary organizations.

<sup>5</sup> The original reads here "*Das Eine oder das Andere*" which is obviously a typographical error. Rather the passage ought to read: "*Das Eine ohne das Andere.*"

conversation about this question in the near future. I did not wish to venture further in this field because I first wanted to be informed by Herr von Broich about the attitude prevailing in Berlin, regarding which I am not clear.<sup>6</sup>

In so far as the situation can be judged time seems to be working for us here,<sup>7</sup> unless the extremists in the Government, especially Major Fey,<sup>8</sup> are further strengthened by violent acts. The leaders of the Heimwehr are evidently striving to establish a kind of fascist dictatorship on the Italian pattern and with Italian support. The Christian Socials seem gradually to realize that a further development in this direction would serve the Heimwehr's aspirations for dictatorship much more than their own party, even if they should succeed—and this is still doubtful—in erecting a dam against National Socialism with the present methods.

However, a considerable effort will still be required to dissuade Herr Dollfuss from the illusion he still cherishes, that he will be able on the one hand with the help of the Heimwehr to suppress National Socialism forcefully and on the other hand to put through a constitutional reform together with the Social Democrats by parliamentary methods<sup>9</sup>—he admitted this plan to me—which would in practice eliminate the Parliament and make new elections impossible for at least 1 year.

It will in any case be necessary that they realize here that the National Socialists will continue to be supported by the Reich until they condescend to reach a reasonable compromise with them. On the other hand, however, violent acts on the part of the National Socialists would delay the possibility of such a settlement and weaken the slowly beginning reasonableness of the Christian Socials to the benefit of the harsh method of struggle desired by the leaders of the Heimwehr.<sup>10</sup>

Yours, etc.

K. RIETH

<sup>6</sup> Marginal note in Köpke's handwriting: "?"

<sup>7</sup> Marginal note in Köpke's handwriting: "Correct!"

<sup>8</sup> Emil Fey, leader of the Vienna Heimwehr and Minister of Public Security in the Dollfuss Cabinet.

<sup>9</sup> Exclamation points and marginal note in Köpke's handwriting: "The case of Dollfuss seems to be hopeless according to this. These plans are really sheer lunacy."

<sup>10</sup> Marginal note: "Minister Rieth received the oral instruction to refrain completely from conversations with Dollfuss at the present time. H[üffer], July 10."

## No. 347

8118/E581409-13

*Vice Chancellor Papen to Chancellor Hitler*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

ROME, July 2, 1933.

Rk. 8727.

DEAR CHANCELLOR: Count Saurma is bringing you enclosed a final text of the concordat with the final protocol,<sup>2</sup> approved by the Cardinal Secretary of State and the Pope. I should like to make the following statements in regard to the changes, in so far as they are not of a purely editorial or explanatory nature:

*Article 3:* The idea has again been incorporated that the Nuncio is Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, in which connection it was added, however, that this arrangement corresponds to the circular instruction of the Foreign Ministry of April 7, 1930,<sup>3</sup> thus avoiding possible difficulties in interpretation.

*Article 14:* The inquiry from the Holy See, whether they are objections of a general political nature against a bishop slated for appointment, will in the future in accordance with your wishes be directed to the Statthalter. In the protocol it has been added, however, that this question should be answered as soon as possible and that in case there is no counterstatement after 20 days it may be assumed that there are no objections to the candidacy.

*Regarding Article 20:* An explanation has been made in the final protocol to the effect that, with respect to the tax laws, church hostels are to be treated like the other ecclesiastical institutions. This statement was made because in individual finance offices here various practices have been followed.

*Article 27:* For the nomination of the dignitary to be appointed Army Bishop we have found the formula that corresponds to your wish, Chancellor. According to this formula there must be agreement between the Reich Government and the Holy See as to the candidate to be appointed, so that no one can be appointed by the Holy See to whom the Reich Government does not agree. Naturally the Reich Government for its part can also propose one or several candidates for this, as was always done in the past. The German Episcopate has thus been eliminated here, so that the arrangement is reached exclusively between the German Reich and the Curia. In the Final Protocol it has been determined that the Apostolic Brief regarding the regulation of pastoral care in the army will be issued

<sup>1</sup> The document is initialed "H[itler], July 8."

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 348.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (9932/E694872-77).

in agreement with the Reich Government, so that we can make effective all our wishes here, too.

*Article 29:* Here I have attained a concession for minority rights that is of quite extraordinary importance for German policy, for in the final protocol the Holy See expressly declares its adherence to the principles it represents in regard to the right to use the mother tongue in pastoral care and in religious instruction, and promises to include provisions in concordats with other countries which guarantee the *protection of the German minorities*.<sup>\*</sup> I should like to stress that it is the first time that the Holy See has stated its support of protection of minorities in this form.

*Article 31:* In the place of article 31 we have put the former article 32, so that the former article 31 concludes the concordat as its most important article. In the first sentence of the new article 31 the position of the purely religious associations is regulated, regarding which there was no difference of opinion between us. In the second sentence an arrangement is provided for the Catholic associations which are not purely religious but also serve, for example, occupational purposes, e. g., the associations of journeymen. Here it is provided that such associations enjoy the protection of article 31, paragraph 1, if they offer a guarantee that they will keep their activity outside any political party and also if they are declared by the Episcopate to be members of the Catholic Action. In this connection it is to be remarked that in accordance with the instructions of the Curia only entirely nonpolitical, purely religious associations can become members of the Catholic Action. Thus by the wording of paragraph 2 it is left to the judgment of the State to determine whether an association offers a guarantee to conduct its activities outside of any political party. The most expedient solution would be, when the concordat has been concluded, to bring about an agreement between the State and the Episcopate by special arrangements regarding all the associations for which the Church desires special protection in the future. Sport associations are entirely eliminated from this regulation of paragraph 2. These sport associations will be taken care of solely in accordance with paragraph 3.

I believe that by this arrangement, as in the Italian Concordat, a very clear distinction can be made in the future between the associations that serve really religious purposes and those that the State must take under its protection on the basis of the National Socialist philosophy.

*Article 32:* Finally brings the solution which you have wished, Chancellor, whereby the Holy See issues regulations excluding membership and activity in political parties for all members [of the

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<sup>\*</sup> Unsigned marginal note referring to this entire sentence: "A mistake!"

clergy] and people belonging to Orders [*für alle Mitglieder und Ordensleute*]. In this regard it is simply stated in the final protocol that similar regulations are to be made for the other denominations. Articles 31 and 32 thus follow the Italian Concordat textually also.

In the supplementary protocol<sup>5</sup> we have, finally, adopted a provision to the effect that general principles are agreed upon concerning the treatment of clergymen in case Germany should reintroduce general military service. This supplement is of less value to me for the content of the regulation than for the fact that here the Holy See is already reaching a treaty agreement with us for the event of general military service. I hope that this agreement will therefore be pleasing to you. It must, of course, be treated as secret.

I must not conceal from you, Chancellor, that the reports at hand here at the Vatican regarding the numerous arrests and abusive treatment of clergymen, the confiscation of diocesan property, etc., had brought about a frame of mind which made the conclusion of this concordat very difficult. However, on the basis of your telephoned instruction of yesterday<sup>6</sup> I informed the Cardinal Secretary of State that you, Chancellor, would be willing after the conclusion of the concordat to arrange for a thorough and full pacification between the Catholic portion of the people and the Reich Government or the Länder governments, and that you would be willing to put a finish to the story of past political developments. I myself am convinced that the conclusion of this concordat must be considered a great success in foreign policy for the Government of the National Uprising, precisely because a number of foreign powers have exerted their full influence at the Vatican to keep it from concluding a treaty with the new Germany. I also believe, however, that the conclusion of the treaty will introduce an era of pacification that will in a high degree assist the great work of inner national unification.

In conclusion I request that you authorize me in the course of Monday evening to initial the treaty on Tuesday, so that I can then start my return journey.<sup>7</sup>

Yours, etc.

PAPEN

P. S. The rumor is abroad here (and they asked me about it at the Vatican) that Cardinal Faulhaber will be arrested and that rigorous measures are to be taken against the Cathedral chapter, etc. It is said that in Bavaria they wanted to create precedents in order to make it impossible to conclude a concordat. I have said that these are all "stories"—but am reporting it to you nevertheless so that another "incident" will not after all bring everything into jeopardy.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 348, footnote 2.

<sup>6</sup> No record of these instructions has been found.

<sup>7</sup> See documents Nos. 349 and 350.

## No. 348

6153/E460821-39

*Draft Concordat*<sup>1</sup>CONCORDAT BETWEEN THE HOLY SEE AND THE GERMAN REICH<sup>2</sup>

. . .

Article 1 . . .

Article 2 . . .

Article 3

In order to foster good relations between the Holy See and the German Reich, an Apostolic Nuncio will as heretofore reside in the capital of the German Reich and an Ambassador of the German Reich at the Holy See.

The Apostolic Nuncio to the German Reich is, in accordance with the circular instruction of the Foreign Office of April 7, 1930, Dean of the Diplomatic Corps accredited there.<sup>3</sup>

## Article 4

In its relations and correspondence with the bishops, the clergy, and other members of the Catholic Church in Germany, the Holy See enjoys full freedom.<sup>4</sup> The same applies to the bishops and other diocesan officials in their relations with the faithful in all matters pertaining to their pastoral office.

Instructions, ordinances, pastoral letters, official diocesan gazettes, and other enactments regarding the spiritual guidance of the faithful

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 347. This draft was examined in detail by Hitler, Neurath, and Frick at meetings on July 4 and 5 (telegram No. 26 of July 5, Neurath to Bergen: 6153/E460860-61), and the changes considered by them to be necessary were entered by Neurath on the draft; these are noted in the footnotes to this document.

The Ministry of Interior had worked up a memorandum containing detailed suggestions for changes in the draft concordat, and the reasons for them. In the files is what appears to be the copy of this memorandum as it emerged from the meeting on July 5 (6153/E460842-56). This Ministry of Interior memorandum provided the basis for most of the changes entered by Neurath on his working copy of the draft concordat.

On July 6, Ministerialdirektor Buttman of the Ministry of Interior took to Rome, as the basis for final discussions at the Vatican, a document containing the changes which the German Government wanted to have made in the concordat, but the text of this document has not been found.

<sup>2</sup> The preamble and several articles of the draft concordat were accepted in toto or with minor verbal suggestions and are omitted here. For the text, the reader is referred to the final version of the Concordat, printed as document No. 371. The supplementary "Final Protocol," however, differed so substantially in this draft from the final version that both documents, including the identical paragraphs, are printed in their entirety. The draft secret annex (6153/E460840-41) is identical with the final text printed with document No. 371, and is therefore not reprinted here.

<sup>3</sup> Marginal note in Neurath's handwriting: "Should be put in separate note with suitable changes."

<sup>4</sup> At this point Neurath added the words: "in spiritual matters."

issued by the Church authorities within the framework of their competence<sup>5</sup> may be published without hindrance and brought to the notice of the faithful in the forms hitherto usual.

#### Article 5

In the exercise of their spiritual activity, the clergy, in the same manner as the officials of the State, enjoy the protection of the State. The latter will not permit offences to their persons or their character as clergy, or interference with the carrying out of their official duties;<sup>6</sup> it will punish incidents of this kind and, in case of need, will provide official protection.

#### Article 6 . . .

#### Article 7 . . .

#### Article 8 . . .

#### Article 9 . . .

#### Article 10 . . .

#### Article 11 . . .

#### Article 12 . . .

#### Article 13

The Catholic parishes, parish and diocesan organizations, the episcopal sees, bishoprics and chapters, the Orders and religious societies, as well as the institutions, foundations, and property of the Catholic Church administered by Catholic bodies shall retain or acquire legal capacity for the national sphere in accordance with general precepts of civil law.<sup>7</sup> They shall remain corporations under public law in so far as they have thus been such. The others are<sup>8</sup> granted the same rights under the law that applies to all.

#### Article 14

In principle, the Church has the right to make appointments freely to all Church offices and benefices without the participation of the State or the civil communities, in so far as other arrangements have not been made through the concordats mentioned in article 2. With respect to the filling of episcopal sees, the regulation applying to the Metropolitan See of Freiburg (ecclesiastical province of Upper Rhine)

<sup>5</sup> At this point Neurath added the words: "within the general laws of the State (article 1, paragraph 2)."

<sup>6</sup> According to the marginalia in Neurath's handwriting, this sentence was to be revised to read as follows: "The latter will proceed in accordance with the general laws of the State against offences to their persons or their character as clergy, as well as against interference with the carrying out of their official duties, and in case of need will provide official protection."

<sup>7</sup> Neurath amended this phrase to read: "law of the State."

<sup>8</sup> For the word "are" Neurath substituted here the words "may be."

shall be similarly applicable to the two suffragan bishoprics of Rottenburg and Mainz, as well as to the bishopric of Meissen. The same applies to appointments to the Cathedral Chapter and the regulation of the right of patronage.

Furthermore, there is agreement on the following points:

1. Catholic clergy who hold an ecclesiastical office in Germany, or who exercise pastoral or educational functions, must

- (a) be German citizens,
- (b) have obtained a diploma entitling them to study at German higher institutions of learning,
- (c) have finished at least a 3-year course of philosophical-theological study at a German State college, a German ecclesiastical academic institute, or a pontifical institution of higher learning in Rome.

2. Before the drawing up of the bull for the nomination of archbishops, of bishops, of a coadjutor *cum jure successionis* or of a *praelatus nullius*, the name of the person selected will be communicated to the Statthalter of the appropriate provincial government in order to learn whether there are objections of a general political nature against the person.<sup>9</sup>

In case of the consent of the Church and the State, the requirements listed in paragraph 2, figure 1, (a), (b), and (c) may be waived.

#### Article 15 . . .

#### Article 16

Before the bishops take possession of their dioceses, they shall take an oath of allegiance before the Statthalter of the appropriate State or the Reich President, as follows:

"I swear and promise before God and on the Holy Gospel, as befits a bishop, loyalty to the German Reich and to the province of . . . I swear and promise to respect, and to have my clergy and the faithful entrusted to me<sup>10</sup> to respect, the constitutionally constituted government. In dutiful solicitude for the welfare and interest of the German State, I shall try, in the exercise of the spiritual office entrusted to me, to prevent any injury that might threaten it."

#### Article 17

The rights of ownership and other rights of the corporations under public law, the institutions, foundations, and associations of the

<sup>9</sup>The foregoing paragraph was stricken out by Neurath, and in the margin he wrote "see annex." The annex—the memorandum (6153/E460842-56) referred to in footnote 1—contains a formulation for figure 2 identical with that in the Concordat as signed (see document No. 371), except that the words "... Statthalter of the appropriate provincial government" were changed to "... Reichsstatthalter in the appropriate Land." Cf. document No. 362.

<sup>10</sup>A line is drawn through the words "and the faithful entrusted to me"; the Ministry of Interior memorandum elaborating the recommended changes noted that "the allegiance of citizens to the Government does not need to be guaranteed by the bishops and thereby in a certain sense also interpreted and supervised by them." (6153/E460847)



Catholic Church in their property are guaranteed.<sup>11</sup>

#### Article 18 . . .

#### Article 19

The Catholic theological faculties in the State institutions of higher learning are to be retained at their present size. Their relation to the ecclesiastical authorities is to be based on the stipulations set forth in the pertinent Concordats and the Supplementary Protocols appended to them, with due regard to the Apostolic Constitution "Deus scientiarum Dominus" of May 24, 1931.<sup>12</sup> The Reich Government will interest itself in assuring a uniform practice, in accordance with all the pertinent regulations, for all Catholic faculties of Germany in question.

#### Article 20

The Church has the right, in so far as other agreements do not exist, to establish, for the training of the clergy, philosophical, and theological institutions entirely dependent on the ecclesiastical authorities, provided no government subsidies are requested.

The establishment, direction, and administration of the seminaries for priests, and for boys,<sup>13</sup> as well as of the church-maintained hostels, shall, within the limits of the law that applies to all, be left exclusively to the ecclesiastical authorities.

#### Article 21

Catholic religious instruction in the primary schools, vocational schools, secondary schools, and higher educational institutions is a regular subject of instruction and is to be taught in accordance with the principles of the Catholic Church. In religious instruction, as well as in all other instruction, special emphasis is to be placed on the inculcation of a patriotic, civic, and social sense of duty in the spirit of Christian religious and moral law.<sup>14</sup> The subject matter of in-

<sup>11</sup> At this point Neurath added the words: "in accordance with the general laws of the State."

<sup>12</sup> Neurath struck out the words "at their present size" from the first sentence and revised the second sentence to read: "Their relation to the ecclesiastical authorities remain subject to specific agreements."

In the Ministry of Interior memorandum (6153/E460842-56) these changes were explained on the following grounds: "The deletion of the words 'at their present size' is necessary because cut-backs in all faculties may be necessary for reasons of economy, and the Catholic theological faculty can not be guaranteed a special position."

"The change in the second sentence results because concordats with the Länder are to be discontinued."

<sup>13</sup> The words "and for boys" are stricken from the draft, and the Ministry of Interior memorandum gives the following reason: "Catholic boys' seminaries, such as were first introduced in the Bavarian Concordat, alienate the young person destined for the priesthood too much from his comrades, even in boyhood."

<sup>14</sup> Neurath amended this sentence to read: "In religious instruction, special emphasis is to be placed on the inculcation of a patriotic, civic, and social sense of duty in the spirit of Christian religious and moral law, just as is done in all

struction and the selection of textbooks for religious instruction are to be determined in agreement with the ecclesiastical authorities. The ecclesiastical authorities are to have an opportunity to make sure<sup>15</sup> that the students are receiving religious instruction in accordance with the tenets and requirements of the Church.

#### Article 22 . . .

#### Article 23

The retention of Catholic denominational schools and establishment of new ones is guaranteed as heretofore. In all parishes in which parents or guardians request it, Catholic primary schools shall be established if, with due regard for local conditions of school organization, the number of pupils allows a regular school operation to<sup>16</sup> appear feasible.

#### Article 24

In all Catholic primary schools, only such teachers are to be employed as belong to the Catholic Church and guarantee to fulfill the special requirements of the Catholic denominational school.

Within the framework of the general professional training of teachers, facilities are to be provided which will assure a training of Catholic teachers in accordance with the special requirements of the Catholic denominational school.

Existing institutions of the orders and congregations will be taken into account when permission [for private institutions] is granted, in so far as private institutions are in the position, after the teachers' training system has been reorganized, to meet the State regulations generally in effect for the training of teachers.<sup>17</sup>

#### Article 25 . . .

#### Article 26

Subject to more comprehensive regulations later on of questions of marriage law, it is agreed that, in addition to the case of a critical ill-

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#### Footnote (14)—Continued

other instruction." The Ministry of Interior memorandum gave the following reason for the change: "The change in the second sentence seems necessary, because in the present version the State formally obligates itself to the Church to undertake the inculcation of a patriotic, civic, and social sense of duty with the especial emphasis on its Christian coloration."

<sup>15</sup> Neurath amended this to read: "The ecclesiastical authorities are to have an opportunity, together with the school authorities, to examine whether . . ." The Ministry of Interior memorandum stated that the amendment was intended "to prevent a revival of ecclesiastical control of the schools, even if this were confined only to religious instruction."

<sup>16</sup> At this point Neurath added the words: "in accordance with the standards prescribed by the State."

<sup>17</sup> Neurath noted in the margin that this sentence was to be deleted. The Ministry of Interior memorandum gave as the reason that "private teachers' training institutions are not to be introduced in the German Reich. Therefore institutions of the orders and congregations in this field are out of the question."

ness of a betrothed person admitting of no delay, also in case of serious moral emergency, the existence of which must be confirmed by the appropriate episcopal authority, the consecration of the marriage by the Church may precede the civil wedding. The pastor is obliged in such cases to notify the Registry Office without delay.

#### Article 27

The German Reichswehr is granted an exempted pastoral care for the Catholic officers, officials, and enlisted men belonging to it, as well as for their families.<sup>18</sup>

The Army Bishop is responsible for the direction of the military pastoral care. His appointment is made by the Holy See after the latter has put itself in touch with the Reich Government in order to designate, in agreement with it, a suitable person.

The appointment of the chaplains and other military clergy is made on the part of the Church by the Army Bishop, after prior agreement with the competent authorities of the Reich. The Army Bishop may appoint only such clergy as have received from their competent diocesan bishop permission to enter upon military pastoral work and an appropriate certificate of qualification. The military clergy are to have pastoral rights with respect to the troops and members of the Army assigned to them.

More detailed regulations concerning the organization of the Catholic pastoral work in the Army are to be set forth in an Apostolic Brief.<sup>19</sup>

#### Article 28

In hospitals, penal institutions, and other institutions, the Church is permitted to make pastoral visits and hold divine services.<sup>20</sup> If regular pastoral care is established in such institutions, and if clergy must be engaged as State or other public officials for this purpose, this is to be done in agreement with the ecclesiastical authorities.

#### Article 29

In matters concerning the use of their mother tongue in divine services, religious instruction, and church organizations, the Catholic members of a non-German national minority residing within the German Reich will be placed in no less favorable a position than that which

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<sup>18</sup> Marginal note in Neurath's handwriting: "See annex." In the Ministry of Interior memorandum it was proposed that the following sentence be added at this point: "They do not belong to the local church parishes and do not contribute to their expenses."

<sup>19</sup> At this point Neurath added the sentence: "The regulation of the relationship as it applies to the civil service is to be done by the Government of the Reich."

<sup>20</sup> At this point Neurath added the words: "subject to the general regulations of these institutions."

corresponds to the legal and effective<sup>21</sup> position of individuals of German descent and language within the territory of the foreign state in question.

#### Article 30 . . .

#### Article 31

Those Catholic organizations and associations which serve purely religious, cultural, and charitable purposes and as such are either directly subordinate to ecclesiastical authority or stand in special relations to it are permitted to continue in their establishments and their activity.

Those Catholic organizations which do not serve exclusively religious, cultural, or charitable purposes but, for example, also have social or professional tasks will, without prejudice to a possible future inclusion in state associations, enjoy the protection of article 31, paragraph 1, in so far as they guarantee to carry on their activity outside any political party, and thereby can be declared by the Episcopate, consistent with the directives of the Holy See, to be members of the Catholic Action.<sup>22</sup>

In so far as the Reich and the Länder have in their charge sports or other youth organizations, care will be taken that the Catholic members are enabled<sup>23</sup> to perform their Church duties on Sundays and holidays,<sup>24</sup> and that they will not be required to do anything irreconcilable with their religious convictions and obligations.

#### Article 32

On the basis of the special conditions existing in Germany, and in view of the guarantees created by the stipulations of this Concordat of legislation protecting the rights and freedoms of the Catholic Church in the Reich and its Länder, the Holy See will publish stipulations which exclude the clergy and members of Orders from membership and activity in political parties.<sup>25</sup>

#### Article 33

The matters pertaining to ecclesiastical persons or things, which have not been dealt with in the foregoing articles, will be regulated for

<sup>21</sup> For "effective" Neurath substituted the word "actual."

<sup>22</sup> The foregoing paragraph is crossed out by Neurath. Cf. document No. 349.

<sup>23</sup> Neurath added here the word "regularly."

<sup>24</sup> The remainder of the sentence was crossed out by Neurath.

<sup>25</sup> In the memorandum containing suggested changes it was proposed that the final part of this sentence read: "... membership in political parties and activity for such parties." The reason for the change was explained as follows: "According to the present version, it would be possible for the clergy to work actively for a political party as organizers, speakers, or writers without performing these activities within the party."

the ecclesiastical sphere in accordance with applicable Canon Law.<sup>26</sup>

Should any difference of opinion occur in future regarding the interpretation or application of a stipulation of this Concordat, the Holy See and the German Reich will effect a friendly solution by mutual agreement.

Article 34 . . .

FINAL PROTOCOL

At the signing of the Concordat concluded today between the Holy See and the German Reich, the duly empowered signatories made the following identical statements, which form an integral part of the Concordat itself.

*To Article 13*

It is agreed that the right of the Church to levy taxes remains guaranteed.

*To Article 14, paragraph 2*

It is agreed that if objections of a general political nature exist, they will be put forward in the shortest possible time. If after 20 days no such statement has been made, the Holy See will be justified in assuming that there are no objections to the candidates. The names of the persons in question will be kept in strict confidence until the announcement of the nomination.

*To Article 20*

The hostels under the direction of the Church in institutions of higher learning and gymnasia are to be regarded, with respect to the tax laws, as essential ecclesiastical institutions in the true sense of the word and as integral parts of the diocesan organization.

*To Article 23*

The one-class denominational school is also to be recognized as a regular school operation.<sup>27</sup>

*To Article 24, paragraph 2*

It is agreed that it is in accordance with the special requirements of the Catholic denominational school that its teachers be trained in denominational teachers' training institutions.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>26</sup> The foregoing paragraph was marked for deletion on the draft, the following reason being given in the explanatory memorandum: "It is the problem of a concordat to regulate definitively all subjects in which the spheres of the Church and the State have common or conflicting interests. To declare Church law determinative in cases of doubt would mean for the State a renunciation of its sovereign power, which cannot be expected of it."

<sup>27</sup> This sentence has been crossed out by Neurath.

*To Article 27*

Issuance of the Apostolic Brief takes place after agreement has been reached with the Government of the Reich.

*To Article 29*

Since the Government of the German Reich has indicated its readiness to be accommodating in the matter of non-German minorities, the Holy See declares that, in confirmation of the principles it has always upheld regarding the right to the use of the mother tongue in pastoral work, in religious instruction, and in the conduct of Catholic societies, it will take into consideration when making arrangements for concordats with other countries in the future the inclusion of an equivalent provision protecting the rights of the German minorities.

*To Article 31, paragraph 3*

The principles established in article 31, paragraph 3, apply also to the Labor Service.

*To Article 32*

It is understood that similar regulations regarding activity in party politics will be introduced by the Reich with regard to the non-Catholic denominations.

## No. 349

3241/702255

*The Embassy to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 38 of July 3

ROME (Vatican), July 3, 1933—8:10 p. m.

Received July 3—9:35 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

The Chancellor will discuss the concordat with you tomorrow. Article 31, paragraph 2, does not seem to satisfy him.<sup>1</sup> This article is, however, decisive for the entire structure. The formulation "in so far as they guarantee" gives the State every possibility of determining by itself that a guarantee is not provided. Furthermore, the Curia will no longer tolerate any sort of political association.

In consideration of our entire situation, I consider it exceedingly urgent to bring the matter to a conclusion in order to avoid a *Kulturkampf* and destruction of domestic peace. The difficulties here are very great owing to maltreatment of many clergymen and other excesses.

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 348. No record has been found of when Papen was apprised of Hitler's views on this point.

Since an audience with the Pope is scheduled for 12 o'clock, I urgently request that you telephone a decision to the Embassy by 11:45. Papen.

Speed is urgently requested.<sup>2</sup>

BERGEN

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<sup>2</sup> Cf. documents Nos. 350 and 351.

## No. 350

3241/702256

*The Embassy to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

ROME (Vat.), July 3, 1933—10:25 p. m.

No. 39 of July 3

Received July 3—11:55 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

In the discussion which I had with Pacelli, Archbishop Groeber, and Kaas this evening, it developed that with the conclusion of the concordat, the dissolution of the Center party is regarded here as certain and is approved.

Again, however, conclusion is being made dependent on an early statement by the Chancellor that peace will thereby finally be restored and the interference of subordinate officials checked. Such a statement would also facilitate psychologically the decision of the Center party.<sup>1</sup> Papen.

BERGEN

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<sup>1</sup> The Center party was dissolved on July 5.

## No. 351

6153/E460857-59

*Ambassador Bergen to Foreign Minister Neurath*

ROME, July 3, 1933.

II Vat. 268.

DEAR NEURATH: Today Herr von Papen is sending you the text of the Reich concordat—main treaty, supplementary protocol, secret agreement—that was finally agreed upon yesterday evening,<sup>1</sup> and I should be very grateful if you would be so kind as to have the formulations checked by the competent office—particularly the initial passage. The term “treaty” and the alternation between Holy See and State, which were present in the preliminary draft, were abandoned after lengthy discussion, because the Cardinal Secretary of State insisted by instruction of the Pope—very emotionally—on the word

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 348 and footnotes 1 and 2.

"concordat" and the precedence of the Holy See, pointing to the custom universally observed in the past in the case of concordats; actually this is also the case with the Italian Concordat. The recognition of the deanship of the Nuncio in Berlin had to be reinserted in article 3, because it had already been conceded in the course of the preliminary negotiations. The earlier article 31<sup>2</sup> was exchanged with article 32 for tactical reasons, in order to place at the end the discussion of removing the clergy from politics, a very difficult question for the Vatican, and to confront the Curia with the difficult decision whether it could take the responsibility for sacrificing all the concessions attained with difficulty in the earlier articles solely on account of article 32. Actually it did swallow this bitter article in the end.

Herr von Papen conducted the negotiations with skill and verve; to finish official negotiations for a concordat in four sessions is a record and something new; without the excellent preliminary work of Prelate Kaas this could not have been accomplished. Prelate Kaas was present at the last three sessions, and Archbishop Groeber of Freiburg was also present at those on Saturday and Sunday;<sup>3</sup> he was summoned by telegram at the desire of the Cardinal Secretary of State. The Archbishop displayed full understanding for the wishes of the Government and the necessities brought about by the new situation. In the case of article 31 he went to the greatest pains to save the further existence of the Jugend Kraft with its alleged 100,000 members, but stated very loyally that he would accept all the consequences of the concordat. I myself stated a number of times that I was not participating in the negotiations and intervened in the debate only when general questions came up for discussion and it seemed advisable to second Herr von Papen in particular in warding off attacks. The Cardinal Secretary of State was visibly influenced by reports, letters, and telegrams constantly being received concerning the arrest and maltreatment of the clergy, etc., as well as the latest foreign press propaganda. We countered these very sharply. As matters stand, the concordat can contribute importantly to suppression of the tendencies in the direction of a fight between Church and State suddenly appearing at home and to the general pacification. The Cardinal Secretary of State urgently suggested to Herr von Papen that he sign the concordat himself; I warmly supported this suggestion and refused Papen's friendly suggestion that I obtain authorization to sign with him.

With best regards, etc.

BERGEN

P. S. At his express request I accompanied Papen to the sessions with Pacelli.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 250 and footnote 3.

<sup>3</sup> i. e., July 1 and 2.



## No. 352

6153/E460820

*The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

URGENT

ROME (Quirinal), July 4, 1933—11:25 p. m.

No. 160 of July 4

Received July 5—3:05 a. m.

II Vat. 263.

For the Chancellor and Foreign Minister.

Mussolini received me today, asked in detail about the position respecting the negotiations for a concordat, and charged me to say to the Chancellor that in Germany's present isolated position it would be, in his opinion, an immense moral victory to persuade the Vatican to conclude a concordat. One would thereby win over Catholic opinion throughout the world. Mussolini concluded by saying: "I adjure you not to take off until the concordat is in the harbor." I have the impression that Mussolini urgently desires the strengthening of our moral position so that in the next negotiations on the basis of the Four Power Pact we too will be a valuable factor.

Mussolini anticipates the signing of the Four Power Pact in the middle of July, with the first meeting in August. In order to do this Germany must make concrete proposals on disarmament before that time. About this, as well as about the question of closer economic relations between Austria and Hungary and our two countries, I will report orally. Papen.

Regarding the last paragraph I refer to telegram No. 157 of June 30<sup>1</sup> [and] I 1084 of June 30.<sup>2</sup>

Vice Chancellor von Papen informed me of article 29 of the draft concordat as well as of the statement in the final protocol accepted by the Vatican respecting this text. From the point of view of the protection in church matters of the German minorities, especially in South Tirol, I regard the latter as very desirable in order to strengthen the known principles of the Vatican which, however, have not been very firmly upheld recently.

HASSELL

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<sup>1</sup> Document No. 343.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 343, footnote 3.

## No. 353

9995/E698032-33

*Circular of the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, July 6, 1933.  
e. o. W 4487.

With reference to circular instruction W 3891 of June 14, 1933.<sup>2</sup>

In the law of June 9, 1933, relating to payment obligations abroad the entry into force of the transfer deferment was scheduled for July 1, 1933. By inclusion of the grace period of 3 weeks, the World Economic Conference in London was to be given the opportunity to take up the transfer problem in the meantime. Since a solution of the problem was not found, the deferment of transfers entered into force on July 1, 1933. The Reichsbank has, however, meanwhile held conferences with the representatives of the foreign creditors in order to mitigate as much as possible the effects of the transfer deferment on the foreign creditors of Germany. The result of the conversations is to be seen from enclosure 1.<sup>3</sup> In explanation of the principles set forth in the enclosure, the President of the Reichsbank made the statements concerning the 6-months' transfer agreement contained in enclosure 2, in which the principles governing the attitude of the Reichsbank are set forth in detail.

In extending the transfer agreement over a period of 6 months, assurance is to be obtained that, despite the distribution of the maturity dates of the various coupons over various periods, each creditor will receive once in 6 months the payments provided for in the transfer agreement. Thus an equable treatment of all creditors is assured. The Reichsbank has also, despite the urging of the Swiss and the Dutch, adhered to the principle of nondiscrimination. President of the Reichsbank Dr. Schacht properly, however, stressed the fact that the German side does not fail to sympathize with the viewpoint of the gold currency countries, particularly Switzerland and the Netherlands, according to which those creditor countries that ruin German exports by dumping as a result of currency depreciation [*Valutadumping*], did not have the same claim to debt service by Germany as those creditor countries that permit German goods to come in.

By order :  
ULRICH

<sup>1</sup> This circular was directed to all Missions and Career Consulates.

<sup>2</sup> W 3891, a circular of the Foreign Ministry, is not printed (9119/E640838-44).

<sup>3</sup> The enclosures contained news agency (WTB No. 1589 of July 1) and newspaper accounts of the negotiations with the foreign creditors. They are not reprinted here, but are filmed on 9119/E640918-21, and 9995/E698034-41.

## No. 354

6684/H097013-18

*Minister Zechlin to Ministerialdirektor Meyer*

KAUNAS, July 6, 1933.

DEAR MEYER: As I already reported by telegraph,<sup>1</sup> Lithuania acceded yesterday in London to the Protocol on the definition of an aggressor.<sup>2</sup> This fact would not have been needed for one to view the development of the eastern European situation with the greatest concern, even from this location. For during the past weeks it has been very evident how unsatisfactorily the situation has been developing in eastern Europe. German-Russian relations seem to me at the present time to be rather cool; the small effect achieved in Russia by the ratification of the Berlin Protocol<sup>3</sup> was indicative of that, and also the over-sharp Russian reaction to the unfortunate Hugenberg memorandum<sup>4</sup> was doubtless in good part dictated by tactics aimed at withdrawing from us. On the other hand one can no longer speak of a Russian-Polish antagonism. After all, it was always to be expected that a Russian-Polish rapprochement would alter the situation in eastern Europe in what is for us, I think I can say, a disastrous manner. This has now become reality owing to the events of the last few days in London. Though concern about Japan may play a more or less important role in Russian policy, for me there is no doubt that Litvinov's activity is largely conditioned by his present anti-German attitude. Otherwise why is it suddenly possible to overcome the Russian-Rumanian antagonism? The participation of Poland and the satisfaction in France speak for themselves.

In the last few days I had already been marveling that Lithuania had been the only eastern European state in London able to keep out of this anti-German company extending from Estonia to Rumania and Czechoslovakia; I intended to write you by courier that this situation could not last long; now this is already outdated by the news mentioned at the beginning. The political importance of the Lithuanian accession is very difficult to assess at the moment; while one cannot of course conclude as yet that Lithuania has already joined an anti-German coalition, the element of danger in the situation, that finally Lithuania too will not be able to resist the general pressure, is nevertheless vividly demonstrated.

I should like to make all the more emphatically the request that I intended to address to you in any case: The political tactics which we have been using up to now toward Lithuania are no longer any

<sup>1</sup> Kaunas telegram No. 30 of July 6 (9756/E685724).

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 342 and footnote 3.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 212.

<sup>4</sup> See documents Nos. 325 and 331.

good. In my opinion it is impossible today to let everything depend on whether our negotiations with Russia on the hog quota are successful.<sup>5</sup> You were already rather skeptical in this regard in May when I was more optimistic directly after the ratification of the Berlin Protocol; today I no longer have any hope that the Russians will perform this political transaction with us.

I therefore believe that in this regard we must make ourselves independent of the Russians and must take the Lithuanian hog quota on the German market after all. Of course the negotiations with the Russians can be continued, and all the better if they relieve us of the hogs afterwards after all. But we should no longer stake everything on this card and we also cannot let matters drift any longer until it pleases the Russians to say "yes." In that way our German-Lithuanian relations depend entirely on the favor of the Russians.

In my last official report <sup>6</sup> I pointed out that, even from the narrower point of view of specific German-Lithuanian interests and of the domestic political development here, considerable dangers are gradually resulting from our present delaying tactics: the alien regulations of June 10 are only the first rehearsal. But the general situation with respect to foreign policy seems to me to speak even much more strongly for pushing matters ahead as quickly as possible.

As far as accepting the 100-150,000 hogs on the German market is concerned, to me the domestic political situation seems exceptionally favorable. I was in Königsberg on Monday and Tuesday of this week <sup>7</sup> and spoke there with the National Socialist Gauleiter and Oberpräsident Koch and General von Brauchitsch about the situation. Herr Koch has resolved to exert all his not inconsiderable influence on the Reich Chancellor to get the hogs admitted to Germany. How and where they will be accommodated he considers a question of secondary importance, as we do also. To me the best solution of this question, by the way, would seem to be to provide our unemployed with cheap meat next winter. Hugenberg's withdrawal from the Reich Food Ministry may also have relieved the domestic political situation even further.<sup>8</sup> At any rate I believe that the Foreign Ministry ought to utilize the fact that strong forces in the National Socialist party as well as the Reichswehr Ministry <sup>9</sup> are pulling together with us in this matter and ought to bring about the solution to the hog question through a decision to be obtained from the Reich Chancellor.

As I gather from my talks with Oberpräsident Koch, the National

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<sup>5</sup> See document No. 284, footnote 11.

<sup>6</sup> Not found.

<sup>7</sup> i. e., July 3 and 4.

<sup>8</sup> See document No. 338.

<sup>9</sup> A letter from the Reichswehr Ministry to the Foreign Ministry on June 30 had emphasized the desirability of good relations with Lithuania in the military field and had advocated that this be taken into account in economic negotiations with that country (8919/E622650).

Socialist party will naturally ask in that connection just as we do what political return Lithuania will make. I do not believe we will make any great impression in party circles with the many details of our official program. So far I have always taken the position in this regard that one should refrain from formulated demands of a general political nature; a de facto though not de jure economic and political dependence of Lithuania will evolve of itself. The term "customs union" has often been held out to me by the German side. I have always stressed in reply that it must not come from the German side and particularly not now. It remains a great and unfortunately rather acute problem, to be sure, how the differences in opinion arising from the Memel Statute<sup>10</sup> can be settled between us and Lithuania. So far nothing better has occurred to me on this score than that we help to put across as thoroughly as possible the principle of "bilateralism," i. e., the two-sided friendly understanding between us and Lithuania, as far-reaching as possible and preceding all decisions. I already spoke about this in a general way recently with Lozoraitis; I told him that if Lithuania intended to settle unilaterally the German-Lithuanian controversies arising from the Statute it would strike at the root of the German-Lithuanian settlement and endanger it at its very beginning.

In particular, however, it seems to me at the moment of the greatest importance for both domestic and foreign policy that we continue to press the hog question independently of the Russians, and I wanted to request this of you most urgently with these lines.

Yours, etc.

ZECHLIN

<sup>10</sup> The Memel Convention and Statute of May 8, 1924; for text see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. XXIX, p. 85.

## No. 355

9245/E652928-30

*A Member of the German Delegation to the World Economic Conference to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 110 of July 7

German Delegation, LONDON, July 7, 1933.

Received July 7—1:15 p. m.

W 4605.

With reference to your telegram No. 65 of July 6 (P 5562).<sup>1</sup>

Russian attacks on the German delegation, of which that in *Pravda*

<sup>1</sup> Not found. According to the registers, this telegram forwarded to London Moscow telegram No. 156 of July 5 (3177/684359) which summarized reports from the Tass representative in London, as published in *Pravda*, attacking the German delegation at the World Economic Conference in connection with the Hugenberg memorandum and the statements by Posse referred to in the document printed.

on July 5 is already the third, are in our opinion to such an extent indicative of a pattern that we think it absolutely necessary to provide protection for the German delegation against a continuation of such methods. The possibilities offered here for friendly talks with the Russians continue to be used, but they are limited in their effectiveness. We also find ourselves here in a difficult situation because the Russians constantly draw on the Hugenberg memorandum<sup>2</sup> for their anti-German reports. We believe Rosenblum<sup>3</sup> is behind the last Tass report, just as he was behind former attacks; Posse has repeatedly found him to be the evil genius of the Russian delegation. As has been said in earlier statements from here to you about the facts underlying the Russian reports, so now again the Tass correspondent has arbitrarily and maliciously twisted Posse's statements. In Krogmann's subcommittee for commercial policy the Turkish representative, Sami Bey, Chief Inspector at the Commercial Bank of Turkey, stated that Turkey, too, like other countries, was in a state of evolution in which the establishment of new industries was necessary for maintaining and establishing an economic equilibrium within the country and for the employment of its people. Within the framework of lengthy statements about commercial policy Posse on June 30 took this remark as an occasion to stress, as he had previously done elsewhere, the basic idea of Reich Chancellor Hitler in the following remarks: Posse regarded the establishment constantly of new industries to be an absolute misfortune; it could only accelerate the fatal development of the economic crisis, and in the long run would certainly be without benefit to the country concerned. He even went further: As long as no understanding was reached between the large so-called industrial states regarding their deliveries to the undeveloped areas there would be no end to the existing unsatisfactory state of affairs. Aside from the effects of a general recovery, which one hoped would come soon, there was only one ray of hope: the establishment of a reasonable division of labor by means of bilateral commercial treaties. If a country was willing to accept certain products of the treaty partner by virtue of such treaties, then the latter would also be willing by means of tariff concessions to provide access into his country for the products of my domestic production which interested me most, and he would thus be able to dispense with the protection of the branch of the economy producing these products now or in the future. On July 3, when Posse was absent, the Turkish Ambassador in London, Münir Bey, stated, perhaps not without being influenced by Russia: If Posse aimed at joining the industrial countries together in a united front, then the Turkish delegation had to point out that it was the purpose of the Conference to create a har-

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 312.

<sup>3</sup> Boris Rosenblum, an expert of the Soviet delegation.

monious link between all of the participating nations. The German representative only replied briefly that Posse would explain his position more precisely after his return, but that he had certainly not had the intention of setting up a united front of the industrial states against the agricultural states.<sup>4</sup>

Owing to the development in the work of the Conference with which you are familiar, we here are no longer in a position to continue the discussion with the Turks at the Conference; we would be (evidently "grateful" is missing) if at your end the Turkish Ambassador were informed of the course of the discussion here as described above and if he were told that Germany certainly does not have the intention of forming any front of industrial states against Turkey, but that it is our vital interest to work toward the objective of halting the economic mischief of constantly establishing new branches of industry, which has been going on in the world up to now, and that the process be reversed. This would also serve the self-interest of the countries creating such industries. We would be grateful to be informed about the further development of the matter.<sup>5</sup>

KROGMANN

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<sup>4</sup>For the text of these exchanges between German and Turkish delegates which took place in the subcommission on Commercial Policy of the Economic Commission of the World Economic Conference, June 29–July 3, see League of Nations, *Journal of the Monetary and Economic Conference, London, 1933*, Nos. 18, 19, and 21, pp. 124–125, 133–134, and 138, respectively.

<sup>5</sup>In telegram No. 71 of July 12 Köpke informed the delegation that the Embassy in Turkey, having reported attacks by the Turkish press in connection with Posse's statements, had been instructed to take a stand against "tendentious reports" (9245/E652936–37). Instructions along these lines were sent to the Embassy in Turkey in telegram No. 86 of July 12 (9245/E652937–39). Cf. also document No. 394.

## No. 356

8115/E579898

### *The Ambassador to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

No. 43 of July 8

ROME, July 8, 1933—7:40 p. m.

Received July 8—9:15 p. m.

II Vat. 271.

For the Foreign Minister.

Concordat was initialed this evening at 6 o'clock by the Vice Chancellor and the Cardinal Secretary of State.<sup>1</sup>

BERGEN

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<sup>1</sup>See document No. 348, footnote 1. No report of the discussions between the time of Buttman's arrival in Rome on July 6 with the German comments on the draft Concordat and the initialing of the Concordat on July 8 has been found. The text of the Concordat as initialed was sent as an enclosure to a letter from Bergen to Neurath on July 8 (3241/702262). It is filmed on 6153/E460883–905.

## No. 357

6691/H098154-57

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director of Department IV*

BERLIN, July 10, 1933.

IV Chi. 1620 III.

Director General Eltze<sup>1</sup> and Major Pabst<sup>2</sup> of Rhein-Metall told me the following on June 30:

The Chinese Minister of Finance T. V. Soong, intended, through the intermediary of the China representatives of Rhein-Metall, the Herren Carlowitz & Co., to give Rhein-Metall an order for delivery of machine guns in the value of 10 million reichsmarks. Delivery was to be made over 3 years, payment in quarterly installments over 6 years. Rhein-Metall counted on the sure receipt of the installment payments during the first 3 years in the total amount of 5 million reichsmarks. Since the actual cost to the firm of the whole transaction amounted to 7 million reichsmarks, Rhein-Metall wanted to request a Reich guarantee against loss in the amount of 2 million reichsmarks. If the plant were granted the requested guarantee against loss, this fact would be kept strictly confidential as respects the Chinese. The gentlemen mentioned very confidentially that for reasons of defense policy the Reichswehr Ministry took great interest in the delivery being effected.

I replied to the gentlemen that the Foreign Ministry, as was known, opposed the delivery of war material to China because experience had shown that by such deliveries Germany came under suspicion of taking the side of one of the belligerent parties in the continual Chinese civil wars. The delivery of weapons had a few years ago almost led to a boycott of German goods in southern China. Besides, with the tense Chinese-Japanese relations, arms transactions with China were not unobjectionable politically. If the Reich gave a guarantee against loss for such transactions there could be serious foreign policy complications in case of an indiscretion, which was always to be feared when the Chinese were parties to a transaction. In a discussion that took place a few days ago between the Foreign Ministry and the departments concerned, it was agreed that deliveries of war material must remain excluded, as in the past, from the granting of Reich guarantees against loss.

On July 6 Major Pabst called on me again to tell me that Director General Eltze had discussed the affair with State Secretary Feder in the Reich Economics Ministry and had thereby found a way to make it possible to grant a Reich guarantee against loss. According to

<sup>1</sup> Hans Eltze. Cf. ser. D, vol. III, document No. 80.

<sup>2</sup> Waldemar Pabst, a former German Army officer, had been deported from Austria in 1930 because of his activities as a leader of the Heimwehr.



this, Solothurn would appear to the Chinese as the seller of arms, whereas Rhein-Metall would appear merely as the seller of material (semi-finished goods, etc.) to Solothurn. For these sales of material Rhein-Metall was to receive promissory notes from Solothurn in the amount of 3 million reichsmarks, which Solothurn for its part would receive from the Chinese Government. The Reich guarantee against loss would refer merely to these promissory notes as means of payment for the deliveries from Rhein-Metall to Solothurn, but not to the transaction between Solothurn and the Chinese Government. The Reich guarantee against loss requested for the promissory notes was to be restricted to a loss up to 2 million reichsmarks.

I replied to Herr Pabst that I would submit Rhein-Metall's request to a higher authority for decision.

In my humble opinion this course proposed by Herr Eltze is also not feasible. Even if the German Reich granted a Reich guarantee against loss only for the promissory notes, without reference to the arms delivery transaction behind them, the connection between the guarantee and this transaction would after all be too obvious for one to be able to plead ignorance in case of complications. In the present difficult economic situation it is easy to understand that German industrial and commercial firms interest themselves in the arms trade with China, and to a certain degree this is surely in the interest of defense policy. On the other hand, arms delivery transactions are considered in China quite generally to be disreputable, no matter who the recipient is, and in the past have repeatedly led to political and economic difficulties. Since the Reich Government has always very specifically kept its distance from these transactions, it has been in the position when appropriate to deny categorically any official support of these transactions. If in the present case it should depart from this practice it would deprive itself of this possibility for the future. However, there is certain to be indiscretion, and this could involve not only political complications but could also induce other firms of the German munitions industry to ask for the granting of Reich guarantees against loss for their munitions transactions with China, referring to this incident.

I therefore request authorization to give Rhein-Metall a refusal.

MICHELSSEN

Submitted herewith to the acting State Secretary with the request for his decision.<sup>a</sup>

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<sup>a</sup> Marginal note: "I concur. Köpke, acting, July 15."

## No. 358

6058/E447307-09

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

No. 165 of July 11

ROME (Quir.), July 11, 1933—9:15 p. m.

Received July 12—2:00 a. m.

II It. 919.

1. Suvich has just told me that they had come to the conclusion in Rome that the Pact should be signed as speedily as possible in Rome and without formality by the Ambassadors. England and France and, he assumes, probably Germany, too, will be agreeable to that. Because of various other arrangements, they would appreciate it if the signing could take place as early as Friday or, at latest, Saturday, and for this reason he asked that I have my full powers sent by air mail.

2. The Italian Government informed the English and French Embassies by a note verbale of July 7<sup>1</sup> of the German note (instruction II It. 833 of June 26<sup>2</sup>). Suvich had previously read this note verbale to the Ambassadors in order to see whether, in their opinion, there would be any replies on the part of France and England. Both the Ambassadors thought they could state that there would not be any. At the same time the Italian Government acknowledged the receipt of my note by a note verbale of July 8.<sup>3</sup>

The text of the Italian note verbale to the French and English Embassies refers first of all to documents in the French Blue Book<sup>4</sup> regarding correspondence with the Governments of the Little Entente and Poland and then continues: "The German Government thought it discerned in the references contained in these documents to the interpretation of article 19 of the Covenant and the Pact a procedure which is not calculated to serve the purposes of the Pact, and has addressed to the Italian Government a note expressing these fears and stating that the purpose of the Pact can only be achieved if the four Western Powers are firm in their intention to treat all questions to which the Pact refers in a spirit of sincere cooperation and mutual confidence. It expresses the conviction that the questions concerning the interpretation and application of the Pact can be settled only by mutual agreement and not unilaterally by one of the four signatory

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (8908/E621731).

<sup>2</sup>Document No. 337.

<sup>3</sup>Not printed (8908/E621732). Italian language texts of this note and of the Italian note of July 7 (see footnote 1) were sent by Hassell to the Foreign Ministry with a cover note under date of July 11 (8908/E621730).

<sup>4</sup>See document No. 300.

Governments. The Italian Government, referring to the communication made by the French Government at the time,<sup>5</sup> replied to the German Government to the effect that the only obligation which the French Government had assumed toward the Rumanian, Czechoslovakian, Yugoslavian, and Polish Governments was to remain faithful to the principle of unanimity in connection with the application of article 19 of the League of Nations Covenant to territorial questions, and that therefore the Italian Government considered the fears of the German Government unfounded. On the other hand, the Italian Government is of the opinion (and has also so informed the German Government) that [if] such differences of opinion regarding the interpretation of the Four Power Pact appear, it is in accordance with its spirit that their solution should be sought at meetings of the four Powers."

The paragraph regarding the Italian reply to the German Government is in conformity with the note verbale delivered to me, the text of which I am transmitting by courier. Upon receipt of the Italian note verbale, I stressed expressly that I considered it only as an acknowledgment of my note and not an actual reply; Suvich stated his agreement with this.

Substantively, I think that the way in which our request has been taken care of is adequate in the circumstances, and in conformity with our interests in so far as the Italian Government expressly holds the French Government to the statement made at the time by the French Ambassador.<sup>6</sup>

3. Suvich finally stated that immediately after the signing, practical work on the basis of the Four Power Pact had to begin. I asked whether he had in mind a very early meeting. He replied in the affirmative, with the addition, however, that careful diplomatic preparation would be necessary.

4. In reply to a question as to negotiations with France, Suvich stated that he could tell me positively that nothing at all was decided regarding a visit from Daladier, nor were any negotiations of a positive kind taking place. When I referred to the fact that there was talk of an Adriatic nonaggression pact between France, Yugoslavia, and Italy, he replied that there was no question of one.

HASSELL

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<sup>5</sup> See document No. 321.

<sup>6</sup> Referring to this paragraph in Hassell's telegram Neurath gave instructions to inform Hassell "that he considered satisfactory the way in which Germany's request had been taken care of" and that Hassell was authorized to sign, even if the dispatch of the full powers now awaiting Hindenburg's signature should be delayed (Völcker's memorandum of July 12: 6058/E447317).

## No. 359

3650/813090-94

*Minutes of a Conference of Heads of Departments, Under the  
Chairmanship of the Reich Chancellor, on July 12, 1933, 5:00 p. m.*

Rk. 9036.

*Present:*

Reich Chancellor	Adolf Hitler
Vice Chancellor	von Papen
Foreign Minister	Freiherr von Neurath
Reich Minister of Interior	Dr. Frick
Reichswehr Minister	von Blomberg
Reich Minister of Public En- lightenment and Propaganda	Dr. Goebbels
Reich Minister for Air	Göring
Colonel Haselmayr (retired)	
Ambassador Nadolny	
Ministerialdirektor Fisch	
Major Reinecke (retired)	
Dr. Petzold	
Recording Official:	Oberregierungsrat Dr. Thomsen

Subject: Status of the Disarmament Question and Guide Lines for  
Disarmament Propaganda.

Before proceeding with the agenda the Reich Chancellor announced that, according to information received from Herr Fritz Thyssen, Polish interested parties were now willing for political reasons to take over the mines in eastern Upper Silesia. This would not injure Germany either economically or politically, and it was therefore advisable to conclude the transaction.<sup>1</sup>

The Foreign Minister concurred in this view, with the reservation that the necessary safeguards be arranged with respect to the Reich Germans remaining in Polish Upper Silesia. Moreover, advantage must be taken of the opportunity to make this sale as much of a political transaction as possible.

The members of the Reich Cabinet present took note of this and approved.

The Reichswehr Minister opened the discussion by stating that the disarmament propaganda hitherto carried on by Germany did not need to be changed fundamentally in view of the recess of the Conference that had now taken place. We had hitherto directed our propaganda mainly toward demanding the disarmament of others. It would be advisable from now on to place our demand for our own

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<sup>1</sup> On the background of this transaction, see document No. 473.

security in the foreground. Precautions also had to be taken in time to eliminate the danger that, in case of an adjournment of the Disarmament Conference, demand will be raised in the League Council for an investigation directed against Germany. In the event that such a demand should come before The Hague Court of Arbitration it was necessary, remembering The Hague negotiations on the German-Austrian Union,<sup>2</sup> to see to it in time that the representatives of the Council Powers in the League Council were appropriately influenced.

The Reich Minister for Air requested that in the propaganda especially strong emphasis be placed on the following considerations: flights over German territory by propaganda planes and the complete defenselessness of Germany against such attacks. On the other hand, it should be noted that Austria, contrary to the provision of the Treaty of Trianon [sic], had bought five police planes in England with England's permission. England herself had thereby violated the principle laid down in the Treaties of Versailles and Trianon.

The Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda emphasized that the important thing above all was to camouflage the disarmament propaganda toward the outside world. To that end he had negotiated successfully with the already existing associations. The Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda read a short statement (cf. enclosure<sup>3</sup>) showing the result of these negotiations. Under the leadership of the Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland, a Reich League for German security would be formed.

The Reich Chancellor made the following general statements about the organization of foreign propaganda:

There must be created abroad a propaganda organization which would establish direct contacts with all the important people abroad. Germany today could not limit herself to the normal procedure which consisted in having certain official views transmitted abroad. Rather, it was necessary to strive by scientific methods to penetrate public opinion abroad by a skillful exploitation of natural opportunities for exerting influence. This applied especially to the countries still democratically governed. In this connection it was naturally necessary to spend considerable sums of money. It would be advisable, moreover, to keep a card file in Berlin of all persons in public life abroad, having in mind especially all journalists known to be open to bribes. These principles were already applicable to the disarmament propaganda. The Ministry of Propaganda had to set up the necessary organization.

<sup>2</sup> This refers to the hearings before the Permanent Court of International Justice in July and August 1931 when the League Council had requested an advisory opinion on the project of an Austro-German Customs Union announced in March 1931. The Court handed down a decision on Sept. 5, 1931, to the effect that the projected Customs Union was incompatible with the Geneva Protocol of Oct. 4, 1922.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

With respect to this, the Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda stated that he had already been working for several months on the systematic development of such an organization. This organization could not be purely official but had to embrace the cooperation of all circles which had contacts abroad; in this connection he was thinking especially of the representatives of business, science and art, who for professional reasons often traveled abroad.

In this connection the Vice Chancellor mentioned the German-French Study Committee, recommending its participation in the propaganda. This committee had already done outstanding work in past years, as had also the German associations which had led the fight against the war guilt lie—to which reference was made by the representative of the Wehrpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP.<sup>4</sup>

The Reichswehr Minister expressed the wish that conferences of heads of departments on foreign propaganda be held again as frequently as possible. The next conference of heads of departments ought to deal with Henderson's visit to Berlin.<sup>5</sup>

The Reich Chancellor approved this suggestion. At the end of the discussion he stated that it was desirable and important to study from political points of view all the trade agreements which Germany had concluded.

Recorded:  
THOMSEN

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<sup>4</sup> Colonel Haselmayr.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 370.

## No. 360

2406/510690-91

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, July 13, 1933.  
RM1015.

The French Ambassador, who called on me this morning, turned in the course of his conversation to what he termed the rearmament measures of the German Government which were known in precise detail in France. They knew from the numerous reports received by the French authorities from Germany to what extent the military training of the entire youth was being carried out and arms manufacture was being increased.<sup>1</sup> I replied to M. Poncet that I was, to be sure, firmly convinced that the French Government received a great many reports about alleged military preparations in Germany, but that I had just as many doubts about the reliability of this material. At

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<sup>1</sup> For an account of information available to French military authorities at that time, see Georges Castellon, *Le Réarmement clandestin du Reich 1930-1935* (Paris, 1954), particularly pp. 89-90, 267-268, 349-350.

any rate, I knew nothing about a rearmament, and I therefore denied it. M. Poncet then also came to speak of the question of a direct understanding between France and Germany on the defense problem, whereupon I told him he knew that I had always termed such an agreement desirable and had also made attempts to bring about such a direct agreement time and again. Unfortunately this had not received support from the French side. I hoped that after the signing of the four power pact perhaps a way could be found for a direct understanding during the meetings that could then be expected.

v. N[EURATH]

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[EDITORS' NOTE. In the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs' publication *Official Documents Concerning Polish-German and Polish-Soviet Relations 1933-1939*, pages 15-16, there is a report by the Polish Minister on an interview with Hitler on July 13, 1933. No record of this interview has been found in the German Foreign Ministry files.]

## No. 361

8626/E604585-86

### *The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

I 1162

ROME, July 13, 1933.

Received July 17.

III O 2549.

### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Statements by Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü.

During a reception at the Turkish Embassy today I had a lengthy conversation with Tevfik Rüştü. Fairly soon the Turkish Foreign Minister came to speak of the new regime in Germany that he, being himself a nationalist, of course understood in every way and could respect even though it had to be admitted that in the first period numerous mistakes had been made. With respect to these "mistakes" he expressed himself in a rather presumptuous way, and basically without understanding, and then he concentrated his attacks on the Hugenberg memorandum<sup>1</sup> that had had the effect of a bombshell in London on all the countries of the east. It was not claiming too much to say that this memorandum had helped give the impetus for the policy of mutual security as expressed in the eastern pacts just concluded.<sup>2</sup> When I objected that the memorandum had been circu-

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 312.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 342 and footnote 3.

lated in an incorrect form and had been completely misunderstood, and that in particular there was no question of German colonization in the east, Tevfik Rüştü said that might be so, but that then it was all the less understandable why if we—needlessly—wanted to bring up these problems at the World Economic Conference we did not at least inform the eastern countries concerned in advance and provide them with an authentic text. I replied that I did not want to defend here the methods followed, all the less since Herr Hugenberg was no longer Minister, as was known, but that after all it was the real text of the memorandum that was politically decisive; therefore I could not exactly understand why people were still excited about this matter. The Minister replied that it was still a fact that a German Minister had spoken of economic expansion to the east, even though in vague form—a thrust that could not but provoke distrust and resistance among those affected. At any rate he could only say that according to his knowledge of things strong ill-feeling had been left behind in Moscow and that an effort should be made to remove it. In Turkey that was not the case, since they knew very well that the Hugenberg memorandum was not in accordance with the general German view. Also he wanted to stress specifically that the eastern pacts—even though the Hugenberg memorandum might have given an impetus to them—were in no way directed against Germany or against the Four Power Pact. Rather, they were meant to supplement the Four Power Pact and thus constituted, like the latter, a step along the way to complete pacification of Europe. It was to this effect that he had also furnished Mussolini with explanations which he hoped had dissipated the latter's fears.

HASSELL

## No. 362

8118/E581427-30

*Extract From the Minutes of the Conference of Ministers on  
July 14, 1933*<sup>1</sup>

Rk. 9841.

*(Point 17 of the Agenda)*

Reich Concordat

The Reich Minister of Interior<sup>2</sup> discussed the content of the proposal that article 1 of the draft be omitted.<sup>3</sup>

The Vice Chancellor stated regarding the proposal that it had been necessary to define the functions of the Reich and State on the one

<sup>1</sup> The complete minutes of this conference, including a list of those present, are filmed on 3598/793208-50.

<sup>2</sup> Wilhelm Frick.

<sup>3</sup> The reference is to article 1 of the draft law for adoption of the Concordat (8115/E579899-900). The law was reworded and issued in one article (Menshausen memorandum of July 13, 1933: 8115/E579903-05).



hand and the Church on the other. The Church ought to have some freedom of movement. On the other hand, the sphere of authority of the State ought to be clearly worked out in the Concordat. Objections to the conclusion of the Concordat had been addressed to the Pope by all sorts of sources. However, he had insisted on the conclusion of the Concordat because he wanted to come to an agreement with Italy and Germany as the countries which in his opinion represented the nucleus of the Christian world. He himself had also brought the distinct impression from Rome that the Curia was agreeable to creating a new concordat law after some time, utilizing the experiences made in the meantime. Mussolini, too, had always urgently recommended the conclusion of the Concordat,<sup>4</sup> because he felt that this would represent a considerable strengthening of the German position.

The Vice Chancellor pointed to the particularly noteworthy passages in the Concordat according to which the Church stated its willingness to entrust all associations to the State (Reich), with the exception of the purely religio-moral and charitable associations. The elimination of the clergy from politics and the introduction of an oath of loyalty for the bishops and a prayer for the State, the introduction of independent pastoral care in the armed forces with an independent Army Bishop, the reference to possible general compulsory military service, and the treatment accorded German minority rights were particularly noteworthy provisions of the Reich Concordat.

The Vice Chancellor suggested for decision by the Cabinet that two small changes be made in the Concordat: to provide in article 14 for notification of the bishops to the Reichsstatthalters "with the Governments" instead of "of the Governments."<sup>5</sup> There should be inserted in article 17 (continued retention of state buildings): "without prejudice to existing treaties," as was also done in the three Länder Concordats.<sup>6</sup>

The Reich Chancellor rejected a debate on the particulars of the Reich Concordat. He was of the opinion that one should see only the great success here. In the Reich Concordat, Germany had been given a chance<sup>7</sup> and an area of confidence had been created which was particularly significant in the urgent fight against the international Jews. Possible shortcomings in the Concordat could be rectified later when the foreign policy situation was better.

The Reich Chancellor saw three great advantages in the conclusion of the Reich Concordat:

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<sup>4</sup> See document No. 352.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. document No. 348, footnote 9.

<sup>6</sup> Those with Bavaria (1924), Prussia (1929), and Baden (1932).

<sup>7</sup> Thus in the original.

1. that the Vatican had negotiated at all, while they operated, specially in Austria, on the assumption that National Socialism was non-Christian and inimical to the Church;

2. that the Vatican could be persuaded to bring about a good relationship with this purely national German State. He, the Reich Chancellor, would not have considered it possible even a short time ago that the Church would be willing to obligate the bishops to this State. The act that this had now been done was certainly an unreserved recognition of the present regime;

3. that with the Concordat, the Church withdrew from activity in associations and parties, e. g., also abandoned the Christian labor unions. This, too, he, the Reich Chancellor, would not have considered possible even a few months ago. Even the dissolution of the Center could be termed final only with the conclusion of the Concordat, now that the Vatican had ordered the permanent exclusion of the priests from party politics.

That the objective which he, the Reich Chancellor, had always been striving for, namely an agreement with the Curia, had been attained so much faster than he had imagined even on January 30; this was such an indescribable success that all critical misgivings had to be withdrawn in the face of it.

The Reich Minister of Interior requested that the old wording of article 17 be retained and that article 14 be formulated in accordance with the proposals of the Vice Chancellor. He also proposed an editorial change in article 16, which the Vice Chancellor agreed to.

The Cabinet thereupon agreed to the conclusion of the Reich Concordat, but reserved publication until the Reich Concordat had been ratified.

### No. 363

3086/618590-91

#### *Memorandum by the Director of Department II*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, July 14, 1933.

[II Ung. 426.]<sup>2</sup>

Pursuant to a new directive from Budapest, the Hungarian Minister today conveyed to me some information regarding the visit of Hungarian Minister President Gömbös in Vienna.<sup>3</sup> At the outset the Minister pointed to the official communiqué, known here, which exhaustively presents the facts and the evaluation of the visit on the part of the Hungarian officials. Comments in a different vein, such as those of the *Pester Lloyd*, were private machinations and, to the extent that they contradict the official releases, were not in accordance with the facts. The Minister stated that Gömbös was satisfied with

<sup>1</sup>The copy is not signed at the usual place, but Köpke's signature is at the top of the document.

<sup>2</sup>The file number is from another copy of this document.

<sup>3</sup>Gömbös was in Vienna on July 9.

the outcome of his visit. The clarification of urgent economic questions, which he had desired, had been fully achieved. Austria's rapprochement with the French group had been blocked. Dollfuss had given an assurance that he would keep the Hungarian Government informed about all Central European questions. In this way Gömbös hoped to be able to exert decisive influence on Austria in the future and to prevent her from slipping away to the group under French influence. The Minister, on official instructions, expressed the desire that Germany would do her part in supporting and facilitating this Hungarian effort, which served the common interest. Hungary would be grateful if anything likely to drive Austria into France's arms would be avoided on Germany's part, too. Gömbös had left no doubt in Dollfuss' mind that Hungary was Germany's friend and would always remain so.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> For Dollfuss' account of the Gömbös visit to Vienna, cf. Paul R. Sweet, "Mussolini and Dollfuss" in Julius Braunthal, *The Tragedy of Austria* (London, 1948), pp. 191-192.

## No. 364

9151/E643828

### *Minute by an Official of Department II*

BERLIN, July 15, 1933.  
e. o. II Ts. 857.

The Czechoslovak Minister, Mastný, called on acting State Secretary Köpke this morning on instructions of his Government and reported that the step taken by the German Chargé d'Affaires (see II Ts. 730<sup>1</sup> and 804<sup>2</sup>) with the Czechoslovak Government in the matter of the conviction of the Reich German National Socialists in Czechoslovakia had created a strong impression and had been received with full understanding of the gravity of the situation created by these verdicts.

Both M. Krofta and particularly M. Beneš realized that this action by the courts put a severe strain on German-Czechoslovak relations and they were prepared to give consideration to the German representations to a very large extent. To be sure, a direct interference with judicial procedure was not possible. It was therefore intended to settle such cases in the future as much as possible by administrative measures and not let them reach the courts at all.

Minister Mastný also asked in conclusion to be permitted to refrain from issuing an official written statement for the Czechoslovak Gov-

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 334, footnote 5.

<sup>2</sup> Letter, dated July 5 (9151/E644015-17), from Hüffer to Holzhausen, the Chargé d'Affaires in Prague, dealing with the timing of the official step taken in accordance with the instruction of July 4 referred to in footnote 5 to document No. 334.

ernment in this matter since this would encounter difficulties of domestic policy, but he again stressed the fact that the Czechoslovak Government had the good will to remedy matters.

HÜFFER

## No. 365

8115/E579909

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 172 of July 15

ROME (Quirinal), July 15, 1933.

Received July 15—7:15 p. m.

II Vat. 288.

On the occasion of the signature of the Four Power Pact, Mussolini asked me to express to the Chancellor and the Vice Chancellor his great satisfaction at the conclusion of the Concordat,<sup>1</sup> which in today's world situation he regarded as a great success. It was of very great importance for Germany not to have the organized world power of the Catholic Church against her. Together with the Four Power Pact the Concordat would ease Germany's position appreciably. In a corresponding sort of effort he intended in the immediate future to strive to come quickly to an agreement with Russia, which in his opinion would also be in the German interest.<sup>2</sup> Concerning the negotiations he would inform me in more detail in the coming weeks.

HASSELL

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 371.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. document No. 368 and footnote 6.

## No. 366

9151/E643829-31

*The Chargé d'Affaires in Czechoslovakia to the Foreign Ministry*

A. II. e. Asch.

PRAGUE, July 15, 1933.

Received July 16.

II Ts. 859.

### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Proceedings against German citizens by the Czechoslovak judicial authorities.

With reference to my dispatch A. II e. Asch. of July 13.<sup>1</sup>

In a meeting I had with Krofta yesterday afternoon at the French

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (9151/E643825-27).

Legation here he told me, requesting a strictly confidential treatment of the matter, that he had in the meanwhile succeeded in restraining to a certain degree the exaggerated chauvinism of public prosecutors and judicial authorities with respect to Reich citizens living here.<sup>2</sup> Some days ago an understanding was reached between the Foreign Ministry and the domestic departments, to the effect that the Foreign Ministry was to be consulted before any citizen of the Reich was indicted for a political offense. Krofta said that he would advocate that German citizens residing here should be prosecuted only if they should engage, here or in Germany, whether orally or in writing, in political activity. They should no longer have to answer for mere connection with the National Socialist party or *gleichgeschaltet* organizations, or for any legal activity as Reich citizens. Krofta could not find anything to answer me when I called the Pilsen<sup>3</sup> and Cheb<sup>4</sup> verdicts plain miscarriage of justice and for his part explained them by the general uneasiness which the German revolution had aroused here in the beginning. This uneasiness, Krofta continued, had now largely subsided, so that he hoped that calmer practices would now prevail, as they did with respect to the societies of the German community at the time. In this connection, Krofta again mentioned the worries of the Foreign Ministry resulting from prosecutions in Germany and once more said that he could have his way here only if some good will was shown in Germany, too.

Krofta emphasized that everything he was telling me was strictly said from man to man—a “gentlemen’s agreement,”<sup>5</sup> as it were—and that he could not make any promises in this matter that would commit the one country with respect to the other. He intimated that because of the newspaper reports Beneš, who now is on leave, was also taking an interest in the matter and had requested him to be very restrained in making concessions.

Although after my experiences here I am far from assuming that the troubles of the Reich Germans here are now over, I believe nevertheless that things are now moving in the right direction and that we are approaching reasonably normal conditions.

I should not like to omit mentioning that in our conversation Krofta—practically with sparkling eyes—told me of the conversation which the Czechoslovak Minister in Germany, Mastný, had with Chancellor Hitler yesterday morning.<sup>6</sup> The amiable reception as well as the Reich Chancellor’s statement that he attached particular importance to having good relations with Czechoslovakia, have made, as was

<sup>2</sup> Cf. document No. 364.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 326, footnote 1.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 334.

<sup>5</sup> In English in the original.

<sup>6</sup> Not found.

clearly noticeable in the case of Krofta, a great impression in the Foreign Ministry here and apparently greatly relieved the feeling of anxiety which is generally felt here since the revolution in Germany. I would assume that the conversation which, by the way, is being especially noted today by all the Czech newspapers, will have favorable effects for us in many directions.<sup>7</sup>

HOLZHAUSEN

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<sup>7</sup> Marginal note: "The Reich Chancellor is informed. L[ammers], B[erlin], July 20."

## No. 367

7360/E537150-53

### *The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

#### Telegram

No. 174 of July 15

ROME (Quir.), July 16, 1933—12:25 a. m.

Received July 16—2:55 a. m.

II F Abr. 2356.

With reference to my telegram No. 169.<sup>1</sup>

On the occasion of the signing of the Four Power Pact, Mussolini told me that he had taken cognizance of our standpoint and had to term it altogether moderate. He had also said as much to Henderson and stressed that in his opinion the German position was a suitable basis which France, too, could accept without danger. Henderson had communicated the French proposal, reproduced below, and in defense of the French standpoint had cited French concern on account of the new German regime. Mussolini, and equally Suvich, told me they had replied to Henderson that the French proposal was in all probability unacceptable to Germany, whereas the German standpoint was entirely helpful. Mussolini added that he had vigorously pointed out to Henderson that the concern about the new German regime was thoroughly misplaced.

I then had a lengthy conversation with Henderson, in which at his request I gave a broad outline of the German position which Mussolini and Suvich had hinted at in talking to him. Henderson is obviously very much impressed by the great gap between the German and French attitudes as well as by the concern in Paris (and London)

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<sup>1</sup> This telegram of July 14 (7360/E537135) acknowledged receipt of instruction II F Abr. 2269 of July 11 (7360/E537055-65), which transmitted a memorandum setting forth the German position on disarmament. This memorandum was a German version of the document given by Nadolny to Eden and Lord Londonderry on June 2 (printed as document No. 283). Hassell was directed to inform the Italian Government of the German position in connection with the forthcoming visit of Henderson in Rome.

about the new German regime. He replied to my statements about the latter with the question whether Hitler's peace speech<sup>2</sup> was to be regarded as sincere. I answered that it was undoubtedly sincere for two reasons: 1) because a German Chancellor necessarily had to desire peace today; and 2) because if he knew Hitler he would know that everything he said and did was sincere. Henderson asked whether he was going to see Hitler, to which he seemed to attach importance. I left the possibility open. On the score of French apprehensions and demands for security I asked whether he could name a single word or act of the new regime against France, and added that to our disappointment Locarno and the like evidently counted for nothing in France.

Substantively Henderson evidently considers the main difficulty to be 1) the unconditional French demand for a probationary period under supervision; 2) the unconditional French and English rejection of any sort of rearmament (particularly point 5, page 3, memorandum II F Abr. 2269<sup>3</sup>). A too insistent desire to put through equality of rights was dangerous since, as was known, the statement of December 11 permitted equality of rights only under certain conditions. I replied that we had always rejected the interpretation of security to which he was alluding, and that the statement contained not a word about stages. The latter seemed to surprise him.

Henderson wondered whether a direct German-French discussion would not be the best way, since he was pessimistic about discussions among four or more parties. I replied that after all the Four Power Pact had just been signed today because hopes were being placed in the latter method.

In the evening Suvich gave me, by instruction of Mussolini, a résumé of the conversation with Henderson to read. According to this Henderson set forth the French proposal, which in the main has the following content: A disarmament convention with two periods. The first period, 4 years. Reduction of effectives according to the British plan. Regarding material, only reduction of military aviation, with each nation, however, retaining the eliminated machines under international labels. No German rearmament of any sort. Automatic, strictest, and closest supervision with the authority to inspect everything. In the second period, also of 4 years, a certain amount of disarmament with respect to material if the results of supervision during the first period are satisfactory. Eliminated material to be at the disposal of the League of Nations against aggressors. Continuation of supervision. No German rearmament. Henderson had said that one might perhaps induce the French to shorten

<sup>2</sup> See Editors' Note, p. 451.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 1 and document No. 283.

the first period and disarm more drastically in (group garbled), but never to destroy material. According to Suvich, Henderson himself called the French plan unsatisfactory, but did not show any great energy in fighting it. According to the résumé, Mussolini replied to Henderson that he had to consider the French plan unsuitable as a whole and in its particulars; it was more a plan of supervision than of disarmament. Suvich said he had replied to Henderson that one could visualize disarmament with supervision and without supervision, but not supervision without disarmament. He added as his personal opinion that the sole progress was that supervision now obviously represented for France the concept of "security." Thus if a way were found of decontaminating supervision in such a manner that it would comprise only measures on the basis of the Convention but not the fulfillment clauses of [the Treaty of] Versailles, one would be rid of the French clamor for security once and for all. I replied that unfortunately it was precisely this separation with regard to supervision that was the difficult problem. Mussolini told Henderson further that he would continue to support every initiative for the solution of the problem, but first had to await the results of the Berlin visit.

The Italians regard Henderson's mission with pessimism. If a direct agreement between Germany and France is not possible, the only possible basis remaining is the Four Power Pact; in this connection, the first step to be considered, however, and not precipitately, either, would be a meeting of foreign ministers and not of chiefs of the governments. De Jouvenal is of the same opinion; he visited me today and, as in an address given yesterday before colony and press, termed the Four Power Pact a bridge between Germany and France, after attempts at reaching a direct understanding between the two had proved in vain for the past 2 centuries.<sup>4</sup>

HASSELL

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<sup>4</sup> Neurath recorded on July 17 that Henderson had called on him and that his account of the talks which he had had in Paris and Rome corresponded to the contents of Hassell's report which is printed here (3154/669465).



## No. 368

6058/E447360-61

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

I 1180

ROME, July 17, 1933.

Received July 18.

II It. 942.

## POLITICAL REPORT

The Four Power Pact of Rome was signed Saturday, July 15, at 12 noon and thereby—in the opinion of its spiritual father, Mussolini—entered into force, even though it still requires ratification.

I expressed myself on the course of the negotiations and on the significance of the Pact immediately after it was initialed, in report No. I 1023 of June 13,<sup>1</sup> of this year. Meanwhile, as the foreign policy situation has developed in the past months, it has become more and more apparent that for the political position of Germany and German-Italian relations, very much will depend on whether practical work on the basis of the Pact, and particularly cooperation of Italy and Germany, will be possible. In this way, the Four Power Pact has acquired special importance through developments in the Austrian question (report No. I 1084 of the 30th of last month<sup>2</sup>) and through the eastern pacts (report No. I 1163 of the 14th of this month<sup>3</sup>). Together with the Concordat, it represents a platform from which we may try to smash the threatening circle of isolation. I should like to indicate briefly once more what, in my opinion, must be done for this purpose, in so far as I am able to judge of matters from Rome:

1. The inner German-Italian Front must be developed by agreement on fundamental principles of policy and economic policy, especially in the Danube area, together with Hungary.

2. With regard to the understanding with France, the Gentlemen's Agreement with Italy, suggested by me, should be agreed upon (even if not in the form of a written agreement, but perhaps at a meeting of Ministers): No Franco-Italian and no Franco-German understanding at the expense of Germany or Italy; and no agreement without keeping each other informed.<sup>4</sup>

3. In the field of armaments policy, the attempt must be made to find a common line with Italy (internally). A beginning in this regard has been made through the guiding principles conveyed to Rome for the Henderson visit.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (6058/E447231-39).

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 343, footnote 3.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (6616/E499677-82).

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 51 and footnote 17.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 367 and footnote 1.

4. The spiritual reorientation in the Anglo-Saxon countries toward the new Germany, repeatedly stressed by Mussolini as an important rollary of German-Italian relations must continue to receive our attention.

5. German-Russian relations, likewise termed decisive by Mussolini, must again be strengthened, that is, Russian distrust of German policy and the Four Power Pact must be dissipated. In this connection, the impending conclusion of the Italo-Russian pact<sup>6</sup> might afford opportunity for Germany, through some kind of declaration, for example, by the Reich Chancellor, of expressing sympathy for this act and of stressing the fact that the Four Power Pact was fortunately being implemented by the new Russo-Italian agreement, as well as through the existing German-Russian agreements.<sup>7</sup>

HASSELL

<sup>6</sup> An Italo-Russian treaty of friendship, nonaggression and neutrality was signed in Rome on Sept. 2, 1933.

<sup>7</sup> Marginal note in Neurath's handwriting: "Reich Chancellor."

Marginal note: "The Reich Chancellor is out of town. Th[omsen], July 20."

## No. 369

817/E613818-19

*The Minister of Economics to Hanotaiah, Ltd., Tel-Aviv*<sup>1</sup>

Dev. I 30293

BERLIN, July 18, 1933.

W 5100.

On the basis of the renewed negotiations between M. Sam Cohen and my experts<sup>2</sup> I am willing to support the emigration of German Jews to Palestine by allowing the following facilities for an extended transfer of their assets:

Jewish emigrants who, for the purpose of establishing a new livelihood in Palestine, want to transfer there portions of their assets in excess of the money required by the immigration authorities (1,000 Palestine pounds) will upon application receive from the foreign exchange control offices the authorization to deposit an appropriate additional amount in a special account of your firm kept at the Reichsbank for the Anglo-Palestine bank and the Temple bank. The same authorization can be granted to German citizens of the Jewish community who are not yet emigrating at the present time but who

<sup>1</sup> This document bears the letterhead of the Minister of Economics, but his signature does not appear on the copy sent to the Foreign Ministry.

<sup>2</sup> The background of these negotiations was a proposal put forward by the Consulate General in Jerusalem, whereby Jewish emigrants from Germany would be enabled to transfer a portion of their financial assets to Palestine, by paying equivalent amounts to a blocked account in Germany of the Palestinian orange growers' company Hanotaiah. Hanotaiah would draw upon this account for the purchase of agricultural machinery, pumps, fertilizers, etc. Negotiations held in Berlin with the representative of Hanotaiah, Sam Cohen, resulted in approval of the transaction by the Economics Ministry (letter addressed to Hanotaiah on May 19: 8817/E613764-66). Negotiations, however, continued to modify the terms of the agreement, particularly with a view to increasing the amounts involved in the transaction. Documents on the various stages of these negotiations are filmed on serial 8817. See also document No. 399.

nevertheless want to establish a home in Palestine now and to participate in the development of Palestine.

You will credit the depositors according to customary business principles with the amounts deposited here to your credit, and they will be at the free disposal of the emigrants.

You may dispose of the money in the special account to pay for future exports of German finished goods to Palestine on presenting invoices and confirmation of shipment by the German firms making the deliveries. Export transactions concluded before July 20, 1933, may not be settled by debiting this account. I am taking cognizance of the fact that you will set up an office at the Zionist Association for Germany, Berlin, Meineckestrasse 10, which will have the task of handling the payments made here.

This authorization is good for a total of 3 million reichsmarks. The authorization issued to you in my letter Dev. I 20111/33 of May 19, 1933,<sup>3</sup> is canceled at the same time. Furthermore, I wish to point out what my experts have repeatedly and decidedly emphasized to M. Cohen, that after the 3 million reichsmarks have been used up only the major part of the purchases of German goods may be paid through the special account, whereas foreign exchange must be received in payment of the smaller balance.

I hope that under these conditions it will also be possible to continue promoting the export of German goods to Palestine in the manner envisaged and that in this way the German authorities will be in a position to retain the present principles for dealing with applications from emigrants.

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2.

## No. 370

7360/E537167-73;  
3154/669472-76

### *Memorandum by an Official of Department II*

BERLIN, July 19, 1933.  
e. o. II F Abr. 2393.

The course of the negotiations with Henderson was as follows: On the morning of July 17 in a short conversation with the Reich Minister, Henderson described in broad outline the situation with respect to the Disarmament Conference. In the afternoon there was a meeting in which Reich Minister Freiherr von Neurath, Reichswehr Minister von Blomberg, State Secretary Milch<sup>1</sup> and I took part on the German side, and Henderson, Aghnides<sup>2</sup> and De Wolf<sup>3</sup> on the

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<sup>1</sup> Of the Air Ministry.

<sup>2</sup> Thanassis Aghnides, Secretary of the Bureau, General Commission and Political Commission of the Disarmament Conference; Director of the Disarmament Section, League of Nations.

<sup>3</sup> F. Colt de Wolf, Secretary of the Committee and Special Committee on Effectives.

other side. In this meeting Henderson made detailed statements about the position of the French and gave his own opinion, which was evidently strongly influenced by the opinion of the English Government. He said approximately the following:

The Non-Resort to Force Declaration would come into being on a general basis,<sup>4</sup> since England intended to abandon her previous resistance to it.

In the question of the definition of the aggressor<sup>5</sup> it was expedient to make Roosevelt's definition<sup>6</sup> a general provision in the convention for all signatory states (according to which that state is to be considered the aggressor whose troops have penetrated into alien territory), and in addition to have the more detailed provision about the definition of the aggressor drawn up on the basis of the Litvinov proposal<sup>7</sup> as an optional clause to which those countries could accede who wished to do so. In the negotiations of July 18, in which our memorandum<sup>8</sup> was communicated with the proposal to insert the Litvinov formula in the convention so as to apply generally, but closely linked with the Non-Resort to Force Declaration, Henderson added in explanation that the English Government had certain misgivings about accepting the strict listings of the Litvinov formula, since it believed that such a listing could after all never be satisfactory and exhaustive.

In the question of supervision Henderson explained that the French had now realized that they would not attain anything in the matter of mutual assistance. They therefore now put the main emphasis on supervision. He himself had thought about how one could ensure a fast and effective functioning of supervision. He had come to the conclusion that one should set up the Permanent Disarmament Commission as soon as possible, rather than wait until the entry into force of the Convention (ratification). The Permanent Commission would have to develop the entire organization for supervision. A supervisory

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 36, footnote 2 and document No. 38. The Declaration as adopted by the Political Commission applied to European states only. The report of the Drafting Committee which had submitted the text of the Declaration stated at the same time that "the question of the universal effect of the obligation should be reserved for the present." The demand for giving universal effect to the Declaration had been pressed in particular by the representatives of Iran and the Soviet Union. See League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (Geneva, 1933): *Records of the Conference*, ser. D, vol. v: *Minutes of the Political Commission*, p. 30.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 29, footnote 4. The question of a definition of the aggressor had been referred to a special committee on security questions, which had submitted its report to the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference on May 24. In view of the considerable differences which emerged in the discussion of the problem in the General Commission on May 25, 29, and 30, it was decided to hold over further discussion until the second reading of the draft convention. See League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (Geneva, 1933): *Records of the Conference*, ser. B, *Minutes of the General Commission*, vol. II, pp. 510-517, 547-567.

<sup>6</sup> In the message of May 16; see document No. 243.

<sup>7</sup> See document No. 29.

<sup>8</sup> Enclosure, dated July 18.

body<sup>9</sup> would have to be established, composed of 24, 28, or 32 members, which would be made up of 6 or 7 or 8 groups of 4 members each, of different nationality. The groups (supervisory groups<sup>9</sup>) would have to exercise the actual supervision, each group always in specific countries. Each group would consist of one member particularly skilled in financial matters, one in legal, one in military, and one in political matters. The groups would have to make their reports in the regular session of the Permanent Commission. Henderson stressed that he had conceived this plan himself and it had not yet been communicated to the French.

In his opinion the procedure in preparing the measures to be taken in the event of the violation of the convention should be similar to that employed in the organization of supervision.

As regards aerial bombardment, Henderson stated that the English would now agree to a total prohibition, abandoning their reservation in regard to distant areas. In response to the question on how matters stood with the abolition of military aviation, Henderson stated only very generally that in his opinion matters would have to be left at having the Permanent Commission entrusted with the further study of this question.

Regarding land material Henderson stated that President Hoover's idea<sup>10</sup> that weapons of aggression should be abolished, in the opinion of the French, was to be put through in such a way that the convention would be concluded for 8 years (possibly even for 10) and consist of two parts of 4 years each. The first part was a transition period. During this period France would reduce her effectives; for the rest, a reduction of material would take place in the main only in regard to airplanes, and guns and tanks would be reduced only by small percentages. The material to be eliminated would, however, remain in French territory during this period and only be designated as being at the disposition of the League of Nations. During the second period France would accept a large reduction of tank tonnage as well as of calibers for heavy guns. However, definitive data on the figures for this were not yet to be had from the French. In the second period, too, the material to be eliminated would be delivered by France only to the League of Nations. Henderson remarked, however, that the French would agree in principle during this period to a destruction of the material if this were undertaken by the League of Nations. The important thing is that during the first period a close supervision should be carried out which would relate particularly to the manufacture of weapons also.

<sup>9</sup> In English in the original.

<sup>10</sup> This refers to President Hoover's disarmament proposals made public on June 22, 1932. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1932*, vol. 1, pp. 211-214.

In the question of trained reserves and regarding a time limit for the destruction Henderson was unable to say anything definite, and likewise in regard to the navy, which apparently had not been touched on at all in his negotiations so far.

Regarding the question of budgetary limitation Henderson explained that France contented herself in the first part of the convention with publication of defense expenditures. She desired, however, that limitation of defense expenditures be accepted in principle even in this convention, and that the Permanent Commission be charged with putting into effect this principle for the second part of the convention.

Regarding the manufacture of arms Henderson stated that the French would probably not insist on the immediate abolition of the private armament industry; however, they desired that it be supervised and registered. The Permanent Commission would then examine this question further.

In conclusion Henderson remarked that he visualized the first period of the disarmament convention as being shorter than the French wished it to be—to be explicit, 3 years. In all the convention would then run for 7 years.

In the session of July 18, attended by the same group of persons as well as Ministerialdirektor Köpke, Henderson was informed of the appended memorandum containing the German position. Henderson took cognizance of the statements in the memorandum with great interest and made remarks on separate points.

Regarding point I—definition of aggressor—he asked whether our position excluded the English interpretation according to which the Roosevelt proposal was to be made a general provision in the convention, but the Litvinov formula merely an optional one. He was told that we believed the suggestion contained in the memorandum could be generally accepted, since it employed the Litvinov formula exclusively for defining what was prohibited as aggression.

Regarding section III—supervision—Henderson remarked with pleasure that we had accepted the idea suggested by him of letting the Permanent Commission convene even before the entry into force of the convention in order to build up the organization for supervision. At the end of sentence 1 of this paragraph, there had been originally a passage to the effect that we could accept such a supervision only if it were restricted to what was necessary and expedient.<sup>11</sup> Henderson objected to this sentence, which he misunderstood to mean that we wanted to grant the countries in the individual case a right of examining whether certain measures of supervision were necessary and expe-

<sup>11</sup> The passage is found on a copy which appears to be part of the original text of the printed enclosure prior to the changes made in the meeting with Henderson as described in this document (9956/E696261-63).

dient. It was pointed out to him that the words in question referred only to the elaboration of the general provisions for supervision, and we had in mind particularly immunity for reporting of alleged violations of the convention. Henderson went into this point and took the position that reporting on and publication of the type in question should not be punishable. In reply to this the Foreign Minister stated that such a provision would favor the worst elements and could by no means be accepted by us. After the purpose of the passage in question had thus been explained to Henderson in conversation, the German side deleted it from the memorandum. In the second paragraph of this section Henderson agreed that supervision could have reference only to the execution of the convention but not the disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty. With respect to the idea that the disarmament measures must be in the process of being carried out in all countries when the supervision took place, he said that in view of the French position this was a very difficult point. At Henderson's request, the last sentence was weakened and handed to him in the present form; originally it stated clearly that carrying out the supervision of a disarmed country such as Germany while at the same time practically exempting France from supervision (since in fact she is not going to disarm in the first period) could not be accepted since it violated the principle of equality of rights.

Regarding the section on land material Henderson remarked that this was the turning point.<sup>12</sup> He pointed out that in France and in other countries a strong distrust of Germany had grown up in recent months, rendering exceedingly difficult the settlement of the question of material in the sense desired by us. It was precisely because of this consideration that the idea of the division of the convention into two parts had arisen. The Foreign Minister rejected most decidedly the view that owing to the national revolution in Germany other countries were justified in refusing to put into effect our just demands for equality of rights in the question of material, and stated that we would in no circumstances abandon this demand. These statements referred in particular also to air material. Henderson did not enter further into the naval question or the limitation of defense expenditures and traffic in arms.

F[ROHWEIN]

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<sup>12</sup> In English in the original.

[Enclosure]<sup>13</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, July 18th, 1933.

## THE GERMAN POINT OF VIEW

*I. Security.**Non-resort to force:*

Germany accepts the principle of non-resort to force, as worked out by the Conference, on a universal basis.

*Definition of aggressor:*

Germany is ready to accept the definition of an aggressor as drafted by the Committee on Security questions. It would be useful to insert into the article concerning non-resort to force two or three words mentioning expressly that renunciation of force includes renunciation of aggression. The definition of aggression which, in the order of the articles would then have to follow this article, would be intended exclusively to determine the scope of this prohibition. In this way the Litwinow formula for the definition of an aggressor which includes also President Roosevelt's suggestion, could be generally accepted.

*II. Effectives.*

Germany accepts the principle of standardisation of continental armies, that is to say, the transformation of the Reichswehr along the lines of the British proposals within 5 years, and by methods which take into account the special position of Germany.

In fixing the strength of effectives and the methods of standardisation, the existence in other countries of 14 annual levies of trained reserves and of overseas troops which are stationed in the Metropole or in the proximity thereof, ought to be taken into account. Moreover it should be examined whether the percentage of a so-called military police which shall be allowed to the signatory States without deduction being made from the number of effectives, should not be based, alternatively, either on the number of effectives fixed in the Convention or on the existing population.

*III. Supervision.*

Germany is willing to accept a system of control including periodic and automatic supervision, provided it be generally and equally applied. She has no objections to the Permanent Disarmament Commission being entrusted, before the ratification of the Convention, with the task to work out in detail the organisation and the procedure of the supervision machinery, so that the rules concerning this subject might come into force simultaneously with and as an integral part of the Convention. The same method could be applied to penalties for infringement of the Convention.

<sup>13</sup> The text of this memorandum is in English in the original. A German text in the file is filmed on 3154/669467-71.



However the supervision must be strictly limited to the execution of the obligations freely accepted by the signatory States in the future Convention. It is therefore necessary that disarmament measures provided for in the Convention must be in the stage of actual execution in all signatory States when supervision takes place. Otherwise the supervision would be in its practical application of a fundamentally different character in the various countries.

#### *IV. Land war material.*

The Convention shall put into effect the principle of renunciation of all aggressive weapons. Weapons which are regarded as being of an aggressive character must be abolished and destroyed by all the signatory States within 5 years. On the other hand, weapons which are regarded as being non-aggressive and, therefore, necessary for national defence, must be allowed to all signatory States.

As regards defensive weapons hitherto forbidden to Germany, but allowed and fixed by number, in the future Convention, for the other States, Germany will content herself, for a transitional period of 5 years, with a smaller quantity than she would be entitled to claim under an equal application of Art. 8 of the Covenant to all States.

#### *V. Air material.*

The same principle applies to air material. The question whether military and naval airplanes are to be regarded as aggressive weapons must be decided in the Convention. Germany is in favour of the total abolition of military and naval aviation in order to secure the vertical defence for all countries.

Germany is also in favour of unrestricted prohibition of air bombardment.

#### *VI. Naval armaments.*

On the assumption that the naval clauses of the British draft proposal will be generally accepted, Germany is prepared not to make use, until December 31, 1936, of her right to replace her overaged capital ships, with the exception of one keel to be laid down in replacement. In addition to that, the principle of maintaining the present standard of the different navies pending the results of the Naval Conference of 1935 should be applied to Germany in such a way that the number of surface vessels, not the total tonnage, is taken into account.

Moreover the principle regarding defensive weapons ought to be applied to naval armaments also.

#### *VII. Budgetary limitation.*

Germany is in favour of publication of military expenditure; she considers the limitation by a treaty of military expenditure to be impossible at the present time for technical reasons (e. g. owing to

fluctuation of currency which has played such an important role during the London Conference). Whether and at what moment such limitation can be put into effect in the future, cannot be foreseen at the present moment.

*VIII. Manufacture of and trade in arms.*

In the question of (private and State) manufacture of and traffic in arms Germany is willing to accept:

- a) international publicity,
- b) a system of national licences to be granted generally for manufacturing establishments,
- c) a control on the lines of the general stipulations laid down in the British plan.

No. 371

8109/E599627-53

*Concordat Between the Holy See and the German Reich*

His Holiness Pope Pius XI and the President of the German Reich, moved by the common desire to consolidate and promote the friendly relations existing between the Holy See and the German Reich, and wishing to regulate lastingly, in a manner satisfying to both parties, the relations between the Catholic Church and the State for the entire territory of the German Reich, have decided to conclude a solemn agreement supplementing the concordats concluded with individual German States and also accuring for the remaining states a fundamentally uniform treatment of the questions to which it pertains.

For this purpose:

His Holiness Pope Pius XI has appointed as his Plenipotentiary His Eminence the Most Reverend Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli, his Secretary of State.

The President of the German Reich has appointed as Plenipotentiary the Vice Chancellor of the German Reich, Herr Franz von Papen.

Who, having exchanged their respective credentials and found them to be in good and proper form, have agreed on the following articles:

*Article 1*—The German Reich guarantees the freedom of the profession and public practice of the Catholic religion.

It recognizes the right of the Catholic Church, within the limits of the law that applies to all, to regulate and administer her own affairs independently, and, within the framework of her competence, to publish laws and ordinances binding on her members.

*Article 2*—The concordats concluded with Bavaria (1924), Prussia (1929), and Baden (1932) remain in force, and the rights and liberties

of the Catholic Church recognized in them remain unchanged within the territories of the respective states. For the other states the agreements reached in the present Concordat apply in their entirety. The latter are also binding for the three States named above in so far as they deal with matters not regulated by the State Concordats or supplement the regulations previously adopted.

In the future, the conclusion of concordats with individual States shall be effected only in accord with the Government of the Reich.

*Article 3*—In order to foster good relations between the Holy See and the German Reich, an Apostolic Nuncio will as heretofore reside in the capital of the German Reich and an Ambassador of the German Reich at the Holy See.

*Article 4*—In its relations and correspondence with the bishops, the clergy and other members of the Catholic Church in Germany, the Holy See enjoys full freedom. The same applies to the bishops and other diocesan officials in their relations with the faithful in all matters pertaining to their pastoral office.

Instructions, ordinances, pastoral letters, official diocesan gazettes, and other enactments regarding the spiritual guidance of the faithful issued by the ecclesiastical authorities within the framework of their competence (article 1, paragraph 2) may be published without hindrance and brought to the notice of the faithful in the forms hitherto usual.

*Article 5*—In the exercise of their spiritual activity the clergy, in the same manner as the officials of the State, enjoy the protection of the State. The latter will proceed in accordance with the general laws of the State against offences to their persons or their character as clergy, as well as against interference with the carrying out of their official duties; and in case of need will provide official protection.

*Article 6*—The clergy and members of Orders are exempt from the obligation of taking public offices and such duties as are incompatible, under the prescriptions of Canon Law, with the clerical status or membership in an Order. This applies particularly to the office of juror [*Schöffen und Geschworenen*], member of tax boards or of the finance courts.

*Article 7*—In order to accept employment or an office of the State, or with a corporation under public law dependent on the State, clergy must have the nihil obstat of their diocesan Ordinarius, as well as that of the Ordinarius of the seat of the corporation under public law. The nihil obstat may be revoked at any time for important reasons of ecclesiastical interest.

*Article 8*—The official income of the clergy is exempt from attachment, as are the official salaries of officials of the Reich and State.

*Article 9*—The clergy may not be required by judicial and other

authorities to give information concerning facts that have been confided to them while exercising their pastoral duties and therefore come under the pastoral obligation to preserve secrecy.

*Article 10*—The wearing of the dress of the clergy or of the Orders by laymen, or by clergy or members of the Orders who have been legally forbidden by the competent ecclesiastical authorities to wear them, by order officially communicated to the authorities of the State, is subject to the same penalties by the State as the misuse of the military uniform.

*Article 11*—The present organization and demarcation of dioceses of the Catholic Church in the German Reich is to remain in force. Establishment of a new bishopric or province of the Church or other changes in the demarcation of the dioceses which may seem advisable in the future, in so far as new arrangements within the boundaries of a German Land are involved, remain subject to agreement with the competent Land Government. New arrangements or changes extending beyond the boundaries of a German Land require agreement with the Reich Government, to whom it is to be left to obtain the consent of the Länder Governments in question. The same applies to the establishment of new provinces of the Church or changes in existing provinces, in the event that several German Länder are concerned. The foregoing conditions do not apply to changes in ecclesiastical boundaries which are made solely in the interest of local pastoral work.

In the event of reorganization within the German Reich, the Reich Government will communicate with the Holy See for the purpose of changing the organization and demarcation of dioceses.

*Article 12*—Without prejudice to the provisions of article 11, ecclesiastical offices may be freely established and changed, provided expenditures of state funds are not required. Governmental cooperation in the establishment and alteration of parishes is to take place in accordance with principles agreed upon with which the diocesan bishops, and the Reich Government will try to influence the Länder Governments to make them as uniform as possible.

*Article 13*—Catholic parishes, parish and diocesan associations, Episcopal Sees, bishoprics and chapters, religious orders and congregations, as well as institutions, foundations, and property which are under the administration of ecclesiastical authority, shall retain or acquire legal competence in the civil domain according to the general prescriptions of the law of the State. They shall remain corporations under public law in so far as they have been such hitherto; the others may be granted the same rights under the law that applies to all.

*Article 14*—In principle the Church has the right to make appointments freely to all Church offices and benefices without the participation of the State or the civil communities, in so far as other arrangements have not been made through the Concordats mentioned in article 2. With respect to the filling of Episcopal Sees, the regulation applying to the Metropolitan See of Freiburg (ecclesiastical province of Upper Rhine) shall be similarly applicable to the two suffragan bishoprics of Rottenburg and Mainz, as well as to the bishopric of Meissen. The same applies, in the two suffragan bishoprics named, to appointments to the Cathedral Chapter and the regulation of the right of patronage.

Furthermore, there is agreement on the following points:

1. Catholic clergy who hold an ecclesiastical office in Germany or who exercise pastoral or educational functions must:

- (a) be German citizens,
- (b) have obtained a diploma entitling them to study at a German higher institution of learning,
- (c) have finished at least 3 years of philosophical and theological study at a German state university, a German ecclesiastical academic institution or a pontifical institution of higher learning in Rome.

2. The bull for the nomination of archbishops, bishops, of a coadjutor *cum jure successionis*, or of a *praelatus nullius*, will only then be drawn up after the name of the person selected has been communicated to the Reichsstatthalter in the appropriate Land, and after it has been confirmed that there are no objections of a general political nature against the person.

In case of the consent of Church and State, the requirements listed in paragraph 2, figure 7, (a), (b), and (c) may be waived.

*Article 15*—Orders and religious associations are subject to no special restrictions on the part of the State, with regard to their foundation, establishment, the number and—subject to article 15, paragraph 2—the characteristics of their members, their activity in pastoral work, in education, in nursing and charitable work, in the ordering of their affairs and the administration of their property.

Superiors of Orders who have their official residence in the German Reich must have German citizenship. Superiors of provinces and of Orders, whose residence is outside the territory of the German Reich, have the right of visitation with respect to their establishments in Germany.

The Holy See will endeavor to ensure that the provincial organization is so arranged for the establishments of the Orders within the German Reich that the subordination of German establishments to foreign provincial Superiors is eliminated as much as is feasible. Exceptions to this may be permitted in agreement with the Reich Govern-

ment particularly in cases where the small number of establishments makes the creation of a German province impracticable, or where there are special reasons why a provincial organization that has become historic and proved efficient should be retained.

*Article 16*—Before the bishops take possession of their dioceses they shall take an oath of allegiance either before the Reichsstatthalter of the appropriate province, or the Reich President as follows:

“I swear and promise before God and on the Holy Gospel, as befits a bishop, loyalty to the German Reich and to the province of . . . I swear and promise to respect, and to have my clergy to respect, the constitutionally constituted government. In dutiful solicitude for the welfare and interest of the German State, I shall try, in the exercise of the spiritual office entrusted to me, to prevent any injury that might threaten it.”

*Article 17*—The rights of ownership and other rights of the corporations under public law, institutions, foundations, and associations of the Catholic Church in their property are guaranteed according to the general laws of the State.

Buildings used for religious services may not be destroyed for any reason whatsoever without the previous agreement with the ecclesiastical authorities concerned.

*Article 18*—In case those payments to the Catholic Church by the State which are based on law, treaty, or special legal titles should be commuted, a friendly agreement will be reached in good time between the Holy See and the Reich before the working out of the principles to be laid down for the commutation.

Usage based on law is numbered among the special legal titles.

The commutation must accord to the party entitled to commutation appropriate compensation for the loss of previous government payments.

*Article 19*—Catholic theological faculties in State institutions of higher learning are to be retained. Their relation to the ecclesiastical authorities is to be based on the stipulations set forth in the pertinent Concordats and the Supplementary Protocols appended to them, with due regard to the relevant ecclesiastical regulations. The Reich Government will interest itself in assuring a uniform practice, in accordance with all the pertinent regulations, for all Catholic faculties of Germany in question.

*Article 20*—The Church has the right, in so far as other agreements do not exist, to establish for the training of the clergy, philosophical, and theological institutions entirely dependent on the ecclesiastical authorities, provided no State subsidies are requested.

The establishment, direction, and administration of the seminaries for priests and as well as of the church-maintained hostels shall, within

the limits of the law that applies to all, be left exclusively to the ecclesiastical authorities.

*Article 21*—Catholic religious instruction in the primary schools, vocational schools, secondary schools, and higher educational institutions is a regular subject of instruction and is to be taught in accordance with the principles of the Catholic Church. In religious instruction, special emphasis is to be placed on the inculcation of a patriotic, civic, and social sense of duty in the spirit of Christian religious and moral law, just as is done in all other instruction. The subject matter of instruction and the selection of textbooks for religious instruction are to be determined in agreement with the ecclesiastical authorities. The ecclesiastical authorities are to have an opportunity, together with the school authorities, to examine whether the students are receiving religious instruction in accordance with the tenets and requirements of the Church.

*Article 22*—In the appointment of Catholic teachers of religion, agreement is to be reached between the bishop and the Land Government. Teachers who have been declared by the bishop unsuited for further teaching of religion, because of their teachings or moral conduct, may not be employed as teachers of religion as long as this obstacle exists.

*Article 23*—The retention of Catholic denominational schools and the establishment of new ones, is guaranteed as heretofore. In all parishes in which parents or guardians request it, Catholic elementary schools shall be established, if, with due regard for local conditions of school organization, the number of pupils allows a regular school operation, in accordance with the standards prescribed by the State, to appear feasible.

*Article 24*—In all Catholic primary schools only such teachers are to be employed as belong to the Catholic Church, and guarantee to fulfill the special requirements of the Catholic denominational school.

Within the framework of the general professional training of teachers, arrangements will be made which will secure the training of Catholic teachers in accordance with the special requirements of the Catholic denominational school.

*Article 25*—Orders and religious congregations are entitled to establish and conduct private schools, within the framework of the general laws and conditions fixed by law. These private schools confer the same rights as the State schools in so far as they meet the requirements in effect for the latter with respect to the curriculum.

With respect to the admission of members of Orders or religious associations to the teaching profession, and their appointment to elementary, secondary, or senior schools, the general requirements are applicable.

*Article 26*—Subject to more comprehensive regulation later on of questions of marriage law, it is agreed that in addition to the case of a critical illness of a betrothed person admitting of no delay, also in case of serious moral emergency, the existence of which must be confirmed by the appropriate episcopal authority, the consecration of the marriage by the Church may precede the civil wedding. The pastor is obliged in such cases to notify the Registry Office without delay.

*Article 27*—The German Reichswehr is granted an exempted pastoral care for the Catholic officers, officials, and enlisted men belonging to it, as well as for their families.

The Army Bishop is responsible for the direction of the military pastoral care. His ecclesiastical appointment is made by the Holy See after the latter has put itself in touch with the Reich Government in order to designate in agreement with it a suitable candidate.

The ecclesiastical appointment of the chaplains and other military clergy is made by the Army Bishop after prior agreement with the competent authorities of the Reich. The Army Bishop may appoint only such clergy as have received from their competent diocesan bishop permission to enter upon military pastoral work, and an appropriate certificate of qualification. The military clergy are to have pastoral rights with respect to the troops and members of the Army assigned to them.

More detailed regulations concerning the organization of the Catholic pastoral work in the Army are to be set forth in an Apostolic Brief. The regulation of the relationship as it applies to the Civil Service is to be done by the Government of the Reich.

*Article 28*—In hospitals, penal institutions, and other public establishments the Church is permitted to make pastoral visits and hold divine services, subject to the general rules of these institutions. If regular pastoral care is established in such institutions, and if clergy must be engaged as State or other public officials for this purpose, this is to be done in agreement with the ecclesiastical authorities.

*Article 29*—In matters concerning the use of their mother tongue in divine services, religious instruction, and church organizations, the Catholic members of a non-German national minority residing within the German Reich will be placed in no less favorable a position than that which corresponds to the legal and actual position of individuals of German descent and language within the territory of the foreign state in question.

*Article 30*—On Sundays and religious holidays, a prayer is to be offered up for the welfare of the German Reich and nation in the Episcopal churches, chapels, and abbey churches of the German Reich following the main service, in accordance with the precepts of the Church liturgy.



*Article 31*—Those Catholic organizations and societies which serve exclusively religious, purely cultural and charitable purposes, and, as such, are subordinate to the ecclesiastical authorities, will be protected in their establishments and their activity.

Those Catholic organizations which, in addition to their religious, cultural and charitable purposes, also serve other purposes, such as social or professional interests, will without prejudice to a possible future inclusion in State associations, enjoy the protection of article 31, paragraph 1, provided they guarantee to carry on their activity outside any political party.

It is reserved to the Government of the Reich and the German Episcopate, to determine by joint agreement which organizations and associations come within the scope of this article.

In so far as the Reich and Länder have in their charge sports and other youth organizations, care will be taken that the members of the same are enabled regularly to perform their church duties on Sundays and holidays, and that they will not be required to do anything irreconcilable with their religious and moral convictions and obligations.

*Article 32*—On the basis of the special conditions existing in Germany, and in view of the guarantees created by the stipulations of this Concordat of legislation protecting the rights and freedoms of the Catholic Church in the Reich and its Länder, the Holy See will publish stipulations which exclude the clergy and members of Orders from membership in political parties, and activity for such parties.

*Article 33*—The matters pertaining to ecclesiastical persons or ecclesiastical affairs, which have not been dealt with in the foregoing articles, will be regulated for the ecclesiastical sphere in accordance with applicable Canon Law.

Should any difference of opinion occur in future regarding the interpretation of application of a stipulation of this Concordat, the Holy See and the German Reich will effect a friendly solution by mutual agreement.

*Article 34*—This Concordat, whose German and Italian texts have equal force, is to be ratified, and the instruments of ratification are to be exchanged, as soon as possible. It enters into force on the day of their exchange.

In witness hereof, the Plenipotentiaries have signed this Concordat.

Signed in two original texts, in the Vatican City, July 20, 1933.

EUGENIO CARDINAL PACELLI  
FRANZ VON PAPEN

#### FINAL PROTOCOL

At the signing of the Concordat concluded today between the Holy See and the German Reich, the duly empowered Signatories made the

following identical statements, which form an integral part of the Concordat itself.

*To Article 3*—The Apostolic Nuncio to the German Reich, in accordance with the exchange of notes between the Apostolic Nunciature in Berlin and the Foreign Ministry on March 11 and March 27, 1930, is Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps accredited there.

*To Article 13*—It is agreed that the right of the Church to levy taxes remains guaranteed.

*To Article 14, paragraph 2, section 2*—It is agreed that if objections of a general political nature exist, they will be put forward in the shortest possible time. If after 20 days no such statement has been made, the Holy See will be justified in assuming that there are no objections to the candidates. The name of the person in question will be kept in strict confidence until the announcement of the nomination.

This is not to establish the basis for the right of veto by the State.

*To Article 17*—Buildings or properties of the State devoted to purposes of the Church are to remain in use as before, subject to existing contracts.

*To Article 19, paragraph 2*—At the time of signature of this Concordat, the basis is provided especially by the Apostolic Constitution, *Deus Scientiarum Dominus* of May 24, 1931, and the Instruction of July 7, 1932.

*To Article 20*—The hostels under the direction of the Church in institutions of higher learning and gymnasia are to be regarded, with respect to the tax laws, as essential ecclesiastical institutions in the true sense of the word and as integral parts of the diocesan organization.

*To Article 24*—Existing institutions of the Orders and Congregations will also be given due consideration in the accordance of recognition [*bei ihrer Zulassung*], in so far as private institutions are in the position to meet the State requirements generally in effect after the reorganization of the system for the training of teachers.

*To Article 26*—A serious moral emergency exists when there are insuperable or disproportionately difficult obstacles impeding the procuring of documents necessary for the marriage at the time.

*To Article 27, paragraph 1*—Catholic officers, officials and enlisted men, as well as their families, do not belong to local parishes, and are not to contribute to their maintenance.

*Paragraph 4*—Issuance of the Apostolic Brief takes place after agreement has been reached with the Government of the Reich.

*To Article 28*—In urgent cases entry of the clergy is guaranteed at any time.

*To Article 29*—Since the Government of the Reich has indicated its readiness to be accommodating in the matter of non-German mi-

norities, the Holy See declares that, in confirmation of the principles it has always upheld regarding the right to the use of the mother tongue in pastoral work, in religious instruction, and the conduct of Catholic societies, it will take into consideration when making arrangements for concordats with other countries in the future the inclusion of an equivalent provision protecting the rights of the German minorities.

*To Article 31, paragraph 4*—The principles established in article 31, paragraph 4, apply also to the Labor Service.

*To Article 32*—It is understood that similar regulations regarding activity in party politics will be introduced by the Reich with regard to the non-Catholic denominations.

The conduct which has been made obligatory for the clergy and members of Orders in Germany in virtue of article 32 does not involve any sort of limitation of the preaching and interpretation of the dogmatic and moral teachings and principles of the Church in accordance with their duty.

At the Vatican City, July 20, 1933.

EUGENIO CARDINAL PACELLI  
FRANZ VON PAPEN

#### ANNEX

##### (The High Contracting Parties Agree to Maintain Secrecy Concerning the Annex)

In the event of a reorganization of the present German military system by the introduction of general military service, the induction of priests and other members of the secular and regular clergy for the performance of military service will be regulated in agreement with the Holy See, in accordance with the following basic principles:

(a) The students of philosophy and theology who are in Church institutions preparing for the priesthood are exempt from military service and the related preparatory training, except in the event of general mobilization.

(b) In the event of general mobilization, the clergy who are engaged in diocesan administration or in pastoral work are exempt from reporting for service. This applies to the bishops, the members of the diocesan courts, principals of seminaries and ecclesiastical hostels, professors in seminaries, the parish priests, curates, rectors, coadjutors, and the clergy who permanently preside over a church of public worship.

(c) The other clergy, in case they are declared fit, enter the armed forces of the State in order, under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Army Bishop, to devote themselves to pastoral work with the troops, unless they are inducted into the medical service.

(d) The remaining clerics *in sacris* or in the Orders, who are not yet priests, are to be assigned to the medical service. The same is to be done, so far as possible with the candidates for the office of priest mentioned under (a), who have not yet taken the higher Orders.

At the Vatican City, July 20, 1933.

EUGENIO CARDINAL PACELLI  
FRANZ VON PAPEN <sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> In a communication of Aug. 15, 1933, the Reich Chancellery gave official notification to the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Interior that there were no objections on the German side to adoption of the Concordat (8115/E579971).

Certain minor editorial changes took place between the signature and ratification of the Concordat as shown in the instruction of Aug. 7 to the Embassy to the Holy See (8115/E579927-30) and the Embassy's report No. 177 of Aug. 16 (8115/E579972-73). On the text as ratified see Editors' Note, p. 790.

## No. 372

8554/E598438-47

### *The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry*

A 309

BERN, July 20, 1933.

Received July 25.

## POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: German and foreign propaganda in Switzerland.

With reference to your instruction P 2143 of April 26, 1933.<sup>1</sup>

In answer to the questionnaire with the instruction of the Press Department and Department VI to the German Missions and Consulates General abroad<sup>2</sup> a few general remarks may be permitted in consideration of the special European and international importance of Switzerland. In brief, of course. Should detailed information from historical, cultural, and political standpoints be desired, I refer to volume 8 of the series published by the German Foreign Institute [*Deutsches Auslandsinstitut*] in Stuttgart in 1923: *German Switzerland in Past and Present* [*Die deutsche Schweiz in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*] by Eduard Blocher. This detailed and excellent study, which also contains enough material for propagandist purposes, appeared with my support at the time and its content is in its essentials still valid today.

For the propagandistic treatment of Switzerland and particularly for the German section, which comprises the great majority, it is my

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed (8677/E606979-84). This is a circular instruction to German Missions abroad, accompanied by a questionnaire on the subject of anti-German propaganda.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 1.

experience that great reserve and unobtrusiveness is necessary. Still valid even today is the statement of Dr. Jakob August Frankenstein of Halberstadt in his *Schweizerisches Theaterum* in 1724 that "there is no more agreeable neighbor than the Swiss, from whom you have nothing to fear if you simply leave him alone and don't order him around"; and this nation of what is even yet basically good peasant stock has still retained its desire for undisturbed, self-determined freedom, as already adequately demonstrated as long ago as Morgarten.<sup>3</sup> In particular they are interested in the unconditional maintenance of their neutrality. In this regard one should pay close attention to what the head of the Military Department, Bundesrat Minger, himself a farmer and an intelligent man, who has gained unrestricted authority in the relatively short time he has had the office of Bundesrat, said on July 9, 1933, at Vindonissa (cf. report R 457 of July 11<sup>4</sup>). In spite of the necessity of saving required by the economic conditions even in Switzerland and energetically demanded by the people, he asked for a considerable increase in the military budget and justified it as follows: "If we have no army, or only a weak one, then in a future European war there will be a race between the belligerent neighboring countries to get strategically important Switzerland in their possession. From the very start our country would be a theater of war. To be a theater of war is the most terrible thing that can happen to a country. And for this reason the efforts of all countries are directed at excluding it from their own territory, while a defenseless Switzerland would be as if made for the purpose. If, on the other hand, we have an army that is able to detain an opponent at our borders until an allied neighboring power fights on our side, then an attack by a foreign power has no purpose, for an attacker greatly lessens his chances thereby. Instead of this attacker becoming the master of Switzerland, he suddenly sees his present enemy, whom we have joined in an alliance, fighting at the side of the Swiss, and at the same time such an attacker has also made our country his enemy. Therefore I say time and again that if our neighbors are convinced that the Swiss Army is able to offer any attacker, no matter who he may be, serious resistance on land and in the air, then every country will be very careful not to violate our neutrality. The respect for our neutrality is therefore a question of the belief of our neighbors in the fighting effectiveness of our Army. This belief exists only if we keep our Army in the best possible condition."

The approval of this request is also in *our* political and military interest. For the maintenance of Swiss neutrality by a sufficiently

<sup>3</sup> At Morgarten the Swiss defeated the Hapsburgs in 1315.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed (8561/E599701-04).

strong and adequately equipped armed force provides in case of military conflicts between us and France a flank protection exceedingly desirable to us. This was confirmed to me in February 1917 by General Ludendorff, then still working at the height of his powers, when in agreement with the government at that time and the Swiss Bundesrat I suggested to him an unconditional statement against any trespass by German troop units on Swiss territory. Owing to a concentration of French troops in Haute-Savoie, which appeared threatening, Switzerland feared that the French would cross into French Switzerland, for which the French paid press in Geneva, Lausanne, and the French Jura were trying to create a pretext by means of incessant denunciation of alleged intentions of the German Army leaders to march through [Switzerland]. The then German Minister in Bern and the German Reich Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, thought it better not to ask our Army leaders for this statement themselves, and thus I received the instruction—to make a long story short—to negotiate with the General. Because of his full understanding for the temporary and permanent importance of the case the conversation took an entirely positive course and was very useful for our further relations with Switzerland during the war and thereafter. If it is correct, as I hear from a western source of information that has been reliable for many years, that the French General Staff has *repeatedly discussed and made definite preliminary plans* in agreement with the present Cabinet *for the reoccupation of the Rhineland*, in case of a German rearmament not agreeable to it, then it is really appropriate for our military and political interests (I am ignoring here the well-known economic considerations) to observe the greatest circumspection in our treatment of Switzerland. Accordingly also our need for propaganda is under the compulsion to be as inconspicuous as possible and to maintain good relations to the greatest possible extent. At the moment the atmosphere in Switzerland is very good, in spite of a little understandable agitation on the part of certain interested parties caused by the transfer moratorium.<sup>5</sup> From the very beginning of the recent German change the Swiss Bundesrat has observed an entirely correct attitude, taking friendly account of our interests. The influential Swiss press, not excepting the French-

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<sup>5</sup> The reference is to the German moratorium on transfers of payments on foreign debts, which had gone into effect on July 1, 1933; see documents Nos. 288, 293, 296, and 353. The Swiss Government had protested against application of the moratorium (note verbale of the Swiss Legation in Berlin, June 10, 1933: 8560/E599371, and Ritter memorandum of June 10: 8560/E599360-62). After extended negotiations a protocol was signed at Bern on Oct. 7, 1933, according to which full payments to Swiss creditors would be resumed on condition that foreign exchange for the purpose be secured through additional Swiss purchases from Germany (8555/E598675-82).

Swiss, has in the main followed this example, even though it has been somewhat critical of unfamiliar developments and those appearing strange to it. Serious remonstrances with the German refugees by the cantonal alien police authorities who have been instructed to that effect have nipped in the bud any attempts at agitation in opposition. The aggressive attitude of a few not very widely distributed Social Democratic organs has gradually been halted. And where it still continues it no longer has any practical importance. The middle-class majority in Parliament is entirely in accord with the attitude of the Bundesrat. In June I invited the most important persons of the Ständerat and the Nationalrat along with the members of the Bundesrat who were here at the time to a party, which was at the same time meant as a kind of farewell celebration for my old friends, and heard from them nothing but the serious wish for a prosperous development of our country and the unclouded continuation of our good neighborly relations. If this wish could also be stressed now and then by an authoritative German source from Berlin with friendly words at an appropriate opportunity, it would certainly be opportune and would be more effective propagandistically than any flood of printed paper. Bundesrat Motta, the head of the Political Department, has told me time and again how well Mussolini has understood how to eliminate by personal statements the serious quarrels that had been caused earlier by the overzealousness of fascist agents and propagandists by their more vehement than tactful conduct, especially in Tessin. When M. Motta was in Rome recently, Mussolini assured him anew that he had called off all nonofficial propaganda regarding Switzerland and gave him his word that he considered Switzerland's neutrality a good fortune for Europe and would not let the special moral-political position of this country be touched.

A government as strong as the present German one can afford a similar attitude. It does not need to become nervous if the Swiss people, who are almost without inhibitions in their criticisms of their own Government, cavil here and there at things that happen in Germany. And the German press ought not to speak of hostility to Germany when here and there a German-Swiss newspaper proclaims its wisdom with Helvetian bluntness. Abrupt advice and long-winded polemics would only provoke more resistance, whereas with a calm attitude by us the correction will occur in the country by itself, so to speak. For indeed, the basic mood in German Switzerland is entirely German, and the *furor helveticus* awakens only when misgivings are aroused concerning infringement on the Swiss independence and way of life.

Here I should like to call attention to a special danger point for us which Italy has surmounted for some years through the almost total concealment of her fascist propaganda: In understandable zeal for publicizing their ideology the numerous National Socialist organizations and local branches in Switzerland make much too much noise. They are trying all too energetically on foreign soil to bring about a quicker development along their lines of the present German associations. They have also acquired a feeling of sovereignty over the German Missions abroad, and in their youthful determination their attitude toward them is demanding and domineering. This does not help either of the two parties. For years, besides their other work, our foreign Missions have been carrying on calmly and with determination their—I think I may say—*successful* underground fight against the French propaganda. They do not do this with large funds of money, as do the French, but by maintaining a well-considered, tactful, and personal relationship with the political and policy-making elements of the country. In this small, peculiar country the people want to be personally won over and convinced. They are by nature mistrustful countryfolk. They are reserved and difficult to win over. But once you have them, then they are reliable and not easy to subvert. In this work and in this effort the exaggerated zeal of new organizers results only in obstructive confusion. All the more so since in the narrow Swiss area it is well known that many of today's enthusiastic hotspurs [*Stürmer*] had quite a different opinion yesterday, and that for many of them Schiller's lines are appropriate:

"To the one she is the high, heavenly goddess, and to the other a productive cow that provides him with butter."

Besides the propaganda activity which has been mentioned, carried on by the members of our Legation and our Consulates—and this applies to the Mission Chief down to the Consulate clerk—another sort of continued publicity activity is necessary in Switzerland. But this, too, must be done under the supervision of and in close understanding with the official foreign Missions. Formerly we had for this purpose a press adviser who kept in close personal contact with the editors and—which was the essential thing—knew how by influencing individuals in most cases to have the necessary corrections, changes, and information provided by the Swiss journalists from their own pens. It would be most expedient to have a similar arrangement again. It should be done in connection with the official German news service, independently of the Legation and any official relationship, but in constant connection with it. The person to be considered would be



journalistically very versatile, with personal tact, pleasant deportment, and a certain experience in foreign policy and Swiss affairs. Not someone who writes treatises [*Langschreiber*] but a man who knows how to express himself briefly in a skillful and informative way, who can read French newspapers and also compose an item in French, and who would be active in the above-mentioned sense. However, the basis of a continued legal German influence on the Swiss press should as in the past be the material provided by our official German news service. This news service should report in a short, concise but excellently formulated manner concerning the achievements of the new Reich and should also provide political and cultural news, rather carefully selected, for Switzerland. Reports of Communists shot while trying to escape and similar incidents that can always be exploited by ill-wishers as atrocities should be avoided as far as possible.

When our leading political figures make important speeches at large political functions which attract attention, the texts of these speeches ought to be distributed as quickly as possible in a number of copies. It would still not be too late for the dissemination of a verbatim copy of the important foreign policy speech of the Reich Chancellor in the Reichstag.<sup>6</sup> Thus the Missions abroad ought to be sent a suitable number of such statements as soon as possible. For Switzerland about 50 to 100 copies in each case could be considered. These should be in excellent typographical form (good paper and good print, in tasteful jackets), so that the recipient can enjoy adding them to his library. I know that Bundesrat members, chairmen of the parliamentary fractions, the heads of the larger cantons have a strong interest in such presentations and will read them attentively and preserve them carefully. Mass gifts of printed matter, particularly heavy tomes badly made up, in my opinion fail entirely of their purpose.

In conclusion still a very confidential observation: The appearance of the so-called political fronts in the Swiss political arena has aroused in many who do not know the country the hope of speedy political changes within Switzerland. I wish to warn against any conclusions of the sort. Even more, I would consider it a condition detrimental to our economic, political, and military interests if the old Swiss form of government should be fundamentally changed. In particular, however, I wish to advise urgently against any sort of cooperation by anyone from Germany propagandistically or in any other way with the leaders of such movements. If it should become known (and here in this small area everything eventually becomes known) that we have close relations of any sort with such movements, the result would be a complete poisoning of our relations with

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<sup>6</sup> Apparently a reference to the speech of May 17. See Editors' Note, p. 451.

Switzerland. Secret police work or secret political or economic intelligence activity in Switzerland would lead to this result.<sup>7</sup>

ADOLF MÜLLER

<sup>7</sup> Marginal notes on first page of this report (E598438): "This report should be utilized in connection with the prohibition of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* that has been demanded time and again by the Reich Ministry of Interior. H[ertz], July 27."

"II Switzerland: What has been done from P as a result of this excellent report? Have the State Secretary and the Foreign Minister and the Reich Chancellor been informed? Has it been made available to the party leadership? Köpke, July 28."

Hertz replied: "According to information received from Consul General Croll who is deputizing for Herr Aschmann at present and to whom Ministerialdirektor Köpke's minute was shown, the report has not yet been dealt with. The directions which will be given in connection with it will be routed to Department II for cosignature. Herewith submitted respectfully to Ministerialdirektor Köpke. H[ertz], July 31." (9972/E697341)

## No. 373

8015/597709-10

*Ministerialdirektor Meyer to Foreign Minister Neurath*

BERLIN, July 21, 1933.

DEAR HERR FOREIGN MINISTER: I do not wish to neglect to inform you briefly of the result of yesterday's top-level talk [*Chef-Besprechung*] with the Reich Finance Minister Count Schwerin von Krosigk.<sup>1</sup> The discussion had been prepared by a letter from the State Secretary in the Reich Chancellery;<sup>2</sup> this defined the attitude of the Reich Chancellor to the effect that in the face of urgent considerations of foreign and national policy, economic and financial objections had to retire to the background. After a short introductory speech by me, the Reichswehr Minister supported in a very emphatic way the standpoint of the Foreign Ministry and at the same time asked in the name of the Reich Chancellor for authorization of the necessary sums. The Reich Economics Ministry likewise endorsed our request of its own accord. The Reich Finance Minister thereupon gave his consent, and the amount of approximately 9 million reichsmarks was authorized for the settlement with Lithuania, in which the Memel quotas are included.

<sup>1</sup> Meyer recorded the proceedings of the meeting in a memorandum of July 20 (6684/H097020). He had emphasized that for the purpose of stabilizing the autonomy of the Memel Territory, coming to an agreement with Lithuania and preventing Lithuania from becoming dependent upon Poland, it was essential to make an arrangement to accept a considerable quantity of agricultural products from Lithuania under a quota system, which would include existing quotas applicable to the Memel Territory.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

I asked Dr. Zechlin by telegram<sup>3</sup> to inform me when M. Zaunius is in Kaunas again, and I intend with the permission of Herr von Bülow to take up the negotiations as quickly as possible.<sup>4</sup>

It was no longer possible for the Chinese Finance Minister to call on the Reich Chancellor, since the Reich Chancellor is in Munich on Wednesday only for the one day and has already arranged his schedule. Mr. Soong will probably go to America from here and pass through Germany again on his way back to China.<sup>5</sup> A visit with the Reich Chancellor is contemplated for that time.

With greetings to the Baroness, I am,

Yours, etc.

RICHARD MEYER

<sup>3</sup> Telegram No. 45 of July 21, not printed (8919/E622661).

<sup>4</sup> Neurath replied on July 31:

"I agree that the negotiations with Kaunas be undertaken as soon as possible, but I ask that it be indicated to the Lithuanians, especially to Zaunius, that we, as I already told him myself, make any arrangement conditional upon quiet prevailing in the Memel Territory and Lithuania respecting the Memel Statute in every aspect." (3015/597711)

On the course of these negotiations see Meyer's letter to Neurath of Aug. 16, document No. 405.

<sup>5</sup> T. V. Soong actually continued directly on to China from the United States without returning to Europe. Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933*, vol. III, pp. 506-507.

## No. 374

3154/669480-82

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

LEINFELDEN, July 22, 1933.

RM 1079.

### RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE REICH CHANCELLOR WITH MR. HENDERSON, IN MUNICH ON JULY 21, 1933

The conversation took place in the Hotel Regina in Munich and lasted about one hour. Mr. Henderson at first brought up only the points already discussed in Berlin,<sup>1</sup> in particular the French proposal for dividing the convention into two sections of 4 years each, whereby the first section would be a test of the functioning of supervision. Mr. Henderson thought he could impress us by referring again and again to the bad feeling prevailing against us abroad at the moment. The Reich Chancellor rejected decidedly any trial supervision. With regard to the bad feeling prevailing against us, he made these statements: For 14 years, in spite of the pacifist parties governing in Germany, England had never gone beyond theoretical and platonic declarations of sympathy for an equal treatment of Germany. He wondered how many governments still had to come in Germany until it was

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 370.

agreeable to England to grant in practice, too, the equality of rights that was recognized in principle and to put this through with her former allies. Germany demanded merely weapons of defense, and even these only in very limited amounts. She renounced in advance all weapons that were termed weapons of offense by the other countries, and with respect to which the convention would stipulate that they be abolished and destroyed.

Mr. Henderson then spoke of the alleged German rearmament measures regarding which detailed reports were available in Geneva. He referred particularly to the military training of the youth and the alleged existence of storehouses of airplane material. The Reich Chancellor stressed in reply that the SA men were merely a political formation which could not be considered as having military value. He did not go into the other questions.

Finally Henderson mentioned his plan of a meeting of the Reich Chancellor with Daladier. To this the Reich Chancellor remarked that such a meeting would arouse the greatest attention and the greatest hopes all over the world. Therefore it was justified only if a positive outcome was to be expected from the very start. As matters stood, however, this was not possible at the present time. Such a meeting required rather long and careful diplomatic preparations, especially when, as Mr. Henderson himself said, the feeling all over the world was against us.

Since the Reich Chancellor had stressed at various times that we demanded weapons of defense, too, for the 5-year term of the convention only in limited amounts, Henderson asked in conclusion that we please have him informed of particulars concerning the extent of our wishes.<sup>2</sup>

V. N[EURATH]

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<sup>2</sup> On Sept. 20 Henderson addressed to Neurath a note reminding the Foreign Minister that at the close of the interview with Hitler on July 20, Neurath had undertaken to send Henderson a memorandum stating what defensive weapons Germany desired to possess (3154/669825). Thereupon, on Sept. 22, Neurath handed to Henderson at Geneva a memorandum in English (3154/669826) which reads as follows:

"Weapons which are regarded as being of an aggressive character must be abolished and destroyed by all the signatory States within 5 years. Germany is willing to renounce all these kinds of weapons. On the other hand, weapons which are regarded as being nonaggressive and which therefore will not be generally abolished but maintained as being necessary for national defence must be allowed to all the signatory States including Germany. Germany cannot renounce any kind of these weapons, but she is unable to specify them as long as the Conference has not yet taken a decision as to the categories of arms which shall be generally abolished. However, as far as these weapons are fixed by number in the future Convention for the other States Germany will content herself, for a transitional period of 5 years, with a smaller quantity than she would be entitled to claim under an equal application of article 8 of the Covenant."

## No. 375

8661/E606349

*An Official of Department II to the Bavarian State Chancellery*

CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, July 22, 1933.

Sent July 24.

zu II Oe. 989.<sup>1</sup>

For the attention of State Minister Hermann Esser.

I should like today to confirm also in writing the telephone conversation with you concerning radio speeches about Austria by Reichstag deputy Habicht.<sup>2</sup> Following a special arrangement with Herr Habicht the Foreign Ministry has stated its willingness to waive prior censorship of the Austrian talks broadcast by Herr Habicht on the Bavarian radio. A prerequisite for this was that these speeches, the general political line of which Herr Habicht has described here, do not contain any insults against Austrian statesmen.

The Radio Department of the Reich Propaganda Ministry has taken the same position in this matter as the Foreign Ministry. I should therefore be grateful if the Bavarian radio were to receive appropriate instructions from you.

Yours, etc.

HÜFFER

*Counselor of Legation*

Before sending, to be submitted to the Acting State Secretary<sup>3</sup> with the request for approval. The Chief of the Radio Department in the Propaganda Ministry, Ministerialrat Dressler-Andres, with whom I discussed the matter once more today, thereupon immediately telephoned the instruction to the Bavarian radio not to make any more difficulties regarding the speeches of Herr Habicht. At the same time Herr Habicht had me informed through Herr Schneider that Minister Esser, in spite of having told me that he would not require a written confirmation from the Foreign Ministry, now still requests a communication at once in writing. H[ÜFFER].

<sup>1</sup> II Oe. 989: Not printed (8661/E606348). This is a minute by Hüffer, dated July 19, recording his earlier telephone conversation with Bavarian State Minister Esser, which is referred to in this document.

<sup>2</sup> Habicht's first speech on Austria over the Munich radio had been delivered on July 5. On July 7, the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires lodged a protest against this speech with Köpke. In a marginal note to Köpke's memorandum of this conversation, Neurath recorded on July 12 that he had expressed to the Reichstatthalter of Bavaria his misgivings about this radio propaganda (8661/E606344-47); cf. also Bundeskommissariat für Heimatdienst, *Beiträge zur Vorgeschichte und Geschichte der Julirevolte*, (Vienna, 1934), pp. 26-28.

<sup>3</sup> Köpke.

*State Secretary Bülow to Foreign Minister Neurath*

BERLIN, July 27, 1933.

DEAR HERR VON NEURATH: On Monday I resumed my duties, rested and strengthened after my very pleasant sojourn at the seashore. So many different things stormed in upon me that I still haven't been able to absorb everything that has happened in the meantime. Otherwise I would have written to you earlier, although even today there is no special occasion for writing.

The outcome of the negotiations with Henderson <sup>1</sup> disappointed me very much. I never expected much, to be sure, but I would not have thought he would bring back so little from Paris.

Since the newspaper reports about the Danubian area conversations within the framework of the Four Power Pact disturb us,<sup>2</sup> we are considering possibly sending Herr Ritter to Rome and Paris under the pretext of discussing with the colleagues in those cities what might best be done after the adjournment of the London Conference. At this opportunity he could sound them out in Rome on what is planned in regard to the Danubian area. I am afraid the summer recess will be used by the Italians and others to prepare something, and it would be unpleasant to be surprised at the end of August or beginning of September with a finished program. I hope you agree to the trip of Herr Ritter.<sup>3</sup> A prerequisite for this is, of course, that he meets his business friends in Rome and Paris. He already has invitations of earlier standing to both capitals.

Before he himself left for his vacation Herr Aschmann submitted to me the project of a five power pact that would include Russia.<sup>4</sup> He told me he had reported on the same matter to you, but you had stated that such projects were not ready to be decided on at the present time. Aschmann is of different opinion. I would not mention the question if I had not found a certain nervousness here because of the Russian treaties <sup>5</sup> and because of the activity in Rome. The result of this nervousness is that evidently wide circles have the same feeling as Aschmann that we must somehow take the initiative. I shall naturally counteract this mood in the press. Like you, I consider the Aschmann proposal to be off the track. Yet, the idea of German activity seems also wrong to me. At the moment our position in the world is exceed-

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 370.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 343, footnote 3.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 381. For Ritter's trip to Rome, see document No. 388 and footnote 5.

<sup>4</sup> Not found.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. document No. 342 and footnote 3.

ingly bad. That cannot continue, and even if we do not make any great efforts the general atmosphere will certainly improve if only new openings for an attack are avoided. If we should now take the initiative we would be forced to make sacrifices in order to restore the international atmosphere, and this in a sector that as far as humanly predictable will improve of itself. If we are some day forced to make some sacrifice, as in the case of the Four Power Pact, in order to improve the atmosphere, this ought to be done only when an improvement has already set in, in order more or less to extend the upward swing of the pendulum. If you are likewise of this opinion I shall for the time being oppose all thoughts of a German initiative. Also I would not know what we could practically do at the moment. A prestige policy on paper such as the Russians follow cannot, after all, be considered in earnest by us.

In the last few days there was a not very pleasant incident at the Saar border,<sup>6</sup> and also the Chiefs of Missions here are presenting all sorts of complaints. However, one cannot speak of a deterioration of the situation. The Austrian, too, appears almost daily to make representations because of planes flying over Austrian territory and dropping propaganda leaflets.<sup>7</sup> This is more serious in so far as we know from a very secret source that the Austrians have successfully made representations in London and the British have suggested in Paris and Rome that a joint *démarche* be made with us in behalf of Austria within the framework of the Four Power Pact.<sup>8</sup> I do not believe that Paris and Rome will agree, for that would mean the end of the Four Power Pact. These incidents show, however, how serious the situation is, and I have therefore arranged today with Herr Köpke and Prince Waldeck that Herr Habicht be called to Berlin in order to reach an understanding with him on certain limits to propaganda activity.<sup>9</sup> Since this propaganda does not have any immediate effect, the great danger exists that the measures will have a cumulative effect, and interests will be affected that go far beyond the Austrian question. The Four Power Pact is already endangered, and our position in regard to unauthorized flights over German territory by foreign planes is seriously compromised.

<sup>6</sup> On July 25, the Chairman of the Saar Basin Governing Commission sent a telegram to the Foreign Ministry protesting the recent carrying off of three inhabitants of the Saar Territory "by a group of aggressors who had come from Germany."

<sup>7</sup> Such representations were made on July 17, 25, and 27 (Köpke memorandum of July 17: 3086/616593-96; Köpke memorandum of July 25: 8670/E606849-51; Bülow memorandum of July 27: 8670/E606852-54). Cf. Bundeskommissariat für Heimatdienst, *Beiträge zur Vorgeschichte und Geschichte der Julirevolte*, pp. 28-29.

<sup>8</sup> See document No. 383 and footnote 1.

<sup>9</sup> See document No. 385.

Minister President Göring has so far not answered your letter concerning Ministerialdirektor (retired) Schneider,<sup>10</sup> and I therefore sent him a conciliatory letter of reminder yesterday, in which I once more pointed out that we have a rightful interest in a speedy clarification of the case.

Prince Nicholas of Rumania will now pass through Berlin after all on his trip of inspection of the airplane industry of various countries. Since he is coming only as a private person I did not consider it advisable for me to act for the Foreign Ministry and give a luncheon or something of the sort for him. I have limited myself to suggesting at the Air Ministry that State Secretary Milch or, if he should be back, Minister Göring issue him a luncheon invitation within the framework of the technical arrangements. I hope you will be in agreement with this. All of these arrangements have become somewhat difficult because there are no ministers in Berlin at present. Monday I gave a dinner for the Chinese Vice Chancellor, Soong,<sup>11</sup> and next Tuesday will give another for the South African Minister, Pirow; however, I can ask a number of ministers to the latter function, since Herr Göring and Herr Schmidt will evidently be in Berlin at that time.

I hope you are having good weather and a pleasant time in Leinfelden.

Yours, etc.

BÜLOW

<sup>10</sup> Not found.

<sup>11</sup> See document No. 373 and footnote 5.

## No. 377

8050/E578679-81

### *The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

ROME (Quirinal), July 28, 1933—1:40 a. m.

No. 186 of July 27

Received July 28—4:30 a. m.

II Ung. 459.

Kánya called on me this morning<sup>1</sup> for a lengthy discussion which I continued in the afternoon in the Hungarian Legation with Gömbös and him. It is evident from the conversation that the Hungarians came here out of concern that there is, on the one hand, a danger of Italian relations with Germany becoming cooler, and, on the other, an Italian tendency to draw closer to the Little Entente and force Hungary to the same policy. Both men stated that they were entirely reassured on both counts. Mussolini had stressed that he intended to

<sup>1</sup> Kánya and Gömbös visited Rome July 25-28.



maintain friendship with Germany. The Four Power Pact involves not merely a Franco-Italian understanding—regarding which nothing had occurred so far besides an improvement of the atmosphere—but also cooperation of the four; and with respect to this, a Franco-German understanding was desired—Italian cooperation being available to this end. Mussolini had a high opinion of the German Führer and believed in the operation of the system; initial mistakes were unavoidable. As regards the Little Entente, Mussolini held to his past policy, i. e., that no understanding was possible without taking account of the basic Hungarian demands. The Hungarian Minister said in this connection that the same was true for Hungary, and she did not want to let herself be pushed into the coalition of the five desired in some quarters. Gömbös had taken the same position in Vienna<sup>2</sup> and had tried to get Austria to take a firm stand against such plans. As regards Austria, the Hungarian Minister understood from Mussolini's statements [that he has] the lively desire to eliminate Austro-German tension (cf. my report I 1214 of July 24<sup>3</sup>). Kánya noted in Mussolini a certain disappointment with Dollfuss, on account of weakness toward Paris and Prague as well as toward Marxism. Gömbös and Kánya stated that Hungary was likewise herself still interested in eliminating the tension between the German powers. Kánya wondered whether an understanding was not possible on the basis of German recognition of Austria's independence and elimination of the Anschluss, if Austrian National Socialism were organized independently of Berlin; subsequently a coalition of Christian Socials and National Socialists against Marxism.

Gömbös answered definitely in the negative my question whether Hungary had submitted to Italy a kind of minimum program of demands for revision. Hungary had no reason today to depreciate a part of her demands by doing so.

Gömbös expressed himself as being very much satisfied with his impressions here, and likewise in Berlin.

The immediate purpose of the Ministers' visit, according to the Hungarians, aside from political contact, is the expansion of Italo-Hungarian economic relations on the basis of the Brocchi treaties;<sup>4</sup> the wheat imports to Italy (group garbled) a particularly difficult and important problem.

As regards disarmament, Kánya asked whether it was correct that we had accepted the definition of the aggressor which we had sharply fought heretofore.<sup>5</sup> Hungary was absolutely opposed to and surprised

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 363.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (6058/E447402-07).

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 14, footnote 6.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 370.

at the German concession, and Italy was likewise, as in the past, according to his impression. I replied that the acceptance of the definition of the aggressor had not yet taken place, but had only been promised as proof of a great concession simultaneously with the acceptance of supervision in case agreement satisfactory to us was achieved in the other points. Suvich told me yesterday that the Italian Government had not yet been able to give closer consideration to our counterproposal to Henderson.<sup>6</sup> Gömbös is leaving tomorrow evening for Budapest, where he is expecting the Austrian Minister of Commerce,<sup>7</sup> for which reason he had given up Fiuggi. Kánya is going to Fiuggi for 10 days.

HASSELL

<sup>6</sup> This refers to the memorandum which had been handed to Henderson during his conversations in Berlin; see document No. 370. A copy of this memorandum had been sent to Rome on July 19 (7360/E537184) following a telegraphic instruction of the same day which had informed the Embassies in Italy, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States of the main facts of the Henderson visit (7360/E537181-83).

<sup>7</sup> Fritz Stockinger.

## No. 378

8050/E578691-93

*Ambassador Hassell to Ministerialdirektor Köpke*

ROME, July 28, 1933.

II Ung. 476.

DEAR KÖPKE: I reported yesterday by wire<sup>1</sup> and today in written form<sup>2</sup> on the visit of Gömbös and Kánya. It is unbelievable what conjectures and fantasies are being indulged in today with reference to the Danubian area, and it is really difficult to separate reality from imagination in all this chaos. Typical of the confusion arising in people's heads is a report of the *Züricher Zeitung* of July 27, No. 1362, in which the local correspondent speculates about all possibilities with the same devotion. But it is more serious when such an excellent correspondent as Herr Sieburg in Paris looks at things so entirely through French spectacles as is the case in his report of July 26 (*Frankfurter Zeitung* of July 27, Reich edition No. 550-552<sup>3</sup>). I would be really interested to know whether he actually has evidence even for a single thing in this report. In any case, however, it is very undesirable when Italo-Hungarian policy is presented by a German correspondent entirely "in

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 377.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (8050/E578684-90).

<sup>3</sup> This article emphasized that the Hungarian visit to Rome was taking place with French approval and that it seemed likely that France would succeed in winning Mussolini over to the French project of a Danubian bloc consisting of Hungary, Austria, and the Little Entente.

French" in this manner. The only nice thing about the whole article is really the typographical error at the end where it is said that they want to entice Italy away from the Riviera front, obviously not referring to the struggle for Nice, by any means, but rather to the revisionist front.<sup>4</sup>

For a long time your interesting letter of March 16<sup>5</sup> about Yugoslav-Italian relations has been lying unanswered on my table. I have not replied to it as yet because it was too difficult for me to see the situation clearly. In the meantime conditions have continued to change, and it cannot be seen at the moment how they will further develop. At any rate there is now—I should almost like to say unfortunately—no room for German action in this area. However, I assume that things will soon change once more. As far as I am concerned, since coming here I have limited myself to stressing, in response to the queries of the Italians—which were especially frequent at first—about Yugoslav conditions and tendencies, that in my opinion it would be a mistake to build up a policy on the disintegration of this state. I did not do this for love of Yugoslavia, but because I very soon gained the impression that people here are or were cherishing illusions in this regard, and because it is not desirable in the German interest for Rome to make policy on so deceptive a basis. These statements of mine, however, have also come to the knowledge of the Yugoslavs, and the former Yugoslav Minister, M. Rakić, repeatedly expressed to me his special thanks for providing this clarification and did so still when taking leave. M. Gömbös and M. de Kánya, with whom I spoke for a long time yesterday about this problem, are of course of a somewhat different opinion. Kánya has been Minister in Cetinje and Gömbös was a regular officer in Zagreb, and both acquired the impression there that the various nationalities in Yugoslavia will never get along with each other, and that the variant of the familiar saying: "*Qui mange du Croate en meurt*" applies to the Croats in particular according to ancient Hungarian experience. Of course I must defer to the superior experience of these gentlemen; for the time being, however, I would assume that they are right only in so far as Yugoslavia will have to struggle with great difficulties for a long time yet, but not to the extent of being threatened by disintegration. Naturally this calculation does not include a major European catastrophe with its incalculable consequences.<sup>6</sup>

Yours, etc.

HASSELL

<sup>4</sup> Marginal note to Köpke: "Sieburg's article is evidently merely supposed to give us a picture of French ideas and hopes. Its wording, to be sure, is in part ambiguous. It does not seem to me necessary, in the circumstances, to take further steps. H[eeren], Aug. 26."

<sup>5</sup> Document No. 99.

<sup>6</sup> Marginal note in Hassell's handwriting: "I am sending a copy of this letter to Belgrade."

No. 379

6616/E499863-65

*The Chargé d'Affaires in Poland to the Foreign Ministry*

A 358

WARSAW, July 28, 1933.

Received August 3.

IV Ru. 3504.

Subject: Statements by the Soviet Minister here concerning the relations of the Soviet Union with Poland and Germany.

With reference to my report No. 929 of July 26 (Ru. 3425).<sup>1</sup>

The Soviet Minister here, whose attention I recently called to the press reports about negotiations being conducted between Poland and Russia on neutrality, friendship, etc., called these reports "canards" ["*Enten*"] and tossed the ball back, as he put it, by calling attention to alleged French newspaper reports concerning a secret German-Polish agreement on a joint conquest of the Soviet Ukraine. He denied in particular that an arbitration treaty was in preparation, referring in that connection to the Polish-Russian conciliation agreement already in existence,<sup>2</sup> which made such a treaty appear unnecessary. He also expressly denied that secret Russian-Polish military agreements were being prepared. On the other hand he repeatedly emphasized that the Soviet Union was now maintaining good relations with Poland; Poland was the beneficiary of the present situation, which had been created by Germany's attitude toward the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had no faith in the peace assurances of the German Government, for it was convinced that the leading German personalities were preparing the "crusade" against the Soviet Union. In this connection the Soviet Minister brought up the sufficiently well-known arguments—the Vice Chancellor's proposals for joint collaboration of the German and French General Staffs, allegedly reported to his Government from several completely reliable sources;<sup>3</sup> the writings of Rosenberg; the memorandum of Hugenberg;<sup>4</sup> and the collection for the starving Volga Germans, which he called anti-Soviet propaganda. The Soviet Union therefore had to do everything to be on guard against Germany. He had again and again heard the conviction expressed in the most varied Polish circles, official and private, that Germany was preparing for war with the aim of being ready in 2 years to attack. The internal reason for this appeared to be the desire of the German Government to divert the large masses dissatisfied with the end of the revolution by means of an action in the field of foreign policy. Pre-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (6616/E499708-711).

<sup>2</sup> Such an agreement had been concluded in November 1932.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 43, footnote 2.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 312.

sumably Germany's military attack would take the path of least resistance, hence be directed either to the south or to the east. In this connection the Minister mentioned Lithuania in the first place and Poland only in the second place.

M. Antonov-Osseyenko concluded his statements by expressing the hope that in spite of everything Germany would resume her former, friendly relations with the Soviet Union; the present good relations of the Soviet Union with Poland did not constitute any obstacle. The Soviet Union was waiting for Germany to document her readiness for a renewed rapprochement by "actions."

In reply I naturally pointed at length and with emphasis to the peaceful intentions of the Reich Government.

The statements of the very calm and discreet Soviet Minister, undoubtedly made on instructions from Moscow, are not only characteristic of the Soviet Government's pathological fear of intervention but also throw light on the blackmailing methods by which the Russian psychosis is obviously exploited by the Poles. The mention of Lithuania in connection with the German offensive plans makes it very likely that the argument of the German menace is being intensively exploited by the Poles and probably also by the Russians with respect to that country.

SCHLIEP

## No. 380

3154/669496-503

### *The State Secretary to the Embassy in Great Britain*

BERLIN, July 29, 1933.

II F 2401 Angabe.

The British Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. Newton, called on me today and on instructions of his Government made approximately the following statement to me:<sup>1</sup>

Certain utterances of the German Air Minister and of officials of his Ministry concerning Germany's air armament had surprised the British Government.

1) On June 24, the day after the publication of the report on the dropping of leaflets by foreign planes over Berlin, the German Air Minister had said that he would make every effort to see that orders were placed for construction of at least one or two police planes.

2) On the same day the State Secretary of the Air Ministry had stated in connection with the occurrences of the preceding day that no further postponement of the question of equality of rights for Germany in the air and on land could be accepted.

<sup>1</sup> For Newton's report of this conversation see *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. v, document No. 284.

3) On June 10 an official of the Air Ministry had told the British Air Attaché that the Aerado firm had never built anything but powerful military single-seater planes.<sup>2</sup> It was after all quite pointless, he said, to keep the fact of German air armaments secret and inevitably an armament program like the present one would become known. Moreover, the construction of military types had not appeared to be particularly dangerous since it could be foreseen that it would not be considered important enough to occasion any protest. To be sure a risk had been assumed with the present program but the number of planes in service—apart from those under construction—was so small that they could not be considered in any sense as a fighting force.

4) The State Secretary of the Air Ministry had explained to the British Air Attaché on June 26 that the entire German nation was day by day becoming increasingly rebellious against the peace treaties and was now getting to the point where it felt like forcibly breaking the chains placed upon it.<sup>3</sup>

5) The Air Minister had asked the British Air Attaché on July 15 to inform the British Government that he would like to buy 25 to 50 planes in England for police purposes.<sup>4</sup> The Foreign Ministry had already been informed of the position of the British Government. In the course of his conversation with the Air Attaché the Air Minister had said that the construction of suitable police planes in Germany would take from 3 to 4 months; however, he could not wait that long.

The British Government was certain that all these statements in no wise indicated that the German Government intended to create a police or military force in violation of Germany's obligations under article 198 of the Versailles Treaty and under the Paris Air Agreement of May 22, 1926.<sup>5</sup> It also believed that there must be some mistake if an official of the Air Ministry told the British Air Attaché that Germany was already producing military planes.

The British Government would appreciate confirmation of this view. The German Government would be able to understand the British Government's anxiety in this matter if it considered the British Government's statement of September 19, 1932, that it could not abet any disregard of her treaty obligations by Germany.<sup>6</sup>

I told the Chargé d'Affaires that I must have misunderstood him and asked him to re-read to me the instructions he had received. I then told him that his communications surprised me most painfully. I had not thought that such representations would be possible. Did his Government wish to assume the function of supervising Germany? In any case it had had no reason for crossing the bridge before reaching it.

<sup>2</sup> See *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. v, document No. 223, enclosure 1.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, document No. 231, enclosure.

<sup>4</sup> See *ibid.*, document No. 256.

<sup>5</sup> Agreement on Aerial Navigation between Germany, Belgium, British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, dated Paris, May 22, 1926, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. LVIII, p. 331.

<sup>6</sup> The British Government's statement of Sept. 15, 1932, appeared in the *Times* (London) of Sept. 19. For the text see *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. IV, document No. 92.

I thereupon went through the individual points with him.

With reference to point 1), I told him that Reich Minister Göring had already, as we had learned from the conversation of the English Chargé d'Affaires with Ministerialdirektor Dieckhoff on July 24,<sup>1</sup> said to the English Air Attaché that no police planes were being procured. I did not understand how the English Government could bring up this point again. The statements which State Secretary Milch had made on the same day contained nothing different from what the German delegation in Geneva and other government authorities had repeatedly said in connection with the disarmament negotiations.

With reference to point 3), I asked the Chargé d'Affaires which official of the Air Ministry was supposed to have made such statements to the British Air Attaché. When he hesitated to tell me the name, I said to him that this was at the moment unimportant; I would suggest to him, however, that I propose to State Secretary Milch having the English Air Attaché come in and confronting him with the official in question. If it should appear that the statements of the Air Attaché were incorrect, I feared, however, that this would be the last visit of the Air Attaché to the Air Ministry. For no official of the Air Ministry could have made such statements. There was no German firm producing any military planes, let alone only military planes of one type.

As for point 4) and State Secretary Milch's statements of July [June] 26, they could not be entirely correct in this form. I had known State Secretary Milch personally for a long time and knew that he was far too wise and calm a judge of the situation to speak of an imminent revolt (this was the English expression) of the German nation against the peace treaty. If he had been misunderstood in this way, it would have been the responsibility of the English Embassy first to ascertain at the Foreign Ministry the imminence of such a revolt.

Finally, as for Reich Minister Göring's statements of July 15 to the English Air Attaché, there was obviously a misunderstanding. The content of this conversation was accurately known to me. The Reich Minister had first stated that the report in certain newspapers about the procurement of police planes was incorrect. He had then pointed out that England had apparently delivered five police planes to Austria and had said he was likewise prepared to acquire a number of such planes in England. In the context of the conversation the main emphasis should not be placed on the offer to purchase planes but on the suggestion that England apparently took the question of police

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<sup>1</sup> Described in Dieckhoff's memorandum of the same day (5740/H030925-26). See also *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. v, document No. 267.

planes less seriously in the case of Austria than in the case of Germany. The Minister may very well have said that the construction of police planes in Germany would take 3 to 4 months. His statement that this was too long for him—if such a remark was actually made—was, however, given an entirely false meaning by the English.

The last point of the English comment had been the subject of a discussion between the *Chargé d’Affaires* and *Ministerialdirektor Dieckhoff*. Unaccountably, a distorted report of this conversation had been published by English newspapers. Thereupon I felt obliged to put the character of the English *démarche* in a true light by means of a WTB report of July 25,<sup>8</sup> which appeared in most of the German papers. At the end of this report it was stated verbatim: “No English protest was, or could have been, made in Berlin, since no violation of the Paris agreement has occurred or even come into question.” This rectification settled all the questions which the British Government was bringing up with me today. I could not but express my surprise over the fact that such an obviously semi-official report had not received any attention, but on the contrary an occasion was sought for making representations to us. I had already said that these representations were unjustified and uncalled for, but I must also repeat that such representations in themselves could not but surprise me. I told him once more that the British Government had no reason for crossing the bridge before getting to it. There was all the less occasion for any representations on the part of the English inasmuch as our attitude in the question of military aviation was known precisely. The Paris air agreement, which he had cited, dealt with military aviation and police planes only in so far as we were to be prohibited from building up a military aviation under the guise of police planes. We had, however, stated in Geneva and elsewhere—the last time as his Government undoubtedly knew to the President of the Disarmament Conference, Mr. Henderson, here in Berlin—that we were in favor of the complete abolition of military planes. I did not understand how the English could insinuate that this attitude was not seriously meant and that, contrary to our repeated statements, we were proceeding with the construction of a military air force. I had been especially surprised by the reference to the English statement of September 19, 1932, which we generally called the Simon note. Since that time the discussion of all these problems had made considerable progress; in particular, the five Powers had reached an agreement in Geneva on December 13 of last year which aimed at the establishment of German equality of rights.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Filmed as 5740/H030935.

<sup>9</sup> Reference is apparently intended to the joint resolution of Dec. 11, 1932. See Editors’ Note, p. 18.



Nothing illustrated more clearly than today's step by the English Government (quite regardless of whether it was justified or as in the present case was entirely without sufficient grounds) the necessity of establishing German equality of rights. It was quite intolerable that England or other Governments should be in a position, by appealing to one-sided obligations, to approach Germany and demand statements about Germany's treaty observance or the status of German armament, while Germany was not able or entitled to act likewise toward England or other countries. I asked him, moreover, to make it absolutely plain to his Government that the English step had surprised us greatly on account of the reason given for it and in view of the circumstances under which it was made.

I request that at the first opportunity which presents itself you express to the English Government once more our surprise at the démarche made today, in accordance with the foregoing statements. For your information I wish to add that the statements of the Reich Air Minister and of the State Secretary in the Air Ministry are tendentiously distorted by the English and that the Air Ministry official mentioned under point 3) of the English protest has already said that he never made statements of the kind in question to the English Air Attaché. The English Air Attaché will be confronted with this official in the next few days, and from the result of this confrontation the Reich Air Ministry will doubtless make the appropriate decisions regarding its future contacts with the English Air Attaché.<sup>10</sup> To me there is no doubt that the English Air Attaché, Colonel Herring, who, from what I have heard, played a rather disagreeable role here previously as a member of the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission, systematically brought about the intervention of his Government, and I am inclined to believe that today's step was concerted between London and Paris. I should be grateful if any information could be obtained on that.<sup>11</sup>

BÜLOW

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<sup>10</sup> The confrontation took place on Aug. 9 at which time the German Air Ministry official, Bolle, denied making the statements attributed to him (M113/M004243-46). The reports of the British Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin on this interview appear in *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. v, documents Nos. 326 and 327. Colonel Herring was deprived of official access to the German Air Ministry until corresponding steps by the British Government with respect to the German Military and Naval Attachés in London resulted in restoration of this privilege in April 1934. Documents on this controversy are filmed on serials 1461, 3154, 7290, 7292, 7293, and M113.

<sup>11</sup> Hoesch reported in telegram No. 184 of Aug. 2, sent on Aug. 3, 2:54 a. m. (3154/669506-09), that in accordance with instructions received he had discussed the British démarche with Vansittart. He had not received the impression that the step had been concerted between London and Paris. Cf. *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. v, document No. 298.

## No. 381

4619/E197700-03

*Foreign Minister Neurath to State Secretary Bülow*

At present at LEINFELDEN on the Enz.

July 29, 1933.

DEAR BÜLOW: Many thanks for your letter of July 27.<sup>1</sup> The outcome of the negotiations with Henderson frankly did not surprise me. It was already evident from the reports from Rome<sup>2</sup> that he would bring practically nothing with him from Paris; on the contrary, they are still holding fast to the new thesis there: preliminary concession of supervision. I fear that all further negotiations will founder on this rock since it is naturally quite impossible for us to be subjected to inspection unilaterally. There is now no longer any question of disarmament by the others.

I consider it very expedient that Ritter should go to Rome and Paris so that he may possibly find out something about the Danubian area discussions held in Rome. It is by no means impossible that the Italians, after they failed to make any headway with us in this question and after the wretched Austrian affair created a certain Franco-Italian community of interest, may seek a common line with Paris by means of which they might also to some extent mitigate the opposition to the Little Entente. We could counter this successfully only if we changed our policy toward Austria and thereby relieved the Italians of apprehension lest German influence get the upper hand in the Danubian area.

I fully share your view about the Aschmann plan and its inadvisability. I am not willing to support a policy of prestige, and the time is absolutely unsuitable for any German activity. For that, we must wait for a change in the general atmosphere. As you say quite correctly, this change will come of itself if we only avoid new points of attack. Therefore, please counteract all ideas of a German initiative, which, moreover, is also opposed by the Chancellor. In a situation like ours one must not lose one's nerve: nor should we assume that we can accomplish anything by clamor or paper protests. In general I have the feeling that in England a certain change in our favor is already noticeable.

I consider it absolutely right that you should summon Herr Habicht in order to make representations to him about the propaganda activity in Austria. Shortly before my departure I did, for that matter, make serious representations to him about the inadvisability

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<sup>1</sup> Document No. 376.<sup>2</sup> See document No. 367.

bility of extreme propaganda,<sup>3</sup> and thought at the time that he had understanding for this. In Munich I spoke to the same effect with the Reichsstatthalter and with Minister Esser, both of whom took a quite sensible attitude.<sup>4</sup>

I can hardly believe that the English would have any success in Rome with their proposal for intervention. To begin the four Power discussions with a protest against our attitude toward Austria would certainly mean the end of the Four Power Pact.

It suits me very well that you have written to Göring again. The last few days I had the intention of doing so myself, but did not know whether a reply might not in the meantime have been received in Berlin.

I keenly regret that you have been forced by various foreign visitors to send out dinner party and other invitations in midsummer. I think we shall soon have to set up an office, to be headed by a man with an unusually good stomach, for the purpose of dining all traveling ministers and others to death.

At present I am still absorbed in the Stuttgart athletic festival and will meet with the Chancellor, Deputy Chancellor, Goebbels, and other celebrities in Stuttgart tomorrow. For the rest, we have hot summer weather here, which is very good for the harvest, however. I hope it is not too hot in Berlin.

Yours, etc.

NEURATH

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<sup>3</sup> No record found.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. document No. 375, footnote 2.

## No. 382

8050/E578682

### *The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

#### Telegram

No. 187 of July 30

ROME, July 30, 1933—1:25 p. m.

Received July 30—5:45 p. m.

II Ung. 462.

Baron Aloisi asked me to see him last evening in order, upon Mussolini's instructions, to inform me of the chief results of Gömbös' visit<sup>1</sup> which had been put in writing and which he read to me.

1. No Hapsburg restoration.

2. No Austro-Hungarian personal union of another kind.

3. Italo-Hungarian cooperation in the spirit of the Four Power Pact.

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 377.

4. Consideration of the disarmament program in the spirit of the Four Power Pact.

5. Continuation of Italo-Hungarian economic cooperation within the framework of the Semmering agreement.<sup>2</sup> (Convening of the Mixed Commission, journey of Minister of Commerce Fabinyi to Rome.)<sup>3</sup>

The English and French Ambassadors have received similar communications.

With regard to disarmament, Aloisi stated that a thorough study was being made of the German proposals,<sup>4</sup> which were considered very moderate. Written memoranda on the subject were already available. The German proposal regarding the definition of the aggressor evidently still occasioned certain misgivings. According to Aloisi, Italy conceives of further procedure as follows: Before the question can be taken up in a meeting of the four Powers or of the German and French Ministers, the attempt must be made to develop the problem to a point where it is ready for such discussion. Italy would try, accordingly, to speak with the French on the basis of the German proposal. The new French Ambassador would bring the French proposals along, which the Italians would then discuss in the light of the German proposal, in order, if possible, to find a possibility for reaching an agreement.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Another designation for the so-called Brocchi agreements. See document No. 14, footnote 6.

<sup>3</sup> In report No. I 1266 of Aug. 3 (8050/E578699-704) Hassell stated further that the account of the results of the Gömbös visit contained in the memorandum read to him by Aloisi seemed obviously intended for public consumption. He went on to state that he had received information from a very reliable source that an internal pro memoria embodying the results of their conversations had been signed by Mussolini and Gömbös, which contained the following points:

- "1. No Hapsburg restoration.
2. No personal union between Hungary and Austria.
3. Extension of the Semmering agreements between Rome, Budapest, and Vienna.
4. General agreements of Italy and Hungary with Germany, without closer description, therefore both political and economic.
5. Rome and Budapest to work together for a relaxation of tension between Berlin and Vienna.
6. Italy and Hungary stand together in opposition to Anschluss."

With respect to these six points Hassell added the following:

"Of these points, Nos. 1 and 2 correspond exactly to the official communication. No. 3 corresponds to point 5, in which connection Austria is also explicitly mentioned. With respect to points 4 and 5, there is sufficient evidence in the statements made to me by Gömbös and Kánya. Point 6 is nothing new and entirely probable. The two show pieces [*Paradepunkte*] about the 'spirit of the Four Power Pact'. Nos. 3 and 4 of the official communication, are not in this 'internal' pro memoria which is perhaps not so strange. It might cause surprise that neither the question of equality of rights nor that of revision is mentioned, if it had not been confirmed through the statements made to me by the two Hungarian Ministers that it was only on account of their being a matter of course that these points had not been cited." See also document No. 397.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 377 and footnote 6.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 413.

I should appreciate hearing from you as to whether the report is correct that Nadolny is coming here, and when.

HASSELL

No. 383

3086/616620-25

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, July 31, 1933.

The Italian Ambassador called on me today and told me that he had a *démarche* to make by instruction of his Government, but was to stress in advance that this *démarche* had an entirely friendly, personal, and confidential character.

He then informed me orally by instruction of his Government of an English note that has been delivered in Rome, and, as indicated by its content, also in Paris, suggesting a joint intervention by the three Powers in Berlin for the purpose of settling the Austro-German conflict.

The English note has approximately the following content:<sup>1</sup>

The Austrian Minister<sup>2</sup> had called at the Foreign Office by instruction of his Government and referring to the interview given by Federal Chancellor Dr. Dollfuss during his London sojourn, according to which Germany was constantly trying to undermine Austrian independence, had made the following statements:

Germany's actions gave more and more cause for concern: She was trying to stage terror acts; German planes dropped pamphlets with subversive content over Austrian territory; the German radio, especially from Munich, exhorted the Austrian population to offer resistance to their Government. The Austrian public was extremely alarmed about this. The Austrian Government had continually made representations in Berlin without any success. Although the British press had supported the Austrian Government, the German Government seemed to persist in its conduct and to have very little regard for foreign public opinion in this respect. Therefore the Austrian Government believed it had the right to ask the Governments concerned for their support. It was therefore approaching the British Government with the request that it call the attention of the German Government officially to the daily incidents and acts of violence and request it to prevent these in the future. The Austrian Government would approach the French and Italian Governments simultaneously with the same request.

The British Government considered this *démarche* of the Austrian Minister entirely justified. Indeed, it was seriously concerned about

<sup>1</sup> See *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. v, documents Nos. 270 and 271 for the text of the instruction sent to the British Embassy in Italy on July 25, which provided the basis for the note referred to here.

<sup>2</sup> Lothar Wimmer.

the conduct of the German Government. It regretted this most particularly because the Four Power Pact that had just been signed in its preamble assigned to the contracting parties especially the task of strengthening the faith in peace in Europe and of putting an end to the present state of insecurity. If now the representatives of one nation incited the population of the other against their government this aim was actually sabotaged.

Germany's conduct was also contrary to article 80 of the Versailles Treaty,<sup>3</sup> aside from the fact that the "*Office International de Radio diffusion*" in Lucerne in May of this year passed the resolution with the participation of Germany that radio programs were not to be admissible if they were directed to listeners of other nations against the will of their Governments.

The British Government considered the German radio programs as well as the flights across the borders to be very serious symptoms that in certain circumstances could be regarded as violations of article 11, section 2 of the Covenant, for they were to be considered as affecting international relations in a way that would endanger peace and understanding between the nations.

However, the British Government did not want to go any further into this consideration, since the Four Power Pact after all offered a means of clarification. In this sense it was considering suggesting that the French, Italian and British Governments first jointly call the attention of the German Government to the conduct of the German radio with reference to these Lucerne decisions and article 80 of the Versailles Treaty and request it to refrain in the future from all subversive actions with respect to Austria.

The Ambassador told me on the basis of the Italian instruction, which he had before his eyes, that Mussolini wished to avoid putting into effect the English proposal and asked us urgently to consider whether and how the ground could be cut from under the Austrian protest. This could be done perhaps by our giving him, Mussolini, the assurance that the activities objected to in the English note would be terminated. The instruction then states that otherwise it would be very difficult for Italy not to go along with the action suggested by England. Mussolini pointed out that it was necessary to clarify the present German-Austrian situation before the situation became still more difficult for the German Government.

I for my part went into the Austrian complaints and the English accusations using the familiar arguments that had already been prepared in the last few days. I pointed out that neither the German Government nor the party in Germany had anything to do with the acts of terror in Austria; that investigations at all the airfields in question and regarding all registered airplanes had shown that none of these airplanes had flown over Austrian territory. Finally I pointed out that radio programs, which moreover were much less

<sup>3</sup> By this article Germany had undertaken to respect the independence of Austria.

objectionable than the Austrian ones, were not directed to the Austrian population but solely to the Germans and therefore did not violate the international convention. As far as the English accusations were concerned, there could naturally be no question of a violation of the preamble of the Rome Pact, nor of a violation of article 80, since we were in no way injuring the independence of Austria. I had already expressed myself regarding the alleged violation of the radio agreement and the air agreement. If the English Government was playing with the idea of invoking article 11, paragraph 2, of the League of Nations Covenant, that was a very serious step, the justification of which I had to dispute and the effect of which was incalculable. An application of the Rome Pact was out of the question (it had been concluded for quite different purposes), and would endanger the Pact exceedingly. In general I had to point out that an intervention by the three Powers with whom we had just concluded this Pact would of necessity destroy this Pact. The Ambassador pointed out for his part that arguments such as my statements did not cut the ground from under the Austrian protest, and this was the important thing in the opinion of Mussolini. A way out had to be found that would spare Italy from receiving the Austrian protest and taking it up with Germany, and would make it impossible for the other Powers to do so.

The Ambassador pointed out to me that Mussolini had discussed the matter in an earlier stage with Vice Chancellor von Papen,<sup>4</sup> i. e., before the English *démarche* in Rome, and he intimated for his part that they would consider it a possible solution in Rome if the two large parties in Austria, the National Socialists and the Christian Socials, would form a new cabinet in accordance with the probable ratio of strength in the population, but without new elections which, as he knew, the Reich Chancellor had so far always insisted upon. The conclusion of his lengthy statements was that the *démarche* was of an entirely confidential character; also the content of the English note had been told to us only in strict confidence and the goal which Mussolini visualized was a German-Austrian settlement that eliminated the Austrian protest, and with it the basis for an international intervention.

I told the Ambassador that I could not tell him anything beyond what had already been said (and some counterarguments that I do not need to list here). I would inform the Foreign Minister of his step<sup>5</sup> and the latter would probably get in touch with the Reich Chancellor.

BÜLOW

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<sup>4</sup> Presumably on the occasion of Papen's journey to Rome early in July for the signing of the Concordat. Cf. document No. 352.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 385.

## No. 384

K652/K171254-57

*Foreign Minister Neurath to State Secretary Bülow*

At present at ENZWEIHINGEN on the Enz.

July 31, 1933.

DEAR BÜLOW: I herewith return to you the letter of Schoen and ask you to see to it that Herr von Schoen is now put into the category awaiting assignment.<sup>1</sup> I had suggested to him that he himself should request to be put in the category awaiting assignment if he did not want to accept the post in Buenos Aires. If he has not done so up to now, then we must now take further measures. I agree to Thermann<sup>2</sup> now becoming the successor of Kauffmann in Buenos Aires.<sup>3</sup> I should like to remark also that Schoen, when I talked to him about his transfer to Buenos Aires and the reasons which influenced us—namely, to get for this city a couple who make a good impression—gave the following reason for his rejection of the post: With great effort he had just now succeeded in having his two daughters accepted in what is considered a very exclusive school near London. His wife could not bring herself to be so far away from her daughters. Schoen failed to reply to my objections that he could, after all, take his daughters to Buenos Aires. I thereupon informed the Chancellor, to whom I had previously spoken about the intended transfer of Schoen to Buenos Aires, of the objections raised by Schoen to his transfer; and I asked whether he attached importance to Schoen's remaining, perhaps for the reason that Schoen was Bavarian and that we had just put Lerchenfeld,<sup>4</sup> too, into the category awaiting assignment. Incidentally, the Chancellor, just as I did, characterized the reasons advanced by Schoen for not accepting the post in Buenos Aires as absolutely invalid.

The commissions may be drawn up for those gentlemen for whom the *agrément* of the governments concerned has meanwhile been obtained.

I do not attach decisive importance to having the names of the officials who are moved from the category awaiting assignment into permanent retirement mentioned in the press.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, I

<sup>1</sup> Neurath is here replying to Bülow's letter of July 29 (K652/K171253) which forwarded a private letter from Schoen to Köpke in which Schoen declined to accept the post of Minister in Buenos Aires. This letter from Schoen, German Minister in Hungary, has not been found.

<sup>2</sup> Edmund Thermann, German Consul General at Danzig.

<sup>3</sup> Actually, Friedrich von Keller had been German Minister in Argentina since 1928.

<sup>4</sup> Hugo von Lerchenfeld-Köfering, German Minister in Belgium since 1931.

<sup>5</sup> Neurath is here replying to Bülow's letter of July 28 (K652/K171249-52), in which Bülow had suggested that the names of the officials to be placed in permanent retirement be not published in the press as this might lead to suspicion that they were non-Aryans or Marxists and he had urged that Consul General Fritz Gustav Wendschuch not be placed in permanent retirement.



believe that it would be advisable to have the number appear in the press in one form or another. Of course it was to be anticipated that the measures would result in a number of complaints and objections. Nevertheless, it had to be done.

In the circumstances described, I agree to the canceling of the order placing Wendschuch on the permanently retired list.

Yesterday evening, after the very beautiful but rather tiring gymnastic celebration, I had a long conversation with the Chancellor, which was caused by efforts of the Vice Chancellor to engage in all sorts of activities. It isn't worth while to enumerate them all in detail. I can merely say that of all his ideas, which in large part were not at all new to us, the only one that got anywhere is that he has been permitted to seek a German-French understanding with his German-French committee<sup>6</sup> along the same lines as heretofore, that is to say primarily on an economic basis, and to continue to work on it.

Papen could not bring about a change in the present attitude of the National Socialist party toward Austria any more than I could.<sup>7</sup> The Reich Chancellor categorically rejected an intervention by Mussolini. He likewise refused to exempt visits to the Catholic rally in Vienna<sup>8</sup> from fees.<sup>9</sup>

I shall meet with the Chancellor again in Neuschwanstein on August 12. Whether I shall see him also before that time in Munich is uncertain.<sup>10</sup> The Chancellor himself will be away from Berlin during the whole month of August, and will only go there for a few hours on particular occasions. I, too, intend to be away during August unless urgent matters should require my temporary presence in Berlin.

With best regards,

Yours,

FRH. V. NEURATH

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<sup>6</sup> Presumably a reference to the Franco-German Study Group founded in 1926. Cf. Franz von Papen, *Memoirs* (London, 1952), p. 128.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. document No. 390.

<sup>8</sup> Held Sept. 8-13, 1933.

<sup>9</sup> This refers to the 1000 reichsmarks fee required of Germans traveling to Austria. See document No. 262.

<sup>10</sup> See document No. 390.

## No. 385

3086/616614-19

*State Secretary Bülow to Foreign Minister Neurath*

BERLIN, August 1, 1933.

DEAR HERR VON NEURATH: I am sorry to disturb you while you are on leave with a very urgent and difficult problem. As matters stand, however, I have no other choice.

As I told you in my last letter,<sup>1</sup> the English are urging an intervention by the three Powers in behalf of Austria. The Italians, to begin with, obviously in concert with Paris and London, have made an attempt at mediation. You will find further details about this in my enclosed memorandum on Cerruti's visit yesterday.<sup>2</sup> As appears from telegram No. 192 from Rome,<sup>3</sup> likewise enclosed, it is a question of a mediation effort for which, from the impressions I received yesterday, Mussolini would also like to pocket a broker's fee. The Ambassador made vague statements to me about remarks by Minister President Göring to Mussolini<sup>4</sup> and other Roman officials, and in this connection the Ambassador repeatedly spoke of a written renunciation of Anschluss as being desirable. The Ambassador stated plainly that if the Italian mediation did not lead to a satisfactory result, Italy could not but associate herself with the step of the other Powers.

Immediately before that, in anticipation of coming events, I had a talk with Herr Habicht in the presence of our men in charge of these questions. An account of the course of the conversation is given in the memorandum which is likewise enclosed.<sup>5</sup> It became clear to me from the conversation that Herr Habicht appraises the situation clearly and soberly and that he cannot be accused of deluding himself. His delight in games of war, however, does not permit him to take other theaters of war into consideration, and he gives little or no thought to the damage that may be done in other political areas.

There are four points about which complaints are generally made by the three Powers or by foreign countries: 1. The acts of terror. We are entirely innocent of these, and Herr Habicht thinks he can also guarantee that they will not be repeated and that incidents such as the Alvensleben case<sup>6</sup> will not again occur either. 2. The radio. If the radio [propaganda] is restricted, a certain amount of propaganda activity can undoubtedly be reconciled with the international conventions. Presumably, it would have to be limited in scope and acrimony, however. 3. The flights over Austrian territory. This cannot be justified under international law, and the statement that the propaganda flights are neither approved nor abetted by the responsible authorities is of no help to us in the international discussion. The Italian, too, pointed out that a word from the Reich Chancellor as party leader would suffice to put an end to these things. 4. The fear

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 376.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 383.

<sup>3</sup> Sent July 31, not printed (3086/616613).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. document No. 258.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed (3086/616627-32). The conversation took place on July 31. In addition to Bülow and Habicht it was also attended by Prince Josias von Waldeck und Pyrmont, Counselor of Legation Hüffer, and Schneider, specialist for Austrian questions in the Aussenpolitisches Amt.

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 305, footnote 1.

of a coup de main. According to the Austrian assertion 5-6,000, according to Herr Habicht's account about 1,000, refugee National Socialists have been concentrated as SA in a camp where they are performing "labor service." This point has not yet been brought up anywhere officially; nor do I believe that it has come up in the press as yet. Discussions about it are probably imminent, however. Actually, there is no danger of a coup de main, for Herr Habicht assured us that, if the case should arise, i. e., if the National Socialists in Austria should make an uprising, the party comrades now in Bavaria would move back across the border only in small groups and in such a way that they could not be detected.

The above-mentioned complaints are in my opinion of rather minor importance for the question whether we will succeed in overpowering Austria. Herr Habicht assured us that there could be no question of any weakening of the party comrades in Austria. Contrary to his expectations actually, they were holding their ground very well. Of decisive importance are the coercive economic measures, against which international protest is impossible or hardly possible, and which ensure us, who have the greater staying power, the victory if we are able to ward off international intervention. All these points of view are summed up in a memorandum of today's date by Herr von Heeren, which I am likewise enclosing.<sup>7</sup> To be sure, that means a lot of paper for you, but I thought it better to have the situation summed up once more; perhaps further use can be made of the memorandum.

It seems to me that in the present situation there are only three possible solutions. We can reject any intervention from the outset and refuse to negotiate with the Italians or with the other Powers about their complaints. That might lead to very great tension and probably also to an appeal to the League of Nations, since the economic interests of the creditor powers are also injured by our "legitimate" economic struggle against Austria. The second possibility is that we put a stop to the activities which I have summed up above under four headings and tell the Italians that their complaints are unjustified but that in the future they will see there is no longer any occasion for complaints. Moreover, we did not have to negotiate with anyone about Austria. That seems to me at present to be the best procedure.<sup>8</sup> The third solution, that of breaking off the struggle on the basis of a compromise such as Mussolini suggests, though worth considering, would probably be still premature. According to what Herr Habicht reported, Herr Dollfuss has already put out peace feelers and would be prepared to let the Austrian National Socialists participate in the

<sup>7</sup> Not printed (3086/616633-39).

<sup>8</sup> Marginal note in Neurath's handwriting: "To me also."

Government.<sup>9</sup> Consequently it would really be a matter only of negotiating about the extent of such participation. As far as I have been informed, however, such a solution would not satisfy the Reich Chancellor. The Italian Ambassador, too, told me the Reich Chancellor absolutely insisted that new elections must precede any understanding with the Christian Socials. That is the condition which Dollfuss and his colleagues cannot accept, because this is tantamount to an invitation to commit suicide. The third possible solution therefore involves fundamentally only the question whether a compromise can be made foregoing immediate elections, or whether the struggle is to be continued until the Government in Austria collapses and elections become unavoidable. In this connection I should like to emphasize once more what is already stated in Heeren's memorandum. The struggle with Austria, which has already lasted so much longer than we had expected, is extremely costly to us. We are losing the sympathies of all the smaller countries, which must be telling themselves that we might some day proceed against them with similar methods. We are antagonizing the larger powers. It was one of the Ambassadors here who stated the view of this group of states very vividly to me when he said: "If Germany acts in this way toward a weak state while she is weak, she will, once she herself has become strong, act similarly also toward us, her big neighbors. We all therefore have a common interest in not letting Germany grow strong." Nor must I fail to point out how difficult our situation will be in Geneva in September if the Austrian question is not settled by then.

I believe that in these circumstances a discussion between you and the Reich Chancellor will be necessary. I explained to the Italian Ambassador yesterday the difficulties caused by the vacation period, and he did not especially insist on haste. I believe, however, that we cannot act quickly enough, because the Cabinets in Rome and London will undoubtedly get impatient very soon. I should appreciate it if you would let me know as soon as possible if and when you intend to get in touch with the Reich Chancellor in this matter.<sup>10</sup> Mussolini, too, obviously expects that the Reich Chancellor will deal with the matter personally; at least so it seemed to me from his instruction to the Ambassador. If you should of your own accord want to give a reply or a provisional answer to Cerruti, please inform me to that effect.

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<sup>9</sup> In the course of the conference Habicht had told Bülow that "from three different quarters in the Austrian Cabinet feelers had been put out in order to explore the possibility for such a compromise." Cf. Kurt Schuschnigg, *My Austria* (New York, 1938), pp. 222-224; Franz Langoth, *Kampf um Oesterreich* (Wels, 1951), p. 106; Franz Winkler, *Die Diktatur in Oesterreich* (Zürich, 1935), p. 54.

<sup>10</sup> See document No. 390.

In order to give you the biggest possible number of enclosures I am also enclosing a letter to you which Herr von Heeren has drafted <sup>11</sup> and which perhaps summarizes better than my statements above a discussion which we had among ourselves.

Yours, etc.

BÜLOW

P. S. The Austrian démarche in London was made on July 24. On July 25 instructions were sent to Rome and Paris. When the English note was delivered in Rome is not known. The Italian step in Berlin was taken on July 31 (in the evening). BÜLOW.

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<sup>11</sup> Not printed (3086/616640-42).

### No. 386

3177/684401-04

*Burgomaster Krogmann to Foreign Minister Neurath*

HAMBURG, August 1, 1933.

RM 1123

DEAR HERR MINISTER: Enclosed I am respectfully presenting for your attention a copy of my letter of today's date to Herr Reich Chancellor Adolph Hitler.

With sincere regards, etc.

KROGMANN

[Enclosure]

HAMBURG, August 1, 1933

DEAR HERR REICH CHANCELLOR: With the work of the World Economic Conference having come to a temporary conclusion, I wish, in my capacity as deputy chief of the German delegation, to present to you a brief report on the progress of the work:

The view taken by the Foreign Ministry before the departure for London that no positive result would be accomplished at the conference has been fully borne out.

Apart from the impracticability of uniformly regulating the trade relations of 64 states, what was bound to cause the Conference to fail was, more than anything else, the lack of a will on the part of the principal Powers to seek a solution of the major problems. This was further aggravated by the fact that the stabilization of the world currencies, the dollar and the pound, was with good reason regarded as the preliminary condition for the solution of most of the other questions. But even with stabilization realized, it is not likely that an result would have been accomplished. The German delegation, whe

it became apparent that a positive outcome was not to be expected, conceived its task as that of preventing any decisions and recommendations from being made which might have restricted Germany's trading and financial freedom at some future date, and of avoiding the blame for the failure of the Conference being placed on Germany. Shortly before the close, even the Commission which was to consider the problem of international indebtedness, which would have embarrassed the Reichsbank, remained content with an innocuous, empty resolution as a result of the energetic efforts of the President of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht.

The value of the work actually accomplished by the Conference, if we can speak of any such value at all, lies in the fact that nearly all of the principal states provided precise statements of their stand on each issue, and that on the basis of these statements there is a possibility for Germany to begin an active trade policy. Such a policy would have to be directed to the areas where owing to a passive trade balance we could exert pressure; in addition, there might be a possibility of expanding our trade with the neighboring European countries. As you know, Herr Reich Chancellor, Italy and France approached us several times to discuss the possibility of an economic collaboration of the gold standard countries, the last time on the day of the final session, when they made a formal proposal. The Dutch Minister President, Colijn, likewise talked to me several times about the possibility of an economic rapprochement of the continental powers. To what extent the political situation permits acting upon these desires at this time is impossible for me to judge.

In England there appears to be a very strong movement in younger Conservative circles in favor of expanding the Ottawa treaties,<sup>1</sup> so that the markets of England and her Dominions will become increasingly closed to us. In the United States, on the other hand, the situation is more favorable to us. On the last day I had a very interesting talk with Mr. Bullitt of the United States Department of State, who called on me at the hotel for that purpose. The present administration in the United States and the President are seeking to emancipate the United States from British tutelage and are apparently looking about for friends. Mr. Bullitt told me in this connection that a law is being planned that would prohibit private bankers from accepting deposits, so as to break the power of the big bankers, especially Pierpont Morgan, who has always pursued a strong pro-English policy.

Revival of the conference was considered as quite unlikely by nearly all of the delegations, but not so the continuance of several small

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<sup>1</sup> The reference is to the group of bilateral commercial agreements between members of the British Commonwealth, signed at Ottawa on Aug. 20, 1932.

commissions in Geneva. Italy would prefer, however, not to have the contemplated talks about collaboration of the gold standard countries held in the atmosphere of Geneva.

I am sorry, Herr Reich Chancellor, not to be able to report to you results of a more positive nature, and remain, etc.<sup>2</sup>

KROGMANN

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<sup>2</sup> Neurath replied on Aug. 9:

"Thank you very much for being so kind as to send me your report to the Herr Reich Chancellor on the outcome of the work of the World Economic Conference. Permit me on this occasion, as chief of the delegation, to express to you my sincere personal thanks for the work accomplished in London. That the negotiations at the London Conference were not more productive of results is no fault of ours. Considering the lack of preparation for this world conference and the less than positive attitude of the United States of America on the only problem that might have had a chance of solution, it is not surprising that the result was so unsatisfactory." (3177/684405)

## No. 387

9072/E636974-75

*President of the Reichsbank Schacht to State Secretary Lammers*

I 9325

BERLIN, August 2, 1933.

Rk. 9868.

DEAR HERR STATE SECRETARY: Enclosed I am sending to you a copy of minutes<sup>1</sup> which my specialist on the subject made concerning an informatory discussion held in the Reich Ministry of Finance on the question of "Subsidies by the Reich to Danzig and their Transfer." As is known to you, Herr State Secretary, the Reichsbank has always shown the greatest understanding for the foreign political situation and accordingly, when there was necessity for supplying foreign exchange, has willingly made the foreign exchange available.

In view of the very great sums involved however in the present case, and since I have certain doubts as to whether the Reich Chancellor has been informed about the matter, I am writing herewith to you about the case and would be grateful if you would bring up the subject when an occasion presents itself.<sup>2</sup>

Yours, etc.

HJALMAR SCHACHT

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed (9072/E636976-81).

<sup>2</sup> Lammers replied on Aug. 8: "I brought up this matter with the Reich Chancellor yesterday. He requests you urgently to undertake the transfer of the subsidies of the Reich to Danzig to the amount and as often as you find at all possible. (9072/E636982)"

At the same time a letter to the Minister of Finance stated that "the Reich Chancellor also requests you to approve the requests of Danzig as speedily and as extensively as possible." (9072/E636983)

## No. 388

5642/E410595-97

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

I 1267

ROME, August 3, 1933.

Received August 4.

II WDB 17.

## POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Ideas regarding German-Italian economic cooperation in the Danube Basin, in connection with the Gömbös visit.

With reference to my report No. I 1266 of August 3.<sup>1</sup>

I should like to revert again briefly to the economic side of the matter. I take the liberty of recalling the fact that Mussolini in the past suggested German-Italian economic cooperation in the Danube Basin, with the special proposal that the economic activity of the two countries be divided according to specific categories [*nach sachlichen Zonen*].<sup>2</sup> Mussolini has meanwhile often reverted to this idea. In Berlin the division in accordance with specific categories was not considered feasible; moreover, the suggestion was not found to be sufficiently substantiated and the matter was finally referred to the Mixed Commission of Industrialists. This met in February of this year and was unable, because of the nature of the subject, to arrive at results of any fundamental or far-reaching importance.<sup>3</sup> I am disposed to favor the plan of convening it again in June, if it has not met again. Mussolini spoke quite appreciatively to me about the results, but repeatedly stressed the fact that the guiding principles of economic policy have to be established from above, while only in the second stage would it be the task of the experts and interested parties to start functioning. The great political activity consequent upon the Four Power Pact, etc., then caused the problem to recede. In my recent telegraphic and written reports I already pointed out that the moment seemed to me to have come to revert to Mussolini's suggestion.<sup>4</sup> At the nonbinding conversations which were held here recently by Ministerialdirektor Ritter, partly in my presence, with Under State Secretary Asquini and Director General Ciancarelli,<sup>5</sup> some points were already made which, in my opinion, may be further pursued. It is my impression that agreement exists between Italy and Germany on the following points respecting economic policy in the Danube Basin:

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 382, footnote 3.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 14 and footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 51.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. document No. 343.

<sup>5</sup> Ritter's conversations in Rome took place on Aug. 2 and 3, 1933. A copy of Ritter's report on the conversations was sent by the Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Rome in instruction W 5495 I of Aug. 10 (8079/E579507-22).



1. Of the southeastern European agrarian countries, Hungary and Bulgaria are to be chiefly assisted ;

2. As partners in negotiations, Germany and Italy reject any kind of bloc, particularly, therefore, the so-called Little Economic Entente.

3. For Germany and Italy any Tardieu plan<sup>6</sup> or similar organization is out of the question.

4. Germany and Italy should keep each other currently informed concerning the general outlines of commercial policy with respect to the countries of the Little Entente and possibly also Poland, particularly, for example, concerning the denunciation of commercial treaties and countermeasures against differentials or restrictions, in order, if possible, to bring their commercial policy to the same common denominator.

5. On the basis of these general principles for commercial policy, the attempts should be continued to inform each other regarding economic activity in these countries, just as is done on the Mixed Commission.

I would think that at a meeting of German and Italian Ministers, possibly directly before or during the first Four Power Conference, these general principles could be more precisely defined and possibly even supplemented in the form of an agreement. At the same time, consideration will have to be given especially to what extent it is possible to put No. 4 in a form that would be practically effective.

HASSELL

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<sup>6</sup> See document No. 5, footnote 3.

## No. 389

6609/E497103-05

### *The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

No. 168 of August 4

Moscow, August 4, 1933—11:12 p. m.

Received August 5—4:15 a. m.

IV Ru. 3560.

For the State Secretary personally.

Since I shall not see Litvinov here again before my vacation, and Molotov's further presence in Moscow was doubtful, I availed myself of an opportunity that arose to discuss here in a detailed conversation with Molotov, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, the status of German-Soviet relations.<sup>1</sup>

I explained to Molotov the many signs that had to be construed as a departure of the Soviet Government from its former policy

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<sup>1</sup> A more extended record of this conversation is contained in Dirksen's memorandum No. A 1575 of Aug. 4 (1908/429638-97).

toward Germany. I mentioned the improper tone of the Soviet press, the change in the attitude on Versailles and the question of the Corridor, the imputation of secret rearmament. Whether this altered attitude was attributable to economic or political opportunism or to disgruntlement because of the policy with respect to the party [*parteilpolitische Verärgerung*], I was unable to judge.

Molotov denied categorically that in the case of the Soviet Government, a change in principle had taken place in its attitude toward Germany. The Soviet Government was striving for friendly relations not only with other countries, but also with Germany, regardless of their internal political structure. It adhered as ever to the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries. Molotov then stated that a number of incidents had caused consternation and uneasiness in the Soviet Government. Attacks on Soviet nationals, the well-known German statements at the World Economic Conference,<sup>2</sup> but particularly the interview published here today, which Minister Goebbels gave to the *Sunday Referee*<sup>3</sup> (see my telegram No. 167<sup>4</sup>), which reduced Versailles and Rapallo to a common denominator. The impression was created that the aforementioned manifestations reflected a change in the German attitude toward the Soviet Union. The treaties now concluded by the Soviet Government were not directed against other countries, but were dictated by a general peace policy. Unchanged also was its attitude toward the Versailles Treaty. If Germany's policy toward the Soviet Union remained unchanged, the latter would also not change her policy toward Germany.

I replied that the incidents concerning the Soviet nationals were investigated and in large part settled. The meaning of the statements of German Government representatives in London, repeated in distorted form, had long since been completely clarified. Doubts about German policy were unjustified, since the latter had been unequivocally established by the Chancellor's speech of March 23<sup>5</sup> and the extension of the Berlin Treaty.<sup>6</sup> Regarding the Goebbels interview, I hoped shortly to be able to give him reassuring statements.<sup>7</sup> The conferences that I had had in Berlin recently on German-Russian relations with all leading persons<sup>8</sup> confirmed and corroborated the directives for our Russian policy established in the Chancellor's speech of March 23.

<sup>2</sup> See documents Nos. 312 and 355.

<sup>3</sup> Marginal note: "Denied! v. T[ippelskirch], Aug. 6."

<sup>4</sup> Not printed (1885/425500).

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 104, footnote 5.

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 212.

<sup>7</sup> In telegram No. 171 of Aug. 5 to the Embassy in the Soviet Union, the Press Department of the Foreign Ministry stated that WTB denied officially the interview attributed to Goebbels (1885/42501). This WTB denial, Dirksen reported in telegram No. 169 of Aug. 8, had been published that same day in *Izvestia* (1885/42502).

<sup>8</sup> Cf. document No. 284 and footnote 3.

Molotov's statements, as those of one of the really authoritative men and closest co-workers of Stalin, undoubtedly deserve serious consideration. The anxiety expressed by him concerning the future attitude of German policy toward Russia seemed to me to be genuine. The conversation could, in my opinion, at a time that appears convenient to us, be used as the springboard for more exhaustive discussions on the clarification of German-Russian relations. I obtained the impression that the early publication of a correction of the Goebbels interview<sup>9</sup> was very important.

DIRKSEN

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<sup>9</sup> Marginal note: "Has taken place! v. T[ippelskirch]."

## No. 390

3086/616669

*Foreign Minister Neurath to State Secretary Bülow*

MUNICH, July [August] 4, 1933.

DEAR BÜLOW: I have just come from Obersalzberg, where I spoke with the Reich Chancellor immediately.<sup>1</sup> Result: he will summon H[abicht] and 1) order him to observe still greater moderation [*weitere Mässigung*] in radio propaganda; 2) forbid the airplane propaganda; 3) a coup de main by the refugees is out of the question. If objection is made to their being assembled, the answer is to be given that we cannot permit the many refugees coming across the border on account of the persecution in Austria to run around freely. The economic struggle is to be continued in all its severity. Acts of terror by the German side have already been most strictly forbidden.

I now think you should summon the Italian Ambassador and tell him first of all that we reject any intervention.<sup>2</sup> Their complaints are altogether unjustified and it will be seen that in the future, too, there will be no more occasion for them. For the present no compromise can be reached with Dollfuss. It seems to me, moreover, that any concession (except the changes in articles 1 and 2) would now perhaps be welcome to Dollfuss, but Vaugoin<sup>3</sup> and Fey, whose slave Dollfuss is even now, do not want any compromise.

I wrote not long ago that the Chancellor rejects any written commitment on the Anschluss.<sup>4</sup> I would likewise reject it for that matter. Papen already received a rebuff from the Chancellor on the 30th as a spokesman of Mussolini's wish.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 385.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 391.

<sup>3</sup> Karl Vaugoin, Army Minister in the Dollfuss Cabinet and chairman of the Christian Social party.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. document No. 384.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 384.

I am seeing the Chancellor again on the 12th.<sup>6</sup> It would be advisable to inform the Ambassadors in London, Paris, and Rome, too.<sup>7</sup> I am now going to the mountains for 2 days; I cannot be reached again until Tuesday in Leinfelden. In haste, yours, etc.

NEURATH

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<sup>6</sup> See document No. 402.

<sup>7</sup> Instructions to that effect were sent on Aug. 5 to Rome (telegram No. 202), London (telegram No. 207), Paris (telegram No. 393) and Vienna (telegram No. 67) (6113/E453775-76). These instructions in the main coincided with the statements which Bülow made to the Italian Ambassador in the conversation printed as document No. 391.

## No. 391

6113/E453772-73

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, August 5, 1933.

II Oe. 1118.

After the Foreign Minister had informed me by telephone of his conversation yesterday with the Reich Chancellor,<sup>1</sup> I asked the Italian Ambassador to come to see me this morning. I told him that I had informed the Foreign Minister about the communications last Monday from the Ambassador<sup>2</sup> as well as about the entire state of the discussions with Austria. The Foreign Minister had thereupon got in touch with the Reich Chancellor, and yesterday a conversation between them had taken place. The Reich Chancellor had decided that any mixing of third states in the German-Austrian discussions was to be rejected; furthermore, that a moderation of the economic measures against Austria was out of the question. On the other hand, incidents were in all circumstances to be avoided. In order to ensure this, propaganda was to be kept in check [*eingedämmt*], and, especially, flying over Austrian territory was to be hindered with all means. The Reich Chancellor would instruct the relevant party official (Herr Habicht) in this sense.

The Ambassador objected that the Italian step of last Monday was not to be regarded as an intervention. I replied that the statement of the Reich Chancellor was not meant to say that it was; it obviously referred only to the English and French steps announced in the press. The Ambassador said that he had received the impression—to the easing of his mind—from yesterday's reports in *Temps* that such steps would not be made. I replied that, according to my information, it was not entirely certain that such steps would not be made. The Ambassa-

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 390.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 383.

dor expressed the hope that the statement which I had given to him would cause Mussolini to oppose an intervention of the other Powers. I for my part advised the Ambassador to communicate my statements quickly to Rome, and pointed out that the actual request of Mussolini calling for cutting the ground from under the complaints made by Austria to England—which was the actual cause of the intervention—had been fulfilled.

I told the Ambassador that, in the opinion of the Foreign Minister, the English zeal in this matter derived from the fact that MacDonald was on leave and Simon was on a journey at sea, so that business was being conducted by Vansittart who, as was well known, had long been a close friend of the Austrian Minister in London, Baron Franckenstein, and was strongly under his influence.

BÜLOW

No. 392

6113/E453785-90

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, August 7, 1933.

II Oe. 1136.

The French Ambassador, who had made an appointment with me as early as Saturday but whom I did not receive till today, visited me this morning. He stated that by order of his Government he had to make a *démarche*, which he apparently read verbatim from the telegram he had received. The telegram read approximately as follows:

The French Government, which understood that the English and Italian Governments had begun an exchange of views with the German Government in the same friendly manner, found it necessary, in the spirit of the Four Power Pact, to take up for friendly discussion certain subversive acts committed by the Germans against Austria in the form of radio broadcasts and the dropping of inflammatory leaflets from airplanes which take off in Germany and return there. Such acts appeared to be quite incompatible with the goal set forth in the preamble of the Four Power Pact, according to which confidence in peace was to be strengthened in Europe in order to eliminate the existing state of disquiet. These occurrences likewise conflicted with the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of neighboring countries. They were also difficult to reconcile with Germany's obligations under article 80 of the Versailles Treaty. The French Government also felt that it must call attention to the resolutions adopted by the International Radio Conference in Lucerne on May 13 last.<sup>2</sup> The French Government hoped that these representations would be received

<sup>1</sup> The original of this document is burned around the edges and the signature is no longer visible.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 383.

in the same friendly spirit in which they were made. The occurrences in question might give occasion for the application of article 11, paragraph 2, of the League of Nations Covenant. The French Government preferred, however, in the spirit of conciliation, to forestall such League of Nations proceedings, since it assumed without question that the German Government disapproved of the incidents concerned and would use all available means to put an end to them. The Ambassador then explained his instructions, making them milder in effect.

I said to the French Ambassador that in other years it had been customary to avoid political actions of any kind during the vacation period of the summer months, which in some cases was perhaps due in part to the absence of the responsible Ministers. This year evidently was an exception. I had the impression that the acting officials in some countries took advantage of the absence of their Ministers in order to pursue a tough policy. In two places in the statement which his Government had instructed him to make the friendly spirit of the *démarche* was emphasized. The friendly character of a *démarche*, however, was determined not by such statements but by the content of the *démarche*. In this case I could only say that such representations, which were substantively unfounded, could not be considered friendly, least of all if they had been discussed a week in advance in the English and French press and on Saturday, 2 days before the step was taken, were announced as certain. Could it be that the French and English Governments would presume to exercise a supervision over German foreign policy? The English Chargé d'Affaires was calling on me this afternoon.<sup>3</sup> We had not previously discussed these problems with the English Government. The Italian Ambassador had telephoned me this morning that his Government was not joining in this step. Exactly a week ago I had had a friendly conversation of a quite different character with the Italian on the same subject.<sup>4</sup> The Italian request had been that the ground be cut from under any possibility of intervention. That the Four Power Pact was made the point of departure for such representations was interesting and new to me. I would note this for future cases. This was the first instance of an application of the Four Power Pact. It was incomprehensible to me, however, that it should be invoked in justification of the *démarche*, and I was constrained to point out that such a misuse of this Pact, which moreover had not yet been ratified, seemed to me dangerous for the future of the Pact, even for its existence. The threat of article 11 seemed to me completely uncalled for. (The Ambassador interrupted me vigorously and assured me that there could be no question of a threat.) I knew the League of Nations Covenant sufficiently well to be able to say that there was no occasion

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 393.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 383.

whatever for application of article 11. In spite of its diplomatic trimming the French request amounted to a demand that we should stop or condemn a propaganda directed against Austria. Such a demand was substantively unjustified. I had already had an opportunity 8 days ago to explain to the Italian Ambassador that in our statements over the radio we scrupulously observed the Lucerne agreements. I did not understand the French line of reasoning. Could it be unknown to the French Government how many foreign broadcasting stations, chiefly the Austrian radio but also others, e. g., the Strasbourg radio, were sharply criticizing conditions in Germany? I had told the Italian, furthermore, that we had not violated any air convention, since the planes, with respect to which we did not even know whether they were German or Austrian, did not take off from supervised German airports. The measures of supervision by the appropriate authorities would undoubtedly make such flights more difficult if not put a stop to them. Those were problems, however, which I did not wish to discuss with the French Ambassador. I had merely to point out that the grounds of the French *démarche* were totally insufficient. The Germans had not violated any international agreements, either article 80 of the Versailles Treaty, the Radio Convention, or the agreements on air traffic. For these reasons I had to refuse taking any position on the French demand that such forms of propaganda be stopped. Finally, I could not help pointing out to him that such *démarches* could not contribute toward improving the atmosphere. Unfounded *démarches* and their inevitable rejection could not but cause ill-feeling on both sides.

The Ambassador immediately took up my remark about the Strasbourg station and argued that it had never carried attacks against the German Government by Government representatives or official personages, but only a press review, which, to be sure, had often perhaps not been to our liking. From Munich, on the other hand, German Ministers and high officials—he mentioned by name the Bavarian Minister of Justice, Frank—had sent out appeals to Austria to overthrow the Government there. The Ambassador then tried to explain that his *démarche* was thoroughly friendly and that one of the points of the Four Power Pact was to make possible a friendly discussion of anxieties of the present kind. The Ambassador for his part too characterized as regrettable the announcement in the press made in advance.

I did not take up the statements about the radio again, but merely emphasized that our broadcasts had been kept within the framework of the Radio Convention. The character of the *démarche*, which I could not acknowledge to be friendly, was determined, moreover, not only by the advance announcement in the press but also by the content.

The démarche did not have a sufficient basis and was therefore unfriendly.

The Ambassador was very worried about the press being informed of his step today and tried to induce me to draft a joint communiqué with him. I refused to do this and also to draw up his telegraphic report to Paris jointly with him. He then made the statement, intended also for his own press, that he had carried out the step he had been instructed to take and that I had taken note of his statements. I had said that there were no valid grounds for the French step and that I therefore refused to take any position on the French demand, stating, however, that Germany had not violated existing agreements. The Ambassador will also report my statements about the unfriendly character of the step to his Government, but will not transmit them to the press, since I told him that I did not intend to pass this part of the statements on to the press here.

The Ambassador was very dissatisfied with this outcome<sup>5</sup> and foresaw that his Government would not evaluate the outcome of his step differently and would not let the matter rest with that. He asked me whether he might not at least receive the same reassuring promises that I had given the Italian Ambassador, which were known in Paris. I refused this quite firmly and told him that the Italian Ambassador had, as it were, taken me aside in a friendly manner and whispered in my ear that a démarche was impending which his Government thought inadvisable, and asked me whether I did not know ways and means of cutting the ground from under it. He, on the other hand, came announced by the press, with a raised stick, as it were, admonishing us to behave. My attitude toward such a procedure did not require any further explanation. Moreover, if, as he told me, the reply I had given to the Italian was known in Paris, today's démarche was still more incomprehensible to me and I had one more reason for characterizing it as unfriendly.

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<sup>5</sup> Cf. André Francois-Poncet, *Souvenirs d'une ambassade à Berlin*, pp. 202-203.

## No. 393

6113/E453792-93

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, August 7, 1933.

II Oe. 1137.

The English Chargé d'Affaires,<sup>1</sup> who wanted to see me as early as last Saturday but was put off by me until today, visited me this after-

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<sup>1</sup> B. C. Newton. For Newton's report of this conversation, see *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. v, document No. 312.



noon. Through somewhat vague statements, which resulted, however, from the vagueness of his instructions, he informed me that his Government had been gratified to take notice of the statements I had made to the Italian Ambassador.<sup>2</sup> The statements made to Cerruti were in substance accurately summarized in his telegram. The Chargé was under instruction to convey to me the satisfaction of his Government, but also to inform me of his original instructions, which were identical with those of the French Ambassador.<sup>3</sup>

I tried unsuccessfully to ascertain from the Chargé whether his original instructions were still in force, that is, whether he was to undertake a démarche or whether he was merely supposed to bring to my attention the receipt of an instruction about a matter already overtaken by events in view of the Italian announcement regarding my talk with Cerruti. Inasmuch as the Chargé was unable to give me any clear answer to this question, but confined himself to saying that in his opinion the matter had already been disposed of satisfactorily, while pointing out on the other hand that his Government certainly had no intention of dissociating itself in this matter from France, I read to the Counselor of Embassy the essential points of my reply to the French Ambassador from the memorandum I had made this noon, and explained some points that were not clear to him. I then told him that this was the reply which I would also have to give to his Government if in accordance with the instruction received by him he were to make representations to us as the French Ambassador had done.

The Chargé remained uncertain as to the meaning of his instructions and we agreed that he should report to London in the sense outlined above (on the basis of extensive notes he made). He remarked, not without *Schadenfreude*, that his Government could afterward choose whether it wanted to consider my statements to François-Poncet as a reply to its démarche or merely as information on what I had told the French Ambassador.<sup>4</sup>

BÜLOW

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<sup>2</sup> See document No. 383.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 392.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Walford Selby, *Diplomatic Twilight 1930-1940* (London, 1953), pp. 14-16.

## No. 394

8636/E604937-41

*The Chargé d'Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry*

A 1197

THERAPIA, August 7, 1933.

Received August 10.

III O 2847.

## POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Conversation with Tevfik Rüştü Bey.<sup>1</sup>

I had a long conversation with Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Bey, in which he mainly confirmed what I had mentioned in my current reporting on Turkish policy in recent months and its future course. I should like to pass on the following from the conversation even at the risk of repeating some things:

Tevfik Rüştü finds his policy excellent. It is based on friendship with Russia. This did not exclude Turkey's also going her own way, as she had shown at the time she entered the League of Nations; but such ways of her own were possible only if they were also advantageous to her partner Russia, and precisely this could be openly stated with respect to Turkey's entry into the League of Nations. On the other hand, Turkey would always align herself with Russia when there were common interests to be defended. Thus Turkey had realized that she had to conclude an Eastern pact with Russia<sup>2</sup> as a counterweight to the Four Power Pact of the West. This Eastern pact, in whose realization he, Tevfik Rüştü, had been very instrumental, was not directed against any other country; quite on the contrary, it guaranteed the peace more strongly than any other pact. For it eliminated the fear of attacks. This fear was the most dangerous thing by far; it was the real reason why Europe did not find rest. Even France was afraid of secret rearming by Germany, Russia of Hugenberg's proposals, and Italy of the Anschluss. If in addition there came attacks<sup>3</sup> on the Turkish economic policy, such as State Secretary Posse had launched in London,<sup>4</sup> then one could not blame Turkey if she also for her part struck an attitude against Germany. But this ill-feeling on the Turkish side was now quite forgotten and the old, good relations with Germany were restored since the Reich Chancellor had granted Mahmut Bey, Chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee in the Turkish Parliament, the interview<sup>5</sup> and had directed friendly words to the Ghazi.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "He was always against Germany. N[eurath]."

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 342 and footnote 3.

<sup>3</sup> Marginal note in Neurath's handwriting: "?"

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 355.

<sup>5</sup> This interview took place on July 15 and was reported in the Turkish newspaper *Milliyet* on July 16. A translation of this article was sent to Berlin by the Embassy in Turkey on July 17 (9965/E696671-73).

<sup>6</sup> "The Ghazi" the common nickname given to President Kemal Atatürk.

He, Tevfik Rüştü, had also spoken with the Foreign Minister, Baron Neurath, for whom he had great respect, and had pointed out to him that the German delegation in London had not had any real axle on its wagon. At present one could not see any clear direction at all in German foreign policy. The Duce, too, had complained about this to him in Rome<sup>7</sup> and had said, in particular, that he was an absolute opponent of the Anschluss. Tevfik Rüştü then spoke up for Dollfuss, in whose survival not only France but also Italy had a very strong interest.<sup>8</sup>

In the course of the conversation, during which I did not neglect to explain to him our view on the various points, he also indicated that he hoped Germany would eventually come to adopt an attitude less disturbing to Moscow, in accordance with the grand policy line announced by the Reich Chancellor in his big political speech of March 23, 1933.<sup>9</sup> This would also be very valuable to him, since it restored the old line on which he had worked together with M. Nadolny and M. Suritz<sup>10</sup> for years. However, Russia was still uncertain as to what she had to expect from Germany.

The Russian policy toward France coincided with that which Turkey had followed in Paris. Since the main points of difference with France had been clarified, he, Tevfik Rüştü, had now also been able to conclude the commercial treaty.<sup>11</sup> He greatly regretted that the German-Turkish economic agreement which was now being negotiated had not yet progressed to the point where it could be signed at once.<sup>12</sup> Now that the general political situation with respect to Germany had been clarified once more, he would be very glad if he could add to the signing of the French-Turkish commercial treaty also the agreement with Germany in the economic field. France, as Tevfik Rüştü probably correctly asserted, had yielded in important points in the commercial treaty, in particular with regard to restricting the most-favored-nations clause and accepting the balance of payments in place of the balance of trade as the basis of the clearing. The Turkish exports to France would hereby be increased by about 3 million Turkish pounds.

For the rest, Tevfik Rüştü Bey said, there was nothing in the Paris agreements that changed the Turkish policy. For its guideline was the principle of friendship with everyone. At the same time, however, there was an active friendship with Italy, Greece, and Russia,

<sup>7</sup> See document No. 361.

<sup>8</sup> Marginal note in Neurath's handwriting: "!"

<sup>9</sup> At the opening of the Reichstag. See document No. 104 and footnote 5.

<sup>10</sup> Jacob Suritz, Soviet Ambassador in Turkey, 1923-1934.

<sup>11</sup> Signed on July 27.

<sup>12</sup> A German-Turkish economic agreement was signed in Berlin on Aug. 10 (5667/H013844; 5667/H013849-52).

the importance of which he had documented by the fact that after Paris he had been in Rome and Athens.<sup>13</sup> He had also expressly confirmed this in his conversation with the Duce.

Proceeding to the question of a Balkan Locarno he told me that the most important question was a rapprochement with Bulgaria. He said that this was progressing very well and pointed to Ismet Pasha's<sup>14</sup> visit to Sofia in the near future. Since tripartite treaties had not stood the test, and were very difficult particularly in the case of Greece-Bulgaria-Turkey, because the interests and relations of Greece and Bulgaria with respect to third states were not identical, the attempt would be made to bring about similar bilateral treaties. This system had also proved itself elsewhere; Tevfik Rüşti alluded to the present negotiations between Moscow and Rome,<sup>15</sup> which according to his information were proceeding very favorably.

When I asked whether the arbitration agreements with Yugoslavia and Rumania which were being planned by Turkey would not be an obstacle to Turkey's rapprochement with Bulgaria, the Foreign Minister said that he assumed the opposite, since otherwise Bulgaria would be entirely isolated if she did not make a rapprochement with Turkey. For the rest he believed that all treaties about protection of borders, like the pact on the meaning of definition of the aggressor,<sup>16</sup> reduced the value of the Little Entente, because they were born of "fear," and if Rumania were relieved of the fear of Russia, Yugoslavia of the fear of Italy, and Czechoslovakia of the fear of Germany, then the Little Entente would no longer have any justification and would disintegrate.

To what extent Tevfik Rüşti himself believes in the truth of these arguments I do not wish to discuss. They seem to me to pursue rather the purpose of glossing over the danger which the Turkish rapprochement with the countries of the Little Entente presents to our policy here.

At the close of the conversation, which went off in a very friendly way, Tevfik Rüşti reverted once more to the particular political importance he attached to the speedy, satisfactory conclusion of the economic negotiations now pending, and he asked me to report this to Berlin, as I have already done.<sup>17</sup>

FABRICIUS

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<sup>13</sup> Tevfik Rüşti had been in Paris June 30-July 11, in Rome July 11-16, and in Athens July 16-20.

<sup>14</sup> Turkish Minister President.

<sup>15</sup> See document No. 368 and footnote 6.

<sup>16</sup> See document No. 29.

<sup>17</sup> Not found. The documentation on German-Turkish economic relations during this period is incomplete since the economic files on Turkey of Department III (Orient) have not been found.

## No. 395

5661/H010285-88

*Minute by Ministerialdirektor Ritter*

BERLIN, August 8, 1933.

[W 5584].<sup>1</sup>

Herr Brandsch <sup>2</sup> called on me today at my request.

He said that he came not only with the knowledge but on instruction of the Rumanian Minister President <sup>3</sup> in order to clarify here, in the first place, whether the German Government would be willing to restore the former friendly relations with Rumania in the economic and political field. In the second place, if this was the case, what the methods were for doing this. Brandsch said in this connection that almost all important factors in Rumania were dissatisfied with the present entirely French orientation of Rumanian policy. This was true in particular of the King. He himself had spoken about this in detail with the King. However, he did not have instructions to come here from the King personally. But he knew that the Rumanian Minister President had reported to the King about the Minister President's instructions to Brandsch.

However, there were today still three factors that made it difficult for the Rumanian Government to detach itself from the present orientation of Rumanian policy. These were:

1. The person of Titulescu. He knew that the King found Titulescu's position burdensome, and at the moment material was being collected against Titulescu. (Herr Brandsch also took this opportunity for saying that some time ago M. Titulescu had approached the Reich Chancellor via Herr Rosenberg concerning a meeting.<sup>4</sup> The Reich Chancellor had also said he was ready for a meeting in Munich with the public absolutely excluded. Then, however, nothing more had been heard from Titulescu.)

2. Rumania's financial dependence on France.

3. The fear that the German Government is backing Hungary's wishes for revision.

With respect to the second point, I told Herr Brandsch that the then French Minister of Finance, Flandin, told me as early as about 3 years ago that they did not count in Paris on France's ever seeing again the capital invested in the Danubian countries. If France wanted to see any of the money at all again, they would have to settle for 50 percent.

<sup>1</sup> The file number is from another copy of this document.

<sup>2</sup> Rudolf Brandsch, Deputy representing the German minority in the Rumanian Parliament, 1919-1933: Under State Secretary for National Minorities in the Rumanian Cabinet, 1931-1932.

<sup>3</sup> Alexander Vaida Voevod.

<sup>4</sup> See documents Nos. 118 and 189.

Perhaps they would then at least see this 50 percent again. In this situation no one in Europe had understood for a long time why Rumania was almost the only country still to pay 100 percent of its interest to other countries, while at the same time the government officials and the Army could no longer be paid their salaries. Regarding Hungary, I told him that I did not remember that any responsible German statesman had ever explicitly supported specific Hungarian claims for territorial revision. It was something else when all German Governments supported the demand for revision in general (and in principle), for Germany herself was interested in that.

As for the question asked at the start, I said that for the present moment it could only be answered with a clear "no". In spite of her numerous efforts to create better relations with Rumania in the past, Germany had always harvested only political unfriendliness. The Rumanian Government, and particularly M. Titulescu, had stood on the side of our political opponents on every occasion during the last 10 years. On the other hand it could not be unknown to him that it was a declared aim of the German Government to have an active economic policy with the Southeast. Nevertheless it would not be possible to change anything in the above-expressed "no" as long as the Rumanian Government did not take the first step in making clear that it was changing the political attitude maintained with respect to Germany over the past 10 years. Herr Brandsch said that he understood that and would also say as much in Bucharest. He said that he would make a written report about our conversation for the Minister President, which would certainly also be submitted to the King.

Herr Brandsch made the same serious and reliable impression on me during this conversation, too, that we had of him in the past. With me he did not try for a moment to reach any agreements on commercial policy. He said that this had only been the pretext toward the outside world and also the Rumanian Legation here. The Minister President had given him a letter for the Rumanian Legation here instructing the latter Legation to tell the German Government that Herr Brandsch had been sent here to study economic relations. This had been purposely put forward by the Rumanian Minister President as a blind merely in order to give Brandsch the opportunity for the political sounding mentioned in the beginning.

## No. 396

7360/E587245-46

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

I 1287

ROME, August 8, 1933.

Received August 14.

II F Abr. 2604.

## POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Mussolini on the disarmament problem.

Mussolini spoke to me yesterday in considerable detail about the disarmament question. He termed it the heaviest liability for European policy. Cooperation between the European countries and especially the Powers of the Four Power Pact more or less on a basis of confidence, as well as economic recovery, would only be possible if the nightmare of the conflict over disarmament were eliminated. On the other hand it was precisely the Four Power Pact which after the failure of the Disarmament Conference was the logical forum for reaching an agreement on this subject. However, it would surely be wrong to convene a four Power conference at the present unprepared stage and in the present atmosphere (Austria!). Rather, the matter should first be thoroughly and carefully prepared. He would speak to this effect with the new French Ambassador, Count de Chambrun, who would arrive here on August 14. It was his intention now to use quite plain and determined language with France. He would tell the French openly that they should stop playing hide and seek and take as a basis France's firm intention not to disarm. Only on this realistic basis would they arrive at the absolutely necessary compromise and the armament reductions that were possible. In this sense he would present the German proposal to the French as a moderate and suitable basis, and especially stress in this connection that with respect to defensive weapons it was above all important to accord Germany basic equality of rights immediately. In this he placed some hope on Daladier, who was now taking a firmer stand than before, whereas he assumed, however, that Paul-Boncour was more or less in the hands of the French General Staff. Agreement had to be secured before the reconvening of the Disarmament Conference, that is the beginning of October, and he could imagine that if the preparations took a positive course a conference of the four Chiefs of Government would take place for the conclusion of the agreement.

HASSELL

## No. 397

5642/E410598-99

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

I 1288

ROME, August 8, 1933.

Received August 14.

## POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Mussolini's views on economic plans in Europe and particularly in the Danube Basin.

At a conversation with Mussolini yesterday, the discussion came around to the conferences held here by Ministerialdirektor Ritter,<sup>1</sup> concerning which he was informed through a memorandum by Under State Secretary Asquini. Mussolini thought that it would only be possible to pursue European plans, that is, to reorganize and revive the European economy, when the nightmare of the disarmament conflict was dispelled. This problem weighed so heavily today on the spirits and the relations of the nations that the basis of confidence was lacking for the international economy. Only when the situation was clarified and perceptibly eased in this respect would it be possible to undertake the reorganization of the European economy with some prospect of success. Prior to that it was only possible to do specific work in groups and among neighbors as, for example, in the Danube Basin. I outlined for him in noncommittal form the five points mentioned in my report No. I 1267 of August 3,<sup>2</sup> to which he assented. It should be noted, however, that the Austro-Hungarian-Italian economic conversations, as I reported yesterday by wire,<sup>3</sup> seem to be more comprehensive and important than was at first officially admitted by the parties concerned. There is a certain danger in this respect, as I have frequently had the honor to report. Whether, to be sure, plans tending toward a customs union have any chance of being realized is another question. Moreover, point No. 4 of the internal pro memoria regarding the Gömbös visit<sup>4</sup> would permit of the conclusion—and I am confirmed in this opinion by my informant—that at the Italo-Hungarian conversations, the exclusion of Germany was not envisaged, but rather the supplementation of the agreements by similar agreements with the German Reich.

HASSELL

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 388 and footnote 5.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 388.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram No. 195 of Aug. 7, not printed (3086/616741-42).

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 382, footnote 3.



## No. 398

3086/616762-63

*Foreign Minister Neurath to Reich Chancellor Hitler*REGISTERED  
PERSONALAt present at LEINFELDEN on the Enz.  
Post Enzweihingen  
(Württemberg)  
August 9, 1933.

DEAR HERR CHANCELLOR: I am forwarding to you enclosed two memoranda which State Secretary von Bülow has sent me on the démarche of the English Chargé d'Affaires and the French Ambassador in the Austrian question.<sup>1</sup> This matter appears to be disposed of for the time being by rejection of the interference by the Powers, provided that the desire for interfering is not aroused again by new incidents. Herr von Bülow with whom I talked on the telephone yesterday is afraid, however, that the English, who are the driving force in this instance, will not simply let the matter rest after having been rebuffed by us, but rather will bring it up for discussion at the September session of the League of Nations in Geneva. But perhaps we may still succeed in frustrating this plan. I believe for my part, however, that new mediation efforts by Mussolini must be expected in the near future. I see from the newspapers that Dollfuss is planning a new visit to Rome,<sup>2</sup> and I am sure that this subject will be discussed on that occasion. I assume that you have in the meanwhile instructed Herr Habicht in the sense discussed by us, so that one of the principal points of complaint by the Powers will be eliminated for the immediate future.

Yours, etc.

FRHR. V. NEURATH

<sup>1</sup> Documents Nos. 392 and 393.<sup>2</sup> The visit took place August 19 and 20. See document No. 408.

## No. 399

7052/E523995-4003

*The Ministry of Economics to the Foreign Ministry*

Dev. I 36005/33

BERLIN, August 10, 1933.  
Received August 11.  
W 5524.

Enclosed I am transmitting a copy of my letter of today's date to the Anglo-Palestine bank. In explanation I should like to state the following:

Owing to the difficulties that have developed in carrying out the agreement of July 18, 1933 (Dev. I 30293)<sup>1</sup> with Hanotaiah Ltd.

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 369.

and that gave rise to your instruction No. 27 of July 24, 1933, to the German Consulate General at Jerusalem<sup>2</sup> and its report of July 27, 1933,<sup>3</sup> I have carried on further negotiations with the Jewish circles concerned in order to place the agreement immediately on a more general basis and eliminate the objections that have been advanced against a special agreement with Hanotaiah Ltd. on the part of the Zionist Association for Germany.

In a joint conference of all concerned on August 7, at which not only the representatives of the Zionist Association for Germany but also M. Sam Cohen, Director Hoofien of the Anglo-Palestine bank, Director Nachnes of the firm of Hanotaiah Ltd., and Dr. Ruppim participated, it was possible to reach such an agreement. The Jewish circles have stated that they are willing to set up a trust company in Palestine under the leadership of M. Hoofien which will take over the sale of German goods and the disbursements to the emigrants. M. Cohen explicitly agreed to this arrangement for his person and for the Hanotaiah circle which he represents. It seems to me that this way really affords the best guarantee of the strongest possible effect on the Jewish boycott measures<sup>4</sup> and of payment of the money to the emigrants without loss. As I hear, this view is also confirmed by a later telegram from the German Consulate General in Jerusalem.<sup>5</sup>

In this connection I should like to make the following remarks about the report of July 27 from the German Consulate General:

It had already been intended in the July 18 agreement with Hanotaiah Ltd., and expressly promised by M. Cohen, that the amounts deposited in Germany should be made available to the emigrants by Hanotaiah Ltd. not only in the form of land and materials; rather, from the start, I had attached importance to making sure that those emigrants who did not want to purchase their land from Hanotaiah Ltd. or who had other professional plans, and consequently did not want to enter into business relations with Hanotaiah

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<sup>2</sup> In this instruction the Consulate General was asked to comment on statements made by Zionist organizations in Germany to the effect that it was doubtful whether Hanotaiah had sufficient authorization for negotiating an agreement, and whether German goods in the amounts planned could actually find a market in Palestine (8817/E613824-25).

<sup>3</sup> In this reply to the instruction of July 24, Consul General Wolff affirmed his belief that an agreement with Hanotaiah Ltd. could and should be carried out and that it was being supported by responsible agencies in Palestine (8817/E613829-39).

<sup>4</sup> The reports of the Consulate General at Jerusalem had repeatedly emphasized that the proposed agreement with Hanotaiah Ltd. would greatly weaken the agitation carried on in Jewish circles for a boycott of German goods (No. Exp. 3 of June 15: 8817/E613784-92; No. Exp. 4 of June 24: 8817/E613795-801; No. Exp. 9 of July 3: 8817/E613808-13).

<sup>5</sup> Telegram No. 20 of Aug. 7 reported that a Jewish Committee representing a larger group of Jewish organizations in Palestine had taken up the original plan promoted by Hanotaiah and that an agreement "only on this broad basis" promised to be successful (8817/E613840-41).

at all, would receive in cash the equivalent of the deposit they had made. This was the basis in particular for my objections to granting Hanotaiah Ltd. a monopoly. I have the impression that the arrangement now reached not only avoids this danger of monopoly but also contains the best guarantee for avoiding losses in disbursing the money. However, M. Hoofien did not feel he could give a full guarantee in this respect in the conference on August 7, at least not to the extent that the exports from Germany involve goods which are not taken over by the colonization companies themselves but goods for which a free market must be sought.

Understandably the representatives of the Zionist Association attach particular importance to this question and want to see everything avoided that could give the special accounts to be established the character of the customary blocked accounts, which, as experience has shown, can only be utilized abroad at a considerable discount.

The circles concerned see an essential support of their efforts to sell goods in the amounts provided for in the agreement in the fact that every other promotion of exports to Palestine is barred, particularly the acceptance by German exporters of payments from blocked or registered accounts; for what is being accomplished in this way is that German goods cannot be offered by anyone else on terms more favorable than those of the trust company.

As far as the remark in the last paragraph of the July 27 report of the German Consulate General<sup>6</sup> is concerned, I believe in accordance with the above statements that even the individual projects mentioned there can be included in the general agreement without misgivings. At any rate I would hesitate to permit any special procedures at this time in addition to the procedure provided for in the letter to the Anglo-Palestine bank. An exception could be considered only to the extent that individual emigrants would be permitted to take with them certain goods which they need for their own planned enterprise in Palestine or to pay for them out of their own blocked accounts left behind.

I wish to remark in conclusion that for the transition period until the agreement is operating in practice I shall have authorizations issued to the emigrants, in so far as an amount of more than 1,000 Palestine pounds is involved, in such a way that payment of the appropriate additional amount into a clearing account (special account) to be established in the near future will be promised in the form of a commitment.

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<sup>6</sup> The passage referred to reads as follows: "I assume that individual projects of German Jews who want to settle here, such as, for instance, the carpentry project of Alfons Jaffé (see report of June 20) or projects for establishing industrial plants of small or medium size—in which connection a German yardstick must not be applied as being too big—are not to be squeezed into the Hanotaiah agreement."

Enclosed is a copy of this letter with enclosure for the Consulate General in Jerusalem.

By order:  
SCHEUERL

[Enclosure]

The Minister of Economics

Dev. I 36005/33

BERLIN, August 10, 1933.

To Herr S. Hooffen

Director of the Anglo-Palestine Bank,  
at present in Berlin

On the basis of the discussions which were held between my experts on the one hand and you, as well as M. Sam Cohen, Director Nachnes of the Hanotaiah Ltd. firm, and representatives of the Zionist Association for Germany on the other, I express my willingness to place the present agreement with Hanotaiah—Dev. I 20111 of May 19, 1933<sup>1</sup>—on a more general basis in the following manner, in order to give the German Jews emigrating to Palestine an increased opportunity for transferring their assets and at the same time to promote the export of German goods to Palestine:

Jewish emigrants who for the purpose of establishing a new livelihood in Palestine wish to transfer there portions of their assets in excess of the money required by the immigration authorities (1,000 Palestine pounds) will upon application receive from the foreign exchange control authorities authorization to deposit an appropriate additional amount in a Special Account I, kept in reichsmarks, at the Reichsbank both for the Anglo-Palestine bank and for the bank of the Temple Society Ltd. Similar authorizations may be issued to German citizens of the Jewish community who are not emigrating at the present time but who nevertheless wish even now to establish a home in Palestine and to participate in the development of Palestine; such persons can be granted authorization to deposit money in a Special Account II of the two banks named kept by the Reichsbank.

The deposits in the special accounts will be made for the account of a trust company to be established in Palestine with the cooperation of the Jewish circles concerned, particularly of your bank and Hanotaiah Ltd. The deposits in Special Account I will be credited to the emigrants with the trust company according to the customary business principles; the equivalent will be paid out in cash upon request in Palestine pounds. I have taken cognizance of the fact that in the opinion of those concerned the trust company which you have in mind provides the best possible guarantee that payment will be made to the emigrants without loss to them in so far as possible. In the same manner the equivalent of the sums deposited in Special Account II

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 369, footnote 2.

shall be credited and paid out to the depositors in Palestine with the proviso, however, that the sums credited on Special Account I must be paid out first and that disbursements to the credit of the depositors of Special Account II will be made only when there are no longer claims of depositors of Special Account I.

Until the trust company is established the two banks will perform the tasks of the projected company on a trustee basis.

I suggest that the trust company establish a suitable representation in Germany for transactions with the emigrants and the German export firms.

The two banks can dispose of the assets in the special accounts to pay for the future export of German finished goods to Palestine; actual export to Palestine is to be proved in each case by the appropriate official papers (duplicates of bills of carriage, customs receipts, etc.). Export transactions that were already concluded before July 20, 1933, may not be settled by debiting the special accounts.

This authorization is good for the time being for a total of 3 million reichsmarks. The authorizations issued to the firm of Hanotaiah Ltd. through my letters of May 19 and July 18, 1933—Dev. I 20111/33 and 30293/33—are herewith canceled. I am willing in principle to issue an authorization for an additional sum after these 3 million reichsmarks have been used up. I must point out, however, that, as my experts have repeatedly stressed orally, after the 3 million reichsmarks have been used up additional purchases of German goods may be paid for only in major part through the special account, but that it will be necessary to require payment in foreign exchange for the smaller balance.

I have decided on this concession in the expectation that the procedure envisaged will be suitable for promoting German exports to Palestine and enabling the German authorities to retain the present principles for dealing with applications from emigrants. I must point out, however, that aside from this comprehensive measure any special promotion of individual commercial transactions with Palestine, in particular by permitting payments of amounts from blocked or registered accounts, is out of the question.

Please confirm to me your agreement with the above principles.<sup>8</sup>

By order:  
SCHEUERL

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<sup>8</sup> On Aug. 25, the Economics Ministry sent to the Foreign Ministry Hoofien's letter of confirmation, dated Aug. 22, together with a reply by the Economics Ministry under the date of Aug. 25. Hoofien's letter referred to some modifications of the original scheme, which had been agreed to in a conference held on Aug. 21 and were mainly of a technical nature. One major organizational change resulted from the provision that the German office of the Palestinian trust company, now to be organized under the name of "Palestine Trust Bureau for the Guidance of German Jews Ltd." [*Palästina Treuhand-Stelle zur Beratung deutscher Juden G. m. b. H.*] with its seat at Berlin, would be responsible only for the guidance of German Jews in financial questions relating to emigration, particularly with respect to the new arrangement agreed upon by the Minister of Economics and the Anglo-Palestine bank, while banking operations in connection with the export and transfer transactions would be reserved to the trust company to be organized in Palestine. (7052/E524005-14)

## No. 400

9722/E683446-47

*The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Hungary*

VI A 1707

BERLIN, August 11, 1933.

Received August 19.

In consideration of Professor Bleyer's<sup>1</sup> desire to be informed about how the leadership of the Reich wishes to treat the question of the German element in Hungary with respect to the Hungarian Government at the present time, I request that he be told the following:

It need not be explained more fully that the German Government constantly takes the liveliest interest in the fate of the German community in Hungary, and that it is interested in promoting, in so far as possible, the cultural aspirations of the German community in Hungary by friendly influence exerted on the Hungarian Government in the future as it has in the past.

For general political reasons, however, it is not possible at the present time for the Reich Government to exert pressure on the Hungarian Government. Neither would it be desirable, for the same reason, if the German community in Hungary should get into a hostile position in relation to the Hungarian Government and public. We would therefore consider it useful if Professor Bleyer were to take this into account in his further activity.

At the same time please tell him that he enjoys as in the past our full confidence as the leader of the German community in Hungary, and we accord him the most grateful recognition for his unselfish devotion to his German national group.

By order:

ROEDIGER

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<sup>1</sup> Jacob Bleyer, professor at the University of Budapest, leader of the German minority in Hungary.

## No. 401

3086/616842-46

*Memorandum by an Official of Department II*

BERLIN, August 12, 1933.

zu II Oe. 1182<sup>1</sup> Ang. 2.

The Italian Ambassador, whom I informed yesterday evening as instructed by the State Secretary that the State Secretary would be taken up with official business all morning today, came to see me at

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<sup>1</sup> II Oe. 1182: Not printed (6113/E453830-31). This is a telegram by Heeren informing Neurath briefly about Cerruti's statements, which are dealt with more fully in the document printed.

11 o'clock today for the purpose of carrying out the instruction from the Chief of the Italian Government concerning Habicht's latest radio speech on Austria,<sup>2</sup> the expected receipt of which he had announced to the State Secretary by telephone already yesterday, and which he had received in the meantime.<sup>3</sup>

Ambassador Cerruti first read its contents to me from the telegraphic instruction received.

The contents of the telegram signed personally by Mussolini are substantially as follows: The recent statements by State Secretary Bülow<sup>4</sup> concerning the principles which will guide the further actions of the German Government with respect to the Austrian question and especially the propaganda on this subject within the Reich, together with the statements which Herr von Papen had also made to him some time ago,<sup>5</sup> had prompted him, Mussolini, to have the statement known to us published by Stefani;<sup>6</sup> it intimated that such assurances had been given and that Italy had as a result assumed the guarantee, as it were, that from the side of the Reich at least, there would be no recurrence of the incidents of the kind objected to in the German-Austrian conflict.

In these circumstances, Habicht's new radio speech on Austria, the text of which Federal Chancellor Dollfuss brought to the notice of the Italian Minister in Vienna, had made a painful impression on him. On the basis of this speech Vienna was justified in believing that the German Government had already forgotten the promises made to him [Mussolini]. He found it understandable that the Austrian press had resumed its polemics following this speech. This was creating a situation which he deemed extremely delicate. If as a result France and England were to reopen the matter tomorrow, it would be exceedingly difficult for Italy to dissociate herself from any

<sup>2</sup> On Aug. 9, Habicht again delivered a speech on the Bavarian radio, in which he sharply attacked the Dollfuss Government, in connection with the *démarche* of the British and French Ambassadors in Berlin, for having arranged this foreign intervention in a "purely German quarrel." On instruction from Habicht a text of this speech was sent by his office to Neurath personally on Aug. 11 (3086/616826-35).

<sup>3</sup> In a telegram of Aug. 11 (6113/E453825), Bülow had informed Neurath of Cerruti's telephone messages and of his impending visit.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 391.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 383 and footnote 4.

<sup>6</sup> On Aug. 9, Agenzia Stefani had published a report on the recent Italian step in Berlin on the subject of Austro-German relations. The report stated that the German Government had assured the Italian Ambassador that radio propaganda and flights had been banned. "As for the terrorist acts, the German Government deplors them but declines responsibility for them. Finally, the German Government agrees on the necessity for the cessation of all incidents." A French text of this report is in the files (3086/616825). In a memorandum on a conversation with the Italian Ambassador about this matter on Aug. 11, Bülow noted that "this Stefani report was published here only in a condensed version, that is, the passage dealing with the German assurances was weakened, and the *Völkischer Beobachter* omitted this passage altogether." (3086/616822-24)

new steps they might take, first of all on account of the negative result of Italy's very friendly *démarche*, and then also because Germany had not kept the promises given by her. Cerruti was to make it very plain to the Foreign Ministry that the claim of Italy's policy to be taken seriously as well as its prestige were here at stake. He deemed it absolutely necessary for this reason that the promises given him be kept so as to avoid new and grave complications. He thought it was high time to forbid Herr Habicht to deliver any more speeches disrupting the peace of the Danube area and making still more difficult the political situation of the Reich.

The Italian Ambassador added to this instruction on his own the remark that the impression he had gained from his telephone conversation with Suvich yesterday was that Mussolini had become quite unusually agitated on receiving the report of what Herr Habicht had said in his latest radio speech, and that he attached extreme importance to the matter. This was due not only to the feeling that the prestige of Italy's policy was put in jeopardy, but also to Mussolini's fear that further development of the German-Austrian conflict might become a serious threat to the policy of peace in Europe which he had inaugurated with the Four Power Pact.

I promised the Italian Ambassador in the first place that I would immediately transmit his statements to the Foreign Minister, who would today presumably still have an opportunity to discuss the matter with the Reich Chancellor himself. The reply received with respect to this would be immediately communicated to him or to the Italian *Chargé d'Affaires*, if he himself was no longer here. As for the matter itself, I was constrained to point out to him right away that according to the information available to me there could be no question of any pledges having been violated. In so far as these pledges had applied to radio propaganda, they referred only to the "keeping in check" [*Eindämmung*] of such propaganda, but not to its complete cessation. Cerruti concurred with me on this point saying that in reporting to Rome he had purposely rendered the phrase "keeping in check" in German so as to preclude any misunderstanding. I then told Cerruti that I had the full text of Habicht's speech and that I had to say in all candor that my impression in reading it had been that its whole tone quite clearly indicated a desire to observe great restraint as compared with his earlier speeches. This speech, after all, was merely aiming at making the German people understand that the actions of the Austrian Government allowed no conclusions to be drawn regarding the feeling of the German people in Austria, and that the Austrian Government's appeal for help to France and England must not be interpreted as showing that the Austrian people were anti-German in sentiment. Such statements concerning a matter that



naturally touched the hearts of the German people were only too understandable at a time when it had become commonplace outside the Reich's borders to broadcast through the radio and newspapers a steady stream of reports that were without a doubt calculated to influence the feelings of the German people in a way unfavorable to their Government. In this connection I called the Italian Ambassador's attention to an interview which had been brought to my notice only yesterday, which Prince Starhemberg—that is, the leader of that party in Austria which is recognized today as exercising the most powerful influence in the Austrian Cabinet—had granted to the French newspaper *Paris Midi*. This interview referred to the Reich Chancellor as the accomplice of assassins and terrorists. The Ambassador, who immediately made a note of this instance, remarked that such indiscretions committed by the other side were of course condemned also by Mussolini.

The Ambassador then informed me in conclusion that he was starting his vacation today. He would leave for Munich at 10 o'clock tonight and remain there tomorrow and the day after. He could be reached there during this time through the Italian Consulate General. He suggested whether it might not be possible to meet the Foreign Minister in Munich for the purpose of personally discussing with him the situation that had developed, so that he himself might perhaps receive and transmit to Rome the reply to his *démarche* today.<sup>7</sup>

V. HEEREN

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<sup>7</sup> See document No. 402.

## No. 402

3086/616849-51

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

LEINFELDEN, August 14, 1933.

Received August 15.

RM 1167.

On August 12 I had a thorough discussion with the Reich Chancellor at Hohenschwangau about the situation created by Herr Habicht's Munich broadcast.<sup>1</sup> In its course I read to him the full text of Habicht's broadcast, especially the opening and concluding portions, and informed him of the *démarche* undertaken by the Italian Ambassador in Berlin. The Reich Chancellor was very indignant over the manner of Mussolini's intervention and declared that he would not stand for that sort of tutelage. Habicht's speech was

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 401 and footnote 2.

not in contradiction to the promises that had been made. It consisted merely of a recital of facts and historical retrospects. He had given Mussolini no promise to the effect that the propaganda to strengthen the National Socialist party in Austria would be abandoned, but only that it would be kept in check [*eingedämmt*]. This had in fact been done, just as the flights over Austrian territory and the dropping of propaganda material from airplanes had been stopped. He had repeatedly declared that the German Government complied with international treaties. But he refused to promise that there would be no propaganda for revision of these treaties, which was not forbidden anywhere. When I observed that Mussolini must be informed of the intentions of the German Government in unequivocal terms so as to avoid being suspected of duplicity, the Chancellor stated that the Chief of the Italian Government ought also to be told that he refused to make any kind of deal with the Dollfuss Government.

Following this I telephoned the Italian Ambassador in Munich in the morning of the 13th and told him the following to be transmitted to Mussolini:<sup>2</sup>

1. The German Government and the Reich Chancellor have repeatedly declared that they will respect existing international treaties. But they must refuse to promise that they would desist from carrying on propaganda for the revision of these treaties. Nothing existed to forbid this.

2. As regards Herr Habicht's broadcast speech, it was not in any way in contradiction to the promises given by the Reich Chancellor. He had never stated that these radio broadcasts would be stopped, but only that they would be kept in check. He wished to be told specifically what passages of the speech, to which exception was taken, had violated that promise.

I finally requested the Italian Ambassador to inform Mussolini that the Reich Chancellor rejected any deal with the Dollfuss Government.<sup>3</sup>

V. N[EURATH]

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 401.

<sup>3</sup> Bülow informed the Embassies in Rome, London, and Paris of Neurath's reply to Cerruti in telegrams sent on Aug. 15 (6113/E453856-57).

## No. 403

2860/562510-11;  
2860/562512-13

*Foreign Minister Neurath to State Secretary Bülow*

At present at LEINFELDEN on the Enz.  
August 14, 1933.

DEAR BÜLOW: Enclosed herewith I am sending you a memorandum on the statements made by Vice Chancellor von Papen concerning

the Russian assertions about disclosures made to French authorities regarding German-Russian military agreements.<sup>1</sup>

As to the Reich Chancellor's participation in the demonstration on behalf of the Saar at the Niederwald, Herr von Papen and I have talked with the Chancellor and advised him to participate in it. He refused at first, but it was finally possible to convince him that his participation would be useful. One difficulty is that on the same day a big ceremony will take place at Tannenberg where the Reich Chancellor, with the Reich President present, is also supposed to deliver a speech. I have now arranged that Papen is to try to get one of the two functions shifted to some other date since it would be impossible for the Chancellor to arrive from East Prussia in time for a ceremony at the Niederwald, even if it could possibly be put off until the afternoon.<sup>2</sup>

I also talked with the Reich Chancellor regarding the release of former Reichstag President Löbe and informed him of the Reich President's wish in this regard. The Reich Chancellor said that he would at once talk to Göring in this sense; he himself was absolutely in favor of freeing Löbe and also other Socialists now in custody, in return for the promise not to engage in political activities. I would leave it to your discretion to pass this on to the Reich Chancellery for communication to the Reich President.

With best regards,

FRH. VON NEURATH

[Enclosure]

LEINFELDEN, August 14, 1933.  
e. o. RM 1166.

MEMORANDUM ON THE REPORT FROM THE EMBASSY IN MOSCOW,  
AUGUST 7, 1933, CONCERNING GERMAN-SOVIET RELATIONS<sup>3</sup>

I gave the above-cited report to Vice Chancellor von Papen to read. Herr von Papen thereupon made the following statement:

<sup>1</sup> In report A 1609 of Aug. 7 (6609/E497149-53), Dirksen had given an account of an informal talk between Stern, Director of the second Western Division in the Soviet Foreign Commissariat, and Twardowski in which Stern, referring to the cooling of the attitude of the Soviet Government toward Germany, stressed the importance of information which had come to the knowledge of the Soviets around the middle of May indicating "that Vice Chancellor von Papen had recently, in Rome, told French Ambassador de Jouvenel about the German-Soviet military collaboration even to the last detail." In a letter of Aug. 11 (2860/562502) Bülow had requested Neurath to take up these charges with Papen if opportunity to do so arose.

An earlier reference to Papen's alleged statements had already been made by Stern in a conversation with Hartmann on July 8. Stern had said that the Soviets were investigating the report (Military Attaché report No. 151/33 of July 11: 5892/E432470-72).

<sup>2</sup> Actually, both ceremonies were held on Aug. 27. See document No. 423, footnote 2.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 1.

He did not talk at all with French Ambassador de Jouvenel in Rome.<sup>4</sup> This automatically disposed of the contention regarding the alleged disclosures concerning German-Soviet military cooperation. But quite apart from this, he would not even have been in a position to make any disclosures on the subject because he had no knowledge whatsoever of this alleged military cooperation.

He had talked about German-Russian relations only once, and that in a conversation with Mussolini. The Head of the Italian Government had spoken about this spontaneously and, referring to the obvious deterioration of German-Russian relations, had stressed the need for handling them with care. Herr von Papen told Mussolini on that occasion that on our side everything was being done and had been done so as to keep the German-Russian relationship on a friendly basis as in the past. On the Russian side, however, since the change-over in Germany and the suppression of the Communist party, an unconquerable distrust could be noticed against the present Government in Germany. Its explanation probably was that the hope of the Bolsheviks to spread their ideas in Europe had been very severely disappointed by the advent to power of the National Socialist party in Germany.

Mr. Krestinsky's assertions that Herr von Papen at a conversation in Paris had given to the French the treaties existing between German and Soviet military authorities, were described by Herr von Papen as absurd because, apart from the reason already stated above, that he knew nothing about such treaties, he had not even been in Paris. Herr von Papen finally stated that he had no talks about German-Russian relations with the French Ambassador in Berlin, either.

The assertions of the Russian authorities are therefore untrue from beginning to end and must be emphatically rejected as a Russian attempt to sabotage our hitherto friendly relations.

v. N[EURATH]<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> See document No. 162, footnote 1.

<sup>5</sup> The statements of Papen were transmitted to Moscow, and Dirksen called them to Krestinsky's attention on Aug. 17. Dirksen recorded that Krestinsky seemed much relieved at their contents (Dirksen memorandum A 1711 of Aug. 17: 1908/429728).

## No. 404

6609/E497106-14

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry*SECRET  
A 1684Moscow, August 14, 1933.  
Received August 17.  
IV Ru. 3714.

## POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Clarification of German-Soviet relations.

- I. Need for a stock-taking of mutual relations.
- II. Present attitude of the Soviet Government toward Germany.
- III. Bringing about clarification through political discussion?
- IV. Inauguration, as well as timing and substantive implementation of such conversations.
- V. Concluding remarks.

## I

The attitude of the Soviet Union toward Germany during the last months must have made it appear that Russia had taken the final decision to turn aside completely from Germany and to throw herself entirely into the arms of the France-Poland-Little Entente bloc. This was indicated by the attitude of the Soviet public toward Germany: the unbridled agitation in the press, the inflation of far-fetched pretexts for serious suspicions of the German Government (Hugenberg memorandum,<sup>1</sup> Rosenberg trip to London,<sup>2</sup> Posse's statements<sup>3</sup>). This was indicated also by the positive policy with respect to third states, the currying of favor with Poland, the thrusting of themselves on France, Litvinov's pact concluded in London,<sup>4</sup> and many other political manifestations of less importance.

Only recently a certain clarification and tranquilization has started to take place. Thus the opportunity arises for a sober appraisal of German-Russian relations and for a consideration of the further possibilities for organizing these relations.

## II

I do not think that the Soviet Government intends "to write" Germany "off" entirely. It would be contrary to its supreme political principle of strengthening its own security by the addition of as many security coefficients as possible to force Germany, without compelling

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<sup>1</sup> See documents Nos. 312 and 325.

<sup>2</sup> See documents Nos. 223 and 237.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 355.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 342, footnote 3.

reasons, into the opposite camp. But it is determined to exploit ruthlessly, and if need be at a sacrifice of the corresponding interests of Germany, the various factors that have caused third countries to seek a rapprochement with Russia. It strives for friendly relations with *all* countries in order to weather the period of weakness caused by the economic catastrophe and the threat of Japan. It wishes to avoid a fixed commitment in a definite direction. It wishes to hold open for itself the possibility at some more favorable time of throwing its weight into the one or other side of the scales.

The advances that are made to the Soviet Government by third countries and even more by the press of these countries are also desired by it for tactical reasons with respect to Germany. The evidences of friendliness in the French and Polish press are registered in Moscow probably also in the silent hope that they will influence Germany in a sense that is favorable to the Soviet Union. At any rate these evidences of friendship are registered in the Soviet press, rather than replied to. Even Radek has so far neglected to exploit his trip to Poland<sup>5</sup> by means of a publication.

The attitude of the Soviet Government toward Germany—this has recently been growing clearer and clearer—has been determined primarily by two considerations: the growing anxiety, almost fear, of the ideological consequences of the National Socialist victory in Germany for Bolshevism and world revolution; and the mistrust, which has grown to the proportions of hysteria, that, all official assurances to the contrary, the Germany of the national revolution might after all be pursuing, or would shortly pursue, hostile plans against the Soviet Union (lopping-off of the Ukraine). This complex can be defined by the catchwords: anti-Russian statements of the Chancellor in his book, *Mein Kampf*, Rosenberg's plans for lopping off the Ukraine, Hugenberg's and Posse's behavior at the World Economic Conference, the *Brothers in Need* [*Brüder in Not*] campaign,<sup>6</sup> support for the Russian emigrants' movement, the Rond, Vice Chancellor von Papen's connections with French circles.

I am convinced from observation of political developments here that the agitation against Germany in the press is attributable not only to tactical considerations, but also to an actual mistrust and an honest fear of future German policy. The Soviet Government knows, it is true, that Germany cannot now effect any anti-Soviet combinations; but it wants *even now* to take countermeasures to prevent a *later* realization of such combinations. In its attitude toward Ger-

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 204.

<sup>6</sup> This was a campaign promoted by the Volksbund für das Deutschtum in Ausland to provide assistance to needy Germans in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Embassy had lodged a protest against the campaign and Krestinsky had also protested to Dirksen on July 2 (Moscow telegram No. 149 of July 2, 2860/562480).

many, it is at present oscillating between this negative attitude and the desire for a settlement with Germany.

Very recently, in my opinion, the positive factors with regard to Germany have gained in strength. From the attitude of the Soviet press and from conversations with M. Molotov,<sup>7</sup> M. Krestinsky, and other personages, I believe I can conclude that the hysteria directed against Germany is beginning to dwindle and to give way to a more sober view. In the conversations this mental attitude was expressed in the wish that the German side might after all take the initiative in the matter of a conversation and in making reassuring statements<sup>8</sup>—as if it were not the Soviet side that in the last 2 months was to blame for the mutual estrangement.

### III

In view of this attitude on the Soviet side the question arises, what can be done on our side to clarify or improve German-Soviet relations. There are now apparently two possibilities: either to wait patiently, observe the further course of Soviet policy, and leave the initiative for a cleansing of the atmosphere to the Soviet side; or take the initiative ourselves and induce the Soviet Government to agree to a discussion of fundamental principles.

I incline to give preference to the second possibility. First of all for general political reasons. Germany's entire foreign situation, in my opinion, demands clarification as to whether and to what extent the Soviet Union is to be taken into account as an active factor. The longer the lack of clarity persists, the more will the harmful results already distinguishable in our relations with friendly powers make themselves felt; in the anxiety of Italy; in the uncertainty of Turkey; in the vacillation of Lithuania.

The risk, moreover, of such conversations is relatively small. In the worst case the conversations could result only in confirmation of the present negative impression of the attitude of Russia toward Germany: a clarification in a limited, positive sense is possible and perhaps probable, however.

It has, finally, been our experience in German-Russian relations that it is particularly harmful to let an obscure political situation continue to smolder. Clarification is preferable to uncertainty. In addition to this is the fact that conversations could now be initiated without our having to expose ourselves to the criticism that we "were running after the Russians;" for, in view of the attitude of the Soviet public toward Germany in recent months, we have the right to ask the Soviet Government what its political intentions are with respect to Germany.

<sup>7</sup> See document No. 389.

<sup>8</sup> Marginal note in Neurath's handwriting: "How frequently! [*wie oft noch!*]"

## IV

How shall we conceive of the inauguration, the timing, and the substantive implementation of such an operation?

The inauguration of the conversations might be based on my conversation with M. Molotov (see telegram No. 168 of August 4<sup>9</sup>). Molotov's statements to me, that the Soviet Union did not wish to alter her policy toward Germany if Germany would not undertake any change in her policy, might be used as the occasion for our proposing conversations in a framework that seems to us appropriate.

The time for the conversations would have to be made dependent on the political atmosphere that happens to prevail at a given time. The interval should be employed for a further psychological preparation for the conversations. For this purpose, Deputy People's Commissar Krestinsky's trip through Germany at the beginning of September could in particular be utilized. Krestinsky also showed himself in recent months of serious difficulty to be a moderate, conciliatory, and reliable advocate of good German-Russian relations.

As far as the substance of the conversations themselves is concerned, they would have to be conducted with the purpose of reaching a concrete, tangible goal. In the event the negotiations took a positive course, it would be a matter, therefore, of arriving at a more or less loose but written agreement. This protocol, which would be the basis for the further organizing of German-Russian relations, might comprise the following points:

Establishment of the political results of the negotiations; statements by both sides as to whether and to what extent the present foundations (Rapallo Treaty and Berlin Treaty) should be retained; agreement that both Governments will in their own countries oppose efforts that run counter to the above-mentioned basic principles (radio propaganda, activity of political émigrés, etc.).

The effectiveness of the political agreement would be greatly strengthened if it could also be buttressed economically. It seems to me there are possibilities in this connection that might be not only economically useful to both parties, but also attractive to the Soviet Government from general considerations of economic policy. I would like to reserve further statements on this subject for an oral report.

I should also like to wait until I am in Berlin to discuss other topics of negotiation which it would be desirable to take up.

## V

In the foregoing discussion, I have brought up some ideas as to how German-Soviet relations could be lifted from their present obscurity

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<sup>9</sup> Document No. 389.



and cloudiness. I realize that the details of this program can be altered; that, above all, the moment for the inauguration of such conversations has, as I have already stressed, not yet come. The exact time cannot be determined until the attitude of the Soviet Government is more clearly discernible. In view of the suddenness of the reversal of political sentiment, which is a feature of the Slavic character, the possibility of a rapid disillusionment is not to be dismissed, particularly if the negotiations with France should prove disappointing here. The fundamental question, however, the reply to which must even now be found, is the following: Shall conversations with the Soviet Government be inaugurated by Germany at a suitable time in order to effect a clarification of the political situation? And with what ultimate aim should we, on our side, conduct these conversations? <sup>10</sup>

V. DIRKSEN

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<sup>10</sup> No direct reply to this report has been found.

## No. 405

3015/597721-26

*Ministerialdirektor Meyer to Foreign Minister Neurath*

BERLIN, August 16, 1933.

DEAR HERR FOREIGN MINISTER: The conversations in Kaunas about the German-Lithuanian settlement <sup>1</sup> have lasted through the past week. I demanded as a prerequisite for starting the conversations that the measures in the Memel area directed against the Germans, in particular the denial of work permits, be rescinded and that no one else be refused work or officials be dismissed. The Lithuanian Government, under pressure of refusal to take up negotiations, finally said it was willing to do this. In the second place, I have been trying to bring about a settlement of the controversial issues concerning the Memel Statute.<sup>2</sup> I therefore insisted that there should first be a discussion between the Governor and the President of the Directorate about all the issues concerning the Memel Statute with the objective of "eliminating difficulties that arise out of the Memel Statute." Immediately thereafter, as the second item, there should be negotiations between the German and Lithuanian Governments in which particularly those points would be dealt with concerning which no agreement was being reached in Memel between the Lithuanian and Memel authorities. The granting of economic concessions arises only when agreement has been reached on the political problems. Accordingly, the present negotiations of the economic delegation in Kaunas have merely the purpose of

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 373 and footnote 4.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 354 and footnote 10.

clarifying all economic questions and of preparing the agreement. The delegation has strict orders not to make any definitive arrangements, since a settlement is to be made in all areas simultaneously.

The conversations in Memel between the Governor and the President of the Directorate will be started in the next few days. The negotiations between the German Government and the Lithuanian Government concerning the explanation and interpretation of the Memel Statute will be conducted by Director Gaus; the preliminary discussions are to be conducted for the time being by Counselor of Legation Woermann in his behalf. The concluding discussions will then follow the negotiations of Herr Gaus.<sup>3</sup>

I have the honor to enclose in the annex a copy of the letters which I exchanged with M. Zaunius on August 11.

Yours, etc.

RICHARD MEYER

[Enclosure 1]

*Lithuanian Foreign Minister Zaunius to Ministerialdirektor Meyer*

KAUNAS, August 11, 1933.

DEAR HERR MINISTERIALDIREKTOR: During the past few days we have begun discussions which have as their objective a harmonious settlement of all questions pending between our two countries and which at the same time are meant to bring about a revival of the economic relations of our countries.

On this occasion you have pointed to certain difficulties which impede the conduct of these negotiations for the German Government, and I do not hesitate to confirm to you in this way the preliminary measures contemplated for the interim period up to November 1, 1933, which my Government plans in the interest of creating an atmosphere favorable to the negotiations:

In the question of work permits for Reich German workers, those permits which have been withdrawn or heretofore denied will be

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<sup>3</sup> Neurath replied on Aug. 16: "I am in complete agreement with the handling of the German-Lithuanian negotiations. The decisions regarding the conclusion of the negotiations will, moreover, not have to be made until after my return to Berlin at the beginning of September." (8919/E622759)

The negotiations were interrupted when, on Sept. 6, Zechlin was instructed to protest against the coming into force on Sept. 15 of a Lithuanian law on judicial organization, which contained provisions regarding the nationality of judicial officials and extension of the competence of the Lithuanian Supreme Court. The German contention was that by the agreement reached in the exchange of letters of Aug. 11 (see the enclosures to this document) the law would not come into effect, but that such questions would be discussed by the negotiators on legal questions. (Foreign Ministry telegram No. 71 of Sept. 6 to the Legation in Kaunas: 8919/E622840-41)

Although the negotiations were later continued both in Geneva and in Kaunas no immediate results were achieved.

issued and there will be no more denials of work permits. The same measure has been decided on for the Reich nationals in public positions. The Lithuanian Government is acting here with the expectation, however, that similar treatment of Lithuanian workers in Germany is assured.

The attempt will be made in a direct discussion between the Governor of the Memel area and the President of the Directorate to eliminate difficulties that arise out of the Memel Statute.

If the German Government believes it has reason to assume that any action of the Lithuanian Government is contrary to the Memel Convention, the Lithuanian Government will not fail to enter into an exchange of opinion with the German Government on the controversial questions, as also provided for in the report of the Committee of Jurists of the League of Nations Council of November [September] 20, 1926,<sup>4</sup> with the intention of finding a solution to these questions.

I doubtless do not need to stress that in the interest of the progress of the negotiations my Government considers it necessary for both Governments to do their best in order to avoid disturbing the good atmosphere necessary for the negotiations.

With the assurance of my highest consideration,

ZAUNIUS

[Enclosure 2]

*Ministerialdirektor Meyer to Lithuanian Foreign Minister Zaunius*

KAUNAS, August 11, 1933.

DEAR M. MINISTER: I should like to confirm with many thanks the receipt of your letter and the information it contained concerning measures which the Lithuanian Government has taken in the last few days on the basis of our conversation.

The German Government is gladly willing to give assurance of reciprocity in the question of permission to work. The German Government agrees with the Lithuanian Government that in the interest of the progress of the negotiations both Governments should refrain from doing anything that might occasion a disturbance of the good atmosphere necessary for the negotiations.

MEYER

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<sup>4</sup> See League of Nations, *Official Journal*, Oct. 1926, pp. 1407-1409, 1424 ff.; see also *Survey of International Affairs*, 1932, p. 398.

## No. 406

5740/H030995-031018

*The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

A 2075

LONDON, August 16, 1933.

Received August 18.

III E 2084.

Subject: German-English relations.

England, which has from time immemorial been scrupulously concerned over the sanctity of its summer vacations, vacationed on an especially large scale this year. The political calm is almost complete and the incident of the *démarche* in Berlin in the matter of German-Austrian relations<sup>2</sup> gives the effect, within the total picture, of being an episode in the general lull of activity. The World Economic Conference gave the English Ministers the opportunity to confer with statesmen of the entire world, not least of all also with representatives of the Dominions; and Parliament adjourned in harmony, so that the Ministers almost all went on vacation with clear consciences.

This pause in political activity suggests the idea of drawing up a balance sheet showing the present status of our relations with England. This is done below from the triple point of view of developing the general atmosphere of our relations, the practical effects of this development, and the prospect for the future.

## I

Developments in general atmosphere are naturally governed entirely by the revolution which has taken place in Germany. This was bound to result in a radical shift in the attitude of various sectors of English public opinion with regard to Germany.

It was inevitable for the time being that the new Germany, because of her internal political measures, should lose the sympathies of the Socialist, labor union, pacifist, and liberal circles, which heretofore on the basis of their general opposition in foreign policy to any policy of force, but also on the basis of their personal ties with like-minded German elements, had been the most pro-German element in England. In fact, we must for the present write off from our account this numerically significant portion of the English people.

On the other hand, on the extreme right, a certain sympathy has developed for the way things have shaped up in Germany. This sympathy is based primarily on the interest, that is growing in these circles,

<sup>1</sup> Marginal notes: "v. N[eurath], Aug. 24."

"The Reich Chancellor has been informed. L[ammers], Aug. 29."

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 393.

in the idea of authority which has been carried out in Germany. As typical of persons with this attitude I would think of politicians such as Lord Lloyd and in the sphere of the press, organs such as the *Morning Post* and the press of Lord Rothermere. This incipient process has not as yet led to the winning of real sympathies for Germany because our propaganda in these circles is still confronted with an essentially cool, nay, unfriendly, attitude toward Germany, or one inclining toward France. The Left Wing of the Conservative party, in which City circles and probably also certain Jewish elements play an influential role, has largely adapted itself to the attitude of the Left with respect to Germany, and the center of the party has also not held aloof from the general decline in the sympathies for Germany which have arisen here in the past few years.

It must therefore be stated that a glance at the general line-up of the English political parties and groupings at present no longer reveals any real rallying-point for a pro-German attitude. This has also often been very clearly expressed in parliamentary debates in which German questions were discussed, and, to be sure, positively in the general applause which greeted the various speeches of Sir Austen Chamberlain, which were directed at Germany, and negatively, in the fact that at such debates no one arose to defend Germany.

The picture is somewhat brighter if one disregards political groupings and examines the development of public sentiment in accordance with the class structure of the country.

Here we must first mention the English Court, where true sympathy for Germany is still to be found. To be sure, King George has become more and more critical in his attitude toward the German revolution, and various statements which I know him to have made recently are in fact anything but friendly. On the other hand, the Queen and various princes and princesses who are connected by family ties with Germany still entertain a warm feeling for our people and country, and also a certain sympathy, or at any rate a lively interest, in the most recent German development. Most pronounced are the sympathies and the interest in the case of the successor to the throne, with whom I have often had opportunity for a frank and detailed discussion.

Friendly feelings are also not infrequently found in the circles of the aristocracy and the upper classes, who still send their sons and daughters to Germany to study, particularly to southern and western Germany, and who themselves still prefer to spend their vacations on trips on the Rhine or to southern Germany.

Sympathy for Germany is likewise still to be found in circles of the armed forces and, to be sure, in a greater degree in the case of the Army than the Navy; particularly, however, in the case of former officers, now retired, who were in the war and brought home with them

from the battlefields an honest admiration for the achievements of the German Army and for the gallant behavior of many of their former opponents.

Sentiment in the clergy is divided, or perhaps predominantly unfavorable. Its supreme head, the Archbishop of Canterbury, with whom at various times I have had long conversations, is in his point of view typical of the general attitude of the English clergy. By nature rather inclined toward Germany, these circles believe they perceive on the one hand in certain domestic political measures of the German Government violations of the commandment of the Christian love of one's neighbor and of the principle of equality before the law, which is sacred to them. They also watch with mistrust the movement of the German Christians, which seems strange to them. On the other hand, however, they also have boundless admiration for the moral and ethical side of the National Socialist program, its clear-cut stand for religion and Christianity and its ethical principles, such as its fight against cruelty to animals, vivisection, sexual offenses, etc. From my impressions, there is hope that the position of Germany will soon improve of itself in these circles.

It is worse in financial circles where, apart from everything else, an unfavorable effect is caused on the one hand by the danger of losses on financial transactions concluded in Germany, and on the other hand by anxiety concerning a further deterioration in the business situation through threatening political complications, possibly from the direction of Germany. The same factors, together with the development of German economic policy, have a depressing effect on industrial, commercial, and shipping circles.

Especially discouraging is the development of the general atmosphere in intellectual circles. The great admiration which German science, research, and art enjoy with the intelligentsia here, and the close connection which existed in this field between the two countries, now work out disadvantageously in the formation of the general atmosphere. The strict application of the new German regulations, which has led to the crippling of many intellectual figures who are well known and highly esteemed here, has caused the greatest annoyance here and draws very harsh criticism. Though no real hostility to Germany and the German people results from this, it does produce an attitude that is very much opposed to the new Government of the German Reich. I myself had discussions with leading English scholars on the subject and found the above-mentioned attitude to exist in a degree of obstinacy that seems to me to offer little hope of an early change of feeling. It was interesting to me in this connection that Grandi recently told me of his own accord that the tough work of years, done by fascist Italy in attempting to win Anglo-Saxon

opinion, had been almost entirely successful except in intellectual circles, in which a dull opposition to Fascism and its principles is not infrequently perceptible even today.

Finally, the working class, which in the last analysis coincides here to a rather large extent with the followers of Marxism and the labor union system, is already sufficiently characterized by this statement as being definitely opposed to the new Germany.

One obtains the relatively most favorable impression when one bypasses all grouping and seeks to discover the sentiment of the individual. In so doing, one repeatedly finds that years of antagonism, hate-mongering, and even war have not been able to destroy everything that links the German and English nations in history, tradition, race, and way of thinking. The historic memory of a friendship lasting for centuries and the more recent tradition of friendship from the epoch of Queen Victoria have not yet entirely lost their effect despite the intervening period of strife. Moreover, compared to the basically alien Frenchman, Italian, or Spaniard, the German still seems, together with the northerner of the Netherlands or Scandinavia, the most nearly identical with the Briton. In the case of German-English family ties, the ease with which the German element adapts itself to the English circle, and vice versa, quite differently than, for example, in France, where such assimilations are only rarely successful, is proof of the existence of a certain harmony in the mode of thought. In addition to these uniting factors, there is also the feeling, common to almost all Englishmen, of a certain shame over the treatment that was meted out to Germany after the war, and in which England had a part.

For all these reasons, the individual Englishman is inclined to approach German problems with seriousness and with a certain attempt at objectivity. One finds this effort again and again in conversations and can also infer it from the numerous letters which private persons repeatedly write to the newspapers in reply to the certainly far more numerous anti-German letters.

Actually, it is primarily the idea of authority that brings many Englishmen personally closer to the new Germany, and, secondly, the growing realization that the revolution in Germany has checked the growing Communist danger.

One may therefore indeed take a certain hope from the foregoing description of the attitude of the English individual that it will prove to be in the realm of possibility to stem the anti-German tide in England and gradually again wrest from it the ground which has been lost.

What, however, are now the points individually which have primarily caused the change in feeling in England in the case of the German revolution?

A. The first that must unquestionably be mentioned, because of its broad significance, is the Jewish question.

It would be a mistake to think that the indignation over the handling of the Jewish problem in Germany is attributable principally to the agitation of German and foreign Jews, which undoubtedly exists. On the contrary, the German solution of the Jewish question suffices in itself and without any need for exaggeration to arouse the indignation of the English people. The Englishman feels himself superior to the idea of discrimination against citizens on account of race or religion, and considers any other point of view uncivilized. In addition, he perceives in the equality of individuals before the law one of the fixed and long immovable foundations of civilization, won in battle. He does not understand the Jewish problem as it exists in Germany, for it simply does not exist here in the same form. Let me interpolate here some remarks on the Jews in England: There is here, on the one hand, a Jewish element of high quality but relatively small in number which finds its most distinguished embodiment in the person of the former Viceroy of India and former Foreign Minister, the Marquess of Reading, and which has become a component part of the English nation, integrated without friction. On the other hand, there is in certain quarters of cities, particularly in London, a considerable, congested mass of Jews of the lowest classes, who live by themselves, of whom the real English population takes relatively little notice, and who, in view of the sharply defined social stratification of England, has hardly any prospect of improvement. The highest stratum of the Jews—like the Rothschilds and Sassoons—is at the same time the highest stratum of society, and hardly anybody considers it anything unusual that the present Earl of Rosebery and the Marchioness of Crewe are children of a Rothschild, and that the granddaughter of the Earl of Derby is, through her father, the granddaughter of the same Rothschild, or that a Prince of Battenberg is married to a granddaughter of Sir Ernest Cassel. The danger of a Judaization of the English upper class is averted, however, by the very fact that the number of socially recognized Jewish families is small and diminishing and that the rise to social recognition is tremendously difficult.

In these circumstances the Englishman views the German measures against the Jews as a puzzle, and it is tremendously difficult even in the most painstakingly conducted discussion to make him understand why in Germany the principle of equality of all citizens under the law has been departed from to the detriment of the Jews. Unlike the Frenchman, to whom German Jewish policy is in the main only a welcome means for agitation against Germany, without his taking the matter itself very much to heart, the Englishman takes the matter tremendously seriously and tragically. His indignation



over Germany's action is deep-rooted and expresses itself as a great and painful disillusionment over the fact that in the 20th century principles regarded by him as sacred could be thrown overboard, and that, moreover, by a leading civilized country such as Germany. Naturally, in individual cases, other views are also to be found, and often in the case of individuals one stumbles upon the right understanding of our action. Thus, for example, various persons who recently saw the march of the Jews coming from the East End of London to protest against Germany in Hyde Park and thus perhaps for the first time in their lives saw East End Jews in concentrated form, spontaneously told members of the Embassy that now they understood the action of the Reich Government. Nevertheless we must not deceive ourselves as to the fact that the indignation of the English people over the handling of the Jewish question in Germany is deep-rooted, and that it will be a long and arduous task to undo the unfavorable consequences of this attitude on the general feeling of the English people.

B. Second among the reasons which have served to alienate British public opinion from us is the impression which has been gained here that the German nation is going through a process of progressive militarization and is deliberately being prepared for a later passage at arms.

England, as we know, is afraid of nothing more than the prospect of new warlike complications in Europe. To be sure, she has limited her formal commitments to Locarno and is carefully intent on not expanding them, but there is no denying the fact that any outbreak of hostilities on the Continent may finally involve England in a war again anyway, even if English interests should not seem to be directly endangered. Apart from the direct needs of the British Empire, the English nation as a whole simply does not want to hear of such a new war, and it therefore views with anxiety and annoyance all those developments that seem to it to bring the danger of a conflict closer. This fact explains the great mistrust and vexation with which the organization of German youth in various formations and their systematic physical training is watched, as well as the excitement that attends all utterances made in Germany to which the idea of a reconquest by force of lost possessions can be attributed. There is a desire to be helpful to a peace-loving Germany—unfortunately only quite platonically—in the struggle to obtain reparation for the injustice suffered, at least to a certain extent; from a militant-appearing Germany they turn away in fear and indignation, and again toward those of whose role as former comrades-in-arms for a while they did not like to be reminded.

C. As the third question that incriminates us in English public opinion, I would mention the Austrian problem.

In its complete lack of understanding of what is taking place between Germany and Austria, which is hard to combat even by the most arduous work of enlightenment, public opinion sees in German-Austrian tension in the main nothing more than the attempt at violation of a small country by a powerful one. In view of the tendency of the Englishman to side at once with the weaker party in a battle—at least in cases where England herself is not the stronger one in the fight—and in view of England's partiality for Vienna, which has always existed anyway, a vehement partisanship for Austria naturally results. In addition there is the feeling that the German-Austrian fight involves a dangerous act of self-assertion on the part of Germany, which might be the signal for further German operations on the other side of the German border. Finally, the aversion to the spread of National Socialism over Austria, or beyond the German borders in any case, also plays a role that is important in connection with the attitude of the Englishman. The real problem of Anschluss at the same time receives less prominence, but very many Englishmen take the stand that this wish must not from reasons of justice be denied to an Austria, the overwhelming majority of whose citizens demand Anschluss with Germany. What is unendurable to the Englishman, however, is the idea of force being used by Germany, or, at least, of influence being brought to bear, and in this connection he fails to understand the peculiarities of the case and also does not *wish* to understand them.

D. As the last of the principal reasons for the reversal of British feeling, I would mention German actions against the Social Democrats, the labor unions, and the pacifist agitators, while I need not speak of the suppression of Communism, which to an unequal degree draws applause as well as criticism. I have mentioned this point last because in the main it provokes opposition in *like-minded* circles in England. It is evident from my statements above that this opposition is unbending and vehement, and that it is held by a numerically large segment of the English people.

## II

It need be no surprise that so strong a revulsion as has taken place in English public opinion toward Germany must have entailed practical results for English policy-making.

In no large country of the world has it, indeed, become tradition to the same extent as in England that the Government in its policy follows the general trend of public opinion and is carefully intent on not colliding with it. We ourselves sensed this fact only recently in our *favor*, when the English Government found itself obliged last fall to abandon the idea of the well-known disarmament note of Sir

John Simon of last summer<sup>3</sup> after this note had drawn the sharpest criticism from public opinion here and had brought considerable discredit upon Sir John Simon himself. The Foreign Minister himself had come to the conclusion that he must propose new courses for English policy in the disarmament question, and I witnessed how at the long session of the House of Commons on November 10, with the approval of the entire House, he established the guiding principles for the recognition of German equality on the basis of which the Geneva Five Power Agreement<sup>4</sup> was concluded in December, in which the principle of German equality in the armament field for the first time received formal recognition. It was also plainly evident from the attitude of the press at the time that the English Government, when it consciously and intentionally assumed the leadership in the direction of a practical application of the principle of equality, was in complete accord with the feelings of the English people. Let me refer in this connection only to the remarkable editorial in the *Times* of November 4, 1932, in which the editor-in-chief of the paper had come out not only for a solution of the disarmament question on the basis of equality of rights, but also supported a practical approach to the problem of the revision of the peace treaties.

In the winter we had then to note a reverse effect of public opinion in our *disfavor* after the change in feeling had taken place. This was especially apparent in the events that took place in the month of March. It may be recalled that MacDonald and Simon went to Geneva on March 9, and there submitted the so-called MacDonald plan to the Disarmament Conference,<sup>5</sup> in which at least a certain amount of consideration was given to Germany's desire for equality of rights, and it may be further recalled that they then, accepting Mussolini's invitation, went on to Rome and there declared themselves in agreement with Mussolini's original proposal for the Four Power Pact, with some revisions. The two Ministers were convinced at the time, as they repeatedly stated to me, that they were acting in accordance with public opinion at home which had in general oriented itself in favor of equality and revision. In the dramatic session of the House of Commons of March 23, in which the Ministers, after some two weeks absence, gave an account of their political action, it became clear that this was not the case. The brief span of 2 weeks had sufficed, as a result of events in Germany, to cause a reversal of feeling in Parliament, such as probably has few parallels in history. A member replied to the Ministers, not without reason, that they must realize that when they departed they had left behind a

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<sup>3</sup> Cf. *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. iv, documents Nos. 92 and 111.

<sup>4</sup> See Editors' Note, p. 18.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 90.

pro-German and anti-French England, and had now returned to an anti-German and pro-French England. MacDonald's statements regarding the Four Power Pact and, in particular, the question of revision got a cool reception and in the case of a number of the members drew sharp criticism.

With the accelerated spread of the change of feeling, the interest of the English Government in the realization of the Four Power Pact, for which I had still found strong sympathy in the case of Simon, diminished more and more, and finally seemed, as Grandi also incidentally confirmed to me, to have subsided altogether. It was only aroused again when there appeared positive prospects of an accord, for the realization of which a new active emergence of England into the political battle arena no longer seemed necessary. The toning down by the French of the revision idea, which had lost its appeal for English public opinion, left no regrets with the English Government, and it still seems like a fairy tale when one recalls how MacDonald in his speech of March 23 in the House of Commons said—incidentally, to the greatest horror of the French—that the chief aim of the Four Power Pact was to open the way for an approach to revision of the peace treaties.

As in the question of revision, so also in the question of disarmament the change of feeling exerted its influence on British policy. Since the ill-fated Whitsuntide expedition of Lord Londonderry to Paris,<sup>6</sup> less and less is heard of the intentions to put sharp pressure on France in the sense of extensive concessions in the sphere of war materials, and if, even in principle, the demand that France yield in this matter is still undoubtedly upheld in England, opposition to any increase or improvement in German striking power has at the same time increasingly attained "equality." In its present attitude toward Germany public opinion, of which the Government is watchful, does not really want to hear anything of an improvement or adjustment of the German armament level and pays increasing attention to the familiar argument of Winston Churchill that a strong French Army is still at the moment the best guarantee of peace, and that it is therefore wrong to put too much pressure on France in the direction of a weakening of her armaments as long as the danger of a disturbance of the peace threatens from the direction of the new Germany.

It is not the object of this report to treat exhaustively the above-mentioned important subjects, but rather to show in these statements only in a general way the practical effect on English policy in the most important fields of the feeling that pervades our relations with England. It is obvious that this effect is not confined to the principal fields. A further detailed statement would take us too far afield, and

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<sup>6</sup> See document No. 283, footnote 1.

therefore only brief reference is made to the disproportionately great opposition which our little German-English economic agreement of last winter <sup>7</sup> encountered in Parliament, and to the remark that Runciman, the English Minister of Commerce,<sup>8</sup> made to the Reich Foreign Minister, when the latter was recently in London, concerning the difficulties that the initiation of comprehensive German-English economic negotiations would at present encounter from English public opinion and the English Parliament, and for this reason such negotiations could not for the moment be contemplated.

### III

The outlook for the future naturally hinges on the question as to what can be done on our side with any prospect of success to bring about an improvement in the total picture as painted.

The first answer to this question is contained in *one* word: results. If the new Germany can be successfully developed into a firmly-knit, clearly disciplined, and self-confident political organism that commands the respect and admiration even of the doubters and opponents; also if unemployment can be effectively combated within the limits of possibility, the national budget kept in order, and the finances and the economy guided into safe and tranquil channels, then the most important step will have been taken toward her recognition in the world. England will surely not deny herself the feeling of respect for such achievements.

The next requirement for the winning back of English public opinion is the certainty that German foreign policy is pacific. The new German Government has already done an immense amount of work in this field, or has declared itself ready to do so under certain conditions, and it may properly appear intolerable that new doubts should always be raised and new unreasonable demands always be made. The inner strengthening of Germany, however, inevitably produces in other countries, which are conscious of their guilt with respect to the German nation, the fear of German self-help. To allay this fear and at the same time stress the need for peaceful undoing of the injustice done seems to me to be a dictate of practical policy and at the same time one of the surest ways in which English public opinion can be re-won, even if not in its entirety, yet in its most important component parts.

I consider the Jewish question a *res judicata* and therefore confine myself to recommending that it be speedily dropped from among the

<sup>7</sup> The reference is to the agreement regarding British tariffs on certain items imported from Germany and amounts of coal and coke to be imported by Germany from the United Kingdom set forth in the two exchanges of notes of Apr. 13 and May 3, 1933. These are filmed on 7190/E528646-49; E528656-62; E528650-51; E528667-68.

<sup>8</sup> Walter Runciman, President of the Board of Trade.

topics of daily discussion and that it be rapidly converted into a permanent state no longer subject to discussion.

As far as Austria is concerned, developments will soon, I hope, relieve us of anxiety concerning this problem. Until then the question as to the extent to which the overt participation of Germany in the internal Austrian struggle is necessary, and the extent to which from the point of view of German interests as a whole it is advantageous, requires careful study.

The question of the attitude toward Marxism and finally that toward the trends related to it has been decided by the course of development of the German revolution and hence is no longer a subject for discussion. A softening of the resultant antagonism of the English Left toward Germany is to be hoped for as a result of the general developments in the future.

If one wonders about the methods by which the new Germany with her ideals, her aims, and her actions can be made more comprehensible to the English people, it seems to me that the idea of a systematic and organized campaign of propaganda should from the start be discarded as erroneous. Since the days of the World War, England has lost her taste for propaganda and rebels in principle against any such attempt. It was precisely the English people who had to experience too strongly the anguish of the modern art of propaganda, when it meant at the time bringing to a boiling point and infecting with the war mania a people who were in themselves entirely averse to the war and in no way prepared for it. Neither a propaganda campaign in the press, however ingeniously prepared—if such a campaign could be carried out here at all—nor a swamping of England with pamphlets in which the German point of view is explained, nor finally the dispatching of more or less official publicity agents seemed to me suitable means for the winning of public opinion here. Everything tempestuous, vehement, and blatant must be avoided, and it would be better to reckon with the possibility of only a slow change for the better than the possibility of failure through over-hasty attempts.

Among appropriate methods to be pursued for an effective influencing of English public opinion, I assign first place to the pronouncements of the leading statesmen of the new Germany. A simple reference to the striking effect of the great Reichstag speech of the Reich Chancellor<sup>9</sup> is enough to prove the outstanding importance of such statements to the creation of sentiment in the entire world. More than is the case with any other statesmen in the world, world opinion listens to the pronouncements of the new German Reich Government,

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<sup>9</sup> Apparently a reference to Hitler's Reichstag speech of May 17. See Editors' Note, p. 451.

whose ideas and purposes it would like to fathom, and whose language appears to it to be novel and fascinating.

Also the greatest encouragement of trips of prominent Englishmen to Germany and very gracious reception and attentive treatment of these travelers in Germany seem to me desirable. Experience has shown that by far the greater number of such visitors, whose trips to Germany have in many cases been brought about or encouraged by the Embassy, have returned from Germany with favorable impressions, particularly when they had come in contact with leaders, and that they also did not avoid frankly stating their impressions, in part also in written form. From such public support by *Englishmen* of the new Germany, preferably in the form of letters to the newspapers, such as the Embassy constantly strives to bring about, there results an intangible "propaganda" of the greatest effectiveness.

Similarly, it might also be advantageous if suitable prominent Germans went to England. It would be desirable, if possible, to select only such persons as already have ties here and already enjoy personally a special prestige here, possibly because of scientific, literary, or artistic achievements, or because they occupy prominent positions in social or economic life. Their appearance must naturally be entirely without any commotion and must avoid any appearance of a publicity intent.

Besides this, there would have to be the constant activity of the Diplomatic Mission, whose members, indeed, because of their permanent residence in England, have open to them the most numerous approaches to the various elements of the population. It will also have to be one of its problems to maintain in appropriate form regular contact with the English press and its representatives, inasmuch as it is not possible in some cases to establish ties of an important kind from the Ministry [*Zentrale*].

A careful cultivation of sports relations between Germany and England and a further development of cultural relations also seem to me to be of great importance, as well as the greatest practicable encouragement of all economic ties already existing and in process of formation.

It will not be easy to reconquer the lost terrain and it may be a time-consuming process. There are, however, as I have explained in my remarks, a great number of elements present which make the attempt at reconquest, if efficiently and resolutely undertaken, appear promising in the last analysis. There seems to me to be no doubt that it is worth trying and that the aim involved is of great importance for the future of our Fatherland. I should like in this connection to refer to a remark of Grandi to me, on which I reported at the time,<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> See document No. 237.

and with which I also wish to conclude this report. Grandi told me in a conversation concerning the rise and growth of the fascist State that he had realized immediately after he had entered foreign politics that a newly established state could not thrive against the opposition and antipathy of the Anglo-Saxon world. He had therefore made it the core of his activities in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to aim at winning Anglo-Saxon public opinion for the new Italy, and if posterity should one day wish to attribute to his 8 years of work in the Ministry a result of lasting value for Italy, it would surely be the winning of the sympathies of the Anglo-Saxon world for the new Italy, to which the path to self-assertion and successful growth had thereby been opened.

HOESCH

No. 407

6115/E454702-06

*Minister Rieth to State Secretary Bülow*

VIENNA, August 17, 1933.

II Oe. 1214.

DEAR HERR VON BÜLOW: In the top secret report of July 26, 1933—A 918<sup>1</sup>—I recorded under number II (page 9) the rumor that an SA formation made up of Austrians was being trained and readied in Bavaria for use in Austria when the occasion arises, with September 6 being rumored as the date on which such an action would be launched. I mentioned at the time that I presumed that the Austrian Government had already received knowledge of these rumors. I also made some observations as to the prospects for success of such an action.

In my cover letter to you, of July 27,<sup>2</sup> with which I forwarded that secret report, I added that, as indicated by reports received by me, the above-mentioned rumors that are circulating here seem to some extent to be based on facts.

That this is so has meanwhile been confirmed, in part at least, as you probably will have learned, too. It is an open secret here that an SA formation consisting of Austrians is being equipped with arms and trained in Bavaria, and the local press has already discussed this matter on several occasions. The crossing over the border into Bavaria by Austrian National Socialists seeking to join the "Austrian Legion" has almost become a permanent item in some of the newspapers here.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (6084/E451537-73).

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (6084/E451582-83).



In the special edition of the *Reichspost*, forwarded with report A 1057 of August 14,<sup>3</sup> there are four pages of revelations about the "documents" found with Herr Schneider and his associates of the NSDAP Landesleitung here; one of the principal items is a column-long letter quoted verbatim under the heading "A comprehensive report on the situation from Berlin," by Herr Erwin Schneider, who works in the Aussenpolitisches Amt in Berlin, to his brother Herbert Schneider here, who is now under arrest. This letter, which is authentic, contains the following passage relating to the "Austrian Legion":

"It was clear to us from the outset that, as a result of the ban on travel, our last resort now was really only Reschny (the leader of the SA here, who is at present in Munich). And on that count I can reassure you, it really looks good. Count Bossi had to be in Munich yesterday on some VDA matter and on that occasion also went to see the Landesleitung people, as I had instructed him to do. He said that the impression he received was excellent, he had felt, with Grillparzer: 'In your camp is Austria!'

"Splendid fellows with the inductee's bunch of flowers on their hats, lads from the Alpine provinces, came in in large groups, every last one in tiptop shape. Quite a good number, everyone having what it takes, have already been assembled. I myself have so far gathered up a total of 60 and shipped them down, all of them Austrians so as to avoid any international complications in case the thing comes off. So you see, it's all right."

I did not want to neglect calling your attention to this and to the fact that the foreign Missions here have for a long time been aware of these plans which, as a matter of fact, are now being discussed quite openly. This is plainly indicated by hints which several heads of Missions have already dropped to me. I consider it very likely that the Austrian Government is using this argument in Paris, London, Rome, etc. Whether the interventionist desires of those Powers are partly motivated by anxieties resulting from reports of this kind is impossible for me to judge.

Owing to the numerous conflicting reports, especially from National or National Socialist quarters, I have so far been unable to form any definite opinion as to what actually are the plans for this Austrian SA formation which is doubtlessly being trained and armed. Perhaps the intention is merely to give these young men who have crossed over into Bavaria something to do, and to inspire some hope in the party members in Austria. In his radio address yesterday countering the disclosures of the *Reichspost*, Herr Habicht said among other things:

"I protest in the most vigorous terms against the assertion that armed formations are being organized in Bavaria for the purpose of

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (8946/E627720-34).

invading Austria. This lie is of the same order as the canard about the invasion by Bavarian SA, which was spread for the obvious purpose of alarming the other countries, and which at that time was denied by Chancellor Dollfuss himself. The kernel of truth is that the Austrians who have fled to Germany in large numbers on account of the persecutions by the present regime have been gathered in labor camps so as to keep them from roaming the country in destitute condition."

Actually, however, a part of the National Socialists here counts on an intervention by this force that has been trained in Bavaria, especially since leading party figures here are convinced that the SA in Austria is too weak to prevail against the armed power of the State if the moment should arrive.

Nevertheless, the matter is so serious that I feel duty bound to bring it up with you in any case. The prospects for the success of such an undertaking, if it should actually be planned, cannot be regarded as very good. I am sending you enclosed a copy of a report on the subject which Lieutenant General Muff has sent to the Reichswehr Ministry.<sup>4</sup> From number I of this report you will see that our Military Attaché, on the basis of his very discerning estimate of the situation here from a military point of view, does not believe that such a venture would be successful.

It surely requires no further amplification that the political repercussions of intervention—in case it should actually be planned—by an SA force consisting of Austrians, yet trained and equipped with arms in Germany, could be disastrous. One of the consequences that could certainly be anticipated is that the Austrian question would be raised on the broadest front against us, not to speak of possible military moves by other powers. Even a Hapsburg restoration might perhaps appear not impossible after the failure of such a venture, and it might then perhaps receive the approval of powers which might otherwise seek to prevent it. Whether other moves might not ensue almost of necessity, if the forces assigned to such an enterprise should prove insufficient, and what their international consequences might be is of course impossible for me to estimate even approximately.

Forgive me if I paint these contingencies a little too pessimistically. I do not think it at all unlikely that my fears regarding a possibly intended execution of such a plan are unfounded. But in view of the accumulation of reports about this I do believe that the further development of this matter, which I am unable to size up from here, should be closely watched by you if only on account of the international effects hinted at above which could result even if the plan rumored about here should not be put into effect.

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<sup>4</sup> Not printed (6115/E454707-16).

I would appreciate it if you would regard and treat this letter as being designed for your confidential information.<sup>5</sup>

With best regards, I am, dear Herr von Bülow,

Yours, etc.

K. RIETH

<sup>5</sup> Cf. document No. 411.

## No. 408

6113/E453860-61

### *The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 202 of August 21

ROME, August 21, 1933—4:05 p. m.

Received August 21—7:15 p. m.

II Oe. 1228.

Today's conversation with the Deputy Director of the Political Department about the significance of Mussolini's meeting with Dollfuss at Riccione<sup>1</sup> gives the following picture:

1. The fact that this meeting was held now instead of later, as originally planned, is due merely to other arrangements in the travel program of Mussolini, who will be busy with maneuvers and inspections in the near future. Consequently, all speculations set off by Dollfuss' sudden trip, especially rumors about preparations for a new démarche by France and England in Berlin, for which Italian support was also sought, are wide of the mark.

2. Dollfuss outlined to Mussolini Austria's internal and international situation and requested Italy's continued support. Economic questions were discussed not in detail but merely within the framework of the whole problem of the future organization of the Danube area. British press reports regarding a specific agreement [on the]<sup>2</sup> economic rehabilitation of Trieste and its hinterland are described as incorrect. In outlining Austria's domestic situation, Dollfuss acknowledged that German propaganda had let up somewhat, but at the same time expressed grave concern for the preservation of Austria's independence. Austria wished to remain independent in all circumstances and desired peace and cooperation with all neighbors, especially Italy, Hungary and, as soon as possible, also Germany.

3. Mussolini told Dollfuss that Italy was opposed to Anschluss in whatever form, but at the same time urgently desired an early easing of tension in the German-Austrian relationship.

4. Germany will again be asked in a friendly manner to do everything on her part also to put Austria's fears at rest and prevent new incidents. Mussolini's wish [on the eve of the disarmament negotiations] was the clearing of the international atmosphere and in particular the improvement of Germany's relationship to France and England, which was visibly deteriorating as a result of the Austrian complication.

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 398.

<sup>2</sup> The passages in brackets, garbled in transmission, are from a copy in the file of the Rome Embassy (9971/E697335-37).

5. A communiqué issued for tonight's evening papers will announce Dollfuss' assurance that he wishes to cooperate especially with Italy, Hungary, and, as soon as it will be possible, also with Germany. It will emphasize the firm agreement of the Italian and Austrian views of the questions discussed, and stress the interrelation of this problem with the Four Power Pact in expounding Mussolini's view of Austria's international position.

The chief significance of the meeting, as I see it, lies in the fact that it stresses, once more, Italy's interest in preserving Austria's complete independence, but also on the other hand Mussolini's continued readiness to act as mediator in bringing about a relaxation of tension between Germany and Austria.<sup>3</sup>

SMEND

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<sup>3</sup> On Aug. 28, Smend sent a longer pouched report, I 1383, on the Mussolini-Dollfuss meeting adding a few more details to the story (8048/E578466-70); see also document No. 443.

## No. 409

6609/E497166-67

### *Memorandum by the Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union*

SECRET

Moscow, August 24, 1933.

Lieutenant General Lutz, of the Reichswehr Ministry, arrived here via Bigosovo on August 20 for the purpose of paying a formal farewell visit to the Chief of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army on completion of the joint studies.<sup>1</sup> Herr Lutz, as he told me, was received very cordially by the Russians; any serious talks, however, were avoided on the Russian side.<sup>2</sup>

In the evening of August 22 a dinner was given at my house at which were present from the Red Army: Chief of the General Staff Yegorov, Chief of Mechanization and Motorization Khalep-sky, the Chief of Transport, and the Chief of Communications, as well as the Director and Vice Director of the Second Western Department of the Foreign Commissariat, and the officials of the Division of Foreign Armies. No speeches were made, but the evening passed on a distinctly friendly note, although, on this occasion also, the Russian side avoided any specific political conversation. It was stressed several times, however, that the cooperation was remembered with great pleasure and gratefulness. The marked friendliness of the Russians was indicated by the fact, among others, that they remained at my house until 2:30 a. m.

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<sup>1</sup> This has reference to the conclusion of German-Soviet cooperation at the station at Kazan.

<sup>2</sup> Assistant Military Attaché Krebs gave accounts of General Lutz' visit in reports Nos. 157/33 of Aug. 22 (5892/E432554-60) and 158 of Aug. 29 (5892/E432-567-73).

On August 23 a return dinner was given by the Chief of Mechanization and Motorization at the Spiridonovka, at which about the same persons were present. M. Yegorov excused himself on the ground of illness. This evening also passed on a definitely friendly note. Except for one toast no speeches were made here either.

The impression made by the course of the visit can be summed up by saying that the gesture of the farewell visit was appreciated on the part of the Red Army and received in a decidedly friendly attitude. The change in the foreign political situation was reflected by the pattern of the conversations, which avoided any more serious discussions which could have served to develop new ties. The German side, of course, also showed no eagerness to enter into such conversations.

The chapter of cooperation on the basis of strong mutual confidence must be regarded as closed. The Red Army, however, seems to attribute importance to maintaining good personal relations through which a normalization of relations might be aided.<sup>3</sup>

v. TW[ARDOWSKI]

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<sup>3</sup> Marginal note in Tippelskirch's handwriting: "Minister Hey: According to the reports of Military Attaché Colonel Hartmann, the Russians have even left the door open for themselves for military collaboration with us at some later date."

## No. 410

4620/E201025-28

*Minister Trautmann to State Secretary Bülow*

PEITAIHO, August 24, 1933.<sup>1</sup>

DEAR HERR VON BÜLOW: Your kind letter of June 2<sup>2</sup> reached me today, August 23. It is as if one were living on another planet. The letter, for which I cordially thank you, is very consoling.

I am particularly glad to hear that the wire to Moscow is functioning again. Despite the general breakdown in Russia in all fields, we should nevertheless stake everything on not yielding the terrain to the French. The French Minister here has tried from the very beginning to ingratiate himself [*"herangeschmissen"*], as the Berliner says, very strongly with the new Soviet Ambassador. Evidently this is the general French line. One could, indeed, really envy the successes that French policy has everywhere scored. The French have, indeed, also succeeded in interesting England rather extensively again in French "requirements," although in London they are still somewhat cool-headed. Simon and Boncour are, indeed, both Jews and will also be sympathetic in this respect. Daladier, to be sure, is a very sensible man. I once saw him at Stresemann's and had a long talk with him.

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<sup>1</sup> The date of receipt is not indicated, but Bülow initialed it on Oct. 21.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (4620/E201021-24).

But he will surely be carried along. From many another point of view also I can understand that the Jewish question is a big headache for you. What has actually been done to the Jews has caused more noise than it is worth, but the Jews are a power not to be despised. The Spanish and also the Portuguese Ministers once told me that the expulsion of the Jews from their countries brought about their economic ruin.

You write that, despite our "excellent" reporting, you do not understand the way things are going here. May I just try to tell you something about it?

In Japan there was much vexation over the Lytton report.<sup>3</sup> In China it gave encouragement to certain politicians, chiefly T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance, who believed that they could still perhaps align the other powers against Japan. Soong attempted to organize a "resistance" in Jehol, which had the opposite effect. Jehol was taken in a military promenade, and the Japanese soon stood before the gates of Peiping.

T. V. Soong decamped to America and London and left it to other people to mop up, particularly his brother-in-law, Chiang Kai-shek, and Huang Fu, his present agent in Peiping. The latter concluded the armistice with the Japanese, which actually had the effect of forcing the Japanese out of all of North China. The Japanese troops withdrew approximately to the Great Wall. Practically speaking, however, Japan has strengthened her influence in North China considerably. It is her aim to continue doing so. There is a pro-Japanese regime in Peiping. The police in the formerly occupied areas are very close to the Japanese. In Tientsin and Tsingtao Japanese influence prevails.

The moment has now come for a drastic change of policy in China also. The policy of "wait and see"<sup>4</sup> seems now to be abandoned, and the key man in China, Marshal Chiang Kai-shek, has also induced the Chancellor, Wang Ching-wei,<sup>5</sup> to seek an understanding with Japan. This accounts for the departure of Foreign Minister Lo Wen-kan, who was already having constant eye pains recently (from reading the armistice, etc.). Lo is going to Chinese Turkestan, and they say that Yen, the former Ambassador in Moscow, is to become Foreign Minister. The Japanese are sending doves of peace to China, among others, our fat friend from Geneva, Sugimura.

T. V. Soong will soon return from America<sup>6</sup> with his loan,<sup>7</sup> and with Rajchman, the Polish Jew, from the League of Nations,<sup>8</sup> who shares the blame for the foolish policy pursued by China with her appeal to Geneva. To the Japanese the Soong loan is an abomination. They hate Rajchman, as they do naturally any sizeable reconstruction

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 28, footnote 2.

<sup>4</sup> The quoted phrase is in English in the original.

<sup>5</sup> Wang Ching-wei was President of the Executive Yuan.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. document No. 373 and footnote 5.

<sup>7</sup> As announced on June 4, the United States, through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, had granted China a credit of \$50,000,000 for the purchase of cotton and wheat.

<sup>8</sup> Dr. Ludwig W. Rajchman, director of the Health Section, League of Nations, had recently been appointed liaison officer between the Chinese Government and the technical organizations of the League.

activity of the powers in China (Japan wants to be the chief arbiter here). Hands off<sup>9</sup> is the motto of Japan! In Tokyo they are beginning to promote the Pan-Asiatic idea again.

The question now is, how will Soong behave. Rumors are that he, too, will draw the logical conclusions and make his first visit to Tokyo. One just has to wait and see.

One thing, at any rate, is certain, that the League of Nations melody is played out here politically. From this it follows that we, too, should be as reserved as possible at Geneva. Nagai<sup>10</sup> has, indeed, spoken rather *plainly* recently in the apparently new, semi-official organ, *Dortmunder General Anzeiger*! That is the new language of diplomacy!

We ought, above all, also to keep aloof from matters of arms and armaments, for that is an annoyance to Japan. They have become accustomed to our advisers, although in the case of a rapprochement with Japan or a change of policy toward Japan, there is always the danger that the ground will suddenly disappear from under their feet in China. In that case even Herr von Seeckt will not be able to glamorize the situation any longer. What he did in Canton, apparently "in agreement with a leading German high authority" is wrong, however.<sup>11</sup> In this, Reichswehr Major Preu also played a part. It is obviously the desire to build up the armaments industry in Canton with German assistance. I think we ought to keep our hands off.

Our ideas of economic expansion cause me some anxiety here too. You know that I pleaded unsuccessfully with Curtius in the Russian deal not to let our risk become too great.<sup>12</sup> Here in China the same questions are coming up again. Berlin would like to do something, but it will be very difficult to obtain positive *guarantees* such, for example, as the Americans have for their loan. I take the stand: rather a small but sound deal, than a risk that robs one of one's sleep. If for reasons of internal policy, you wish it otherwise, you must so command.

But enough now. It is too much for you already. My wife sends her best regards.

Yours with the old regard and loyalty,

TRAUTMANN

<sup>9</sup> The two preceding words are in English in the original.

<sup>10</sup> Matsuzo Nagai was Japanese Ambassador in Germany.

<sup>11</sup> See document No. 436.

<sup>12</sup> No record of this has been found.

## No. 411

6115/E454717-21

*State Secretary Bülow to Foreign Minister Neurath*

BERLIN, August 25, 1933.  
zu II Oe. 1214.<sup>1</sup>

DEAR HERR VON NEURATH: In connection with the fears that our quarrel with Austria might furnish the countries that are opposed to

<sup>1</sup> II Oe. 1214: Document No. 407.

Anschluss with pretexts for further attempts at intervention, one matter, which might take a very serious turn, especially in view of the danger of an airing of the Austrian question before the League of Nations, causes me particular concern. I consider it therefore appropriate to inform you in detail on this point in order that, as soon as there is an opportunity, you may be in a position to discuss the matter with the Reich Chancellor.

It concerns the alleged establishment of a so-called "Austrian Legion" in Bavaria. A few weeks ago reports had already come to us that some thousand Austrian National Socialists who had fled across the border in order to escape persecutions by the Dollfuss regime were assembled in a Bavarian Labor Service Camp and were being trained in the use of arms. At that time we got in touch with Herr Habicht at once about the matter and pointed out to him the grave consequences it might entail for foreign policy if these reports were true. Herr Habicht informed us that it was, indeed, correct that some 2,000 Austrian nationals who had crossed over the border were quartered in Camp Lechfeld near Augsburg and were being trained in the SA service there. This was not only absolutely necessary in order to get all these people off the street—since there could be no question of deporting them across the border—but was also directly in the interest of an avoidance of individual acts and incidents at the border. Nobody had any thought, moreover, of attempting a coup de main, such as an armed invasion of Austrian territory, with these people. This was out of the question, if only because the Austrian frontier defenses were much too strong. Should there, of course, be a Putsch in Austria from any quarter, it would, indeed, be impossible to prevent these Austrians from individually disappearing over the border again, the way they came. So much for Herr Habicht.

I should like to believe that no serious acts of the kind mentioned are actually being contemplated by Herr Habicht and in the responsible circles of the party. There is food for thought, however, in the fact that, as a passage in the *Reichspost* report with which you are familiar seems to prove, certain subordinate party officials take a very much different view of the aims pursued with the establishment of this "Austrian Legion." It is very unequivocally expressed there in a letter from Herr Erwin Schneider, who has been employed in the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP in Berlin, to his brother in Vienna, stating that for the solution of our conflict with Austria, an operation of the Austrian SA assembled in Bavaria is being reckoned with. In line with this statement, Rieth informs us from Vienna that in circles of the Austrian National Socialists, an invasion by these troops, which were trained in Bavaria, is actually expected, particularly since the leaders of Austrian National Socialism are convinced



that the SA in Austria is too weak to be able to assert itself by force, if the case should arise against the armed power of the State. A similar report comes also from our Military Attaché in Vienna,<sup>2</sup> in connection with a study on the striking power of the Austrian Army, to the effect that in the general opinion a decision will be reached in the matter of internal policy at the beginning of September, and that in national quarters they seem in this connection to be pinning their hopes on active support from the Reich.

It is natural that they are watching these things most attentively abroad and are accurately informed about everything that has happened in Bavaria. The publication in the *Reichspost* will undoubtedly have convinced people everywhere that we are actually pursuing plans for a forcible intervention in Austria. I take the liberty in this respect of referring to statements of the Italian Chargé d'Affaires, communicated to you in my memorandum of August 23.<sup>3</sup> I am concerned now that some day in Austria the internal political situation may lead to attempts at a Putsch, perhaps entirely unaided by us, and that then before it can be prevented heedless elements among us may let themselves be carried away into actions that might create for us quite an impossible situation in the field of foreign policy and at the same time have a disastrous influence on the development of the Austrian question. But even if such an explosion should not occur, what is happening in Bavaria today is nevertheless a serious liability for us with respect to foreign policy. For in any case, it is viewed abroad as preparation for armed intervention in Austrian affairs. I consider it absolutely necessary, therefore, that the quartering and employment of the Austrian refugees be handled in such a manner that, in contrast to the previous procedure, it no longer feeds the suspicion that we are preparing for an armed invasion of Austria. In this connection I am thinking of the Lechfeld camp being split up and the individual parts quartered in separate camps in the north of Germany or, in any case, at a greater distance from the Austrian border. It would naturally be especially important that their employment, too, should be of an unobjectionable character and that all military training of the Austrian refugees should cease.

We have already tried to influence Herr Habicht to that effect. I believe, however, that no essential change can be effected without a strong word from the Chancellor.<sup>4</sup>

Yours, etc.

B[ülow]

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 407.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (2784/540208-11). In this conversation, the Italian Chargé d'Affaires had brought up for discussion, among several other subjects, the concentration of Austrian National Socialists in the Lechfeld camp.

<sup>4</sup> Marginal note: "Although I made use of the suggestion in conversation, I did not take any special steps. Moreover, the excitement on account of the Austrian Legion has subsided. v. Neurath, Sept. 12."

## No. 412

8580/E601893-98

*The Minister in China to the Foreign Ministry*

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 585

PEIPING, August 26, 1933.

Received October 7.

IV Chi. 2283.

Subject: General von Seeckt's trip to China.<sup>1</sup>With reference to my telegram of May 22, 1933.<sup>2</sup>

The trip to China which Colonel General von Seeckt (ret.) made this summer by invitation of the National Government has gone off according to plan and certainly provided Herr von Seeckt with many new impressions and stimuli. Everything was done by the National Government to receive the visitor properly and to make his stay in China as pleasant as possible.

Herr von Seeckt was met in Shanghai by Minister of Transportation Chu Chia-hua in person and was welcomed ceremoniously in the name of the National Government. He first went from Shanghai to Hangchow, where they took him around as guest of the Government, and he then went to Nanking. There he had various conversations with important Chinese politicians, among others also with Wang Ching-wei.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, it was not possible to arrange a conference with General Wetzell, who was on business at the time in Peiping. General Wetzell regretted this very much, since he understandably would have liked to talk with Herr von Seeckt before the latter complied with the Marshal's invitation to go to Kuling.

For the trip to Kuling the General was provided with a Chinese gunboat. Moreover, they had summoned the director of Tungchi University, Professor Ong Tsi-lung, and detailed him to General von Seeckt as a medical adviser.

In Kuling Herr von Seeckt lived as the personal guest of Marshal Chiang Kai-shek and had lengthy conversations with him, some of them in the presence of the Marshal's wife. Both of them made a great and lasting impression on General von Seeckt, according to his own statements.

Then, accompanied by the military adviser Colonel Heins (ret.), who had been assigned to him personally for the duration of his stay

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 156.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 97 of May 22 Trautmann had transmitted the following message from the Counselor of Embassy in Nanking:

"Herr v. Seeckt told me that to his regret he must omit visiting Japan, since he could not now change arrangements which had been made. He left today by Chinese cruiser accompanied by the Minister of Transportation for a 2-week visit to Kuling, where he will meet Chiang Kai-shek." (8580/E601887)

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 410 and footnote 5.

in China, and by Director Chen Chih-hua of the Transportation Ministry placed at his disposal by Chu Chia-hua, Herr von Seeckt set out for Peiping and stayed here for about 3 weeks. He limited himself here mainly to seeing the sights of Peiping and its environs, but he also had an opportunity to inspect Chinese troops and take up connections with Minister of War Ho Ying-ching, General Huang-fu and Deputy Foreign Minister Liu Shung-chieh. I myself brought him together with the Diplomatic Corps and the foreign Military Attachés, so that these could convince themselves that the visit was a "pleasure trip."

From Peiping General von Seeckt returned to Nanking via Shantung, where he visited several places of historical importance, and soon thereafter he began the return trip via Hongkong and Canton. In Canton he visited the important Chinese generals and politicians, including Marshal Chen Chi-tong. The Consulate General in Canton has already reported about this.<sup>4</sup> I shall revert to the visit in a special report.<sup>5</sup>

Herr von Seeckt believed he should refrain from a visit to Japan, which had been suggested to him according to instructions.<sup>6</sup> I assume that this decision was not solely dependent on the consideration that a trip to Japan would arouse resentment in the official Chinese circles, but also on the fact that the China trip had already made considerable demands on the health and energy of the General and he did not want to expose himself to the further strain of a Japanese summer. He therefore also declined to prolong his visit in China, which Marshal Chiang Kai-shek urged him very strongly to do.

On the other hand, General von Seeckt did not refuse the Marshal's wish to put down for him in a memorandum the impressions he had gained during his trip in the military area and proposals for improvement. During his sojourn in Peiping he prepared a lengthy memorandum and had it submitted to the Marshal by the military adviser, Colonel Heins. General von Seeckt was so kind as to place a copy of it at the disposal of the Legation, which I have the honor to append in the annex.<sup>7</sup>

The memorandum is exceptionally interesting, even for the layman. It shows how accurately Herr von Seeckt evaluates the military-political situation of China, although all in all he had only a very short time to become familiar with conditions here; with sure insight he brings out precisely the points on which all the past efforts of the

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<sup>4</sup> Such a report was sent by the Consulate General at Canton on July 19 (8580/E601891-92).

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 436.

<sup>6</sup> The suggestion that General von Seeckt might visit Japan on his return trip was contained in Foreign Ministry telegram No. 37 of May 13 to the Legation in China (8580/E601883).

<sup>7</sup> Not printed (8580/E601905-25).

Nationalist Government, and doubtless also of the German advisers, have foundered in the past. This is the question of the organization of the Army. Herr von Seeckt stresses very decidedly right at the start of his memorandum that the right course is not to think of the speedy creation of a large army, but that one must start with devoting all efforts in the first place to creating a few well-trained and well-armed troops. China did not have too few troops, but far too many. It was an impossibility to train the army masses now at hand under all sorts of generals working at cross purposes.

Furthermore, the present management of command authority and thus also the position of the officers' corps in the Chinese Army was in need of improvement. The authority of the Government could only be built up on an army standing under *one* command, and that the Marshal's. The prerequisite for this was that the employment of the officers also be administered according to uniform principles and should not be in the hands of the individual division commanders and other generals; rather, the officers' corps had to be set up according to definite principles valid for the whole country, and if necessary with the requisite ruthlessness toward contrary interests of individuals. The supreme principle was the good of the state and not the interest of the individual. But in no circumstances would it do for the higher authorities to work independently of one another, as had obviously been the case during the recent fights against the Japanese.

In order to deal with these deficiencies effectively, Herr von Seeckt proposes the creation of a so-called instruction brigade. This brigade would be not so much for the purpose of training troops, as for giving the officers in the middle and higher positions of leadership a supplementary training which will make up for the deficiencies of their past training and equalize their capabilities with those of the younger officers now trained in Nanking under the guidance of German advisers. In this way one could also best cope with the unpleasant fact that the younger officers trained in Nanking cannot operate effectively with the troops because their superiors do not have the same training.

General von Seeckt wants this training brigade to consist of two infantry regiments, one artillery battalion, one engineer, one tank and one signal company, and one squadron of cavalry. He further proposes assigning to it an advisory staff of older, war-tried officers and a number of younger officers for individual training. It was necessary, of course, for the troops to have adequate high quality arms available. The material so far delivered from the arsenals was in large part inadequate; therefore for the time being they would have to rely on importing arms from abroad, although it was advisable to proceed gradually toward establishing their own armament factories within the country. The establishment of these factories could

best be done on the basis of suggestions by European armament firms. It was not only expensive to import arms and ammunition in the long run, but also dangerous in some circumstances.

It is interesting that at the conclusion of his memorandum Herr von Seeckt said a word about the activity of the German advisers. Perhaps he had reason to believe that the Marshal was not entirely satisfied with the activity of the German advisers and their accomplishments. Therefore Herr von Seeckt stresses that he gained the impression that all German officers called to China were working with real devotion at the task set them. But their numbers and their possibilities of effectiveness were hardly adequate for accomplishing something of real value. Here, too, organizational changes were necessary.

General von Seeckt submitted his impressions and proposals to the Marshal in part with commendable frankness. Considering the understanding which the latter has for the situation it is to be assumed that he will also take the proposals as they are meant. It seems that some of them are already being implemented; at least this is indicated by the report that they have started to set up an instruction brigade in Nanking. However, details on this are not yet known.

The Embassy in Tokyo will be sent a copy.

TRAUTMANN

### No. 413

7360/E537294

#### *The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy*

#### Telegram

No. 216

BERLIN, September 4, 1933—8:35 p. m.  
e. o. II F Abr. 2792.

Drafting Officer: Senior Counselor Frohwein.

With reference to your telegram No. 187,<sup>1</sup> your report I 1287<sup>2</sup> and our telegram No. 210 of August 28.<sup>3</sup>

Please take up again the idea of Italian mediation in the disarmament question with the Government there and say something along these lines: At the end of July Mussolini had opened up the prospect, through Aloisi, of influencing France, using the German memorandum

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 382.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 396.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (7360/E537274). This telegram, informing Hassell of the contents of Paris telegram No. 636 of Aug. 25, quoted "a quite reliable source" concerning Mussolini's first conversation with the new French Ambassador. Mussolini was said to have pointed out "the necessity of giving consideration to Germany's wishes with respect to disarmament and, above all, equality of rights in armaments."

for Henderson as a basis, and shortly thereafter had described to the Ambassador in more detail the position he intended to take toward France. We are exceedingly appreciative of the Italian efforts to bring about a German-French agreement on the disarmament problem and would like to be informed about the present status of the matter,<sup>4</sup> since we share Mussolini's view that there should be a clarification before the Disarmament Conference reconvenes.

BÜLOW

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<sup>4</sup> See document No. 431, footnote 1.

No. 414

9696/E682700-03

*Minute by an Official of the Economic Department*

BERLIN, September 5, 1933.  
e. o. II Balk. Rum. 1614 Ang. 1.

Herr Schwarte, the representative of I. G. Farben Industrie, A. G., informed me today about the big compensation transaction in grain signed a few days ago in Bucharest.<sup>1</sup>

I. G. Farben undertakes to buy grain to the value of 17 million reichsmarks.

Of this amount, 150,000 tons of corn and barley to the value of 6 million reichsmarks and also millet, beans, and oil seeds to the value of 2 million reichsmarks are intended for importation to Germany.

The remainder, in the amount of 9 million reichsmarks, will be exported to third countries, but the exports may not go to the Danubian countries, Italy, France or, in the case of barley, to England.

Moreover, the I. G. has undertaken, as agent for the Rumanian Government, to dispose of an additional 100,000 tons of wheat to the value of 5.7 million reichsmarks on the world market and pay a premium of 10 percent on the price f. o. b. Braila, the premium being intended to support the Rumanian wheat export. I. G.'s assumption of this obligation constitutes the quid pro quo for the Rumanian Government's consent to the partial sale of the Rumanian grain on the world market. I. G. Farben believes, however, that it can buy its way out of this last-mentioned transaction by furnishing about 250,000 reichsmarks for certain political purposes.

In return I. G. Farben will receive import permits for its products in the amount of 13.6 million reichsmarks. (The ratio of 1:1.25 in favor of Rumania, which the Rumanian Government generally demands in compensation transactions, has been taken as a basis.) I. G.

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<sup>1</sup> Telegram No. 36 of Aug. 30 from the Legation in Bucharest had reported that the agreement on the transaction was signed that day (9696/E682698).

Farben must also hand over 25 percent of the Rumanian products sold in Germany, or 1.6 million reichsmarks, to the Rumanian Government in foreign exchange, which will be cleared through a special account at the Reichsbank, and in addition hand over a fixed sum equivalent to 2.5 million reichsmarks in free foreign exchange for the Rumanian products sold on the world market.

Herr Schwarte summed up the total impression from his negotiations to the effect that the Rumanian departments concerned were obviously making a serious effort to achieve better economic relations with Germany. M. Madgearu<sup>2</sup> especially now seemed to share this view. The main difficulties lay especially with the Rumanian National bank, which undoubtedly was following closely the French lead. He expected a possible improvement in relations from direct negotiations between the Reichsbank and the National bank and would also propose such negotiations to the Reichsbank. M. Caesar Popescu<sup>3</sup> had created considerable difficulties. Herr Schwarte expressed his gratitude particularly for the very valuable support given by the Legation, especially by Herr Kirchholtes.

The approval of the compensation transaction by the responsible German departments would presumably not cause any great difficulties, since the transaction will be kept within the framework which has thus far been approved by these departments. On the other hand, the exaggerated demands of the German shipping lines would probably be a serious obstacle. I. G. Farben was in principle willing to give German shipping as much consideration as possible; however, the Rumanian Government for its part, too, demanded a share for Rumanian shipping. Moreover, the German shipping companies demanded an additional payment of 3.50 reichsmarks per ton from I. G. Farben for the goods transported on the grounds that their shipping rates were that much higher than the international shipping rates. If only half of the goods included under the compensation transaction were transported on German ships, that alone would mean a practical loss of 750,000 reichsmarks for I. G. Farben. This was unacceptable. The demands of the shipping lines were supported by the governments of Hamburg and Bremen and partly also by the Ministry of Transport; it would be necessary to work for a reduction of the demands through negotiations with the Ministry of Economics.

When Herr Schwarte remarked that in so far as the grain was destined to be sold on the world market the shipments would to a large extent go by way of Rotterdam, I asked that Antwerp, too, be considered as far as possible. Herr Schwarte said he would study the matter and if the result should be favorable, he promised to inform

<sup>2</sup> Rumanian Minister of Finance.

<sup>3</sup> Secretary General in the Rumanian Ministry of Commerce and Industries.

the Foreign Ministry so that we could use this sometime as a concession to the Belgian Government.

There is for the time being no further action to be taken by the Foreign Ministry. Herr Schwarte only asked for our good offices in case special difficulties should arise in the further discussions with the internal departments.<sup>4</sup>

BENZLER

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<sup>4</sup> Marginalia by Benzler dated Sept. 28 on a letter from I. G. Farben under the date of Sept. 21 indicate that the matter had been approved and that agreement had been reached also with respect to certain conditions upon which the Reichsbank had insisted (9698/E682907-10).

## No. 415

9696/E682704-05

### *Minute by an Official of the Economic Department*

SECRET

BERLIN, September 5, 1933.  
e. o. II Balk. Rum. 1614 Ang. 2.

### SUPPLEMENT TO TODAY'S MEMORANDUM ON A GERMAN-RUMANIAN COMPENSATION TRANSACTION

Herr Schwarte also told me in strict confidence that in order to bring about the compensation transaction I. G. Farben had made available the following amounts:

250,000 reichsmarks to the Rumanian Government "for party purposes";

125,000 reichsmarks to the National Socialist party of Rumania (Tatarescu) at the special request of the Legation.

Herr Brandsch had also made it known that he was counting on subsidies.<sup>1</sup> The request would be granted on a modest scale.

Finally, I. G. Farben had supplied our Legation with an additional amount of 125,000 reichsmarks for the purpose of exerting influence on the press and on persons who might come into consideration for the promotion of German-Rumanian economic relations.

BENZLER

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 395.



## No. 416

6115/E454730-32

*Memorandum by an Official of Department II*

SEPTEMBER 5, [1933].

e. o. II Oe. 1339.

Herr Habicht, who had requested a conference with the State Secretary, was received by him today in the presence of the undersigned.

Herr Habicht informed us that he had received the report from an absolutely reliable source that negotiations between Austria and Italy about a military convention were about to be concluded. In this convention, Italy undertook, in the event of an invasion of Austrian territory by regular or irregular troops or organizations from the Reich, to occupy the Innsbruck-Salzburg line militarily at once. Herr Habicht added that he had no doubt as to the correctness of this report.<sup>1</sup> The question was how we could exploit the knowledge of these negotiations. The fact that Italy showed by these negotiations how one-sidedly she interpreted Austrian independence could later on be exploited by us, in the sense that it showed who really bore the principal share of the guilt in a policy that was possibly disastrous for Austria. He also wondered if it would not be advisable to make this matter public now, or, at least, to hint in Rome that we knew what was up.

The State Secretary pointed out that the authenticity of the information was further corroborated by reports about Mussolini's attitude on the Austrian question, which had come to us from Hungarian quarters.<sup>2</sup> From these it appeared that Mussolini was actually very much concerned over the rumors of an early invasion of Austria by the so-called Austrian Legion allegedly established in Bavaria, and that he was determined to prevent such an operation with all the means at his command. The State Secretary emphasized that it did not seem to him expedient to give publicity to Mussolini's attitude and intentions in this matter, since circles in Paris and London that were opposed to Anschluss would only derive from it renewed hope of winning Italy over to intervention of some sort in the German-Austrian

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<sup>1</sup> The German Military Attaché, Lieutenant General Muff, in a lengthy report sent on Sept. 14, referred to information coming from the Austrian War Ministry, to the effect that the Austrian Military Attaché in Rome had been called to Vienna in a hurry "in order to receive instructions to negotiate with Italy about conclusion of a military convention for the protection of the Tirolian border against an invasion from Germany." (5705/E414185-98)

<sup>2</sup> On Aug. 30, the Hungarian Minister told Neurath that he had been instructed to inform the German Government that Kánya, on his recent visit to Rome, had noticed Mussolini's great anger over the aggravation of the Austro-German conflict. "Herr Kánya furthermore has learnt from an authentic source, that, if National Socialist propaganda should continue, Mussolini would not hesitate to break with Germany, even though this would be difficult for him, given the great importance which he attaches to maintaining good relations with Germany." (6115/E454725-28)

dispute. Nor did he consider it expedient to bring the matter up for discussion in any form in Rome, since in this way the matter might also become known in Paris and London, perhaps quite contrary to Mussolini's wishes. The State Secretary again in this connection pointed out to Herr Habicht the necessity of avoiding anything that might be interpreted as support by the Reich of a Putsch in Austria. It was to be considered whether the Austrians assembled in the Lechfeld camp could not be distributed over several camps in central and northern Germany. Their very removal from the proximity to the Austrian border would have a reassuring effect abroad.

Herr Habicht promised to have this matter studied by the responsible authorities. He expressed optimism, moreover, about developments in the Austrian question. Sentiment against the Dollfuss Government was becoming more and more unfavorable. Even now the situation was such that only with the greatest difficulty could the Austrian National Socialists be restrained from striking at once. He considers the dispatching of Rintelen to Rome<sup>3</sup> a sign that Mussolini has come to realize that he cannot hold the Dollfuss Government much longer. Mussolini, who had himself probably asked that Rintelen be sent, obviously wished in this way to establish the closest contact with the presumable successor of Dollfuss.

HEEREN

<sup>3</sup>The appointment of Anton Rintelen, Governor of Styria, to the post of Austrian Minister in Italy had been officially announced on Aug. 29. In a dispatch of Sept. 10 which dealt with this appointment, Rieth stated that "Rintelen, as may be known to you, conducted negotiations with Habicht when the latter was still in Austria, with the aim of getting National Socialist participation in a government of which he himself would be the Federal Chancellor. Moreover, since that time, he has never completely given up contact with the National Socialists here." Rieth mentioned also the fact that "Rintelen, according to the ideas of important National Socialists here, is the heir apparent as Federal Chancellor with whom they want to form a cabinet after the present regime has been overcome if the occasion should arise." (8655/E605935-39)

See also document No. 497.

## No. 417

6601/E495064

### *Minute by the State Secretary*

SEPTEMBER 6, 1933.

zu IV Po. 6456.<sup>1</sup>

It must be carefully considered *whether* we will let the Danzig-Polish quarrel revive, and *when* this should be done, before or after

<sup>1</sup>e. o. IV Po. 6456: Not printed (6601/E495059-63). This is a memorandum of Sept. 5 by Hey, to which this handwritten minute by Bülow is a commentary. Hey's memorandum dealt with direct negotiations which had been taking place between Danzig and Poland on increased use of the port of Danzig by Poland and on questions concerning the Polish minority in Danzig. Hey had expressed concern lest Danzig make too extensive concessions to Poland in order to reach agreement. Agreements between Poland and Danzig were reached on both these subjects on Sept. 18.

the meeting of the League Assembly. The German-Polish and Danzig-Polish relaxation of tension has made a very great and generally favorable impression in the world. The longer it lasts the better. On the other hand neither we nor the Danzigers can let ourselves be swindled by the Poles. If Poland believes she can take liberties with us or Danzig as a result of our international isolation we must intervene, since our compliance would encourage other countries to similar conduct.

Therefore it seems advisable to me to warn the Danzig Senate Council, utilizing these general considerations.<sup>2</sup>

BÜLOW

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<sup>2</sup> Marginal notes: "Also my opinion. v. N[eurath], Sept. 9."

"The matter will be discussed with Herr Rauschning when he is here on Sept. 13. M[eyer], Sept. 13."

## No. 418

8115/E580005-10

### *The Chargé d'Affaires of the Embassy to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

No. 200

ROME, September 6, 1933.

II Vat. 391.

Subject: Reich Concordat.

With reference to my telegraphic communication.<sup>2</sup>

I have the honor to send you enclosed herewith a "Short Note on a Discussion on September 5, 1933," handed to me today by the Cardinal Secretary of State.

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<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Note. Herr Hüffer, to whom this report was given personally on Sept. 9 by Herr Klee in my behalf, submitted a copy of the enclosure in a private letter to Ministerialdirektor Buttman (Reich Ministry of Interior) by reason of his concern in the matter. Herr Hüffer informed Herr Klee by telephone on Sept. 9 that it had been proposed to send Herr Buttman in about 10 days to Rorschach, where the Cardinal Secretary of State will soon be spending his leave, in order to negotiate there with Cardinal Pacelli about the questions of interpretation. For the files, M[en]sh[ausen], Sept. 11."

In a letter of Sept. 18 to Ambassador Bergen (8125/581721-22), Menshausen stated that Buttman had asked to be received at Rorschach on Sept. 22. See document No. 501.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram No. 59 of Sept. 5, not printed (8115/E579981).

In explanation of his understanding of the concept "German ecclesiastical academic institutions" [*Deutsche kirchliche akademische Lehranstalten*] (p. 2, line 13, of enclosure<sup>3</sup>) the Cardinal Secretary of State referred to footnote 2 to article VII of the Baden Concordat (*Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, No. 7, of April 7, 1933, p. 184), "The words, 'ecclesiastical college' (*alta scuola ecclesiastica*), shall be understood to mean both diocesan institutions and institutions of Orders and of Congregations of the religious."<sup>4</sup>

KLEE

[Enclosure]

#### SHORT NOTE ON A DISCUSSION ON SEPTEMBER 5, 1933

In one of our recent conversations I had the opportunity of bringing up disquieting reports that had reached me from various parts of the German Reich, especially from southern Germany, concerning government actions against the Catholic clergy, the Catholic press and Catholic organizations. Subsequent reports have unfortunately confirmed the previous ones and my anxieties.

The above-mentioned reports show that not only are there differences of opinion or uncertainties about the meaning of Concordat provisions<sup>5</sup> which in accordance with article 33, paragraph 2, might safely be left to a future exchange of views for bringing about an amicable solution, but that unquestionably the basic views diverge on essential points, and that, above all, the Concordat has in practice been applied in a manner detrimental to the Catholic interests and contrary to the intention of the Holy See.

In these circumstances the Holy See considers it highly expedient, if not absolutely imperative, that a number of Concordat provisions be clarified and their practical application assured even before ratification. Among them the following points should be given special attention.

*Article 14, paragraph 2, 1 a-c:* Since according to reports received by the Holy See this paragraph is given an interpretation by the

<sup>3</sup> The reference is to the paragraph of the enclosure dealing with the text of article 14.

<sup>4</sup> The quotation from the footnote to the Baden Concordat is in Latin.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 371.

Government which, as compared with the assurances of the Länder Concordats, would severely restrict the freedom of pastoral work, it should be made clear (1) what the relationship of the paragraph is to the provisions of the Länder Concordats on the same matter; (2) whether the expressions "ecclesiastical office" and "pastoral or educational functions" include all the ordinary and also the extraordinary pastoral work, or apply only to the pastoral institutions endowed by the State; (3) which institutions are included under the definition, "German ecclesiastical academic institutions."

*Article 31:* It is urgently desirable that the list of Catholic organizations to be agreed upon under paragraph 3 of this article between the Reich Government and the German Episcopate and their assignment to group A (paragraph 1) or B (paragraph 2) be prepared and agreed on before ratification of the Concordat.

Assurances must then be provided for the right of the Catholic organizations to appear in public. A number of statements by government leaders as well as certain instructions to the Hitler Youth not to tolerate any other youth alongside of them on the street have given rise to the fear that the activity of the Catholic organizations might be limited to the church and church functions. The same applies for the same reason to the right of the Catholic organizations, especially the youth organizations, to continue as hitherto to carry on so-called minor sport.

Assurances should also be provided that the members of the Catholic organizations will not suffer any legal or economic discrimination on account of their membership. According to reports received by the Holy See the Catholic youth organizations are already threatened by severe discrimination and undermining through the decree of the Reich Jugendführer of July 29, according to which simultaneous membership of youths in Catholic and National Socialist organizations is forbidden. For a great many young Catholics feel that for professional and economic reasons they must belong to the latter. Consequently they are forced by this decree to leave the Catholic associations. In addition there are a number of other reports of discrimination against members of Catholic organizations in their economic situation or in school. If these occurrences are attributable only to subordinate authorities, it would be urgently desirable to make reparations for the abuses and regulate the jurisdictional questions even before ratification of the Concordat. The same applies to the confiscations and prohibitions to which the Catholic associations and organizations have been subjected in the last few months and which have not yet been revoked.

*Article 32:* The press controversies carried on in connection with this article make it urgently necessary in the opinion of the Holy See that the concepts and spheres of activity of party politics, politics in general and public life be defined in relation to each other.

*Final Protocol to Article 32, paragraph 2* (in connection with article 1, paragraph 1): Assurances must be provided for the right to proclaim and defend Catholic principles publicly and above all in the press. The *Fränkische Volksblatt*, for example, was prosecuted only because it had printed the passage on eugenics from the encyclical of Pius XI, *Casti connubii*. Likewise action was taken against Catholic clergymen in Württemberg, for example, allegedly only because they had recommended the Catholic press. For both cases and a number of similar ones the Holy See appeals to the provisions of the Concordat.

*To Article 23:* The Holy See is of the opinion that the concept of the Catholic denominational school also includes the right of the Church authority to exert an appropriate influence on the means of instruction (schoolbooks). It would be desirable to reach an agreement on the subject also before ratification.

If I have the most serious objections to proceeding with the ratification of the Concordat before the above-mentioned points and others have been clarified or definitively settled, I am unfortunately confirmed therein by a statement of the *National-Zeitung* on the recent Episcopal Conference at Fulda. According to the *Temps* the statement reads as follows: "We expect that the Episcopal Conference at Fulda will support the Concordat without reservation and not compromise this grand gesture of peace and reconciliation by petty claims unworthy of this historic document. That would be the case if, for example, the Episcopal Conference goes astray in tricks of interpretation as did the *Osservatore Romano* on certain points of the Concordat. It is to be hoped that the opinion of the Roman journal does not reflect the point of view either of the authoritative circles of the Curia or of the German Episcopate."<sup>6</sup>

If the French translation is a correct rendering of the German text, there is no doubt that the views of the Holy See and the German Government diverge considerably on the interpretation of the Reich Concordat. I wish to add explicitly, however, that the foregoing remarks are not intended for the purpose of evading ratification; the only object is to gain time for reaching an amicable agreement on the sense and implementation of the Concordat on those points that have an immediate and strongly practical effect.

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<sup>6</sup> The quoted passage is in French.

## No. 419

8125/E581703-04

*Memorandum by the Chargé d'Affaires of the Embassy  
to the Holy See*

ROME, September 7, 1933.

e. o. A 443.

The Cardinal Secretary of State, who gave a report to the Pope this morning, just handed me the enclosed memorandum<sup>1</sup> and told me that he could obtain the Pope's consent to immediate ratification if the German Government would issue this declaration.

I replied that all the points brought up in this declaration were already contained in the "Short Note" which I had transmitted to Berlin yesterday.<sup>2</sup> Consequently it should suffice if I merely forwarded the last section.<sup>3</sup>

The Cardinal Secretary of State, who at first expressed objections to this, dropped them after I had gone through the "Short Note" with him and ascertained that all points as well as the introductory sentences were in fact already set forth therein.

I asked him how he envisaged these consultations, and he replied that he thereby meant first of all a study of his "Short Note" and of an official memorandum which he would send me as soon as possible as a supplement.<sup>4</sup>

He then requested that a joint communiqué be issued after the prospective ratification had taken place, wherein a statement would be made to the effect that upon the entry into force of the Concordat the Reich Government would immediately enter into a friendly exchange of views with the Holy See about any differences of opinion that might exist. The reason for this request, he said, was that in the world press views and interpretations of the Concordat provisions had already been discussed which all too often were contradictory, without any pronouncement thereon having been made by the Curia.

K[LEE]

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (8125/E581705-06).

<sup>2</sup> Enclosure to document No. 418.

<sup>3</sup> The last section of the proposed declaration reads:

"The German Government is prepared to enter into consultations as soon as possible on these and other Concordat matters which in the opinion of the Holy See need to be clarified and definitively settled immediately in order to bring about an understanding that is genuinely in harmony with the letter and the spirit of the Concordat and will ensure a fruitful cooperation of Church and State." (8125/E581706)

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 425.

## No. 420

3170/676644

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, September 8, 1933.

The Italian Chargé d'Affaires visited me today, in order, by direction of his Government, to inform me about the Italo-Russian pact.<sup>1</sup> In accordance with his instructions, he stressed the fact that basically the pact contained nothing new; at any rate, nothing that would change relations between Italy and Russia. Second, he referred to Mussolini's speech in the Senate<sup>2</sup> on the interpretation of the Four Power Pact and pointed out that the agreement with Russia should guarantee the collaboration of the Soviet Union with the four Powers on such questions which must be dealt with jointly with Russia. The pact, as we knew, provided for such an extension to other Powers. Finally he asked me about our opinion of the Italo-Russian pact. I told him that we had always advocated that Russia take a part in European and world policy. Russia's isolation benefited no one. According to reports I had received, the pact, with the text of which I was, to be sure, not yet familiar, contained nothing new. I could only welcome the fact that it would help make Russia look with favor on the Four Power Pact.

BÜLOW

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 368, footnote 6.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 295, and footnote 2.

## No. 421

2860/562520-21

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, September 8, 1933.

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires called on me today accompanied by M. Weizer to complain about the development of German-Russian trade relations.<sup>1</sup> M. Weizer stated that, compared with the first 6-month period of 1932, Russian imports to Germany had dropped 44 percent, as against a total drop in German imports of only 13 percent. He pointed to the heavy losses which the Derop had suffered as a result of unauthorized encroachments and asserted that our agreement with Holland put Russia at a disadvantage precisely with respect to

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<sup>1</sup> Weizer had come to Berlin early in July to conduct trade talks with the appropriate German authorities. Documents relating to these discussions are filmed on serial 6688, especially frames H097488-504.



articles the export of which was important to Russia. He finally came to speak of the grain question in the tenor of the previous notes and letters to the Economics Ministry, and pointed to barter transactions of a "preferential type" which private interests had concluded with Hungary,<sup>2</sup> Rumania,<sup>3</sup> and Yugoslavia. In the further course of the conversation M. Weizer claimed to have knowledge of a Yugoslav order indicating that customs duties would be refunded on wheat exports to Germany, which virtually amounted to the according of preferential treatment. (I denied the existence of any such arrangements.) M. Weizer pointed out that the deficit of the Russian balance of payments would reach the sum of 520 million reichsmarks. Deducting the credit granted by us,<sup>4</sup> this would still leave a deficit of 380 million reichsmarks. He also complained that the Russian request to increase the 60 million blocked marks to 90 million had been denied. In conclusion he stated that the Russians had exhausted all their capabilities and were not going to make any new proposals for negotiations because they did not know what more they could propose. He complained of a lack of German accommodation, negative replies and evasive answers, and stressed that the development of German-Russian economic relations could not fail to excite the gravest concern. He indicated that he would in addition later submit his statements in writing.<sup>5</sup>

I replied that I had only recently spoken with the new chairman of the Russia committee<sup>6</sup> about the necessity of increasing the Derop business to make up for the losses incurred. Concerning the effects of the agreement with Holland and the question of the blocked marks, I could make no comments. As regards the grain deliveries and last year's agreement, our position (which I set forth in accordance with memorandum W IV Ru. 4037 ' ) was known. The Chargé d'Affaires replied that he could not agree with my position. We did not go further into the question after that. In conclusion I promised the Russians that I would take up the things about which the Russians were concerned with the competent officials in the Ministry and with the responsible departments.<sup>8</sup>

BÜLOW

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<sup>2</sup> See document No. 247.

<sup>3</sup> See documents Nos. 414 and 415.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. document No. 43 and footnote 7.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed (9387/E664685-89).

<sup>6</sup> This refers to the Russia Committee of German Business (Russland-Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft), an affiliate of the Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie, the national organization of German industry.

<sup>7</sup> Not found.

<sup>8</sup> See document No. 457.

## No. 422

8125/E581713-14

*Memorandum by the Chargé d'Affaires of the Embassy  
to the Holy See*

ROME, September 8, 1933.

The Cardinal Secretary of State asked me at 8 o'clock to see him immediately. He told me that an oral statement<sup>1</sup> was not enough for the Pope. I replied that owing to the lack of time it had not been possible to obtain the agreement of all the offices concerned and that consequently I was only authorized to give a written statement in the following form:

"The Reich Government is prepared, with respect to all Concordat matters which need to be clarified and definitively settled immediately . . ."<sup>2</sup>

Together we then worked out the following formulation, which takes account of both the position of the Holy See and that of the Reich Government:

"The German Government is prepared to enter into consultations as soon as possible on the Concordat matters set forth in the "Short Note on a Discussion on September 5, 1933,"<sup>3</sup> delivered by His Eminence the Cardinal Secretary of State, as well as on all those Concordat matters which need to be clarified and definitively settled immediately in order to bring about an understanding that is genuinely in harmony with the letter and the spirit of the Concordat and that will ensure a fruitful cooperation of Church and State."

The Cardinal Secretary of State reserved the approval of the Pope, and I reserved the approval of the Reich Government.<sup>4</sup>

Then the question of the joint communiqué was discussed (cf. No. 443<sup>5</sup> with reference thereto).

I transmitted the result of the conversation at 10 o'clock to Counselor Hüffer at his residence and reported on the communiqué by encoded telegram.<sup>6</sup>

K[LEE]

<sup>1</sup> Klee had been in communication with Berlin regarding the proposed statement during the course of the day and one suggestion had been that an oral statement be made (Klee's memoranda e. o. A 444, e. o. A 446, and e. o. A 447: 8125/E581708-12).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. document No. 419, footnote 3.

<sup>3</sup> Enclosure to document No. 418.

<sup>4</sup> Cardinal Pacelli on the following day informed Klee that the Pope was willing to agree to the statement in this form with the insertion of the word "likewise" (*gleichfalls*) following the words ". . . all those Concordat matters which . . ." Agreement was reached that this insertion be made (Klee memorandum of Sept. 9: 8125/E581716-19).

Prior to the ratification of the Concordat, Klee informed Cardinal Pacelli in writing that he had been authorized to make the statement with the agreed text (Klee's report No. 210 of Sept. 12: 8115/E580025).

<sup>5</sup> Document No. 419.

<sup>6</sup> Telegram No. 61 of Sept. 8 (8115/E580000).

[EDITORS' NOTE. The Concordat between the Holy See and the German Reich was signed by Pope Pius XI on September 9, and documents of ratification were exchanged between Cardinal Pacelli and Klee at 5:30 p. m. on September 10, 1933 (Klee's report No. 206 of September 11: 8115/E580016-17). The text as ratified is filmed as 8109/E579655-81, and that text, except for the secret annex, is in *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* of September 10, 1933, volume XXV, No. 14, pages 389-414; in *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1933, II, pages 679-690; and in *Raccolta di Concordati su materie ecclesiastiche tra la Santa Sede e le autorità civili*, edited by Angelo Mercati, volume II, pages 185-202.]

## No. 423

2406/510694-96

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, September 11, 1933.  
RM 1284.

The French Ambassador came to see me today in order to call attention to yesterday's festival in the Stadium and, as he said, without instruction from his Government, to protest against the portrayal of French soldiers in full uniform and against the text accompanying scene 9.<sup>1</sup> At the same time he expressed his concern over the effects of such provocative scenes and representations. He fully acknowledged that the speech of Propaganda Minister Dr. Goebbels had been peaceable and unobjectionable in every respect; but it was in crass contradiction with the above-mentioned scenes. M. Poncet spoke with concern about the increasing deterioration of Franco-German relations, which were heading for a dangerous crisis on account of the propaganda carried on in Germany. I called M. Poncet's attention to the speeches of the Chancellor in Munich and to yesterday's speech by Herr Goebbels—both speeches by the most responsible sources, clearly expressing Germany's will to peace. M. Poncet stated that not only in France but also in the rest of the world people harbored the greatest suspicion about the sincerity of the declarations of the German statesmen, to which I replied that we on our part saw in this suspicion hostility on the part of France and the other states not only toward understanding the new form of government but also toward recognizing the equality of rights of the German people in general. As for the propaganda, I pointed out that M. Poincaré, for

<sup>1</sup> On Sept. 10 there had been held in the Stadium a demonstration forming part of the "Festival of German Schools" promoted by the Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland.

example, had for years made an inflammatory speech against Germany every Sunday and that M. Herriot had followed in his footsteps. All attempts on our part to reach an understanding with France had been blocked by the rejection of France. Only recently the Chancellor had again in his speech at the Niederwald<sup>2</sup> declared that Germany was willing to reach an understanding with France. This declaration had not met with any response whatever in France. To me this showed that no understanding was desired there, and he should not be surprised if we acted accordingly. The assertion that we were preparing for a new war was nonsense. In France all the youth were already being given military training. The reference to the marching brown columns as an indication of the military rearmament of Germany was completely misleading, since they had no arms and were merely a party force, increasingly disciplined, to be sure, but militarily untrained.

M. Poncet then also brought up yesterday's speech by Vice Chancellor von Papen<sup>3</sup> and referred to the passage in which Herr von Papen is supposed to have said that His Most Christian Majesty Louis XIV had in his day allied himself with the Turks and M. Herriot was now seeking an alliance with the Bolsheviks, and asserted that in France they were very sensitive to such comparisons. I replied that I was surprised at such sensitiveness, for the mention of Louis XIV concerned a historical fact and in the case of M. Herriot it was a question of a factual observation that we could make.

M. Poncet then launched into long-winded complaints about the increasing chauvinism in Germany and the resulting dangers for the future. I replied that there was no question whatever of any chauvinism among us; that frame of mind was found only in France. Moreover, it was precisely France's attitude toward us that had promoted the change of feeling in Germany.

In conclusion the Ambassador emphasized once more that he did not wish to register any protest but had only wanted to point out the dangers of propaganda.

V. N[EURATH]

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<sup>2</sup> Hitler's speech at the Niederwald Monument on Aug. 27 was directed to the Germans of the Saar. Portions are printed in Baynes, *The Speeches of Adolf Hitler*, vol. II, pp. 1084-1086.

<sup>3</sup> On Sept. 10 Papen had delivered a speech in Berlin dealing with the Austrian question. Portions are printed in *Keessing's Contemporary Archives, 1931-1934*, p. 942.

## No. 424

8542/E597907-08

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Press Department*

BERLIN, September 11, 1933.

P 7705 II.

Drafting Officer: Consul General Crull.

From the very start the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* has fought the National Socialist Government most vigorously and has reported entirely one-sidedly about conditions in Germany. In many articles the German Government has been insulted without the newspaper being banned by Germany, since one wanted to give it time to change its view.

Since the newspaper contained a good deal of news from Germany which the German papers kept from their readers, its circle of subscribers in Germany has increased considerably during the last few months. Concern about losing them then led the paper gradually to adopt a more moderate attitude. However, it departed from this role with an article entitled "Impressions in Southern Germany" which appeared on August 30; since this article with its alleged factual material must necessarily create doubt and distrust toward the national idea and the German Government among many readers, the Reich Ministry of Interior wished to ban the newspaper for a considerable length of time. It was then agreed between the Press Department and the Ministry mentioned that the ban would be limited to 2 weeks.

Of the bourgeois papers, aside from the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, only the *Zürcher Volkszeitung* is still banned. This ban dates from the beginning of July, has no time limit, and was imposed for unusually violent defamation of members of the German Government. The Reich Ministry of Interior would be willing to lift the ban on this paper if a guarantee would be given that there will be no new defamation of the Government.

Of the other bourgeois papers, the *Basler Nationalzeitung* was recently banned for 2 weeks. This ban ended yesterday.

The Reich Ministry of Interior, according to information from there, cannot accede to a lifting of the ban on the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* before the time limit.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.<sup>1</sup>

ASCHMANN

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<sup>1</sup>The Swiss Minister discussed with Neurath on Sept. 11 the bans on Swiss newspapers. Neurath's statements to the Minister followed in general the line presented in this memorandum (Neurath memorandum RM 1290 of Sept. 12, 1933: 3015/592745-47).

## No. 425

8115/E580011-13

*The Chargé d'Affaires of the Embassy to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

ROME (Vat.), September 12, 1933—2:50 p. m.

No. 65 of September 12

Received September 12—4:50 p. m.

II Vat. 393.

On the occasion of the ratification the Cardinal Secretary of State handed me, as a supplement to the "Short Note,"<sup>1</sup> the memorandum that had been promised.<sup>2</sup> It contained three points: (1) Catholic associations, (2) Catholic press, (3) dismissal of Catholic officials and Catholics of Jewish descent. I told the Cardinal Secretary of State that I had been promised a memorandum on the implementation of the Concordat. Point (3), however, did not deal with any Concordat matter. Therefore I could accept only a memorandum on points (1) and (2). The Cardinal Secretary of State acknowledged that my objection was justified, had the memorandum rewritten and handed it to me in the abbreviated version containing only the first two points, which I have transmitted by mail.<sup>3</sup>

Then he asked me to accept a separate pro memoria on point three. It requested the reinstatement of Catholic officials and employees who because of a different political conviction and for reasons of conscience opposed the National Socialist movement, and in addition the same treatment of Catholics of Jewish descent as of Catholics of Aryan descent.<sup>4</sup>

I told him that the appointment of officials was an internal matter of the State and that only the national Government decides which officials it considers suitable to represent its interests. Giving Catholics of Jewish descent the same status as Catholics of Aryan descent was not possible, since the Jewish question was not a religious but a race problem. The Cardinal Secretary of State thereupon indicated that the pro memoria was delivered at the wish of the Pope, who was guided solely by religious and humanitarian points of view. I replied that even though I was willing to take this circumstance into consideration, I still had to insist that it be stated at the beginning that the Holy See had no intention of interfering in Germany's internal political affairs, that the sentence about equal status for

<sup>1</sup> Enclosure to document No. 418.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 419.

<sup>3</sup> Klee's letter of transmittal (8115/E580022) and the accompanying memorandum (8109/E579587-90) are not printed.

<sup>4</sup> This telegram was sent in two sections. The section from this point on was sent at 4:20 p. m. and received at 6:35 p. m. on Sept. 12.

Catholics of Jewish descent be deleted, and that there be a toning down in other respects, too. The Cardinal Secretary of State thereupon decided not to deliver the pro memoria. Tonight, however, I received the following note, stamped by the Secretariat of State under date of September 9, which takes my reservation into account:<sup>5</sup>

The Holy See has no intention of interfering in Germany's internal political affairs. It would like, however, now that a friendly understanding has been established with the Reich Government through the conclusion of the Concordat, to make the following request:

A great many Catholic officials and employees have, according to information received here, been dismissed from service and employment because it is feared that they are nationally unreliable. This applies especially to all those who up until the seizure of power by the National Socialist movement were opposed to it because they were of a different political conviction and because they felt obligated as Catholics, for reasons of conscience, to maintain reserve or aloofness with respect to the teachings of National Socialism. After the March declarations of the Reich Chancellor, and even more after the conclusion of the Concordat, practical cooperation in the new State was quite possible for them and they were in a high degree prepared for it. It is painful for the Holy See to have to note that these officials and employees suffer through being excluded, despite the fact that the obstacles to practical cooperation in the new State have been removed. It would contribute immensely to the friendly understanding between the Holy See and the Reich Government if the measures of the last few months mentioned here were reviewed and as far as possible rescinded or their harsh effects mitigated.

The Holy See takes this occasion to add a word in behalf of those German Catholics who themselves have gone over from Judaism to the Christian religion or who are descended in the first generation, or more remotely, from Jews who adopted the Catholic faith, and who for reasons known to the Reich Government are likewise suffering from social and economic difficulties.

KLEE

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<sup>5</sup> Klee transmitted the original note from the Papal Secretariat of State as an enclosure to his report No. 216 of Sept. 14 (8115/E580053-55). The text as transmitted in his telegram differed in a few minor particulars from the original.

A marginal note on Klee's report indicated that the Ministry of Interior had been informed of the note by a letter of Sept. 21 (II Vat. 409: 8115/E580035-39) and had been asked for its views.

The Ministry of Interior replied on Oct. 4 that a reply to the note seemed unnecessary as "the elimination from the civil service of persons who entered the public administration without the education and other qualifications, and the removal of persons who fail to offer assurance that they will at all times give unreserved support to the national State, is a measure which is in no wise related to confessional questions." (8115/E580056)

No. 426

3598/793688-93

*Minutes of the Conference of Ministers on September 12, 1933, at  
4:30 p. m.*

Rk. 11151;  
11152;  
11153;  
11154.

*Present:*

Reich Chancellor	Adolf Hitler
Vice Chancellor	von Papen
Foreign Minister	Freiherr von Neurath
Reich Minister of Interior	Dr. Frick
Reich Minister of Finance	Count Schwerin von Krosigk
Reich Minister of Economics	Dr. Schmitt
Reich Minister of Labor	Seldte
Reich Minister of Justice	Dr. Gürtner
Reichswehr Minister	von Blomberg
Reich Minister of Posts and Transport	Freiherr von Eltz-Rübenach
Reich Minister of Food and Agriculture	Darré
Reich Minister of Public En- lightenment and Propaganda	Dr. Goebbels
Reich Minister for Air and Prussian Minister President	Göring
Prussian Finance Minister	Dr. Popitz
President of the Reichsbank	Dr. Schacht
State Secretary in the Reich Chancellery	Dr. Lammers
State Secretary in the Office of the Reich President	Dr. Meissner
Reich Press Chief:	State Secretary Funk
Deputy Führer of the NSDAP	Hess
Recording Official:	Oberregierungsrat Dr. Thomsen

*Agenda:*

1. Report on the forthcoming session of the League of Nations Assembly in Geneva.
2. Germany's relations with the International Labor Organization.
3. Outside the agenda (Leuschner case).

*1. Report on the forthcoming session of the League of Nations Assembly in Geneva*



The Foreign Minister: The members of the League of Nations are convening soon for the regular annual assembly, in which he would participate. The first session of the League of Nations Council is set for September 22, 1933. At the League of Nations session this year special interest will be claimed by the minorities questions, which partly concern the fate of the German minorities, but will also partly be directed against the Reich Government. Attacks against the Reich Government on account of the handling of the Jewish question in Germany are to be expected. At this year's assembly, moreover, Germany's fundamental relationship with the International Labor Office will presumably come up for discussion. The various spheres of activity of the League of Nations are entrusted to special commissions. One of these commissions handles the refugee relief work organized by the League. It has been learned that proposals had been received in Geneva from Jewish committees that this relief be extended also to émigrés from Germany. If a discussion of that kind should develop, it will be stated by the German side that the refugees from Germany are free to return to Germany at any time. The only exceptions are those refugees who have been deprived of their citizenship. Moreover, it will be natural for the German representatives to point to the action of the Austrian Government in the same question.

According to the reports received by the Foreign Ministry the present mood in League of Nations circles in Geneva is especially unpleasant. Considerable propaganda resources are being employed so as to bring the Jewish question up for discussion in the Political Commission. Our counterpropaganda must not hesitate, for its part, to place the Jewish question in the foreground. In that connection account should be taken of the special position of the Jews in eastern Upper Silesia under the League of Nations agreement.<sup>1</sup> It has become known that the synagogue congregation in Gleiwitz is considering a complaint to the League. It will be asserted in the League Assembly that in Germany a disfranchised Jewish minority has been created which needs protection. In reply it will have to be emphasized that the quarrel with the German Jews is the Reich's own affair. In order to make our counterpropaganda as effective as possible the Reich Chancellor is requested to give his consent to having the Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda join the delegation as a member. In addition, the specialists in the Reich Ministry of Interior and in the Prussian Ministry of Interior are to be on call.

The accomplishments of the League of Nations have never before been so lacking in positive character as today. Nevertheless, it would

<sup>1</sup> The German-Polish Convention on Upper Silesia, signed at Geneva, May 15, 1922; for the text, see *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1922, II, p. 238.

be a mistake to yield to the opponent without a struggle the field afforded by the League of Nations for exerting political influence. The time for withdrawing from the League of Nations will probably come only with the complete collapse of the Disarmament Conference and after the definitive settlement of the Saar question. The Italian Government, too, in spite of its fundamentally antagonistic attitude to the League of Nations, has constantly and successfully used the League as a means to attain Italian political goals. However, if the League of Nations should take decisions that would be intolerable for vital German interests, the Reich Government will have to reserve the right to recall the German delegation from Geneva.<sup>2</sup>

### 2. *Germany's relations with the International Labor Organization*

The Reich Minister of Labor: During the plenary meeting of the League of Nations there will be a session of the Administrative Council of the International Labor Office, to which a German representative as a matter of course has to be sent. It is necessary to settle the question of how Germany's participation is now to be handled.<sup>3</sup> After a short discussion the Reich Chancellor decides that a representative of the Ministry of Labor (Ministerialdirektor Dr. Engel) is to be assigned to the German delegation to the League of Nations Assembly. This representative, however, is not to participate in the session of the Administrative Council of the International Labor Office but confine himself to observation only.

### 3. *Outside the agenda*

The Vice Chancellor brings up for discussion the fact that Leuschner, the former German representative on the Administrative Council of the International Labor Office, had been arrested a few months ago on his return from Geneva and was still in custody. From circles of the International Labor Office it had been reported that the release of Leuschner would be strongly welcomed there. The upshot of the discussion was that the release of Leuschenr could not be considered in any circumstances. The Minister of Interior will find out whether Leuschner is still in protective custody or is already in prison pending trial.

For points 1, 2, and 3  
of the minutes:  
THOMSEN

<sup>2</sup> In the files is a document identified in a marginal note by Völckers as "Report on the League of Nations session given by the Foreign Minister in the Cabinet on Sept. 12 prior to his departure." This version apparently was a briefing paper prepared for Neurath's appearance in the Cabinet on Sept. 12 (3147/-665446-52).

<sup>3</sup> At the International Labor Conference in June 1933, the Workers' group had refused to recognize the delegates from the German Labor Front and the Italian syndicates as workers' representatives. Thereupon the German delegation announced on June 19 that it would withdraw from the International Labor Conference.

## No. 427

6115/E454748

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, September 12, 1933.

II Oe. 1382.

At a conference that I had with the Reich Chancellor on another matter today,<sup>1</sup> the latter of his own accord brought up the Austrian question and told me that he intended to remove the Austrians quartered in the Lechfeld camp from proximity to the Austrian border and to quarter them elsewhere.<sup>2</sup>

Transmitted herewith to the Director of Department II through the State Secretary.

N[EURATH]

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. document No. 426.

<sup>2</sup> Under the date of Sept. 16, the Austrian Minister sent to the Foreign Ministry a note (6115/E454744-45) protesting the formation of an "Austrian Legion" on German soil and requesting the German Government to discontinue immediately the military training of this Austrian Legion. The Austrian note is printed as an enclosure to document No. 398 in *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. v. On the file copy is the following marginal note: "I informed the Austrian Minister yesterday, prior to receipt of this document, that the Austrians interned in the Lechfeld camp would be distributed over different labor camps. v. N[eurath], Sept. 16."

The official reply of the German Government was contained in a note of Sept. 21 (6115/E454750-53).

## No. 428

2860/562528

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, September 13, 1933.

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires, on the occasion of his visit today, brought up the point that it had come to his attention that the representatives of the Communist and Socialist press would not be permitted at the Reichstag fire trial at Leipzig. He requested me to find out whether this also applied to Russian representatives. His Government wished to send two representatives to Leipzig, one for the Tass Agency and one for *Izvestia* and to request that they be admitted to the trial. The exclusion of Russian representatives would constitute discrimination, which would be most displeasing to the Russian Government. He requested that we intervene so that the two Russian press representatives would be admitted.<sup>1</sup>

BÜLOW

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<sup>1</sup> In a memorandum by Völckers on Sept. 19 it was noted that word had come from the Reich Chancellery "that the Reich Chancellor has expressed himself against the admission of the Soviet press representatives, even the Tass representative." (9465/E667494)

This decision was communicated to the Soviet Embassy by the Propaganda Ministry. The Soviet Embassy lodged a protest in a note verbale of Sept. 20 (9447/E666684), to which the Counselor of the Soviet Embassy added his representations orally (Meyer memorandum of Sept. 20: 9447/E666688). These representations were rejected (draft note to Counselor of Soviet Embassy, 9447/E666685-87).

## No. 429

9151/E643889-45

*The Minister in Czechoslovakia to the Foreign Ministry*

A. III. 1. b. 8.

PRAGUE, September 13, 1933.

Received September 15.

II Ts. 1092.

## POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Conversation with Krofta on relations between Czechoslovakia and Germany.

The daily arrests and punishments of National Socialists<sup>1</sup> and the mounting tension between Czechs and Germans, as well as the increasing nervousness of the Sudeten Germans, made it seem advisable to me to call at the Castle. I used Krofta's return from leave for that purpose.

At the beginning I emphasized that today I was not coming on instructions of my Government. It was therefore only a question of a personal contact which was in no way to prejudge any official steps that might be taken later. The question that preoccupied me day and night was: What aim does Czechoslovakia pursue with the course she is following against Germany? Almost every day Germans—Reich Germans and Sudeten Germans—were being sentenced to imprisonment for no other reason than that they were National Socialists or were in contact with National Socialists in the Reich, always with the stereotyped explanation that the Reich German National Socialism had as its aim the separation of parts of Czechoslovakia; therefore anyone who was a National Socialist or established contact with National Socialists was guilty of complicity in a crime against the integrity of Czechoslovakia! How could it conscientiously be maintained in such circumstances that entry into Czechoslovakia was safe for Reich Germans! In any case, it was not so for National Socialists, and the overwhelming majority of Reich Germans were today National Socialists!

On the other hand, every liar, every forger, every hater of Germany found in this country an asylum, a field of operation from which he could spew undisturbed his venom into Germany! When the Ger-

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<sup>1</sup> On Aug. 21, Koch had reported on new intensification of measures taken by the Czechoslovak Government against the "nationality conscious Sudeten German element." He mentioned the refusal by the Government to confirm German burgomasters in their offices if they were members of the National Socialist or German National party; arrests of members of student organizations in Moravia after police searches in homes had uncovered SA uniforms and membership cards showing Hitler's picture; arrests of officials and editors of the National Socialist party and press (9127/E641952).

man people are described every day in the newspapers here as assassins, arsonists, Huns, and cutthroats, there is no censor to put a stop to these activities directed against a neighboring state with which correct relations were allegedly desired! Czechoslovakia had by now become the center from which the hate propaganda against Germany was being carried on. Through this propaganda the hatred within the Czech and the Leftist German circles was at the same time raised to a white heat. In this connection I presented as an illustration the latest issue of the widely circulated *A. I. Z.* published here, on the title page of which the Prussian Minister President—8 days before the trial in Leipzig begins!—is vilely represented as the originator of the Reichstag fire.

The principal strain on the mutual relations of the two states, however, was still to come. On October 2 the Supreme Court would pronounce its decision in the *Volkssport* trial.<sup>2</sup> Would it uphold the verdict of the court of the first instance? One ought for heaven's sake to realize that in the period between the two verdicts the political prospect had changed completely. When the verdict of the court of the first instance was pronounced, it was directed in its statements on National Socialism against one party among many in the Reich; if the verdict of the court of the second instance should today concur in these statements, it would direct them against the entire German people, against the entire administration of the Reich, against the entire Reich Government! It would be imputed to the Reich Government and the German nation that one of their aims was the forcible separation of areas of Czechoslovakia. Surely, this was not going to be maintained seriously! Otherwise one ought to have the courage of consistency and break off diplomatic relations; for their primary prerequisite was the recognition of and respect for the mutual boundaries.

What, then, was the basis of the assumption that the National Socialists wanted to detach a part of Czechoslovakia by force? The party program, which spoke of a union of the Germans beyond the border with Germany. There was no question of any union "by force." The party program was at least 10 years old, coming therefore from a period in which the Wilsonian idea of the minorities' right of self-determination was still reverberating among all peoples. That was the origin of the whole statement. Since when did they take party programs so literally and seriously in Czechoslovakia? After all, it was very well known that they were designed for remote effect, were crudely hewed with the axe, and were intended for the

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 326, footnote 2. Actually, the Supreme Court decision was issued on Oct. 7. Fundamentally, it upheld the verdict of the lower court even though it reduced the sentences of some of the defendants.

gallery. One should perhaps look through the programs of the parties which today form the Czechoslovak Government and nail down the demands which these parties have quietly left behind them as long as they bear the responsibility for the state.

Over against all this picking to pieces of programs, however, were the Reich Chancellor's calm and definite declarations, made before the whole world, that Germany wants to live in peace with all nations and not curtail the rights of any state. Could it be that the court intended to ignore these clear utterances? Or would it perhaps fall into the subaltern way of thinking of some newspapers, here, which confronted the decisive policy statements of the responsible Chancellor with opinions expressed by some subordinate official on some occasion or other?

To me it seemed an inescapable necessity to consider once more all the consequences before such a verdict went out into the world and wrought disaster.

Nor was it a valid argument to say that the Sudeten Germans had to be protected from the spirit of the Third Reich. Only yesterday I had talked with the leader of the Sudeten German National Socialists and could with a good conscience state as my impression that not one of the Sudeten German parties was gravitating toward the other side of the border. All of them accepted this state as a basis and were prepared for practical cooperation. If here and there along the border a few young people in despair as a result of years of unemployment should cross over and try to get into the SA or one of the labor camps, that should be attributed to the real reasons: youthful romanticism, craving for action, hunger; and the poor fellows should not be barred from every chance of returning to their homeland.

In short, I had to revert to the 10 Reich Germans in Asch,<sup>3</sup> who, incomprehensibly, had been sentenced to imprisonment on account of participation in an election meeting in Germany. The court of second instance had, moreover, declared their expulsion permissible. I repeated, I could not believe that these people, who after all had atoned for the crimes they had allegedly committed, would now subsequently be driven from house and home, from their positions and shops and into want. What was to be gained thereby? Did they think that the Reich would calmly put up with these expulsions? Was not the possibility considered at all that Czechoslovakia would in return, likewise by way of expulsion, receive 10 or 20 or 30 of her people who would be considerably more troublesome to her politically and economically than those intimidated Reich Germans in Asch and Cheb?

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<sup>3</sup> See document No. 326 and footnote 1.

Since he was not prepared for these statements, Minister Krofta was naturally somewhat at a loss as to what to reply. He, too, often wondered where the worsening of the mutual relations would end. But for the present he saw no way out. The basic political views of the two countries were as irreconcilable as fire and water. Democracy, the ideal of Czechoslovakia, was daily besmirched in Germany by official and other authorities and dragged in the dirt, as were also the Social Democrats, who had a large circle of followers here and participated in the Government. This was resisted, and rightly so in his opinion. One was determined to keep the spirit of the Third Reich away from Czechoslovakia by all available means. If Beneš were to inaugurate any mitigation of this course, the majority of the voters here would turn against him in extreme rage. They were only waiting to be able to accuse him of not having courage to stand up to Germany. They were already saying that he had been badly fooled at the time by Stresemann, and in fact, after the unfortunate publication of the diaries of Stresemann, he had been bitterly disappointed in him. However much he was inclined not to question the good intentions of Hitler, he would not want to experience a second disappointment in him; that would be fatal to him. Moreover, people here could not convince themselves of the homogeneity of the National Socialist movement in Germany. The moderate statements of Hitler were balanced by the countless daily demonstrations in word and deed with which Reich German National Socialism showered Czechoslovakia along the borders and which one could not dismiss as easily as I tried to do. The example of Austria was a tremendous warning to Czechoslovakia. At times he, too, could not escape the painful thought that diplomatic relations between the two countries could hardly be maintained in the long run if things continued as they were, and the Government here was deeply grateful to the German Foreign Ministry and Legation, which had hitherto avoided taking the ultimate step. If one wanted to make complaints against the other, Czechoslovakia probably had more grounds for protests than Germany. He would merely recall the case of Walter Tschuppik.<sup>4</sup> In Czechoslovakia, every person arrested was tried within a few weeks before a regular court; Tschuppik, on the other hand, had been under arrest for more than 6 months without knowing why and without being brought before a regular judge. What right had I to intercede so vigorously in behalf of the 10 Reich Germans in Asch who were to be expelled? Their expulsion was based on a court judgment, whereas 291 Czechoslovaks had recently been expelled from Germany through administrative procedures, for precisely the same reason as

<sup>4</sup> Tschuppik, a Czechoslovak citizen and editor of a Munich newspaper, had been arrested after National Socialism came into power.

that present in the case of the Reich Germans of Asch—namely because their basic political ideology was outlawed in the country where they were guests.

To be sure, the Sudeten German National Socialists were at the moment perfectly tractable. But previously they had talked differently. And there was no guarantee that their conversion was lasting.

In Czechoslovakia one had the vague feeling that sooner or later there would be a powerful outward explosion in Germany and that the first impetus of such an explosion would vent itself in a fearful manner against Czechoslovakia. I replied that this "vague feeling" could be accounted for only by complete ignorance of the Third Reich. The subsequent fear, on the other hand, that in such an event Czechoslovakia would receive the hardest and first blow was fully justified. She would have herself to blame for that, because she had, of her own free will, made herself a glacis from which all the guns of hate were firing.

I repeated that I could indeed conceive of a certain lessening of tension. If the Czechoslovak Government would decide to curb the émigrés and the hate propaganda, then it would also be possible to put a stop to the daily attacks which National Socialism was broadcasting across the border into Czechoslovakia. Krofta shrugged his shoulders nervously, but thanked me warmly for the visit and asked that it be repeated soon.

I am enclosing the first draft <sup>5</sup> of the decision on the appeal in the Volkssport trial, which fell into my hands as the result of an indiscretion and which shows clearly that the sentence of the first instance will be upheld.<sup>6</sup>

DR. KOCH

<sup>5</sup> Not printed (9151/E643846-70).

<sup>6</sup> In a letter sent on Sept. 20, Köpke told Koch that he had shown this "exceedingly interesting and detailed report" to Bülow, and that the latter subsequently sent a copy to Neurath in Geneva, since "perhaps there is an opportunity there for exerting influence on Beneš to the same effect." (9151/E643872-74)

## No. 430

2406/510703-07

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, September 15, 1933.  
RM 1302.

This morning the Reich Chancellor received the French Ambassador in my presence.<sup>1</sup> The latter expressed to the Reich Chancellor

<sup>1</sup> In a memorandum of Aug. 16 Dieckhoff had recorded that, at a conversation the previous evening, François-Poncet spoke sorrowfully of the deterioration of Franco-German relations in recent months and remarked that he himself had



his concern about the deterioration of German-French relations and mentioned in that connection among other things the complaint he had also advanced to me, concerning the "Strassburg" standard in Kehl<sup>2</sup> and the appearance of French soldiers in the Stadium last Sunday.<sup>3</sup> The Reich Chancellor replied to the French Ambassador that the blame for the deterioration in German-French relations certainly did not lie with us. He himself had constantly given assurance since taking over the Government that he was far from having any warlike intentions of any sort against France. This already followed from the National Socialist ideology, which was racial in nature and rejected the oppression or assimilation of foreign nations or their nationals. He was forced to note, however, that in France they did not believe his statements. M. Poncet explained this by the propagandist utterances, often contradictory to the Chancellor's statements, made by prominent National Socialist party members, and by the SA and SS men who were appearing in increasing numbers. The Chancellor said thereupon that if he had had the intention to arm the SA and organize it as a troop with military training he would have given it a different uniform and would not let it appear so openly at all opportunities as it did. This was a party troop and militarily valueless. He had armed only 1,000 SS men, but on the other hand had dismissed 6,000 men from the police owing to former membership in the *Reichsbanner*, etc. These 1,000 men were a bodyguard for him and the other leaders of the National Socialist party. He could only repeat that he had no greater desire than to eliminate the differences that still existed between France and Germany and bring about a good understanding between the two nations. He could not imagine any finer memorial for himself than if it should later be said of him that he had brought about a German-French rapprochement. He

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Footnote (1)—Continued

"practically no opportunity to reach the Reich Chancellor and his intimate circle in order to create a more friendly atmosphere for France; his attempt at the end of July to meet the Chancellor informally in Bayreuth had completely foundered." Neurath had added the marginal comment, to this statement, that he would try to bring Hitler and François-Poncet together when the Reich Chancellor returned to Berlin, but that Hitler "did not take to François-Poncet's arrogant manner" (5669/H014152-53). When, on the occasion of the Conference of Ministers on Sept. 12, Neurath suggested to Hitler that he receive François-Poncet, Hitler declined to do so (memorandum by Völckers of Sept. 13: 2406/510699), but on the next day after François-Poncet made a personal démarche at the Reich Chancellery Hitler agreed to a meeting on Sept. 15 at 11 a. m. (memorandum by Völckers of Sept. 13: 2406/510700).

<sup>2</sup> François-Poncet in an interview with Neurath on Sept. 14 had protested against the SA Standarte at Kehl being presented with a standard inscribed "Strassburg" by Hitler at the Nazi Party Congress at Nuremberg. Neurath's memorandum of the interview is filmed on 2406/510703-04.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 423, footnote 1.

could furthermore state that for us there was no Alsace-Lorraine question at all. We had had our experience with the Alsatians and Lorrainers for 50 years and the French were cordially welcome to them. Moreover the question was after all settled by the Locarno Treaty. As for the transfer of the "Strassburg" standard to the "Kehl" standard, mentioned by the French Ambassador, he could tell him that this had already been withdrawn. It had merely been meant in remembrance of the many former members of the 139th Infantry Regiment formerly garrisoned in Strasbourg who lived in Kehl and its vicinity. He himself had not noticed the matter in Nuremberg. However, as stated, he had now already withdrawn the transfer since the matter had become known.

Since the French Ambassador's sole answer to the Chancellor's far-reaching offer for a German-French rapprochement consisted in pointing to the great sensitivity of the French toward everything that happened in Germany, I intervened in the discussion and told M. Poncet that I wanted to ask him to stress in his report to Paris on this conversation the great seriousness and the good intentions of the Reich Chancellor toward France. I had to repeat what I had already told him during our conversation yesterday, that in contrast to the repeated efforts on the German side to reach a friendly arrangement of Franco-German relations the French side had never even made the attempt to arrive at such a solution. Instead they complained about trifles which they blew up unnecessarily, and then they were surprised afterward when the feeling both east and west of the Rhine became worse. The blame for such a deterioration was entirely the French Government's. I expected, however, that now on the basis of this conversation they would not doubt our good will any longer in Paris, and I hoped that the effect of the Ambassador's report would already be noticeable at my conversations with M. Paul-Boncour in Geneva. Should this not be the case I would have to assume, and would also state this publicly when an opportunity offered, that the French Government simply did not want an understanding with Germany.

In answer to this the French Ambassador only referred once more to the French sensitivity.

## No. 431

7467/H178798-800

*The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

No. 210 of September 16

ROME, September 16, 1933—11:45 p. m.

Received September 17—3:50 a. m.

II F Abr. 2936.

With reference to my telegram No. 207 of September 6.<sup>1</sup>

Today Suvich asked me to call on him and stated that he could now tell me more about the concrete proposals announced at the time, which had recently been discussed with Chambrun. At the start he had to observe that during this discussion France had so far not displayed a very accommodating attitude and from the impressions gained here one would have to reckon with strong French resistance in the disarmament negotiations. Mussolini, who continued to view the prospects of the Conference with the greatest skepticism, was of the opinion that one must now put an end to fruitless debate and come to practical results as quickly as possible, even though in the initial stage this did not yet satisfy everyone. The agreement to be concluded would have to be a point of departure for general disarmament of the highly armed states. Unfortunately the time had today not yet arrived for such a step, and therefore one had to insert an interim period of several years during which no rearming would be permitted except for certain concessions to Germany. The projected rest pause would, it was to be hoped, lead to a general political relaxation of tension, so that after it was over one could proceed to real disarmament with a good prospect of success.

The Italian proposals that Suvich read to me from his memorandum comprise the following points:

1. Immediate abolition of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Destruction of factories and all stockpiles within 2 years.
2. Prohibition of air bombardment against the civilian population.
3. Reduction and standardization of the effectives of the land army according to the English proposal.
4. The commitment of highly armed states not to increase their land and air armaments during a certain period of time and not to exceed their present army budget.
5. The commitment of highly armed states after the passage of the above-mentioned trial period (not less than 4 years) to proceed to the effective disarmament of offensive weapons.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram (7360/E537297-98) was an interim reply to Bülow's telegram No. 216 of Sept. 4 (document No. 413) and relayed statements of Suvich concerning recent talks with the French Ambassador on the disarmament question.

6. Germany's right to strengthen her defensive weapons in stages and on the basis of special agreements (*per tappe e per accordi*).

7. Regulation of the question of supervision in accordance with our standpoint as expressed in the Henderson memorandum.<sup>2</sup>

8. A permanent disarmament commission in accordance with the earlier agreement accepted by Germany.

9. Regulation of naval disarmament only after termination of the Washington Convention.<sup>3</sup>

10. A new conference after passage of the trial period (not before 4 years) in order to usher in the second period of disarmament.

Suvich remarked that with respect to these proposals, which were also being transmitted to the English Embassy here,<sup>4</sup> it was naturally only a matter of creating a basis for negotiations and not anything definitive. Chambrun had been very skeptical in regard to disarmament concessions to Germany, particularly when his question as to the size of German air forces received the reply that Germany would have to be granted a suitable number of airplanes for reconnaissance purposes. So far he is still without instructions from Paris. Evidently the French do not want to answer before the discussions with Eden and Norman Davis have been concluded.<sup>5</sup> It was still not certain whether these two would also come to Rome. At any rate no announcement to this effect had been made as yet. The English Chargé d'Affaires considers it improbable that Eden will come, as the time is too short.

I maintained a noncommittal attitude on the whole with respect to Suvich's statements and only pointed (group garbled) to yesterday's statements of the Foreign Minister on the disarmament question.<sup>6</sup> Suvich told me that the speech had made an excellent impression here.

SMEND

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 370.

<sup>3</sup> Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament, signed at Washington, Feb. 6, 1922; see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1922*, vol. i, pp. 247-270.

<sup>4</sup> See *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. v, documents Nos. 395 and 396.

<sup>5</sup> Eden went to Paris for talks with the French on Sept. 18, and then returned to London to report to the Cabinet. He and Sir John Simon were back in Paris on Sept. 22 for further talks with the French, followed that same day by a French-British-American meeting at the Quai d'Orsay. Norman Davis, the principal American representative at the meeting, had been in Paris since Sept. 18. Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933*, vol. i, pp. 211-232, and *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. v, documents Nos. 399, 406, and 407.

<sup>6</sup> This refers to Neurath's foreign policy statement to representatives of the foreign press on Sept. 15. For a published text, see Karl Schwendemann, *Abrüstung und Sicherheit* (Berlin, n. d.), vol. ii, pp. 440-450.

## No. 432

5966/E438467

*The Ambassador in France to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 719 of September 18

PARIS, September 18, 1933.

Received September 18—11:00 p. m.

II Ung. 571.

With reference to my telegram No. 712 of September 16.<sup>1</sup>

From a conversation with Kánya I gained the impression that greater importance has to be attached to his talk with the Minister President than to the one he had with Paul-Boncour. Daladier in a manner not to be misunderstood emphasized to Kánya the French Government's wish that Hungary meet with understanding the ideas of M. Beneš aiming at a political truce of God for a number of years; in this connection the French Government would be prepared, in case the Beneš proposal should be accepted, to support certain Hungarian wishes, as for example with regard to military questions, with the Little Entente and especially Czechoslovakia. According to Kánya's statement, he did not leave Daladier in any doubt that Hungary must decline to undertake commitments that would lead to a pause, even only for a few years, in the struggle for revision of the frontiers and the protection of Hungarian minorities in the detached areas. Daladier had to realize that any government that entered into such proposals would be overthrown at once.

The conversation seems to have ended with both men agreeing that a practical realization of Beneš' proposal and thus fulfillment of the French wishes was impossible.

KÖSTER

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<sup>1</sup> This telegram reported that Kánya had informed Köster "entirely confidentially" about the background of his visit to Paris, Sept. 15-18, which he characterized as an act of courtesy in view of the earlier visits by Hungarian statesmen in Rome and Berlin. Kánya had also reported specifically on his conversations with Foreign Minister Paul-Boncour and Minister President Daladier; Kánya had told the French statesmen that the Tardieu plan was not feasible and that Hungary would not accept the proposal made by Beneš for a political truce as a preliminary condition for a Czechoslovak-Hungarian commercial treaty. (5966/E438464-66)

## No. 433

3154/669802-04

*State Secretary Bülow to Foreign Minister Neurath*

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, September 18, 1933.

DEAR HERR VON NEURATH: As I believe I have already told you, former State Secretary Schäffer <sup>1</sup> has gone to London in the matter of

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<sup>1</sup> Hans Schäffer, State Secretary in the Finance Ministry, 1931-1932.

the Kreuger liquidation.<sup>2</sup> Prior to this he asked me for instructions to guide his conversation in case Norman Davis, with whom he would meet on Kreuger matters, should speak to him about disarmament questions. I gave Herr Schäffer a number of general anti-French arguments. Herr Schäffer returned from London yesterday evening and this morning he told me the following:

Norman Davis had not spoken to him at all about the disarmament question, but Allen Dulles had. The latter had even very emphatically pressed the unwilling Schäffer to a special meeting. To be sure, we are already acquainted with Dulles, particularly from the last Norman Davis visit in Berlin.<sup>3</sup> He is more intelligent than Davis, clearer and more objective, and in this case, too, he was very well informed. The enclosed memorandum<sup>4</sup> gives particulars about his statements regarding the instructions of Norman Davis.

In the course of the discussion on a subject with which he is not familiar, Schäffer could not avoid intimating that certain points of view which he expressed originated with me. Allen Dulles understood this very well and this encouraged him to ask Schäffer to submit three questions to me which, however, had to be answered at once in view of the Paris conversations with Eden.<sup>5</sup>

1. If control commissions should come into being, was it our desire to exclude the neighboring countries from carrying out the control or were we willing to admit French members of a control commission?

2. (Neither Schäffer nor I understand this.) Could the nonincrease of the armies be achieved by prohibiting an extension of the period of service and by prohibiting the numerical increase of the army?

3. What should be done about air disarmament if there should be a period of armament standstill without increase in material? The wear and tear in the air force proceeded very fast, something which caused the Americans particular difficulties considering their inferiority with respect to Japan.

I listened to Herr Schäffer and, since he told me he had no opportunity to get a communication to Dulles in time, but on the other hand arranged with him that an unsigned letter was quite sufficient for these purposes, I sent the enclosed secret telegram<sup>6</sup> to Paris, which I request that you destroy after perusal.<sup>7</sup> In it I answered in the

<sup>2</sup> Ivar Kreuger, a Swedish financier, had organized the Swedish Match Company and developed it into an international match trust after the first World War, partly by advancing loans to various European countries in return for monopoly grants. His suicide in March 1932 led to the discovery that he had been engaged in financial frauds on a large scale and this subsequently resulted in the bankruptcy of his enterprises.

<sup>3</sup> On Apr. 8, 1933, Davis had a meeting with Hitler and Neurath at which Allen Dulles was also present. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933*, vol. 1, pp. 85-89.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed (3154/669805).

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 431, footnote 4.

<sup>6</sup> Document No. 434.

<sup>7</sup> Marginal note: "Has been destroyed. V[ölkers], Oct. 2."

affirmative the question about control by neighboring states, since Köster has reported to us here that the French were absolutely against participation by Germans in a control in France. If we insist on our participation, that can only weaken the control when it comes. After a conference with Frohwein I answered the two other points in a way that is in accordance with our general ideas but probably does not contain what Dulles wanted to know. Since his apprehensions have not become clear to me I could not give any more useful answer.

I believe it is good to cultivate relations with Dulles. Already in the past we have observed that he has a very strong influence on Norman Davis and on the Government in Washington. Schäffer's action is herewith terminated. He will not meet Norman Davis and Dulles again in the near future.

Yours, etc.

BÜLOW

No. 434

8154/669806-07

*The State Secretary to the Embassy in France*

Telegram

PRIORITY

BERLIN, September 18, 1933—1:00 p. m.

IMMEDIATE

RM 1315.

TOP SECRET

No. 451

Please see that the following message in written form, undated and unsigned, without indicating the sender, and without employing American go-betweens, reaches Allen Dulles, at present at the American Embassy there:<sup>1</sup>

"With reference to our London conversations concerning Kreuger.<sup>2</sup>

"Exclusion of neighbouring countries in question of control is not advisable.

"Duration of service and number of effectives should not be rigidly standardised for the period of transition, they should however be limited in a way that would eventually lead to realisation of British plan.

"Airforces of highly armed states should be reduced or at least limited and during period of transition the right to replace machines no more fit for service should be adapted to the necessity of future reduction and adjustments of relative strengths of airforces of different states."<sup>3</sup>

BÜLOW

<sup>1</sup> The remainder of the document is in English in the original.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 433.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. 721 of Sept. 19 Köster reported that the instruction was carried out that morning (8154/669808).

## No. 435

8805/E613638-39

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, September 18, 1933.  
zu IV Chi. 2200.<sup>1</sup>

The Chinese Minister visited me today accompanied by his First Secretary, in order, as he stated, to inform me that he had been recalled and to explain to me the status of German-Chinese economic relations, which had registered a little progress. He informed me in strict confidence of the letters of Minister Soong to Herr Krupp von Bohlen,<sup>2</sup> which he had already delivered to the Foreign Minister, and remarked that the matter was so confidential because of the reference to Chinese national defense, that in the Chinese Legation only his First Secretary, whom he had do the interpreting because of the importance that he attached to the matter, was informed. There was involved, for one thing, a matter of 500 million marks, and another of 26 million dollars. His Government had discussed all these questions only with Herr von Bohlen as chairman of the Reich organization of German Industry [*Reichsstand der Deutschen Industrie*], in order to emphasize the commercial nature of the agreement and last, but not least, in view of the fact that Japan might easily take umbrage at German-Chinese governmental negotiations, particularly since questions of national defense were involved. The Minister mentioned also (it was not quite comprehensible to what this statement referred), that Germany had a surplus of rolling stock, for which China was a potential customer. The Minister finally stated that Mr. Soong had refrained, for the above-mentioned political reasons, from delivering an official memorandum to the Reich Government, as had originally been contemplated, but that these questions would be taken up with the Reich Government, particularly the Foreign Ministry, at the proper time.

I thanked the Minister for his communication and pointed out to him that a participation of the Reich Government in the agreements was inevitable later on because of the credit and currency questions involved.

BÜLOW

<sup>1</sup> IV Chi. 2200: Not printed (8805/E613630-33), Michelsen memorandum of Sept. 25.

<sup>2</sup> Relating to the delivery of an arsenal by the Krupp firm to the Chinese Government (8805/E613635-37). Copies were given the Foreign Minister by the Chinese Minister in his farewell interview on Sept. 16 (Neurath memorandum: 3088/624750).



## No. 436

8580/E601940-43

*The Minister in China to the Foreign Ministry*

CONFIDENTIAL

PEIPING, September 18, 1933.

No. 623

Received November 20.

File No. 8304/5573/33

IV Chi. 2592.

Subject: Cantonese armaments plans:

Negotiations with a German group, represented by Herr Klein and Major Preu.

Position of Consul General Dr. Wagner with respect to this.

In my report No. 585 of August 26<sup>1</sup> on the trip made by Colonel General (retired) von Seeckt, I mentioned that, on the return trip, Herr von Seeckt stopped for a few days in Canton, where he was received by the Government there with all honors and took the opportunity to enter into personal contact with the leading Chinese military men and politicians.<sup>2</sup>

On the way to Canton, Colonel General von Seeckt was met in Hong-kong by Major Preu, who had already accompanied him on the trip from Germany to China as far as Nanking, had then parted from him there and gone to Canton. Herr Preu had been joined in Canton by a Herr Klein, who had arrived from Germany, and both had started negotiations which were being conducted with great secrecy with the Cantonese authorities. They had to do with shipments of military armaments, as later became known.

Consul General Dr. Wagner wrote me as follows in the matter:

"On August 1, Klein informed me that he had signed a contract with Marshals Chen Chi-tong and Li Tsung-jen (represented by their chiefs of staff), which envisaged the regular establishment of an armaments industry in Canton. I did not conceal my great concern from him:

- a) Nanking would consider this a hostile act;
- b) he risked bringing us into serious conflict with Japan, England, and France;
- c) how could he assume responsibility for the financial risk.

With regard to a), Klein stated that I could feel quite easy. No protest was to be feared from Nanking. The field had been thoroughly reconnoitered in Nanking. He could not betray details, but he intimated that there was a secret agreement between the rulers in Nanking and Canton.

With regard to b), Klein said that the leading circles at home had considered this carefully. In view of the general preoccupation of the countries with other problems, the danger should not be considered

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 412.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 410.

too great. Moreover, they would proceed only gradually and unobtrusively. (How they intended to transport all the machinery here "unobtrusively" and set up the plants, which are to come to a point north of Canton, is not clear to me.)

With regard to *c*), Klein assured me that he had secured very favorable terms of payment (high down payments, first installment upon shipment, monthly installments if I remember rightly over a period of 24 months). He showed me the text of what appeared upon casual inspection to be a very comprehensive guarantee by the two provincial banks of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, as well as by the Municipal Bank of Canton (but what is the significance of all bank guarantees if the people for one reason or another do not wish to pay, or a revolution takes place, such as we have often experienced here in the past).

In my reports, in which I had to express myself on the relatively harmless, in any case relatively small, Siemens project for the province of Kwangsi, I did not conceal my objections connected with the political and financial risk of such plans.<sup>3</sup>

Herr Klein stated, moreover, that he was going to Germany now and would there make a report to the responsible authorities concerned in the matter, and would make the necessary explanation. He indicated that a Reich guarantee against loss might be asked for. Should this be the case, it will probably be necessary to look more carefully into matters than I am able to do here. There is a lot about the whole matter that I cannot understand, particularly how the whole project came up and who is its real author at home.

Klein was very reticent about himself. The only thing positive that I learned is that in prewar times he had big trading companies in Central Africa. The fact that he was working with Major Preu—Klein evidently had complete leadership in the matter—also the fact that, together with Preu, he traveled with Colonel General von Seeckt from Hongkong to Canton and accompanied him back again, nevertheless permits of certain inferences concerning connections at home. My questions were evaded, however, and it was only stated that the high authorities at home knew about the matter. I asked whether the activities did not violate the Reich law concerning Army equipment. Answer: No, it was not the delivery of arms that was concerned, but only of machinery, the manufacture of which was entirely permitted in Germany, even according to the Treaty of Versailles. There is no doubt at all, however, that ordnance machinery is involved (the question seems to be primarily one of a gun factory). From my knowledge of such things so far, I consider a Reich guarantee entirely out of the question. When I questioned Klein in a roundabout way about the financing at home, I wormed out of him that it was indeed his firm intention to obtain it—subsequently I have thought that he might perhaps have initiated steps in this direction even before he left Germany."

Up to this point, Consul General Wagner.

I, too, cannot help expressing serious objections to such arrangements with a local government whose relations with the central government are entirely unstable. The many difficulties that deliveries

<sup>3</sup> These reports have not been found.

of war material of German firms to Cantonese generals in the year 1931 caused us both from the direction of Nanking and that of Canton are still fresh in our minds. These experiences enjoin us to the exercise of extreme caution in so far, at any rate, as official support of Klein's plans is concerned.

TRAUTMANN

No. 437

7360/E537397-99

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the  
Foreign Ministry*

A 1995

Moscow, September 19, 1933.

Received September 21.

II F Abr. 2982.

POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Litvinov on the coming session of the Disarmament Conference.

In a conversation People's Commissar Litvinov spoke to me in his well-known skeptical manner about the chances of success of the coming session of the Disarmament Conference. He was of the opinion that the fate of the London World Economic Conference, namely an adjournment sine die, would be the most favorable outcome to be expected from the Disarmament Conference. The situation might become so critical, however, that his presence in Geneva would be necessary, and therefore he expected that, following his visit to Ankara,<sup>1</sup> he would have to go directly to Geneva.

With regard to the probable composition of the Soviet delegation, M. Litvinov thought that it would be the same as the last time, i. e., the Ambassador in Paris, Dovgalevsky, and the Minister in Finland, Boris Stein, to whom might be attached the Military Attaché in Paris, Vinzov, if that should be necessary.

M. Litvinov then asked me whether I had authentic information about the probable attitude of England, America, and Italy, to which I replied in the negative. I asked the counterquestion, what M. Herriot had said to him about the disarmament problem.<sup>2</sup> M. Litvinov replied that the French position had after all been made known by

<sup>1</sup> Litvinov was to visit Ankara with a Soviet delegation on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Turkish Republic; later it was reported that he would go to Washington instead for negotiations with the United States Government (Ankara reports of Oct. 14 and Oct. 24: 9961/E696292-94).

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 439, annex 1.

the press. Herriot had not told him anything new. In reply to a question which I interposed he admitted that Herriot had expressed to him the greatest distrust of German policy and German disarmament plans. I took the opportunity to explain our view of the problem once more in detail to Litvinov.

On the question of supervision M. Litvinov said that the Soviet Government agreed in principle to supervision after effective disarmament. It had always taken this position. In this connection the question of the manner of carrying out the supervision, the composition of the control commission and its method of operation was naturally of importance. But those were details which had not yet been tackled at all; the Soviet Government had no intention of making proposals in the matter. As for the question of an international determination of the present status of armament, this idea was absurd and unworkable, since with the exception of the former Central Powers no state was bound by treaty in any way with respect to its armament, so that consequently any subject for inspection was lacking. Finally, as for the French idea of a check on the status of the armament of the former Central Powers before the beginning of general disarmament, this was a matter for the Versailles States, in which the Soviet Union as a nonsignatory of the Versailles Treaty was disinterested. It would therefore take no position on the matter. He assumed that this was quite in accordance with the intentions of the signatories of Versailles, since the Soviet Union had never been consulted on questions having reference to the Versailles Treaty—which had recently been demonstrated also by the Five Power Convention of December 1932 and the Four Power Pact.

I should be grateful for instructions as to whether I am to continue the conversation on the coming Disarmament Conference if the opportunity should present itself; if so, I request that you send me the appropriate material.<sup>3</sup>

TWARDOWSKI

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<sup>3</sup> Instructions to continue the conversations were sent under the date of Sept. 25 but actually not dispatched until Oct. 3 (7360/E537401). No record of such a conversation has been found.

## No. 438

9464/E667478 ;  
6025/H046198-200 ;  
6025/H046201-03

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry*

A 1997

Moscow, September 19, 1933.

Received September 21.

IV Ru. 4232.

## POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: German-Soviet relations.

The irritation in official quarters here over the continuous chain of incidents, but particularly the Ehrt pamphlet,<sup>1</sup> has reached an unusually high degree. It is becoming a serious menace to good German-Soviet relations and, if the incidents do not stop, may lead to consequences which are undesirable for Germany in both the political and the economic fields.

Two memoranda on talks with M. Litvinov and M. Stern are attached hereto.

V. TWARDOWSKI

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<sup>1</sup>The reference is to a publication entitled *Der bewaffnete Aufstand* [The Armed Uprising] which had recently appeared and which contained charges stated to be based on official sources involving the Soviet trade mission and members of the Soviet Embassy staff in alleged plans for an armed Communist uprising on the eve of the Nazi seizure of power.

[Enclosure 1]

Moscow, September 14, 1933.

## MEMORANDUM

On the occasion of my visit to M. Litvinov today, the conversation turned to German-Soviet relations. I observed that the continuing practice, now carried on for months, of publishing and noting all reports of the world press unfavorable to Germany, and their dissemination through newspapers, pamphlets, and radio, was making an exceedingly bad impression in Germany. In the interest of good political relations between the two countries it was essential that the Foreign Commissariat bring influence to bear on the competent offices to observe greater objectivity; I must demand emphatically that an end be put to the more or less direct insults to German Reich Ministers and the official emblems of the German Reich. Germany had gradually come to realize that the Soviet Government was sympathetically tol-

erating all these outrages, and that it had a political interest in demonstrating to the world, and France and Poland in particular, that German-Soviet relations have deteriorated. M. Litvinov replied with unusual vehemence that what counted were the actions of governments, and in this regard one was bound to note that while the Reich Government proclaimed good German-Soviet relations in its official declarations, the actions of German governmental organs and the organs of the German National Socialist party, that is, *the* Government party, proved the absolute opposite of the Chancellor's words. No day passed without Soviet citizens being oppressed, without Soviet institutions being insulted, without the German press with the support of governmental authorities waging a hate campaign against the Soviet Union. Now even a pamphlet containing official material, which abused and attacked official Soviet personages and Soviet institutions in the most degrading manner, was being distributed through official facilities. If Herr Hitler really wanted to have good relations with the Soviet Union, it should be easy enough for him to order the cessation of the anti-Soviet hate campaign. It should indeed be a slight matter for the Chancellor to order that agents of the German police should henceforth not subject Soviet citizens any more to a special regime, and that the SA and the SS should stop molesting the representatives of the trade mission. But nothing of the sort is happening.

I tried to refute the statements of the People's Commissar with the familiar arguments. In replying to this, the Foreign Commissar also pointed out that it was an unheard of occurrence for the Foreign Minister of a supposedly friendly nation to be called the most degrading names by a newspaper in the capital, with no need being seen on the German side for making an example of this newspaper. Had Signor Balbo or Signor Mussolini been abused in this way, it is probable that publication of the paper would have been forbidden for a considerable period and the responsible editor would have been punished. I countered this by saying that it had never come to my attention that Soviet newspapers, which were abusive especially of Prussian Minister President Göring and Reich Minister Goebbels, were ever made to take back these insults, to say nothing of the Foreign Commissariat expressing to us its regret in writing, as had been done in the case of the Foreign Commissariat by State Secretary von Bülow vis-à-vis the Soviet Embassy. M. Litvinov then came to speak of the discouraging development of economic relations, without going into details. Also in this he saw evidence that Germany no longer considered it important to continue cooperation.

The conversation continued for a while longer on this unpleasant note until M. Litvinov finally dropped the subject with the remark

that the Foreign Ministry possibly wanted good relations—other forces in Germany were more powerful. He was convinced, and this conviction could be changed only by deeds and no longer by words, not even words in official speeches, that Germany had entered upon an anti-Soviet course.

[Enclosure 2]

Moscow, September 19, 1933.

#### MEMORANDUM

M. Stern informed me today of another series of incidents in Germany concerning Soviet citizens. The feeling in Soviet circles was growing worse every day, and it has already come to the point where the Foreign Commissariat is laughed at when it tries to counsel calm and keeps repeating that it is necessary to wait and see. I. Litvinov was especially aroused over the fact that directly following upon Herr von Neurath's words of friendship it was reported that the SA and the police had forcibly entered the Soviet club in Berlin. He wanted me to be told with reference to our last talk that the divergence between words and deeds in relation to the Soviet Union was increasing daily. The echo should cause no surprise to us. M. Stern added that the good will of the Foreign Ministry was recognized here, but that it was also recognized that the Foreign Ministry was unable to assert itself. As an old friend of good German-Soviet relations he wished to warn me urgently against discounting the growing indignation in the Soviet Union. Any single incident, to be sure, was of no tragic importance, but the cumulation and the increasing recurrence of ever new incidents are evidence of a systematic pattern to which the Soviet Government would have to react eventually. He wished to inform me confidentially that the effect of the Ehrt brochure, with its attacks on official Soviet representatives, and its distribution through the Conti Bureau, which is owned by the VTB, the introduction by the Conti Bureau, etc., have made the worst conceivable impression here and completely nullified the efforts of the Foreign Commissariat to induce the Soviet press to temper its language in connection with the Reichstag fire trial. In view of the temper now prevailing in all circles here the German Department was no longer able to make its point of view prevail. To my arguments M. Stern repeated what M. Litvinov had already told me, that if Germany actually cared for good relations with the Soviet Union, if the words of the Reich Chancellor and the Foreign Minister were to be no mere soothing pills for the Soviet Union, it ought, considering the discipline of the National Socialist movement, to be a simple matter for the Führer to forbid and make punishable the molestation

of Soviet citizens, and to bring those to account who undertook acts in public which disparaged the reputation of the Soviet Union, a friendly nation. This had been done in Italy, and it had also been done in Turkey. But nothing of the sort had been done in Germany. The Soviet Union had apparently been placed "outside the law," and Soviet citizens and Soviet installations pronounced "outlaws." For months the Soviet Government had been warning; for months it had called attention to the reaction to these incidents here. If there was no response to these warnings in Germany, the only reasonable inference was that there was simply no interest in having friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

In conclusion M. Stern called my attention to the collection of National Socialist songs *Sturm- und Kampfliederbuch*, p. 10, "Song of the Machine Gun Company," which calls to war against Bolshevik Russia. This song, as the Soviet Embassy has heard, is now being sung with great enthusiasm.

### No. 439

5892/E432620-30

#### *The Military Attaché in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry and the Reichswehr Ministry*

Report No. 161/33

Moscow, September 19, 1933.

Received September 21.

II F 3130.

1. Your dispatch No. 29/33 with all annexes has arrived.<sup>1</sup>

2. *Discussion of the present situation respecting German-Russian military policy* is contained in annex I.

The possibility of damaging repercussions of the active political propaganda carried on by France in the Soviet Union suggests the idea of a revival of the military relations between Germany and Russia. The moment appears appropriate for this from here, in so far as the termination of cooperation in its previous form gives both partners freedom of action and a certain willingness is recognizable from the Russian military side.

3. *Longer period of duty for the territorial enlisted personnel in the first year of service.*

Annex II,<sup>2</sup> paragraph 3 contains reliable information on the longer period of duty for the 1910 age group with the territorial troops.

4. *Visit of the French Minister of Air.*<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> None found.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (5892/E432632-35).

<sup>3</sup> See annex I and footnote 7.



Annex III<sup>4</sup> contains information on the French airplanes which have arrived in Moscow, and at the same time answers some of the questions posed in Foreign Ministry Instructions II F 2961 of September 8, 1933, and II F 2991 of September 11, 1933.<sup>5</sup>

5. *Party purge in the armed forces.*

The party purge has now begun in the Army, too, half a year later than for the bulk of the party members. Particulars are contained in annex IV.<sup>6</sup>

6. *Annexes*

Annex I: The situation respecting German-Russian military policy.

Annex II: Military information.

Annex III: Air information.

Annex IV: Party purge in the armed forces.

HARTMANN

Annex I

SECRET

Moscow, September 19, 1933.

THE SITUATION RESPECTING GERMAN-RUSSIAN MILITARY POLICY

The stations were discontinued on September 15.

Therewith the period of many years of German-Russian military cooperation has been terminated in its previous form. This conclusion, however, is only the logical outward manifestation of a change in the reciprocal political relations originating with the Soviet Russian side, which could already be observed for about the last year and a half. Nevertheless the suspension of the experimental work indicates a turning point which can be of decisive significance.

The fact of the change and the possibility of a further deterioration in our relations is emphasized by the two visits of French statesmen.<sup>7</sup> Herriot's trip through Russia was allegedly of a private nature, to be sure; but all quarters in Russia, from the official governmental authorities down to the schools, plants, etc., which were visited took pains to treat the guest with the highest respect and courtesy and make the progress as obvious to him as possible. To judge from my personal observations, the purpose of this skillfully executed Russian "care" ["*Fürsorge*"] was fully attained. Herriot has made no secret of his admiration for the development in the Soviet Union; it is based on

<sup>4</sup> Not printed (5892/E432641-42).

<sup>5</sup> Neither found.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed (5892/E432643-44).

<sup>7</sup> Herriot had visited the Soviet Union at the end of August as the guest of the Soviet Government, while Cot, the French Minister for Air, had been in the Soviet Union in September in connection with the visit of a French air squadron to Moscow.

conviction; it exceeds by far the bounds of conventional politeness. He will promote the further rapprochement of France and Russia as far as he is able, and with an appropriate internal political situation this can at any time take on immediate importance. Herriot's views are a political creed and program.

Although it can still be said that the *present* French Government and, particularly, also the military circles keep somewhat apart from Herriot's hymns of praise with a certain reserve, the official state visit by the French Air Minister, Pierre Cot, is of still greater importance; it carries the stamp of an action in the field of military policy. Cot is accompanied by high French air officers (Inspector of the Air Troops, Chief of Staff in the Air Ministry, Chief of the Military Cabinet in the Air Ministry, among others; a total of 10 to 12 active air officers). The reception of the Minister in Kiev, Kharkov, and Moscow had the character of an international military tribute, new for Russia: tricolor decorations at the airport and at the hotel; guard of honor reviewed by the Minister as they marched by; honorary escort by a Russian fighter wing of the 20th Air Brigade on the flight from Kharkov to Moscow; welcoming addresses by Military Commanders as governmental representatives; official entertainments on the part of the military authorities. In the speeches there occurred sentences such as: "full and regular exchange of achievements in aviation"; "development and consolidation of relations in the field of aviation, which will certainly carry over to other (!) fields as well"; "normal political relations, reciprocal confidence"; "the visit is a link in the chain of events (!) since the Non-Aggression Pact"; "growing influence of the circles that desire peace and therefore a strengthening of cooperation in military matters (!)"; Herriot was feted as a champion of peace and an opponent of the international policy of the French Right.

The political, economic, and military consequences of this visit cannot as yet be calculated. The skill with which both sides are proceeding would seem to bring about a certain success, even if all the hopes of both parties are not fulfilled. The cooperation between the two states which seems constantly closer with its attention to objectives in the field of military policy must seriously damage Germany's situation in that field. For it must be emphasized most sharply time and time again that, looked at from the French side, the whole Russian game is not being played principally for Russian or even for French interests, but in the main for the purpose of isolating Germany.

The visit of the Polish aviator, Philipowic, did not have its full effect owing to the plane accident. However, the Russians provided every conceivable help and granted the pilot (Air Force Captain), who died of his injuries, full diplomatic and military honors when his body was taken from Moscow to Warsaw. (Honor guard, delegations, deposit of wreath, etc.) The thread will be taken up again by the Poles, since

an official Polish commission is being sent to Moscow to express thanks.

A few weeks ago at the beginning of the liquidation it also came about that the outward forms of social intercourse of the Russians toward us deteriorated markedly—as already reported. The brusque refusal for the Russian Commanders invited to visit Germany—at the Russian desire—falls in the same period. The whole atmosphere was decidedly unfriendly. In the last few weeks, however, a pronounced change could be observed in this regard. The smooth, liberal, friendly course followed in the liquidation probably contributed most to this. This was expressed in a significant way during a dinner which I gave on September 12 for the departing station chief. This evening there were present on the Russian side, besides Smagin and Sutchkov (both from the “Foreign Liaison” Department), also Khripin, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, a very congenial, obviously very able, leader personality of remarkable intellectual attainments. At the table I had intentionally spoken only a few short neutral words of welcome to my guests. Thereupon Khripin answered in detail and in a very friendly manner. He stressed that the Russian Army looked back with satisfaction on the joint work in the field of aviation and that it hoped to continue the reciprocal exchange of experience in another form. They had noted with particular satisfaction the good will with which the German side had carried out the liquidation. In the subsequent conversation Smagin used the opportunity to tell the station chiefs that the gratitude expressed referred also to cooperation in the other military fields. He regretted that representatives of the other two offices, whose chiefs had also been invited, had been unable to come because they were away on maneuvers. Furthermore Smagin stressed in the conversation the particularly skillful conduct of the negotiations by the Director of ZM,<sup>8</sup> who through his work, which was imbued with a friendly spirit, dispelled all misgivings that had existed on the Russian side at the start of the liquidation. The People’s Commissar for War had also particularly appreciated the fact that the principles of further friendly cooperation expressed in the written notification by order of the Chief of the Army Command [*Chef der Heeresleitung*] concerning the liquidation of Station L<sup>9</sup> (your report 18/33 of June 26, 1933, annex I<sup>10</sup>) had not been conventional amenities but had been converted into deeds by ZM and the stations within their limits. This manner of liquidation had contributed toward creating a foundation on which friendly military relations could

<sup>8</sup> Abbreviation for Zentrale Moskau (Moscow Center), administrative center for German military activities in the Soviet Union.

<sup>9</sup> Abbreviation for Lipetsk, one of the German military stations in the Soviet Union.

<sup>10</sup> Not found.

be newly based in another form to the benefit of both armies. These statements by Khripin and Smagin were evidently meant sincerely; according to custom here they go beyond personal opinion and are more or less official in nature. My former impression, which agreed entirely with that of the Ambassador, that the Russian side is constantly trying not to let the connections with us break off, is strengthened anew by these utterances. It even appears that the military considered that the time had already come for creating warmer military relations again. The present low point, which is marked by the effort toward a speedy conclusion of the liquidation, by the failure to appear for the assignments which they had originally themselves specifically requested, and by the lack of a German delegation at the Russian maneuvers, and which has a political character (Geneva, French rapprochement, Polish arrangement, eastern pacts), is evidently by no means to be intensified from the military side, but if possible smoothed over. However, these are all additional indications of mood. For whether, when, and in what form, an actual change can be brought about depends of course quite exclusively upon the development of the reciprocal political relations. In this regard, however, I believe that one should at least prevent the present state of affairs from continuing or even becoming worse; this would doubtless prevent even a resumption of friendly military relations. But in any case one could start considering even now—at least within the province of the Wehrmacht—how we could later promote the activation and reorganization of military relations. The conclusion of the liquidation, which was executed willingly and smoothly by the Russian side also, and which gave both parties freedom of action—as desired—could in my opinion represent the first step without further ado. I should like to point out thereby that the previous serious concern of individual station chiefs, which incidentally I did not share at any time, did not turn out to be justified in any way. On the contrary, in all discussions the willingness to continue the joint work in a new form as expressed by the Chief of the Army Command had the effect on the Russian side of a recognition and repeatedly brought forth counterdeclarations of a similar nature—as reported several times already.<sup>11</sup> It may also be pointed out that according to Smagin's statements the "Foreign Liaison" Department of the Staff of the Red Army contemplates as a conclusion of the cooperation a joint dinner for the Director of ZM,<sup>12</sup> in which partic-

<sup>11</sup> In reporting on a conversation between General Lutz and General Khalepsky on Aug. 21, Assistant Military Attaché Krebs noted: "Both sides stressed the absence of friction in carrying out the liquidation so far, and expressed the wish to continue the cooperation in another form." (report No. 157/33 of Aug. 22: 5892/E432554-57.) Similarly, Krebs' report zu No. 158/33 of Aug. 29 (5892/-E432570-73).

<sup>12</sup> See document No. 460.

ular importance is laid by the Russian side on the personal participation of the chiefs of the administrations concerned (Alksnis, Khalepsky, and Fischmann); this will be one more friendly gesture in conclusion. However, I cannot imagine that any *very strong* gesture for a rapprochement can be expected from the Russian side in the *very near future*. Operating against it are the instability, and the dependence on many political and economic factors, of the relationship with the large European Powers with respect to military policy; the fact that the Soviet Union's military tasks of the future have their center of gravity in the Far East also operates against it; and finally, the political leadership of the present Foreign Commissar, who is outspokenly unfriendly to Germany, operates against it. The Russian military leadership cannot proceed independently outside the general political framework of the Soviet Union. If, however, simply following the German interest, one has such a rapprochement in the field of military policy as an objective, then the hints offered by the Russians could in my opinion suffice for the German side to step forward more actively once more.

The idea is still possibly premature that on the occasion of the conclusion of liquidation one might receive the Soviet Russian Military Attaché at the Reichswehr Ministry and embark on a discussion with him which, in connection with the previous work, would go directly into the possibilities for the future. On the other hand I suggest that in a letter from the Reichswehr Minister to the Soviet Russian People's Commissar, Voroshilov,<sup>13</sup> on the occasion of the conclusion of the liquidation, thanks be expressed for the obliging attitude shown by the Russians in that connection and that, with a general reference to the repeatedly stressed readiness on the German side, a positive statement be obtained from the Russians regarding their attitude toward further cooperation.

This letter could be sent to me for personal delivery to the People's Commissar for War. The gesture could receive still more emphasis if such a letter were brought by a high-ranking officer on behalf of the Reichswehr Minister, for example, the Chief of the Foreign Armies Department.

The Chargé d'Affaires shares the above opinions and would for his part strongly welcome the suggested measure.

HARTMANN

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<sup>13</sup> An attached note in Bülow's handwriting referring to this passage reads: "According to information from Colonel von Stülpnagel the letter to Voroshilov suggested by Hartmann has already been dispatched. However, it contains only thanks for the accommodating spirit shown by the Russians on the occasion of the liquidation. On the other hand, S. crossed out of the drafting officer's version a remark expressing the hope of continued German-Russian collaboration. Bülow, Oct. 7."

## No. 440

7818/E566978-80

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, September 20, 1933.

e. o. II Ung. 575.

On his first visit to the Reich Chancellor today, the Hungarian Minister<sup>1</sup> began with explanations of the antecedents of the visit of Kánya to Paris<sup>2</sup> which were intended to justify it. He claimed that the aim of the visit was to counteract the influence of Beneš in questions of the Danubian area. The Minister stressed in this connection the extraordinary hostility of the Czech Foreign Minister toward Germany. He was not informed about the particulars of the visit itself. The Reich Chancellor would, however, in the next few days learn all the details through Herr von Papen.<sup>3</sup> The Minister then spoke of his experiences in Czechoslovakia<sup>4</sup> and welcomed the union of the German parties in Czechoslovakia, which the press reported. He expressed the hope that the Germans and the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia would act together politically.

The Reich Chancellor stated for his part that the union of the parties and politically interested persons was a natural thing. Parties in the old sense were, indeed, obsolete, and the examples of Italy and Germany could not fail to have an effect on other countries. A beginning had been made with the Versailles Treaty, and more and more the ideology of the French Revolution was disappearing. He entirely approved of cooperation and unity among the Germans, Hungarians, and Slovaks in Czechoslovakia. The way to achieve this, however, was for national groups first to unite themselves and then come to an understanding with one another.

The Minister then went into German-Hungarian relations by way of explanations similar to those that he had recently made to me<sup>5</sup> and apparently on the basis of the same instructions. He complained about the well-known article on Sopron in *Montag* and the article in the Mannheim paper on the people of foreign extraction in Hungary, and again stated that Hungary was quite prepared to let the 500,000 persons of German extraction in Hungary retain their language,

<sup>1</sup> Constantin de Masirevich.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 432 and footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> Papen had gone to Budapest on Sept. 16 for a private visit with Minister President Gömbös. A report on Papen's visit was sent by Minister Schoen on Sept. 21 (9565/E673588-92).

<sup>4</sup> Masirevich had been Minister to Czechoslovakia prior to his appointment to the Berlin post.

<sup>5</sup> In a visit on Sept. 9 Masirevich had complained about articles in German newspapers accusing Hungary of pursuing a policy of denationalization toward the German minority (9572/E674631-32).

schools, churches, and culture, provided they learned enough Magyar besides to make good citizens. He complained, on the other hand, of alleged German emissaries, who were making attempts to re-Germanize Germans who had been Magyarized for generations. The same picture presented itself in the "occupied" territories, particularly in those under Rumanian rule, where, with Rumanian support, Transylvanian Saxons were trying to re-Germanize Magyarized persons of German descent. He had noticed a similar situation in Czechoslovakia. He stated that such things were disquieting to Hungary and apt to disturb German-Hungarian relations. Political cooperation between Germany and Hungary was surely more important than the re-Germanization of some hundred or even thousand of Magyarized Germans. He asked that the Reich Government exert its influence on all organizations and persons in question in order that matters may be dealt with not from the point of view of parochial politics, but by adhering to the fundamental policy of German-Hungarian collaboration.

The Chancellor did not enter into the details of this complaint but pointed out that he aspired to have the same good relations with Hungary as existed between Germany and Italy. As far as press articles were concerned, there were naturally papers that often tried maliciously to disturb foreign relations and others that acted from an excess of zeal, as, for example, newspapers of his own party, which reproached him with seeking an understanding with the Catholic Church. Moreover, a large part of the Hungarian press was anything but pro-German, and he was not thinking at all of holding decent Hungary responsible for the utterances of Jewish newspapers.

The visit was harmonious in every respect.<sup>6</sup>

BÜLOW

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<sup>6</sup> On Sept. 22, the Foreign Ministry sent to the Legation in Hungary a copy of this memorandum on the visit of Masirevich. Simultaneously, the instruction repeated a request, made by Counselor Hüffer on Sept. 21 in a telephone conversation with Minister Schoen, for information on the results of Kánya's trip to Paris and on the explanations which had been given to Papen on his visit to Budapest with respect to the same subject (7818/E566981).

A detailed report by Schoen based on a conversation with Kánya immediately after the latter's return from Paris was sent to the Foreign Ministry on Sept. 20 (7818/E566982-85).

## No. 441

7467/H178815

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

SEPTEMBER 21, 1933.

zu II F Abr. 2971.<sup>1</sup>

To: II F Abr.

1) It was agreed yesterday evening between Reichswehr Minister von Blomberg, who was already acquainted with the attached memorandum,<sup>2</sup> and myself, who was not yet acquainted with it, that no German position on the "Mussolini plan" will for the present be communicated to the Italians. The plan has little prospect of being accepted. The Italians must not be given the opportunity of being able to say that *we too* did not accept their plan. There is still time to take a position.

Herr von Blomberg will report to the Chancellor in this sense today.

Therefore please do not send an instruction to Rome for the time being.

2) Herr von Blomberg told me that he had formulated with General Schönheinz a much shorter position regarding the 10 Italian points. Please submit the Blomberg points.<sup>3</sup>

BÜLOW

<sup>1</sup> II F Abr. 2971: Not printed (7467/H178804-11); see footnote 2.

<sup>2</sup> This memorandum (II F Abr. 2971) with an enclosure entitled "Position regarding the proposals of Signor Mussolini for the solution of the disarmament question" had been submitted to Bülow by Schwendemann on Sept. 20. The position paper had been drafted following a meeting on Sept. 19, with Nadolny in the chair and representatives of the Reichswehr and Air Ministries present, which had considered the Italian proposals contained in document No. 431.

<sup>3</sup> The document requested here was sent to the Foreign Ministry by the Reichswehr Ministry on Sept. 22 (7467/H178824-27), and its contents were transmitted in telegram No. 226 of Sept. 23 to the Embassy in Rome, but with instructions that it was not to be communicated to the Italian Government. The Italians were to be told that a detailed German position would be communicated later (7467/H178828). Cf. document No. 446.

## No. 442

7467/H178823

*The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 213 of September 21

ROME, September 21, 1933—11:00 p. m.

Received September 22—12:55 a. m.

II F Abr. 2996.

With reference to telegram No. 210 of September 16.<sup>1</sup>

After he had a long conversation with Mussolini, Suvich just asked

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 431.



me to see him and told me that the Chief of Government was extremely disturbed about further developments in the disarmament question on the basis of the impressions gained so far of the course of the French-English conversations.<sup>2</sup> The greatest nervousness prevailed in Paris, and it was being heightened still further as a result of the urgent representations being made by Poland and the Little Entente, which feared that France would yield to English pressure. In order to clarify the difficult situation through a calm preliminary discussion in a small circle and to prevent the threatening failure of the Disarmament Conference, Mussolini proposed a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers in the first 10 days of October, on Italian soil, possibly Stresa, and asked for our attitude toward this proposal. At the same time Suvich stated that they would be glad to learn here how the Italian proposals transmitted in the above-cited telegram were received by you,<sup>3</sup> since Mussolini had to make sure whether he could continue to act as mediator in the direction indicated.

Suvich also informed me that he would arrive at Geneva on Monday, September 25, and would like to get in touch with the Foreign Minister at once. Please inform the Foreign Minister accordingly.<sup>4</sup>

SMEND

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<sup>2</sup> See document No. 431, footnote 5.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 441 and footnote 2.

<sup>4</sup> Marginal note: "On instruction from Ministerialdirektor Köpke the telegram was sent to the delegation in Geneva this evening. Schwendemann, Sept. 22." It was sent to Geneva as telegram No. 6.

## No. 443

8737/E610110-13

### *The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

I. 1486

ROME, September 21, 1933.

Received September 25.

II Oe. 1497.

### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Italo-Austrian relations.

Prospects for the new united front in Austria. The effect of Riccione. Italy continues to be the protective power of Austrian independence. Attitude of the Vatican. Indications of a German-Austrian détente.

With reference to report I. 1383 of August 28.<sup>1</sup>

In appraising the Austrian question, they seem to be further disposed here to await developments calmly. Federal Chancellor Doll-

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed: See document No. 408, footnote 3.

fuss' Prater speech<sup>2</sup> was received with satisfaction in Government circles, as was to be expected, and was even effusively hailed in the press as a great political event. Recently a certain reserve has been more or less manifest with regard to the Austrian problem, and in this the fear may play a part that the reorganization of the state on a corporative basis, such as was announced in the Prater speech, might, instead of composing the internal differences, perhaps even aggravate them. The contrast, as it appeared in former Vice Chancellor Winkler's Graz address, which made short shrift of Fascism, and the enthusiastic espousal of Fascism by Prince Starhemberg at Kufstein a few days ago<sup>3</sup> may have given new sustenance to these apprehensions. All the bigger is the expectation with which today they view the non-partisan Cabinet of concentration just formed,<sup>4</sup> which is regarded in the press generally as a sign of the beginning of a new era in Austria and is accordingly most joyously hailed.

Like the Prater speech, this reorganization of the Cabinet is undoubtedly also attributable to the direct influence of Mussolini. As I have since learned, already at Riccione the Duce pointed out very seriously to Herr Dollfuss the dangers of party mismanagement in Austria and urged him to do away with parliamentarianism for good, and to go over to a strong-arm policy. Dollfuss, who until very recently seems to have been convinced of the need for retaining a parliamentary system in Austria, even though it be a limited one, is supposed to have been deeply impressed with Mussolini's forceful representations; he also expressed this particularly in his farewell telegram to the Duce after the Riccione meeting, in which he thanks him for the "valuable advice" he received. Starhemberg, too, on the occasion of his most recent visit to Rome,<sup>5</sup> obviously got special hints and suggestions there as to the most effective use that could be made of the Heimwehr movement in the fight for the preservation of Austrian independence. According to my information, Mussolini is said even today by no means to underestimate the difficulties in the way of the execution of a tightly organized [*straff organisierte*] policy in

<sup>2</sup> On Sept. 11, Dollfuss delivered an address at a Fatherland Front rally at the trotting race course in the Vienna Prater, outlining his program of a reform of the constitution in the direction of a "Social Christian German state with a corporative basis."

<sup>3</sup> Both of these speeches were delivered on Sept. 17.

<sup>4</sup> In a reorganization of the Austrian Cabinet, which took place Sept. 20-21, Vice Chancellor Winkler and another member of the Agrarian League, as well as Army Minister Vaugoin, resigned from the Cabinet, while Dollfuss took over the additional Ministries of Public Security and Defense. A Foreign Ministry instruction sent on Sept. 27 to the Legations in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia stated that the new Dollfuss Cabinet would of necessity adopt a course in the direction of Legitimism (8654/E605851-54).

<sup>5</sup> This visit took place early in September; cf. Ernest Rüdiger von Starhemberg, *Between Hitler and Mussolini* (London, 1942), pp. 114-116; see also Paul R. Sweet, "Mussolini and Dollfuss" in Julius Braunthal, *The Tragedy of Austria*, pp. 195-196, 198-199.

Austria. In addition there is the fact that here, in general, neither Herr Dollfuss, who is regarded as a good Philistine, nor Prince Starhemberg, who is criticized for his vanity and political fickleness, are esteemed particularly highly. But they tell themselves that the Federal Chancellor, who clings tenaciously to his idea, will finally win out, despite his lack of popularity; and in this connection he will profit from the influence with the masses which Starhemberg undoubtedly has. Thus, in the long run, Mussolini also definitely expects the success, on a corporative basis, of the new and energetic leadership of the state, for he is of the opinion that through the creation of a form of government related to Fascism and National Socialism, not only can the National Socialist movement in Austria be brought under control, but also the groundwork laid for an understanding with Germany, which he is still particularly anxious to achieve. Once the next goal, the smashing of Social Democracy, is reached—and in this connection no appreciable difficulty is expected—it is thought here that the path will be cleared to the complete internal reorganization of Austria and the safeguarding of her political independence.

Until this goal is attained, they will extend all possible assistance and protection in the rear to their neighboring country. At the same time, they will focus their attention on the attempt to help Austria who is in need through the granting of special preferences and concessions in the economic field. Various indications, such as the presence of Schüller<sup>6</sup> in Rome for the purpose of holding economic conversations, the visit of Buresch, Minister of Finance, in the question of the loan, the sounding-out with regard to the future of Trieste,<sup>7</sup> suggest that increased activity on the part of Italy in the matter of the further development of Italo-Austrian economic relations<sup>8</sup> is to be expected in the very near future. In addition, other trends in the purely political and military spheres were becoming increasingly noticeable. The former have to do with Austria's desire to obtain a seat on the Council, to which Italy is sympathetically disposed—although this is not at present of topical importance—for the reason that it would serve as a further effective bar to all Anschluss aspirations. The latter trends have to do with the expansion of the Austrian armed forces<sup>9</sup> and the assimilation of the Heimwehren and also of the

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<sup>6</sup> Sektionschef Richard Schüller, chief economic and financial expert of the Austrian Foreign Ministry, 1917–1938, on special assignment to the Austrian delegation at the League of Nations, 1932–1933.

<sup>7</sup> There were reports at the time that Austria and Hungary were to be granted free zones in the port of Trieste.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. document No. 397.

<sup>9</sup> On Aug. 30, the Austrian Government had sent identical notes to the British and French Governments, inquiring whether they would object to Austria's raising the effectives of her Army to the limit fixed by the Treaty of St. Germain (30,000) by establishment of an auxiliary military force composed of short-term volunteers. Under the date of Sept. 1, the British Government replied that it did not raise any objections, and the French Government sent a note to the same effect. For the text of these notes, see *Documents on International Affairs*, 1933, pp. 388–391.

Austrian youth organizations to the Italian model.

My attention is also being called from various quarters to the special interest that the Vatican has been taking recently in the further development of the Austrian question; an interest that was evinced, for instance, on the occasion of the Catholic Congress in Vienna,<sup>10</sup> in the awarding of high Papal decorations to President Miklas and the Federal Chancellor, as well as in the columns of the *Osservatore Romano*. To what extent this interest taken by the Vatican is being reciprocated by Austria has likewise been sufficiently demonstrated by the Vienna Catholic Congress (encyclical letter "*Quadragesimo Anno*" as the model for building a corporative state). Since this question does not come under the special reporting by the Embassy, I should like to confine myself only to pointing out that there seems to be in this field a cooperation that is surely not accidental, between the Italian Government and the Curia in the interest of preserving Austrian independence, which also merits our attention.

Finally I should like also to mention that in the Foreign Ministry they repeatedly expressed to me their satisfaction recently over various indications of an approaching relaxation of the tension between Germany and Austria. It was noted with satisfaction that radio propaganda had been further curtailed, that the incidents were becoming fewer, and that the tone of the press on both sides was growing more moderate. The shifting of the Lechfeld camp from the frontier area into the interior seems to have had an especially good effect. In the Palazzo Chigi no importance is attached to the rumors that are circulating here to the effect that Herr Rintelen<sup>11</sup> will not enter upon his Roman post because he is considered too pro-German. In this connection, it is pointed out that it was only very recently that the *agrément* for the new Minister was given.

SMEND

<sup>10</sup> The "German General Catholic Congress" took place in Vienna, Sept. 8-13.

<sup>11</sup> See document No. 416 and footnote 3.

## No. 444

6615/E498958-62

### *Memorandum by the Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union*<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, September 22, 1933.

I had an opportunity today to talk for some time with the Vice Director of the Third Western European Department, M. Helphand.

<sup>1</sup> An attached memorandum by Tippelskirch dated Sept. 30, reads: "The accompanying memorandum was sent to me privately by Herr von Twardowski." (6615/E498957)

M. Helphand represented the visit of M. Herriot and M. Pierre Cot<sup>2</sup> as an outward sign of the completion of the normalization of Franco-Soviet relations and as a sign that France was willing not only to give up her previous hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union but also in addition to arrive at really friendly relations. Although formally the Soviet Government had invited both M. Herriot and M. Pierre Cot, the initiative for both visits had originated with the French side, as in general France had assumed the lead in her efforts to bring about friendly relations with the Soviet Union in all areas. The Soviet Government was naturally interested in having good relations with all countries, and consequently the French initiative had been very welcome. The hope was very strong here that a closer connection between the two countries, particularly in the economic area, would result from this friendly political attitude. Thanks to the cooperation of the French side, the discussions on a temporary trade agreement were now proceeding apace, and the Soviet Government was willing to transfer there large orders which were interesting to French industry. When I asked about the acceptance of French specialists in the Soviet Union, M. Helphand stated that the Soviet Government would naturally like to accept specialists to build up Soviet industry in areas in which French industry was outstanding, but of course I knew that there were certain difficulties in regard to salaries in foreign currency. The Soviet Government would naturally not depart from the general conditions under which foreigners were engaged here in favor of the French, i. e., salaries in foreign currency would be paid only to valuable specialists who would not otherwise be willing to come here. But these were all plans that were only developing slowly, and one would naturally also have to wait and see whether the friendly attitude of Herriot, Pierre Cot, and other leading French politicians toward the Soviet Union would prevail.

When I asked about the concrete negotiations of Pierre Cot here in Moscow, M. Helphand replied that M. Pierre Cot had come in order to inform himself about the airplane industry in the Soviet Union. They had willingly shown him everything he wanted to see, and he had declared himself very much surprised at how highly developed the Soviet airplane industry was. Contact had been established, and the possibilities of an exchange of experience and of technical cooperation had been investigated, but nothing definite had been decided upon. When I asked about a Soviet return visit, M. Helphand said that nothing definite had been arranged in that respect.

M. Helphand then went over to German-Soviet relations and expressed his great regret that such a hostile attitude toward the Soviet

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 439 and footnote 7.

Union was assumed in Germany. He observed things only from the sidelines and was therefore not influenced by the little daily political annoyances. But he must say to me that the resentment against Germany had penetrated not only Soviet circles, but also far into the party, and that the workers were very indignant about the restrained language in the Soviet press in the face of the constant new incidents in Germany affecting Soviet interests. The Foreign Commissariat had a difficult task in keeping the editors even moderately within bounds. Germany's friends hardly dared to bestir themselves any more. If things continued in this manner the indignation would seek an outlet. I explained to M. Helphand the German position in detail, and pointed out to him that the Soviet Government evidently wanted to align itself as closely as possible with France and therefore sought excuses for representing Germany as the guilty party in the deterioration of German-Soviet relations. The incidents were very regrettable, but were after all not so bad that they could destroy an old friendship if there were good will on both sides. M. Helphand categorically denied that the Soviet Union was sacrificing German friendship for the sake of France. This contradicted entirely the sense and intention of Soviet foreign policy, the main objective of which was the maintenance of peace in order to be able to dedicate itself undisturbed to the building up of the country economically and politically. The guiding principle here was normal, friendly relations with every country. They would seek alignment with other countries only when they felt themselves threatened, and he did not want to conceal from me that the feeling that the German attitude was a threat to the security of the Soviet Union was rapidly growing in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had no interest in letting itself be drawn into coalitions by France or Poland. If it became convinced, however, that Germany was trying to bring about a coalition against it, it would naturally try to anticipate this. In his opinion this was the political problem of German-Soviet relations. At any rate he could only say to me, as a neutral observer of the special German-Soviet relations, that we should not deceive ourselves concerning the excitement here with regard to the attitude of German policy, whether official or unofficial, simply because for the time being it was not expressed outwardly. There was very great discipline here, and they did not yet have the intention here to create a *fait accompli*. I replied to M. Helphand that in my opinion there was a lack of good will on the Soviet side for understanding the situation in Germany, where a great and fundamental revolution had just been completed and where it had not yet been possible to reorganize the whole mechanism of the state so that incidents could be entirely avoided. If the Soviet Government was interested in good relations with us, which we doubted

at the present time, it ought to be easy for it to reduce the incidents to the proper proportion, also the way in which they were represented to the public. But the Soviet Government saw its advantage at the present time in ostentatiously withdrawing from Germany for the sake of France and Poland. The friendship with Germany had lasted for 10 years; no one knew as yet how the French friendship would develop. France's interest in the Soviet Union lay mainly in destroying German-Soviet friendship. If she succeeded in this her interest in the Soviet Union would wane. Here in Moscow they should not forget that, and they should also not forget that there was a very lively feeling in Germany of being unkindly left in the lurch here in a time of need by alleged friends. This would also have repercussions in Germany.

(TWARDOWSKI)<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The signature has been added in Tippelskirch's handwriting.

## No. 445

7467/H178833-34

### *The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry*

#### Telegram

GENEVA, German Delegation, September 23, 1933—12:20 p. m.

URGENT

Received September 23—12:40 p. m.

Del. No. 491 of September 23

II F Abr. 3020.

For the State Secretary personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 6.<sup>1</sup>

In the conversation next Monday<sup>2</sup> I intend to inform Suvich approximately as follows:

We considered Mussolini's proposal to clarify the disarmament question by a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers at Stresa as entirely expedient. At the same time, to be sure, we were proceeding from the assumption that we would not be confronted by the three other parties with agreements previously arranged among them. In any event, a thorough political preparation of the meeting at Stresa really seems to me to be advisable in order to prevent failure which would only aggravate the tense situation. The time of the meeting at Stresa would have to be set in accordance with the course of the preliminary discussions now to be opened.

In a practical respect, the Italian proposal contains elements for a positive solution of the disarmament problem. We infer from it

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 442, footnote 4.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. document No. 454.

that Italy is recognizing once more that Germany must at once have stocks of those weapons which are not being generally abolished and are therefore regarded as weapons of defense. However, we consider positive disarmament measures in the case of highly armed states absolutely necessary even in the very first period, if only because supervision would otherwise assume a one-sided character. We are assuming, moreover, that the disarmament measures to be carried out by the highly armed countries in the second period would be defined in concrete terms even now. Four years was too long a time to allow for the first period. We agreed to supervision if it were general and applied to all countries similarly. On the question of effectives, agreement on the basis of the MacDonald plan in accordance with the Italian proposal would seem possible if certain German demands were met, particularly that pre-military training be permitted, that police organizations not be included in the calculation, and that trained reserves and overseas troops, the percentage of long-term service personnel, as well as a suitable transition period, be taken into account.<sup>3</sup>

NEURATH

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<sup>3</sup> See document No. 474, footnote 1.

No. 446

3154/669880-81

*State Secretary Bülow to Foreign Minister Neurath*

BERLIN, September 23, 1933.

DEAR HERR VON NEURATH: According to Smend's telegram,<sup>1</sup> which you have at Geneva, Suvich has reported that Mussolini was proposing a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers on Italian soil, possibly at Stresa, in the first 10 days of October. As I have already wired you,<sup>2</sup> this telegram was shown to the Chancellor, but he has not taken a position on this suggestion, and I really did not expect that he would. It will therefore be necessary that at the proper time you approach the Chancellor from Geneva on the subject of this meeting, in case Mussolini's proposal should be seriously intended, or else that you instruct me to present your views on this matter to him.

It appears to me very probable that a serious proposal on the part of Mussolini is being put forward, or rather is under consideration. I had always expected that Mussolini would suggest a meeting of the Rome pact Powers in the time between the League Assembly and the Disarmament Conference. Whether the meeting will be agreed to by

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<sup>1</sup> Document No. 442.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 8 of Sept. 23, not printed (7467/H178829).



everybody is another matter entirely. But precisely because we have to reckon with the possibility that France or England have no desire to go to Stresa and will reject the proposal, possibly by requesting a conference at Geneva, I think we should agree to the proposal. I am unable to judge from here when the moment for a statement of assent will have arrived. I assume, however, that your conversations in Geneva will give you all the data for this decision. In any case, I intend to ask Herr von Hassell, who happens to be here, not to delay any longer his return to Rome.

Finally, it has to be stated that we have no news from Paris or London that would even suggest that the Stresa proposal is known.

With best regards,  
Yours, etc.

BÜLOW

No. 447

7360/E537424-26

*The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 492 of September 24      GENEVA, September 24, 1933—12:45 p. m.  
Received September 24—12:50 p. m.  
II F Abr. 3030.

Yesterday evening, Sir John Simon called on me accompanied by Eden, in order to speak with me regarding the disarmament question. He stated that he had encountered a considerably less abrupt attitude in Paris <sup>1</sup> than was the case only a short while ago. To be sure, it was not to be expected that France would at once agree to any disarmament measures. They were still thinking there of the division of the convention, with which we were certainly still familiar, into two periods of 4 years each. In the first part, during which the operation of the supervision was to be tried out, no further rearmament would be undertaken by the highly armed countries. In the second period disarmament was then to begin. To my objection that the present condition of discrimination would thereby be extended for another 4 years, Simon replied that this was not true. With respect to the highly armed countries the control was to mean that no new arms of any kind should be manufactured in excess of the existing material and, on the other hand, that no large stocks in addition to the categories of arms to be accorded to the disarmed states under the convention should be made available. No supervision was to take place with respect to anything that had thus far been done. I asked Simon whether, together

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 431, footnote 5.

with this, material equality of rights was to be granted in practice to Germany and <sup>2</sup> the disarmed states. He said that no agreement had as yet been reached on this question, and it would, indeed, be the crucial point of the entire negotiation. I explained to Simon in detail that we would, of course, in no case accept a unilateral supervision, as contained in the procedure described by him. A first period of 4 years was, moreover, not acceptable to us. In any case we had to insist that we be permitted at once to procure all the arms that were not prohibited to the others. Simon thereupon asked whether I could indicate to him how many of these weapons we wanted in the first period. I replied that I could not tell him, that it depended to a large extent also on the length of the first period and on the amount of material that the other countries had. He then asked that if possible we give him detailed information regarding our demands.

In the course of the conversation which lasted more than 1 hour, I pointed out repeatedly that if we consented at all to a division into two parts of the disarmament convention to be concluded, and if, as was to be expected from his own statements, practical disarmament measures would not be taken by the other side in the first period, we would have to demand in any case that it should be laid down very precisely even now at this time what weapons and what amounts had to be destroyed in the second period. Furthermore we would have to demand precise stipulations as to what were regarded as offensive weapons. The conversation did not go into details. From the account of Sir John Simon, I gained the definite impression, however, that no accord has been reached in Paris as yet between the English and the French. Simon then proposed that in the next few days a conversation of the five Powers, as in December of last year,<sup>3</sup> take place under Henderson's chairmanship. This will certainly bring out to what extent the views of the French, English, and Italians diverge. We spoke only briefly regarding the reorganization of the Reichswehr in accordance with the English proposals, and I pointed out that this reorganization could by no means take place overnight, as the English or the French again seemed to think it could.

The English, according to Simon, have replied to Mussolini's proposal of a four power meeting at Stresa, at the beginning of the month of October, to the effect that they first wanted to await the outcome of the negotiations here, but in any case would not come to the conference until it was thoroughly prepared, so that there would be no more question of a failure. We must in any case for the present expect the solid opposition of the French and the English to our procuring

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<sup>2</sup> The original reads here "um" which is obviously a typographical error and should read "und."

<sup>3</sup> See Editors' Note, p. 18.

any additional weapons of defense and the negotiations here presumably will collapse over this point.<sup>4</sup>

NEURATH

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<sup>4</sup> For Simon's record of this conversation see *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. v, document No. 411.

No. 448

8038/E578135-38

*Unsigned Memorandum*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, September 24, 1933.

*Points Concerning Foreign Policy (September '33)*

1. The most important goal is rearmament, and this is the principal immediate problem, because without an armaments settlement, no active foreign policy is possible.

2. The next aim is then to do away with our mutilation in the East.

3. To attempt to achieve this aim in opposition to France *and* Poland would mean postponing it indefinitely. A political condition should therefore be sought in which France would have reason to stand back if we settle matters with Poland in one way or another.

4. Matters are not yet ripe for such an arrangement with France, because France is still riding a too high horse, playing for too high stakes.

5. From 1-4 it follows that there is a concrete community of interest with Italy, based on the nature of things, on this point: through German-Italian collaboration and through German rearmament to attain a balance of power in Europe that would make France ready for agreement with us both: for the most important goal for Italy also is to get rid of French supremacy.

6. While there is little chance today of a German-Italian front, above all, because there can be no front with a militarily impotent country like Germany, still it is certain that we have an altogether essential common interest with Italy in the points mentioned, which makes it possible for us, and *must* cause us, to preserve this mutuality without any question and to go a good way together on its basis. We do not need to be disturbed today because Italy desires our military strengthening only within limits. On the other hand it should be noted that Italy, just because of our absolute and her relative weakness, desires no conflict today, not even over the disarmament question. (See Motives for the Four Power Pact.)

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<sup>1</sup> The memorandum is by Hassell. Cf. document No. 485.

7. There are dangers for our cooperation with Italy in two directions: first in the form of a direct Italo-French agreement at our expense. This is to be obviated, on the one hand, by trying to reassure Mussolini regarding the aims of German policy, then, through a gentlemen's agreement, repeatedly proposed by me, between the Führer and the Duce, to the following effect: no German-French, or Italo-French agreement at the expense of the other party and without the other party's being kept informed.

8. The second danger lies in the conflict of interests between Germany and Italy in the Danube Basin; above all, in an Italian closed-door policy *against* Germany, dictated by fear of Germany, *with* Hungary and Austria. On the other hand, as I have repeatedly pointed out, it is necessary for Germany to strive systematically for cooperation with Italy (elimination of her distrust) in the Danube region, on the basis, first, of as intimate a German-Hungarian relationship as it is possible to form and, second, of a determination of joint German-Italian interests in this area and of a settlement of the interests. In my last report from Rome before my vacation,<sup>2</sup> I set forth five points that may serve as a basis.

9. Good German-Yugoslav relations can at the same time perform useful service for Italy.

10. The conflict between the Reich and Austria is a serious impediment to German-Italian policy. I have expressed myself orally on the varying shades of Italian opinion. In my opinion, in dealing with Mussolini, the following fundamental points should be adhered to and always stressed *authoritatively*:

1) Unqualified recognition of the independence of Austria (Anschluss an international treaty problem that does not enter into question at all).

2) The chief demand we make and which we are justified in making because the Germans in the Reich and Austria are *one* people, is that all discrimination against the NSDAP in Austria cease.

11. The conflict is an *internal* affair of the German nation. Foreign "intervention" is out of the question. It would be impolitic to deny, however, that Italy decisively influences Viennese policy, or even that this influence must still be more welcome to us than that of the French and the Czechs, who even rely on Austro-Marxism, or rather, support it. In the circumstances, we should by no means strive to resolve the conflict through intervention, not even under the "patronage" of Italy, but on the basis of amicable understanding with Italy.

12. The problem of the southeast can only be solved satisfactorily for Germany if the Reich-Austrian conflict is settled. Meanwhile

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<sup>2</sup> See document No. 388.

German-Italian cooperation (on the basis of the "five points") is possible even today to a limited extent "around Austria" [*um Österreich herum*] and is at the same time calculated to have a favorable effect on the conflict. In this, too, the position of Hungary plays a special role.

## No. 449

2945/575849

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

SECRET

GENEVA, September 25, 1933.  
RM 1349.

I had a conversation today with Polish Foreign Minister Beck. He had already greeted me most amiably in the meeting of the League of Nations Assembly, contrary to his conduct heretofore. Before and after a luncheon with President of the League of Nations Council M. Mowinkel, he came to me and told me how very glad he was that German-Polish relations had experienced such a considerable relaxation of tension during recent months. He welcomed quite particularly the developments in Danzig. The Polish Government was tired of always letting itself be played off against Germany. In Warsaw they wanted to regulate relations with their neighbors themselves, and he was firmly resolved not to let the direct wire to Berlin break off again. With good will one could gradually solve most of the pending questions in a direct way. I replied to M. Beck that I decidedly welcomed his statements. He could be convinced that we had the best will on the German side and in particular were very much inclined to solve all pending questions in direct consultation with Warsaw. M. Beck then also mentioned that he had also chosen the new Minister in Berlin <sup>1</sup> from this viewpoint. The choice of the High Commissioner for Danzig played no role of any sort in the present conditions.

v. N[EURATH]

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<sup>1</sup> M. Józef Lipski.

## No. 450

3086/616948-49

*Memoranda of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*<sup>1</sup>

SEPTEMBER 26, 1933.

In accordance with instructions I telephoned to Dr. Matsch <sup>2</sup> at 8:45:

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<sup>1</sup> These memoranda originated at Geneva.

<sup>2</sup> Franz Matsch, an official in the Austrian Foreign Ministry.

The Foreign Minister spoke with the Federal Chancellor yesterday. The latter desired a meeting. The Foreign Minister would be at his disposal at 12:30 today, and suggests, in order that the conference should not attract attention and because he has to be present at negotiations before and after, that the meeting take place in the Hotel Carlton.

Dr. M[atsch] said Dollfuss was still asleep; that he would call up.

V[ÖLCKERS]

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SEPTEMBER 26.

Herr v. Hornbostel<sup>3</sup> called up at 9:30 and informed Herr Siegfried as follows:

D[ollfuss] had no reason for being particularly anxious that the meeting with the Foreign Minister should be inconspicuous. If the Foreign Minister had misgivings, however, about coming to the Hotel de la Paix for a talk, then, according to protocol, the solution could perhaps be found that the Foreign Minister would pay him a short courtesy visit at his hotel, whereupon he would gladly call on the Foreign Minister for a lengthy conversation at the Hotel Carlton.

In accordance with instructions, I have informed Herr von Hornbostel as follows:

After Federal Chancellor Dollfuss yesterday expressed the desire to have a conversation with the Foreign Minister, the latter proposed the Hotel Carlton as the place for the meeting. He was equally prepared, however, to meet the Federal Chancellor at any third place, should the latter have objections to a visit at the Carlton. I added that the Foreign Minister was attending the meeting of the Bureau of the League of Nations Assembly this morning and could be reached there.

SI[EGFRIED]

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SEPTEMBER 26.

To this, H[ornbostel] later replied:

Dollfuss was so busy that he could not undertake to meet Herr v. N[eurath] at the Bureau [meeting].<sup>4</sup>

V[ÖLCKERS]

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<sup>3</sup> Theodor Hornbostel, Director of the Political Department (Foreign Affairs) in the Austrian Federal Chancellery.

<sup>4</sup> According to a memorandum by Völckers of Sept. 28, Neurath had arranged with Kánya, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, that he would meet Dollfuss at Kánya's that morning. Dollfuss, however, canceled the engagement on account of the unfriendly reaction of the German press to his "very mild" speech in the League Assembly. Nevertheless, he would still be prepared to come to the meeting as arranged, provided Neurath would leave his calling card at his hotel. Neurath thereupon had Kánya notified that in the existing circumstances he now would rather not have the meeting (3086/616956).

## No. 451

2945/575850

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

GENEVA, September 26, 1933.

RM 1351.

In pursuance of yesterday's conversation with the Polish [Foreign] Minister <sup>1</sup> I had invited him to lunch today in order to introduce him to Minister Goebbels, too. In the course of the conversation M. Beck repeated the statements he made to me yesterday, in particular his intention to continue the policy of improving relations which he had instituted by means of direct negotiations with Germany. He mentioned as a concrete expression of his intentions the institution of discussions about the rescinding of bans on Polish newspapers in Germany and also on German newspapers in Poland. Reich Minister Goebbels promised to negotiate with him in this direction and gradually to readmit such Polish newspapers into Germany as were named to him by the Polish Government. M. Beck gave the same assurance with regard to the German newspapers.

M. Beck then also came to speak of the economic relations between Germany and Poland and suggested that we enter into an exchange of views on how the "rye competition," as he expressed it, could be eliminated. I suggested to him that he have the new Polish Minister make suggestions on this score.

The whole conversation took place in a decidedly friendly atmosphere.

v. N[EURATH]

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 449.

## No. 452

3058/609801

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

GENEVA, September 26, 1933.

RM 1357.

This morning Mr. Knox, Chairman of the Saar Government, called on me. He complained bitterly about the difficulties that had developed in the Saar Territory of late owing to the agitation of the parties, and about the fact that he had not even been allowed to bring in 5-10 Luxembourg criminal police. He had resolved to maintain the peace in the Saar Territory with all severity; he requested, however, that in Berlin they exert influence on the National Socialist leaders

in the Saar Territory in order to facilitate his task. I replied to Mr. Knox, that as regards his latter wish, I knew that instructions along these lines had been issued some time ago. But that the internal struggles which had taken place in Germany should also have their effects in the Saar Territory could not of course be avoided. Furthermore, it was after all natural that with the approach of the date of the plebiscite the agitation in the Saar Territory must increase. Mr. Knox then also mentioned that he intended to urge the Secretary General of the League of Nations to start the preparations for the plebiscite in the near future.

Finally, he also asked for an answer to the question he had raised in Berlin regarding the confiscation of the property of the labor unions in the Saar Territory.

V. N[EURATH]

### No. 453

3015/592752-53

#### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

GENEVA, September 26, 1933.  
RM 1358.

This afternoon Swiss Federal President Motta called on me. I had also asked Reich Minister Goebbels to the discussion. M. Motta stated that he was very much interested in clarifying German-Swiss relations, which of late had been seriously affected by various incidents. He considered it his duty to his country to keep relations with Germany as good as possible. For this it was necessary, however, that Germany, too, refrain from all actions that could disrupt these relations. M. Motta mentioned as such the recent border incidents.<sup>1</sup> I replied to him regarding these incidents that an investigation was in progress concerning the last incident near Otterbach. Should it become evident that the Germans concerned were at fault, then they would be punished. At the same time I informed him that those concerned in the incident in Ramsen had already been severely punished, a communication that M. Motta received with visible satisfaction. Then M. Motta turned the conversation to the prohibition of certain Swiss newspapers.<sup>2</sup> Minister Goebbels explained to him the reasons that had made such prohibitions necessary. Finally M. Motta came to speak of the great anxiety that reigned in Swiss circles

<sup>1</sup> The file on these incidents (Abt. II, Schweiz, Recht 5) is missing from the archives. Information appearing in the journal indicates that the reference is to several frontier violations along the German-Swiss border.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 424.



concerning the alleged ambition in National Socialist circles to annex the German parts of Switzerland. Minister Goebbels and I told him categorically that such an idea was entirely absurd. In Germany no reasonable person thought of endangering the existence of the Swiss Confederation. We authorized M. Motta to make whatever use of this statement he wished. In conclusion M. Motta asked us to work toward the final ratification of the German-Swiss agreement on double taxation that had been concluded a year ago. I promised that I would look into the matter.

V. N[EURATH]

No. 454

3154/669897-99

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

GENEVA, September 26, 1933.  
RM 1359.

Signor Aloisi and Signor Suvich called on me this afternoon to talk about disarmament questions. They told me that they discussed these questions yesterday with Sir John Simon and Eden,<sup>1</sup> as well as with Paul-Boncour and Massigli. So far as they could tell the French appeared to be inclined to give definite assurances regarding the abolition of arms in the convention to be concluded for the second period, which is to begin in about 3 years. For the first period, the French would agree not to increase their armaments. They were further prepared, within the framework of the 200,000 effectives under the MacDonald plan, to allow Germany to double the number of arms already permitted to the Reichswehr. But they were definitely opposed to having other arms permitted, especially aircraft. I told my two visitors that this question was of overriding importance to us. We demanded the right to possess all arms not forbidden to the others even in the first period, but would renounce such arms as the heavily armed states under the convention would undertake to destroy. Aloisi and Suvich agreed in their statements that the opposition to granting us any aircraft or other arms formerly forbidden to us came chiefly from the English and Americans. They said that they thought it impossible that we would be allowed these arms already in the first period. They tried to convince me that it would be, after all, a big success and step forward for us to have the French declare their willingness to give specific figures for their disarmament obligations with regard to the second period. I replied to them that the obliga-

<sup>1</sup> See *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. v. document No. 412.

tion to disarm was long overdue and that we viewed the promise of the French to destroy certain arms during the second period merely as the tardy fulfillment of this obligation. At any rate, I could only say that if we were not granted qualitative equality of rights, conclusion of a convention would be unacceptable to us, since it included, in addition, limitations in the form of supervision extending over several years. Both gentlemen kept reverting to the proposal that we content ourselves for the first 3 years with the increase in effectives and the additional armament which this implied. This I rejected.

Regarding the question of supervision the gentlemen informed me that the English had now agreed to automatic supervision. As for the commitment to be entered into by the heavily armed powers not to increase their armaments, they interpreted it as permitting replacement of obsolete weapons by the same number of new ones. This production for replacement purposes and the surrender and destruction of old weapons would come under the scope of supervision. The two gentlemen thought that, given the wide divergence of views at present about granting Germany arms that were not forbidden, there was little likelihood of reaching an early agreement. They stressed the danger, however, that in case of a failure of the negotiations, France might not only continue to arm at an accelerated pace but also proceed independently of others to occupy German territory.

With regard to Mussolini's plan for holding a four Power conference, Signor Suvich has also finally come to realize that such a conference could take place only after thorough diplomatic preparation to preclude its failure.

V. N[EURATH]

## No. 455

2880/562539-41

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, September 26, 1933.

The Russian Ambassador called on me today and brought up for discussion the Leipzig journalists incident<sup>1</sup> and the recall of the

<sup>1</sup> The two representatives of the Soviet press, M. Besspalov of the Tass Agency and Mme. Keith of *Izvestia*, to whom admission to the Reichstag fire trial at Leipzig had been denied (see document No. 428), had nevertheless proceeded to Leipzig, where they had been arrested in their rooms at the Hotel Kaiserhof at 7 a. m. on Sept. 22 (Tippelskirch memorandum of Sept. 22: 9447/-E666689-92). The Soviet Embassy had lodged an energetic protest in a note verbale of Sept. 23, in which warning was given of the possible consequences of such treatment on the position of German journalists in the Soviet Union (9447/E666693-98).

Russian correspondents here and the expulsion of the German correspondents from Russia.<sup>2</sup> He pointed out that the two correspondents who had gone to Leipzig had not yet known at their departure that they would not be admitted to the Reichstag fire trial, and thus were still justified in hoping that they would be permitted to attend.

I for my part pointed out that the affair of the correspondents had been made suspicious by the article in *Izvestia* in which it was asserted that the Soviet press would find ways and means of informing itself exhaustively about the progress of the trial. The suspicion had thereby arisen that the Russian correspondents would get into the court building without permission. The Ambassador stated that he had known nothing of the trip of the correspondents and that upon being informed conclusively that they would not receive admission cards he had immediately tried to recall them by telephone. At the hotel they had told him that the two had already left for Berlin. When they did not arrive here he had suspected that they had been arrested and had immediately dispatched his secretary Hirschfeld to Leipzig to bring them back. I pointed out that the Leipzig Police President had apologized and also expressed my regret at the incident. I also reminded the Ambassador that according to an earlier agreement the recall of Mme. Keith had already been promised us some time ago. Then I explained to the Ambassador the difficulties which we had in settling this type of case with the state governments in a brief period, and from this point of view I criticized the intention of the Russian Government to end the activity of the correspondents on both sides within 3 days. The Ambassador agreed with me in this. He, too, regretted very much the decision of his Government, but he had not been able to prevent it, since upon inquiry from Moscow he had not been able to point to any satisfaction accorded him. I pointed out that a step like that of Russia would be enthusiastically taken up abroad in order to proclaim the end of German-Russian political relations. They would say that after the Russian nonaggression treaties and the visits by Herriot and Cot the interruption in the old relations was now made strikingly evident. Furthermore, in the absence of correspondents, inadequate as they might be, the public opinion of both countries would be still further poisoned by agency and other reports from third countries. Also it would be difficult to get press relations going again later. Finally, the moment for such an action was the most unfavorable that could be

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 212 of Sept. 26, dispatched from Moscow at 1:43 p. m., Twardowski reported that he had been notified that the Soviet Government was recalling all Soviet correspondents from Germany immediately. In connection with this step the Soviet Government had requested all German correspondents to leave the Soviet Union within 3 days (2860/562545). Cf. document No. 477 and footnote 2.

imagined. By its very nature the Reichstag fire trial forms a high point of agitation. This was the case on the German side in view of the agitation concerning the Reichstag fire that had been carried on in Russia and other countries during the past weeks and months. It was impossible to bring about a noticeable relaxation of tension during the trial. For a long time I had had the end of the trial in mind as the time to try to bring about such a general relaxation of tension. That was being rendered more difficult if not impossible by the precipitate and unwise conduct of the Government in Moscow. I had resolved, independently of the Russian note,<sup>3</sup> to bring up the Leipzig case and its background for discussion in the Cabinet today or, if that should not be possible, to report on it to the Reich Chancellor. Whether, in view of the attitude of the Russian Government, this would lead to any sort of satisfactory statement on our part, I had to leave open.<sup>4</sup>

The Ambassador acted very reasonably and asked to be permitted to report on my very frank statements to his Government. He also asked me to inform him as soon as possible in case my report to the Reich Chancellor produced anything new.

Finally, the Ambassador complained that the Reich Minister of Economics had so far not made it possible to receive the Russian Chargé d'Affaires and M. Weizer. He—the Ambassador—now hoped to be able to speak with the Reich Minister of Economics tomorrow. He asked that the latter be persuaded to meet the Russian Ambassador tomorrow with understanding.

The Ambassador left me a memorandum on German-Soviet relations in the year 1933, in which the situation of Soviet nationals in Germany (arrests, house searches, molestations), the direction of commercial activity, economic relations, and political campaigns were discussed.<sup>5</sup> He remarked in that connection that he had not yet submitted this memorandum to Moscow.

In the course of the conversation the Ambassador mentioned that he had intended to go to Moscow in order to discuss German-Russian relations thoroughly. Since Stalin was on vacation this trip had no purpose, for to deal with the Foreign Ministry alone would lead to nothing. However, he was sending his Counselor of Embassy to Moscow by plane in order to try to bridge the present acute tension in some way or other.

BÜLOW

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<sup>3</sup> In addition to the note verbale of Sept. 23 (see footnote 1) the Ambassador had written a further note on Sept. 26 in which he announced the decision of the Soviet Government for the withdrawal of Soviet and expulsion of German journalists (9447/E666707).

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 457.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed (6025/H046847-60).

## No. 456

2339/487244-49

*Minutes of a Conference of Heads of Departments, Held at the Reich Chancellery, on Tuesday, September 26, 1933, at 4:15 p. m.*

Rk. 11565.

*Present:*

Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler  
Reich Minister of Interior Dr. Frick  
Reichswehr Minister von Blomberg  
Deputy of the Führer of the NSDAP Hess  
State Secretary Dr. von Bülow  
State Secretary Dr. Lammers  
State Secretary Funk <sup>1</sup>  
State Secretary Pfundtner <sup>2</sup>  
State Secretary Posse  
State Secretary Milch <sup>3</sup>  
Oberregierungsrat Dr. Thomsen as Keeper of the Minutes  
Ministerialrat Wienstein

*Agenda: Questions of Foreign Policy.*

I. Dutch proposal regarding the treatment of German emigrants.

State Secretary Dr. von Bülow: The Dutch Government has addressed a proposal to the League of Nations which concerns the treatment of political refugees from Germany. The Dutch Government did not undertake this step in order to make political difficulties for Germany, but in order to find ways and means that are appropriate for relieving Holland herself of this care which is becoming increasingly oppressive. A number of attempts have been made to prevent the Dutch Government from submitting this proposal.<sup>4</sup> The attempts were unsuccessful. According to the estimate of the Foreign Ministry there are about 50,000 refugees abroad, and they are mainly in France, Czechoslovakia, and Holland. They are beginning to become burdensome in these countries. Theoretically these refugees, with the exception of the few deprived of citizenship, are still German citizens

<sup>1</sup> Of the Propaganda Ministry.

<sup>2</sup> Of the Ministry of Interior.

<sup>3</sup> Of the Air Ministry.

<sup>4</sup> The German Minister at The Hague reported in telegram No. 48 of Sept. 22 that he had questioned the Dutch Foreign Minister about the matter after the newspapers had reported that the Netherlands Government would broach the question of Jewish refugees at the forthcoming League session (8792/E612570). On Sept 25 it was reported in telegram No. 13 from the delegation at Geneva that Neurath had explained the German position on this matter to the Dutch Foreign Minister. The latter replied "that the Dutch Government was acting from domestic political motives and was no longer able to retreat"; he also handed Neurath a copy of the Dutch proposal. (8792/E612573)

who have a claim to German protection. The intention is therefore to issue a statement at Geneva to the effect that with the exception of the few who have been deprived of citizenship all the other German refugees emigrated voluntarily, but that they continue to be under German protection and can also return to Germany at any time.<sup>5</sup> On the contrary it was to be stated that these German refugees are not to be issued special international identification papers, such as was done by establishment of the so-called Nansen passports in the case of the emigrated Russians and Rumanians.

The Foreign Minister wants authorization for issuing such a statement.

The Reich Chancellor objects to the content of the statement suggested by the Foreign Ministry. Actually it was a great advantage to Germany that the political refugees had left the country. Since these were predominantly eastern Jews it was no more than fair and just if other countries were also forced to accept a modest quota of this wave of eastern Jewish immigrants. Rather it should be stated in Geneva that:

1. It was a matter exclusively of people who had fled Germany because of a bad conscience and against whom investigations were being made in Germany.

2. In spite of the emergency in Germany we had in recent years accepted hundreds of thousands who had immigrated from the east.

3. We could not be expected to be forced to keep these people, and it had to be pointed out that other countries, particularly France and Switzerland, have always willingly accorded the right of asylum. Germany, however, could not make any statement which could be interpreted to mean that we were willing to accept refugees again and by virtue of which we might possibly be committed internationally.

State Secretary Dr. von Bülow asked permission to communicate the view of the Reich Chancellor to Geneva.<sup>6</sup> He pointed out that the possibility of the refugees returning to Germany was only to be hinted at in theory in order to make it more difficult to issue international interim passports.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup> According to a minute taken on Sept. 26 by Senior Counselor Barandon of the Legal Department, a statement of this kind had first been suggested by Gaus, who had telephoned from Geneva earlier that day informing the German Government of the possibility of a debate on the Dutch proposal and requesting authorization by the Cabinet for making this statement in such an event (8777/E611514-15).

<sup>6</sup> This was done in telegram No. 27 sent to the German delegation at Geneva on Sept. 26 (8777/E611516-17).

<sup>7</sup> Neurath recorded on Sept. 28 that the Dutch Foreign Minister handed him a new French text of the proposal he intended to place before the League emphasizing that his Government had no intention whatsoever of making difficulties for Germany. Neurath criticized the Dutch for not having first taken up the matter with Germany and stated that Germany had decided to declare that she was disinterested in the matter.

The Dutch proposal which was put before the League Assembly on Sept. 29 pointed out that the influx of German refugees into neighboring countries repre-

## II. German-Russian relations.

State Secretary Dr. von Bülow: German-Russian relations had been severely strained by the arrest of correspondents of the Russian Telegraph Agency and of *Izvestia* in Leipzig.<sup>8</sup> On his visit to the Foreign Ministry today,<sup>9</sup> the Russian Ambassador left a protest about individual cases of undue interference with Soviet citizens. The list of complaints comprises 113 incidents, including 16 relating to violation of diplomatic privileges, 23 relating to actions taken against Russian economic organizations, and 74 individual complaints. Most of these complaints have not yet been disposed of; only in a few individual cases have regrets been expressed. Consequently, Moscow has the impression, according to the Russian Ambassador, that Soviet citizens are without any rights in Germany and are exposed to any kind of arbitrary action. The individual incidents which had been subjects of complaints had occurred not only at the time of the revolution but as recently as August and September, and that without any incriminating material being uncovered.

The Russians have hitherto shown great patience; now, however, they have taken a step which is politically very unpleasant. They have recalled all Russian press representatives from Germany and suggested to the German journalists in Moscow that they leave immediately—which is tantamount to expulsion. This is happening at a time when a definite change in Russian policy is noticeable. Furthermore, the military relations between Germany and Russia have also cooled perceptibly.

The situation is also complicated by German-Russian economic relations. The Russian Government has considerable debts in Germany and is paying them to the last penny, since it does not wish to lose its international credit. For a long time, however, the Russian Government has been complaining about lack of understanding on our part for its wishes with respect to imports. It is therefore to be feared that the Russians will cease to do business with Germany. At present we have nothing to compensate for such heavy loss.

In this situation the Russian Ambassador has asked whether it would not be possible to authorize the present head of the Foreign Ministry to make a statement to the effect that we desire normal relations with Russia, as in the past, and will carefully investigate the individual complaints submitted. The Ambassador has also announced the impending visit of the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister,

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Footnote (7)—Continued

sented "an economic, financial, and social problem, a solution to which could only be found through international cooperation," and asked the League Council to study with the shortest possible delay the methods for bringing about a practical arrangement to that effect. (8777/E611518-19)

<sup>8</sup> See document No. 455, footnote 1.

<sup>9</sup> See document No. 455.

Krestinsky, and has asked that Krestinsky be received by the Reich Chancellor.

The agitation of public opinion in Russia is of course completely artificial. The Russian Government seems inclined, however, to abandon the patience it had hitherto shown. If there should be a further deterioration in German-Russian relations, it would also be in a position to suspend further payments on its debt without injuring its credit with other countries.

The Reich Chancellor: The Russian Government will never forgive Germany for our having smashed communism in Germany, for the fate of Soviet Russia has been decided by our revolution. The rulers in Moscow know that very well. In the relations with Russia the liabilities have always exceeded the profits. If we make the requested statement, the Russians will nevertheless look for some occasion to evade their obligations. Although he did not expect that it would do any good, he would be glad to receive Krestinsky. While German-Russian relations could not in practice be maintained in the long run, it would perhaps be advisable tactically, by means of the requested statement, to deprive them of an opportunity to get away from us.

State Secretary Posse and the Reichswehr Minister spoke briefly about the economic and the military relations between Germany and Russia.

After the conclusion of the discussion State Secretary von Bülow asked that instructions be issued to the domestic authorities that in the future there is to be no undue interference with Soviet citizens in any circumstances.<sup>10</sup>

Recorded:  
THOMSEN

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<sup>10</sup> See also document No. 457.

## No. 457

2860/562542-44

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, September 26, 1933.

Following the meeting of the Cabinet,<sup>1</sup> at a ministerial conference attended by the Reichswehr Minister, the Reich Minister of Interior, representatives of the Reich Minister of Economics, and the Prussian Minister President, I outlined the latest development in the German-

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<sup>1</sup> At the Cabinet meeting referred to, the hereditary estate act was discussed; the minutes are filmed on 3598/793865-81.



Russian tension as reflected by the rupture of journalistic relations. I pointed to the Russian complaints, of which the Ambassador had handed me a list today,<sup>2</sup> and commented on our own list which we had compiled on the subject. I made a particular point of stressing that to all intents and purposes Russians in Germany were deprived of the protection of the law; that there was hardly a case where they had received satisfaction on their complaints and that naturally the feeling was growing that they were treated in an arbitrary manner. This has generated the impression in Moscow that the patience practiced initially no longer served any useful purpose, that German-Russian relations could not be kept up, and under the effect of this mood the break coming about with the recall and expulsion, respectively, of the correspondents is dramatically announced before the whole world. This creates a situation which is difficult for our foreign policy to cope with. There had been much talk in the past about orientation toward the East and toward the West; at the present time there is nothing our foreign policy could gain in return for the break with Russia, and in our present situation, moreover, we can only with difficulty dispense with the "Russian shadow." To this must be added the break in the previously existing military relations, which as such could be very easily replaced by new ones of a new character, provided a reasonably normal atmosphere could be restored. Finally I outlined the precarious state of economic relations, directing a special appeal to the Reich Minister of Economics and warning of the danger that the Russians, who were anxious to avoid any suspension of payments so as not to compromise their credit, might look for and find political pretexts to rid themselves of their indebtedness to Germany. I asked for authorization to make reassuring statements to the Russian Ambassador here, and requested the Chancellor personally to receive Krestinsky when he passed through Berlin at the middle of October.

The Reich Chancellor explained in a lengthy discourse that a restoration of the German-Russian relationship would be impossible because the new order in Germany had crushed every hope the Russians had to carry out the world revolution. A sharp antagonism would of course remain between Germany and Russia, but he was not in favor of our side breaking off German-Russian relations or furnishing the Russians with a pretext for such a break. He would therefore agree to my giving the Russian Ambassador reassuring statements and he would be willing, distasteful though it would be for him, to receive Krestinsky. We ought not, however, to indulge in delusions: The Russians were always lying and they would one day leave us in the lurch; and they would probably never pay off the remainder of their debts.

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<sup>2</sup> See document No. 455 and footnote 5.

State Secretary Posse delivered a few remarks about the difficulties in meeting the Russian demands in the economic field, and the Reichswehr Minister spoke briefly on German-Russian military relations in the past.

I then requested once more that measures be taken to curtail, if not stop, the countless illegal acts against Russians in Germany, for which there was no sufficient justification. Several instances cited by me were discussed. The Reich Minister of Interior ascribed these undesirable incidents chiefly to the vague delimitations of jurisdiction and authority and indicated that he would in another connection present to the Chancellor a report on the subject.

The consensus at the conclusion of the conference seemed to be that while it would be impossible to satisfy the complaints of the Russians in all respects, substantial efforts ought to be made to remove at least some of the grievances.

BÜLOW

No. 458

2860/562546-49

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

No. 215 of September 26

Moscow, September 26, 1933—11:00 p. m.

Received September 27—4:15 a. m.

In a prolonged and in part very sharp discussion with Litvinov I orally repeated the protest against the expulsion of the German correspondents in the most categorical manner. I characterized this action of the Soviet Government as a breach of German-Russian agreements, underscored the political consequences of this step, and requested revocation of the expulsion. Litvinov replied in greatest agitation that the dignity of the Soviet Government and the Russian people could no longer tolerate Soviet citizens being placed on a level with criminals; for a half year now Soviet nationals had without cause been subjected to house searches and molestations against which the Soviet Government had protested over and over again, without these protests accomplishing more than getting apologies. Neither the Soviet Government nor the public had heard anything about measures by the German Government designed to prevent repetition of these incidents, and particularly about punishment of the guilty. Representatives of official Soviet organs, and no one else, had been barred from reporting the trial, which was of special interest to the Soviet public particularly. Just as in connection with the Reichstag opening, the Soviet Embassy had protested against this in vain.

Subsequently, Soviet correspondents in Leipzig were arrested and even threatened with revolvers. He would not even say anything about the continuing molestations of Soviet correspondents by the SA and the SS. For a long time the Soviet Government had shown patience and awaited a sign of a change of attitude in Germany. At long last it was realized that diplomatic methods apparently brought no response in Germany, and the Soviet Government had now reached the decision that it would not allow the representatives of the Soviet public to work in Germany under these humiliating conditions. It had therefore instructed the Soviet Ambassador on September 23 to serve notice in a note to the Foreign Ministry<sup>1</sup> that the Soviet Government would recall the Soviet correspondents from Germany unless redress was offered for the past incidents. This note had remained unanswered, which fact, of course, seriously aggravated the situation for the Soviet Government. As a countermeasure it had even been tentatively considered that German press representatives in Moscow be subjected to a similar regime as the Soviet press representatives in Berlin. But it seemed preferable to expel the press representatives since the principle of reciprocity did not admit of letting German press representatives work unmolested in Moscow when the practices of German authorities actually rendered impossible any work by representatives of the Soviet public.

Over against this I recalled the many instances where Reich Germans in the Soviet Union were arrested and their houses searched, and cited individual cases. I stressed in the most emphatic terms that the arrest of the Soviet correspondents in Leipzig was the unauthorized act of subordinate organs, that the Police President had personally apologized for it, and that the Foreign Ministry had expressed its regrets, so that every amend possible had been made.

As regards the note of September 24,<sup>2</sup> that day was a Sunday so that as a practical matter the Foreign Ministry did not receive it until Monday and for technical reasons alone was unable to let the Embassy have an answer by Tuesday morning.

Upon my renewed and most earnest representations regarding the political consequences, M. Litvinov replied that the Soviet Government had reached this decision only with a heavy heart. It attached great importance to good relations with Germany, but had the impression that this disposition found no answering sentiment in Germany. The Soviet Government had no intention of forcing its friendship on Germany, and while other countries were seeking to

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 455, footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup> This apparently refers to the Soviet Embassy's note verbale of Sept. 23, mentioned in footnote 1. An attached note of Sept. 23 by Tippelskirch states that the note was delivered to him by the Soviet Counselor of Embassy at 2 p. m. on that day, Saturday (9447/E666697-98).

compose their disagreements with the Soviet Union, Germany showed not the least consideration for the feelings of the Soviet Union. This development of events was a cause of deep personal regret to him.

In the course of the conversation M. Litvinov intimated that in Soviet opinion the existing conflict could be settled if the Soviet correspondents received redress, that is to say, were admitted to the Leipzig trial, since thereby the discrimination would be terminated, and if the German public were given to understand in some form or other that any person unlawfully interfering with a Soviet citizen would be brought to justice.

In answering the note of the Soviet Embassy it might perhaps be possible to make immediate use of M. Litvinov's hints regarding settlement of the conflict.

M. Litvinov then also said that he had intended not to publicize the expulsion, in order not to intensify the conflict, but unfortunately the German correspondents had already notified their newspapers. That would necessitate a reaction by the Soviet press. I replied not to inform Herr Lindenhard of this intention;<sup>3</sup> besides, the Foreign Commissariat had it in its power, through its censorship, to prevent the reports from going out, as had in fact been done in other instances. However, it was impossible to expel newspapermen without having the world public know about it at once.

I have advised the German correspondents here to submit individual applications for postponement of the expulsion date by, say, 14 days.

It is my impression that Baum will be able to stay on here as Embassy press adviser, but no reporting activity for the WTB will be possible at present.

TWARDOWSKI

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<sup>3</sup> It would appear that part of this sentence was garbled in transmission.

No. 459

6609/E497195

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry*

SECRET  
A 2037

Moscow, September 26, 1933.  
Received September 28.  
IV Ru. 4337.

Subject: Soviet indiscretions.

With reference to your Instruction IV Ru. 4080 of September 14, 1933.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> This instruction stated that the Hungarian Government had learned from reliable sources and had informed the Foreign Ministry "that the Soviet Govern-

Since for some days M. Stern could not be reached owing to illness, I used the opportunity today of a discussion with M. Litvinov to inform him of the alleged indiscretions of the Soviet Government in Paris spoken of in the instruction referred to above. M. Litvinov replied gravely that there were certain circles that had an interest in making German-Soviet relations even worse. He wanted to tell me quite formally that the Soviet Government had naturally not made any communications to Paris of the type mentioned. At the same time he wanted to assure me that no matter how French-Soviet relations developed, the Soviet side would not commit indiscretions concerning the former cooperation with Germany. It owed that to its political prestige.

TWARDOWSKI

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Footnote (1)—Continued

ment had made detailed disclosures in Paris concerning alleged preparations by Germany in the field of gas warfare and in air armament." Twardowski was instructed to bring this to Stern's attention, stating that it represented a French attempt to stir up distrust of the Soviet Government in Germany, and to report Stern's reaction and that of other Soviet officials to whose attention it might be brought. (6609/E497163-64)

## No. 460

5892/E432651-61

*The Military Attaché in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry*

No. 162/33

Moscow, September 26, 1933.

Annex I<sup>1</sup>

II F 3202.

### FAREWELL DINNER TO THE DIRECTOR OF ZM

Discussion of pending questions with the Director of the "Foreign Liaison" Department of the Red Army Staff

1. The dispatch of the following telegram of September 18 is confirmed: "Smagin contemplating farewell dinner for Schüttel, with Alksnis, Khalepsky, Fischmann, present in person. The latter here only after maneuvers. I request that you wire approval for the postponement of Schüttel's departure until toward the end of the month in order to assure the effectiveness of the proposed strong gesture of the Red Army. Hartmann."

The Reichswehr Ministry agreed to the postponement of the departure. (It has meanwhile taken place on September 24.)

The dinner took place on the evening of September 23. Those participating on the German side were Herr Schüttel, Herr Grasshoff, Herr Krebs and I; on the Russian side, from the Red Army Staff,

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<sup>1</sup> The Military Attaché's report itself is not printed (5892/E432646-50).

MM. Smagin and Smolin. The chiefs of the Air Force, the Chemical Administration, and Motorization and Mechanization, who were expected, did not appear personally. Representatives sent were as follows: in place of Alksnis, Commanders [*Kommandeure*] Chernobrovkin and Feodorov; for the two other administrations, one representative each, not previously known. The dinner took place in the Government House on the Spiridonovka. Krebs and I appeared in uniform.

2. The first impression was one of absolute astonishment that only representatives were sent by the three Russian administrations, although the personal presence of the chiefs had been promised. I should like definitely to assume, however, that the undoubted intention of Smagin to include the chiefs personally could not be carried out for valid reasons. I cannot assume an intentional deception on the part of Smagin. The further course of the evening would have disproved this. As it was, moreover, a thorough discussion with Smagin could all the more readily be had in the course of the evening.

The after dinner speeches were characterized entirely by appreciative recognition of past cooperation and of the wish for its continuance in new forms which might be found. Smagin's speech rose considerably above the level of the conventional and above the immediate occasion of the party as a farewell dinner for Herr Schüttel. He stated in great detail that the Soviet Union desired peace in all quarters; that the Red Army was working for this peace; that the cooperation had likewise served this purpose; and, finally, that the *Rapallo Treaty was still the foundation of friendly political relations between Germany and Russia and also of the peace in Europe, which depended very much on the importance of the Red and German Armies and their relations with each other.*

In my reply I could again "state with pleasure and satisfaction on the occasion of the termination of the cooperation in its previous form, that this joint work has admittedly served the interests of both Armies, and that it is the wish of both Armies to continue the cooperation." In this connection I was able to cite: the words of the Chief of the Army Command, in his statement on the occasion of the liquidation of *Lipetsk [Liquidation L.]*; the friendly reaction that these words had met with in the Red Army; the repeated references and similar statements of high ranking leaders (Voroshilov, Yegorov, Khripin, Smagin, etc.), and the reiterated similar avowal just now made by Smagin; the many statements of appreciation and gratitude to the Reichswehr, which high ranking leaders of the Red Army had expressed in the Soviet Union and abroad.

Herr Schüttel briefly expressed his personal thanks.

Thereupon the three representatives of the administrations spoke in succession in the names of their chiefs. The representative of the Air Force gloried in the fact that the Reich Army, in spite of lacking an air force of its own, had kept and developed after the war its high degree of aeronautical competence in a tactical and technical respect, and that the Red Army had been able to derive great benefit therefrom. The representative of the Gas Administration stressed the importance of the chemical arm for the next war and in connection therewith spoke appreciatively of the German chemical industry. The representative of the Motorization and Mechanization Administration had the highest praise for German industry, which he had learned to esteem on the occasion of various visits to Germany.

3. After dinner there was opportunity for a very long, very frank conversation between me and Smagin, conducted in a friendly tone, and yet in completely penetrating seriousness. From its substance, the following principal topics may be noted:

a) *Remonstrance over the content and form of the Russian refusal in the summer of this year.*

Smagin referred to the many disagreeable occurrences in Germany which had in one case also been directed against a commander [*Kommandeur*] of the Red Army. He said, that, with every allowance for the heated political atmosphere, these things should not be minimized. There were Soviet citizens and Soviet citizens [*Sowjetbürger sei nicht gleich Sowjetbürger*]. If incidents involving any Soviet persons at all could not perhaps be entirely prevented, this could be taken into account. But the prominent position of the Red Army within the structure of the Soviet State, and the high rank of the officers of the Red Army who were sent to Germany (recently expressions such as "officer" or "General of the Red Army" are frequently heard) *under no circumstances* permits that they be exposed to the danger of an unjust molestation. The possibility of this had, in the Russian view—which I rejected as completely unwarranted—definitely existed last summer and had been the principal reason for their refusal. Smagin no longer justified it, as was done then, on the grounds that they were occupied with official duties. He did not wish to attribute any deeper significance from the point of view of foreign policy to the refusal. Smagin mentioned the undeniable fact of the preferential treatment of German military guests in Russia. He also said that if the German officers invited to and expected at the maneuvers had come to Russia (see b), then in his opinion, the sending of Russian officers to Germany could also have taken place subsequently. He saw for the future, moreover, no difficulties in principle in the way of sending Russian officers to Germany, in so far as there was assurance that they would not be exposed to political or police incidents. I

told Smagin that it would, indeed, have been better to give these real reasons under their correct descriptions at the time instead of embellishing their refusal with pretexts of official duties, which under the existing conditions could hardly have been believed in Germany.<sup>2</sup>

*b) Failure of the German officers to appear at the Russian maneuvers.*

The failure to appear caused astonishment in the Red Army and was regretted. Smagin tried to fathom the reasons since he said he did not even now have any real explanation for it. I replied that he had at the time been informed of the reasons.<sup>3</sup> Aside from practical reasons, the fact had also played a part that, just before this, Schnittmann's<sup>4</sup> refusal of participation by Russian officers in the German maneuvers, which had been communicated brusquely and only by telephone, had been painful and offensive, particularly to persons whose complete and vigorous advocacy of the cultivation of friendly relations between the Armies was beyond all doubt. Smagin admitted that a considerable error of form had been committed in that case. I mentioned to Smagin, moreover, Levichev's<sup>5</sup> visit to the Reichswehr Ministry and the information on this matter that he had been given there, which he had apparently also understood properly.

*c) Wishes of the Military Attaché and his assistant regarding assignments.*

In connection with the talks on points a) and b), I was able to complain to Smagin that Russian readiness to receive German officers in fulfillment of our wishes regarding exchange of intelligence personnel [*Informations-kommandos*] had not been in evidence. Not even reciprocity had been granted corresponding to the ready fulfillment of all of Levichev's requests. Smagin at first tried to prove that

<sup>2</sup> The basic documents on the matters discussed in this paragraph have not been found. In a subsequent conversation with Tukhachevsky, however, on Nov. 1, Twardowski referred back to difficulties which had come up during the summer as follows: "The trip of General von Bockelberg to the Soviet Union had gone off very harmoniously, but during the time between his departure from Moscow and his arrival in Berlin the Red Army had suddenly made the quite unexpected demand for an immediate liquidation of the operations. Shortly thereafter came the rejection, in extremely discourteous form, of participation of officers of the Red Army in courses in Germany which had been arranged for Soviet Commanders at the request of the Red Army." (6609/E497288-94)

Twardowski's report A 2410 of Nov. 6 on his conversation with Tukhachevsky will be printed in vol. II of this series.

<sup>3</sup> In report No. 154/33 of Aug. 3 Hartmann had given an account of a conversation with Smagin on July 26, during which he had informed Smagin that the German Government had decided not to send any officers to Soviet "exercises" in the summer of 1933. Smagin was described as "obviously surprised" at this news and inquired whether this included "maneuvers" as well. Hartmann said that he would find out (5892/E432509-14). On Aug. 16 Assistant Military Attaché Krebs informed Smagin that maneuvers were included (Krebs memorandum of Aug. 22 sent to Berlin as annex to report No. 157/33: 5892/E432554-60).

<sup>4</sup> Soviet Assistant Military Attaché in Berlin.

<sup>5</sup> Soviet Military Attaché in Berlin.



reciprocity existed by means of the Attaché visits which were general here. Then he tried to plead lack of time in connection with the change of positions between Sukhorukov and Smagin and with the French visits of Herriot and Pierre Cot. Finally he said he was prepared also to promise that the requests would still be complied with, for the training period was not yet over. As opportunity was again provided in this connection to speak about these points, I shall not of my own accord revert to the subject of these requests, for we cannot—at least at present—expect really beneficial exchanges of personnel.

When I contrasted the cautious attitude toward requests for exchanges of personnel put forward by us as representatives of a friendly army, with the extensive admission of Japanese officers for long details with troops, Smagin stated repeatedly and emphatically that the details were ended and there were no longer any Japanese officers of any kind detailed within the Red Army (!)

*d) Willingness to continue with the exchange of personnel.*

It could be inferred from the discussions on a), b), c) that, from the military point of view, the Red Army was prepared forthwith for a further exchange of personnel. There was no direct discussion of this question by either side.

*e) Russian affirmations of friendship for France and Poland. Military agreement with France.*

I asked Smagin how we were to reconcile the evidences of friendship toward France and Poland with former German-Russian military relations and the reiterated desire for their further cultivation. Smagin said that at present they had no military significance of a deeper kind. The Soviet Union desired to live in peace with *all* states; she therefore had to cultivate friendly relations in *all* directions. What happened in this respect with regard to *one* state was no sign of unfriendliness toward *another*. It was natural, to be sure, that developments in German foreign policy should be watched carefully in Russia. It was up to Germany to come out positively and unequivocally. Repeatedly Smagin's statements were marked by references to the political ideas of Rosenberg, for which they had the strongest mistrust in the Soviet Union, and in which, despite all assurances to the contrary, they thought they perceived an official character or at least official support. The ideas propagated in literature, the Government press, and public speeches could not be dismissed as private utterances, if the Government did not dissociate itself unequivocally from the person of Rosenberg, who stood for a political program. If this condition which, considered from the Soviet side, was a dubious one continued it would mean a serious and direct danger to the existence of the Soviet Union; and it would then, in Smagin's

opinion, also not be impossible that in time the affirmations of friendship to France and Poland would acquire a deeper political significance.

A military treaty between the Soviet Union and France does not, according to Smagin, exist, and is also not sought by the Soviet Union. Smagin stated that, in his opinion, a military treaty only made sense if it were to unite two states and be directed against a third. For the Soviet Union, however, there was at present, in his opinion, no country against which such a combination was necessary. But . . . etc.,<sup>\*</sup> as in the preceding paragraph ("Rosenberg complex").

In this connection the reproduction of an article from the *Petit Parisien* in *Izvestia* of September 24 also deserves consideration. It expresses French disinterestedness in a Franco-Russian military alliance.

Reports of very much more extensive rapprochements, particularly that they have already entered the stage of receiving military instructors and the like, are not to be believed, in my opinion, particularly when they emanate from a French source. Facts in this respect are not known to me. The other Attachés here, too, are very dubious about effective military agreements between France and Russia. The intention of the Russians to discriminate against us is too obvious and shows too much similarity with the previous discrimination of the Germans against the Russians (alleged Papen talks).

Smagin would not agree with my statement that in its attitude toward the Versailles Treaty and the problems of Geneva Russian public opinion was now being formulated differently than formerly.

f) *Conclusions:*

aa) In his discussions, Smagin naturally spoke only as a private person. Since he is a distinctive personality, however, and since his thinking is flexible and he is independent in action, his views go beyond what was to be expected of his predecessors in the same position. The fact that he enters into such conversations willingly and engages in free discussion is all the more deserving of consideration since Smagin himself indicated that to a large extent he had the ear of Voroshilov. I have the opinion that such conversations could clear the atmosphere and never divide but only bring people together personally, even if strongly divergent views are expressed.

bb) The desire and the willingness to continue military relations in a new form, yet earnestly and sincerely, is, in my opinion, *still* a firm political concept, but it has been undermined. Russian anxiety concerning the future course of our foreign policy, which is, among other things, expressed also in our military relations, is of an elemen-

<sup>\*</sup> Omission indicated in the original.

tary nature. Its reasons have nothing to do with partisan or ideological anxiety, but simply with the anxiety concerning the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union. This fear may, in our opinion, be greatly exaggerated. From the Russian point of view it is a reality. I therefore consider it sincere and basically not intended as bluff.

The essential consistency of the Russian thinking, whether it is communicated through official channels or in private conversation, from politician to politician or from soldier to soldier, likewise seems a certain assurance of their internal solidarity, but also of its serious significance at the present time. Confined to military relations, the situation *still* looks as if the Russians wanted to ease the present tension but are trying to lay the blame on the other partner in order to substantiate their claim that the initiative would have to be taken by the other side.

For Germany to offer her hand in agreement to this means, in my opinion, the preservation of the military friendship, but this alone is not enough; it must be predicated on the exclusion of all secondary manifestations that cloud our political relations. The German side would have to be prepared for both offer and performance (reference: report 161/33 of September 19, annex I, pages 6-8<sup>7</sup>). To wait for a Russian initiative means, in my opinion, not only probably deferring rapprochement, but resigning oneself to a progressive deterioration of our present relations. At the same time I do not wish to neglect mentioning that I see the thing from the angle of the Russian attitude toward us Germans. The view is still too favorable a one, however, if it is true that if, perhaps in order to "spare" us, they are even now painting the picture in friendlier colors than they do in discussion with foreigners not directly concerned.

HARTMANN

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<sup>7</sup> Document No. 439.

## No. 461

2860/562550-52

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, September 27, 1933.

Today, as promised, I reported to the Russian Ambassador, whom I had asked to call, the position which the Reich Chancellor and the competent ministers had yesterday taken on the Leipzig incident and German-Russian relations. The Chancellor had stated on his part that he was entirely able and willing to draw a line between political matters related to the party and issues of foreign policy, and to regulate German-Russian relations accordingly. But he wondered whether

Russia, having raised world revolution to a position in its program, would be able to draw the same distinction. Besides, it had not been forgotten in Germany that for 10 long years Russian emissaries and Germans specially trained in Russia for that purpose had carried on Communist propaganda in the Reich. Anti-Bolshevik feeling was therefore running very high in Germany, all the more so because Russian propaganda was still continuing by radio and other means. The current trial in Leipzig marked the climax of both this propaganda and the excitement about Bolshevism in our country, and this climax was not the proper moment for bringing about a clarification of German-Russian relations. He was nevertheless prepared to receive M. Krestinsky on his passage through Berlin, if the latter expressed a desire for it, in order to discuss German-Russian relations with him. He, the Reich Chancellor, was also alive to the fact that party political issues changed their aspect but that peoples, foreign political interests, and geographical conditions remained unchanged, and he was prepared to take this into account in assessing and dealing with German-Russian relations. I had finally detailed the numerous incidents which had been discussed here by the Russian side, and the Reich Minister of the Interior had promised that he would take up with the Reich Chancellor administrative measures designed to remedy this unhappy situation which he believed was mainly due to the overlapping jurisdictional boundaries of diverse agencies. I also mentioned in passing that other countries had even more frequent occasion for similar complaints.

With regard to the Leipzig trial itself, the Reich Chancellor had said that he entirely understood the attitude of the court in refusing to admit Communist and Social-Democratic correspondents. In view of the continuing partisanship of the Russian press for the defendants and their motives, it was inconceivable that the reporting of the Russian representatives would be objective. These Russian representatives moreover demanded to be admitted not as representatives of Russia but as representatives of the Communist ideology, and were in fact viewing the proceedings in Leipzig solely from the point of view of the Communist party, as had been amply shown by their attitude all along.

I also told the Ambassador that since this conference with the Reich Chancellor I had learned from Moscow<sup>1</sup> that M. Litvinov had laid down two stipulations for settling the conflict, namely, admission now of Russian representatives to the trial, a demand that was utterly impossible of fulfillment, and, further, punishment of the police officials who had indulged in illegal acts against the Russian correspondents in Leipzig. The latter demand was premature and I was sorry that

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 458.

the Russian Government had not shown the wisdom of awaiting the outcome of the investigation in Leipzig. There had been sent from Berlin last night, or rather this morning, a special representative to hasten investigation of the affair. His report had not yet come to my hand. In addition I repeated the statement I made yesterday regarding the unwisdom of the breaking off of journalistic relations contemplated by Russia.<sup>2</sup>

The Ambassador said that what I had told him yesterday about the *tertius gaudens* along with my other remarks had already been reported to Moscow by him, that is to say, would be reported to Litvinov by the Counselor of Embassy who had flown to Moscow this morning. As for himself, he also failed to understand the hastiness with which his Government was acting. But, similarly, he could no more understand our attitude regarding the correspondents and their exclusion from the trial. The fact remained that not a single Russian representative had been admitted. That seemed unreasonable to him also for the reason that one duly admitted representative—and the Russian side would have been content with the admission of one official Tass representative—would report with greater circumspection and objectivity than the correspondents who now were dependent on the observations of other reporters.

BÜLOW

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<sup>2</sup> See document No. 455.

## No. 462

9387/E664702-06

### *Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry*

BERLIN, September 30, 1933.  
e. o. W IV Ru. 4409.

On September 27 I discussed German-Russian economic questions with M. Weizer, the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Trade and head of the Soviet Trade Mission here. M. Weizer began with the question of the release of additional blocked mark funds and informed me that the negative attitude of the German Government had made an extremely unfavorable impression in Moscow because in the view of the Soviet Government the Reich Economics Ministry was trying to go back on a definitely given promise. It might perhaps seem strange that this matter should be given such importance in the entire context of German-Russian economic relations. But one thing was coming on top of the other, and there was a danger that the tension might go beyond tolerable bounds. Just as in the case of the German newspaper-

men, a trifle might after all suffice to bring the cup to overflowing. Disturbed economic relations, however, were much harder to set right again than disagreements in political questions, the shaping of which, in the final account, was governed by the common political interests.

I replied to M. Weizer that the Foreign Ministry had exerted itself strenuously in behalf of a satisfactory settlement of the matter but, as we understood, the objections from the point of view of financial policy were very strong. In any case, the last word had not yet been spoken in the matter.

M. Weizer then discussed the grain question at length with the familiar arguments. Moscow and he were taking the view that Germany had broken the Grain Agreement of May 2, 1932.<sup>1</sup> The resentment provoked was all the greater because Germany had negotiated large-scale grain purchases in Hungary, Yugoslavia,<sup>2</sup> and Rumania, even though only private contracts were involved. It was firmly believed, however, that the Reich Government had lent a helping hand. Be that as it may, the fact remained that the Soviet Union was left out completely in the matter of German grain imports. Without Government pressure exerted on the German mills it was out of the question for the Soviet Union to sell grain in Germany because the German mills, on account of the high tariff, had a greater profit margin in importing high grade Canadian (Manitoba) wheat.

I replied to M. Weizer that in our view the text of the Grain Agreement of May 2 of last year imposed no commitments upon us for the current year, but that the Reich Food Ministry had nevertheless agreed to negotiate with the Trade Mission about importing Soviet grain. The German side naturally presented counter demands, which the Soviet side had rejected without even making an attempt to negotiate about them. An offer of the Reich Food Ministry to act as go-between for a grain compensation deal was ignored by the Soviet side.

M. Weizer stressed particularly that the atmosphere in Moscow had to be taken into consideration. The Soviet Government had to strain itself to the utmost at the present time to meet its financial obligations toward Germany. Gold and practically all of the foreign currency available must be used to pay the debts owed to Germany. This tremendous effort failed to be appreciated by Germany. Exports to Germany were severely contracting and the German Government adopted a negative attitude in all matters that were calculated to improve the Soviet balance of payments. The Soviet Government was prepared to meet its commitments in Germany, but Germany must not draw the bow too tightly. In the event of a stoppage of payments

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<sup>1</sup> Filmed on 9530/E672068-71.

<sup>2</sup> A handwritten question mark appears in the margin opposite "Yugoslavia." See document No. 421.

to Germany—this being of course put forward only on a hypothetical basis—the world credit of the Soviet Union would not at all be shaken by it. On the contrary, the international Jewish world of finance would be pleased and the Soviet Government would probably stand a better chance of obtaining foreign loans if it were no longer saddled with the liability [*Hypothek*] of Germany. Only a few days ago he had been asked by Dutch *government* circles why indeed the Soviet Government was continuing to pay to Germany who on her part made no payments to her foreign creditors. Since so many countries were no longer meeting their foreign obligations, M. Weizer thought that it could not shake the credit of the Soviets either if—and he repeatedly stressed the hypothetical character of his remarks—the Soviet Government were to make its payments to Germany into blocked ruble accounts in Moscow and temporarily suspended the transfer.

I recalled to M. Weizer in detail the continuous efforts of the German Government over the past 2 years in helping the Soviet Union discharge her financial obligations to Germany (Protocol of December 22, 1931; <sup>3</sup> Reichsmark Agreement of May 2, 1932; <sup>4</sup> Customs Tariff Agreement of May 27 [28], 1932; <sup>5</sup> Protocol of January 17, 1933; <sup>6</sup> interim loan of February 25, 1933; <sup>7</sup> the letter of recommendation concerning the importation of Soviet crude naphtha, etc.<sup>8</sup>) and told him that we could not see why we should have to commit ourselves to special gratuities to the Soviet Government as a reward for its willingness actually to pay for the goods bought in Germany. Certainly, we were prepared to cultivate further our economic relations with the Soviet Union, but our readiness had limits set to it by our domestic economic policy. Furthermore, we did not know how the Soviet Government was going to treat us in the matter of new orders. In these past months orders had dropped to a minimum; the Soviet orders in the past 2 months had amounted only to 9 million reichsmarks.

M. Weizer stated that *up to this time* there was no intention of treating Germany differently in economic matters as against other states. But he had to bring to my attention that in the countries with devaluated currencies, but also in France, Belgium, Holland, and Poland, prices were far below German prices. The Soviet Union was moreover able to buy, e. g., products of the I. G. Farben-Industrie cheaper in Holland than directly from the I. G. itself, because exports of the I. G. to third countries are to a large extent paid for with blocked marks bought at a cheap rate.

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<sup>3</sup> Not printed (9530/E671822-82).

<sup>4</sup> Not printed (9530/E672064-67).

<sup>5</sup> Filmed on 5644/H001432-38.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed (6608/E496594-601).

<sup>7</sup> Agreement not printed (6608/E496638-81).

<sup>8</sup> Not found.

The outcome of the conversation could in substance be summarized as follows :

1. The Soviet Government intends to continue its payments to Germany as hitherto. But it has apparently already examined the question of the consequences which stoppage of payments to Germany might entail. It appears not impossible that the Soviet Government will seize upon any serious new economic incident to suspend the transfer of its debts owed to Germany. This danger could be forestalled on the German side by continuing to cultivate economic relations with the Soviet Union, which believes itself entitled to expect considerate treatment in return for being prompt in its payments to Germany.

2. No instruction has so far been received to discriminate against Germany in the matter of future orders from the Soviet Union. Such discrimination, however, may occur if Germany should fail to show a greater interest in German-Russian economic relations.

BRÄUTIGAM

No. 463

8805/E613629

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, September 27, 1933.  
zu IV Chi. 2200.<sup>1</sup>

Herr Krupp von Bohlen visited me today in order to speak about the Chinese projects.<sup>2</sup> He asked only one question. He wished to know if we had objections to the Chinese business in general and to the proposals made by the last Chinese visitors in particular, on grounds of the annoyance to be expected in Japan.

I told him that the annoyance in Japan undoubtedly had to be considered, but since we were not alone, but also America, England, Italy, Holland, and many other countries were engaged in China, the risk was so divided that one could quietly take a chance on Japanese opposition and objection. It was necessary only to avoid agreeing to things that might provoke Japan directly. Much more serious was our concern in the economic field owing to the dangers that might arise from a possible radical change in internal conditions in China. I then argued in the sense of the enclosed memorandum<sup>3</sup> and pleaded for individual treatment of each individual enterprise, for limitation of the scope of each enterprise, and for great caution in negotiating the necessary guarantees.

<sup>1</sup> IV Chi. 2200: Not printed (8805/E613630-33), Michelsen memorandum of Sept. 25.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 435.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 1.



We did not go into details. Herr Krupp von Bohlen mentioned, however, the Chinese proposal for a 500 million loan for a period of 5 to 7 years, and spoke very appreciatively, moreover, of the support that his firm had always received from Department IV China.

BÜLOW

## No. 464

6145/E459932-33

*Counselor Benzler to Ministerialdirektor Ritter*

BERLIN, September 27, 1933.

[zu] II Ung. 647.<sup>1</sup>

DEAR MINISTERIALDIREKTOR: Schnurre informed me in confidence of his memorandum<sup>2</sup> concerning the development of German-Hungarian trade. M. de Winchkler,<sup>3</sup> with whom we finally brought the linseed agreement to completion today, spoke to me privately about this. I informed him that the memorandum had first been submitted to you<sup>4</sup> and that we had to await your further instructions. Winchkler pointed out to me the fact that only the Minister President, on whose explicit instructions he was acting and a few Ministers knew of his conversations with Schnurre in Hungary. His conversations with Schnurre therefore had for the present to be treated as *strictly confidential*, and he therefore asked that the memorandum not be used or mentioned at Geneva where members of the Hungarian delegation were concerned, since even M. de Nickl,<sup>5</sup> for example, had no knowledge of it. Winchkler made the suggestion here that he would first just like to speak with you in confidence about the questions mentioned in the memorandum. He was prepared to go to Berlin for this purpose. Perhaps there would be opportunity for this at the end of November, for he then had to go to London again and could stop in Berlin on the way.

I do not wish to neglect mentioning that, in the course of a purely academic conversation on the possibility of the granting of preferences to Hungary, Winchkler made the statement: There was no doubt that Hungary would be granted preferences by Germany. The Chancellor

<sup>1</sup> II Ung. 647: Not printed (6145/E459904). This is a letter of Sept. 26 from Karl Schnurre, Counselor of Legation in Budapest, submitting to Ritter a requested memorandum on a preferential system of German-Hungarian trade relations, which was partly based on talks with Hungarian economic experts.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (6145/E459905-24); cf. footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> Stephen Winchkler, Ministerial Counselor in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry and President of the Hungarian Board of Trade.

<sup>4</sup> Marginal note: "It has not been so far. R[itter]."

<sup>5</sup> Alfred de Nickl, head of the Economic Department in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry.

and M. Gömbös were in agreement about this.<sup>6</sup> It was now only a matter of the form the preferences were to take, and in this connection Hungary was prepared to go almost to the length of a customs union, but for the time being had to insist that preferences could be agreed upon only in hidden form.

At the request of Schnurre and Winckler, I, too, for the present have not yet informed anyone in the Ministry about the memorandum.

Yours, etc.

BENZLER

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<sup>6</sup> Marginal note in Ritter's handwriting: "?"  
Cf. document No. 324.

## No. 465

3086/616957-59

### *Memorandum by Baron Hahn*<sup>1</sup>

GENEVA, September 28, 1933.

Today, Thursday, at 11:00 a. m. I had a lengthy conversation with Austrian Federal Chancellor Dollfuss in the Hotel de la Paix. I had asked to have the conversation since I had received written instructions from the T. U. to negotiate with Dollfuss about the ban on circulation of the T. U. service to the Austrian press in order if possible to bring about a cancellation of this ban which is exceedingly disadvantageous from the point of view of business for the T. U. In the course of the conversation which was entirely negative on this point, Dollfuss as was to be expected came to speak of German-Austrian relations. He asked me whether I was instructed to act as mediator. I stressed that I was of course only speaking as a journalist, but that on the basis of familiarity with the German-Austrian situation I was greatly interested in doing whatever I could to set it in order. Dollfuss made the following statements:

I made the greatest efforts to avoid any sharp note with respect to Germany in my speech yesterday before the League Assembly. I hope that this was understood by the German side. Considering the present situation it would have been easy for me to achieve cheap triumphs. Of course I did not do this. Similarly I have not taken aggressive steps toward Germany of late and shall certainly not do so in the future. I am a simple German man, and I am anxious, above all, to bring about a settlement of this conflict between the German brothers as soon as possible. But the German press has adopted an attitude that is openly negative toward me and is casting suspicion on me to such an extent that I must presume that this follows the line of official policy. Thus yesterday one paper wrote that my

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<sup>1</sup> Baron Hahn was the Geneva representative of the news service Telegraphen-Union (T. U.).

speech of yesterday had been applauded only by the Jews, Freemasons, and French. The rest of the German press is likewise so negative that I certainly must presume that a definite purpose is involved. I had hoped that the German press would adopt an objective attitude and approach the Austrian question more calmly. This has unfortunately not happened. Naturally I should be very much interested in meeting with the two German ministers.<sup>2</sup> It would seem most appropriate to me in the first place for the struggle to be broken off by both sides and a more peaceful atmosphere created which could then prepare the way for a settlement in the course of time.

When I pointed out that after all a first step could be taken in this direction and there was an opportunity of a discussion with the Foreign Minister and the Propaganda Minister, Herr Dollfuss stressed emphatically that he personally was very anxious to have a discussion with the two German ministers. However, he was forced to adhere to protocol and could not for his part pay the first visit to the two German ministers.<sup>3</sup> After the plenary session he had told Baron Neurath that he hoped to be able to see him very soon. However, not the slightest move had been made;<sup>4</sup> not even calling cards had been left with him. He had the impression that evidently no steps of any sort toward meeting him were being taken by the German side. He intended to go to Bern to the Federal Council this afternoon by automobile, but would postpone his trip until 4:00 p. m. if any possibility of a meeting could develop. Dollfuss suggested that I make this explicit, in a suitable way, at the Hotel Carlton, in case I was able to do so. Dollfuss stressed that he absolutely had to be in Vienna Friday evening, since he was being urged from Vienna to participate in a large press reception on Friday at 6:00 p. m. and would deliver the Government statement on the impending foreign loan. Dollfuss stressed in conclusion time and again how very anxious he was to come into personal contact with the German ministers, but as Chief of Government he now bore the entire responsibility for his country, had to act according to his best knowledge and conscience, and could not act differently than he had heretofore. He freely admitted that he like all men could commit mistakes and errors, but that the responsibility for his country was decisive for him.

BARON HAHN

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<sup>2</sup> Propaganda Minister Goebbels had gone to Geneva as a member of the German delegation. See document No. 426.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. document No. 450 and footnote 4.

<sup>4</sup> Marginal note in the handwriting of Völckers: "Not correct!"

No. 466

3154/669919-21

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

GENEVA, September 28, 1933.

RM 1364.

This afternoon I visited M. Paul-Boncour, since the previous talks with Sir John Simon,<sup>1</sup> Norman Davis<sup>2</sup> and the Italians<sup>3</sup> had produced no clear picture of the concessions which the French side has supposedly made in the disarmament question. My talk with M. Paul-Boncour was equally unsuccessful in ascertaining exactly what assurances the French intend to undertake regarding reduction of their armaments. M. Paul-Boncour was evasive when I put the question to him directly. But I availed myself of the opportunity to discuss with him in very general terms the relationship between Germany and France, and I told him that since I scarcely saw a possibility any longer of getting a convention concluded on the disarmament question, it seemed to me necessary to seek a way of reaching a direct understanding with France on the questions of mutual interest to us. Indeed, we had for our part tried this several times, but had met with no response in France. This could not deter me, however, from making a new effort in that direction. I referred M. Paul-Boncour to the statements which the Reich Chancellor had made to the French Ambassador 2 weeks previously,<sup>4</sup> about the substance of which M. Paul-Boncour, incidentally, was informed. I emphasized that disagreements between France and Germany existed actually only with respect to the question of security which France kept bringing up. I asked him to consider the possibility of perhaps reaching some understanding through a discussion between several high ranking military figures. Moreover, any other method that in his opinion was capable of bringing us closer to our objective would be agreeable to me. M. Paul-Boncour voiced the old French accusations against Germany's present Government and stated that in France distrust was so deep-seated that he would expect but little success from direct conversations. He would nevertheless inform the Minister President of the suggestion. He then began to talk about the dossier he had about Germany's rearmament, to which I replied that I was doubtful that the file was based on reliable sources and that, since he did not give me any particulars, I was consequently unable to refute the alle-

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 447.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933*, vol. 1, pp. 232-235. No Foreign Ministry record of Neurath's conversation with Davis has been found.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 454.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 430.

gations about German rearmament. M. Paul-Boncour finally stated that failure of the Disarmament Conference would arouse deep concern throughout the world, to which I replied that, after all, the Conference had not yet collapsed and the door was still open to new negotiations, but I must repeat that we could not put up with the present condition for 4 or 5 years more merely on the promise that the heavily armed powers would disarm if we behaved well. M. Paul-Boncour then embarked on tirades about France's continuous yielding to our demands, whereupon I replied to him that for my part I regretted that I always had to present such demands, but the reason for this was that we had been robbed by the Treaty of Versailles of all natural rights of a free nation, and that we now had to struggle to regain them with great difficulty.

Further talks with M. Paul-Boncour appear to me useless at this time.

V. N[EURATH]

### No. 467

2860/562556-57

#### *The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 218 of September 28      Moscow, September 28, 1933—9:31 p. m.  
Received September 28—11:55 p. m.

Today's visit to the Foreign Commissariat had the following result:

1. As a personal concession to the German newspapermen and "for humanitarian reasons" the time limit for the expulsion has been extended 48 hours.<sup>1</sup> Departure must therefore take place on Saturday.<sup>2</sup>

2. As a concession to the Embassy, Baum will not be affected by the expulsion provided the Embassy informs the Foreign Commissariat that Baum is exclusively the press advisor of the Embassy and has ceased working for the WTB.

3. No relaxation is otherwise noticeable in the attitude of the Soviet Government. Stern stated: The WTB communiqué aggravated the situation by claiming that the Soviet newspapermen in Leipzig had behaved "in a suspicious manner." The communiqué sought also to put the blame for their arrest on the Soviet newspapermen themselves, for having gone to Leipzig. Since other press representatives who had not been admitted to the trial were also in Leipzig, this allegation constituted a new act of discrimination. Nor did the conversation

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 455 and footnote 2.

<sup>2</sup> i. e., Sept. 30.

between Khinchuk and the State Secretary<sup>3</sup> bring out any means for settling the conflict.

4. As essential condition of the settlement of the conflict, the stipulation is made as before that the Soviet newspapermen receive full equality of rights and footing with the other foreign correspondents. The outward token of their having been granted equality would be admission to the Leipzig trial. It is my impression that the Soviet Government will not yield on this demand.

The following seems to me symptomatic of the situation:

Whereas in past conflicts between foreign states and the Soviet Government, the Diplomatic Corps and the foreign newspapermen here were always unanimous in their opposition to the Soviet Government, surprisingly little understanding for our point of view is shown in the present case, despite personal sympathy for the German newspapermen affected. This will probably further bolster up the Soviet Government.

TWARDOWSKI

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 455.

## No. 468

6121/E456354-55

### *The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Rumania*

VERY URGENT

BERLIN, September 28, 1933.  
zu II Balk. 1703 R.<sup>1</sup>

Drafting Officer: Counselor Dr. Busse.

With reference to your reports Nos. 2083 of August 7<sup>2</sup> and 2207 of August 26, 1933.<sup>3</sup>

The Reich Chancellor received on September 15 retired Colonel Tatarescu, the leader of the Rumanian National Socialist party and on September 19 the former Rumanian Minister Goga. M. Tatarescu explained to the Reich Chancellor the origin and the goals of the Rumanian National Socialist party,<sup>4</sup> whereas M. Goga informed the

<sup>1</sup> II Balk. 1703 R: Not printed (6121/E456351).

<sup>2</sup> This report from Schulenburg recommended that favorable consideration be given to the requests made by Octavian Goga, leader of the Rumanian National Agrarian party and Stefan Tatarescu, leader of the Rumanian National Socialist party, that they be received by the Reich Chancellor. Schulenburg characterized Goga as a serious pro-German politician who had also claimed that King Carol knew and approved of his desire to be received in Berlin. "Primarily, Goga would like to learn the position of the Reich Chancellor with respect to the question of the Hungarian desires for revision of Rumania's western borders, so that in case this position gives Rumania a certain reassurance (as he hopes it will do), he may advocate quite openly a change in the course of Rumanian foreign policy in the direction of the closest possible rapprochement with Germany. (9588/E675719-21)

<sup>3</sup> This report dealt with the date of the forthcoming visit to Berlin of Goga and Tatarescu (9588/E675727).

<sup>4</sup> Marginal note in the handwriting of Counselor Busse: "Discussed with Herr Thomsen who was present at both receptions." Memoranda of Hitler's meetings with Tatarescu and Goga have not been found.

Reich Chancellor in detail about the possibility and necessity for a closer cooperation between Germany and Rumania. The question of the revision of Rumania's western borders was not discussed in either of the two conversations.<sup>5</sup>

M. Tatarescu also called at the Foreign Ministry and at other departments in order to see to it that the necessary machines and financial means are made available to him for expanding and operating a newspaper printing plant. The enterprise planned is to include the already existing newspapers *Calendarul* and *Tara Noastra*, as well as a newspaper yet to be founded, *Curajul*. M. Tatarescu also informed Minister Dr. Goebbels of his requests in this matter and he furthermore established contact with several officials of the NSDAP. An additional instruction on this subject is to be sent.<sup>6</sup>

By order:  
KÖPKE

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<sup>5</sup> Marginal note in the handwriting of Counselor Busse: "Information from Herr Thomsen."

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 496.

## No. 469

3154/669930

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

GENEVA, September 29, 1933.  
RM 1369 b.

Signori Aloisi and Suvich called on me again yesterday afternoon in order to report on their conversations on the disarmament question. The result of their communications is contained in the special memorandum.<sup>1</sup> The Italians as usual regard their activity here purely as that of a go-between. They avoid committing themselves. I explained to both gentlemen that I saw no possibility for bringing about a convention as long as our demands for allotment of all the weapons of defense permitted to the others were not in principle fulfilled and agreement reached as to the extent of this allotment. In the opinion of the Italians, which agrees with my observations, the chief resistance to our demands with respect to material comes from the English delegation.

In a conversation I had only this morning with Sir John Simon in the presence of Eden and Cadogan,<sup>2</sup> we merely took inventory once more of the attitude of the various delegations. The English urged, as they had been doing right along, referring to the poor opinion the

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed (3154/669927-29). This memorandum listed the current position on the various features of the disarmament convention taken by the British, French, Italian, and United States delegations.

<sup>2</sup> See *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. v, document No. 422.

world held of Germany, that we yield in the question of material. This I definitely rejected. I promised, however, to report on the entire matter in Berlin and then inform them again as to our attitude.<sup>3</sup>

v. N[EURATH]

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<sup>3</sup> See document No. 478.

## No. 470

6609/E497198-99

### *Memorandum by an Official of Department IV*

BERLIN, September 29, 1933.

Colonel von Stülpnagel (Reichswehr Ministry, Division of Foreign Armies), visited me today in order to communicate the following:

The liquidation of the military stations in Soviet Russia has been completed, according to a report which reached here yesterday. The initial difficulties and unfriendliness of the local Soviet authorities had ceased at once after the intervention of Ministerialdirektor Meyer with Soviet Ambassador Khinchuk. The liquidation had then taken place in the most friendly fashion, and apparently the Soviet military authorities had been pleasantly surprised that most of the material<sup>1</sup> had been turned over to them for retention and free of charge.

The high Soviet military men had taken their leave of the Germans in the most friendly manner and repeatedly expressed their thanks for the valuable collaboration. At the same time Voroshilov and other key military persons (except Tukhachevsky) had intimated that they hoped that policy would permit the re-establishment of closer military relations again shortly.

Colonel von Stülpnagel added that, according to his observations, something of an improvement was to be noted recently in German-Soviet military relations. In Italy, from where he had just returned, he had found that the officers of the Red Army who were there had ostentatiously joined our officers, very much to the displeasure of, for example, the French officers, who had not been able to refrain from criticizing. Here, too, Colonel von Stülpnagel believes he can discern a rapprochement in the behavior of Levichev, the Soviet Military Attaché. The latter had already sounded us out on the admission of officers of the Red Army to German courses and on the agreement on new exchanges of personnel.

Reich Minister General von Blomberg had recommended reserve for the present. Colonel von Stülpnagel inquired about the attitude of the Foreign Ministry.

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<sup>1</sup> Marginal note in Tippleskirch's handwriting: "Value: 2.9 million marks."



Subject to the approval of the State Secretary, I stated first of all that before the conclusion of the Reichstag fire trial and the next disarmament negotiations in Geneva, we should, in my opinion, make no proposals to the Russians at Geneva.

Most dutifully submitted herewith to the State Secretary via Minister Hey; then to Ministerialdirektor Meyer—after return.

VON TIPPELSKIRCH

No. 471

3154/669944-45

*Memorandum by an Official of Department II*

BERLIN, September 29, 1933.  
e. o. II F Abr. 3100.

Colonel Haselmayr came to see me today after unsuccessfully trying to see the State Secretary and Ministerialdirektor Köpke. He informed me that he had had a lengthy talk with the Reichswehr Minister and cleared up certain misunderstandings. He also outlined to me his familiar position regarding the transformation of the Reichswehr into a people's army and emphasized that an understanding with France on the disarmament question was impossible to reach so long as the Reichswehr adhered, as it appears to have done so far, to Seeckt's plans of preserving the professional army side by side with the army of universal service. I reminded Colonel Haselmayr that we had agreed to the standardization of the European military systems and that the Reichswehr to my knowledge declared that it was prepared to carry through the reorganization within about 6 years; the question of the ratio of long-term to short-term soldiers and of establishing stages for the transformation process was of course of great importance in that connection. Colonel Haselmayr further told me that he had no intention of going to Geneva until he felt that the departments at home had come to an agreement on the aims of our military policy and formulated a definite plan. It would be a mistake, in his opinion, to be anything but honest with the other countries in this respect. An understanding with France was also conceivable only if England was included. Colonel Haselmayr emphasized in conclusion that he did not think that a world disarmament convention would be concluded, but at best a series of regional agreements which might later be brought together under a general convention. I pointed out that, on the contrary, the talks of the past weeks, especially those held in Geneva, had left me with the impression that the Anglo-Saxons and Italians, like ourselves, were

working for a general agreement and that I, personally, considered it still entirely possible to bring about such an agreement even now.

Colonel Haselmayr will be back here next week, Thursday, and will call again at the Foreign Ministry on that occasion.

Herewith submitted to the State Secretary through Ministerialdirektor Köpke for his information.<sup>1</sup>

SCHWENDEMANN

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<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "The Foreign Minister has received Colonel H[aselmayr], V[ölckers], Oct. 1."

## No. 472

7360/E537630-32

### *Minute by the Minister in Switzerland*

BERN, October 2, 1933.

Received at the Foreign Ministry October 6.

II F Abr. 3197.

In the afternoon of September 29, M. Massigli, member of the French League of Nations delegation, sent me a message inquiring whether, in view of the imminent departure of the Foreign Minister, he could have a brief word with me. I spoke with M. Massigli for a quarter of an hour and reported to the Reich Minister orally the substance of the conversation at the railroad station.

M. Massigli's communication was as follows:

Although the chiefs of delegation had indeed seen each other often in the past week, it seemed to him that the degree to which the French were prepared to make great concessions in the disarmament question was not being expressed adequately. As a result of the Paris conferences<sup>1</sup> that had preceded the Geneva meeting, the French Government was prepared in the so-called second period of the proposed convention, that is, between the 5th and 8th year of its validity, to abolish all those heavy weapons that exceeded the qualitative arms limit to be established by treaty. France was prepared, in particular, to destroy under supervision all calibers down to 155 mm. (naturally with the exception of the stationary land or floating heavy guns). This was a very large and very concrete concession, indeed, which the English knew about but had thus far withheld from us for not quite understandable reasons of discretion. In reply to my further questions, M. Massigli stated that the French Government would agree that in this second period gun calibers up to 155 mm. could be constructed in Germany, so that a qualitative difference would no longer exist in this respect. To my further question as to planes and tanks, M. Massigli stated less definitely that the French agreed to a reduction of the qualitative French armament to certain limits which, to

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 431, footnote 5.

be sure, would not coincide entirely with the English proposals, but would probably go somewhat beyond them.

I told M. Massigli that, so far as I was informed, to be sure, our delegation had not yet been informed of such concrete French intentions regarding qualitative disarmament in the second period. Of course, this left unaffected and unsettled the real point at issue—namely, the readiness of the French to disarm in the field of material in the *first* period. Massigli wanted to show, however, that French intentions with regard to the first period also expressed a very accommodating attitude. He referred to the contemplated reorganization of the Reichswehr from 100,000 to 200,000 men, with the appropriate smaller weapons, to the proposed general supervision of the manufacture of arms, to the general truce in armaments, etc.

I thanked M. Massigli for his information, but naturally persisted in my opinion that the real point at issue did not as a result appear in a new light.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 473

5552/E393553-54

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, September 29, 1933.

Today I had the opportunity to speak with the Reich Minister of Finance about the situation in eastern Upper Silesia and the sales negotiations of the I. G.<sup>1</sup> I proceeded on the assumption that our Upper Silesian policy had been mistaken from the very start. First we had screamed that the partition was an economic impossibility, and then we had made it possible by costly investments, instead of leaving the eastern and western Upper Silesian industry entangled. Furthermore, we had tried to keep the eastern Upper Silesian industry, but at the same time ruined it through our economic war against Poland. Now an economic change in German-Polish policy was under preparation which, if it had any purpose, must end with an economic penetration of Poland, for which we needed our Upper Silesian interests as point of departure, and precisely at this moment their

<sup>1</sup> The reference is to negotiations for the sale to Polish interests of the largely German-owned I. G. Kattowitz-Laura enterprises in Polish Upper Silesia. This had been discussed earlier at a conference of heads of departments on July 12; see document No. 359.

An analysis of the background and financial structure of these enterprises is contained in the enclosure to a long letter of Mar. 20, 1934, from Reich Minister of Economics Schmitt to the Foreign Minister and the Reich Minister of Finance, filmed as 5552/E393795-836.

sale was being negotiated.<sup>2</sup> I had investigated the motives for selling and had had to conclude that the decisive factor here was solely the balance sheet of the Stahlverein and the exposure of the participation in the eastern plants. I asked Herr von Krosigk to try to find other ways of restoring the balance sheet of the Stahlverein that would make it possible to discontinue the sales negotiations.

Herr von Krosigk agreed essentially with my general ideas, and saw the procedure of Thyssen, Vögler, and Flick as an extortion in the main which exploited nationalistic attitudes. He was basically also in favor of keeping the eastern Upper Silesian position after putting through the rehabilitation, at least for a number of years until one could forecast how the understanding with Poland or the extension of the Upper Silesian Agreement would work out. As far as the Stahlverein was concerned, this was an old question for him. They asked time and again to be able to tender the interests of the Stahlverein to the Reich for 35 million in cash. It was clear to him, however, although Herr Vögler always denied it, that this 35 million interest was worth nothing today. He wanted to consider whether an arrangement was not perhaps possible by which he would accept the offer of the interest, to be sure, but would not pay for it in cash but in shares (Gelsenkirchen?). He would have this question looked into together with the Ministry of Economics and let us know as soon as the ideas took on a more concrete form.

I pointed out in conclusion that it was important for us to instruct the agents of the Stahlverein soon that they should let the sale negotiations die down, so that the Poles would not take the offensive against the I. G. in eastern Upper Silesia in order to force down the sale price.<sup>3</sup>

BÜLOW

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<sup>2</sup> Marginal note: "At the present moment sale would be folly. v. N[eurath], Sept. 30."

<sup>3</sup> Additional documents on this subject will appear in subsequent volumes of this series.

## No. 474

7467/H178838-41

### *The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 217 of September 29

ROME, September 30, 1933—1:00 a. m.

Received September 30—4:15 a. m.

II F Abr. 3103.

Today I had a detailed discussion with Mussolini on the disarmament question and outlined to him the German position in conformity

with your telegram No. 228 of the 23rd<sup>1</sup> and today's telephone conversation.<sup>2</sup> Mussolini said that agreement was virtually impossible to reach in the infected atmosphere of Geneva, particularly as a result of the activities of the Ministers from Poland and the Little Entente countries. The only way would be a meeting of the Foreign Ministers on the basis of the Four Power Pact. I replied that we agreed to this in principle but that a certain amount of political preparation would be necessary. The Italian plan certainly contained elements of a solution, but important points still remained to be clarified. I placed the main emphasis on the question of material and explained that we had to demand complete freedom with respect to defensive arms, which were not affected by the future convention. Unacceptable to us in particular was the French proposal to permit us only arms for a militia-type army of 234,000 men. But the decisive feature, the very heart of qualitative equality which we could not abandon in any event, was the authorization for us to have a certain amount, and not just a few sample specimens, of those defensive arms which were forbidden to us by the Versailles Peace Treaty, but which the future convention would not forbid but merely restrict in number. On the other hand we were prepared even at this time to renounce the offensive weapons, which would be abolished in the future. I asked Mussolini directly whether he would continue to support our demand for arms that would in the future only be limited in number, inasmuch as I had heard that it had been suggested in Geneva also by the Italians that we renounce these.<sup>3</sup> Mussolini replied in the affirmative (group garbled), saying substantially the following: The basic motivation of the French attitude is, as it always was, the fear of Germany and the nightmare of German rearmament as a result of the Disarmament Conference. He had explained to Chambrun that this fear was utterly unfounded, in his opinion, because France's superiority would remain overwhelming even if Germany's demands were met, while rejection of the German demands would result in Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations and unlimited rearmament. It was necessary, however, to deprive France of this argument, which was possible only if Germany were to provide figures for her demands for material. Such figures would show to France and to the world that the German menace was a figment of the imagination. He would therefore urgently suggest that he personally be given the figures for the weapons of all categories—both of the first, unlimited category and the

<sup>1</sup> This telegram (7467/H178835) transmitted the contents of document No. 445 and added that the Embassy should not take any action for the time being but should be guided by the previous instructions transmitted in telegram No. 226 of Sept. 23. See document No. 441, footnote 3.

<sup>2</sup> No record has been found.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 454.

second category, to be limited in number by the convention—which we would demand for the first period. With this material at his disposal he would be in an entirely different position with respect to dispelling French fears. I then asked him what the attitude on this would be of the English to whom, as was known, disarmament was also an obsession. To this he replied that they would welcome any solution that was acceptable to the others. I said thereupon that it was difficult to give any figures because we did not know to what extent the others would reduce their armaments. Mussolini then reviewed the problem against the background of the Italian 10 points<sup>4</sup> and observed that actually some essential points were already conclusively established. Point 1 would be generally accepted. On point (group garbled, but might conceivably be “2”) France was going even further and demanded, with Italy in agreement, the absolute abolition of bombing aircraft. On point 3, agreement would not be difficult once an understanding was reached on material. With regard to points 4, 5, and 6 it was hoped that progress could be made along the path indicated by him. I remarked that the probationary period was too long and that effective disarmament had to begin prior to that; but it was in any case essential even now to establish exactly the nature and extent of the reduction of armaments. Mussolini suggested that the length of the trial period was a matter amenable to discussion, and could perhaps be reduced to 2 or 3 years. Disarmament with regard to material, on the other hand, could not begin until after the end of the trial period; the extent of such reduction, however, absolutely had to be fixed now, and the French could be made to go along provided one accords them, in view of their nightmares about security, the establishment of sanctions. He had already tried to talk Chambrun out of this and had gained the impression that the French did not know themselves what sort of sanctions they would want to apply; Chambrun had spoken only of moral sanctions, and this was perhaps an obstacle that could be removed. I replied that the French would have to dismiss military sanctions and occupation from their minds, because such things did not exist any more; it would mean nothing less than war, no matter how hopeless for us such a war would be from a military point of view. Mussolini continued saying that on point 7 our own position had been adopted, and point 8 would not give rise to any difficulties, nor would point 10. As regards point 9, naval disarmament would be postponed until 1936; Germany, of course, would in any case remain unaffected by it and would not be limited in her construction for replacement under the Treaty. Summing up, Mussolini stated once more that giving figures for our demands would be the best means of outmaneuvering France.

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<sup>4</sup> See document No. 431.

The future course of French policy would greatly depend on the Congress in Vichy,<sup>5</sup> where Herriot was preparing a large-scale attack on Daladier. I remarked that to my knowledge the Chancellor had only recently, through the Ambassador in Berlin, given the French firm assurances of Germany's peaceful intentions and desire for an understanding,<sup>6</sup> which had not failed to make an impression; I added that I was making a point of telling him this in conformity with our repeated talks to the effect that both Germany and Italy desired an understanding with France, but only on the basis of a balance of power and equality of rights and also through mutual agreement on this subject. Mussolini concurred vigorously, saying that reassuring France in such a manner was of the utmost importance; and [he asked] whether the Chancellor would not want to say something similar publicly on a suitable occasion in order to reassure the French people and thereby make easier an accommodating attitude in the disarmament question.

HASSELL

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<sup>5</sup> The annual Congress of the Radical Socialist party met in Vichy at the beginning of October.

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 430.

## No. 475

3154/669946

### *Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, September 30, 1933.  
RM 1373.

This afternoon I gave a detailed report to the Chancellor about the negotiations at Geneva. The Chancellor was entirely in agreement with the course adopted by me at the negotiations. On the question whether a disarmament convention was to be concluded or whether the negotiations were to be delayed or broken off, the Chancellor expressed himself to the effect that it would be desirable in any case to conclude a disarmament convention even if not all our wishes were fulfilled by it.

As far as the question of equality of rights with regard to material was concerned, it would be wrong, in the opinion of the Chancellor, to ask for more than we are able for technical, financial, and political reasons actually to procure in the next few years. The Chancellor stated that he had always held this view and also wished to see it upheld in the further course of the negotiations.

V. N[EURATH]

## No. 476

2860/562559

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

No. 221 of September 30      Moscow, September 30, 1933—4:25 p. m.  
Received September 30—6:30 p. m.

The German journalists Just, Görbing, and Herrenstadt leave this evening via Warsaw.

In the conflict the Foreign Commissariat now takes the following position, which is rather effective from the propaganda point of view, a knowledge of which seems to me important for the evaluation and possible settlement of the conflict: The basis of the relationship of the Soviet Union to the capitalist states is the fact that in spite of unbridgeable ideological differences ways of practical cooperation can be found in concrete day-to-day policy as long as one does not intentionally touch ideology. The treaty complex of 1925 and its supplements regulating German-Russian relations rested upon this basic attitude. German-Russian friendship has been possible only by strict observance of this principle.

In Leipzig it was not that a single Soviet journalist who had proved undesirable was deprived of an admission card to the trial as a reprisal for untrustworthy conduct, but the entire Soviet press was excluded for ideological reasons. Therewith the previous basis for a recall has been abandoned in principle by the German side. The resulting conflict is of the greatest fundamental importance for the Soviet Union; it is a fight to maintain the basis on which its relations with capitalist states are erected. An abandonment of its demand for full equality of rights in principle for the Soviet press is not possible. For if today the Soviet press is not admitted to a trial because it is Communist, tomorrow, harbors can be closed to Soviet steamers because they come from a Communist country, or Soviet diplomats can be refused agreement because they belong to the Communist party.

TWARDOWSKI



## No. 477

2860/562561-62

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

No. 222 of October 2

Moscow, October 2, 1933—9:35 p. m.

Received October 3—1:40 a. m.

For Ambassador von Dirksen exclusively.

Our Soviet friend<sup>1</sup> asked for a conversation with me. He stated:

The atmosphere had greatly deteriorated. An improvement before the end of the Reichstag fire trial was hardly to be expected. The conflict about the journalists should not be permitted to run its course, because here as perhaps also in Germany forces were at work to deepen this conflict. Litvinov had himself drafted the note to me.<sup>2</sup> The note was unusually mild for conditions here, and already indicated possibilities for settling the conflict.

I asked exactly what possibilities he saw for settling the conflict, since it was impossible now for the Soviet journalists to be admitted to the Leipzig trial. He replied: The conflict as such cannot, of course, be settled for the time being; only in the framework of a larger action that would clear the atmosphere between Germany and the Soviet Union and restore the old relationship. He then asked what the situation was concerning Krestinsky's trip.<sup>3</sup> I told him that the German side could not take any initiative at the moment in inviting Krestinsky to Berlin. If, however, the Soviet Embassy should let the Foreign Ministry know unofficially that Krestinsky was in Berlin, I believed that a series of interesting conversations could be carried on. In order to be able to prepare this I would like our friend to let me know as soon as possible whether Krestinsky will come through Berlin and whether he will receive permission from Litvinov or from other authorities to carry on conversations with the aim of clearing the atmosphere. My informant remarked in this connection that he visualized as a concluding step a very short concluding protocol somewhat as follows:

The many recent misunderstandings and incidents between Germany and the Soviet Union have been the subject of detailed conversations between the two Governments. The conversations have had the result that both Governments regard the incidents which happened in the past as no longer in existence. Thus the conflict

<sup>1</sup> The person to whom reference is made has not been identified.

<sup>2</sup> In a memorandum of Sept. 27 Tippelskirch recorded (9447/E666708-09) a telephone call at noon from Twardowski who reported that the Soviet note delivered to him on the night of Sept. 26 had been published that morning in *Izvestia* and *Pravda*. The note is filmed on 9447/E666710-12.

<sup>3</sup> See documents Nos. 404, 461, and 487. Actually Krestinsky did not return to Moscow via Berlin, but by way of Vienna.

about the journalists should at the same time be resolved. I once more stressed emphatically that a German initiative was out of the question at the present time, and that a visit by Krestinsky to Berlin would probably be welcome.

Evaluation of the conversation: The informant certainly did not come to me without authorization. He stressed again and again in the conversation that the conflict about the journalists should be localized and settled as soon as possible. It is interesting that in spite of the conflict it is his opinion that Krestinsky's visit in Berlin is possible. I have the impression that the Foreign Commissariat counted on the German side quickly giving in, in the journalist conflict, and that the situation that has now arisen is unpleasant for Government circles, particularly in view of the increased tenseness of the situation in the Far East.

TWARDOWSKI

### No. 478

7360/E537577-78

*The Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 231 of October 3

LONDON, October 4, 1933—12:46 a. m.

Received October 4, 1933—3:40 a. m.

II F Abr. 3154.

On the basis of various pieces of information from official circles, among others from an informant especially close to Simon, I have obtained a picture of the plans and attitude of this Government toward the disarmament question as summarized below:

After Simon spoke in detail to MacDonald yesterday and to Henderson today, he drew up *this afternoon* a revision of the English draft convention, which was brought "up to date"<sup>1</sup> on the basis of the limit set at the Geneva conferences.

There is to be no meeting of the Cabinet before Simon's return to Geneva, which is planned for Saturday,<sup>2</sup> or possibly not until Sunday. On the other hand, the new document will be discussed tomorrow with Baldwin and MacDonald in order that their approval may be obtained. It seems possible that Eden will not return to Geneva for the meeting of the Bureau the date of which, October 9, is to remain unchanged, since he is to conduct the business of the Foreign Office in the absence of Simon. The revision of the draft convention is supposed to have taken place in close collaboration with Roosevelt, since they are anxious

<sup>1</sup> In English in the original.

<sup>2</sup> Oct. 7.

here, because of forthcoming debt negotiations,<sup>3</sup> to predispose the Americans in their favor and to the extent possible make sure of America's consent in advance. Simon was planning to wait until he got to Geneva to make public the new draft convention, so as not to have its impact weakened through prior criticism on the part of the other powers, and he was therefore leaving for Geneva at as late a date as possible. It is said that the French are not participating in the conversations here about revising the draft convention. The German reply, allegedly promised to Simon for Tuesday by the Foreign Minister,<sup>4</sup> had not yet been received.<sup>5</sup>

The informant stated with regard to the contents of the new English document that the French wish for immediate sanctions was not being granted by the English Government but the invoking of article 11 of the League of Nations Covenant<sup>6</sup> in cases of treaty violations was being considered. On the other hand, the English Government would reject the German demand for models of weapons. With regard to delivery [sic] the view was held that Germany was weaker than she had ever been in the field of foreign policy, since she was not only disarmed but also isolated. This realization would necessarily make it much easier for us to do without models of weapons during the first 4 years. The British Cabinet could not in any case conclude a convention that called itself a disarmament convention but which would however be interpreted as a rearmament convention because of rearmament concessions to Germany.

According to the experience at Geneva, the attitude of the Italians, who did not wish to commit themselves, played no decisive role. Simon, who was in the best of health, was firmly determined to push through with all his energies a new draft convention. If he did not succeed, England would withdraw from the Disarmament Conference.

BISMARCK

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<sup>3</sup> The first meeting of American and British representatives on intergovernmental debts took place in Washington Oct. 5; see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933*, vol. I, pp. 842-843.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 469.

<sup>5</sup> Another copy of this document from the Foreign Minister's file has the following marginal notes in the handwriting of Völckers: "Sent? To Weizsäcker? With the instruction that it be handed to Simon. Wire to London immediately." (3154/669970-72)

Cf. document No. 480.

<sup>6</sup> On the copy from the file of the Foreign Minister (see footnote 5) the German text of article 11 of the League Covenant is cited verbatim in a marginal note in the handwriting of Counselor of Legation Völckers.

## No. 479

3154/669975-76

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

Under special security cover

BERLIN, October 4, 1933.

TOP SECRET

The Chancellor summoned me from today's Cabinet meeting<sup>1</sup> to participate in a conference with the Reichswehr Minister regarding today's telegram from London<sup>2</sup> concerning the new Simon plan.

The Chancellor and Herr von Blomberg agreed that we must not run the risk of negotiating at all on a new draft that was, in the last analysis, unacceptable to us. Otherwise we would find that the others might agree on this plan and try to force us to accept it. As in the case of the Rome pact, the Italians would then play the part of the biased mediator. Things must not be allowed to reach this pass. Furthermore, said the Chancellor, a breakdown of the Conference as a result of our rejection of supervision or our rearmament demands must be absolutely avoided. It was time, therefore, in order to prevent such a development, to revert to the "original question" (Blomberg), to demand by ultimatum the disarmament of the others and to declare that we would leave the Conference, as well as withdraw from the League of Nations in the event that the others rejected disarmament, if they denied us equality of rights, or if a draft unacceptable to us was brought up for debate. At a later stage in the discussion, the Chancellor also considered making a big speech on such an occasion (as, at the time, in the Reichstag<sup>3</sup>) in order to appeal to world opinion.

Proceeding from the present state of the debate (instruction to Weizsäcker<sup>4</sup>), I pointed out that the break would then possibly take place very soon—perhaps even Saturday or Monday. I also advised, as the first stage, a retreat to the MacDonald plan, as we interpret it, and without any change for the worse. This was accepted.

The Chancellor and Herr von Blomberg were extremely anxious to learn soon the details of the new Simon plan.

I also suggested that we make a *démarche* in the nature of an ultimatum to the most important delegation leaders before the public statement of withdrawal.

Bülow

<sup>1</sup> The minutes of this Cabinet meeting are not printed (3598/793926-35). Cf. document No. 485, footnote 5.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 478.

<sup>3</sup> On May 17, 1933; see Editors' Note, p. 451.

<sup>4</sup> Document No. 480.

No. 480

7360/E537562-65

*The State Secretary to the Legation in Switzerland*

Telegram

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, October 4, 1933—5:40 p. m.

PRIORITY

e. o. II F Abr. 3143 Ang. I.

No. 78

Drafting Officer: Senior Counselor Frohwein.

For the Minister personally.

Please go to Geneva at once and by order of the Foreign Minister tell Sir John Simon and the Italian delegate Aloisi (or Suvich) approximately the following in regard to the question of defining our demands with respect to arming our future army:

1. The basis of our position on the disarmament problem is our claim to equality of rights (recognized by the agreement of December 11, 1932). Now as in the past we proceed from the English plan and consider a duration of the convention of 5 years provided therein to be appropriate. We cannot accept the idea of a trial period; on the other hand, we have no objection to the convention being divided, for reasons of expediency, into two periods with respect to disarmament in material; in this connection we would recommend division into [a period of] 2 plus [one of] 3 years.

The equality of rights for Germany to be realized under the convention would have to be put into practice already in the first 2-year period.

2. In order to be accommodating, Germany is willing to begin at once with transforming the Reichswehr into a short-service army. Germany could give information on the type and extent of armament of this new army only when it has become clear what concrete measures of disarmament the convention will contain in regard to material. Only then will it be possible to determine the organic requirements for the army of the Reich transformed into a short-service army.

3. As far as the weapons of the land army are concerned, the English plan is based on a tripartition—namely, into weapons that are to be prohibited in the future, weapons that are to be limited in numbers in the future, and weapons that are to be permitted without any limitation in numbers. We take the following position on these three categories of weapons:

a. We do not reject any arms prohibition as too drastic, provided it is applied equally to all countries. We are even willing to renounce the allotment of all weapons which the heavily armed countries com-

mit themselves to destroy within a definite, not too long period of time, not to exceed the duration of the convention, and the further use of which is internationally prohibited. We attach great importance to being informed as soon as possible what types of weapons are to be prohibited and destroyed in the opinion of the important countries.

b. In the English draft convention a limitation according to type and numbers is provided for certain weapons. However, it is not yet discernible how these types of weapons are to be defined and what quantities will be established for them in the convention. On this point, too, we consider an explanation necessary in the near future.<sup>1</sup>

c. In regard to the weapons that are permitted in the convention without limitation in numbers, there must not be any limitation in numbers for us, either. We are in agreement, however, that any type of weapon may be limited in numbers in so far as this applies to everybody equally. A different arrangement whereby for us the number of weapons would be fixed, while they would be permitted to all other countries without such restriction (as, for example, the provision for doubling the amounts of weapons permitted us in the Versailles Treaty), would preserve discrimination and in addition not be compatible with our security.

Please state the content of the above, but in doing so avoid giving the impression that these are German counterproposals in the nature of an ultimatum, since we must attach importance to the negotiations being continued.

For your information: The return of the Foreign Minister to Geneva is not intended for the time being. However, the Foreign Minister attaches importance to keeping his promise<sup>2</sup> that he would state a position before the negotiations with Nadolny begin next week.<sup>3</sup>

BÜLOW

<sup>1</sup> The following lines were to be added here according to telegram No. 79 also sent over Bülow's signature on Oct. 4 at 8:45 p. m.: "It follows from the principle of equality of rights that the weapons which are permitted to all other countries, though limited in numbers, must also be permitted to Germany even in the first period, with the amounts still to be negotiated." (7360/E537570)

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 469.

<sup>3</sup> This telegram was sent the same day to the Embassies in Italy and Great Britain (7360/E537566) and on Oct. 5 to the Embassy in the United States (3154/669977-80). Rome and London received the following additional instruction: "Please inform the Government at your posts to the same effect, pointing out at the same time that we are ready to explain our position in detail at Geneva." Added to this, in the instruction to London was the following: "An opportunity for this will be provided by the forthcoming meeting of the Bureau of the Conference at which Ambassador Nadolny is going to represent us."

Weizsäcker replied to this instruction in telegram No. 502 sent from Geneva on Oct. 5. He reported that Simon had not yet arrived at Geneva but that he had spoken to Aloisi who expressed the opinion "that the answer I gave him did not advance the matter but rather represented a small step backwards compared with the previous situation." (7360/E537609).

From London Bismarck reported on Oct. 6 in telegram No. 232 that he had talked to Simon in accordance with the instruction (7360/E537640-42). See also document No. 486; *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. v, document No. 434; and *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1933, vol. i, pp. 238-247.

## No. 481

3086/616989-91

*Memorandum by an Official of Department II*

BERLIN, October 4, 1933.

e. o. II Oe. 1550.

Today Austrian Minister Tauschitz called on me after telephoning first, in order to give expression to his fear that intensified propaganda activity against Austria would set in again in Germany and in this way a revival of the unpleasant quarrels of recent months was to be feared. With respect to this he was relying on a report from the Austrian Consulate General in Munich, parts of which he read aloud to me and which merely indicated that on October 5 Gauleiter of Tirol Hofer, rescued from prison in Innsbruck,<sup>1</sup> another National Socialist who has fled from Austria, as well as the German Gauleiter O. Nippold, will speak as part of the program featuring Herr Habicht's propaganda talks. I replied to Minister Tauschitz that we really could not seriously be expected to prohibit such speeches, the proceeds from which, besides, were meant for charitable purposes; whereupon he replied that he was bringing this up without any instructions only out of fear that an intensification of the quarrel might result from it; I calmed him on this score.

Minister Tauschitz then stayed with me almost an hour more, and during this time he described the Austrian problem as he saw it in all its aspects and did not even let himself be disturbed when he was informed by the Austrian Legation of the visit of the Hungarian Minister. Minister Tauschitz stressed time and again that he personally as a convinced Greater German found the conflict between the two countries exceedingly painful and wanted to do everything that could lead to a tolerable settlement.

With respect to the internal political situation in Austria Minister Tauschitz believed he could say that the exclusion of the Agrarian League and the existence of the present Dollfuss Cabinet <sup>2</sup> could not be of long duration, since the majority of the Austrian population, as he had been able to convince himself during his recent trip, rejected a dictatorship on the Italian pattern. Moreover, the new Dollfuss Cabinet resulted from the suggestions given by Mussolini at Riccione.<sup>3</sup>

Minister Tauschitz, who was exceedingly impressed by the cele-

<sup>1</sup> On Aug. 30, four National Socialists had broken into the Innsbruck jail and rescued Hofer. The whole group succeeded in escaping to Italy and Hofer eventually made a public appearance at the Nuremberg party rally in September.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 443 and footnote 4.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 408.

bration at the Bückeberg<sup>4</sup> and who, in contrast to his earlier statements, is now convinced of the absolute stability of the Reich Government, expressed himself this time rather openly about Fey's mistaken policy and his rigorous course against National Socialism. He agreed with Herr Habicht that the solution could be sought only by calling new elections in the near future. This was also Dollfuss' intention, but he wanted to call the new elections only after first amending and reforming the Constitution, including among other things raising the voting age. At present, Federal Minister Ender<sup>5</sup> had been given the assignment by Dollfuss to work out appropriate proposals for reform.

HÜFFER

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<sup>4</sup> A mountain range in the German State of Schaumburg-Lippe where the harvest thanksgiving celebration in honor of the German peasantry had been held on Oct. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Otto Ender, Governor of Vorarlberg and a former Federal Chancellor.

## No. 482

7956/E574595

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, October 4, 1933.

II SG 2519.

Vice Chancellor von Papen informed me today that he intended, with the approval of the Reich Chancellor, to take in hand the preparations for the plebiscite in the Saar Territory and the reincorporation. He wanted to discuss the details with the Foreign Minister. He did not contemplate the creation of new official posts. Nor did he intend to take over any of the work of any department. He believed, however, that he could make an important contribution to the solution of existing antagonisms between party offices and government agencies, between Prussia and Bavaria, both of which strove for territorial increase at the expense of the other (in connection with the reincorporation), between the departments and the Propaganda Ministry, which had set up a giant program of its own, etc. He asked only that he be regularly informed about all important Saar matters. I made our agreement dependent on the position of the Reich Minister (after his return), and also recommended occasional—not too frequent—conferences of officials so that the paper work would not get out of bounds.<sup>1</sup>

BÜLOW

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<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "The Foreign Minister agrees to regular information with the qualifications mentioned. Herewith to the State Secretary. Völckers. Berlin, Oct. 11."



## No. 483

9151/E643878

*The Minister in Czechoslovakia to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 36 of October 5

PRAGUE, October 5, 1933—1:00 p. m.

Received October 5—2:30 p. m.

II Ts. 1195.

After the NSDAP disbanded on October 3, there followed yesterday the prohibition by the Government which applies at the same time to the National party. Deputies Jung, Kaspar, Schubert arrested. Krebs has allegedly fled to Germany. Further arrests probable.

Konrad Henlein, the organizer of the Gymnastic Association, is trying with the support of the *Kameradschaftsbund*<sup>1</sup> and the approval of the National Socialist party leaders here to unite the national Sudeten Germans under the name of Sudeten German Home Front [*Sudetendeutsche Heimatsfront*], if they are not compromised by undergoing prosecution.<sup>2</sup>

KOCH

<sup>1</sup> In later reports from Prague, the *Kameradschaftsbund* was characterized as a small group which, although little known among the public, wielded great influence within the Sudeten German community. The members of the group, mostly intellectuals, were said to be followers of the ideas of the corporative state, as formulated by Professor Othmar Spann of the University of Vienna.

<sup>2</sup> In a subsequent telegram (No. 37 of Oct. 7), Koch reported that Henlein's prospects for forming the new Sudeten German group were slight, since it had been learned confidentially that President Masaryk as well as the Minister President and the Minister of Interior had refused to receive Henlein (9149/E643585). See also document No. 488.

## No. 484

7360/E537591-92

*Unsigned Memorandum*

BERLIN, October 6, 1933.

zu II F Abr. 3166.<sup>1</sup>DIRECTIVES FOR THE GERMAN DISARMAMENT DELEGATION<sup>2</sup>

1. In case the English Government submits a new draft convention which contains the essential French theses (trial period with super-

<sup>1</sup> e. o. II F Abr. 3166: Not printed (7360/E537585-90), a memorandum by Nadolny of Oct. 4 with the heading: "State and prospects of the disarmament question prior to the reconvening of the Conference." According to the Schwendemann minute referred to in footnote 2, this memorandum was not submitted "to the higher authorities," since Hitler's conference with Blomberg and Nadolny had occurred in the meantime.

<sup>2</sup> According to a minute by Schwendemann of Oct. 10, these directives were decided upon in a conference which Hitler had with Blomberg and Nadolny on Oct. 6 (7360/E537593).

vision before actual disarmament, etc.), it is to be branded as a new attempt of the heavily armed states to avoid disarmament and to shove off the blame for a possible breakup of the Conference on Germany. Negotiation concerning such a draft is to be rejected. Return to the MacDonald plan is to be demanded, and (in case this does not happen) return to the original task of the Conference—the disarmament of the heavily armed states and the restoration of equal national security for all states as laid down in article 8 of the League of Nations Covenant and the Five Power Declaration of December 11, 1932. It is to be intimated in this connection that failure to consider this demand is apt to result in German withdrawal from the Conference and therewith also to her leaving the League of Nations. The Chancellor reserves for himself the decision concerning the carrying out of this intimation.

2. In case the English Government presents its demands merely in the form of amendments to the MacDonald plan, then a position is to be taken on them individually and objectively. The instruction of October 4 (II F Abr. 3143) to Minister Weizsäcker<sup>3</sup> is authoritative in this connection, also the memorandum of July 20 to Henderson<sup>4</sup> and the position on the Mussolini proposal.<sup>5</sup>

3. In general a situation must be avoided where Germany will be compelled to reject individual points one after the other and possibly to withdraw from the Conference because her demands for equal rights to armaments are rejected.

The German demands are dependent upon the extent of disarmament by the other states. In the immediate future it is this, therefore, which is to be decided. Only in this way can it be made clear to the world that the heavily armed states do not want to disarm and therefore bear the full responsibility for the breakup of the Conference.

<sup>3</sup> Document No. 480.

<sup>4</sup> Enclosure to document No. 370. In some cases copies of this memorandum had been forwarded to officers concerned under cover letters bearing the dates of July 20 and 21.

<sup>5</sup> See documents Nos. 445 and 454.

## No. 485

5737/H028755-61

### *The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

I 1520

ROME, October 6, 1933.

Received October 9.

II It. 1264.

### POLITICAL REPORT

In my reports during the last weeks before beginning my vacation<sup>1</sup> I have repeatedly referred to a number of factors which even today

<sup>1</sup> e. g., document No. 388.

affect German-Italian relations and in certain circumstances endanger them. Upon my return I have been forced to the conclusion that the development in this direction has become more serious. For the first time in a long time there have appeared attacks and criticism against Germany even in the press, which is, as is known, kept very much on leading strings from above, and these have come even from authoritative quarters; at the same time events in Germany have for some time been receiving very much less space than before.

The "points" which I reported to the Reich Chancellor and left for the State Secretary in a somewhat amplified written form<sup>2</sup> deal with the decisive consideration that a community of interests exists between Italy and Germany in one very essential point (elimination of the supremacy of France), and that Germany must not be responsible for neglecting this community of interests. Today I should like once more to refer briefly to the factors which have to a certain extent cooled the German-Italian relationship and which without appropriate measures can cool it still further in the future. It seems proper to me to pay attention to these dangers so that what is necessary can be done to ward them off.

The favorable development of German-Italian relations experienced at first a new stimulus through the victory of National Socialism in Germany: The coming into power of a political regime regarded in Italy as a sister or even daughter movement was evaluated in Rome as an event that could lend support to the world position of Fascism and create the possibility of close cooperation. The first drop of gall that fell into this cup was the realization of a growing isolation of Germany in foreign policy for various reasons, which made this country appear as an endangered, and at the same time weak—and consequently dangerous—friend. I should like to call to mind in this connection that in a number of conversations which I reported Mussolini warned me time and again even before the German changeover of the danger that Russia seemed to be turning away from Germany—something which he had to warn against urgently. This danger, which Germany at first did not want to believe existed, has in the meantime been realized. In a similar way Mussolini warned later against underestimating the world power of the Jews and Freemasons, from which a tremendous offensive against the new Germany was to be expected. Finally, the Italian statesman time and again urged upon us the necessity of improving the state of mind of the Anglo-Saxons toward us, since an established dislike of present-day Germany by the English and Americans would mean for this country a very serious handicap in its difficult struggle. I am mentioning these warnings now only in order in the first place to show that Mussolini's

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<sup>2</sup> Document No. 448.

wish to see Germany tolerably strong cannot well be doubted. In the second place it is obvious that isolation of Germany in foreign policy must have an unfavorable effect on Italian policy.

Another factor which I should also like to mention is a certain irritation about commercial policy: They believe they must conclude that of late the German-Italian balance of trade is developing increasingly unfavorably for Italy, and they lay the responsibility for this at the door of a protectionism which flourishes particularly among the lower authorities (measures by mayors, etc., against Italian fruit, etc.). It is these events which are in reality at the basis of Mussolini's arrogant article about the "secondary leaders",<sup>3</sup> even though he chose his examples from outside the Italian area of interest.

The most important factor that has brought about the deterioration of German-Italian relations and still encumbers them today is the conflict between the Reich and Austria. Such detailed reports have been made on this subject from here that I can spare myself further particulars. The fact is, at any rate, that when the danger suddenly dawned upon Italy that German National Socialism intends to take over Austria [*Österreich in "Entreprise" zu nehmen*] it struck a severe blow to German-Italian cooperation and on occasion almost brought it irrevocably into channels of a very hazardous kind. I have shown previously the reasons why this latter, most serious danger has not yet fully materialized. Today I should only like to emphasize two special considerations:

The new changeover in Austrian politics to a fascist authoritarian state, which came about with Italian participation, brings with it not only the danger that Italy may commit herself even more strongly for the Dollfuss regime than has been the case sometimes hitherto, but also it has the effect at the same time that an idea already repeatedly touched on softly in Italy grows stronger and louder—namely, the idea that National Socialism is not at all the legitimate sister or daughter of Fascism, but is something different and "Germanic", for which one does not need to interest oneself so much and of which one also cannot expect anything in particular, whereas the "real" Fascism is beginning to develop in Austria and perhaps also in other places in Europe (cf. the Swiss "fronts").

The second point which I should like to stress is the organization of the Danube area, in which—as I have likewise reported repeatedly—German-Italian cooperation is affected badly by the conflict with Austria. In this respect, too, one cannot deny that suggestions by

<sup>3</sup> The reference is to an article which had appeared in *Popolo d'Italia* entitled "Gli 'unterführer'" ("The secondary leaders"). It had dealt with instances of unwarranted assumption of authority by secondary leaders in Germany. It was reprinted in *Messaggero* of Oct. 5, 1933, and elsewhere, and filmed on 8125/E581733.

Mussolini have been available for a long time to the effect that a common German-Italian line in economic policy should be sought, and this idea had also not yet been given up by Mussolini when the German-Italian difference in regard to Austria came sharply to the fore; rather, even then he still kept to the possibility of cooperation "around Austria". Mussolini's initiative did not find any particular response with us. Shortly before the summer vacation I still tried on the occasion of the visit of Ministerialdirektor Ritter to crystallize five points that were in my opinion not unimportant and not unsuitable as a first basis (report No. I 1267 of August 3, 1933 <sup>4</sup>), with which one should attempt to make progress. For the sake of simplicity I shall repeat the points:

1. Of the southeastern European agrarian countries, Hungary and Bulgaria are to be chiefly assisted;

2. As partners in negotiations, Germany and Italy reject any kind of bloc, particularly, therefore, the so-called Little Economic Entente.

3. For Germany and Italy any Tardieu plan or similar organization is out of the question.

4. Germany and Italy should keep each other currently informed concerning the general outlines of commercial policy with respect to the countries of the Little Entente and possibly also Poland, particularly, for example, concerning the denunciation of commercial treaties and countermeasures against differentials or restrictions, in order, if possible, to bring their commercial policy to the same common denominator.

5. On the basis of these general principles for commercial policy the attempts should be continued to inform each other regarding economic activity in these countries, just as is done on the Mixed Commission.

Since then I have not heard anything further from Berlin. In the meantime France, owing to the improved atmosphere between the two countries, has been in a position to undertake an attempt to come to an understanding with Italy in this area, too, and formidable as the obstacles to such an understanding may be, nevertheless one cannot dismiss the danger that if we do not act we will be outmaneuvered.

Italy has now taken the initiative with a proposal,<sup>5</sup> concerning the

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<sup>4</sup>Document No 388.

<sup>5</sup>This refers to the Italian memorandum dated Sept. 29, which set forth proposals for improving the economic situation in the Danubian States. The memorandum was sent to signatories of the Four Power Pact and other States immediately involved. It presented the view that efficacious action could be based upon the following principles:

"a) Bilateral agreements.

b) Preferential treatment for grains and other agricultural products of the Danubian countries.

c) Preferential treatment for Austrian industrial products. The carrying out of paragraphs b) and c) implies naturally a limitation—which will have to be kept in reasonable bounds—of the rights of third countries which enjoy most-favored-nation treatment.

d) Improvement of the balance of trade of the Danubian countries and increase of their exports. Each Danubian country should reserve an appropriate part

details of which judgment must still be reserved. It is certainly tactically correct for a semi-official comment of the Wolff-Büro (telegram No. 234 of October 2<sup>a</sup>) to welcome the Italian proposal warmly. Unfortunately, however, the effectiveness of this has been impaired in that for reasons incomprehensible to me this communiqué arouses the impression that we wish to contest the priority of Mussolini's idea and claim paternity for ourselves. I tried at once to bring the comment to the local press in a condensed form, but discovered that the formulation alluded to had already caused bad blood. In my opinion it will now be appropriate and necessary to make sure of German-Italian cooperation on the basis of the Italian suggestion and in connection with "the 5 points."

In discussing German-Italian relations one meets almost without exception and alternately two sharply contrasting opinions: One of them proclaims a German-Italian front, calls Mussolini our only friend and expects both the possible and the impossible of him; the other writes off the Italians as demonstrably unreliable people, criticizes their duplicity, highlights the discrepancy between certain statements by Mussolini and the actual conduct, e. g., of his delegates in Geneva, and shows sensitivity in regard to occasional, mostly naive, Italian arrogance. In my opinion both are wrong. What is in question here is neither complete and emotional love of Germany nor conscious duplicity and unreliability. The political fact with which we have to do is a German-Italian community of interests in a decisive point of grand policy, a community of interests which, however, is hampered and impaired by the present balance of power in Europe and a number of other circumstances discussed above. In my opinion it is possible even today to exploit this community of interests for ourselves if we recognize the dangers which threaten it and develop political activity on the basis of this realization.

HASSELL

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Footnote (5)—Continued

of its market to any non-Danubian country which grants it preferential rights and thereby has an unfavorable balance of trade with it.

e) Measures which will guide the stream of commerce of these countries into channels which are natural and likely to promote commerce.

f) Measures to improve the balance of payments of the Danubian countries: agreements whose conclusion is desired could indirectly prepare and facilitate these measures."

The Italian memorandum was handed to Ritter in Geneva on Sept. 30 (unnumbered telegram from Geneva of Sept. 30: 3086/616965-68), and a German translation (3086/616969-75) was sent to Berlin that same day. In a discussion of commercial policy in the Cabinet meeting of Oct. 4 (3598/793926-35), Posse referred to the Italian memorandum as indicative also of the orientation of German commercial policy in the southeastern area. A text of the memorandum, in French, is printed in *Documents on International Affairs, 1933*, pp. 410-414.

\* Not printed (8036/E577959-60).

## No. 486

7360/E537742-46

*The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 235 of October 10

LONDON, October 10, 1933—11:06 p. m.

Received October 11—4:10 a. m.

II F Abr. 3253.

When Sir John Simon learned of my return yesterday, he asked me to call on him today in order, as he said, to state to me the unanimous position taken at yesterday's Cabinet meeting on Bismarck's communications in the disarmament question.<sup>1</sup> Simon is leaving by plane for Paris at 4 o'clock and will be in Geneva tomorrow morning.

He stated that the English Government was very much taken aback by Bismarck's communications, since it felt that it had to interpret it as a step backward in the German attitude, and did not see how the disarmament convention was to be brought about on the basis of the German demands. Two points seemed to give cause for particular concern; first, the fact, to be inferred from Bismarck's statements, that Germany did not accept for practical purposes the division of the disarmament convention into two periods; second, the circumstance that Germany, obviously abandoning the concept of models of weapons that had recently been accepted, was now demanding immediate, partly limited, partly unlimited, rearmament in all nonaggressive weapons. In his conversations with the Foreign Minister at Geneva, the latter had, to be sure, by no means approved the said division. He had, however, discussed it without committing himself, just as the German demands for qualitative equality in arms were apparently also based on the concept of models of weapons. The latest German attitude undid, so to speak, the results of the negotiations to date, and created a very serious situation. It was out of the question to prevail upon certain neighboring countries of Germany to effect immediate disarmament without first creating security, just as it was impossible to obtain the consent of the world to an immediate increase in German arms. It was precisely the division into two stages that was to serve the purpose of creating security for Germany, with the provision that after a period of transformation of the continental armies and of organized supervision, with time limits still to be set, a second period of disarmament was to follow, with a considerable degree of disarmament to be established even at this time. Developments in Germany and various pronouncements during the past months had simply created a feeling

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 480 and footnote 3.

of insecurity in the world which requires a certain amount of consideration if a disarmament convention is to come about at all. He urgently requests the German Government to instruct Nadolny in such a manner that he need not remain intransigent, but will be able to negotiate. He asked me in this connection whether Nadolny would have a general statement to make and when this might possibly occur, intimating at the same time that he might possibly be forced to define the British position in a counterdeclaration. After I explained that I was not informed about this, Simon concluded his statements with an appeal addressed to the German Government on special instruction from MacDonald, which he apparently had before him in writing. It was to the effect that Germany should not forget that it had been England which soon after the war's end had repeatedly advocated a more just treatment of Germany; occupation of the Ruhr, evacuation of the Rhineland, settlement of the question of tribute were the stages along this road. Nor did England wish now to treat Germany unjustly, but she wished merely to bring about a disarmament convention by the methods and ways which at present were indeed the only ones conceivable. Germany should not refuse to cooperate in this.

In my reply I took up first Simon's remark about the German revolution and pronouncements. Of important German pronouncements, I mentioned that I was acquainted above all with the Reichstag speech of the Reich Chancellor,<sup>2</sup> the speech of the Chancellor at Nürnberg,<sup>3</sup> the speech of the Foreign Minister to the foreign press in Berlin,<sup>4</sup> and the Geneva address of Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels,<sup>5</sup> and I had to say that these pronouncements had been anything but disquieting. Aside from speeches, however, there were also deeds, such, for example, as the handling of the questions concerning Danzig. There were therefore no tangible reasons for the mistrust of Germany, which was, rather, only a result of the agitation that was artificially stirred up against Germany. Under the influence of this agitation, Germany had been increasingly eased out of her lawful rights in the disarmament question. Only last spring the English and Norman Davis had promised in the event of German consent to the transformation of the Reichswehr to put strong concentric pressure on France urging immediate disarmament measures,<sup>6</sup> and only at Whitsuntide Lord Londonderry<sup>7</sup> had made a futile attempt at Paris in this direction. Things had now gone so far that it was the desire to base the first period of the

<sup>2</sup> See Editors' Note, p. 451.

<sup>3</sup> On Sept. 3 at the National Socialist party rally.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 431, footnote 6.

<sup>5</sup> Before representatives of the press on Sept. 28.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. document No. 242.

<sup>7</sup> See document No. 283, footnote 1.



Convention on the two principal concessions of Germany, namely, the transformation of the Reichswehr and of supervision, while forgetting about disarmament itself. I was not authorized to give an interpretation of Bismarck's communications or to negotiate about disarmament, but I could, however, say that we did not reject the division into two stages as such, but only asked that both disarmament and equality of rights should take place in the first period. As far as the arms question was concerned, I could only repeat the tripartite division of the MacDonald plan, already proposed by Bismarck. In this connection I had to call attention to the fact that Daladier, in his speech at Vichy,<sup>8</sup> had imputed to us intentions with regard to weapons of aggression to be destroyed later on, which we did not have. The concept of models of weapons had always been misleading; we were, however, as was known, prepared to discuss the quantity of the second category of arms to be permitted us. The introduction of a militia finally precluded logically a limitation of arms of the third category, since the militia army is, indeed, based precisely on the idea of national defense by means of reserves with short periods of training, who, of course, must have the customary weapons for the purpose.

I concluded, for my part, with an appeal to Simon that the English Government should not allow itself, through the agitation against Germany, of which I knew, to be driven into espousing the policy of an anti-German front. If justly treated, the new Germany was prepared and qualified to cooperate extensively on great world problems. It would be a sad mistake to go over the head of the German Reich in pursuing a policy and not exploit the possibilities for cooperation on a footing of equality.

The conversation, which lasted over an hour, did not fail to make an impression on Simon. Nevertheless, at the end he reverted to his arguments, which I promised to transmit to Berlin. Accordingly, we shall have to face tough opposition from the English at Geneva. Their guiding principle will be in any case to produce a disarmament convention.<sup>9</sup>

HOESCH

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<sup>8</sup> At the Radical Socialist Party Congress on Oct. 8.

<sup>9</sup> For Simon's account of this conversation see *British Documents*, 2nd ser., vol. v, document No. 443.

## No. 487

6609/E497201-08

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry*

A 2180

Moscow, October 10, 1933.

Received October 12.

IV Ru. 4531.

## POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: German-Soviet relations.

The conversations with high officials of the Foreign Commissariat and other Soviet officials, which I had the opportunity of holding in the course of these past weeks, leave no doubt that the irritation against Germany, far from easing, has on the contrary increased. This excitement, which impresses one as almost hysterical, leaves open the possibility of new unpleasant surprises on the least provocation. On this account I called on the director of the Second Western Affairs Division on October 7, and in the course of a discussion on official business talked with him about the current state of German-Soviet relations. This conversation, a note on which is enclosed herewith, confirmed the impression which I had gained from other talks that so far the time has not yet come for entering into discussions with the Soviet Government with a view to a thoroughgoing clarification of German-Soviet relations. That would require first a calming of the temper prevailing here; to a large extent this could be accomplished by cessation of incidents.

On the other hand, however, it is not my impression—and this view is shared by most diplomats here—that the Soviet Government has already made a definitive change in its policy line toward Germany. I believe on the contrary that the Kremlin's directive to the Foreign Commissariat not to commit the Soviet Union to any European coalition, and to maintain the best possible relations with all European states in order to retain a free hand, is still in force as heretofore. In the event, however, that the German-Soviet conflict should become sharper and create a prolonged period of mutual irritation, it would not be impossible for the forces which are advocating here a definite turning away from Germany to win the upper hand.

V. TWARDOWSKI

[Enclosure]

SECRET

Moscow, October 7, 1933.

## MEMORANDUM CONCERNING GERMAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

After various official matters were disposed of, my talk with M. Stern today turned to German-Soviet relations. M. Stern said to me that these past days had not only brought no improvement but on the contrary a worsening of the atmosphere in Moscow in regard to Germany. In particular, the conversations of State Secretary von Bülow with Ambassador Khinchuk on September 26<sup>1</sup> and 27,<sup>2</sup> and October 5 or 6<sup>3</sup> did not suggest to the Soviet Government any hope for expecting the termination of the acute conflict.

I replied that nothing was known to me of any conversation in early October, but I had received the memoranda on the conversations between M. Khinchuk and State Secretary von Bülow on September 26 and 27, and it seemed incomprehensible to me how these talks could have led to a worsening of the situation. On the basis of some notes on the State Secretary's remarks I reiterated to M. Stern the view adopted by the Reich Chancellor and asked him where any worsening was to be seen.

M. Stern replied that the Reich Chancellor's attitude on the subject of the Soviet press in relation to the Leipzig trial justified the position taken by the Soviet Government and indicated no possibility of resolving the differences. In regard to the many other incidents, it was true that measures had been promised, but so far promised only. For the rest he could only repeat what M. Litvinov had already told me repeatedly: Words about good intentions had been heard aplenty from Germany, but unfortunately any evidence was lacking that these words would also be followed by deeds. The statements of the Reich Foreign Minister before the foreign press, if made at a more propitious moment, would certainly have had a beneficial effect on German-Soviet relations. But in the context of the incidents they were absolutely valueless for the Soviet Government.

Upon this I repeated that the incidents in Germany, deplorable as they might be, were given much too much symptomatic significance by the Soviet Government; what did matter was the will of the Govern-

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 455.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 461.

<sup>3</sup> The only record found of Bülow's conversation with Khinchuk on Oct. 6 is a brief note by Bülow (6609/E497223), stating that Khinchuk had told him very confidentially that he did not know whether Krestinsky would come to Berlin, since he had to see a doctor in Vienna; that in any case the conflict could only be settled by Litvinov himself. A letter was sent to Twardowski on Oct. 10 (6609/E497224) informing him of Khinchuk's statement and inquiring further if he knew whether Litvinov was going to the Disarmament Conference, and if so what route he would take.

ment, and that, as before, was to maintain good relations with the Soviet Government. In this connection I inquired when M. Krestinsky would come to Berlin. M. Stern replied that M. Krestinsky would probably not come to Berlin at all. His plans were not yet definite, but an itinerary via Berlin was not likely any more. I thereupon with serious emphasis pointed out that State Secretary von Bülow had informed the Soviet Ambassador on instruction of the Reich Chancellor that the Reich Chancellor was ready to receive M. Krestinsky on his passage through Berlin if M. Krestinsky should express such a desire. If M. Krestinsky were to change his original travel plans after the Head of the German Government had expressed his willingness, that could be interpreted by the German side in no other way than that M. Krestinsky on the instruction of his Government wanted to avoid this conversation. That would mean therefore that the Foreign Commissariat did not care to avail itself of a favorable opportunity to eliminate the existing tension and misunderstandings through a frank talk, and we would have to draw our conclusions from this.

M. Stern replied that M. Krestinsky was taking a cure, had now been away from Moscow for nearly a month and a half, and consequently was not sufficiently up to date on these affairs to be able to conduct such a conversation with any prospect of success. To this I countered that there was a Soviet Embassy in Berlin, which was thoroughly familiar with the situation and through which M. Litvinov could without any difficulty send appropriate instructions. This excuse was really too weak to be accepted by us. To this M. Stern replied that a conversation at the present moment could promise no success in view of the atmosphere prevailing between the two countries. The admission of Soviet newspaper reporters to the Leipzig trial had been refused by the Reich Chancellor. This was the *conditio sine qua non* for the Soviet Government with respect to returning to better relations with Germany, because this was regarded as a test of Germany's having abandoned discrimination against the Soviet Union. With the situation now having stiffened to this extent, a conversation between M. Krestinsky and the Reich Chancellor actually could amount to no more than another mutual presentation of the position of each side. The position of the Soviet Government is known to the German Government. Similarly the Soviet Government was aware of the position of the German Government. In addition to that, the atmosphere between the two countries was as bad as one could imagine. Nothing remained therefore but to wait a few months and see whether the atmosphere had calmed in the meantime. Should it meanwhile be possible in Germany to put an end to the incidents so that no new inflammatory material would be brought before the Soviet public it would perhaps be possible

at some later date to enter into conversations with greater prospect of success.

I replied to M. Stern that I had taken note of his remarks. Germany, through the Reich Chancellor's declaration that he was ready to have a talk with M. Krestinsky, had taken a conciliatory step to the end of removing the existing misunderstandings. If the Soviet Government failed to avail itself of this opportunity, we would draw our conclusions therefrom, and it could now be taken as self-evident in any case that the next initiative for a settlement of the conflict would have to issue from the Soviet side.

M. Stern, whose positive efforts in behalf of good German-Soviet relations are not in doubt, gave during this conversation an impression of utter resignation. He obviously had very strict instructions on how the conversation was to be conducted. In my work with him over several years he had never been so unapproachable as he was this time.

I would add that in the course of the conversation I did not conceal from M. Stern that in my opinion the acute conflict between Germany and the Soviet Government over the newspaper reporters had been contrived by the Soviet side in order to provide for the world public, especially France, visible proof of the cooling of German-Soviet relations, probably in the hope that French tokens of friendship of a material sort would thereby be easier to secure. M. Stern vigorously denied this of course and emphasized that Soviet policy was solely directed to maintaining the best possible relations with all states.

VON TWARDOWSKI

## No. 488

9149/E643586-89

### *The Minister in Czechoslovakia to the Foreign Ministry*

A. III. 2. f.

PRAGUE, October 10, 1933.

Received October 16.

II Ts. 1253.

Subject: Situation of the Sudeten Germans.

With reference to the telegraphic reports of October 5<sup>1</sup> and 7.<sup>2</sup>

The dissolution of the National Socialists and of the German National party has created an entirely chaotic political situation in the Sudeten German community. The Sudeten German community is divided today into three parts. The activists (Agrarian League

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 483.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 483, footnote 2.

[*Landbündler*] and Social Democrats), the opposition (Christian Socials, Business party [*Gewerbler*], Labor and Economy Group [*Arbeits- und Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*], and the amorphous, unorganized mass of the former adherents of the parties that have just been dissolved. The attempt to avert threatening chaos by means of the "Popular Front" [*Volksfront*] has failed. The idea of the "People's Council" [*Volksrat*] has had now to be postponed indefinitely in view of the confusion following the dissolution of the parties. Konrad Henlein, the leader of the German gymnastic association, has now undertaken to give to the portion of the German community that lacks a leader a new rallying point around which to gather their forces in the idea of the "Home Front" [*Heimatfront*]. For the present, however, it is only an experiment that is involved, not a political factor with a definite value that can be included in a political calculation. Henlein began too soon with his operation for the Czechs not to judge his efforts as a device for "picking up" the parties that had just been dissolved or even as a "National Socialist attempt at camouflage."

Nevertheless Henlein is trying everywhere on the Czech and the German side to gain confidence. He stresses the fact that his movement accepts in principle the existing state, takes a positive stand on the question of participation in the government, regards the idea of democracy as fundamental, rejects the class struggle and, despite a Christian-German ideology, extends a welcome to every Jew who declares his allegiance to the German community. It remains to be seen whether this versatility will allay Czech mistrust (his first press conference was broken up by the police) and will exert enough attraction on the Sudeten German masses that incline to extreme views. Meanwhile Minister Spina,<sup>3</sup> on behalf of the Agrarian League, has issued an appeal to the Sudeten German community, which is intended to rally the scattered forces around a farmers' core. Between Spina and Henlein, who, moreover, has a reputation for uprightness and honesty of purpose, efforts at unification are in progress.

On the whole, it may be said that the state of dissolution of the Sudeten Germans is similar to the one that approximately prevailed in 1918 after the revolution. The German national population is in the clutches of the Czech authorities as it never was before. Terror and confusion are being spread by the arrest of the leaders, the suspension of the newspapers, the seizure of party property, continual house searches and interrogations, and commissions that are already beginning to investigate the activities of Sudeten German government employees in the national parties. On the Sudeten German side, there is,

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<sup>3</sup> Franz Spina, Minister of Public Health in the Malypetr Government.

moreover, the feeling that all that has been going on has not made a sufficiently deep impression on the Reich German public and press and that no help is to be expected from Germany. The rather indiscriminate nervousness (arrests are being made incessantly), with which the Czech authorities carry out their measures, increases the general insecurity even more.

The loss of parliamentary seats involved in the dissolution of the parties strengthens the present government majority. The opposition has lost 15 votes. The Government is preparing new laws which are to make possible an even easier and speedier dissolution of parties and suspension of their organs than heretofore. The parties are to fall under the Law of Association, which is to be extended for the purpose. Parties that do not strictly accept the state as a basis shall in future not be allowed to put up candidates. That is what Czechoslovak democracy looks like now.

As a result of the arrest of the leading persons in the national parties, and as a result of the apprehensions that have seized all those not yet arrested, I am compelled to occupy a mere observer's post here with respect to Sudeten German affairs. This condition will last until the present political atomization is overcome from within by new, viable groupings. Reich German activity without the possibility of concrete help in an emergency could only do damage here. The recreation of the political will of the Sudeten Germans must take place through their own efforts. They must learn to bear the responsibility for their actions. It seems to me always to be dangerous and inexpedient to relieve them of this responsibility.

DR. KOCH

## No. 489

7360/E537761

### *The Foreign Minister to the German Delegation at Geneva*

Telegram

No. 80

BERLIN, October 11, 1933—8:00 p. m.  
e. o. II F. Abr. 3259.

For Ambassador Nadolny personally.

If, as the statements of Simon to Ambassador von Hoesch<sup>1</sup> lead us to assume, and as is also to be inferred from Baldwin's speech in Birmingham,<sup>2</sup> the English proposals for amending the MacDonald plan are irreconcilable with German equality, such as was defined in December, we shall withdraw from the Disarmament Conference. Please

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 486.

<sup>2</sup> In a speech at the annual conference of the Conservative party on Oct. 6.

keep this constantly in mind in your conversations. The statement regarding the break-off would be made by the Reich Chancellor here, in accordance with the concluding sentence of point 1 of the directives of October 6,<sup>3</sup> and not at Geneva. A violation of the supreme principle of equality would consist primarily in a trial period with unilateral supervision and a ban on the weapons of defense allowed the other Powers.

NEURATH

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<sup>3</sup> Document No. 484.

No. 490

9992/E697949-52

*Memorandum by an Official of Department II*

BERLIN, October 11, 1933.

The enclosed "Study concerning a reinforced border patrol service along the borders of the Reich facing Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Switzerland, and Austria"<sup>1</sup> was the subject of a preliminary conference in the Reichswehr Ministry on October 10 of the experts of the Reich Ministry of Finance (Ministerialrat Wapenhensch), Reich Ministry of Interior (Major Henrici), the Reichswehr Ministry (Lt. Col. Stapf), and the Foreign Ministry (Secretary of Legation von Bülow), under the chairmanship of Lt. Col. Stapf.<sup>2</sup>

I first described the objections on grounds of foreign policy to the establishment of the increased border patrol service proposed in the study, on the basis of the Versailles Treaty (article 162 and articles 42-44<sup>3</sup>), the Locarno Treaty, and the disarmament negotiations.

I pointed out in particular that taking into account the obligations assumed by Germany the western border of the Reich and especially the demilitarized zone were Reich territory in which, even when the necessary military interests with respect to borders are fully appreciated, everything must be avoided that can and must give the signatory powers of Versailles and especially France the pretext and justification for setting in motion against Germany the coercive measures provided for in the Versailles and Locarno Treaties. In this connection I

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed (9992/E697953-70). This study had been sent on Sept. 28 to Secretary of Legation Adolf Bülow, who was liaison officer of the Foreign Ministry with the Reichswehr Ministry, by Colonel Keitel, at that time Chief of the Department of Army Organization in the Reichswehr Ministry.

<sup>2</sup> Minutes of this meeting under the date of Oct. 16 are filmed on 9992/E697975-80.

<sup>3</sup> Article 162 stipulated that the number of German police forces and officials employed as customs officers, forest guards, and coast guards should not be larger than in 1913, except that police forces might be increased in proportion to the population increase in a certain area. Articles 42-44 established the demilitarized zone in the Rhineland.



stressed the contrast that exists in this respect between the eastern border that does not come under the Locarno Treaty and its stipulations and the western border of the Reich.

I particularly emphasized the statement that the reinforcement of the border service of the customs authorities by members of the paramilitary organizations, provided for in No. B 5 of the study, was not only contrary to the meaning of the obligations entered into at Versailles and Locarno, but also (as the recent encroachments at the border by members of the paramilitary organizations and their consequences had shown) created a danger of unrest even on the borders of the Reich with friendly and neutral countries and in this way brought on diplomatic conflicts with these countries. When Ministerialrat Wapenhensch gave me the argument that 2,000 members of paramilitary organizations were already employed in the customs service at the border without any border incidents resulting from it so far, and that this had occurred in agreement with the Foreign Ministry, I pointed out that such a *small* scale measure justified by the necessity of a closer supervision of the smuggling of foreign exchange and other things in restless times was something different; in particular, from the point of view of foreign policy, it was easier to camouflage than the new organization of the border patrol service employing members of the paramilitary organizations which was being planned at present.

The objections I expressed were taken into account to the extent that I was assured that for the time being the Study, and knowledge of it, would be restricted to a limited circle of top officials: the Chiefs of the Provincial Police Inspectorates of Düsseldorf, Frankfurt a/M., and Stuttgart, and the Provincial Finance Office Presidents of Hannover, Cologne, Düsseldorf, Münster, Stuttgart, and Munich.

Furthermore I have been assured that the military purpose of the reinforced border patrol service will be camouflaged, to an even greater degree than in the newly completed Study, in the pamphlets, forms, and other instructions dealing with the execution of specific organizational measures which become necessary as a supplement to the Study. The Foreign Ministry will furthermore participate in the preparation of these pamphlets, etc.

Above all, however, the independent authority of the Provincial Finance Office Presidents of regions which are suddenly endangered to decide independently regarding the moment for employing the reinforced border patrol service, envisaged in II 12, has been at my suggestion dropped by deletion of the second paragraph of No. 12. Accordingly, only the Reich Government and no local authority would now have to decide on such employment.

I have further succeeded in having the term "political tension", used in A 1, replaced by the less elastic expression "threat to the borders of Germany." Furthermore, through various textual changes evident

from the cover sheets, care was taken at my suggestion that the military purpose of the reinforced border patrol service would be largely camouflaged.

Now that all of the most serious objections from the point of view of foreign policy have been taken into account, at least to a certain extent, I felt that, while maintaining for the time being the basic objections of the Foreign Ministry, I could in conclusion define my position to the effect that in the new formulation, on condition that its secrecy was assured, the draft appeared to me to represent progress in the direction of achieving a compromise between our objections and the military necessities.

Submitted herewith through Ministerialdirektor Köpke to the State Secretary for his information and with the request that I be provided with instructions for the new discussion of the draft intended in the very near future.<sup>4</sup>

BÜLOW

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<sup>4</sup> Marginal note: "To the State Secretary with the request that he receive Secretary of Legation Bülow and myself for a conference. Köpke, Oct. 12."

## No. 491

6204/E468598-99

### *Memorandum by the Deputy Director of Department IV*

BERLIN, October 11, 1933.  
zu IV Po. 7294.<sup>1</sup>

With reference to Reichsbank Directorate No. I 12087 of October 3, 1933.<sup>2</sup>

The new orientation of Danzig policy toward Poland, against which the Foreign Ministry had already raised a warning voice, though in vain, before the conclusion of the port agreement,<sup>3</sup> is developing with a speed and intensity which endangers the interests of the Reich, as the political and financial discussion in the attached letter demonstrates.<sup>4</sup> It signifies a complete departure from the basic concepts of the official German eastern policy if the Corridor is described as cement between the Reich and Poland, and the existing cross connections to East Prussia are described as entirely adequate. If and when this concept becomes the common property of public

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<sup>1</sup> IV Po. 7294: Not printed (6204/E468587-97); see footnote 2.

<sup>2</sup> This letter (IV Po. 7294) forwarded a copy of a letter of Sept. 26 from President Schäfer of the Bank of Danzig to President of the Reichsbank Schacht and a minute concerning a visit of Schäfer to the Reichsbank on Oct. 2. In this letter and at this visit Schäfer had discussed the new policy of the Danzig Government aimed at closer economic ties with Poland. He had indicated that this policy might also involve tying the Danzig currency more closely to the Polish zloty.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 417 and footnote 1.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 1.

opinion in the detached area, the defenders of the Versailles eastern system will be provided with a strong argument which practically amounts to a permanent renunciation of recovery of the Corridor.

In connection with these general political observations the political importance of the financial proposal of the President of the Bank of Danzig appears at once. Through this procedure the detachment of Danzig from the German association and a closer attachment to Poland would be further promoted. Furthermore, from the arguments in the letter no compelling reason can be discovered that would force Danzig from the economic point of view to take the course which is proposed. All the considerations of the letter rest upon combinations and possibilities that might perhaps occur in the future: Perhaps Poland will make use of her treaty right to apply for unification of the currency. However, Danzig can defend herself against this, and the final decision rests with the League of Nations Council, in which Germany could if necessary defeat the application. However, it is typical of Danzig's constantly more evident impulsive urge to pursue a grand independent policy, when she voluntarily wants to take over the task of lending a helping hand to the financially embarrassed Poland with the funds provided her by the Reich. Here, too, the Reichsbank Directorate has misgivings, and it is likewise aware of the political dangers of the project, as is evident from its memorandum.

I should like to suggest that the enclosures be sent to Herr Meyer with the instruction that he have a conversation with Herr Rauschning, who is still in Geneva,<sup>5</sup> and in it utilize the above statements. It would depend on the report of Herr Meyer concerning his conversation whether the Foreign Ministry in conjunction with the President of the Reichsbank should bring the matter before the Reich Chancellor.

Submitted to the State Secretary in accordance with instructions.

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<sup>5</sup> See document No. 492 and footnote 3.

## No. 492

6204/E468605-06

*Ministerialdirektor Meyer to Foreign Minister Neurath*<sup>1</sup>

Cipher Letter

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, October 11, 1933.<sup>2</sup>

DEAR HERR FOREIGN MINISTER: In accordance with instructions I spoke with President Rauschning this evening concerning the report

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<sup>1</sup> The file copy lacks the printed signature. An attached note reads: "The Foreign Minister gave the top copy of the letter to Herr Schacht at the Cabinet meeting of Oct. 13. Vö[llcker]s, Oct. 13." (6204/E468603)

<sup>2</sup> A marginal note indicates that the letter was sent by air mail on Oct. 12

of a possible intention to adjust the Danzig currency to the Polish zloty.<sup>3</sup>

President Rauschning replied that there could be no question of an adjustment of the Danzig currency to the Polish zloty; something else was involved, namely the following:

1. The question of bringing about a fixed relationship between the Danzig gulden and the Polish zloty (similar to the *former* relationship between the Danzig gulden and the English gold pound). This fixed relationship was necessary for Danzig-Polish trade.

2. The question of the Bank of Danzig providing the Bank of Poland with a certain amount of foreign exchange (the equivalent of about 20-25 million Danzig gulden) as a loan, with the Bank for International Settlements acting as trustee. The purpose of such a transaction would be to place the Danzig Government in the position on the one hand of possessing an important bargaining object in the coming economic negotiations with Poland, and on the other hand, by the short-term provision of foreign currency, of having permanently the practical possibility of making Poland live up to her contractual commercial obligations and eliminating any open or camouflaged intervention by Polish authorities (also auditors).

According to previous information from the Reichsbank, President Rauschning conducted the first technical preliminary discussions with the Bank for International Settlements (Hülse) a short time ago. No agreements of any sort were made, nor has Poland been informed.

President Rauschning informed me that when he is in Berlin at the beginning of next week he will speak with the Reich Chancellor and you about the question sketched above concerning the possibility of a combination of credit action and economic negotiations.

For your information I should also like to report that President Rauschning told me a few weeks ago that the Bank of Danzig provided the Bank of Poland with a short-term open credit of about 3 million zloty in foreign exchange. This was a credit transaction quite independent of the above project.

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<sup>3</sup> See document No. 491 and footnote 2.

A memorandum by Neurath on Oct. 12 reads: "According to a telephone message from Ministerialdirektor Meyer whom I had instructed to say to Herr Rauschning that in the question of bringing the Danzig currency to the same level as the Polish currency no decisions should be made before Herr Rauschning had conferred with me here, Herr Rauschning stated that the Danzig Government did not intend to undertake such an assimilation at all and there consequently must have been a misunderstanding." (6204/E468600)

## No. 493

'360/E537762-65

*The Head of the German Delegation at Geneva to the  
Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

GENEVA, German Delegation, October 12, 1933—1:20 a. m.  
Del. No. 515 of October 11      Received October 12—2:30 a. m.  
II F Abr. 3260.

I had conversations today with Henderson, Beneš, Simon, and Norman Davis. Henderson was not informed in detail about the status of the discussions and merely said with reference to the procedural question that in the event an agreement was reached, a drafting committee should first go to work before one proceeded with the second reading.

Beneš spoke to the same effect about the procedural question; he thought that, in the event of an agreement, one or more committees of specialists should first be appointed to draw up the texts. He then said that England was pressing for early agreement, if possible by Saturday. He responded skeptically to a remark of mine that in case the present negotiations broke down there was always the possibility of Four Power negotiations under the chairmanship of Mussolini. He thought that many were opposed to the very idea of Four Power negotiations, and if such negotiations were really held the chances of success would be extremely slight following a breakdown of the Geneva negotiations which had been carried on under the leadership of England. With regard to the substantive aspect, Beneš stated that if we insisted on immediate realization of equality of rights with respect to material, that would in his opinion be an insuperable obstacle to agreement. I cited our well-known arguments against that, however, and pointed out especially that the differences of opinion were limited only to the question whether we were to obtain, somewhat sooner or later, certain quantities of specific arms categories, which could not constitute a military threat to any of the neighboring states. Beneš admitted this, but maintained that the governments had committed themselves to their decision—originating in the political atmosphere—not to grant us equality of rights until the end of the Convention.

Simon had a lengthy discussion in the afternoon with the French and Americans. After its conclusion he asked me to come to see him. He told me that the reply which the German Government had given through Bismarck to the questions addressed to the Reich Foreign Minister in Geneva <sup>1</sup> had given little satisfaction to the British Cabinet.

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 480 and footnote 3

The Cabinet had decided that disarmament with respect to material of the heavily armed states should not take place until a second period of the convention. In the first period the conversion of the Reichswehr was to be effected and any German rearmament was excluded. The realization of equality of rights with respect to material was not to be carried out till the second period. Simon gave as the reason for this the general bad feeling toward Germany. To this I replied, giving the familiar reasons, that such a solution was entirely unacceptable to us. It meant renunciation of immediate disarmament of the others, our own disarmament as a payment in advance and renunciation of immediate claim to equality of rights. Anything like that could not be expected of us. In that connection I pointed out in a very serious way the great responsibility which England took upon herself if she persisted in this attitude, which meant discrimination against Germany and an affront to her honor, and expressed my astonishment that the feeling created by irresponsible press influences could so decisively affect the decisions of the English statesmen in such a momentous question of foreign policy. Simon insisted that in view of the roused public opinion it was impossible at present for the English Government to grant Germany immediate equality of rights; on the other hand, I persisted in my statement that we could in no case renounce the immediate realization of equality of rights. After the views of the two sides had thus been set forth, Simon said that we would continue our conversation at another time, for which I said I would be available.

My conversation with Norman Davis lasted only a short while and produced no further result.<sup>2</sup> He stated that according to his observations the English attitude on the question of delaying the granting of defensive weapons was extremely stiff and that he did not know, moreover, how he could dissuade his own Government from this position, and he asked me whether we could not make some concession in this question. I said of course that we could not.

There are certain indications that as a result of today's conversations others will try, while adhering to their position in principle, to offer us a compromise proposal, which will perhaps be in the direction of shortening the first period. Unless I am instructed otherwise, I shall reject this, too, and continue to insist that equality of rights must be realized immediately.<sup>3</sup>

NADOLNY

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<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933*, vol. 1, pp. 255-258.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 495, footnote 1.

No. 494

3154/670058-59

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

BERLIN, October 12, 1933.

RM 1414.

The Italian Ambassador visited the Reich Chancellor this morning in order to submit to him, on instruction from Mussolini, a new proposal for the settlement of the disarmament question. After a detailed presentation of the entire political situation, Signor Cerruti delivered the enclosed memorandum as a preliminary excerpt of Mussolini's proposal and promised to deliver the proposal in detail in the next few days. The Chancellor reserved taking a position until the entire proposal had been received<sup>1</sup> and merely made some remarks in regard to the necessity for making arms available to the reserves that would be created under the militia system, whose numbers he put at some 150,000 a year. He further pointed out that none of us harbored aggressive intentions toward France, that the Alsace-Lorraine question was for us nonexistent, and that we had to discuss with France only the return of the Saar region and later possibly the return or awarding of colonies.

V. N[EURATH]

[Enclosure]

*Mussolini Proposal*<sup>2</sup>

OCTOBER 12.

## GERMANY'S REARMAMENT

1st year<sup>3</sup>—double the number of Versailles weapons;2nd year<sup>4</sup>—an X-number of antiaircraft batteries;

3rd year—a minimum number of technical weapons, which are to be considered as supplementing the modern divisions, as well as reconnaissance planes, small tanks, etc.

4th and 5th years—models of the other weapons that are permitted under the Treaty;

6th and 7th years—double the number of those models;

8th year—triple the number of those models.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. document No. 498.<sup>2</sup> This heading and the date of the enclosure were added in Neurath's handwriting.<sup>3</sup> Another copy of this enclosure has marginal notes in Köpke's handwriting to the various points listed (7467/H178866). The first of these reads as follows: "Not sufficient, nor is it in accordance with the character and the needs of an army of 200,000 men."<sup>4</sup> Marginal note: "Why not right away?"

## DISARMAMENT OF THE ARMED POWERS

1st year—prohibition of the bombardment of the civilian population and of chemical warfare;<sup>5</sup>

4th year and progressively on to the 8th year—destruction by stages of the weapons not permitted by the Treaty, beginning with the bigger guns, tanks, and planes.<sup>6</sup>

In the 3rd year a meeting or conference<sup>7</sup> should be called to consider the situation and the operation of supervision.

<sup>5</sup> Marginal note: "Too little."

<sup>6</sup> Marginal note: "Too general."

<sup>7</sup> Marginal note: "On which practically everything else would depend since the disarmament of the others begins only in the 4th year!"

## No. 495

7360/E537772-73

*The Head of the German Delegation at Geneva to the  
Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

GENEVA, German Delegation, October 12, 1933—2:00 p. m.  
Del. No. 516 of October 12      Received October 12—2:10 p. m.  
II F Abr. 3272.

In order to be able to carry out the instruction of the Chancellor,<sup>1</sup> I am having a plane come here for me immediately, so that I can arrive in Berlin tomorrow noon. I feel in duty bound, however, to point out the following, with the request that it be reported to the Chancellor:

1) Simon said yesterday after the two positions had been clarified that this was the first conversation between us and that others would follow.<sup>2</sup> My departure without any further conversation cannot but create the impression over there that we are again considering the demands of the other side and possibly intend to give in. In my opinion therefore we ought to wait at least for the next conversation.

2) Soragna just related the following: He had had a conversation with Simon yesterday before I did. He had been told the same things by Simon about the German reply in London and the English attitude as I had. He had thereupon replied that the last word in the matter had probably not yet been spoken, and the negotiations would after all have to continue. Simon had answered that it would be necessary to finish by Saturday or at the latest before the session of the General Commission on Monday. When he was leaving, how-

<sup>1</sup> In telegram No. 85, sent at 11:26 a. m. on Oct. 12, Neurath had transmitted to Nadolny the following instruction: "The Chancellor requests you to come here immediately to report." (7360/E537799)

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 493.



ever, Eden had told him that he would not take this so seriously; the negotiations had to continue under all circumstances. This morning he, Soragna, had spoken to Norman Davis. The latter had told him that under all circumstances one must make concessions to the German views and spare Germany a defeat. He would do all he could to bring about an arrangement that was generally acceptable. If this could not be accomplished so quickly, the agenda for the General Commission on Monday would have to be made such that the negotiations could continue. He would in any case insist on that.

There are therefore indications that not everyone on the other side is disposed to hold fast to the blunt position taken at first by Simon. My departure at this moment would, as a sign of German weakening, result in a uniting of the opposing front and a renewed strengthening of its intransigent attitude; at least it would greatly prejudice the American-Italian attempt at mediation.

I therefore request that I be given at least a certain leeway for my departure. As soon as I see that the opponents persist in their demands and intend to force us to accept them, I will of course come to Berlin immediately.<sup>3</sup>

NADOLNY

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<sup>3</sup> At 5:58 p. m. Neurath wired Nadolny as follows: "I request you to proceed with your departure as ordered." (telegram No. 87 of Oct. 12: 7360/E537774)

## No. 496

6121/E456358-60;  
6121/E456363-65

### *The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Rumania*

SECRET

BERLIN, October 11, 1933.

Sent October 12.

zu II Balk. 1703 R<sup>1</sup> Ang. 2.

Drafting Officer: Counselor Busse.

With reference to instruction II Balk. 1703 R I of September 28.<sup>2</sup>

Enclosed for your information is the copy of a memorandum of September 19, 1933, drawn up in the Press Department of the Foreign Ministry about the requests put forward by Colonel Tatarescu, leader of the Rumanian National Socialist party. At present the memorandum is also being submitted to the Ministry of Propaganda, and it is expected that the Foreign Ministry will be requested by the former to take a position.

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 468, footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 468.

From a political point of view it would be welcome in itself if we succeeded through the methods suggested by M. Tatarescu to gain influence on at first, perhaps, a small part of the Rumanian press. It goes without saying, however, that the Reich must not be in evidence in any way in this matter. It has not yet been discussed whether, and in what form, the NSDAP might be brought into the picture. Perhaps a way could be found which would make a private individual or a manufacturer of printing presses appear as the donor of the printing plant requested by M. Tatarescu. In any case it may be expected that the Rumanian public would be concerned with the question of the origin of the printing plant and its operating capital if the Rumanian National Socialist party and the political groups affiliated with it should have available to them, very soon after the visit to Berlin of MM. Tatarescu and Goga, a press instrument necessary for an intensified political struggle. Finally, the fact is also to be considered that the Rumanian National Socialist party and its allies are only at the very beginning of their political development and that a definite judgment about its political prospects and political capacity can perhaps not yet be pronounced.

Since, however, this is a question, after all, of a considerable and substantial suggestion, the Legation is requested to express an opinion about the request of M. Tatarescu as speedily as possible and to take up in this connection once more his personality and that of his political friends, their financial situation, and their political importance.<sup>3</sup>

By order:  
KÖPKE

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<sup>3</sup> Replying to this instruction on Oct. 31, Schulenburg stated that, while it was "imperative" to bring influence to bear on the Rumanian press to safeguard German political and cultural interests, Tatarescu was not a suitable person through whom Germany might achieve this influence owing to his political unreliability and lack of a following in the country. Schulenburg conceded that some financial assistance might be granted to Tatarescu, but at the same time, he strongly urged that Germany primarily support Nichifor Crainic, publisher of the newspaper *Calendarul*, who, although being "a convinced National Socialist and friend of Germany" had the reputation of having no party affiliations (9601/E676804-06).

With reference to this dispatch, an instruction sent to Bucharest by the Press Department on Nov. 30 pointed out that "since the Tatarescu matter has not meanwhile been taken up again from other quarters it will be possible to let it rest for the time being. In any event, there is no intention of doing anything from here with respect to this." As for supporting Crainic, the instruction stated that it appeared inopportune to do so for the present because of recent political developments in Rumania and particularly the banning of his paper *Calendarul* (9601/E676815).

[Enclosure]

VERY URGENT

BERLIN, September 19, 1933.  
P 8202.

Accompanied by Herr Weber,<sup>4</sup> the Bucharest reporter of the *Völkischer Beobachter*, Colonel Tatarescu, the leader of the Rumanian National Socialists, called here and made approximately the following statements:

Internal political conditions had become untenable in Rumania. The parties were all split up, corrupt, and therefore interested in the maintenance of the present condition. In the sphere of foreign policy the fear of a fundamental change in Rumanian policy manifested itself in the fact that the French orientation prevailed among the leading politicians. The Rumanian press reflected this political impotence, and, whether it was bribed or controlled by Jews, agitated against Germany in the most infamous manner. Thus a superficial observer might gain the impression that the mood of the Rumanian people toward the new Germany was extremely unfavorable. In reality, however, the sympathies of the Rumanian nation were on the side of Germany, and it welcomed Germany's national aspirations. As leader of the Rumanian National Socialists, he had, therefore, undertaken to help this sentiment, which was favorable to Germany, to assert itself. In the elections which would probably take place in a short time, he would go into battle with the slogan "Away from France—to Germany," and, in view of the general sentiment, he would surely meet with great success. Here in Berlin he had also come to terms with former Minister Goga, who is expected to play an important role. He, too, wanted to support the National Socialist movement. In order, however, to be able to wage the battle successfully against the existing system and in particular against the anti-German press, he wanted to create a reliable press, and for this he requested the help of the responsible authorities of the German Reich. His proposal was that first a loan of 10 million lei—250,000 reichsmarks—be obtained for him through a bank, against which a mortgage was to be taken on his property (sanatorium and vineyard). Secondly, a printing plant was to be placed at his disposal which might be taken from the stocks of Communist or Social Democratic printing plants that had been confiscated. In the new printing plant, a new morning paper, *Curajul* (Courage), the evening paper *Calendarul* of Professor Crainic, and Goga's organ, *Tara Noastra*, would then be printed. Consideration could perhaps also be given to including also a *Deutsche Zeitung* in the combine. He was convinced that with this press he

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 118.

would be in a position to put an end once more and for all to the anti-German orientation and agitation.

Herr Tatarescu also stated that his reception by Minister Dr. Goebbels was under consideration. At a second visit he reported briefly on the visit to the Minister, which had meanwhile taken place. The latter had manifested great interest in his plans and his request, had especially expressed his pleasure at the cooperation with Goga, and had promised to help him in putting it into effect.

One copy each to the Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda—Dept. IV (Press); the Foreign Ministry—Department II; respectfully submitted for their information.

CRULL

### No. 497

6114/E454085-88

#### *Memorandum by an Official of Department II*

SECRET

BERLIN, October 13, 1933.

(Under cover only)

e. o. II Oe. 1636.

With reference to my memorandum II Oe. 1544 of October 5, 1933.<sup>1</sup>

As Herr Habicht informed me today, the conversation which Count Alberti, the emissary of Vice Chancellor Fey, had with Herr Habicht's plenipotentiary in Sopron on October 5 has led to detailed discussions of the possibility of a reorganization of the Austrian Government on the basis of Heimwehr and National Socialists. Count Alberti, who produced an authorization in writing from Vice Chancellor Fey, gave expression to Fey's willingness to form a cabinet of Heimwehr and National Socialists, at the head of which there should be a neutral personage. In such a role there were mentioned, besides Dollfuss, also

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (6114/E454081-83). This memorandum by Hüffer for the State Secretary gave background information regarding Prince Max Egon Hohenlohe-Langenburg, who had called at the Reich Chancellery and the Foreign Ministry on Sept. 29 to make soundings, allegedly at the request of Austrian Vice Chancellor Fey, about settling the German-Austrian conflict (Köpke telegram No. 90 to Vienna: 6114/E454078). Hüffer's memorandum also recorded information supplied by Habicht concerning other overtures in recent weeks by emissaries of Fey. "Habicht had Fey informed that he could receive only a person whom Fey had explicitly authorized; and then today, as Habicht had just been informed by telephone, a thorough discussion took place in Sopron (Hungary) between his emissary and Fey's official emissary, Count Alberti, leader of the Heimwehr in Lower Austria. Also, in the last few days he himself had held similar conversations with Starhemberg's emissaries in Czechoslovakia. He would inform me in the very near future about the final results. In any case, Fey who is involved in serious disputes with Starhemberg was putting out feelers to the National Socialists."

Rintelen or General Bardolff.<sup>2</sup> As soon as Herr Habicht had approved the report of his plenipotentiary on the conversation in Sopron there was to be a personal discussion between Fey and Habicht as proposed by Count Alberti about the details of this plan—distribution of seats, relative strength of the two contracting parties, etc.

Herr Habicht (to whom Fey has suggested that he acquire Austrian citizenship and give up his seat in the Reichstag) told me that he is prepared—subject to the consent of the Reich Chancellor, which he wants to obtain today or tomorrow—to continue negotiations on the basis proposed by Fey,<sup>3</sup> and he is going to establish direct contact with Fey in the immediate future. Of interest in this connection is the conversation on October 4 and 5 between the editor-in-chief of the *Münchener Zeitung*, the very quiet and critically-minded Herr Ewald Beckmann, and the new Austrian Minister to Rome, the well-known Governor of Styria, Dr. Rintelen, in which Rintelen asked Beckmann to inform Habicht that he was working for a compromise in the German-Austrian conflict; Rintelen did not consider it possible, however, to bring about an initial opening conversation between Dollfuss and the National Socialists. The first contact had to be made between Dollfuss and a member of the Reich Government, preferably Foreign Minister von Neurath. He (Rintelen) found the idea very attractive that such a first contact, which had unfortunately not come about in Geneva,<sup>4</sup> might be made in Rome. The German Foreign Minister, who after all used to be in Rome, could go to Rome for a short vacation without arousing any special attention and after about 8 days the Federal Chancellor could then follow. A conversation could take place at his, the Austrian Minister's, residence or at that of German Ambassador von Hassell—incidentally, Rintelen would pay a call on Hassell immediately following his move to Rome. He was ready and willing, if he had news that the German side was inclined toward an understanding and toward taking the course suggested, to speak with Dollfuss at once, and he hoped he would succeed in persuading Dollfuss to give his consent, too. Dollfuss had not agreed to the discussion in Geneva because he had not liked the place proposed; the matter had assumed too mysterious a character, and by this Dollfuss would have exposed himself to distrust from other quarters.

During the confidential conversation Rintelen then expressed himself further on the question of personalities; in many circles this ques-

<sup>2</sup> Field Marshal Karl Bardolff of the former Austro-Hungarian Army was president of the German People's Council [*Volksrat*] for Austria, which aimed at coordinating the activities of all German nationalist organizations in Austria. On the occasion of a visit to Berlin in April 1933 Bardolff had requested to be received by Hitler, but apparently received a negative reply (9970/E697285-91).

<sup>3</sup> On Oct. 16 Hüffer recorded that he was informed by Habicht that Hitler had given his consent to the continuation of these negotiations.

<sup>4</sup> See documents Nos. 450 and 465.

tion was considered to be difficult in the event of an understanding. He stressed in this connection that it was necessary for the National Socialist party in Austria to be given a purely Austrian leadership. This could be done by Herr Habicht's acquiring Austrian citizenship, while double citizenship was also conceivable. He, Rintelen, naturally also saw the difficulty that Dollfuss could not discuss with the German Foreign Minister the internal political order in Austria. In his opinion, however, the sole way in which an understanding could be reached at all was by first establishing contact between the Federal Chancellor and a member of the Reich Government. If then the German side would indicate that it wished to settle the existing differences and state at the same time that the Federal Chancellor should really come to terms with the National Socialists in Austria in the interest of the goal, he, Rintelen, hoped that the Federal Chancellor would then be able to negotiate directly with the National Socialists.

HÜFFER

## No. 498

7360/E537812

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy*

Telegram

No. 245

BERLIN, October 13, 1933—9:05 p. m.  
e. o. II F Abr. 3296.

Please inform Mussolini at once in accordance with telegram No. 244,<sup>1</sup> that we expect nothing more from a continuation of the negotiations and will announce our withdrawal from the Conference Saturday evening through a speech by the Chancellor.

We will take a position on Mussolini's last mediation proposal<sup>2</sup> in the next few days.

NEURATH

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<sup>1</sup> This telegram, dated Oct. 13, had also been sent to the Embassies in Great Britain, France, and the United States, and informed them that withdrawal from the Conference was being considered in view of the "completely unacceptable demands" put forward by the British with the support of the French, the "partial agreement of the Americans" and in the face of "inadequate Italian attempts at mediation." (7360/E537797-98).

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 494.

## No. 499

3598/793999-794007

*Minutes of the Conferences of Ministers on October 13, 1933, 6:20  
p. m. and on October 14, 1933, 12:00 Noon*

Rk. 12162;  
12163.

*Present:*

Reich Chancellor	Adolf Hitler
Vice Chancellor	von Papen
Foreign Minister	Freiherr von Neurath
Reich Minister of Interior	Dr. Frick
Reich Minister of Finance	Count Schwerin von Krosigk
Reich Minister of Economics	Dr. Schmitt; on October 14 for the Minister of Economics, St.S. Posse
Reich Minister of Labor	Seldte; absent on October 14
Reich Minister of Justice	Dr. Gürtner
Reichswehr Minister	von Blomberg
Reich Minister of Posts and Transport	Freiherr von Eltz-Rübenach
Reich Minister of Food and Agriculture	Darré
Reich Minister of Public Enlight- enment and Propaganda	Dr. Goebbels
Reich Minister for Air and Prussian Minister President	Göring
Prussian Finance Minister	Dr. Popitz
President of the Reichsbank	Dr. Schacht
State Secretary in the Reich Chancellery	Dr. Lammers
For the State Secretary in the Office of the Reich President	Ministerialdirektor Dr. Doehle
Reich Press Chief:	State Secretary Funk
Deputy of the Führer of the NSDAP	Hess
Recording Official:	Oberregierungsrat Dr. Thomsen

*Also present:*

(On October 14) State Secretary Pfundtner, Reich Ministry of In-  
terior

Subject of Conference: Political situation.

The Chancellor called a meeting of the members of the Reich Government in order to give them a picture of the decisions on foreign policy that are necessary in view of the situation of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. In the course of next week we shall be forced at the Disarmament Conference to take a stand on many questions which will be put to us. The English Government has expressed the view that the equality of rights granted us last December cannot be upheld under the changed political conditions.<sup>1</sup> When the Disarmament Conference reconvenes we will be handed a draft containing the following conditions:

A convention is to be concluded the duration of which will be divided into two equal parts of 4 years each. During the first half of the convention no positive disarmament of the heavily armed states is contemplated. At most an adjustment of the number of troops to the militia system is to be carried out. For Germany the introduction of the militia system means the destruction of the hitherto existing armed forces through the transformation of the Reichswehr into a militia of 200,000 men, and in this connection it is still undetermined to what extent the police forces are to be included in the count. We will be permitted a doubling of the arms allowed us under the Versailles Treaty. On the other hand, we will still be prohibited from acquiring additional defensive arms. In return, we will have to submit to a supervision over our military establishment. After 4 years it would then be determined how we might be permitted to possess the arms which all other nations are to be allowed to have. Only then will the disarmament of the heavily armed nations begin.

This convention would have the effect that while we would first be permitted to double the arms allowed us, no consideration would be given in that connection to the reserves that have in the meantime been trained. Furthermore, there is the possibility that after the first 4 years have elapsed it will be found that the new system has not proved successful. In this case, the second part of the convention, namely the disarmament of the other powers, would automatically be dropped.

Germany cannot put her signature under such a convention. We would be prepared to sign the convention if it provided that in the course of 2 years we could, within the framework of the Versailles Treaty, arm the new militia to be created, including reserves. It is absolutely impossible, however, to sign a convention which leaves the entry into force of our practical equality of rights to the decision of a later conference. Especially intolerable are the provisions regarding supervision, which technically can be carried out only with respect to us.

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<sup>1</sup> See documents Nos. 486 and 493.



It therefore becomes necessary to defeat the draft and thereby torpedo the Disarmament Conference. In such a situation, compelled by the force of circumstances, one must decide to act. The path of negotiation is now closed. The other nations have firmly committed themselves in order to be able to blame us for the failure of the Disarmament Conference. This eliminates the hope for improving the situation by individual discussions. The explanation of our decision must deprive the world of the possibility of propagandistically exploiting it against Germany. We entered the League of Nations and participated in the work of the Disarmament Conference assuming in good faith that we would be treated like a nation with equality of rights. Once before, we have taken the appropriate action<sup>2</sup> following the denial of this equality of rights. The English Ministers have now declared that equality of rights cannot be granted to present-day Germany, although the MacDonald plan, which we accepted in principle, was brought up for discussion only after January 30 of this year. As a national government we find it incompatible with our honor to take part in the deliberations of a Conference which revokes the requirements which would have enabled us to take part again in the Conference.

We shall therefore have to leave both the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations, since the condition that we be recognized as a nation with equality of rights is not fulfilled. In this situation our position can be strengthened if, at the same time as we make the announcement of our withdrawal—which will take place tomorrow unless new facts should in the meantime come to light which, contrary to expectations, would make it possible to remain at the Disarmament Conference—we dissolve the Reichstag, call for new elections, and ask the German people to identify themselves through a national plebiscite with the peace policy of the Reich Government. By these measures we will make it impossible for the world to accuse Germany of an aggressive policy. This procedure will also make it possible to capture the attention of the world in quite a different manner than previously. He, the Reich Chancellor, would in a radio speech explain to the world the reasons which had made the step of the Reich Government necessary.

The immediate future would bring with it increased political activity by Italy. Italy would want to mediate, since she had no interest in Germany's destruction. Italy was interested rather in having a voice in determining the development of Germany's power. If, however, Germany should be condemned to complete impotence, that would also be the end of Italy's role in Europe. He, the Reich Chancellor, had therefore not been surprised that the Italian Ambassador

<sup>2</sup> Presumably a reference to Germany's withdrawal from the work of the Disarmament Conference in July 1932. See Editors' Note, p. 18.

had on the 12th of this month delivered a proposal of Mussolini,<sup>3</sup> which in itself could have been accepted by us. It was a complete mistake, however, to assume that Mussolini's draft, which provides for a disarmament convention of 2 to 3 years' duration, could be discussed in Geneva. At best this was possible outside Geneva, and it was certain that Italy would use the Four Power Pact for this purpose.

As far as the threat of sanctions was concerned, it was only a matter of keeping cool and remaining true to one's principles. All statements on possible and conceivable improvements of the disarmament convention failed to deal with the decisive question; the situation would be much more unfavorable for us if the impossibility of our accepting the convention should become evident only in the course of the negotiations.

He, the Chancellor, had made a report to the Reich President; the Reich President shared his view completely.

It will be a service to the world if the League of Nations, the establishment of which was in the last analysis only designed as a measure directed against Germany, is gradually rendered inactive by demonstrating its inability to solve the problems submitted to it.

The Chancellor asks the members of the Reich Government to agree to the measures proposed by him.

The Minister of Labor, in the name of the war veterans, expresses his unqualified approval of the measures of the Reich Government.

The Minister of Interior takes the floor in order to describe briefly the necessary measures in foreign and domestic policy; they are:

- 1) a statement to the President of the Disarmament Conference
- 2) a statement to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations
- 3) the proclamation of the Reich Government and the appeal of the Chancellor to the German people
- 4) a decree by the Reich President dissolving the Reichstag
- 5) a decree by the Reich President concerning new elections on November 12—in these elections only one list [of candidates] will be voted on
- 6) a law concerning the plebiscite on November 12, in which the German people will be asked whether they approve the policy of peace and honor pursued by the Reich Government.

By the dissolution of the Reichstag all Landtage will also be dissolved. The Reichsstatthalter will be instructed not to order any new elections for the time being. After the new Reichstag convenes it will have to deal on the basis of Reich law with the future of the individual Landtage.

In reply to a question by the Minister of Finance on the significance of the election the Chancellor states that the significance of the election lies in this, that the new Reichstag deputies are likewise to be committed to the policy of the Reich Government. The number of votes

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<sup>3</sup> See document No. 494.

cast both in the Reichstag election and in the plebiscite will be of decisive importance.

*Continued on October 14, 1933, 12 noon.*

The Chancellor emphasized at the very beginning that there had been no change in the situation since yesterday. The English Foreign Minister would presumably strike a calmer note in his speech today,<sup>4</sup> but the basic position remained the same. He therefore proposed that the decisions taken yesterday be carried out today. The Chancellor reads the text of the two appeals to the German people.<sup>5</sup>

The Minister of Interior reads the text of the decrees of the Reich President and proposes as an amendment to the Reichsstatthalter Law the following third law:

The Reichsstatthalter may be removed by the Reich President at any time on the proposal of the Reich Chancellor.

This law is necessary, since the term of office of a Reichsstatthalter has hitherto been made to coincide with the duration of the Landtag period.

The Foreign Minister discloses that the Italian Minister President, but no one else, has been informed<sup>6</sup> by the German Ambassador in Rome of the steps we intend to take. He points out, furthermore, that in view of article 44 of the Versailles Treaty any demonstrations in the demilitarized zone must be scrupulously avoided.

Recorded:

THOMSEN

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<sup>4</sup> This refers to Sir John Simon's statement made in the morning session of the Bureau of the Conference on Oct. 14. For the text, see League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (Geneva, 1933): *Records of the Conference*, ser. C, *Minutes of the Bureau*, vol. II, pp. 181-183.

<sup>5</sup> For a German text, see *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik*, vol. I, pp. 94-97.

<sup>6</sup> See documents Nos. 498 and 502.

## No. 500

7467/H178869

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

ROME (Quirinal), October 14, 1933—1:15 p. m.

No. 229 of October 14

Received October 14—4:05 p. m.

II F Abr. 3298.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 244<sup>1</sup> and 245<sup>2</sup> of the 13th.

I shall today inform Mussolini in the sense of today's telephone conversation<sup>3</sup> in accordance with telegram No. 245, and at the same time

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<sup>1</sup> See document No. 498, footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 498.

<sup>3</sup> No record of this conversation.

stress the fact that the skepticism he showed from the beginning with regard to the unsuitable character of the Disarmament Conference as a body and the atmosphere at Geneva had proved justified. The course of events at Geneva had been such that not even the most necessary basis for the establishment of figures had evolved. The sole possibility for making headway was through negotiations on the basis of the Four Power Pact, which had, however, to be carefully prepared, and for which Mussolini's last proposal of mediation,<sup>4</sup> on which a position can only be taken in detail in the next few days, could serve as a starting point.<sup>5</sup> I shall at the same time stress the fact that he was the only one to receive information about our decision in advance of the Reich Chancellor's speech.

I strongly advise that in today's speech the aim of keeping Italy from joining the front of our opponents should be borne in mind, and that the last Italian attempts at mediation should be recognized, even if, according to telegram 244, they were inadequate.

I intend to fly to Berlin at the beginning of next week for a short consultation on the situation.<sup>6</sup>

HASSELL

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<sup>4</sup> See document No. 494.

<sup>5</sup> The following marginal note in Köpke's handwriting as well as question marks are found on another copy of this document (7467/H178870): "For this, an entirely different atmosphere would first have to be created."

<sup>6</sup> Marginal note: "Instruction to Herr V. Hassell not necessary since he is coming here. Schwendemann."

Marginal note on the other copy referred to in footnote 5: "Taken care of by an instruction from the State Secretary to the Embassy in Rome with respect to this telegram. Schwendemann, Oct. 17."

Marginal note on a third copy of this document (7467/H178872): "I informed H[assell] by telephone that the Reich Chancellor is writing a personal letter to M[ussolini] which can be published. N[eurath]."

## No. 501

8115/E580080

### *The Ambassador to the Holy See to the Foreign Ministry*

#### Telegram

No. 70 of October 14 ROME (Vatican), October 14, 1933—1: 15 p. m.  
Received October 14—4: 05 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

The Cardinal Secretary of State who recently returned from vacation informs me that the Pope has instructed him to lodge a strong protest against the violations of the Concordat and oppression of the Catholics which are steadily increasing despite all solemn promises on the part of the Germans, and he plans in an address, I suppose at the forthcoming consistory, to come out publicly against the

acts he objects to in Germany. The dignity of the Holy See requires that he emerge from the reserve which has heretofore been incomprehensible to the faithful. A note of protest has already been drafted. In a lengthy conversation I warned Cardinal Pacelli seriously against carrying out the steps and intentions, which were unjustified in view of the cooperative measures of the Reich Government; I pointed out the incalculable consequences and advised entering into negotiations with Ministerialdirektor Buttman, the representative of the Government,<sup>1</sup> which had been postponed at the express request of the Pope,<sup>2</sup> and submitting to him for consideration all the material relating to grievances. Possibly a statement of the new grievances could be sent me in advance. The Cardinal doubted whether he could dissuade the Pope, who was deeply annoyed, from carrying out his order and his intention, but he finally declared himself ready to make the attempt.

Report 242<sup>3</sup> concerning the view entertained by the German bishops of the situation of the churches in Germany went off today.<sup>4</sup>

BERGEN

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 418, footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup> This request of the Pope had been reported by Ambassador Bergen in telegram No. 68 of Sept. 20 (8115/E580040) the text of which reads as follows: "Under State Secretary Pizzardo stated today that negotiations of the Cardinal State Secretary with Ministerialdirektor Buttman could not take place for the time being. The Pope desires the Cardinal to rest up first from his exhausting recent activity. To the question whether one could count on negotiations in Rorschach at the end of the holiday, Pizzardo answered evasively that the Cardinal would let us know about that.

"In this I see evidence that the Pope, as has been the case recently, wants to follow also the further course of negotiations from close at hand so that he can step in directly at any time."

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (8115/E580071-78).

<sup>4</sup> Marginal note: "As I have just learned in the Wolff Bureau, a Stefani report has come in to the effect that the Pope in today's allocution to the Cardinals has refrained from any political allusions. That is very encouraging.

Please authorize me to discuss the contents of the telegram addressed to the Foreign Minister with Herr Buttman. Menshausen, Oct. 16."

## No. 502

7360/E537818

### *The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

#### Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME (Quirinal), October 14, 1933—4:00 p. m.

No. 230 of October 14

Received October 14—6:35 p. m.

II F Abr. 3299.

I notified Mussolini at 1 o'clock in accordance with instructions.<sup>1</sup> Mussolini showed no particular surprise in receiving the statement and strongly recommended that in today's speech, if only because of the

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 498.

effect that our decision would have in the world, we by all means indicate the possibility of negotiations on the basis of the Four Power Pact and at the same time cite the preamble and article 3.<sup>2</sup> Italy had better not be mentioned in order to avoid the appearance of collusion. On the other hand, he advised that the participation of America in the person of Norman Davis be suggested as desirable, since the attitude of America was of the greatest importance for Germany now that England had moved completely over to the side of France and was even outdoing her. In reply to an inquiry from Soragna on the basis of a conversation with Davis,<sup>3</sup> in which the latter had expressed the desire to participate, he had wired Soragna today that, in view of England's abandonment of her activity as mediator, the latter should keep in contact with Davis and promise him participation as an observer in any conferences to be held on the basis of the Four Power Pact.

Mussolini further stated that in case a reference to this effect was made by the Chancellor in his speech today, he would, for his part, reserve the right of taking the initiative at once with respect to Four Power Pact negotiations. Reference to the Four Power Pact is in my opinion absolutely necessary for further cooperation with Italy. If the communiqué has already been issued to the press, please, in any case, put such a reference, if it is lacking, into the speech or arrange it to follow immediately in some other way.

HASSELL

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<sup>2</sup> Document No. 292.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1933*, vol. I, pp. 258-259.

## APPENDICES

# Appendix I

## ORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY

### JANUARY 1933<sup>1</sup>

#### THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER

Freiherr von Neurath

*Attached:* Counselor of Legation Dr. Völckers

*Office:* Attaché Dr. Siegfried

#### THE STATE SECRETARY OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

Dr. von Bülow

*Office:* Secretary of Legation Dr. Kordt (Theodor)

M. A. Reifegerste

Director of the Ministerial Office: Hofrat Schönhertz

#### PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT

Diplomatic Corps in Berlin, foreign consuls in the German Reich, audiences with the Reich President, ceremonial, decorations:

Chief of Protocol: Senior Counselor Minister Count von Bassewitz

Counselor Dr. Röhrecke

Secretary of Legation Dr. Mumm von Schwarzenstein  
(Herbert)

Hofrat Pingel

#### ECONOMIC DEPARTMENT (W)

Director of Department: Ministerialdirektor Dr. Ritter

Deputy Director: Senior Counselor Wiehl

##### 1. Economic negotiations:

Senior Counselor Wiehl

Counselor of Legation Benzler

Counselor of Legation Freiherr von  
Stein

Counselor Dr. Kroll

Secretary of Legation Dr. Schnurre

##### 2. Foreign economic and financial questions; promotion of exports:

Senior Counselor Dr. Ulrich

Counselor Dr. Baer

Vice Consul Dr. Eberl

Vice Consul Hollberg

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<sup>1</sup> This organization plan has been translated and condensed from a German Foreign Ministry organization circular (293/183927-44).

The titles or grades of the officials have been translated when such grades or titles have standardized translations in this volume. Otherwise the initials or German terms indicating rank or title are explained in the Glossary.

On March 20, 1933, a Department of Internal German Affairs (*Referat Deutschland*) was reconstituted. The former *Referat Deutschland* had been abolished in 1931. The reconstituted department was placed under immediate control of the State Secretary. Senior Counselor von Bülow-Schwante served as its head, and Counselor Röhrecke as deputy (K900/K223903-04).



- |   |  |
|---|--|
| Credit questions:   | Senior Counselor Seiler                |
| 3. Reparations and interallied debts:   | Senior Counselor Dr. Vallette          |
| 4. Economic relations with the Near East: <sup>2</sup>  | Consul General Schlesinger             |
|   | Secretary of Legation Dr. Bräutigam    |
|   | Hofrat Bienotsch                       |
| Central office for foreign trade (joint agency of the Foreign Ministry and of the Reich Ministry of Economics): | W. L. R. z.D. Dr. Bosenick             |
|   | Hofrat Grunow                          |
| Commissar for international navigation negotiations and delegate on the river commissions:                      | Senior Counselor Minister Dr. Seeliger |
|   | Consul z.D. Henkel                     |

## DEPARTMENT I

Personal data on members of the foreign service. Matters relating to pay and welfare. General administration of the Foreign Ministry and of missions abroad. Budget, finances, accounts. Political archives and library. Cryptographic and language services. General questions concerning the organization of the foreign service.

Director: Ministerialdirektor Dr. Freiherr von Grünau

Deputy Director: Senior Counselor Dr. Poensgen (Walter)

Chief of budget, finance and accounts: Senior Counselor Dr. Nöldeke

1. (I H) Organization of the foreign service abroad; Senior Counselor Dr. training of candidates for the higher Köcher service; personal data of the higher officials, of the consular agents, of experts, etc.; information bureau:
2. (I M) Personal data on the other officials and employees; organization and simplification Senior Counselor Dr. of the work of the Foreign Ministry: Bode

## DEPARTMENT II

## Western, Southern, and Southeastern Europe

Director: Ministerialdirektor Dr. Köpke

Deputy Director: Senior Counselor von Friedberg

1. Western Europe (Belgium, France and its colonies, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Switzerland): Counselor von Rintelen  
Secretary of Legation Dr. Hertz  
Consul Karow  
Hofrat Findekle  
Hofrat Jüngling
- Saar territory and matters left over from the occupation of the Rhineland: Senior Counselor Dr. Voigt  
M. A. Gudohr
2. Southern and Southeastern Europe (Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Yugoslavia, Austria, Portugal, Rumania, Spain, Czechoslovakia, Hungary): Senior Counselor von Heeren  
Counselor Dr. Busse  
Counselor of Legation Dr. Hüffer  
Secretary of Legation Dr. Altenburg (Günther)  
Hofrat Gronau  
Hofrat Tettenborn

<sup>2</sup> This Division actually dealt also with economic relations with Eastern Europe.

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 3. Vatican:   | Counselor Dr. Menshausen  |
| 4 War guilt question:   | Senior Counselor Mundt  |
| 5. Disarmament, military and political questions of aerial navigation, limitations of armament: | Senior Counselor Dr. Frohwein<br>Counselor Dr. Schwendemann<br>Consul von Bülow (Adolf)<br>Vice Consul Dr. Kreutzwald<br>Secretary of Legation Dr. Budde<br>Consul Schultz-Sponholz |
| 6. League of Nations:   | Senior Counselor von Kamphoevener<br>Secretary of Legation Dr. Haas   |

## DEPARTMENT III

Great Britain, Ireland, the British Dominions and possessions, the United States of America, Central and South America, the Orient, international navigation, colonial affairs.

Director: Ministerialdirektor Dr. Dieckhoff

Deputy Director: Senior Counselor Dr. Prüfer

- |         |  |  |
|---------|--|--|
| 1.      | Great Britain, Ireland, the British Dominions and possessions:   | Counselor Dr. Baron von Plessen (Johann)   |
| 2.      | The United States of America and possessions (except the Philippines), Mexico, Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Liberia:   | Senior Counselor Dr. Fuehr<br>Senior Counselor Dr. Davidsen<br>Vice Consul Krienen                   |
| 3.      | (Pending dissolution). Matters relating to property sequestered in the United States of America and American damage claims, German-American debt agreements:     | Senior Counselor Dr. Albrecht (see Department V)   |
| 4.      | Central and South American States:   | Counselor of Legation Dr. Poensgen (Erwin)<br>Vice Consul Dr. Anderson<br>Secretary of Legation Ramm |
| 5.      | International navigation questions; matters relating to the navy; fisheries; international railway matters:  | Senior Counselor Bleyert<br>Hofrat Zornow<br>Hofrat Volkner  |
| 6.      | The Orient (Egypt, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Arabia, Ceylon, Cyprus, India, Iraq, Palestine, Persia, Sudan, Syria, Turkey); Jewish political affairs of the Orient: | Counselor Schmidt-Rolke<br>Secretary of Legation Dr. Melchers  |
| (III k) | Colonial affairs:  | Chief: Ministerialdirigent Brückner  |
|         | Personal affairs of the former colonial officials:   | Ministerialdirigent Brückner   |
|         | East Africa; legal matters:  | Senior Counselor Gunzert   |
|         | West Africa, Southwest Africa, the South Seas, the Mandate system, the slavery questions, colonial organizations, colonial science, protectorate loans, etc.:    | Counselor Rudolph  |

## DEPARTMENT IV

## Eastern Europe, Scandinavia, and East Asia

Director: Ministerialdirektor Meyer (Richard)

Eastern Europe and Scandinavia:

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 1. Russia and Siberia, Ukraine, White Russia, Transcaucasia, Turkomen, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan:  | Deputy: Senior Counselor Hey<br>Counselor von Tippelskirch<br>Secretary of Legation Dr. Leyden<br>Hofrat Wenger   |
| 2. Poland, Danzig:  | Senior Counselor Noebel<br>Counselor von Lieres und Wilkau<br>Counselor Dr. Windecker<br>Vice Consul Dr. Schwarz<br>Secretary of Legation Adelman<br>Hofrat Proppe<br>Hofrat Giesche<br>Hofrat Meier (Max)<br>Hofrat Brembach |
| 3. Scandinavia and the Baltic States (Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Lithuania, Memel Territory, Estonia, and Latvia); winding up of Polish revalorization and liquidation matters: | Senior Counselor Dr. von Schack<br>Counselor of Legation Duckwitz<br>Secretary of Legation Dr. Eckner<br>Hofrat Solkowski   |

East Asia:

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 4. China:   | Deputy: Senior Counselor Dr. Michelsen<br>Counselor Dr. Altenburg (Felix)<br>Secretary of Legation Dr. Bidder |
| 5. Japan and its mandate territories:   | Counselor Dr. Czibulinski   |
| 6. Siam, French Indochina, Straits Settlements, Philippines, Dutch East Indies: | Consul Gipperich  |

## DEPARTMENT V

## Legal Department

Director: Ministerialdirektor Dr. Gaus

Deputy Director: Senior Counselor Dr. Barandon (February, 1933).

- |  |                        |
|--|------------------------|
| 1. (V. A.) General international law, especially the law of state responsibility and assistance in individual claims; general law of treaties especially their formalities; the Versailles Treaty; the Permanent Court of International Justice and arbitration; security negotiations; laws and customs of war; the Red Cross; peace movements; Interparliamentary Union; promotion of jurisprudence: | Counselor Dr. Woermann |
|--|------------------------|

2. (V. B.) Commercial treaties and treaties regarding the right of settlement including codification of law regarding aliens; extraterritoriality; consular law (legal position of the consuls, consular treaties, consular jurisdiction); the law of international communications (railways, maritime law including river and coastal water navigation); questions of German property abroad including liquidation agreements and war damage legislation; termination of the mixed arbitration courts and of compensation claims of neutrals from the World War; revalorization of foreign loans in German possession; professional legal protection; copyright law:

Senior Counselor Dr. Kraske  
Secretary of Legation Bergmann
3. (V. S.) State and constitutional law, canon law; questions of citizenship (including registration); extraditions, criminal prosecution of German nationals in Germany because of crimes committed abroad; prosecution of aliens abroad because of crimes committed in Germany; penal information; legal aid in criminal cases; legal advice in penal matters:

W. L. R. Dr. Siedler  
Secretary of Legation Dr. von Barga  
Hofrat Jander  
Hofrat Hanck
4. (V. P.) Labor law (International Labor Office); police matters, particularly regarding foreign police; receiverships; counterfeiting; white slave trade; protection of minors; obscene literature; passport law; refugee matters; international regulation of motor vehicle traffic; World Postal Union; World Telegraphic Union (including cables); World Radio Union; welfare matters; war prisoners; persons accused of war crimes; war graves:

Counselor Rödiger (Gustav)  
Hofrat Reimke (Passport Office)  
Hofrat Müller (Georg)
5. (V. D.) Tax law; administrative law; social insurance; private insurance law; opium and other narcotics, duty matters of German and foreign diplomats by procurator:

Senior Counselor Dehl

6. (V. C.) International legal protection and legal aid in civilian matters; foreign litigation; treaties regarding civil rights matters; authentications; legal disputes of the Foreign Ministry; matters of marriage law and legal status; legacy matters; German revalorization matters; advice in civilian legal questions: Senior Counselor Dr. Albrecht  
Secretary of Legation Dr. Mayr

## DEPARTMENT VI

## Cultural Policy Department

Director: Senior Counselor Dr. Stieve

Deputy Director: Senior Counselor Dr. Terdenge

1. (VI A) German national groups abroad; minority questions; Evangelical church and mission affairs: Senior Counselor Dr. Roediger  
(Conrad)  
Dr. Goeken  
Hofrat Pollow
2. (VI W) General cultural policy; scientific relations with foreign countries and with the League of Nations, especially institutes, congresses, and travel; archeological institute; university and lecture matters; student affairs; German books abroad; medical affairs; hospitals; doctors; Catholic church and mission affairs; administration of the funds of the Department: Secretary of Legation Dr. Zoelch  
Vice Consul von Heinz  
Vice Consul Dr. Bock
3. (VI S) German school matters abroad; relations abroad and to the League of Nations in pedagogical matters; youth movement: Senior Counselor Böhme  
Vice Consul Dr. Kuhna  
Hofrat Grimm  
Hofrat Blum  
Hofrat Unruh
4. (VI C) Fine arts, handicrafts, art exhibits abroad, music, theater, congresses which concern artistic matters; film and photographic matters; sports events: Senior Counselor Dr. Sievers  
Secretary of Legation Hencke
5. (VI E) Matters of emigration; investigations: Counselor of Legation Dr. Wendler  
R. R. z.D. Dr. Kundt  
Hofrat Ballhorn (Otto)

PRESS DEPARTMENT (P)  
(61a Wilhelmstrasse)

Director: Ministerialdirektor Marcks

Deputy Director: Senior Counselor Aschmann

- |     |   |   |
|-----|---|---|
| I J | Domestic and foreign policy in relation to the German press; political information service:                       | O. R. R. Dr. Heide<br>R. R. Freiherr von Steinling<br>Dr. Schacht<br>von Bose<br>Dr. Brauweiler |
|     | Economic, financial and reparations questions:  | R. R. Dr. Winger  |
|     | Labor and social questions:   | R. R. Stephan   |
| I P | Administrative service, reading service, archive service, distribution of the German press abroad; press reports: | Vice Consul Walther   |
| I K | Fiscal and budgetary matters:   | Hofrat Schwebel   |
| II  | France and its colonies, Morocco, Belgium and its colonies, Luxembourg, Switzerland, League of Nations:           | Counselor of Legation Braun<br>von Stumm  |
|     | Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, Albania:                                 | Counselor Wolf  |
| III | United States of America:   | Counselor z.D. Dr. Drechsler  |
|     | Great Britain, Ireland, the Dominions and colonies (except India), the Orient:                                    | Secretary of Legation Dr. Gans<br>Edler Herr zu Putlitz   |
|     | Central America, South America, Liberia, Spain and Portugal, Italy, the Vatican:                                  | Secretary of Legation Tripe-<br>loury   |
| IV  | Russia, Caucasus, Ukraine, the Baltic States, Finland, Poland:  | Counselor von Saucken   |
|     | Scandinavia, Iceland, The Netherlands:  | R. R. Cohn  |
|     | East Asia, British and Dutch East Indies:   | Consul General z.D. Dr. Crul-   |

## Appendix II

### LIST OF GERMAN FILES USED

The following table identifies the German file from which each document has been derived. The documents of the Foreign Ministry were bound into volumes by the Germans. As documents in these volumes have been microfilmed, each film of a file has been identified by a film serial number, while each page of the documents has been identified by a frame number stamped on the original at the time of filming. The documents published in this collection are identified by the film serial number and frame numbers in the upper left-hand corner of each document. By reference to the following table of film serial numbers the location in the German Foreign Ministry or other Archives of the copy of the document used in this publication may be determined. In some few cases separate files, usually on closely related topics, have been filmed consecutively under a single serial number; these are marked by an asterisk (\*). A number of serials are given as supplementary to earlier ones; these are cases where re-examination of the file in question indicated that additional filming might be useful to scholars or, as is more often the case, where in the process of editing for publication the editors wished to provide a film record of documents of lesser importance to which references appeared in the documents selected.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
1549	Reich Chancellery: Austria.
1908	German Embassy in the Soviet Union (secret).
2339	Reich Chancellery: General Foreign Policy.
2368	Reich Foreign Minister: England; South Africa.*
2406	Reich Foreign Minister: France.
2784	Reich Foreign Minister: Italy.
2860	Reich Foreign Minister: Russia.
2945	Reich Foreign Minister: Poland.
2980	Reich Foreign Minister: Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece, Albania, Turkey.*
3015	Reich Foreign Minister: Netherlands, Luxembourg, Eupen-Malmédy, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Memel, Danzig.*
3058	Reich Foreign Minister: Occupation of the Rhineland; Saar Territory.*
3086	Reich Foreign Minister: Austria; Czechoslovakia.*
3154	Reich Foreign Minister: Security Committee of the League and Disarmament.
3170	Reich Foreign Minister: Anglo-French Consultative Pact, Mussolini Pact, Federalism, Danube Question, Interallied Commission, Demilitarization and Interallied Commission, Peace Treaty.
3177	Reich Foreign Minister: Military Affairs (1920-1935).
3241	Reich Foreign Minister: Miscellaneous.*
3598	Reich Chancellery: Cabinet Protocols (1932-1938).

*Film Serial  
Numbers**Title of File*

- 3650 Reich Chancellery: Conferences of Lausanne, Geneva and London.\*
- 4619 State Secretary: Correspondence with the Reich Foreign Minister.
- 4620 State Secretary: Correspondence with Officials of the Foreign Service (1930-1936).
- 4624 State Secretary: Miscellaneous Papers.
- 4938 German Embassy in Austria: (secret, 1914-1938).
- 5266 German Embassy in Italy (secret): German Relations with Austria, Poland, Russia, Belgium, France (1924-1934).
- 5552 Direktoren: Meyer Personal Files (1920-1935).
- 5642 Direktoren: Ritter Papers, Italy (1932-1936).
- 5661 Direktoren: Ritter Papers, Rumania (1931-1933).
- 5737 Department II Pol.: Political Relations between Italy and Germany (1932-1936).
- 5740 Department III Pol.: Political Relations between England and Germany (1932-1936).
- 5752 Department IV Pol.: Political Relations between Poland and Germany (1932-1936).
- 5881 Geheimakten: Political Relations between France and Germany (1921-1936).
- 5885 Geheimakten: Revision Question (1933-1936).
- 5892 Geheimakten: Military Attaché in the Soviet Union (1933-1936).
- 5966 Geheimakten: Political Relations between France and Hungary (1933).
- 6001 Geheimakten: Political Relations between Italy and Germany (1920-1936).
- 6024 Department IV Pol.: Political Relations between Japan and Germany (1933-1936).
- 6025 Department IV Pol.: Political Relations between Russia and Germany (1932-1936).
- 6057 Geheimakten: Political Relations between Italy and Hungary (1927-1935).
- 6058 Geheimakten: Italy and the Four Power Pact (1933-1935).
- 6064 Geheimakten: Political Relations between Yugoslavia and Germany (1921-1933).
- 6076 Geheimakten: Austria; Commercial Treaty Relationship to Germany (1926-1934).
- 6077 Geheimakten: Political Relations between Austria and Germany (1928-1936).
- 6111 Geheimakten: National Socialism in Austria (1930-1936).
- 6113 Geheimakten: Intervention of England, France, and Italy in favor of Austria (1933-1934).
- 6114 Geheimakten: Austria; National Socialism—Negotiations for an agreement (1933-1936).
- 6115 Geheimakten: National Socialism; the Austrian Legion (1933-1935).
- 6121 Geheimakten: Political Relations between Rumania and Germany (1921-1934).
- 6145 Geheimakten: Hungary; Commercial Treaty Relationship to Germany (1931-1934).
- 6153 Geheimakten: Vatican; Conclusion of Concordats with the German Reich and with the German Länder.



<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
6176	Geheimakten: The German-Polish Border Problem (1932-1933).
6200	Geheimakten: Poland; Military Affairs (1933-1936).
6203	Geheimakten: Financial Relations between Danzig and Germany (1931-1936).
6204	Geheimakten: Financial Relations between Danzig and Poland (1933-1935).
6208	Geheimakten: Danzig-Polish Conflict over the Reinforcement of the Polish Military Garrison of the Westerplatte (1933).
6212	Geheimakten: Political Relations of Upper Silesia and Germany (1926-1936).
6601	Geheimakten: Political Relations between Danzig and Poland (1932-1935).
6609	Geheimakten: Political Relations between Russia and Germany (1932-1936).
6613	Geheimakten: The Russo-German Treaty of April 1926 (1932-1936).
6615	Geheimakten: Political Relations between Russia and France (1933-1936).
6616	Geheimakten: Security Pact (1932-1936).
6684	Geheimakten: Political Relations between Lithuania and Germany (1932-1936).
6691	Geheimakten: East Asia; General (1932-1936).
6693	Geheimakten: East Asia; The Heye Case.
7052	Economic Department: Palestine (1932-1934).
7188	Reich Chancellery: Foreign Credits and Loans.
7289	Department III Pol.: Political Relations between England and France (1930-1936).
7360	Department II F Abr.: General Disarmament Conference 1932 (1932-1936).
7467	Department II F Abr.: Mussolini's Proposals and Negotiations after the Withdrawal of Germany from the Disarmament Conference (1933-1936).
7688	Department II F Abr.: Disarmament Conference; General (1931-1935).
7810	Supplementary to 5881.
7818	Department II Pol.: Political Relations between France and Hungary (1931-1936).
7892	Department II BG: Political Affairs of the Saar Territory.
7956	Department II BG: Reich Plenipotentiary for the Saar.
8036	German Embassy in Italy: The Danubian States (1932-1936).
8038	German Embassy in Italy (secret): South Tirol; German-Italian Relations; Italy, Austria and Hungary; Situation in Upper Italy 1932; Letters of Ambassador von Hassell.*
8048	Department II Pol.: Political Relations of Italy and Austria (1930-1936).
8050	Department II Pol.: Political Relations of Italy and Hungary (1929-1936).
8068	Geheimakten: Russia; Military Affairs (1932-1934).
8070	Economic Department: Italy.
8080	Reich Chancellery: Italy.
8109	Treaties, Department II: The Concordat between the German Reich and the Holy See.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
8115	Department II Pol.: Conclusion of Concordats with Germany and the German Länder except Prussia (1929-1936).
8118	Reich Chancellery: Concordats.
8125	German Embassy at the Holy See: Concordat with the German Reich (1933-1935).
8443	Reich Chancellery: Reich Chancellor Wirth.
8468	Department II Pol.: Political Relations between Belgium and Germany (1932-1936).
8481	Referat Deutschland: Dissolution of the Reichstag; New Elections.
8510	Referat Deutschland: Military Personalities (1920-1933).
8542	Press Department: Suppression of Newspapers in Germany.
8554	Department II Pol.: Political Relations between Switzerland and Germany (1929-1936).
8566	Department II Pol.: National Socialism, Fascism, and Similar Movements.
8580	Department IV Pol.: China; Military Affairs (1932-1935).
8593	Reich Foreign Minister: Organization of the Foreign Ministry; Personnel Questions.
8618	Department II F Abr.: Proposals of Various States at the General Disarmament Conference, 1932.
8626	Department III Pol.: Political Relations between Turkey and Germany (1933-1936).
8636	Department III Pol.: Turkey; Journeys of Foreign Statesmen.
8643	Department II Pol.: Political Relations between Austria and Germany (1932-1936).
8661	Department II Pol.: Austria; National Socialism—Radio Speeches of Habicht.
8665	Department II Pol.: Austria; National Socialism—Affairs of Habicht, Cohrs, Wasserbäck.
8674	Supplementary to 1549.
8683	Referat Deutschland: Ministries (1931).
8698	Department II F Abr.: Proposal for an Armaments Holiday.
8737	Department II Pol.: Austria; National Socialism—Attitudes of Foreign States (1926-1934).
8781	Reich Chancellery: Jews and National Movement (1933-1935).
8805	Department IV W, East Asia: Reconstruction of the Chinese Economy after the Internal Disorders (1931-1935).
8806	Supplementary to 3124.
8817	Supplementary to 7052.
8825	Direktoren: Meyer Papers, Danzig, Political (1932-1935).
8840	German Embassy in Italy: Peace Treaty; Mussolini Pact Proposal.
8907	German Embassy in Italy: German-Italian Relations (1933-1934).
8909	Geheimakten: Italy; Four Power Pact—Supplement.
8918	Department IV Pol.: Political Relations between Lithuania and Germany.
8965	Legal Department: League of Nations Disarmament Conference (1931-1932).
9037	Economic Department: Currency and Exchange Policy.
9062	Department IV Pol.: Danzig—Internal Politics, Parliament, Parties.
9072	Reich Chancellery: Territorial Cessions, Danzig (1931-1933).

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
9094	Reich Chancellery: Press (1933-1941).
9119	Economic Department: Loans and Securities.
9127	Cultural Policy Department: German Community in Czechoslovakia (1932-1936).
9149	Department II Pol.: Czechoslovakia; Nationalities.
9151	Department II Pol.: Czechoslovakia; National Socialism, Fascism, and Similar Movements.
9182	Geheimakten: German Military Attaché in Poland (1928-1935).
9183	Geheimakten: Political Relations between Poland and Germany (1930-1933).
9189	Reich Chancellery: Poland (1933-1934).
9198	Department IV Pol.: Polish Movement in Germany.
9214	German Embassy in France: Danzig and the Eastern Question (Personal Papers of Ambassador Köster).
9237	Reich Foreign Minister: The Hugenberg Memorandum.
9245	Economic Department: International World Economic Conference in London (1930-1936).
9269	Reich Chancellery: Economic Conference in London.
9280	Economic Department (Wiehl): World Economic Conference.
9293	Cultural Policy Department: Minorities and Jewish Question.
9325	Direktoren: Meyer Papers, Private Correspondence with Ambassadors von Dirksen and von Schulenburg (1932-1935).
9387	Department IV W: Commercial Relations of Russia and Germany (1922-1936).
9417	Economic Department IV W: Russian Commercial Representation in Germany (1932-1935).
9419	Reich Chancellery: Sessions of the Reich Cabinet (1930-1935).
9459	German Embassy in the Soviet Union: Proceedings against Derop.
9464	Supplementary to 6025.
9508	Economic Department: Finance.
9564	Department II Pol.: Political Relations between Hungary and Germany (1931-1936).
9565	Department II Pol.: Hungary; Reciprocal Visits of Leading Statesmen.
9583	Economic Department: German-Hungarian Foreign Exchange Matters.
9588	Department II Pol.: Political Relations between Rumania and Germany (1929-1935).
9614	Reich Chancellery: Hungary (1933-1935).
9696	Department II W: Rumania; Commercial Treaty Relationship to Germany (1933-1936).
9722	German Legation in Hungary: Nationalities in Hungary.
9992	Department II F secret: Reich Defense Council (1932-1935).
9994	Supplementary to 9037.
9995	Supplementary to 9119, 9509.
9996	Supplementary to 9037, 9494.
9997	Department II FM: Kehl Incident; Occupation of the Kehl Barracks by National Socialists.
K652	Reich Foreign Minister: Organization of the Foreign Ministry; personnel questions.

## Appendix III

### LIST OF PRINCIPAL PERSONS<sup>1</sup>

- ALBERT I, King of the Belgians.  
ALEXANDER I, King of Yugoslavia.  
ALKSNIS, Yakov Ivanovich, Chief of the Air Force of the Red Army.  
ALOISI, Pompeo, Baron, Chief of Cabinet, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; member of League Council.  
ANTONOV-OVSEYENKO, Vladimir Alexandrovich, Soviet Minister in Poland.  
ANZILOTTI, Eugenio, commercial and economic expert; Director General in the Italian Ministry of Corporations.  
ARAS, Tevfik Rüştü, Turkish Foreign Minister.  
ARNAL, Pierre-Albert, Counselor, French Embassy in Germany.  
ASCHMANN, Gottfried, Deputy Director, then Director of the Press Department, German Foreign Ministry.  
ATATÜRK. *See* KEMAL.  
BALBO, Italo, Marshal, Italian Governor General of Libya.  
BALDWIN, Rt. Hon. Stanley, British Conservative M. P., Lord President of the Council.  
BALUGDŽIĆ, Živojin, Yugoslav Minister in Germany.  
BANG, Paul, State Secretary, Reich Ministry of Economics, February–June 1933.  
BASDEVANT, Jules, legal adviser to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
BAUM, Wilhelm, Press Attaché, German Embassy in the Soviet Union.  
BECK, Józef, Polish Foreign Minister.  
BENEŠ, Eduard, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister.  
BENZLER, Felix, Counselor of Legation in the Economic Department, German Foreign Ministry.  
BERGEN, Diego von, German Ambassador to the Holy See.  
BERNING, Wilhelm, Roman Catholic Bishop of Osnabrück.  
BERNSTORFF, Albrecht, Count, Counselor of Embassy, German Embassy in Great Britain, 1930–July 1933.  
BERTRAM, Adolf, Cardinal, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Breslau.  
BISMARCK, Otto, Prince von, Counselor of Embassy, German Embassy in Great Britain.  
BLOMBERG, Werner von, German General, Reichswehr Minister.  
BOCKELBERG, Alfred von, German General, Chief of the Army Ordnance Office.  
BOHLEN. *See* KRUPP.  
BORAH, William Edgar, United States Senator from Idaho.  
BOURQUIN, Maurice, Belgian jurist, delegate to Disarmament Conference.  
BRÄUTIGAM, Otto, Secretary of Legation, specialist for economic relations with the Near East, German Foreign Ministry.  
BRANDSCH, Rudolf, Deputy representing the German minority in the Rumanian Parliament.  
BRAUCHITSCH, Walther von, German General in charge of Military District I (Königsberg).

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<sup>1</sup> The biographical details given relate principally to the period and subjects covered by the documents in this volume.

- BRAUN, Otto, Minister President of Prussia, 1921-1932.
- BRÜNING, Heinrich, Reich Chancellor, March 1930-June 1932.
- BÜLOW, Bernhard W. von, State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry.
- BULLITT, William Christian, executive officer of the United States delegation to the World Monetary and Economic Conference.
- BUTTMANN, Rudolf, Director of the Cultural Policy Department, Reich Ministry of Interior.
- CADOGAN, Alexander, Secretary General, British delegation to the Disarmament Conference; adviser, League of Nations Affairs, British Foreign Office.
- CAILLAUX, Joseph, French Radical Socialist Senator; President of Finance Commission of French Senate; former Premier and Finance Minister.
- CAROL II, King of Rumania.
- CECIL OF CHELWOOD, Viscount, former British Conservative M. P.; President, International Federation of League of Nations Societies.
- CERRUTI, Vittorio, Italian Ambassador in Germany.
- CHAMBERLAIN, Austen, British Conservative M. P.
- CHAMBERLAIN, Neville, British Conservative M. P.; Chancellor of the Exchequer.
- CHAMBRUN, Charles, Count de, French Ambassador in Turkey, 1928-1933; in Italy, August 1933-1936.
- CHIANG KAI-SHEK, Generalissimo, Commander in Chief of the Chinese Armed Forces from 1932.
- CHURCHILL, Winston Spencer, British Conservative M. P.
- CHVALKOVSKÝ, František, Czechoslovak Minister in Italy.
- CIANCARELLI, Bonifacio Francesco, Chief of the Division of Political Economy, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- COHRS, Heinz, official of the Austrian National Socialist party.
- COT, Pierre, French Minister for Air.
- COULONDRE, Robert, Assistant Director, Department of Political and Commercial Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- DALADIER, Édouard, President of the French Council of Ministers and Minister of War.
- DAVIS, Norman H., United States delegate, Disarmament Conference; member, Organization Committee, World Monetary and Economic Conference.
- DIECKHOFF, Hans Heinrich, Director of Department III, German Foreign Ministry.
- DIRKSEN, Herbert von, German Ambassador in the Soviet Union, 1929-September 1933.
- DOLLFUSS, Engelbert, Austrian Federal Chancellor.
- DOVGAEVSKY, Valerian, Soviet Ambassador in France.
- DRUMMOND, Sir Eric, later, Earl of Perth, Secretary General of the League of Nations, 1919-July 1, 1933.
- DUFOUR von Feronce, Albert, Freiherr, German Minister in Yugoslavia.
- DULLES, Allen, legal adviser to the United States delegation, Disarmament Conference.
- DULLES, John Foster, United States delegate to debt conferences with Germany.
- EDEN, Anthony, British Conservative M. P., Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
- ELTZ-RÜBENACH, Paul, Freiherr von, Reich Minister of Posts and Transport.
- FAULHABER, Michael, Cardinal, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Munich.
- FEY, Emil, leader of the Vienna Heimwehr; Austrian State Secretary, later Minister for Public Security, October 1932-September 1933; Vice Chancellor, September 1933-May 1934.
- FLANDIN, Pierre, French Deputy; Minister of Finance in Laval Cabinet, 1931-1932 and in Tardieu Cabinet. February-May 1932.

- FLICK, Friedrich, German industrialist with important interests in the German coal and steel industry.
- FOPPA, Hermann, Chairman, Greater German party and member of the Austrian Parliament.
- FORSTER, Albert, National Socialist Gauleiter of Danzig.
- FRANÇOIS-PONCET, André, French Ambassador in Germany.
- FRANK, Hans, Bavarian Minister of Justice since March 1933, Reich Commissar for the Gleichschaltung of Justice in the German States and the reform of the legal system, 1933-1934.
- FRICK, Wilhelm, Reich Minister of Interior.
- FROHWEIN, Albert Eduard, Senior Counselor in Department II, German Foreign Ministry; specialist on disarmament.
- FUNK, Walther, Chief, Reich Press Bureau; State Secretary in the Reich Ministry of Propaganda.
- GAUS, Friedrich, Director of Department V (Legal Department), German Foreign Ministry.
- GEORGE V, King of Great Britain.
- GHIKA, Prince Dimitrie, Chairman of the Rumanian delegation to the Disarmament Conference; Rumanian Minister in Italy, 1932-July 1933.
- GIBSON, Hugh, United States Ambassador in Belgium; delegate to the Disarmament Conference.
- GOEBBELS, Paul Josef, Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda.
- GÓMBÖS DE JÁKFA, Julius, General; Hungarian Minister President.
- GOPPERT, Otto, Minister; member, German delegation to the Disarmament Conference.
- GORING, Hermann Wilhelm, President of the Reichstag; Reich Minister without Portfolio and Reich Commissar for Air, January 30-May 5, 1933; Reich Air Minister, May 5, 1933-1945; Acting Prussian Minister of Interior, January 30-April 10, 1933; Minister President of Prussia, April 10, 1933-1945; Prussian Minister of Interior, April 10, 1933-May 1, 1934.
- GRAHAM, Sir Ronald William, British Ambassador in Italy.
- GRANDI, Count Dino, Italian Ambassador in Great Britain.
- GRÖBER, Conrad, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Freiburg.
- GRÜNAU, Werner Otto, Freiherr von, Director of Department I, German Foreign Ministry.
- HABICHT, Theodor, member of the German Reichstag, as *Landesinspekteur*, leader of the National Socialist party in Austria.
- HAILSHAM, Douglas McGarel Hogg, Viscount, British Secretary of State for War and Leader of the House of Lords in National Government; delegate to World Monetary and Economic Conference.
- HANTOS, Elemér, Hungarian economist; professor at the University of Budapest.
- HARTMANN, O., Colonel, German Military Attaché in the Soviet Union.
- HASELMAYR, Friedrich, retired Colonel, executive secretary of the Wehrpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP.
- HASELL, Ulrich von, German Ambassador in Italy.
- HEEREN, Viktor von, Senior Counselor in Department II, German Foreign Ministry.
- HENDERSON, Arthur, British Labor M. P.; President, Disarmament Conference.
- HERRING, Justin Howard, Colonel, British Air Attaché in Germany.
- HERRIOT, Edouard, French Radical Socialist Deputy, former Premier and Foreign Minister.
- HESS, Rudolf, Hitler's Deputy as leader of the National Socialist party.
- HEY, Siegfried, Deputy Director of Department IV, German Foreign Ministry.

- HINDENBURG, Paul von, Field Marshal, President of Germany.
- HITLER, Adolf, leader of the German National Socialist party from 1921; Chancellor of the German Reich.
- HOESCH, Leopold von, German Ambassador in Great Britain.
- HOOVER, Herbert, President of the United States, 1929–March 4, 1933.
- HORY, Andreas de, Hungarian Minister in Italy.
- HUGENBERG, Alfred, Chairman, German National People's party, 1928–1933; Reich Minister of Economics and Reich Minister of Food and Agriculture, January–June 1933.
- HULL, Cordell, United States Secretary of State.
- HYMANS, Paul, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs; chief Belgian delegate, Disarmament Conference.
- İNÖNÜ, İsmet, General, Turkish Minister President.
- JODL, Alfred, Major, General Staff, German Army.
- JOUVENEL, Henri de, French Ambassador in Italy, January–July 1933.
- JUNG, Guido, Italian Minister of Finance.
- KAAS, Ludwig, German Roman Catholic ecclesiastic and politician; Chairman, German Center party, 1929–May 6, 1933; papal house prelate and adviser in the Vatican on German ecclesiastical affairs.
- KALININ, Mikhail Ivanovich, President of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union.
- KÁNYA, Kálmán de, Hungarian Minister in Germany 1925–February 1933; later Hungarian Foreign Minister.
- KEITH, Lilly, Berlin representative of the Soviet newspaper, *Izvestia*.
- KELLER, August Friedrich von, German representative to the League of Nations, January–October 1933.
- KEMAL, Mustafa Pasha (Kemal Atatürk), President of the Turkish Republic.
- KEPLER, Wilhelm, member, German delegation to the World Monetary and Economic Conference; Commissioner for economic affairs in the Reich Chancellery from July 1933.
- KERRL, Hanns, Reich Commissar for the Prussian Ministry of Justice; Prussian Minister of Justice, April 1933.
- KHINCHUK, Leo, Soviet Ambassador in Germany.
- KIRCHHOLTES, Johann, Counselor of Legation, German Legation in Rumania.
- KLAUSNER, Erich, Head of the Catholic Action in Germany.
- KLEE, Eugen, Counselor of Embassy, German Embassy to the Holy See.
- KNOX, Geoffrey George, Chairman, Saar Basin Governing Commission.
- KOCH, Walter, German Minister in Czechoslovakia.
- KÖPKE, Gerhard, Director of Department II, German Foreign Ministry.
- KÖSTER, Roland, German Ambassador in France.
- KORDT, Theodor, Secretary of Legation, head of the secretariat of the State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry, 1933–1934.
- KOSSMANN, Bartholomäus, German member of the Saar Basin Governing Commission.
- KRESTINSKY, Nikolay Nikolayevich, Soviet Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs; member, Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union.
- KREUTZWALD, Reiner, Vice Consul, official of Department II, German Foreign Ministry.
- KROFTA, Kamil, Czechoslovak Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- KROGMANN, Carl, Burgomaster of Hamburg; member, German delegation to the World Monetary and Economic Conference.
- KRUPP VON BOHLEN UND HALBACH, Gustav, German industrialist; Chairman, Reich organization of German industry, 1931–1934.
- LAMMERS, Hans, State Secretary and Head of the Reich Chancellery.

- LAROCHE, Jules, French Ambassador in Poland.
- LAYAL, Pierre, French Senator; President of the French Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1931-1932.
- LÉGER, Alexis, Secretary General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- LERCHENFELD-KÖFERING, Hugo, Count von, German Minister in Belgium, April 1931-August 1933.
- LIPSKI, Józef, Chief, Western Division, Polish Foreign Ministry; Polish Minister and later Ambassador in Germany, October 1933-1939.
- LITVINOV, Maxim Maximovich, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.
- LÖBE, Paul, German Socialist leader; President of the Reichstag, 1925-1932.
- LONDONDERRY, Marquess of, Sir Charles Stewart, British Secretary of State for Air, and delegate, Disarmament Conference.
- LUTHER, Hans, German Ambassador in the United States from April 1933.
- MACDONALD, James Ramsay, British Prime Minister.
- MALKIN, Sir William, legal adviser to the British Foreign Office.
- MASARYK, Thomas Garrigue, President of Czechoslovakia.
- MASIREVICH, Constantin de, Hungarian Minister in Germany from August 1933.
- MASSIGLI, René, French delegate, Disarmament Conference; representative, League of Nations Council and Assembly.
- MASTNÝ, Vojtěch, Czechoslovak Minister in Germany.
- MEISSNER, Otto, State Secretary in the Office of the Reich President.
- MELI LUPI DI SORAGNA TERASCONI, Antonio, Marchese, official of the Italian Foreign Ministry, member of Italian delegation to the Disarmament Conference.
- MENSHAUSEN, Fritz, Counselor in Department II, German Foreign Ministry.
- MEYER, Alois, Luxembourg industrialist; member, League of Nations Economic Consultative Committee.
- MEYER, Richard, Director of Department IV, German Foreign Ministry.
- MICHELIS, Guiseppe de, Italian economist, Vice President of the Administrative Council of the International Labor Organization.
- MILCH, Erhard, State Secretary in the Reich Air Ministry.
- MOLOTOV, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.
- MOLTKE, Hans Adolf von, German Minister and later Ambassador in Poland.
- MOTTA, Giuseppe, Head of the Political Department (Foreign Ministry) of the Swiss Federal Council.
- MUFF, Wolfgang, Lieutenant General, German Military Attaché in Austria.
- MUSSOLINI, Benito, Head of the Italian Government and leader of the fascist party.
- NADOLNY, Rudolf, Head of the German delegation to the Disarmament Conference; Ambassador in the Soviet Union, September 1933-June 1934.
- NAGAI, Matsuzo, Japanese Ambassador in Germany.
- NEURATH, Constantin, Freiherr von, German Foreign Minister.
- NEWTON, Basil Cochrane, Counselor of Embassy in the British Embassy in Germany.
- ORMESSON, Wladimir, Count d', French journalist, foreign political editor of *Le Temps*.
- OSUSKÝ, Štefan, Czechoslovak Minister in France, delegate to the League of Nations Assembly.
- PACELLI, Eugenio, Cardinal, Papal Secretary of State.
- PAPEN, Franz von, German Vice Chancellor; Reich Commissar of Prussia, January 30-April 10, 1933.



- PARMENTIER, Jean, member, French delegation to the World Monetary and Economic Conference.
- PAUL-BONCOUR, Joseph, President of the French Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs, December 1932–January 1933; Minister of Foreign Affairs, January 1933–January 1934; permanent delegate to League of Nations and member of League Council.
- PETRESCU-COMNEN, Nicolas, Rumanian Minister in Germany.
- PHILLIPS, William, United States Under Secretary of State.
- PILSUDSKI, Józef, Marshal of Poland, Minister of War and Inspector General of the Polish Army.
- PIUS XI, Pope, Achille Ratti, elevated to Papacy February 6, 1922.
- PLESSEN, Johann, Baron von, Counselor in Department III, German Foreign Ministry.
- POSSE, Hans Ernst, Ministerialdirektor, Reich Ministry of Economics; member, German delegation to the World Monetary and Economic Conference.
- PRITZWITZ UND GAFFRON, Friedrich von, German Ambassador in the United States, 1927–March 1933.
- QUARONI, Pietro, Head of the Office for Western European Affairs, Italian Foreign Ministry.
- RADEK, Karl Berngardovich, Soviet journalist, editor of *Izvestia*.
- RAUSCHNING, Hermann, President of Danzig Senate from June 20, 1933.
- RHEINBABEN, Werner, Freiherr von, member of German delegation to League of Nations and delegate to Disarmament Conference.
- RIETH, Kurt, German Minister in Austria.
- RINTELEN, Anton, Governor of Styria; Austrian Minister in Italy from August 1933.
- RITTER, Karl, Director of Economic Department, German Foreign Ministry.
- RÖCHLING, Hermann, German industrialist; leader of the German People's party in the Saar.
- ROOSEVELT, Franklin Delano, President of the United States, March 1933–1945.
- ROSENBERG, Alfred, Head of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the National Socialist party; editor-in-chief, *Völkischer Beobachter*.
- ROSTING, Helmer, Danish League of Nations official, High Commissioner of League of Nations at Danzig.
- Rŧŧŧŧŧ. See ARAS.
- RÜTER, Ernst Heinrich, Counselor of Legation in the German Embassy in Great Britain.
- RUMBOLD, Sir Horace, British Ambassador in Germany, 1928–August 1933.
- SARGENT, Sir Orme Garton, Counselor in the British Foreign Office; Assistant Under Secretary of State from August 1933.
- SCHACHT, Hjalmar, President of the Reichsbank.
- SCHINDLER, Max Joseph, Major General, German Military Attaché in Poland, April 1933–September 1935.
- SCHLEICHER, Kurt von, General, Reichswehr Minister, June 1, 1932; Chancellor, December 2, 1932–January 28, 1933.
- SCHLESINGER, Moritz, specialist for economic relations with the Near East, German Foreign Ministry.
- SCHLIEF, Martin Bernhard, Counselor of the German Legation in Poland.
- SCHMID-KRUTINA, Hermann, Secretary of Legation, German Embassy in Italy.
- SCHOEN, Hans von, German Minister in Hungary.
- SCHÖNHEINZ, Kurt, Major General in the German Army, technical adviser to the German delegation at the Disarmament Conference.
- SCHULENBURG, Friedrich Werner, Count von der, German Minister in Rumania.

- SCHUSCHNIGG, Kurt von, Austrian Minister of Justice; Minister of Education.
- SCHWENDEMANN, Karl, Counselor of Legation in Department II, German Foreign Ministry
- SCHWERIN-KROSIGK, Lutz, Count von, Reich Minister of Finance.
- SEECKT, Hans von, Colonel General, Chief of the German Army Command, 1920-1926.
- SELDTE, Franz, Reich Minister of Labor.
- SHIPSTEAD, Henrik, United States Senator from Minnesota.
- SIMON, Sir John, British Liberal National M. P.; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
- SMEND, Hans, Counselor of Embassy, German Embassy in Italy.
- SOONG, T. V., Chinese Minister of Finance and Vice President of the Executive Yuan; member, Chinese delegation to the World Monetary and Economic Conference.
- SORAGNA. See MELI LUPI DI SORAGNA.
- STALIN, Josef Vissarionovich, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union and member of the Politburo.
- STARHEMBERG, Prince Ernst Rüdiger, leader of the Austrian Heimwehr.
- STEED, Henry Wickham, former foreign editor and editor of the *Times* (London).
- STEINMANN, Dr. Johannes, spiritual adviser of the German Embassy to the Holy See.
- STEINMANN, Dr. Paul, Roman Catholic Vicar General of Berlin.
- STERN, David, Head of Second European Department (Germany) in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- SUVICH, Fulvio, Under Secretary of State, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- SZEMBEK, Jan, Count, Under Secretary of State in the Polish Foreign Ministry and Deputy Foreign Minister.
- TARDIEU, André, French Deputy, former Premier and member of several cabinets.
- TATARESCU, Stefan, leader of the Rumanian National Socialists.
- TAUSCHITZ, Stephan, Austrian Minister in Germany from March 1933.
- THERMANN, Edmund, German Consul General at Danzig.
- THOMSEN, Hans, official in the Reich Chancellery.
- THYSEN, Fritz, German industrialist, chairman of the board of directors, Vereinigte Stahlwerke A. G.
- TIPPELSKIRCH, Werner, Counselor of Legation in Department IV, German Foreign Ministry.
- TITULESCU, Nicolae, Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
- TRAUTMANN, Oskar, German Minister in China.
- TUKHACHEVSKY, Mikhail Nikolayevich, Marshal, Soviet Deputy People's Commissar for Defense.
- TWARDOWSKI, Fritz von, Counselor, German Embassy in the Soviet Union.
- TYRRELL OF AVON, William George, Baron, British Ambassador in France.
- ULRICH, Robert, Senior Counselor in the Economic Department, German Foreign Ministry.
- VANSITTART, Robert Gilbert, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
- VICTOR EMMANUEL III, King of Italy.
- VOLCKERS, Hans Hermann, Counselor of Legation, German Foreign Ministry, attached to the Foreign Minister's staff.
- VOIGT, Hermann, Senior Counselor in Department II, German Foreign Ministry.
- VOGLER, Albert, German industrialist, head of the executive committee, Vereinigte Stahlwerke A. G.
- VOROSHILOV, Klement Efremovich, Soviet People's Commissar for Defense.

- WALDECK UND PYRMONT, Josias, Prince von, SS-Gruppenführer, Counselor of Legation in Department I, German Foreign Ministry.
- WANG CHING-WEI, President of the Chinese Executive Yuan.
- WASSERBÄCK, Erwin, Press Attaché in the Austrian Legation in Germany, 1929-June 1933.
- WEIZER, I., Soviet Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade and head of the Soviet trade mission in Berlin.
- WEIZSÄCKER, Ernst, Freiherr von, German Minister in Switzerland.
- WETZELL, Wilhelm, General, military adviser to the Chinese Government.
- WIEHL, Emil, Deputy Director of the Economic Department, German Foreign Ministry.
- WILLUHN, Franz, official in the Reich Chancellery.
- WILSON, Hugh R., United States Minister in Switzerland; member, United States delegation to the Disarmament Conference.
- WINKLER, Franz, Austrian Vice Chancellor, May 1932-September 1933.
- WIRTH, Joseph, member of the Center party; German Reich Chancellor and Foreign Minister, 1921-1922.
- WYSOCKI, Alfred, Polish Minister in Germany, February 1931-July 1933.
- YEGOROV, Alexander Ilyich, Marshal, Chief of Staff of the Red Army.
- ZAUNIUS, Davos, Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- ZECHLIN, Erich, German Minister in Lithuania.
- ZIEHM, Ernst, President of Danzig Senate and Director of the Foreign and Agricultural Departments, 1931-June 1933.

# Appendix IV

## GLOSSARY

### OF GERMAN TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

- AEG, Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft**, a large German electrical combine
- Angabe (Ang.)**, a designation given when action of more than one sort was to be taken on a paper. In such cases the relevant instructions were usually split up as Ang. I, II, etc., which designations followed the file numbers
- Aussenpolitisches Amt**, foreign affairs office of the NSDAP
- Bundesführer**, title of the supreme leader of the Stahlhelm in Germany; also, title of the supreme leader of the Heimwehren in Austria
- Bundesrat**, Federal Council, the executive branch of the Swiss Government; also, Federal Councilor, a member of the Federal Council
- D, Direktor**, the Director of one of the Departments of the German Foreign Ministry
- Derop, Deutsche Vertriebsgesellschaft für russische Ölprodukte A. G.**, an organization for marketing Russian petroleum products
- Deutsche Diplomatische Korrespondenz**, the official organ of the German Foreign Ministry
- DNSAP, Deutsche Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei**, the official name of the Sudeten German National Socialist party
- e. o.**, ex officio; where this precedes the file number, it indicates that there are no previous papers on the subject bearing this number (see zu)
- G. A., Gehorsame Anzeige**, a memorandum submitted in accordance with instructions
- Gau**, the largest territorial administrative unit of the NSDAP
- Gauleiter**, highest official in a Gau
- geh. R., geheime Reichssache**, top secret
- Gleichschaltung, gleichschalten**, term used to describe the process of bringing organizations and institutions under National Socialist control
- Gruppenführer**, SA and SS rank, equivalent to Major General
- Heimwehr, Heimwehren, Heimatschutz**, Austrian political and paramilitary organization of a fascist type
- Hofrat**, a grade in the pre-1918 German Civil Service
- Jugendführer**, youth leader of the German Reich, an office established June 17, 1933, and placed under the leader of the Hitler Youth
- Kommerzienrat**, Commercial Councilor, German honorary title
- Kreisleiter**, district leader of the NSDAP
- Land**, pl. **Länder**, the Federal States of Germany
- Landesinspekteur**, title of the chief leader of the Austrian National Socialist party
- Landesleitung, Landesleitung Österreich**, directorate of the Austrian National Socialist party, staff of the Landesinspekteur; its headquarters were moved to Munich in June 1933
- Landesrat**, elective body with advisory functions in the Saar Territory
- Landgerichtsdirektor**, a rank in the German judiciary
- Ministerialdirektor**, a grade in the German Civil Service, usually the director of a department in a Ministry

- Ministerialdirigent**, a grade in the German Civil Service, usually deputy director of a department in a Ministry
- Nationalrat**, a chamber of the Swiss Parliament
- NSBO, Nationalsozialistische Betriebszellenorganisation**, the National Socialist organization in the factories
- NSDAP, Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei**, National Socialist German Workers party, the full title of the Nazi party
- Oberpräsident**, highest civil administrative official in a Prussian Province
- O. R. R., Oberregierungsrat**, a grade in the German Civil Service
- P., Presseabteilung**, the Press Department of the German Foreign Ministry
- Rd., Randstaaten**, file number referring to that Division of Department IV in the Foreign Ministry which dealt with the Baltic States
- Ref. D., Referat Deutschland**, the Division for German internal affairs in the Foreign Ministry
- Reichsdeutsche**, Reich Germans, i. e., those Germans who were Reich subjects, used usually with reference to those living outside the frontiers of the Reich (see **Volksdeutsche**)
- Reichsstatthalter**, Reich Governor, representative of the Reich in one of the German Länder, exercising large powers of administrative control under the Law issued April 7, 1933
- Reichswehr**, the official designation of the German armed forces, 1919-1935
- Rk., Reichskanzlei**, Reich Chancellery, the Office of the German Chancellor
- RM, Reichsminister**, Reich Minister, any member of the Reich Cabinet, but in Foreign Ministry documents usually the Reich Foreign Minister
- R. R., Regierungsrat**, a grade in the German Civil Service
- SA, Sturmabteilungen der NSDAP**, Storm Troops of the NSDAP (brown shirts)
- Sektionsrat**, a grade in the Austrian Civil Service
- SPD, Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands**, the German Social Democratic party
- SS, Schutzstaffeln**, elite corps of the NSDAP, used also for police purposes
- Ständerat**, a chamber of the Swiss Parliament representing the individual cantons
- Stahlhelm**, a German nationalist veterans' organization
- Standarte**, SA and SS unit equivalent to a company
- T. U., Telegraphen-Union**, a German news service
- VDA, Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland**, an organization with the aim of strengthening the German national groups outside the German borders; in the course of 1933 it fell under the control of the NSDAP
- Volksdeutsche**, ethnic Germans, i. e., persons belonging to the German cultural community living outside the frontiers of the Reich and not Reich subjects
- Volkstag**, the representative assembly of the Free City of Danzig
- W, Abteilung W**, the Economic Department of the German Foreign Ministry
- Wehrpolitisches Amt**, the military affairs office of the NSDAP
- WLR, Wirklicher Legationsrat**, a high grade in the German Foreign Ministry
- WTB, Wolffs Telegraphisches Büro**, the principal German news agency
- z. D., zur Disposition**, awaiting assignment
- ZM, Zentrale Moskau**, administrative center for German military activities in Russia
- zu**, to, in connection with; where this precedes the file number it indicates that the previous papers on the subject have this number

## Appendix V

### ANALYSIS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ARCHIVES

The schedule attached to this note gives a rough picture of the captured Foreign Ministry archives. When captured, the documents were, for the most part, packed in bundles. On average, each bundle contains some six files or volumes, totaling perhaps a thousand to fifteen hundred pages. The schedule purports to show only whether there is much or little material. Qualitatively, the table tells nothing: one bundle may be more important than a hundred other bundles.

Apart from the Schmidt files (item 66) the items listed in the schedule are those files which were in April 1945 in the Political Archives of the Foreign Ministry. This department never received the working files in use at the end of the war and precise details of their fate are not known. Certain files formerly in its custody, notably those of the *Kolonialabteilung* and the bulk of those of the pre-1920 economic policy department (Abt. II: of which the *Restakten* form item 2), were transferred to other State Archives before World War II.

Apart from these transfers the files from 1867-1920 seem intact.

The post-1920 files remaining in or subsequently received by the Political Archives suffered the following casualties between 1943 and April 1945:

One of the trucks moving the secret political files of the period 1920-36 (item 25) to the Harz in October 1943 caught fire at Aschersleben and many of its contents were destroyed or damaged.

The evacuation center at Burg Friedland, south of Berlin, through which the post-1920 economic files were being transferred to the Harz, was apparently overrun by the Red Army before the process was complete. Consequently, for the period 1920-36, the economic files for Austria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, England, Guatemala, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Spain, U. S. A., and also some of those for Danzig, Greece, and Poland have not been available. The same applies to almost all such files for Denmark, Far East, Finland, Italy, Near East, Poland, and Russia for the period 1936-45.

The degree to which the destruction order of April 10, 1945 was executed has been checked by means of the packing lists of the Political Archives and details are given below in connection with the departments concerned.

The destruction list included the most important files from 1934 onwards but only 3 bundles from the 1920-36 section of the archives are known to have been destroyed. Unfortunately, these bundles comprised a large part of the material on armament questions. With these and the exceptions noted above it can be tentatively stated that the evacuated archives of the Foreign Ministry are intact from 1920-36.

In 1936 the three geographic departments (*Länderabteilungen* II-IV) and *Sonderreferat W* were fused into two departments, Political and Economic, and the corresponding reorganization of the filing system can be most clearly studied in relation to the organization of the offices it served. The division of responsibility within the Foreign Ministry on December 1, 1939, is shown at Appendix I.

At the top was the Reich Foreign Minister. The files of his personal secretariat bore the general title "Office of the Reich Foreign Minister" (*Büro RAM*). Part of these files was destroyed on Ribbentrop's orders, and only a fragment was captured. It is obvious that the collection contained material of great importance. Some 10,000 pages of this material, however, are recorded on a German microfilm whose authenticity has been fully established. It is of the greatest value, since it contains many highly important documents of which no other copies have been found. The last documents recorded on the film date from 1943; after that there are a substantial number of records of important conferences and other documents of similar quality preserved in a box belonging to Paul Otto Schmidt, the senior interpreter at the Foreign Ministry. Unfortunately, the records of the personal staff which accompanied Ribbentrop on his various moves in the latter stages of the war (while the *Büro RAM* remained in Berlin) are not in our possession.

Next under the Foreign Minister came the State Secretary. The State Secretary's office (*Büro des Staatssekretärs*) kept extensive files which are almost complete until they break off during the latter years of the war. They include both the State Secretary's own memoranda and correspondence and also copies of telegrams and other documents handled by the different departments of the Foreign Ministry. The only known gap is the highly secret group of volumes supplementary to the "War" series; according to notations on the covers of the "War" series, these files were kept in an iron box, but neither this box nor its contents have been found. It is known, from cross-references in the files, that these volumes contained papers on peace moves not found elsewhere. On the whole, the State Secretary's files form the most important single collection for the period after 1936.

Of the major departments of the Foreign Ministry, the most important was the Political Department (*Politische Abteilung*). Until February 1938, the Director of this Department was Weizsäcker, and he was succeeded by Woermann, for whom the title of Under State Secretary (*Unterstaatssekretär*) was revived. The Under State Secretary had his own files, but these do not in general compare with those of the State Secretary in range and value. The Political Department was divided into a number of sections, mainly along geographical lines. By and large the open files of the political divisions are not available for the period from 1941 on. Presumably the current files remained in Berlin or in the Mühlhausen area. The secret files of the political divisions (*Pol. Geheim*), except for a few special categories, also represent a gap in the available documentation.

The files of the remaining departments have less importance. The secret files of the Legal Department (*Rechtsabteilung*), headed for many years by Ministerialdirektor Gaus, are missing, since all 23 bundles listed for destruction were actually destroyed. Distribution lists on other documents show that the Legal Department received many of the most important political papers.

The files of the Personnel Department (*Personal- und Haushalts-Abteilung*) were also partly destroyed, but this is probably a less serious loss.

The files of the Press and Cultural Departments (*Presse- und Kulturpolitische Abteilungen*) are apparently complete, except for the secret files of the Press Department.

In addition to the losses noted above, the secret files of the Economic Policy Department (*Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung, Handelspolitische Abteilung*), ex-

cept for certain files on war material, were destroyed. The survival of the *Handakten* of Ritter, Wiehl, and Clodius, which contain copies of secret and top secret documents of importance, has compensated in large measure for these losses. There are many such *Handakten* for officials of other departments, normally reflecting their own special interests, but sometimes containing copies of important documents not circulated elsewhere.

In January 1937 Ernst Wilhelm Bohle, the chief of the organization concerned with Reich Germans living abroad (*Auslandsorganisation*), entered the Foreign Ministry, and in December 1937 was given the title of State Secretary. In spite of the fact that he ranked level with the State Secretary and reported directly to the Foreign Minister, Bohle's files have yielded little of value and, indeed, he sometimes complained himself that he was inadequately informed of current Foreign Ministry activities.

For many years there had existed a special internal office in the Foreign Ministry (*Sonderreferat Deutschland*) responsible for questions concerning the relations between foreign and domestic policy. In December 1938 Ribbentrop added another special office for party questions (*Referat Partei*) responsible for liaison between the Foreign Ministry and all party organizations. Its chief was Martin Luther, an old collaborator of Ribbentrop in the *Dienststelle Ribbentrop*. In May 1940 these two offices were amalgamated into one (*Abteilung Deutschland*), and during the war years Luther succeeded in increasing the scope of his activities, including, in 1942, control over a directorate of propaganda abroad (*Auslandspropagandaleitstelle*). However, in February 1943 Luther was arrested and sent to a concentration camp on charges of plotting against Ribbentrop. The place of the *Abteilung Deutschland* was taken by two "groups" (*Gruppe Inland I und II*) directly under the Minister. The files of these various offices, though numerous, are far from complete.

The files of the German Diplomatic Missions abroad are comparable in bulk with those of the Foreign Ministry and are very important for filling gaps in the Foreign Ministry records. The files of the Embassies in Rome and Moscow, and of the Legation in Prague, are particularly valuable. Most of the secret files of the Paris Embassy were destroyed by the German archivists in accordance with the destruction order, but those that survive contain documents of the war years not available elsewhere. The files of the London Embassy were not mentioned in this order, but no secret files later than 1936 have been found; it is possible that, in this and similar cases, the files had already been destroyed at the Embassy.

Of the files from other sources in the collection, the largest are those of the Old and New Reich Chancellery (*Alte and Neue Reichskanzlei*). These are mainly concerned with internal affairs, but those of the Old (pre-Nazi) Reich Chancellery contain minutes of Cabinet meetings at which foreign policy was discussed.



*Schedule of Documents in the Custody of the Foreign Office and the  
Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

<i>No.</i>	<i>Division</i>	<i>Subdivision</i>	<i>Period</i> <sup>2</sup>	<i>Bundles</i>
A) DOCUMENTS OF THE FORMER GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY				
I. DOCUMENTS PRIOR TO 1920				
1	Ia	Pol.	1867-1920	4296
2	II—Restakten		1853-1920	252
3	Treaties	Pol.	1867-1920	107
4		World War	1914-1918	547
5		General Headquarters	1915-1918	58
6	Conferences		1890-1920	22
7		Welfenfonds	1870-1914	20
8	Missions	Bogotá	1913-1918	58
9		Petersburg	1816-1914	206
10		Tangier	1845-1914	88
11		Cetinje	1906-1914	1
II. DOCUMENTS 1920-1936				
12	World War		1921	16
13	Office of the Reich Minister		1920-1936	175
14	Office of the State Secretary		1920-1936	100
15	Handakten of various heads and Deputy Heads of De- partments	Ritter (Sonderreferat W)	1920-1936	63
16		Heads of Departments II-IV	1917-1935	50
17		Gaus (Department V— Legal)	1914-1930	64
18		Miscellaneous Hand- akten (so-called) Kleine (Archive)	1914-1932	85
19	Special Departments and Sections	Friedensabteilung (later Department II F)	1920	140
20	Friedensabteilung		1919-1920	7
21		Friedensvertrag	1920-1921	50
22		Referat Deutschland	1920-1936	89
23		Sonderreferat W— (Transportation and Shipping Questions, pre- viously in Depart- ment IV)	1920-1936	840
24		W Rep. (Reparations)	1920-1936	230

<sup>1</sup> For the period before 1936, the schedule of documents was compiled from fragmentary German lists, not from the documents themselves.

<sup>2</sup> The dates indicated in the fourth column are the extreme dates of the first and last document in each series. For instance, for practical purposes the *Pol.* files numbered 80-91 end with December 1940. Isolated documents only are found after this date. Similarly, the *Inland* series numbered 69-74 are of most value for the period after 1938, though a few documents go back to 1929.

No.	Division	Subdivision	Period	Bundles
25	Secret papers of Department F and the Geographic Divisions		1920-1936	467
26	Department II	II Pol.	1920-1936	634
27		II W	1920-1936	514
28		II be (occupied areas)	1920-1936	470
29		II F Air	1921-1936	104
30		II F Military, Navy	1921-1936	130
31		II F Secret	1932-1936	4
32		II F Disarmament	1921-1936	100
33		League of Nations (previously Sonderreferat)	1923-1936	400
34	Department III	III Pol.	1920-1936	449
35		III W	1920-1936	167
36	Department IV	IV Pol	1920-1936	892
37		IV W	1920-1936	278
38	Treaties	Department II	1920-1936	150 <sup>3</sup>
39		Department III	1920-1936	42 <sup>3</sup>
40		Department IV	1920-1936	160 <sup>3</sup>
41		Shipping	1920-1936	24
42	Commissions <sup>4</sup>		1920-1924	300
43	Delegations <sup>4</sup>		1920-1932	130
44	Plenipotentiaries, Commissioners <sup>4</sup>		1921-1923	140
45	Representatives of the Foreign Ministry <sup>4</sup>		1920	17
46	Plebiscite Area in Upper Silesia <sup>4</sup>			
47	War Guilt Section		1920-1936	131
48	Committee of Inquiry into the War Guilt Question		1923-1925	12
49	Reichstag Investigating Committee		1914-1926	20

## III. DOCUMENTS 1936-1945

50	Reich Foreign Minister	1936-1943	9
51	Dienststelle Ribbentrop	1935-1944	36
52	State Secretary	1936-1944	127
53	Head of the Auslandsorganisation in the Foreign Ministry	1937-1943	40

*Miscellaneous Handakten*

54	Ettel	1939-1944	3
55	Etzdorf (Representative of the Foreign Ministry to the OKH)	1939-1944	6
56	Hencke	1922-1944	9
57	Hewel	1937-1943	9
58	Keppler	1930-1944	5

<i>No.</i>	<i>Division</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Bundles</i>
59	Krümmer	1934-1943	2
60	Künsberg	1938-1943	29
61	Luther	1936-1943	18
62	Megerle	1934-1942	7
63	Rahn	1942-1943	2
64	Ritter	1938-1945	14
65	Schmidt (Press)	1938-1943	10
66	Schmidt (Interpreter)	1938-1944	12 <sup>s</sup>
67	Representative of the Foreign Ministry to the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine	1941-1944	4
68	Liaison Office of the Commissioner for Information Services	1940-1943	16
<i>Groups Inland I and II</i>			
69	Inland I D	1938-1945	22
70	Inland I Partei	1929-1944	101
71	Inland II A and B	1935-1945	355
72	Inland II C	1933-1945	51
73	Inland II D	1929-1945	47
74	Inland II Geheim	1936-1945	117
75	Referat D VI (Bauten)	1938-1943	21
<i>Papers of the Political Department</i>			
76	Under State Secretary Pol.	1936-1943	27
77	Pol. I League of Nations	1936-1940	6
78	Pol. I M	1936-1944	56
79	Pol. I Air	1936-1940	56
80	Pol. II	1936-1944	43
81	Pol. III	1936-1942	79
82	Pol. IV	1936-1944	110
83	Pol. V	1936-1944	144
84	Pol. VI	1936-1944	26
85	Pol. VII	1936-1943	10
86	Pol. VIII	1936-1941	27
87	Pol. IX	1936-1944	15
88	Pol. X	1936-1944	5
89	Pol. XI (War Guilt Question)	1941-1943	3
90	Pol. XII (Preparations for Conclusion of Peace)	1941-1945	1
91	Pol. XIII (Russland Gremium)	1936-1942	11
92	Pol. Geheim	1936-1943	25
93	Directives Pol. II	1940-1943	18
94	Handakten Wiehl	1921-1943	62
95	Handakten Clodius	1921-1945	65
96	Handakten Collection (Ha. Pol.)	1914-1944	76

<sup>s</sup> Reckoned in files.

<i>No.</i>	<i>Division</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Bundles</i>
97	Papers of the Economic Policy Department	1936-1945	825
98	Papers of the Legal Department	1880-1945	3264
99	Papers of the Cultural Policy Department	1890-1945	1885
<i>Treaties</i>			
100	Political Department	1936-1944	80 <sup>a</sup>
101	Economic Policy Department	1936-1944	44
102	Legal Department	1920-1943	400
103	Cultural Policy Department	1920-1941	28
104	Press Department	1915-1944	520
105	Protocol Department	1920-1944	227
106	Personnel Department	1860-1945	5042
107	Accounts Division	1920-1944	1100
108	Politisches Archiv (Geschäftsakten)	1920-1944	185
109	Referat Pers. (Historisches Referat)	1937-1939	4
110	Asservate zum Politischen Archiv <sup>7</sup>	1920-1944	15
111	Politisches Archiv (Geschäftsakten Meisdorf, Friedland, Degnershausen)	1936-1944	6
112	Asservate <sup>7</sup>	1860-1945	122
113	Nachlässe <sup>8</sup>	1860-1945	300
<i>Missions</i>			
114	Ankara	1875-1943	213
115	Athens	1927-1940	28
116	Belgrade	1876-1944	71
117	Bern	1854-1943	860
118	Brussels	1845-1940	89
119	Budapest	1910-1944	209
120	Bucharest	1867-1940	177
121	Hague	1858-1944	172
122	Helsinki	1899-1944	27
123	Copenhagen	1862-1944	139
124	Kovno	1895-1941	246
125	Lisbon	1869-1943	277
126	London	1861-1937	433
127	Luxembourg	1879-1940	61
128	Madrid	1865-1942	580
129	Moscow	1921-1941	216
130	Oslo	1890-1940	610
131	Paris	1871-1944	1438

<sup>a</sup> Reckoned in files.<sup>7</sup> Small miscellaneous accessions to the archives from various sources.<sup>8</sup> Documents of defunct sections or former officials.

<i>No.</i>	<i>Division</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Bundles</i>
132	Prague	1918-1939	333
133	Pressburg	1922-1944	390
134	Reval	1919-1941	207
135	Riga	1868-1941	273
136	Rome (Quirinal)	1818-1943	1517
137	Rome (Vatican)	1849-1943	179
138	Sofia	1879-1944	113
139	Stockholm	1825-1941	368
140	Warsaw	1920-1939	193
141	Washington	1870-1938	504
142	Vienna	1867-1939	758
143	Zagreb	1921-1944	773

*Missions—Secret Papers*

144	Antwerp	1931-1939	1
145	Athens	1937-1938	1
146	Bern	1939-1942	5
147	Bucharest	1936-1942	3
148	Ciudad Trujillo	1941	1
149	Lisbon	1928-1943	8
150	Madrid	1936-1943	9
151	Moscow	1937-1941	18
152	Paris	1938-1944	26
153	Prague	1938-1939	1
154	Rome (Quirinal)	1920-1943	66
155	Rome (Vatican)	1903-1942	7
156	Sofia	1931-1938	1
157	Tirana	1924-1943	6
158	Zagreb	1940-1944	28
159	Special Commissioner Southeast	1944	1
160	Consulates	1845-1944	4270 <sup>9</sup>
161	Miscellaneous Documents		800 <sup>9</sup>

## B) DOCUMENTS NOT ORIGINATING IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

162	Handakten Epp	1900-1945	36
163	Handakten Frank	1918-1945	86
164	Handakten Speer	1936-1945	18
165	Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut	1933-1945	69
166	Alte Reichskanzlei	1920-1933	3665 <sup>10</sup>
167	Neue Reichskanzlei	1933-1945	1630 <sup>10</sup>
168	Präsidialkanzlei	1919-1940	125
169	Chancellery of the Vice Chancellor	1933-1942	168 <sup>10</sup>
170	Office of the Führer's Ad- jutants	1935-1940	328 <sup>10</sup>
171	Party Offices	1930	15
172	Various documents of for- eign origin		50

<sup>9</sup> Estimated figure.<sup>10</sup> Reckoned in files.

